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The evolution of Al-Qaedaism Ideology, terrorists, and appeal Edwin Bakker and Leen Boer December 2007 NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CLINGENDAEL CIP-Data Koninklijke bibliotheek, Den Haag Bakker, Edwin and Boer, Leen The evolution of Al-Qaedaism / Edwin Bakker and Leen Boer – The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. ISBN-13: 978-90-5031-122-9 Desk top publishing by: Karin van Egmond Language Editing by: Michael Andrew Berger Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen Clingendael Clingendael 7 2597 VH Den Haag Phone: +31 (0)70 – 3245384 Fax: +31 (0)70 – 3746667 P.O.Box 93080 2509 AB Den Haag E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.clingendael.nl © Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holders. Clingendael Institute, P.O. Box 93080, 2509 AB The Hague, The Netherlands Contents Foreword ......................................................................................................... 1 1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 3 1.1 Basic questions .................................................................................... 3 1.2 ‘Al-Qaedaist terrorism’ defined............................................................. 5 1.3 Outline of this study............................................................................. 6 2. Al-Qaeda .................................................................................................... 7 2.1 Phases in the development of Al-Qaeda ................................................ 8 Predecessors of Al-Qaeda..................................................................... 9 Al-Qaeda as ‘the vanguard’ ................................................................ 11 Al-Qaeda as ‘the base’........................................................................ 11 Al-Qaeda as ‘the maxim’ .................................................................... 12 2.2 Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks................................................................... 14 2.3 Al-Qaeda’s worldwide presence.......................................................... 15 The leadership ................................................................................... 16 Recognized affiliates........................................................................... 17 Self-proclaimed affiliates .................................................................... 20 Inspired by Al-Qaeda ......................................................................... 21 The virtual Al-Qaeda ......................................................................... 22 2.4 A new phase? ..................................................................................... 24 3. Al-Qaeda’s ideology: inside and outside perspectives.................................. 25 3.1 Al-Qaeda’s ideology in its own words ................................................. 26 Al-Qaeda as ‘the vanguard’ ................................................................ 26 Al-Qaeda as ‘the base’........................................................................ 30 Al-Qaeda as ‘the maxim’ .................................................................... 35 3.2 Al-Qaeda’s ideology as interpreted by analysts .................................... 41 The genesis of political Islam and jihadism ......................................... 42 Islam is the prime mover .................................................................... 45 Politics is the prime mover ................................................................. 48 Islam politicized, politics islamized ..................................................... 51 3.3 Al-Qaeda’s ideology: Clear and rather vague at the same time............. 52 Clear and constant elements in Al-Qaeda’s ideology ........................... 52 Less clear elements in Al-Qaeda’s ideology ......................................... 53 4. The buffet from which Al-Qaeda ............................................................... 55 4.1 Socioeconomic and political stagnation .............................................. 56 4.2 History’s golden ages and traumas...................................................... 57 4.3 A culture of powerlessness, rancour and distrust ................................. 58 4.4 The concept of a clash of civilizations ................................................. 59 4.5 Western modernity and universalism .................................................. 60 4.6 An extremely rich buffet..................................................................... 62 5. Al-Qaeda’s appeal to its outer circles and Muslim masses........................... 63 5.1 Inner and outer circles ....................................................................... 63 5.2 Al-Qaeda’s relationship with affiliates and inspired jihadist groups and individuals ....................................................................... 65 Recognized affiliates........................................................................... 65 Global salafi fighters........................................................................... 67 Self-proclaimed affiliates .................................................................... 69 Groups and individuals inspired by Al-Qaeda ..................................... 69 Jihadi Terrorists in Europe ................................................................. 70 Comparing groups ............................................................................. 70 5.3 The grassroots ................................................................................... 72 Al-Qaeda’s practice alienates Muslim public opinion .......................... 72 5.4 Al-Qaeda’s next generation ................................................................ 73 6. Concluding remarks .................................................................................. 75 6.1 What makes Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaedaism tick? .................................... 76 6.2 Has Al-Qaeda been successful?........................................................... 79 6.3 Exposing and exploiting the weaknesses of Al-Qaeda and Al Qaedaism ...................................................................................... 84 6.4 Recommendations for further research ............................................... 85 7. References.................................................................................................. 87 About the authors .......................................................................................... 96 Foreword For the past six years, the phenomenon that is Al-Qaeda has been the subject of intensive study, and many publications, in all realms of today’s global landscape: politics, government (not in the least by its intelligence and security services), international co-operation, non-governmental circles, journalism, science and academia. So when Edwin Bakker and Leen Boer started on their work on “The evolution of Al-Qaedaism”, it seemed a tall order indeed to write something meaningful and original, adding value to what we already know about Al-Qaeda and its terrorists. The reader will obviously judge for her- or himself, but to me this booklet has succeeded in bringing something useful to the crowded landscape of thoughts, speeches, articles and books on Al-Qaeda. If Al-Qaeda can be described as a dune, ever changing in form, location and nature, the present publication certainly can be described as beach grass, giving its reader, in a very concise yet detailed ways, at least some grip on this phenomenon. It gives the beginning reader on the subject useful information on the origins, motivations and manifestations of Al-Qaeda and the terrorists behind it. At the same time, it is a useful reference work for those working on terrorist issues on a daily basis. Its appearance, moreover, is very timely: events in the recent past in Denmark, Germany, Algiers and likely also Ankara have shown that unfortunately Al-Qaeda is by no means a thing of the past, but has the nature to 1 adapt and regroup itself, networking with ostensibly more autonomous groups or terrorist cells around the world. In its core the message of Al-Qaeda is about violence, oppression, domination and power, irrespective of Al-Qaeda as the vanguard, the base or the maxim. Understanding this phenomenon better will help us fight it and preserve our freedom and our other values. The present publication is an important contribution to this process. Onno Kervers* The Hague, October 2007 * Mr. Kervers is head of the Terrorism and New Threats Unit, Political Affairs Department, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 1. Introduction 1.1 Basic questions More than six years after the attacks on the United States, Al-Qaeda is still perceived by many as one of the most important threats to the security of the West, most notably to the United States. In September 2001 it was obviously a very serious physical threat to security. In the years following these catastrophic events, Al-Qaeda has not managed to repeat a deadly attack that has been anywhere near the scale of ‘9/11’. This has partly been the result of the ‘Global War on Terror’, including the fall of the Taliban regime
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