Chad: Powder Keg in the East

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Chad: Powder Keg in the East CHAD: POWDER KEG IN THE EAST Africa Report N°149 – 15 April 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE SPECIFIC POLITICAL FEATURES OF THE CHADIAN EAST................... 2 III. THE DYNAMICS OF TODAY’S VIOLENCE............................................................. 5 A. LOCAL VIOLENCE ........................................................................................................................5 1. Dar Tama .....................................................................................................................................5 2. Dar Sila ........................................................................................................................................7 3. Ouara............................................................................................................................................9 4. The failure and distortion of local conflict management structures...........................................10 B. REGIONAL AND CROSS-BORDER DYNAMICS .............................................................................12 C. THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND REBEL FRAGMENTATION.14 1. N’Djamena: the manipulation of local militias and patriotic language .....................................14 2. The ethnic polarisation of the rebellion .....................................................................................16 IV. PEACEKEEPING: AN ASSESSMENT ....................................................................... 18 A. EUFOR/MINURCAT...............................................................................................................18 B. MINURCAT: THE NEW MISSION AND THE PROBLEMS THAT IT FACES .....................................20 V. DEFUSING THE POWDER KEG ................................................................................ 22 A. A REGIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE FOR THE EAST .....................................................................22 B. RELAUNCHING THE DAKAR PROCESS AND REINFORCING MINURCAT....................................24 VI. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 25 APPENDICES A. MAP OF CHAD .................................................................................................................................26 B. MAP OF EASTERN CHAD .................................................................................................................27 C. THE SYRTE AND DAKAR AGREEMENTS AND THE 13 AUGUST 2007 PLATFORM................................28 D. ABBREVIATIONS ..............................................................................................................................31 E. ABOUT INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...........................................................................................32 F. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2006.....................................................33 G. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................35 Africa Report N°149 15 April 2009 CHAD: POWDER KEG IN THE EAST EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Eastern Chad is a powder keg with potential to desta- For more than five years, the Déby regime has instru- bilise the entire country as well as neighbouring states mentalised the troubles in eastern Chad in order to and worsen the already dire humanitarian situation. perpetuate itself. Déby has been able not only to divide Local conflicts based on resource scarcity have been his political opponents at the local level in the East, exacerbated by national and regional political manipu- but also to limit the political space for his adversaries lation. The population has already suffered enormously, at the national level. His strategy has had two phases. from the domestic Chadian disputes, the Darfur crisis During the first, in 2004-2005, the government tried and the proxy war between Chad and Sudan alike. and failed to consolidate the support of its Zaghawa The two governments, with support from their inter- ethnic base. Following splits among the Zaghawa, Déby national partners, should resume implementation of stoked the historical mistrust between the Zaghawa the Dakar Agreement, but a conference specifically and Tama ethnic groups in Dar Tama. He claimed that dedicated to the conflict in eastern Chad should also the Front uni pour le changement (United Front for be organised in order to allow local and national Change, FUC), the main coalition of rebel groups at actors to find solutions to the domestic causes of the the time, was an alliance between the Tama and the crisis. This conference should be integrated into the Janjawid of Darfur ill-repute and had been armed by existing structures of the peace process in Chad. Khartoum to eliminate the Zaghawa on both sides of the border. To the international community, he depicted Chad’s successive regimes have failed to ensure the the FUC as the “Chadian-armed right hand of the well-being and security of the population in the East, Sudanese Islamist regime”, a characterisation that was thereby fuelling mistrust of the central government. In widely accepted, given the many Janjaweed attacks order to counter armed opposition groups, the regimes against Sudanese refugees in Chad. first of Hissène Habré and now of President Idriss Déby have used a divide-and-conquer strategy, pitting During the second phase, from 2006 to the present, ethnic groups against one another. Nevertheless, east- the government has tried with limited success to win ern Chad was relatively stable until 2003, despite a the allegiance of the Dadjo ethnic group in Dar Sila tense political climate and sporadic bloody clashes. by providing support both for existing Dadjo self- The humanitarian and security problems that have defence groups and for the creation of new, mostly shaken it since then are unprecedented, with spillover Dadjo militias. This support is supposed to protect from the Darfur crisis aggravating pre-existing inter- civilians from Janjawid attacks, but its real purpose is ethnic confrontations and strengthening cross-border to enlist the Dadjo in fighting Chadian rebel groups. intercommunal loyalties. In turn, rebel leaders have used the crisis as a conven- ient political justification for settling scores with Déby. Large-scale internal displacement and a massive influx Sudan has exacerbated the instability in the East by of Sudanese refugees have upset eastern Chad’s demo- supporting virtually all the rebel groups, even though graphic balance and intensified the struggle for re- they are strongly divided along ethnic lines. sources. Both the Chadian government and rebel groups have armed their supporters, leading to blood- The international community has had a pair of peace- ier banditry and bloodier inter-ethnic conflicts that keeping missions on the scene since February 2008 to often pit farmers against cattle breeders and making alleviate spillover effects of the Sudanese conflict into the work of humanitarian workers increasingly diffi- eastern Chad: a European Union force (EUFOR) and cult. The central government has systematically co-opted the United Nations Mission in the Central African for its own political purposes traditional mediation Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). However, neither and conflict management mechanisms, such as diyah, significantly improved the security situation. On 15 the compensation due for shedding blood. March 2009 MINURCAT took over the responsibili- ties of EUFOR but with a mandate that, like those of Chad: Powder Keg in the East Crisis Group Africa Report N°149, 15 April 2009 Page ii its predecessors, is limited to reducing insecurity in agree on a sustainable ceasefire, define assembly camps for refugees and internally displaced persons points and create a joint military commission. (IDPs) and the surrounding areas and does not in- 5. End any support for Chadian militias as well as, in clude, as it needs to, promoting a political process that accordance with the Dakar Agreement, for Suda- treats the Chadian roots of the crisis. nese armed groups and work towards normalisa- The international community should end its head-in- tion of bilateral relations with Sudan. the-sand attitude and deal with the root causes of the crisis by putting pressure on the Chadian government To Chadian Rebel Groups: to organise the conference on the conflict in eastern 6. Agree to a long-lasting ceasefire and resume, Chad cited above. That conference should include under UN oversight, dialogue with the Chadian representatives of the central government, rebel groups, government on the basis of the Syrte Agreement customary leaders and opposition political parties. It and support the holding of a peace conference on should examine the fundamental political causes of eastern Chad. the instability in the East and put in place an adequate framework for dealing with them. MINURCAT should To the Government of Sudan: be mandated to organise the conference and act as a neutral body for selecting many of its participants. 7. End support for incursions and armed attacks by France, which has reinforced Déby without helping Chadian rebels operating from Sudanese territory the Chadians to find a durable solution to the crisis,
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