Documentof TheWorld Bank

FOR OMCLALUSE ONLY

Public Disclosure Authorized ReportNo. 8441

PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT

Public Disclosure Authorized

FOURTHEDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1961-TUN)

MARCH16, 1990 Public Disclosure Authorized

Populationand Human ResourcesOperations Division CountryDepartment II Public Disclosure Authorized ,Middle East and North Afrie~aRegional Office

7hisdocument has a reicteddsbution andmay be sedby recipetsondyInde peforanueof dth offii duties.Its conten may nototherwie be diclosedwithbot Wodd BankauthwoizatW ATC - Apprentice Training Center CFP - Vocational Training Center OFPE - Officer for vocation Training and Employment OPS - Operational Policy Staff PCR - ProjectCompletion Report SAR - Staff AppraisalReport VT - Vocational Training VTC - Vocational Training Center r

Evolution of the scxhanmeRates

At appraisal 02-81 US$ 1 - Dinar .4000 TD 1 - US$ 2.5 Period average 1981 US$ 1 - Dinar .4938 TD 1 - US$ 2.025 U n ~ 1982 US$ 1 - Dinar .5907 TD 1 - US$ 1.692 1983 US$ 1 - Dinar .6788 TD 1 - US$ 1.473 1984 US$ 1 - Dinar .7768 TD 1 - US$ 1.287 1985 US$ 1 - Dinar .8345 TD 1 - US$ 1.198 ea 1986 US$ 1 - Dinar .7940 TD 1 - US$ 1.259

*U 1987 US$ 1 - Dinar .8287 TD 1 - US$ 1.207 1st semester 1988 average US$ 1 - Dinar .8516 TD 1 - US$ 1.174 Estimatedproject's life average 81/88 US$ 1 - Dinar .8333 TD 1 - US$ 1.200 w~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ b

VOl OFIICIALUSEOLY T1E WORLDBANK WashingtonD.C. 20433 U.S.

OPsra' EVhAetia

March 16, 1990

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUU'ECT: Project Completion Report: TUNISIA - Fourth Education Proiect (Loan 1961-TUN)

Attached, for information,is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report: Tunisia - Fourth Education Project (Loan 1961-TUN)"prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Regional Office with Part II of the report contributedby the Borrower.

Attachment

IThidocumeant ha a _u disuibutio an may be udby mci&ts oIn he pfotem*me of th_ ofiew dtiuie Its cononts mayrnot othorEe be dmiscBd witbot Wodd IBankaut |m FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLY

PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT

TUISIA

FOURTHEDUCATION PROJECT (WAN 1961-TUN)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pag2 No.

Preface i Evaluation Summary ii

PART I - Project Review from Bank's Perspective .1 Project Identity. 1 Project Background...... 1 ProjectObjectives and Description. 2 ProjectDesign and Organization. 3 Project Implementation. 4 ProjectResults. 6 Bank Performance. 9 BorrowerPerformance ...... 9 ConsultingServices ...... 9 ProjectDocumentation and Data ...... 10 Project Sustainability...... 10

PART II - ProjectReview from Borrower'sPerspective ...... 13

Objectives ...... 11 OriginalLoan Amount...... 11 The Amendmentdated April 21, 1986 .11 Extensionof Closing Date .11 Delays in ProjectExecution .12 Status of Components.12 Evaluationof Civil Works Components,Conclusions 13 Evaluationof EquipmentComponent, Conclusions 14 QuantitativeAspect of the Project.14 FinancialAspect of the Project.15 Action Plan to FinalizePayments on IBRD Loan TUN-1961.17

Annex 1 - Breakdown of Componants of IBRD- Financed Projects .19 Annex 2 - Quantitative Aspect of Project .20

This document has a restrcted distributionand may be used by recipientsonly in the performance of their officialduties. Its contents may not otherwisebe disclosedwithout World Bank authorization. Table of Contents (cont"d)

PART III - StatisticalInformation ...... 21 Related Bank Loans ...... 21 Project Timetable ...... 21 CumulativeEstimated and Actual Disbursements...... 22 Project Implementation...... 23 Project Costs and Financing...... 25 ProjectResu.ts ...... 26 Status of Covenants ...... 27 Use of Bank Resources ...... 28

Annex I - Comparative Schedule of Implementation .... 30 Annex II - Evolutionof the ExchangeRates ...... 32 PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT rUNISI

FOURTHEDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN1961-TUN)

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) on the Fourth Education Project in Tunisia, for which Loan 1961-TUN in the amount of US$26 million was approved in March 1981. The Loan was closed on December 31, 1988, two years behind schedule. Following a cancellationof US$5 million in April 1986, the reduced Loan of US$21 million was disbursed except for a balance of US$1.8 million which was cancelled. The last disbursementwas made on October 5, 1989. The PCR was jointly prepared by the Population and Human Resources Operations Division, Country Department II, EMENA Region (Preface,Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III) and the Borrower (Part II). Preparation of this PCR was started during the Bank's final supervisionmission in December 1988, and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report and Loan Agreement; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; ana internai BianK memoranda. - it -

PROJECTCONPtETION REPOR

FOURTHEDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN1961-TUN)

EVALUATIONSUMMARY

Objectives

1. The objectivesof the Fourth EducationProject in Tunisiawere:

(i) to increasethe supply of technticalmanpower at skilled worker and lower technician levels through the establishmentof seven new vocational training centers (VTCs) and one apprentice training center (ATC),and the expansionof 13 existingVTCs and 2 ATCs;

(ii) to improve the quality of existing training centers through the re-equippingof four VTCs and the ATC; and

(iii) training related to project managementand specialistservices to assist with long-termplanning.

2. Implementingagency was the Office for Vocational Training and Employment (OFPE), an autonomous organizationunder the umbrella of the Ministry of .abor. A Bank loan in the amount of US$ 26 million was to support this project (paras.2-4).

IJmRalentaLon ExZlerience

3. Loan 1961-TUNwas approved on March 26, 1981 and became effective on November 18, 1981. It experienceddelays in implementationstemming, first, from Borrower/Bankdisagreement on space standardswhich slowed down the architectural design work and all subsequent activities, then the absence of a project coordinator foreseen for the first three years of implementation, and the part-time work of the PIU director. The PIU was rather inexperienced, particularly with procurement procedures and disbursementquestions, but improved its performanceconsiderably over the course of implementation. As an extraneouscomplication, two contractors bankruptedbefore their tasks were completed (para. 11).

4. A Loan Agreement modification in April 1986 cancelled US$ 5 million (19% of Loan funds), increased the civil works disbursement percentagefrom 26% to 50%, and changed the mix of project activities: the ATCs were removed from the list of project institutions(their role to be assumed in part by existingVTCs), and three/twoother VTCs were to benefit from upgrading and extension/newconstruction program. In addition, two mobile training units were included in the project. The diminished Loan was disbursed except for US$1.8 million, and the accounts closed on October 5, 1989, after an extension of the Closing Date from December 31, 1986 to December 31, 1988 (para. 12). - iii -

FLesults

5. The project has led to the establishment of a modern, well equipped vocational training system which is able to offer Its trainses much more practical instructionthan used to be the case in the older and under-equippedfacilities (para. 15).

6. Its impact on the labor market is difficult to assess, as the trade system establishedin accordancewith the Loan Agreement is not yet operational. In addition, the present downturn in economic activities appears temporarilyto disguise the longer-termdemands of the economy for technicalmanpower (para. 16).

