sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 9 February 2008 Echo effects Chadian instability and the Darfur conflict
n 2 February 2008, a force of emerged in eastern Chad: following The on-again, off-again Chadian around 4,000 fighters from the arrival of more than 200,000 Suda- rebellion has flared up since the O the three main rebel groups nese refugees, janjawid militia similar failed October 2007 peace deal in Chad—Union des forces pour la to those in Darfur contributed to the between Déby’s regime and the démocratie et le développement displacement of a further 170,000 principle Chadian rebel groups. (UFDD), UFDD–Fondamentale Chadians in 2005 and 2006. An addi- The Sudan-supported attack on (UFDD/F), and Rassemblement des tional 30,000 Chadian refugees have N’Djamena, and the bombing cam- forces pour le changement (RFC)— fled back across the border into Darfur.1 paign waged by Chadian forces reached the Chadian capital, N’Djamena. Deepening Chadian instability is against Chadian rebel bases inside Supported by Khartoum, they had connected to complex interlocking fac- Darfur, have placed further pressure come from West Darfur less than a tors arising in both Chad and Sudan at on fragile Khartoum–N’Djamena week before, crossing the border local and national levels. These include relations. around Adé, south of El Geneina. localized ethnic conflicts exploited by the Threats by the main Chadian rebel They had then driven quickly towards Déby regime; long-standing Chadian groups against the deployment of the capital, avoiding the government opposition to Déby’s repressive admin- peacekeepers, together with confu- forces concentrated in the east and istration and the slow pace of democra- sion over the peacekeeping mandate finally coming up against them around tization; and the use of armed proxies and the roles and responsibilities of Massaguett, only 50 kilometres north- by both Khartoum and N’Djamena. contributed troops, raises the like- east of N’Djamena, on 1 February. This Issue Brief describes the evolu- lihood of violence and insecurity, After an hour of fighting, the Chadian tion of the current crisis. Recent devel- and places humanitarian operations Army, and President Idriss Déby him- opments only make sense when cast in jeopardy. self, had to retreat to N’Djamena. After against ethnic and political power Though largely ignored by the inter- 17 years in power, Déby’s regime was struggles in Chad and Sudan that date national community, bilateral diplo- thought lost by many people in the back to the 1990s. The Brief also con- macy and international pressure rebel and government forces, the siders in particular the emergence of are essential to restoring security civilian population, and the interna- rebel groups and proxy militias since the to Chad. tional community. But he and his end of 2005, and the many challenges forces held out, thanks largely to his facing the deployment of United superior arsenal, including tanks and Nations–African Union and European Gradual collapse: bilateral helicopters. Union peacekeepers. The attack represented perhaps the relations 1990–2005 The Issue Brief finds that: lowest point so far in the deepening The present instability in Chad has Chad–Darfur crisis, the root causes of Proxy forces supported by both deep roots. President Idriss Déby which persist. President Déby has faced N’Djamena and Khartoum are overthrew his former mentor Hissein insurrections almost since the day he increasingly beyond the control Habré in 1990 from a base in Darfur, came to power in 1990. But these rebel- of their masters, and pose serious where he had fled in 1989 after the lions have become more organized and risks to both. These militias are persecution of his ethnic group, the stronger in recent years, due in part to integrated into local ethnic and Beri. Habré was supported there by assistance from Khartoum. Predict- political conflicts, and limit the the Sudanese Beri, and by Omar al- ably, Chad has retaliated by becoming capacity of Chad, Sudan, or the Bashir, who had recently seized power increasingly involved in the Darfur international community to stabi- in Sudan. More widely known by their conflict. Echoes of Darfur have since lize the region. Arabic name of Zaghawa,2 the Beri
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 1 straddle the Chad–Darfur border. based Chadian opposition elements For its part, Khartoum received anyone Crucially, Déby and a number of the into the janjawid.8 Primary among them who might hurt the Chadian regime, main Darfur rebel leaders are Beri.3 were Arabs, themselves former sup- including the Bideyat (among them Since Déby became president, civilian, porters of the Conseil démocratique close relatives of Déby), who gradually military, and economic power in Chad révolutionnaire (CDR) (the main his- joined the rebellion. In May 2004 Déby has been consolidated within the Beri torical Chadian Arab rebel group), as escaped an attempted putsch fomented community, and particularly within well as the Tama, traditional enemies by soldiers from within his own ethnic his own sub-group, the Bideyat, and of the Beri.9 When these groups were group. Since then, and particularly his own clan, the Kolyala.4 not fighting alongside the Sudanese since the end of 2005, desertions have Throughout the 1990s Déby was a army in Darfur, they launched periodic multiplied. But, while deserters were loyal ally of the regime in Sudan. He attacks on Chadian territory. leaving to join the rebels in Darfur in consistently refused to supply aid to Whether Khartoum wished to desta- 2003, they are now choosing anti-Déby Sudanese rebels—whether from Darfur bilize the border region or install a rebel movements within Chad sup- or South Sudan—despite requests to puppet regime in Chad is not clear. ported directly by Khartoum. do so since the early 1990s.5 But from From 2004 onwards, opponents of the In 2004 Khartoum started asking 2003 he was unable to stop the two regime in Chad streamed into Sudan in the numerous rebel Chadian factions 10 rebel movements in Darfur, the Sudan the hope of winning popular support. to unite. From 2005, Déby began a rap- Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), from using Chad as a rear base, recruiting Chad M editerra nean Sea LIBYA combatants even among the Chadian Republican Guard (a pillar of his re- gime) and garnering support among CHAD the Chadian Beri, including those close to the government. In March and April N’Djamena
