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The South China Sea Reader Papers and Proceedings of the Manila Conference on the South China Sea: Toward a Region of Peace, Cooperation and Progress

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The South China Sea Reader Papers and Proceedings of the Manila Conference on the South China Sea: Toward a Region of Peace, Cooperation and Progress First Manila Conference on the South China Sea: Toward a Region of Peace, Cooperation, and Progress 1 The South China Sea Reader Papers and Proceedings of the Manila Conference on the South China Sea: Toward a Region of Peace, Cooperation and Progress July 5-6, 2011 Manila, Philippines Co-Published by the NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE OF THE PHILIPPINES FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY OF VIETNAM A special edition of the National Security Review 1 2 Editorial Board Dr. Fermin R De Leon Jr, MNSA President National Defense College of the Philippines Ambassador Laura Q. Del Rosario Director Foreign Service Institute Ambassador Dang Dinh Quy President Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam Secretariat/Publication Committee Foreign Service Institute Rhodora M. Joaquin, Eileene M. Arquiza, Edwin S. Estrada, Valerie Ann Jill I. Valero, Dashell C. Yancha-Po, Julio S. Amador III, Ariel P. Bacol, John Marie T. Baguios, Armando R. Bueser, Jr., Maureen P. Licayan, Louie Dane C. Merced, Mary Fides A. Quintos, Virgemarie A. Salazar, Jemimah Joanne C. Villaruel, Carlo L. Santiago National Defense College of the Philippines Rostum J. Bautista MNSA, Prof Christine June P Cariño MNSA, Manmar C. Francisco, Segfrey D. Gonzales, Gee Lyn M. Magante Printed by: GPV Printing Ventures, Co. Copyright 2011 by NDCP, FSI and DAV This volume is a special edition of the National Security Review and is jointly published by the National Defense College of the Philippines, Foreign Service Institute and the Dip- lomatic Academy of Vietnam. The papers compiled herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views and policies of their affiliated governments and institutions. While the NDCP and FSI refer to the area in dispute as the “West Philippine Sea,” they however, deemed it appropriate to adopt the international conference title which used the term “South China Sea.” Comments and suggestions are welcome and may be sent to NSR Publication Office, NDCP Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, with telephone number +63-2-912-9125. First Manila Conference on the South China Sea: Toward a Region of Peace, Cooperation, and Progress 3 FOREWORD n the 4th of November 2002, the ASEAN and Chinese leaders gathered to sign the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the O Conduct of Parties (DOC) in South China Sea then trumpeted as the much awaited breakthrough in the management of disputes in the SCS. This milestone in the history of East Asia diplomacy seemed to have marked a new and encouraging period of warming of relations between and among claimant and non-claimant parties. Raising expectations and bolstering optimism, such auspicious event was largely seen as a positive and bold step toward the eventual adoption of a legally binding code of conduct in Asia’s “maritime heartland.” The ensuing period, however, proved to be as challenging as it was before the adoption of the 2002 DOC. Issues and concerns that were thought to have been settled by the said document crept back into the limelight, slowly putting into question the foundation of trust and confidence painstakingly forged by the signatory parties. Also, the recent months witnessed the seeming renewal of tension in the region, suggesting that the fruits of previous diplomatic negotiations might yet be hanging in a balance. Because of this, a growing number of scholars seem to be gradually drawn more and more into doubting the seriousness and determination of parties to move further ahead into crystallizing previously agreed upon norms and principles. Apparently, the celebrated optimism that characterized the promulgation of the 2002 DOC seems to have tapered off, while the stubborn predicament of “zero-sum” game in the dispute perennially raises its ugly head. Notwithstanding the achievements of bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures in the region, the recently seen flare-ups in rhetoric and in action do not augur well for a region which aspires to become a more coherent community in the years and decades to come. This strategic backdrop and the imperatives for policy reevaluation and reformation almost a decade after the signing of the 2002 DOC provided a strong impetus for the convening of the Manila Conference on the South China Sea on 5-6 July 2011 with the theme “The South China Sea: Toward a Region of Peace, Cooperation, and Progress.” Jointly organized by the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), and the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), the Conference sought to bring 4 Foreword together renowned scholars and practitioners from the Asia Pacific region to discuss issues