Sustainabi_lity

7. The VTCs appear to be running on a tight budget, reflecting the general budgetary austerity. The Government has responded to diminishing demand for training in specific areas (e.g., construction) reflecting the present downturn of economic activities by a temporary consolidation of training programs. On the whole, this realisticattitude and the obvious policy support the vocationalsystem enjoys bodes well for its future. The advisory councils should contribute to a better dovetailing of training programs with the needs of the economy. Finally, the gradual shift of vocationaltraining to a se:toral training concept is seen as achievinga greater degree of program flexibility(para. 25).

Firinzs and Las sp laarn 1 d 8. The project experience confirms, first, the great difficulties in settingup an effectivetrade (or more generally,output monitoring)system and second, the importanceof flexibilityin the institutionalarrangements for vocationaltraining. *1-

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

FOURTHEDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN1961-U)

PART x Prolect Review from Bank's Pergpective-

I. Prolect Identity

ProjectName: Fourth EducationProject Loan Number: 1961 TUN Country: Tunisia Sector: Education Subsector: VocationalTraining

Loan Amount: $26 million - reduced to $21 million in April 1986. Board Approval: March 1981 Effectiveness: November 1981 Original Closing Date: December 31, 1986 Actual Closing Date: December 31, 1988

II. Proiect Background

1. In the 70's, Tunisia experienceda rapid economic growth, result- ing in impressive social gains, particularlyin education. Employment generationto reduce unemployment(around 15% in the late 70's) and absorb the increasing annual additions to the work force were among the main prioritiesof Tunisia'sdevelopment strategy. The 1982-86Plan in prepara- tion at the time of identificationof the Fourth EducationProject defined a strategy of job creation through increased investment in manufacturing industriesand an accompanyingeffort in expandingvocational and technical training to meet the country'sskilled manpower needs, in the context of a lessening reliance on overseas employment for Tunisian workers (by 1979 only about 2% of the Tunisian labor force was working abroad, as compared to about 13% in 1971). - 2 -

2. The Fourth Education Project (US$26 million, FY81) aimed at expanding training opportunitiesfor school leavers, upgrading the skills of the workforce and broadening the range of adult training opportunities. This was to be done through the establishmentof new centers and creation of new sections and the expansion and upgrading of the apprenticeship training scheme. In addition,the project aimed at reinforcingthe insti- tutional and training capacity of the Office des TravailleursTunisiens A l'Entranger, de VEmploi et de la Formation Professionnelle (known as l'Office), the agency responsibl2for vocational training (VT) within the Ministry of Social Affairs.

III. Project Obiectivesand Description

3. Project Objectives: The projectwas designed to:

(a) increase the supply of skilled technicalmanpower in response to regional employment needs through the establishmentof seven new vecational training centers (VTC's) and the addi- tion of new sections to the e-xistingcenters;

(b) improve the quality of vocational training and apprentice trainingby re-equippingpoorly equippedworkshops; and

(c) assist in the development and strengthening of the vocational/apprenticeship training systems through the financingof technicalassistance related to the organization planning, management and evaluation of the Office's opera- tions, togetherwith staff training.

4. Project Components: These objectiveswere to be achieved through:

(a) Construction,furniture and equipmentfor:

(i) seven new vocationaltraining centers;

(ii) a new apprenticetraining center;

(iii) extensionsto 13 existingvocational and 2 apprenticetraining centers;

(b) furniture and equipment for re-equipping four vocational centers and one apprenticecenter; and

(c) technical expertise to assist in long-term planning of the vocational training system, and training related to project management. IV. Project DeaiBn and Orjanizatton

5. By the m'd 70's, the Tunisian authoritiesemphasized the need to make education and training more relevant to the needs of the economy and labor market. With the Third EducationProject, the Bank had endorsed the shift of emphasis from general to technicaleducation. The Projecthelped introduce practical work into grades 5 and 6 by prov!ding workshops for primary schools and the expansion or equipping of some primary teacher trainingcolleges so that they couildtrain practicalteachers for the work- shops. The authorities,however, were increasinglyaware of the need to addresspressing issues such as: (i) lack of coordinationbetween training institutionsand employers;(ii) limited relevanceof training programs to the needs of the labor market; and (4ii) insufficientparticipation of employers in trainingefforts. The Governmenthad started to address this probl m through the creation of advisury councils, with strong local emplo>ar representationfor each so-hooland vocationaltraining center, and regional councils comprisingtrainers/teachers, administrators and employ- ers to provide a broader perspectiveon employmentneeds. 6. In the fall of 1977, the Tunisian Governmentformally requested Bank assistance in the field of vocational training. In light of the implementationproblems the Third EducationProject was experiencingat the time (after loan effectiveness,the Governmenthad reconsideredits educa- tion prioritiesand did not wish to proceedwith the project as appraised), the Bank was reluctantto launch anotheroperation in the educationsector. Moreover,the Third EducationProject provided for a study of the relation- ships between the education/trainingsystem and the job market with the objectiveof establishinga viable employmentpolicy for the 1977-81 Plan, on which the Bank wished to anchor its future assistance.

7. Project definitionand preparationwas a lengthy and intermittent process which spanned over three years (until post-appraisalmission of September 80). This was due essentially to two unrelated reasons, one concerningstrategy, and the other technicaldifferences of opinion. The Tunisian Governmentwas in the process of defining its strategy on voca- tional and apprenticetraining, tackling the issues related to planning, coordinationand future directions. At the same time, Office and Bank staff were identifyingand preparingproject componentswithout concerning themselvestoo much about the relationshipto the overall country strategy on VT. In fact, project appraisal was delayed by nine months at the Minister of Planning'srequest, while the various governmentministries and agencies involvedin the policy formulationfinalized a strategy.

8. Secondly, project preparation was slowed down by prolonged technical discussionsbetween governmentand Bank staff on two matters: workshop equipment costs and space standards for training centers. The Governmentequipment cost estimates,based on French market prices, were substantiallyhigher than the Bank's estimates,based on Bank norms for vocational training and on 1980 prices, likely to be quoted under ICB. Reconciliationof the c nt estimates only occurred during a post-appraisal - 4 - mission. An increase in the loan amount resolved the issue. Lengthy debaves on space standards delayed the preparation of architectural designs,resulting not only in delayedpreparation but in a ons-year imple- mentationde'ay. The debates,however, were not fruitlesssince the agreed space standardswere in fact implemented.

9. These delays could have been, if not entirely avoided, certainly lessened with more careful planning,both on the Bank and the Government's side. But a more lasting impact of the intense focus on technicalissues was the relative neglect.of broader institution building objectives. Although provisionwas made in the project for technicalassistance to the Office, it was mainly targettedfor expertisein procurementand in super- vision of civil works. Limitedprovision (18% of all technicalassistance) was made for expertise in vocationaltraining systems, programs, monitoring and evaluation, and assessment of relevance to labor market. During project preparation,an OPS education advisor expressed concern that this was primarily a hardware project and that 95% of project financing was going to provision of physical facilities,equipment and furniture. No answer is recorded in the project files.

V. ProjectImplementation

10. There were three salient aspects of implementation: (1) substan- tial delays in start up activities and slower than anticipated implemen- tation; (ii) changes in project designs and cancellationof a portion of the lean; and (iii) partial successof the technicalassistance component. These points are discussedmore extensivelybelow.