2003, Déby sent Chadian troops to fight Gulf of the SLA and the JEM inside Darfur. Not Guinea surprisingly, however, Beri soldiers from Chad showed little inclination to NIGER fight against other Beri and gave the Darfurian rebels advance warning. BORKOU-ENNEDI-TIBESTI In March 2004, Déby served Khar- toum by creating a dissident group within the JEM (the National Move- ment for Reform and Development, or NMRD), which secured a short-lived Bir Kalaït NORTH ceasefire agreement with Khartoum in Kariyari DARFUR December 2004.6 He managed not only KANEM WADI FIRA CHAD Dar to weaken the JEM, but also to recast Guéréda SUDAN Tama Hadjer Morfaïn himself as a mediator for the Darfur BATHA el-Fasher conflict. On 8 April 2004, he hosted the LAC Abéché L. Chad Adré Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement El Geneina OUADDAÏ between the Government of Sudan, HADJER-LAMIS WEST Goz Beida DARFUR Nyala the SLA, and the JEM. Very quickly, NIGERIA N’Djamena Dar Sila however, the Chadian mediation lost CHARI- credibility among both the rebels and BAGUIRMI GUÉRA Am Timma Tissi SOUTH DARFUR the Sudanese government due to its MAMAYO-KEBBI SALAMAT ESEST perceived partiality, and the agreement 7 was violated by both sides. MAYO-KEBBI TANDJILÉ MOYEN-CHARI OUESTST International boundary Concurrently, Déby’s inability to LOGONE prevent those close to him from sup- OCOCCIDENTALCIDENTAL Region/state boundary MANDOUL National capital porting the Darfur rebels weakened LOGONE CAMEROON ORIENTAL Regional capital his credibility among power-brokers Other town in Khartoum. In response, starting in 0km200 Military base 2003, Khartoum incorporated Darfur-
2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 9 February 2008 prochement with Darfur rebel groups (SLA–Minni Minnawi and JEM), in Khartoum has consistently tried to unite the various exchange for their commitment to aid in fighting Chadian rebels on Chadian Chadian rebel factions, with only limited success. soil. The situation deteriorated rapidly. An attack on the border down of Adré on 18 December 2005 by the Rassemble- ment pour la démocratie et les libertés as a mediator. On 26 July 2006, an Meanwhile, attacks on Chadian (RDL), a Chadian rebel movement made agreement was signed in which each territory by janjawid with both Suda- up of Tama led by Captain Mahamat government agreed not to give refuge nese and Chadian elements resumed in Nour Abdelkarim, marked a turning to the others’ rebels and by 8 August the south-eastern department of Dar point. Déby now realised that Sudan the two countries had normalized Sila. Fighting also erupted between was decisively supporting Chadian their diplomatic relations. By the end these elements and the Darfur rebels. rebels against him. While the rebels of the month, they agreed to sign a The janjawid operating in Chad had did not manage to take Adré, the raid framework agreement recording the previously been seen only on horse- allowed Mahamat Nour to display his normalization of their relations ‘as back, but by October 2006 they were strength and later assume the leadership friends and good neighbours’, though also seen riding in cars, most likely of the Sudan-supported rebel coalition, many close to the process felt the tem- supplied by Sudan or by Chadian rebel the Front Uni pour le Changement porary thaw was unlikely to last. groups. The janjawid also frequently (FUC).11 From this point onwards Déby The agreement was indeed short- wore Sudanese uniforms, and identity actively supported the Darfur rebels. lived, but it was the first bilateral cards of the Sudanese army were found attempt that yielded any real impact on on those killed in the fighting.20 the ground. Déby requested that the Many of these late 2006 attacks by Intensification of a proxy Darfur rebels seeking sanctuary leave Sudanese-backed Chadian rebels were war: December 2005– Chad, and some complied.16 Meanwhile, a prelude to a much larger offensive. the Chadian rebels based in Darfur By 22 October, the Union des forces pour October 2006 returned to Chad, but with the clear la démocratie et le développement The strategy in Khartoum was to bring intention of rapidly resuming the offen- (UFDD), a new coalition formed that the various Chadian rebel factions sive as soon as possible. By the end of same morning, directly attacked Goz into the FUC, placing them all under the rainy season (July to September), Beida, the capital of Dar Sila. On the Mahamat Nour. Like many of the key rebels and janjawid independently re- following day, the UFDD attacked Am players in the Darfur conflict, Mahamat sumed attacks within Chad, and the Timma, the capital of the neighbouring Nour has long worked for Khartoum. bilateral agreement collapsed. As the department, Salamat. These surprise He served as a Sudanese intelligence year drew to a close, Darfurian rebels attacks enabled the Sudanese govern- officer in Western Upper Nile and as had reason to expect Chad to support ment to make another attempt to form janjawid leader in West Darfur, where their cause once again.17 More omi- a coalition of all Chadian rebel groups he recruited troops within his Tama nously, the failure of the agreement to replace the failing FUC. This second ethnic group for the Sudanese Popular potentially signalled that both the Suda- effort to create unity was triggered by Defence Forces (PDF).12 In the event, nese and Chadian regimes were losing the return of two veteran soldiers the FUC was short-lived, though its control over their proxies. from the earlier Chadian insurrection: one significant attack came alarmingly Military victories by the Darfur Acheikh Ibn Oumar Saïd, an Arab and close to a major victory. In April 2006 rebels served to consolidate their sup- former leader of the CDR, who was an FUC column moved directly on port from N’Djamena. On 7 October alternately a minister and a rebel under N’Djamena, where it was only defeated 2006, for example, the National Redemp- all regimes since 1979; and Mahamat at the last minute on 13 April due to tion Front—a newly created coalition Nouri, a Goran from the Anakazza support from the French—and to the of rebel groups opposed to the Darfur sub-group, like Hissein Habré. Nouri FUC’s poor preparation. At the same Peace Agreement—attacked the Suda- had been a minister under both Habré time, the Chadian armed forces and nese base of Kariyari on the border with and Déby.21 the JEM13 pushed other rebel forces Chad, opposite the Sudanese refugee The UFDD incursions were intended back from Adré.14 camp of Ouré Cassoni.18 The disman- as a preparation for Mahamat Nouri to Amidst accusations of voter fraud, tling of the base served the interests of assume the leadership of a wider coa- Déby was re-elected head of state in N’Djamena. In fact, Darfur rebels were lition. A short while later a meeting of May 2006.15 He moved quickly towards actively supported by being permitted the various rebel factions and their a rapprochement with Bashir, using to cross into Chadian territory and re- Sudanese backers was held in Geneina, Libyan leader Muammar al-Gadhafi main there before and after the attack.19 West Darfur, with a view to extending
