Naval War College Review

Volume 73 Number 3 Summer 2020 Article 13

2020

Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer for Senior Leaders

Kenneth M. Sandler The U.S. Naval War College

Thomas P. Galvin

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Recommended Citation Sandler, Kenneth M. and Galvin, Thomas P. (2020) "Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer for Senior Leaders," Naval War College Review: Vol. 73 : No. 3 , Article 13. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/13

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smaller actions necessarily means devot- suggest here that those interested ing less space to the critically important in the naval war from 1939 to 1945 ones. Coverage is always a delicate matter, should read (and buy) both of them. for while leaving something out invites CRAIG L. SYMONDS criticism that the book is incomplete, limiting coverage of the critical turning points invites criticism of another kind. Mawdsley has chosen to be inclusive,

and he covers a number of events that Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer are overlooked in most general histories for Senior Leaders, by Thomas P. Galvin. Carlisle, (including my own), such as the British PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018. 120 raid on the Lofoten Islands off Norway pages. Available for download at publications (Operation CLAYMORE) in 1941 and .armywarcollege.edu/. Free. the invasion of Madagascar (Operation As Charles D. Allen states in the fore- IRONCLAD) in 1942, as well as extensive word, “70 to 80 percent of organizational coverage of the Soviet navy in both the change efforts fail” (p. vii). Numerous Baltic and Black Seas. All that comes reasons exist why initiatives to improve with a cost, of course; running to six an organization’s performance, effective- hundred pages, Mawdsley’s book is ness, or morale do not succeed: incorrect not short, and yet it occasionally feels problem diagnosis, poor planning or crowded as events pile up on one resourcing, strategy mismatch to culture, another—although no doubt that is how and resistance, among others. U.S. the war felt to those who fought it as well. Army War College professor Thomas Mawdsley is not afraid to make judg- P. Galvin’s well-researched primer ments. He argues, for example, that the effectively distills numerous organiza- role of “special intelligence” (ULTRA) tional change philosophies and strategies has been greatly exaggerated and into a practical and intuitive guidebook that Hitler gave up on the invasion of for military professionals at all levels. England (Operation SEA LION) before the A plethora of books on organizational Battle of Britain even began. He defends change exists, with an Amazon.com Churchill’s decision to attack the French search returning hundreds of results. fleet at Mers el-Kébir, asserting that it Professor Galvin tailors his approach to was “correct” (p. 71), and concedes that the unique challenges of the military, the Dieppe raid was “badly planned,” which prepares for an uncertain future for which Mountbatten “deserves environment that before the crucible some blame” (p. 282). In the Pacific, of operations and combat can only be Mawdsley concludes that Kimmel and simulated. He argues that most change Short were “rightly held responsible” efforts are too process oriented, at the for being unready on 7 December expense of the often-overlooked context 1941 (p. 182) and that Nagumo was of the environment and the content “surely right” not to approve a third aerial of the change effort, which explain attack against Pearl Harbor (p. 181). its purpose and the path to success. It would be inappropriate for me to To this end, he develops a framework recommend one of these books over similar to the military’s planning process the other. Therefore I merely will that emphasizes context and content,