11. Delavs in Droject implementation. From the very beginning, the project experienced substantial delays (see Annex I for Comparative Implementation Schedule): the lengthy debates on space standards that slowed down the preparationof the project also delayed the preparationof architectural designs, resulting in a one-year postponement of the construction program. Project implementation also suffered from the absence of a project coordinator, an expert from outside the Office's structure to be hired for the first three years of implementation. His terms of reference, presented in a Supplemental Letter to the Loan Agreement,were the following: (i) assure the planning, coordinationand monitoring of all project components (construction,equipment, recruitment and training of VTC trainers and administrativestaff; (ii) organize end rationalize the VT system by analyzing and making recommendationsfor changes on selection, orientationand examinationprocedures, curriculum development and trainer recruitment procedures; and (iii) design and Implementa cost analysis system. Some of the coordinator'sfunctions were ssumed by the project unit, headed by one of the directorsof the Office who, while project director,maintained his other functions. The functions the unit assume'dwere essentiallythose related to the planning and imple- mentation of the constructionand equipmentcomponents. The unit, fairly inexperienced at the start of the project, was understandably fully occupied with the implementationo' these components,a task which was at the core of its terms of reference. Its initial inexperienceresulted in substantial delays in establishingadequate procurement procedures and, later on, an effective reimbursementmechanism. Over time, however, the unit became quite adept in both. One may wonder if there would not have been partial duplicationof assignments,had the coordinatorbeen hired. However, the coordinator'sfunctions pertaining to the software aspects of the project (analysisof selection/orientationprocedures, programs devel- opment and evaluation, and cost analysis of training) were altogether neglected, the nomination of a coordinator(four years into project imple- mentation) remaining a fact on paper only. Again, the limited attention given to the technicalassistance component was felt in this aspect of the project (the project coordinatorwas to be assisted by expertise outside the Office in his assessmentof the VT deliverysystem). The hiring of the project coordinatorbefore the start of project execution may have pre- vented start up delays and facilitatedthe use of technicalassistance. To ensure satisfactory implementation, the Bank should insist that the appointmentof key managersbe a conditionof loan effectiveness. Finally, the bankruptcy of two contractorsalso contributedto the extensivedelays observed. 12. Changes in project design. In April 1986, the Loan Agreementwas amended to: (i) replace the constructionand equippingof the four appren- tice centers with the further upgradingand extensionof three of the VTCs already covered by the Project and the inclusion into the project of two additional VTCs; (ii) increase the disbursementpercentages for civil works from 26% to 50%; and (iii) cancel US$ 5 million, out of the US$ 26 million loan. The Government decided, and the Bank concurred,to utilize existing VTCs to accommodateapprenticeship programs, by keeping the VTCs open after hours and on holidays. In addition, on-site training was encouraged a a more efficient training delivery method, particularlyin remote areas. The funds made availableby the cancellationof the appren- tice centers were utilized to expand and equip two new VTCs workshops and equip two others, in order to enhance teacher effectiveness,often impaired by poorly equipped and inadequate training facilities. These funds were further utilized to purchase two mobile units for training truck drivers and for maintenancetraining. This new aspect of the project reflectedthe interestin flexible,low cost, ad hoc trainingprograms to meet the chang- ing manpower needs of the country. The Bank was confident that the Office could absorb the additional recurrent expenditures, which proved to be true. In countries where labor markets evolve rapidly,project description should be flexible enough to be easily adapted to changing manpower needs (see also para. 16 on the type of facilitiesand training most adapted to evolving labor needs). At the same time, disbursementpercentages for civil works were increasedfrom 26% to 50%, to reflect the actual indirect foreign exchange cost of civil works 'ecently observed in the project - since appraisal,the Tunisian Dinar/US dollar exchange rate had moved at a faster rate than the differential inflation between local and foreign costs. Finally, it was also decided to cancel US$ 5 million (or 19%) of the loan, in light of the favorable trend of the dollar exchange rate as opposed to the currenciesused to purchase equipment. By 1986, the Dinar purchasingpower of the Bank loan had doubled from the time of appraisal. (See page 14 for revisionsto project costs expressedin dollars, reflect- ing favorable exchange rate fluctuation and Annex II for evolution of exchange rates during the life of the project). - 6 -

13. Utilizationof technical assistance. Lack of attention to tech- nical assistance for long-term system developmenthad the effect of TA largelybeing used for alternativepurposes, mainly for the preparationof equipmentlists and for other activitiesrelated to the physical aspects of the project. About 26 months of expert services were used for architec- tural design and for the inventoryand evaluation of the Office's infra- structure azn equipment. An additional 24 months were used in 1988, more as a res.a_ of the formulation of the reform package leading to the Education and Training Sector Loan (FY 89) than in the framework of the Fourth Education Project. In June 1988, the Office'smandate was expanded to include the supervisionof labor market 'ctivitiesand the coordination of all training activitiesin the country. UNDP has designed a technical assistanceprogram to assist the Office in implementingits new organiza- tLonal structure and strengthen its human resources. The program is co- financed by the Bank and is executed by ILO. Finally, foreign fellowships for about 370 persons (both trainers and administrativestaff) were granted under the project. Very little of the Bank's loan proceeds were used for that purpose, however, since the Office had access to various bilateral funds.

14. ProsLet Risk: The Staff Appraisal Report is silent on project risks. It did, however, state that, although the project was the first operationbetween the Bank and the Office, the latter had a core staff of experienced administrators Pnd technicians(presumably competent enough to successfully implementthe pcoject). This assessmentwas overly optimistic as is explained in para. 20. In most SARs, risk assessment is often limited to the physical execution of the project. Particular attention should be given to evaluatingthe risks involvedwith the potentiallack of action on institution building and other 'software' components of a project. The other importantrisk that the SAR could have identified was the unavailability of counterpart funding, a problem which slowed down several other projects at the time. As it turns out, this was not a problem, in spite of the economic downturn the Tunisian economy experi- enced during part of the life of the project. Owing to slow implemen- tation, the demand for counterpartfunds was stretchedout over a longer time frame than anticipated,thus making yearly Government funding of the project much more manageable.

VI. Project Results

15. PhvsicalFacilities: As a result of the project, the VT system of the country now has physical installationsthat are being used for quality training. The project impactedon 26 VTCS run by l'Office,of which 7 were created under the project, 14 were expanded and upgraded, and 5 were reequipped. The expansionof the Office VTC system had an importantimpact on trainingconditions. Where, prior to the project, there had been only four to eight fully equipped training places in a workshop enrolling 16 trainees, there are now 16 well equipped training places. Consequently, traineesreceive much more hands-on training. This overall picture is true for all centers affectedby the re-equippingprogram, although it cannot be quantifiedin the same way for all specializations. * -~~~~~~~~~~~~7-

16. Oualitative Results: The project called for (and made it a covenant in the Loan Agreement) the design of a tracer system and the carrying out of tracer studies for the graduates of each project insti- tution for five years after the first group of traineesgraduated. It also called for the creation of advisory councils,essentially a group of local employers,to ensure close links with industry and the continuedrelevance of training to labor market needs. These advisory councils have been established and are functioningwell: it is with their guidance, among other, that the Office reorients its training programs. They remain, however, a mostly informal and incompletemechanism for following up on graduates' employment and can, at best, provide a limited share of the information the tracer studies were meant to furnish. A formal tracer system was not established. Although not specificallyidentified in his terms of reference, it is in all likelihood one of the project coordi- nator's many tasks which were never carried out. Formal tracer studies were never carried out either. As the table below shows, the relative importanceof trades taught in the project VTCs have evolved over the life of the project and reflect more recent industry needs. This information remains at the level of secondary observation. Detailed studies of graduate outcome are still needed to fully assess the relevance of the training. When discussingthe relevanceof training,the issue of rapidity of responsivenessmust be addressed. The lead time involved in planning and creating new facilities,both in their hardware and software contents, is longer than the pace at which industry needs change. The sectoral training center approach,to be implementedunder the forthcomingEducation and Training Sector Loan, will enable the Office to respond rapidly and flexibly to changing labor market demand: existingVTCs' will be converted into sector dedicated training centers catering to the needs of specific industriesand services. The conversionswill be implementedon the basis of sub-projectsprepared by the Office and industryassociations.