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 3 the base of the UFDD. But the UFDD Goran communities that had settled Abuja agreement in May 2006, the failed to bring many of the most impor- in Dar Tama over the previous 30 years Chadian Arabs, like many Darfurian tant groups on board, including the following successive droughts.25 Beri ones, have increasingly lost confidence Tama core of the FUC, which was faith- militia responded with acts of violence in Khartoum.28 Prominent Arab per- ful to Mahamat Nour. In May 2007, against Tama civilians. sonalities in the Chadian regime, such the UFDD also suffered the desertions Déby’s generous rewarding of Ma- as the former minister of defence and of Acheikh Ibn Oumar and Abdelwahid hamat Nour, a Tama whose men were now governor of the Ouaddaï region, Aboud Makaye, who took Arab mem- killing Beri, initially alienated his own Bichara Issa Jadalla, are encouraging bers with them to found the breakaway people. More Beri began to join the Chadian Arabs in Darfur to leave UFDD–Fondamentale. Thus, this sec- Chadian opposition. By mid-2007, Khartoum’s side. As a Mahariya Awlad ond unification effort looked likely to relations between Déby and Mahamat Mansur Arab, Bichara is in touch with dissolve as quickly as the first. Nour cooled when rumours circulated prominent janjawid leaders in Darfur, that he might attempt a coup d’état. beginning with members of his tribe On 1 December, after ex-FUC forces in such as Mohamed Hamdan Dogolo Ethnic divisions Dar Tama resisted government efforts ‘Hemeti’, another Mahariya Awlad Since the beginning of his rule, Déby to disarm them, Déby dismissed him Mansur of Chadian origin, who has dealt with rebellions through a and arrested the Tama sultan Haroun recently turned against Khartoum.29 combination of repression and selective Mahamat, one of the most respected Thus N’Djamena and Khartoum incentives. He rewards those who return traditional leaders in eastern Chad. are competing for Chadian Arabs, and to him with money and status: countless Mahamat Nour took refuge in the not only those who left Chad decades former rebels in Chad have become Libyan embassy in N’Djamena. Within ago. Throughout 2007, Déby called back ministers from Abbas Koty (Zaghawa) just a few months, then, Déby had given the Arabs to his regime, promising to Moise Ketté (Southerner) and Maha- up his risky alliance with the Tama. them amnesty for any crimes they had mat Garfa (Tama). (Though the first Playing further on ethnic rivalries, committed and offering the same incen- 22 two were later killed by the regime. ) Déby also vilified Chadian Arabs by tives as Khartoum.30 This policy began Even before the emergence of the UFDD, expelling certain Arab ministers from to have an effect when the main Arab rumours were circulating that Maha- the government—in particular Rakhis rebel group, the Concorde nationale mat Nour, in disgrace in Khartoum Mannani, a former CDR leader—and, du Tchad (CNT), rallied to support over the failure of the FUC, might re- more importantly, launching a cam- N’Djamena in December 2007. Among turn to Déby’s fold. In February 2006, paign denouncing them as janjawid the CNT’s reasons for changing sides with Libyan support, he did precisely and ‘mercenaries’ in the pay of Khar- was the fact that Khartoum had made toum.26 His strategy has apparently that and was rewarded with an unu- clear it did not want an Arab to rule been to present himself as a pro-Western sually important gift—the position of Chad: first because Chadian Arabs bulwark against a Sudan that seeks to minister of defence. could then support Darfurian Arabs Mahamat Nour came with consid- ‘Arabize’ and ‘Islamize’ the whole opposed to Khartoum, and second erable leverage in the form of 4,000– region. But denouncing Chadian Arabs because it would strengthen the argu- 6,000 fully armed men.23 They were in this way has increased the risk that ments of international activists denounc- supposed to be assimilated into the the existing gulf in Darfur between ing Khartoum’s supposed plans to Chadian Army, but they refused to mix Arabs and non-Arabs will be replicated ‘Arabize’ the region.31 Since 2005, Khar- with Beri soldiers or to be disarmed. in Chad.27 toum’s preference for Chadian leader- Concentrated in their homeland of Dar So far, this has not happened, partly ship has thus been a non-Arab—first Tama, they operated as a Tama militia due to Arab dynamics. In Darfur, the Mahamat Nour, then Mahamat Nouri there, carrying out acts of violence many Chadian Arabs who left for —in spite of the inability of either to against civilians from other ethnic Sudan several decades ago were given unite the Chadian rebels. groups, particularly the Beri. They or promised local power, wealth, attacked Sudanese Beri who had taken land, and development assistance by refuge in the Kounoungou camp in Dar Khartoum, in exchange for forming 24 Splintering coalitions: Tama, and also invaded Beri and the bulk of the janjawid. But since the October 2006–present Unable to bring the rebels together under one banner, Khartoum appeared Khartoum’s reluctance to support Chadian Arab rebels to ease off its proxy support of Chadian armed groups in early 2007. Even after in their struggle has caused some to return to Déby. an incident in April by pro-Chadian forces in Foro Boranga, just across the
