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Gorbachev and the Trials of Perestroika GORBACBEV AND THE TR.IALS OF PERESTR.OIKA GORBACHEV AND THE TRIALS OF PERESTROIKA By Michele Janice Ryfelj, B.A. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts McMaster University (c) Copyright by Michele Janice Ryfelj, July 1993 MASTER OF ARTS (1993) McMASTER UNIVERSITY (Political Science) Hamilton, Ontario TITLE: Gorbachev and the Trials of Perestroika AUTHOR: Michele Janice Ryfelj, B.A. (University of Western Ontario) SUPERVISOR: Professor Peter J. potichnyj NUMBER OF PAGES: vii, 255 ii ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis is to examine the nature and significance of economic perestroika during Mikhail Gorbachev's rule from 1985 to 1991. In particular, the focus is upon the importance of Gorbachev's role as leader in the process of reform, upon how he approached the Soviet state of systemic crisis, and, in broader terms, upon the nature of the debate concerning economic reform. It is argued that, in the wake of the attempted coup d'etat, the downfall of economic perestroika -- and, indeed, the downfall of the empire and of Gorbachev himself -- was the result of an intensifying state of economic, political, social, ideological, and nationalistic crises, crises which Gorbachev could neither stem nor mitigate. His vision of economic transformation, framed by his continued dedication to Marxism-Leninism and motivated by his enduring commitment to revitalize Soviet socialism and the Soviet state, is examined from the perspective of its three distinct, yet interrelated, elements: first, the process of de-Stalinization; second, the process of de-Brezhnevization; and third, the formulation of a new socialist economic model. Within this context, emphasis is placed upon Gorbachev's understanding of the interdependence between economics and politics or, more precisely, his intention to have political iii iv reform serve an economic function. Furthermore, particular attention is paid to the significance which Gorbachev accorded to the leading role of the Communist Party in both the process of reform and, more generally, the building of Soviet socialism. In order to consider the 'environment' which surrounded the formulation of Gorbachev's vision of economic transformation, the nature of the debate concerning economic reform is examined, specifically with a focus upon the post- 1988 period. There are two reasons for this focus: first, it marked the official drive toward systemic change; and second, it marked the emergence of far-reaching political conflict among elites regarding the nature, scope, and direction of economic transformation. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the assistance of three individuals. I am especially grateful for the advice, patience, and support of my supervisor, Dr. Peter J. Potichnyj. Specifically, I am grateful for his allowing me to find my own way through both an interesting and a difficult question. As well, I would like to thank my second and third readers, Dr. Robert H. Johnston (from the Department of History) and Dr. Marshall N. Goldstein; their generous donation of time and energy in reading and commenting upon my thesis is greatly appreciated. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 1 1) The Importance of Gorbachev as Leader 2 2) Thesis Outline 10 3) Sources 15 Chapter 2: THE ROOTS OF PERESTROIKA 16 1) The Nature of the Soviet Crisis 21 2) The Legacy of the Past 26 3) The International Context 38 4) Some Closing Remarks 42 Chapter 3: GORBACHEV'S VISION OF ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 46 1) The Essence of Gorbachev's Vision 51 2) The Process of De-Stalinization 52 3) The Process of De-Brezhnevization 81 4) Gorbachev's New Model of Socialism 96 5) Some Concluding Remarks 113 Chapter 4: GORBACHEV'S STRATEGY: A FOCUS ON THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS . 116 1) Gorbachev's Starting Point 118 2) Gorbachev's Understanding of the Past 122 3) The Role of Political Change in Economic Transfonnation . 128 4) The Leading Role of the Party and its Relation to Economic Change 135 5) Some Closing Remarks 144 vi vii Chapter 5: THE DEBATE SURROUNDING GORBACHEV'S VISION OF ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION ... 146 1) The Period 1985-1987: Officially Sponsored Within System Change Versus Unofficially Sponsored Systemic Change . 149 2) Abalkin at the 19th Party Conference: A Stepping Stone to Systemic Change .. 158 3) Toward Systemic Reform in the Post 1988 Period 162 4) Some Closing Remarks 212 Chapter 6: CONCLUSION 214 APPENDICES 233 BIBLIOGRAPHY 243 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, there was no one who could have predicted the ultimate outcome of the changes which he initiated, indeed not even Gorbachev himself. For he clearly had no intention of dissolving either the Soviet Union or the party and, furthermore, no intention of abandoning Soviet socialism. Indeed, at the heart of Gorbachev's effort to transform the economic, political, and social spheres was a distinct desire to realize the potential of Soviet socialism, to relegitimize the party, and, in so doing, to modernize and revitalize the Soviet state as a whole. Had Gorbachev realized this ultimate outcome, he might not have taken the steps that he did to effect change. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the nature and significance of economic perestroika during Gorbachev's rule from 1985 to 1991. However, not professing to be an economist, there is no attempt to consider its strictly economic aspects and the implications thereof. Rather, the focus is upon the political actors or, more precisely, upon Gorbachevand certain key individuals who surrounded him; upon Gorbachev's ideas concerning the course of economic transformation and the debate which his ideas generated. This 1 2 focus points toward an understanding of why economic perestroika failed, why the Soviet Union and the Communist Party dissolved, and why Soviet socialism a la Gorbachev withered away. THE IMPORTANCE OF GORBACHEV AS A LEADER Before any serious discussion of economic reform can take place, what must be achieved is an understanding of the nature and significance of Gorbachev as a leader. Is it reasonable, or even possible, to examine what transpired during the period 1985 to 1991 from the vantage point of 'Gorbachev and his economic reforms'? Indeed, it may appear ill-founded to emphasize the role of one individual in change, particularly when that change affected the whole of Soviet society. Yet, if considered from a political perspective, Gorbachev's role as a leader in the economic reform process becomes crucial. As Stanley Hoffmann notes, such a perspective means that the focus is on statecraft or, more precisely, on "the way in which the leader conceives of and carries out his role as statesman, [and] his relations with and impact on his followers or opponents. ,,1 Hence, from this point of view, Gorbachev's role in economic change is important because its nature and its scope are determined by how he conceives of 1 Stanley Hoffmann, "Heroic Leadership: The Case of Modern France," in Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies, ed. L.J. Edinger (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1967): 109. 3 change, and by the extent to which he can successfully mobilize support and demobilize opponents. In order to further establish why Gorbachev's role as leader in the reform process is important, some consideration must be paid to the arguments against such an assertion. Many analysts, for example, have affirmed the significance of collective leadership over individual leadership. T.R. Rigby states that " ... while the Soviet system of rule is indeed a dictatorship, for the most of the time it has functioned as a dictatorship not of one man but of several, in other words as an oligarchy. ,,2 Other analysts have argued that with or without Gorbachev the need and the demand for change was evident; change simply had a broad constituency of support. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, claims: Gorbachev's emergence was not a freak event. Ris coming to power represented the surfacing of a new reality in the Soviet Union, both on the objective and the subjective levels. In other words, if not he then some other Soviet reformer would have in all probability emerged as the leader in the mid-1980's.3 This "new reality", many analysts would assert, arose largely as a result of economic development. Accordingly, society was thought to be more educated, urbanized, and informed. In 2 T.R. Rigby, "The Soviet political Executive, 1917- 1986," in Political Leadership in the Soviet Union, ed. A. Brown (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989): 5 (my emphasis) . 3 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990): 42 (my emphasis) . 4 essence, these analysts claim that change became a function of these long-term qualitative shifts in society. Gorbachev had little control and, inevitably, was forced to accept change. S. Frederick Starr states that these qualitative changes had, in fact, established the outlines of a civil society. Reform under Gorbachev's leadership, then, comprised of simply clearing away the bureaucratic impediments to a liberal society.4 General Volkogonov takes Starr's claim even further. He states that Gorbachev has played a large, historic role in the collapse of the totalitarian system in our country ... If, though, we are honest, he did not so much playa role, did not so much do things -­ he did not hinder the process.' The claims outlined above discount both the significance and the impact of Gorbachev's leadership on the reform process. Yet, to a large extent these claims are overstated and, thus, require some discussion in response. First of all, the very structure of Soviet politics, where power was concentrated at the summit of the political system, implied that change would invariably be focused upon the leader himself.
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