ProductionCapacity of the Office by Spiecialty

Before the urolect At roiect coemletion(a) X Increase Production I of Productien X of durln8 Capacitv Total Camacir Total Imlementation

Metal WorkersI Electriciansl Electronicians 1,074 18X 2,057 21X 922 Building trades 2,833 472 3,527 35S 242 1echanicslAutomotive 328 51 590 61 802 Secretarial 170 3X 579 61 340X Textile & Clothlng 581 10X 605 62 4X Transportation 639 llX 2,224 22X 348X Leather & Shoes 368 62 374 4X 21 Other 47 OX 140 .X ,298Z

T0TAL 6,040 1002 10,096 100X 671

(a) September 1989.

0802g 17. The project also had an impact on the social environment,as expanded and improvedboarding facilitiesin the project institutionshave made it possible for candidatesfrom more remote areas to have access to training and, in some centers, to provide access to girls for the first time 308 young women are enrolled in the VTCs created or expanded by the project today as opposed to about 100 at the start of the project),and to offer overallbetter quality of accommodations.

18. Furthermore,the project resulted in a higher level of qualifica- tion on the part of instructionalstaff. In addition to the 370 overseas fellowshipsfinanced through the loan proceeds and bilateral aid, an in- country training program was organized, mainly to familiarize instructors with the new equipment. The country now disposes of a corps of technically well qualified instructorsthat are self-confidentenough to implementthe changes ahead.

19. The main shortcomingof the project is that it did not meet its institutionbuilding objectives. Thirteenyears of expert serviceswere to be used by the Office to strengthenits role in the planning,coordination, management and operation of VT and in improving the efficiency of its training programs. When the project was revised in 1986, the funds for expert services were cut down by a third, reducing the expert services to about 8.5 years (or 104 months). In the first 6 years of implementation (1982-1987),only 24 months (or 23%) were utilized, exclusivelyon archi- tectural design and inventoryof the Office's buildings and equipment (see para. 13). In 1988, UNDP designed and started executinga technicalassis- tance program to assist the Office implementits new organizationalstruc- ture, and strengthenits human resources. The program is cofinancedby the Bank under the Fourth Education Project and executed by IIO. Although this program clearly meets the institutionbuilding objectives of the project, it was not designed as an attempt to meet these objectivesat the eleventh hour of the project but rather as an indispensablefirst step in readying the Office for the preparationof the Educationand Training Sector Loan.

20. Quantitative Results: 80 workshops were created under the project and an additional 120 were expanded or reequipped. The table in para. 16 shows that student capacity went up 67%, from 6040 to 10100. It assesses the quantitativeimpact of the project on the basis of before and after the project. Any comparison between project targets set for 1986 (anticipated project completion), and project accomplishments in 1989 (actual completion),is not very meaningful: the profile of traininghas changed considerably during the years of project implementation- the configurationof specializations,the duration of courses, and above all the employmentopportunities for graduateshave changed with the evolution of the country's economic situation. The fact that the targets set were not adhered to must be viewed as a positive outcome of the project, reflectinga good grasp of the evolving conditionsand a flexible approach. -9-

VII. Bank Performance 21. Bank performanceparallels the overallproject accomplishment: strengthwith regardto the physicalcomponents, lesser attention on the systemdevelopment features of the project. The all-absorbingand indis- pensableresolution of issuesrelated to constructionand equipment(space standards,workshop cost estimates)during project preparation was done at the cost of the institutionbuilding and trainingassessment components. In its paragraphon risks,the Staff AppraisalReport in fact failedto identifytlhe difficulty the Officewould have in carryingout its first operationwith the Bank, as well as its inexperiencein recruitingthe necessaryoutside expertise. The lightemphasis on the qualitativeobjec- tivesof the projectwas continuedduring the earlyyears of projectimple- mentationwhen the Bank had to assistthe Governmentin resolvingthe obstaclesto a timelystart up (productionof architecturaldesign, exten- sive assistancewith all stagesof procurement).Moreover, over the years (and partlyowing to the lengthyimplementation), the projectwas super- vised by about ten different Bank staff members. Nonetheless, the Bank managed to ensure institutional continuity and approached implementation with flexibility to newly developingsituations (changes in projectdesign to accommodatethe Government'swish to utilizeVTCs for apprenticeship programs, revision of cost estimatesand disbursementpercentages to reflectevolving world financialconsiderations).

VIII. BorrowerParrmance 22. For the most part, the Office'smain strengthsand weaknessesare the same as thoseobserved for the projectand the Bank: overallsatisfac- tory (albeitslow) implementation of the physicalcomponents, lesser atten- tion given to systemdevelopment features. Moreover, the high turnoverin the Bank'sstaff responsiblefor this projectwas matchedby an equally high turnoverin the Office'stop management(five managing directors in the life of the project). The burdenof continuityfalling on the imple- mentationunit coupledwith the desireto overseeall aspectsof project implementationled to a certainconcentration of informationand decisions in the unit. Very littlefeedback was requestedfrom the project'sbene- ficiaries: the trainingcenters' staff and trainees. Little interest, until 1988 at least,seems to have been taken in tracingthe actualemploy- ment outcomesof the Office'sVTC graduates,including the ones from project-financedcenters.

IX. ConsultingServices 23. Consultantswere used at all levelsof projectpreparation and implementation,although in inadequate quantity to fully meet the objectivesof the projectrelated to institutionalbuilding and to the strengtheningof the VT deliverysystem. However,the expertsrecruited performedsatisfactorily in the fields assignedwith the exceptionof architecture,where there was considerablevariation in the qualityof architectural designs and of supervision of construction of VTCs. - 10 -

X. Project Documentation and Rata 24. The legal documents pertaining to the project followed the usual format.Their particularstrength lay in their flexibilityso that they were easilyamended to reflectchanges. Data for the preparationof this ProjectCompletion Report were readilyavailable at the Officeand at the Bank, althoughon the part of the Bank,changes in formatreports over the yearsmade it difficultto establishcoherent time series.

XI. Proiect-8uatainabilLi 25. As a resultof the project,the countrynow has in place a wider network of better equippedVTCs which offer more geographicalequity. Althoughspecialty-specific in their initialdesign, these facilitiesare now being converted into sector-dedicatedtraining centers under the Educationand Training Sector Loan. This conversion makes the centers more responsive to changing labor market demands and should ensure them full utilizationfor the future. In addition,the corps of well qualified technicalinstructors trained under the project should provide higher qualitytraining to new studentsfor years to come. - 11 -

PART II - ProjectReview from Borrower' kegsgective

1. Objectives

Assistance from IBRD requested by the TunisianGovernment since June 1978 (signature of loan agreement May 18, 1981, effective date of loan November 18, 1981, loan opening date June 29, 1982) for the purpose of modernizing, renewing a,nd developing the vocational training system managed by the Office, to enable it to meet the expressedand latent skilledmanpower needs of the country'seconomy.