4 Sudan Issue Brief Number 9 February 2008 border in Sudan, which resulted in transitional prime minister chosen by pour la renaissance nationale (FPRN) the deaths of Sudanese policemen,32 the rebel movements, and the organiza- of Adoum Yacoub, one of the smaller Khartoum resisted retaliation. In May, tion of a round table that would include rebel groups not party to the Tripoli Chad and Sudan signed a new agree- the official opposition with a view to agreement, attacked the area of ment in Saudi Arabia, very similar to holding new elections.33 These open Tissi on the border with Darfur and that of July 2006, once again making a grievances and the ongoing lack of trust the CAR. commitment to expel their neighbour’s in Déby proved to be serious enough— Armed violence persisted into rebels. As before, the rainy season and the Libyan and Sudanese commit- January 2008, and the Chadian Army marked an uneasy truce. ment to peace weak enough—for the responded with the aerial bombing of Under pressure from Khartoum, rebels to withdraw from the agreement, Chadian rebel bases south of Geneina, the Chadian rebels accepted negotia- expressed through a chain-reaction of in Darfur. Khartoum interpreted these tions with Déby under the aegis of attacks starting on 24 November 2007. actions as ‘attacks on Sudan’ and threat- Libya. By 3 October, N’Djamena had While Déby’s forces were busy ened to bring its army to the border.35 signed an agreement in Tripoli with containing and disarming the ex-FUC Khartoum had good reason to worry. the four largest rebel movements: the forces in Dar Tama and Dar Sila, the The JEM36 had just succeeded in launch- UFDD, the UFDD–Fondamentale, the RFC and the UFDD launched a series of ing a major offensive in West Darfur, RFC, and the CNT. All had previously attacks all along eastern Chad, between controlling important territories north benefited from Sudanese support. Cru- the Central African Republic (CAR) of Geneina for the first time, and was cially, most of the factions remaining border in the south and the town of now seriously threatening the state outside these negotiations have had Kalaït in the north, catching the mili- capital. Having contained the Chadian less manpower, and received little tary off-guard and inflicting heavy rebels east of the Goz Beida–Abéché– backing from Sudan. casualties. Ex-FUC forces also attacked Kalaït line, N’Djamena’s strategy now During the course of the negotia- the army. Estimates put the number of seemed to be extending the war into tions, the Chadian government accepted government forces killed and wounded Sudanese territory, thanks to JEM activi- about a third of the rebel demands, in November and early December in ties. Khartoum, meanwhile, seemed including the reintegration of deserters the hundreds, and rebel losses were to be relying mostly on the Chadian into the army. But Déby’s administra- likely as high.34 As the Chadian Army rebels to defend Geneina.37 Thus, in tion firmly rejected many decisive re- moved its forces to the area in response spite of their limited success they were quests, such as the appointment of a to these attacks, the Front populaire rearmed once again: according to Chad-
Some 30,000 Chadian refugees returning to N’Djamena on 8 February 2008, following failed attacks on the capital by the UFDD, UFDD-F, and RFC. © AP Photos/Sunday
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 5 ian officials, Khartoum likely donated Box 1 Returned to sender: arms flows between Chad and Sudan several hundred new vehicles prior to their raid on N’Djamena the following Both Chad and Sudan have armed one another’s opponents throughout various phases of the rebellions in month.38 both countries. However, this process of militarization has never been constant, symmetric, or uniform. But unlike their backers, Darfurian Indeed, the uneven arming of various factions has shifted the power dynamics between competing rebel groups and fostered dissent. A second notable aspect of weapons transfers and flows in the region is recy- and Chadian rebel groups both pre- cling, whereby weapons captured from one rebel group are subsequently turned over to other groups. ferred not to fight against each other Until mid-2004, the flow of Sudanese-supplied arms to Darfur was intended primarily for the janjawid. directly. The JEM’s strategy was to leave At the time, some Chadian rebels who recruited Chadian combatants or combatants of Chadian origin for open the south of Geneina, thereby the janjawid, such as Mahamat Nour Abdelkarim, benefited from this support. In 2005, when fewer arms allowing Chadian rebels to return to were flowing to the janjawid, Khartoum began to arm Chadian rebel groups, in some cases with Chinese- south-eastern Chad where the Chad- made weapons, some of which were produced in Sudan itself.41 Arms were funnelled primarily to the FUC, ian Army was waiting for them. This is and in particular to Mahamat Nour’s Tama faction, causing disputes within the rebel coalition.42 exactly what the rebels did at the end Much of what is known about arms flows comes from weapons recovered during clashes. For example, of January, but this time they continued weapons captured from the FUC by Chadian forces during the battle of N’Djamena in April 2006 included Chinese MBRL, recoilless rifles (Chinese B-10s or Russian SPG-9s), and RPG rocket launchers.43 on towards N’Djamena—leaving the An FUC ‘head of section’ based in Harara (south of Geneina) and captured in N’Djamena in April 2006 JEM fearful that a change of power in told the Chadian police that: ‘We were visited three times by the president of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, in Chad could bring an end to its strat- person. Each time he came, he talked at length with our leaders. The last time he brought us food, uniforms, egy in Darfur. JEM forces thus went and weapons overland. The leaders left by air and the vehicles returned empty.’44 Many FUC combatants, back to Chad to support Déby, which including the prisoners taken by the Chadian authorities, have been observed wearing Sudanese uniforms. allowed the Sudanese Army to attack Some of these prisoners claimed that they were Sudanese soldiers or police officers.45 Significantly, weap- JEM areas north of Geneina, pushing ons taken from Mahamat Nour’s men in April 2006, such as those taken at Adré in December 2005, were several thousand new refugees into subsequently given to Darfur rebels by the Chadian government. A source close to Idriss Déby admitted to 46 Chad.39 this gift, describing it as a ‘return to sender’. After the failure of the FUC raid on N’Djamena, Khartoum shifted its transfers of weapons to the UFDD. It is difficult to determine whether The new coalition received RPG rocket launchers, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, as well as SAM-7 missiles.47 and how Khartoum will maintain its Mahamat Nouri told Radio France Internationale (RFI) that ‘most’ of these missiles had been taken from support for Chadian groups after the Chadian Army stocks during the raid on Abéché in November 2006. However, it seems that the SAM-7 mis- failure of the latest raid on N’Djamena, siles were also supplied to the UFDD by Khartoum. An RFI journalist noted that there was ‘Chinese script . . . and given the international condemna- on the UFDD’s batteries of anti-aircraft missiles’.48 Deliveries of arms from Khartoum to Chadian rebel fac- tion of the rebels. Even while attacking tions, particularly the UFDD, appear to have continued in the first