such as: the security dilemma in the disputed area, relevance of multilateral mechanisms, prospects for cooperation beyond the 2002 DOC, and the geopolitical realities involving claimant and non-claimant parties. We at NDCP, FSI, and DAV all felt the compelling need to facilitate such gathering of well known South China Sea scholars in the hope that academic discussions will contribute meaningfully to the peaceful and harmonious interactions between and among parties and relevant stakeholders. In our capacity as Track II entities, we intended to cast a fresh new look into the dispute and its surrounding circumstances, and bring again to the fore the issues and policy concerns whose strategic implications are becoming more and more visible to the eyes of the peoples of Asia and the world. The South China Sea Reader a compendium of papers presented during the Manila Conference is a tribute to our collective will to nurture an atmosphere of harmony, understanding, and mutual respect in a region that finds itself at the center of occasional rifts and uncertainties. We present this volume as an addition to the wide array of academic resources on the said topic with a desire to further increase the level of scholarship and solidify domestic and international commitments for a secure and stable region. Dr Fermin R De Leon Jr, MNSA President, National Defense College of the Philippines Ambassador Laura Q Del Rosario Director, Foreign Service Institute Ambassador Dang Dinh Quy President, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam 3 November 2011 First Manila Conference on the South China Sea: Toward a Region of Peace, Cooperation, and Progress 5 C O N T E N T S Foreword............................................................................................... 3 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................ 7 II. ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION.................................................................................... 11 Security Cooperation in the South China Sea: An Assessment of Recent Trends Prof. Carlyle A. Thayer, University of New South Wales............................. 13 Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Unconstrained Waves of Tensions Dr. Tran Truong Thuy, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam................................. 41 Geopolitical Analysis of South China Sea Disputes: A Japanese Perspective Mr. Tetsuo Kotani, Okazaki Institute.................................... 59 The July 2010 Hanoi Declaration on the South China Sea Dispute: A New Strategy vis-à-vis an Emergent China? Dr. Renato De Castro, De La Salle University................................................... 64 Beyond the DOC: Guidelines for Military Activities in Foreign EEZs Dr. Mark J. Valencia, National Asia Research Program, National Bureau of Asia Research and Woodrow Wilson Center................................................... 81 Is Time Running Out: The Urgency for Full, Final and Equitable Resolution of the South China Sea Imbroglio Maj. Gen. (rtd) Vinod Saighal, Eco Monitors Society................................... 96 III. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE IN ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS................ 107 ASEAN+1 Regime in the South China Sea: A Review for the Past and A Prospect for the Future Dr. Nong Hong, China Institute, University of Alberta.................................... 109 South China Sea: Taming the Turbulence Mr. Nazery Khalid, Maritime Institute of Malaysia.................................... 126 6 Contents A Multi-Level Approach to ASEAN-China Cooperation in the South China Sea Dr. Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, University of the Philippines............................. 141 IV. LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD: COOPERATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.................................................................... 147 The South China Sea Disputes: Regional Security Implications and Avenues for Cooperation Dr. Carolina Hernandez, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies........ 149 Various Lessons Learned from Various Conflicts and Potential Conflicts Management in Southeast Asia Prof. Dr. Hasjim Djalal, Indonesian Maritime Council...................................... 157 An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Current Maritime Security Frameworks and Mechanisms in the South China Sea Prof. Peter Dutton, China Maritime Institute of the Naval War College............. 171 The South China Sea: Back to the Future Through Cooperation Amb. Alberto A. Encomienda, Dagat Kalinga Alaga, Inc.................................. 182 China’s South China Sea Policy: Claims and Changing Contexts Dr. Li Mingjiang, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.................... 195 South China Sea Dispute Sea of Opportunities? Dato’ Vice Admiral Noor Aziz Bin Yunan, Difense Konsult plc........................... 212 South China Sea Issue in China-ASEAN
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