The draft applicationsubmitted to IBRD comprisesthe following activities,designed to strengthenand developvocational training, including apprenticeship:

- renewal of training equipment - additional training equipment - procurementof equipmentfor new centers - constructionand fittingout of training facilitiesand common facilities

2. Original loan amount (IBRD share in USS millions)

- Civil works 4.6 - Equipment 12.4 - Technical assistance 1.0 - Fellowships 0.1 - Unallocated 7.9 Total 26.0

3. The amendment dated Agril 21. 1986. negotiated and approvedby the two Rarties (OFPP and IBRD in agreementwith the PlanningMinistry) amends the financialstructure of the loan as follows:

- Civil works 7.0 - Equipment 11.0 - Technical assistance 0.6 - Fellowships 0.1 - Unallocated 2.3 Total 21.0

4. Extensionof closing date

To attain the project objectives,IBRD was asked to authorizetwo closingdate extensions(one year each).

First extension

- Closing date: December31, 1987 insteadof December 31, 1986 - Last disbursementdate: June 30, 1988 insteadof June 30, 1987 - 12 -

Seoond extension

- Closingdate: December 31, 1988 instead of December 31, 1987 - Last disbursementdate: June 30, 1989 insteadof June 30, 1988

5. Delays in oroject execution

The two extensionswere requestedto make up for the cumulativedelay in project execution,essentially due to the followingcauses:

5.1 The Fourth EducationProject was the first project executed by OFPE, which had never before been required to executeprojects of such magnitude (lack of experiencein projectmonitoring, engineering, etc.).

5.2 Complexand long-drawnout procurementprocedure (8-12 months between the bid call and the meeting of the departmentalcommission on procurementand signatureof the contracts).

5.3 Slow equipmentdeliveries and acceptance.

5.4 Frequentchanges in key IBRD personnel (four Division Chiefs during project execution).

5.5 IBRD's extensiverestructuring during 1988.

6. Status of comonents

6.1 Civil works

Constructionhas been completedon all centers; all that remains to be done is the finishingwork on the followingcenters:

- GAPSA: (90% executed),probable acceptance March 31, 1989.

- : (952 executed),probable scceptanceMarch 31, 1989. - II: electricity(651 executed),probable acceptance March 31, 1989. (See detailedbreakdown, Annex I)

6.2 Equipment

All the equipmentcontracts have been signed. Deliveriesshould be completedend March-earlyApril 1989. (See detailedbreakdown, Annex I)

6.3 Technicalassistance

It is true that this componentis not emphasized,when compared to other categories,but this is essentiallydue to the fact that the technicalassistance requirements have been met: - 13 -

- through bilateral cooperation (OFPE - AFPA) for management standards; - by an OFPE expert in infrastructureand equipmentevaluation (TOR approvedby IBRD in January 1988). - by a consultingfirm hired to audit the project.

The follo-ingnumbers of OFPE technicianshave done internships abroad each year:

1984 1985 1986 1987 TOTAL 78 126 105 62 371

7. Evaluationof civil works component.conclusions

The initialplanning of the civil works componentwas very rigorous. But, it did not take into account the Borrower'slegal or economic realities, namely:

7.1 The frequent lack of certainconstruction materials on the domesticmarket.

7.2 Inclementweather conditions(wind and rain in winter, excessive heat in summer),which can hold up constructionfor some time.

7.3 Default on the part of certain contractors,causing the borrower to terminateseveral contracts.

The proper course of action would have been either to provide OFPE with a project executionand monitoringcapacity, or to treat all construction contractsas turnkeycontracts, so as to have only one contractorto deal with. The huge number of multi-partycontracts has led to the accumulationof enormousdelays in execution. This is mainly due to the fact that coordinationis becoming more and more difficult,if not impossible. The delays accumulatedby one contractingparty are automaticallypassed on to the next party, resultingin missed deadlines.

7.4 The choice of constructionsites has, for certainprojects, resulted in the need for supplementaryworks that were not foreseeableat the time of the study. Examples are Electronique(construction of a protectiveembankment); JEBENIANA (elevationabove ground zero); SOLIMAN (90 cm of fill for flood control); (groundzero); ENFIDHA.

In future, it would be wise to ensure that the architecturaldesign is compatiblewith the characteristicsof the site (soil analysis,rainfall study, feasibilitystudy).

In conclusion,the option selectedby the borrower,namely the purchase of sites at nominal prices,has been offset by the additional expendituresarising out of the poor choicesmade (e.g. SOLINAN connection water supply by SONEDE: TD31,000;GAMKARTH: connection STEG: TD21,585 DT). - 14 -

8. Evaluationof equipmentcomponent. conclusions

8.1 EguiRmentregisters [cadastresi

The equipmentregisters serving for the preparationof technical dossiersfor the bid proceedingscontain various gaps with respect to the technicalspecifications on certain items.

These gaps have now been remedied in agreementwith the suppliers. This operationtook anywherebetween 15 days and 2 months, quite apart from the large volume of correspondencebetween borrower and supplier. It is recommendedthat in future the item to be purchasedbe describedwith the maximum of technicaldetails.

8.2 Bid aDRraisal

The tardinessin the bid appraisalprocedure was mainly due to the fact that the technicianhandling the appraisalwas not the one who prepared the technicaldossier.

8.3 Methodologvfor lot classification

Followingis the borrower'smethodology:

Homogeneous,inseparable lots, by sector.

The followinghomogeneous lots are used as a basis for the award of equipmentcontracts for the mechanicalsector:

I.Machinery 2. Tools 3. Fitting out

While this methodologyhas the advantageof involvingonly one supplier,it complicatesthe acceptanceprocedure. For a single contract, 4-10 acceptancepoints are scatteredthroughout the Republic,without taking into account the multitudeof contracts,suppliers and lots, hence the need for a huge number of trips throughoutthe country to accept often negligible quantitiesof equipment. In future, it is recommendedthat calls for bids on equipmentcontracts be issued by individualtraining unit, since this will involve a single acceptancepoint, providingthe trainingunit with all of its equipmentand ensuring that its activitiescan all get under way simultaneously.

9. Ouantitativeaspect of the proiect (see Annex II) - 15 -

10. Financialaspect of the project

Evaluationof financialprocedure, conclusions.

For the disbursementof Loan No. 1961 TUN for the Fourth Education Project, IBRD has drawn up a procedureto be adoptedby the borrower (Republic of Tunisia - OFPE) for the withdrawalof loan proceeds.

10.1 Present procedure

For every operationgenerating a withdraws.lof loan proceeds,the borrower should adopt the followingprocedure:

(a) 9xtrationsprior to withdrawalof loan Rroceeds

Prior to any withdrawalapplication, the borrower should first, followingthe chronologicalorder of operations,~.end duplicate copies to IBRD of:

tthe architecturaldrawings (for civil works) and the technical dossiers (for equipment),for approval: - the bid appraisal reports; - comparativetables and selectedreports, to obtain "non objection" ccontracts duly signed as commitmentsagainst the loan.

(b) Withdrawalsof loan proceeds

All withdrawalsare effected throughan official applicationsigned by the borrower'sauthorized representative (OFPE's President and Managing Director).

This application,to be submittedto IBRD in duplicate,should comprise:

- an applicationfor the withdrawalof funds; - a fund withdrawal table; - copies of invoices or accounts; - acceptance slips and reports; - any other necessarydocument in supportof the withdrawalof funds (bank guarantees,summary statements,etc.).