months of 2007, and more significantly N’Djamena, the Chadian rebels seemed after September 2007.49 to consider a return to Sudan impos- For their part, the Darfur rebels had the benefit of Chadian support (money, gifts, and sales of vehicles and weapons) from 2003, particularly from the Beri community, and even from the family of Déby, without sible, not so much for practical reasons his consent. The JEM and above all the Zaghawa branch of the SLA benefited, thanks especially to the good as for the fact that Khartoum is not contacts of Abdallah Abbakar Bashar with the Beri community in Chad.50 Apparently Chadian financial aid willing to receive them back. ‘The also enabled the SLA to purchase anti-aircraft weapons in Chad, in particular about 15 or 20 SAM missiles next battle will be the last one, but no that were taken from SLA–Minni Minnawi by the G19 in the summer of 2006.51 matter what will happen, we can’t go After the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006,52 the non-signatory G19 rapidly acquired arms during back to Sudan,’ one of the main rebel clashes with the Sudanese army and SLA–Minni Minnawi. In autumn 2006, the new National Redemption leaders said the day before they entered Front alliance (which included the JEM and the G19) also enabled the G19 to benefit from N’Djamena’s aid. N’Djamena.40 A few days later, the But the rapid split in the coalition meant that the Chadian arms and vehicles were mainly concentrated in remaining rebel forces—in some 200 the hands of one faction, namely that of Adam Bakhit and Abdallah Abbakar. The arms market in N’Djamena has also been a source of supply. Russian Kalashnikovs, Libyan handguns, vehicles—had to retreat to Mongo, in and other weapons can be bought for USD 200–USD 600. These small arms appear to come from various the Guéra Mountains of central Chad. sources, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo via the Central African Republic. Even if the rebels had succeeded in N’Djamena, their lack of unity would have proven difficult to overcome. A short time before their attack on of persistent Goran–Bideyat rivalries working in Déby’s favor, and which N’Djamena, the RFC, UFDD, and following the eviction of Hissein Habré helps explain the timing of the Febru- UFDD–Fondamentale established a (a Goran) by Déby (a Bideyat). Many ary attacks, is the planned deployment Joint Military Command, but political Arabs who suffered a great deal under of the international peacekeeping divisions between them—such as the Habré are also reluctant to bring the forces in eastern Chad. terms of possible negotiations with the Goran back to power. These divisions government—as well as ethnic divisions, mean that Déby’s two-pronged strategy remain strong. The two main groups of fighting combined with negotiations The international response involved in recent fighting, the UFDD remains effective, while concurrently The international community’s response (Goran) and the RFC (Bideyat), are frustrating Sudanese attempts to unify to the crisis in Darfur and Chad has unable to build a real alliance because the Chadian rebels. Another factor been a push for peacekeeping opera-
6 Sudan Issue Brief Number 9 February 2008 Box 2 Chadian rebel groups and coalitions
The following groups represent the most significant of the rebel groups and Rassemblement des forces pour le changement (Rally of Forces for coalitions from 2005 to the present. Change)–Rassemblement des forces démocratiques (Rally of Democratic Forces) or RFC–RAFD. Founded in February 2006, this is a coalition of several Front uni pour le changement (démocratique) (United Front for Democratic Bideyat deserter groups, the principal one being the Socle pour le Changement, Change) or FUC/FUCD. Coalition founded in December 2005 and expected (by l’Unité et la Démocratie (Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy) or SCUD. Khartoum) to unify all of the Chadian rebel factions against Déby under the Initially known as the RAFD, it took the name RFC during a brief alliance with Sudanese protégé Mahamat Nour Abdelkarim, a Tama. At its peak in April 2006 the Ouaddaïan Rassemblement National Démocratique Populaire (RNDP), a the FUC had 5,000–7,000 men but went into decline after its failed attack on splinter group of the RND (see above). The RAFD is led by Tom and Timan Erdimi, N’Djamena on 13 April. In March 2007, the Tama section of the FUC rallied to the Chadian regime and became a pro-government militia operating in Dar Tama. Bideyat twin brothers and cousins of Idriss Déby. Because of these family links, both the Sudanese government and other rebel factions remain suspicious of Rassemblement pour la démocratie et les libertés (Rally for Democracy the movement. The force consists of approximately 800 men. They have been and Freedom) or RDL. The main component of the FUC, which recruited princi- based mainly in the area of Hadjer Morfaïn, at the Sudanese border east of pally among the Tama (from Chad and Sudan), Chadian Arabs (particularly the Guéréda. Eregat of Dar Tama), and the Ouaddaïans. Concorde nationale du Tchad (Chad National Concordia / Convention) or Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement (Union of Forces CNT. Sometimes called Convention nationale du Tchad (Chad National Conven- for Democracy and Development) or UFDD. The second significant Sudanese- tion). The main Chadian Arab rebel group, founded in 2004 by Hassan Saleh supported coalition of groups, founded on 22 October 2006, led primarily by Al-Gaddam ‘Al-Jineidi’, a Chadian Hemat Arab and former member of the CDR in Mahamat Nouri (a Goran). The UFDD has 2,000–3,000 men including Ouaddaïans, the 1970s who has been in rebellion against Déby since 1994. The CNT made its Arabs, and Gorans. Khartoum intended for the UFDD to replace the failed FUC first incursion on to Chadian territory while attacking Haraz Mangueigne, in and unify all the major Chadian rebels against Déby. The UFDD has operated southern Salamat, in July 2004. Arrested by the Sudanese government, which mostly in south-eastern Chad, Adré, Abéché, and west of Ennedi (Goran area). It disapproved of this early operation, Hassan Saleh was released in 2005 and was party to the Tripoli agreement of October 2007. Following several splits, the became the first vice-president of the FUC. He broke away in July 2006. The CNT UFDD was reduced to two main factions: is the only rebel group to have controlled a part of Chadian territory—the south- (i) Union des forces pour le progrès et la démocratie (Union of Forces eastern areas of Daguessa and Tissi—during several months in 2006 and 2007. for Progress