The withdrawalapplications used by the borrower within the framework of this Fourth Project are numbered successively,starting from 1, and are of two types: direct payment applicationsand reimbursementapplications. Differentforms are used for each type. - L6 -

Direct Rayment apglicatiions

This type of applicationis used by the borrower for payments to foreign suppliersfor equipmentand technicalassistance, or for fellowships abroad.

The forms used in this case are those for procedureIII.

bpglicationsfor reimbursement This type of applicationis used for reimbursementof the share of IBRD loan funds that the borrower has advanced to local supplierson IBRD's behalf.

The forms used in this case are those for procedureI.

It should be noted that IBRD replaced the above-mentionedforms in October 1988. The new ones may be used for both types of withdrawal application,which simplifiescorrespondence.

10.2 ProRosalsand conclusions

Use of the Bank's procedurefor the withdrawalof loan proceeds and the internalprocedure for monitoringand managementof the IBRD project has led to two types of difficulty,which have preventedsatisfactory project execution.

(a) Difficultiesinherent in the Bank's procedures

The principaldifficulty encountered in applicationof those proceduresconcerns the grace period grantedby IBRD before the last disbursement(six months after the loan closing date).

This period is unrealistic,in light of possible delays in delivery by suppliers,the fact that some items do not match the order and have to be replaced,the time needed for preparation,forwarding and authorizationof invoicesand acceptanceslips, etc.

The second difficultylies in the conversionof funds committed against a loan in dollars.

While IBRD notifies the borrower of the status of disbursementswith their dollar equivalents,the same is not ture of commitments,which has led the borrower to use an arbitraryrate in making such conversions. - 17 -

With respect to the above gaps, we propose that IBRD:

- extend the grace period (last disbursementdate) from six months to one year; - send the borrower a quarterlystatement of commitmentsagainst the loan, expressedin dollars, to enable the borrower to handle Its commitmentsin relationto the appropriations(since the latter are expressedin dollars).

(b) Difficultiesinherent in the borrower's internalprojLect managementprocedures

The internalprocedures have given rise to certaindifficulties during project execution,namely:

- The existenceof two units handling payments on the IBRD project (FinancialDirectorate, budget unit title II, for dinar payments,and the project unit's bookkeeperfor foreignexchange payments).

This has led to the existenceof two project informationcenters, slow reimbursementsprocedures, and difficultiesin project component evaluation.

It is thereforerecommended that in future the payments on any IBRD project all be handled by the projectunit's bookkeeper,that a specialbank accountbe opened for the local currencycounterpart to the IBRD loan, and that IBRD-financedprojeccs be shown separatelyin the equipmentbudgets for OFPE. - At the EquipmentDirectorate (project execution unit), the authorizationof IBRD project invoicesis handledby a unit also dealingwith the authorizationof invoicesrelating to other projects.

11. Action glan to finalisepayments on IBRD loan TUN - 1961

A steering committeemet on January 4, 1989 (minutesof the same date), chaired by Mr. TaoufikBaccar, to adopt a new strategyfor accepting equipmentgeared to the last disbur3ementdate (June 1989).

It was decided to adopt three methods of acceptancedepending or the nature of the equipment.

(a) Tool contracts

General acceptanceto take place at :heAriana centraldepot.

The acceptanceteam will comprise:

- a DST official (responsiblefor acceptanceand administrative documents)

- a representativeof the supplier - principals,or their representatives,of the centers concerned. - 18 -

(b) Sm*al eauirnienteontg ras

Since start-up can take place at centers similar to (CFP Radfs, CPMAT Ariana, CFP Ben Arous, Ariana centraldepot), the equipmentwill be accepted at one of those locations,by a team composed of:

- a DET official (responsiblefor acceptanceand administrative documents) - a representativeof the supplier - the principals,or their representatives,of the centers concerned - an instructorwho participatedin the technicalbid appraisal.

(c) Contractsfor tools and machinery (requiringassembly and start-up)

Two scenariosare contemplated:

(1) If the tools are to be deliveredseparately from the mac.hinery: acceptancewill take place as in (a) above, while the machinerywill be accepted on the site.

(2) If tools and machineryare coveredby the same delivery, acceptancewill be on the site.

The on-siteacceptance team will comprise: - a DET official (responsiblefor acceptanceand administrative documents) - a representativeof the supplier - bhe principalof the center - the instructorwho will use the tools and machinery.

N.B. An instructorwho participatedin the technicalbid appraisalwill be invited,as necessary,to be a member of the various acceptanceteams. BREAKDOWNOF COMPONENTSOF IBRO-FINANCED PROJECTS

SL. PhIUE Centers Construction Eauiment Nature of Operation X Executed Completion X Delivered Completion Date oate l C.P.M.A.T. ARIANA 100% - 100% - EXT. G.C. & C.E. 2 C.F.P.I.C. ARIANA 100% - 100% - EXT. G.C. & C.E. 3 INST. TEXTILE OEN-DEN 100% - 100% - EXT. G.C. & C.E. 4 I C.F.P.B. BEN AROUS 100% - 100% - EXT. G.C. & C.E. s C.F.P. RADES 100% - 90% Apr-89 EXT. G.C. & C.E. 6 GABESII 100% - 90% Apr-89 NEWCENTER 7 ELECTRONIQUESOUSSE 100% - 100% - NEW CENTER 8 C.P.B.I.M. MDNASTIR - - 100% - COMPT. EQUIP. & C.E. 9 MEDENINE - - 95% Apr-89 COMPT. EQUIP. & C.E. 10 EL JEM - - 100% - COMPT. EQUIP. & C.E. 11 EL GRINE - - 100% - COMPT.EQUIP. & C.E.

12 C.F.P EMFIDHA 96% Apr-89 - EXT. G.C. 13 C.F.P. BEJA 100% - 70% May-89 EXT. G.C. & C.E. 14 MANDIA 100% - 70% May-89 EXT. G.C. & C.E. 15 MISAKEN 100% - 100% - EXT. G.C. & C.E. 16 II SIDI-BOUZID 100% - 70% May-89 EXT. G.C. & C.E. 17 100% - 100% - EXT. G.C. & C.E. 18 C.M.F. SOUSSE 100% - 100% - EXT. G.C. & C.E. 19 C.F.P. GAFSA 95% Apr-89 40% May-89 NEWCENTER 20 C.F.P. SOLIMAN 100% - 95% May-89 NEWCENTER 21 C.M.F. 100% - 100% NEW CENTER 22 III BEN AROUS(SIR KASSAA) 100% - 70% May-89 NEWCENTER 23 DJEBENIANA 100% - SO% May-89 NEWCENTER 24 TABRKA 100% - SO% May-89 EXT. G.C. & C.E. 25 KORBA 100% - 70% May-89 EXT. G.C. & C.E. 26 - - SO% May-49 C.E. 27 ADDENDUM THIBAR - - - May-89 C.E. 28 C.M. ADRTY - - 100% May-89 A.N. 29 MATERIEL BURAUTIQUE - - 100% - A.N.

C.E. = ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT EXT. G.C. = CIVIL WORKSEXTENSION A.N. = NEWPURCHASE - 20 - Annex 2

QUANTITATIVEASPECT OF PROJECT

IBRD NO. 1961-TUN

NO. VOCATIONALTRAINING CENTER SECTION# INSTALLEDCAPACITY

1 C.P.M.A.T.ARIANA 9 130 2 C.F.P.I.C.ARIANA 6 87 3 C.F.P.H. 15 225 4 C.F.P.B. BEN AROUS r 17 225 5 C.F.P. RADES 16 234 6 C.P.B.I.M.MONASTIR 6 84 7 C.F.P. MEDENINE 6 90 8 C.F.P. EL JEM 6 82 9 C.F.P. EL GRINE 8 128 10 C.F.P.B.GABES II 6 96 11 C.N.F TECH. EN ELECTRONIQUE 6 96 SOUSSE 12 C.F.P. ENFIDHA 4 60 13 C.F.P. BEJA 7 105 14 C.F.P. 5 72 15 C.F.P.B.M'SAKEN 5 75 16 C.F.P. 6 90 17 C.F.P. SILIANA 8 120 18 C.F.P. EMPLOIDEDE BUREAU SOUSSE 6 120 19 C.F.P. GAFSA 11 162 20 C.F.P.B. SOLIMAN 7 105 21 C.F.P. EMPLOI DE BUREAU GAMMARTH 12 240 2! BEN AROUS II (EX. MEGRINE) 3 45 BIR EL KASSM 23 C.F.P. II 14 214 24 C.F.P. THIBAR 3 45 25 C.F.P. 3 45 26 C.F.P. MOKNINE 1 15 27 C.F.P. KORBA 3 45

TOTAL 199 3,035

EXISTINGSITUATION 120 1,800 PLUS NEW SITUATION 79 1,235 - 21 -

PART III Statistical[oma£Et ion

1. Related Bank Loans

None of the thre. Bank operations (2 credits and one loan) pre- ceding the Fourth Education Project focussed on vocational training. Rather, they supported Government'sprograms to improve primary and sec- ondary schoolingand teacher training,and to introducepractical work in primary and lower secondarylevels.

The Education and Training Sector Loan, approved by the Board in May 1989, would support the Government'sdevelopment of system-widepolicy changes in the education and training system. With regard to vocational training,the main objectivesare: (i) improvingefficiency of administra- tion of vocational training; (it) improving linkages with productive sectors; (ii) promoting apprenticeshiptraining and dual training; (iv) improvingquality and efficiencyof training programs; and (v) mobilizing resourcesfor training.

2. Project Timetable

Date Date Planned Actual

- Identification May 1978 - ProjectBrief Dec. 1978 - Preparation Jan 1979 - May 1980 - Appraisal mission June 1980 - Loan Negotiations Nov. 1980 - Board Approval 26 March 1981 - Loan Signature Feb. 1981 18 May 1981 - Loan Effectiveness July 1981 18 Nov. 1981 - Loan Closing 31 Dec. 1986 31 Dec. 1988 - Loan Disb. Completion30 June 1987 30 Sept 1989 a)

The loan closing date was postponedby two years and an additional three months were added to the standard 6-monthdisbursement grace period, resulting in an overall project duration extension of 40% for reasons explainedin part I, paragraph11.

(a) The Governmenthas requesteda 3-month extension to the disbur.se- ment grace period (from 6/30/89 to 9/30/89) to allow for the fall disbursementof all committedfunds. - 22 -

3. Cumulative Estimated and Actual DisburseMs

(US$ Million) expectedat as of Disbursement Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 5/15/89 Completionk/

Appraisal Estimate .1 3.5 11.1 19.3 26.0 - - -

Actual .1 1.9 3.2 4.4 7.3 11.0 15.0 18.0

Actual as % of Estimate 100% 54% 29% 23% -.- . . .

Actual as % of revised loan amount a 35% 52% 63% 71% 86%

at Loan amount reducedto $21 million in April 1986

b/ Scheduledfor September30, 1989. -23 -

4. Prolect Implementation

List of CriticalActivities

Appraisal Indicators Estimate Actual

CIVIL VORKS

Completionof site acquisition (N) November 1980 February 1983

Completionof architectural preliminarydrawings (E) December 1980 December 1981 (N) December 1980 December 1981

Completionof bid documents:

1st phase (E) December 1980 September1983 (N) December 1980 February 1981 2nd phase (E) February 1982 October 1984 (N) February 1982 June 1983 3rd phase (N) October 1982 October 1984

Construction start-up:

1st phase (E) January 1982 February 1982 (N) January 1982 February 1982 2nd phase (E) September1982 February 1983 (N) September1982 May 1983 3rd phase (N) July 1983 April 1985

Completionof construction:

1st phase (E) December 1982 November 1988 (N) February 1984 March 1989 2nd phase (E) October 1983 March 1989 (N) November 1984 February 1989 3rd phase (N) August 1985 March 1989 - 24 - FriTURE An UIP

Completion of preliminary lists: (A) December 1980 December 1981 (E) December 1980 February 1983 (N) December 1980 February 1983

Completion of bid documents:

1st phase (A) June 1981 March 1982 (E) June 1981 March 1982 (N) September1982 March 1982 2nd phase (E) January 1982 October 1985 (N) February 1982 October 1985 3rd phase (N) August 1983 October 1985

Completionof delivery:

1st phase (A) January 1983 October 1984 (E) March 1983 October 1984 (N) July 1984 June 1989 (*) 2nd phase (E) January 1984 June 1989 (*) (N) February 1985 June 1989 (*) 3rd phase (N) January 1986 Jure 1989 (*)

TECHNCAL ASSISTANCE

Submissionof program for Bank review December 1980 May 1981

Program start-up February 1981 February 1981

Program completion February 1985 June 1989 (*)

Legn:

(N) - New Institutions(7 VTCs) (E) - Extensions (13 VTCs) (A) - AdditionalEquipment (4 VTCs) (*) - Expecteddate

The apprentice centers component as well as the CFP extension included in 3rd phase and mentioned in the appraisal report have been cancelled. Construction of third phase started up with a delay of almost one year. The main reasons for delays are presented in part I, 5 (i). The unforeseenadditional works (e.g.,electrical transformers) greatly delayed the completionof constructionworks. Delivery of equipmenthas been very slow throughoutthe project. - 25 -

5. Prolect Costs and Financina

A. Prlece Costs (US mI.l)

Anuratsal Estimate Rfevled fa) Actual tb

Foreign Forein Forein Local Exchange Total Lcal Exohaage Tota1 Local Exchange Total Costs Costs Costs COss Costu costs Costs Costs Costs

Construction 12.5 4.6 17.1 6.3 3.1 9.3 6.0 5.5 11.5 Equip. & Purn. 1.7 12.4 14.1 0.9 8.3 9.1 3.0 10.0 13.0 Professional svs 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.7 Experts' eve 0.2 1.0 1.2 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.7 Fellowships 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 Unallocated 5.2 7 1LL 2L4 7I9 ,0. --

Total I=RD 21.0 26.0 47.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 9.9 16.1 26.0

(a) revised as of 1986 when amendments to Loan Agreement were made. (b) projected at project completion, September 1989.

Notes,

Favorable evolution of the US dollar as opposed to currencies used for the project resulted In the ctual total cost of the project and the foreign exchange part calculated Ln US dollars to be slightly more than half of the amount estimated at appraisal. (See para. 12 and Annex II for evolution of exchange rate).

S. Prolect FLnsn=i

Loan Atreement ta) AReisedActual (b)

X of X of Z of X o Xof X of Category: us AM 2 usLaSL1 1B TRD a8IJS n .