and Democracy) or UFPD. Founded in July 2006 by Mahamat The group is said to have had close links with janjawid active in Chad and West Nouri, a Goran from the Anakazza sub-group, like Hissein Habré. Nouri was Darfur. In March 2007, the CNT participated alongside janjawid forces in the formerly Chadian ambassador to Saudi Arabia. very violent attack on the villages of Tiero and Marena in Dar Sila, in which 200–400 civilians and militiamen were killed.53 In December 2007, after the (ii) Rassemblement national démocratique (National Democratic Rally) failure of the Tripoli agreement (to which the CNT was a party), Al-Jineidi re- or RND. Founded by Adouma Hassaballah Jedareb (Arab with an Ouaddaïan sumed talks directly with the Chadian regime and finally switched allegiance, mother), ex-member of the FPRN (see below) and of the FUC, who took bringing some 2,000 men with him. numerous Ouaddaïan combatants with him in the wake of the failed FUC attack on N’Djamena. Front populaire pour la renaissance nationale (Popular Front for National Rebirth) or FPRN. Founded in 2001 by Adoum Yacoub, this group of Ouaddaïan Rassemblement populaire pour la justice (Popular Rally for Justice) or (like Adoum Yacoub) and Masalit combatants was first based in West Darfur. RPJ. A Bideyat component of the FUC, headed by Abakar Tolli and made up of When the war in Darfur began in 2003, ethnic solidarity with non-Arab civilians deserters from the Borogat sub-group, a Bideyat group very close to the Goran. made the FPRN switch from rebelling against N’Djamena to fighting the Suda- After the fall of the FUC, it joined the UFDD. nese Army and the janjawid alongside the newborn SLA. For these reasons, and UFDD–Fondamentale. An Arab breakaway group from the UFDD, founded in May because of Yacoub’s friendship with the late John Garang, the FPRN did not 2007 by Acheikh Ibn Oumar Saïd and Abdelwahid Aboud Makaye. Party to the benefit from Sudanese support until the end of 2007 at least. Not party to the Tripoli agreement of October 2007. Tripoli agreement, it operates mostly in the area of Tiss, on the border between Chad, Sudan, and the CAR.54 Conseil démocratique révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Democratic Council) or CDR. One of the oldest Chadian rebel movements, founded in 1978. Until 1982 Front pour la salut de la république (Front for the Salvation of the Republic) it was led by Acyl Ahmat Agbash and since then by Acheikh Ibn Oumar Saïd—both or FSR. Led by Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane, a Chadian Arab from the Mahamid Awlad Rashid Arabs. Acheikh Ibn Oumar retained the CDR name when he left branch and a former minister of Déby. A recently founded group, it was not France, where he was a political refugee, to rejoin the rebellion in Sudan and party to the Tripoli agreement and is not strongly supported by Khartoum. At found the UFDD alongside Mahamat Nouri in 2006. He broke away in May 2007 the end of 2007, the FSR united with the FPRN. Together, the two groups com- and formed the UFDD–Fondamentale. prise some 500 men.
tions. UN Security Council Resolution Chad and the north-eastern Central tasked with taking ‘all necessary meas- 1778 of 25 September 2007 created the African Republic and by creating favour- ures, within its capabilities and its area UN Mission for the Central African able conditions for the reconstruction of operation in eastern Chad and the Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), and economic and social development north-eastern Central African Republic which will consist of 350 police and of those areas’.55 It will be focused pri- to protect civilians, facilitate delivery military liaison personnel directly under marily on the security of refugees and of humanitarian aid, and ensure the UN control and will have a mandate internally displaced people (IDP) camps. safety of UN personnel’.56 ‘All neces- to contribute to the ‘protection of refu- But the most important peacekeep- sary measures’ is widely interpreted gees, displaced persons and civilians ing operation will be the European as including engaging armed groups in danger, by facilitating the provision Union Force (EUFOR) Chad/CAR, directly. Deployment was delayed over of humanitarian assistance in eastern expected to include about 3,700 troops the question of troop contributions
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 7 Chadian National Concord (CNT) president Hassan Saleh el-Dinedi (R) and General Bichara Issa Djadallah, governor of Achebe and former Chadian Defence Minister, 11 December 2007 in Abougoudam, eastern Chad. © Sonia Rolley/AFP
and financial commitments for trans- tion Epervier’) on the ground since 1986, reached some 3,440 soldiers, of which port, aircraft, and medical resources seeing any international intervention as 2,000 were French.61 It is also likely to but the first EUFOR Italian and Spanish tainted by French interests. The main make a substantial financial contribu- soldiers finally arrived in N’Djamena Chadian rebel groups/coalitions (the tion, beyond the nearly EUR 120 million on 28 January. The rebel attacks on RFC, UFDD, and UFDD–Fondamentale) (USD 170 million) in the EU budget.62 N’Djamena created further deployment have explicitly threatened violence To the dismay of other European coun- delays. Full deployment is expected against peacekeepers.58 This threat tries, including the UK and Germany by mid-2008. Unofficial estimates put places humanitarian staff and their who have both declined to take part the cost of the one-year mission at EUR beneficiaries, whom EUFOR will be in the force, France is implementing 500 million (USD 725 million), but it protecting, in a high-risk position. The its contributions in the absence of a may rise much higher.57 rebels reiterated their opposition to broader comprehensive process of re- There are great differences of opinion EUFOR after their defeat in N’Djamena, form or reciprocal offers from Déby. within Chad regarding the peacekeep- asking ‘the other European countries As explained by a British diplomat, ‘We ing operations. After initially requesting [than France]’ not to participate in ‘an do not understand why France does the force, then rejecting it during the operation whose final aim is to protect not ask for anything in exchange [for first half of 2007, the government now Déby’s regime’.59 EUFOR], like a democratic process hopes it will help protect the regime The perception that France is prop- and a real dialogue with both official from destabilizing incursions from ping up Déby is one of EUFOR’s pri- and armed oppositions.’63 Sudan. Rebels and many civilians regard mary liabilities.60 France is contributing France’s role in defending the capi- the operations as simply an extension the bulk of the peacekeepers: by Janu- tal in February 2008 was limited but of the 1,200-strong French force (‘Opéra- ary 2008, overall contributions had significant. French troops fought the
8 Sudan Issue Brief Number 9 February 2008 rebels when they attempted to seize Closing reflections Mahamat Choua, who was heading a N’Djamena airport, which was used not committee overseeing the application The current instability in Chad has only to evacuate foreign citizens but of an agreement between the opposi- precedents extending back as far as also to provide a launch pad for Déby’s tion and the government in August 1990, many of them emerging from helicopters. Though unconfirmed, 2007 concerning reform of the electoral divisive ethnic policies. Khartoum’s 67 French officers may also have coordi- system. International pressure for arming of some (Arab and non-Arab) nated the failed counterattack by Chad- their release is needed. janjawid in Chad, and Déby’s attempt ian Army forces against the rebels on There are other clear entry points to exploit local conflicts between Arabs 1 February, as one news outlet reported. for the international community. and non-Arabs and between Beri and Finally, Paris asked Tripoli—a recent Applying pressure on N’Djamena to Tama, threaten to expand the conflict ally after the Bulgarian nurses affair64— end its support of local conflicts and from eastern and south-eastern Chad to deliver Déby ammunitions, in par- arming of ethnic militias, and to support to the rest of the country. These same ticular for the T-55 tanks that ensured targeted disarmament, demobilization, ethnic divisions are largely responsible his survival in the following days.65 and reintegration (DDR) programmes for the failure of the rebels in both Sudan Chadian rebels are not alone in for militia and rebel groups, is key. Such and Chad to unite. Alliances are frac- challenging an expanded role for activities should begin with the Tama turing, local tensions are increasing in France in Chadian affairs. Anti-French militia—many of them formerly mem- severity, and conflicts formerly driven bers of the FUC—who recently made sentiment is also widespread among by clear goals and objectives have de- peace with the regime. They should civilians. France’s reputation suffered volved into violence for its own sake. then focus on other rebel groups who a serious blow during the Zoe’s Ark The current international peacekeep- may be ready to lay down their arms. scandal of October–December 2007,66 ing solution does not address the root The Chadian government also needs in which many Chadians believed that causes of the instability. More alarm- to be pressured to end its support for Paris was trying to shield from Chadian ingly, it could bring UN and EU forces Darfurian armed groups. justice the six French citizens accused into direct armed conflict with local The perception of Paris as the pro- of kidnapping local children and pre- forces, and put the lives of humanitarian tector of the Chadian regime militates senting them as Darfurian orphans. The workers and their civilian beneficiaries at against the possibility of a genuine fact that on 7 February, only a few days risk. For a peace process to be reignited, dialogue between Déby and his oppo- after the attack on N’Djamena, Déby a concerted and comprehensive diplo- nents. Critical reflection on French offered to pardon them—their sentence matic initiative is needed. This requires policy could enable other European of eight years forced labour has now support from the international commu- and international stakeholders to sup- been converted into a prison sentence nity for continued dialogue between port a meaningful diplomatic process. of the same length of time in France— the Chadian government and both the The selection of an appropriate media- has only aggravated this sentiment. rebels and the official opposition. Unlike tor is also essential: the UN, or more Finally, despite the differing man- the Libyan process, future negotiations likely the AU, are institutional partners dates of MINURCAT, EUFOR, and must involve the Chadian political that the Chadian opposition would Opération Epervier, the distinctions in opposition and touch on core issues likely accept. the roles and responsibilities of these relating to democratic governance. The The international community can forces are far from clear for those on the rebels agreed several times for such also help by providing selective de- ground. French troops in EUFOR and inclusive negotiations before, during, velopment assistance, in setting up those of Epervier will have different and after their February attack on programmes that can deal with fast- uniforms, but the European peacekeep- N’Djamena, but the Chadian president changing (and in some cases politically- ers will be stationed in the same areas is moving even further in the other induced) ecological changes, and in as the Epervier troops in N’Djamena direction: after the attack, Déby’s forces resolving conflicts between settled and and Abéché, and will also benefit from arrested prominent figures of the offi nomadic peoples and between long- Epervier aerial support. These compli- cial opposition, including Ibni Oumar established populations and newcomers. cations bode badly for the reception of Mahamat Saleh, president of the coali Aid that enables nomadic Arabs to these forces. tion of the opposition parties, and Lol maintain a way of life appropriate to their environment while minimizing their clashes with other communities could prevent future conflicts in both For a Chadian peace process to take hold, a concerted Chad and Darfur. Successful diplomatic pressure on and comprehensive diplomatic initiative is needed. both Khartoum and the Darfur rebels to return to the negotiating table after