1. ilR

Construction 4.6 181 7.0 35X 5.5 31X Equip. & Furn. 12.4 48X 11.0 52X 12.0 672 Experts'svs 1.0 42 0.6 3X 0.5 32 Fellowships 0.1 O 0.1 OX 0.0 OX Unallocated X 9 LA ulZ - - aI

Total IBRD 26.0 1001 552 21.0 100X 702 18.0 1002 692

2. Government 21.0 45S21 9.0 3X8 _1S

TOTAL(1+2) 47.0 100S 30.0 1002 26.0 1002

N1t91 a) US$ 5 million cancelledIn April 1986. b) lt is anticipatedthat $18 out of the $21 million loan will be utilLaed. As of May 15, 1989, $15 million have been dlsbursed. - 26 -

6. ProjectResults

Direct Benefits

Appraisal Estimatedat Full Indicator& Estimate Development

(i) Increaseof additionalannual 4,060 annual output; skilled output from project see table in manpower institutionsabout para. 16 for 5,400; details;

(ii) Qualitative qualitative centersvisited improvement improvement in had adequately of CFP's vocational training equipped workshops through re-equipping poorly equipped workshops in four vocational centers;

(iii) Increase the an increasein the the government apprentice output capacity of policy toward center the apprentice apprenticecenters output system by over 900 has been rethought capacity skilledworkers per and the re- year and qualitative equippingof improvementof apprenticeworkshops existingapprentice (as against VTCs) training through re- has been equipping of subsequently workshops; cancelled;

(iv) Improvement improvedcapacity partiallyachieved. of the Office's for planning and The new Office's planning and coordinating structure (merging coordinating training efforts; vocational training capacity and labor responsi- bilities) should facilitateits planning and coordinating functions. - 27

7. Status of Covenants

Descrintionof Conantveant Status Hire a coordinator,a 3.02 (a) A coordinatorwas procurementspecialist, appointedon a part time and a civil works basis but never specialist. functionedas such. The procurementand civil works specialistswere never recruited.

Instructorsreceive 4.03 (c) InstruLtorsreceive training, working adequate training and conditionsand benefits benefits. comparableto industry.

Establishsystem to 4.04 Local industriessit on assess if trainees are exam panel, hire some of adequately trained and the trainees. Formal find employment related monitoring system is to their training and lacking. Tracer studies furnish to the Bank for a were not carried out. period of five years, starting Advisory Councils with the first group of provide some informal graduates,the results of feedback on graduates' tracer studies. employment.

Establishadvisory 4.05 Councilshave been councilsno later than establishedfor all six months after centers having opening of VTC. completedone school year. More are being organized. - 28 -

8. Use of Bank Resources

A. Staff -InMue (Staffweeks)

Stage of nr9I Mg E8L EMl W I5 mlEu8E UY fl9 SOt&

To AMozlsol D.awtme 43.9 15.3 18.3 77.5

Appmlsal thbrough Boa.d Apprva 13.7 51.5 65.2 bard A4ppvl through Effective"*& 5.1 5.1 suparwivLos - -7 A IL 14.8 83.7

VS&/llL 43.9 29.0 74.9 8.2 9.1 16.3 14.S 12.3 13.7 7.7 1.6 231.5

0802. - 29 -

B Lm aas1a Stage of No. of Days Specialization Types of Proj.Cycle dnntbAOEWPersozns In Field Reprosented Problems Identification 5/78 1 10 EC to Appraisal 6/78 1 14 TE 11/78 3 14 EC,T8,AC 5/79 3 14 EC,TE,AC 9/79 1 10 TE 2/80 3 17 EC,G8ETE

Appraisal 6/80 3 18 EC,T8,AC throughBoard 9/80 4 17 GE,TE,AE,AC Presentation

Board Approval 2/81 2 8 GE,AC through Effect. 6/81 2 19 TE,GE

Supervision 11/81 3 8 CH,GE,AC X.T. 4/82 4 8 CH,GE,TE,AC M.T. 9/82 3 12. GE,AC,EC M.T. 10/82 1 5 CH M.T. 2/83 2 7 CH,AC K.T. 5/83 3 1 TE,AC,EC M.T. 12/83 2 17 GE,AC M.T. 6/84 2 7 GE,AC M.T. 10/85 3 11 (H,TE,AC M.T. 6/86 1 7 AC M 10/86 1 7 AC H 2/87 2 8 AC,GE, M 10/87 2 11 AC,EC N 6/88 1 6 EC M 12/88 1 4 EC M

eggn:

CH - Chief or Deputy Chief of Division; EC - Economist/Operations Officer AC - Architect; AE - Agricultural Educator; TE - Technical Educator; GE - General Educator; T - technicalproblems M - managementproblems

NMt: Time in field in some cases includeswork on other projects. CO4PARATIVESOSEDU OFPMIENATIO

i t 198t t 1982 1 1983 t 1984 1 1985 t 1986 1 its? I 1988 1 1989 1

I C L WORKS t I I PUASE I I t I I I t I I I I I Appraisal estimate I t 1 I Actual I I I I t t I t t I Q1( Arion, I t I .I . I t I I I CFPIC Artna I t I . . .I I I I I INST DM De I I I I ... I I cpn DMArous I I I...... I I I S I I 0113.6 I I t I I I Itttt t CFP Rad * I I ...... I ...... I I CNP Cab a I I t...... I t I I URFA Sousse t t...... t...... t I t I

I PIUSB!! I t I I I t I tf t I Appraisal estImte I t I t I t I t

I Actual I I I It t I t t t I CO Enfdsh I t I I...... I CP 3I. I t I I . . I I I CO Maba i I t t I ...... I ...... tI I OP WBaa I CFP n It . t.t.t... . I ...... I I I CFP Sidl BoutLd I I I ...... I C8P t11aa I t f t t...... t OW Souss I ...... tCFP "gas tttt...... t I or1 80.1.. I t I I.. I.t

t P8lISl Ill I I t t t t t t I Appraisal stisatt I I t t I I I Actual I I t I t t t I I CFP B .nA"" II I I I. . I I CFP Djeban± I I t I I. .I I . I t I ADDITIONALPAS I I t I I I I I 1 t

t CP tabarka I t t I t I. .. t t CIP Iorba t I I t tt. .. I t t t I t t t t t I t IFI nuc, a I tM I PEAm I I I I t I I t t t Appraisal astimate I 1 I I tI t Actual I t .. I I I t t I f PHASE I I I I Appras al stimte It I It t H I Actual I I I I 1 .. t...... I PEASEII I I I t I t t I It I Appraisal estimate I t I I t I t I Actual I I I ...... I ADDITIONAL PASE I I I I I I I I I I I ActuaL I I I . . 1..... t I I I I I It 1 2 - 32 -

-ANNEX I

- - _- _- - (Page 2/2)

3 N

2.4~~~ - 33 -

ANNEXII

zvolutionof the Ixbhange Raees

At appraisal 02-81 US$ 1 - Dinar .4000 TD 1 - US$ 2.5

Periodaverage 1981 US$ 1 - Dinar.4938 TD 1 - US$ 2.025

1982 US$ 1 - Dinar .5907 TD 1 - US$ 1.692 1983 US$ 1 - Dinar .6788 TD 1 - US$ 1.473 n U 1984 US$ 1 - Dinar .7768 TD 1 - US$ 1.287

nU 1985 US$ 1 - Dinar .8345 TD 1 - US$ 1.198 1986 US$ 1 - Dinar .7940 TD 1 - US$ 1.259

1987 US$ 1 - Dinar.8287 TD 1 - US$ 1.207

1st semester 1988 average USS 1 - Dlnar .8516 TD 1 - US$ 1.174

Estimatedproject's lifeaverage : 81/88 US$ 1 - Dlnar .8333 TD 1 - US$ 1.200

Source: "InternationalFinancial Statlsticsn, IMF and WorldBank