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 9 successive failures would also have a 17 Interviews with the leaders of various rebel 41 Amnesty International (2006) and Small positive echo effect in eastern Chad. groups in Darfur and Chad, September Arms Survey (2007), p. 4. 2006. 42 Correau (2007). But this alone would be insufficient to 18 Tanner and Tubiana (2007), p. 55. 43 These weapons were exhibited by the improve security. Chadian opposition 19 Interviews with rebel forces, Bahay and regime after the battle. groups will not unilaterally disarm Kariyari, October 2006. 44 Transcribed interviews with FUC prison- without systematic changes to the 20 Interviews with Chadian IDPs and JEM ers by the Chadian police, file consulted democratic arena in Chad. rebels, Dar Sila (locations withheld), Octo- by the author. ber 2006. 45 Transcribed interviews with FUC prison- 21 In July 2006, Nouri left his post as Chad- ers by the Chadian police, file consulted Notes ian ambassador in Saudi Arabia to return by the author. to the rebellion and found the Union des 46 Interview with a source close to Idriss This Sudan Issue Brief was authored by Forces pour le Progrès et la Démocratie Déby, N’Djamena, September 2006. Jérôme Tubiana, an independent journalist (UFPD). 47 Correau (2007). 22 Marchal (2007). and researcher. He has carried out field 48 Correau (2007). 23 Interviews with sources close to the Chad- 49 2006 research in Chad over the past 15 years, UN ( ). ian government, N’Djamena, March 2007 50 Abdallah Abbakar Bashar, a Sudanese and in Darfur since 2004. His is co-author, and January 2008. Zaghawa Wogi, was the first chief of staff with Victor Tanner, of Divided They Fall: 24 UNHCR (2007a). of the SLA until his death in December The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel 25 Interviews with Tama, Beri, and Goran 2004. Groups, HSBA Working Paper No. 6. civilians, N’Djamena and eastern Chad, 51 Interview with a rebel leader from the September–October 2006 and March 2007. G19, rebel area of North Darfur, March 26 See, for example, President Déby’s speech 2007. See also Tanner and Tubiana (2007), 1 UNHCR (2007). 7 2007 in Goz Beida on January , available p. 42. 2 Beri is the term used by the group itself; at
10 Sudan Issue Brief Number 9 February 2008 Bibliography HSBA Issue Brief No. 6. Geneva: Small Number 8 September 2007 Arms Survey. April. Responses to pastoralist wars: a review of violence Amnesty International. 2006. ‘Chad/Sudan: Tanner, Victor and Jérôme Tubiana. 2007. reduction efforts in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya sowing the seeds of Darfur: ethnic targeting Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of in Chad by janjaweed militias from Sudan.’ Darfur’s Rebel Groups. HSBA Working June.
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 11 International Southeast Asia, by Katherine Number 10 August 2003 Communities, edited by Emile LeBrun and Kramer Beyond the Kalashnikov: Small Arms Production, Robert Muggah Exports, and Stockpiles in the Russian Federation, Number 4 January 2002 by Maxim Pyadushkin with Maria Haug and Number 16 November 2005 Shining a Light on Small Arms Exports: The Anna Matveeva Behind a Veil of Secrecy: Military Small Arms Record of State Transparency, co-published with and Light Weapons Production in Western Europe, NISAT, by Maria Haug, Martin Langvandslien, Number 11 October 2003 by Reinhilde Weidacher Lora Lumpe, and Nic Marsh In the Shadow of a Cease-fire: The Impacts of Small Arms Availability and Misuse in Sri Lanka, by Number 17 November 2005 Number 5 October 2002 Tajikistan’s Road to Stability: Reduction in Small Stray Bullets: The Impact of Small Arms Misuse Chris Smith Arms Proliferation and Remaining Challenges, in Central America, by William Godnick, with Number 12 February 2004 by Stina Torjesen, Christina Wille, and S. Neil Robert Muggah and Camilla Waszink (2nd edition March 2007) MacFarlane Number 6 November 2002 Kyrgyzstan: A Small Arms Anomaly in Central Politics from the Barrel of a Gun: Small Arms Asia?, by S. Neil MacFarlane and Stina Torjesen Number 18 January 2006 Proliferation and Conflict in the Republic of Demanding Attention: Addressing the Number 13 October 2004 Georgia (1998–2001), by Spyros Demetriou Dynamics of Small Arms Demand, by David Small Arms and Light Weapons Production in Atwood, Anne-Kathrin Glatz, and Robert Number 7 December 2002 Eastern, Central, and Southeast Europe, by Yudit Muggah Making Global Public Policy: The Case of Small Kiss Arms and Light Weapons, by Edward Laurence Number 19 2006 Number 14 November 2005 September and Rachel Stohl Securing Haiti’s Transition: Reviewing Human A Guide to the US Small Arms Market, Industry, Number 8 March 2003 Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, and Exports, 1998–2004, by Tamar Gabelnick, Small Arms in the Pacific, by Philip Alpers and Demobilization, and Reintegration, by Robert Maria Haug, and Lora Lumpe Conor Twyford Muggah Number 20 December 2007 Number 9 May 2003 Number 15 June 2005 Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity Demand, Stockpiles, and Social Controls: Small Silencing Guns: Local Perspectives on Small Arms in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective, Arms in Yemen, by Derek B. Miller and Armed Violence in Rural Pacific Islands by Jennifer M. Hazen with Jonas Horner
HSBA project summary The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment The HSBA project is supported by Canada, the UK (HSBA) is a three-year research programme Government Conflict Prevention Pool, the Danish Interna- (2005–08) administered by the Small Arms Survey. tional Development Agency (Danida), and the Norwegian It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN Mission in Sudan, the UN Development Programme, and a wide array of inter- national and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active Credits generation and dissemination of timely empirical research, Design and layout: Richard Jones ([email protected]) the HSBA project works to support disarmament, demobi- Cartography: Jillie Luff, MAPgrafix lization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security. The assessment is being carried out by a multi-disciplinary Contact details team of regional, security, and public health specialists. It For more information or to provide feedback, contact reviews the spatial distribution of armed violence through- Claire Mc Evoy, HSBA project coordinator, at out Sudan and offers policy-relevant advice to redress [email protected] insecurity. Sudan Issue Briefs are designed to provide periodic Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment snapshots of baseline information. Future briefs will focus Small Arms Survey on a variety of issues, including the demilitarization of the 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva Other Armed Groups (OAGs), the Joint Integrated Units Switzerland (JIUs), and local security arrangements governing the use Tel.: +41 22 908 5777 of small arms. The HSBA also generates a series of timely Fax: +41 22 732 2738 and user-friendly working papers in English and Arabic, available at www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan. Visit www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan
12 Sudan Issue Brief Number 69 AprilFebruary 2007 2008