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with sequences of questions to aid in I really never managed to convince the navigating all stages of change efforts. Congress of the United States that what Galvin argues that understanding the they were doing to the military budget context requires correctly diagnosing would have a detrimental effect over the problem, gauging receptivity to time. . . . It’s hard to articulate words the proposed change, and determining like risk, they can be parsed and they whether it even warrants expending can be twisted or turned, or words like the resources. Although hierarchical, readiness.” His salient point highlights military organizations are complex the difficulties leaders have in articulat- adaptive systems, highlighting the ing future risk and promoting change. difficulty in tracing causal links and Professor Galvin recommends often resulting in misdiagnosis. Factors constructing dual narratives of future that gauge receptivity to the change undesired and desired end states, with include internal and external environ- the former describing a status quo that mental pressures; the level of trust and risks mission failure and the latter a empowerment within the organization; version in which competitive advantage and, for distributed organizations, the is restored. His principles of prepared- fit between the change agenda and ness consist of a series of questions to local contexts. We live in an age of data spark development of these competing analytics, and often suffer from survey stories and include tangible and fatigue. Therefore, taking the time to de- abstract performance metrics. While termine what data to collect for analysis vivid imagery, framing, and marketing is essential and may flush out funda- can help sell an idea, Galvin correctly mental issues that need to be addressed asserts that credibility demands rigor. before implementation can proceed. Narratives must limit negations, refrain The most valuable section deals with from sounding unduly alarmist, and forecasting, which is the glue of the avoid one’s being perceived as simply content portion of the book. This links a cheerleader. Once all elements are the vision, plan, and communication established, the concept should be effort. While still an endeavor of expressed as a cognitive journey in uncertainty, forecasting is differenti- practical and actionable terms, with ated from prediction in that it is more obstacles and barriers presented as chal- quantifiable and probabilistic. Although lenges that can and must be overcome. many tools exist within the Department Galvin’s primer is filled with invaluable of Defense to paint this picture, making insights, frameworks, and anecdotes. a convincing case remains a challenge He provides examples of failed changes, from the strategic to the tactical level. including General Eric K. Shinseki’s As General Martin Dempsey said in decision to switch from standard an interview with Kelly Brownell for headgear to the black beret and Secre- the 9 September 2016 Making It Matter tary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s podcast concerning the significant cuts attempt to transition to the National imposed by the 2011 Budget Control Security Personnel System. However, Act, “When people ask me if I have selection of a case study, vignette, or any regrets during my four years as scenario applicable to any number of Chairman, one of them in particular is situations and woven throughout the

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entire primer or as a separate annex involved in that process. Piscitelli’s might have stitched the elements of work ultimately is most useful, though, the book tighter together and made it not for reviewing why the Marine resonate more. Regardless, leaders at Corps adopted maneuver warfare but all levels who want to increase their for providing a model for instituting chances of successfully implementing structural changes at the service level and sustaining an organizational change necessary for future battlefield success. effort will benefit from making this an Following the Vietnam War, a combina- essential addition to their tool kit. tion of external and internal pressures led KENNETH M. SANDLER the Marine Corps to institutionalize and train to a war-fighting philosophy it had practiced to varying degrees throughout its history. The Marine Corps Way of War details how the Marine Corps had The Marine Corps Way of War: The Evolution of practiced elements of maneuver warfare the U.S. Marine Corps from Attrition to Maneuver from Belleau Wood to Beirut. This Warfare in the Post-Vietnam Era, by Anthony J. historical survey provides the context Piscitelli. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2017. for the interpersonal and bureaucratic 264 pages. $27.50. battles that Piscitelli then recounts that Despite battlefield success in both Iraq led to the Corps’s full embrace of ma- and Afghanistan over the past fifteen neuver warfare in the post-Vietnam era. years, the threat environment confront- Piscitelli then uses an excellent combina- ing the United States and its Marine tion of first-person interviews and Corps only has grown more dangerous. after-action reports to summarize how The United States now confronts a the Corps’s success in all the humanitar- variety of challenges both old and new, ian operations, low-intensity conflicts, including the return of great-power and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and Europe; Vietnam resulted from the major internal operating in (what until recently has and external bureaucratic struggles over been called) an antiaccess/area-denial the service’s future during that era. The (A2/AD) battle space; nuclear prolifera- book’s emphasis on education and the tion; and navigating the effects of global impact of maneuver warfare on Marines’ climate change on military operations. professional development also deserves Such an environment calls for both refin- mention. Piscitelli’s decision to explore ing old solutions and thinking in new, how the adoption of maneuver warfare bold ways to ensure that the U.S. mili- also forced the Corps to rethink the tary—and especially, for purposes of this professional development of its enlisted review, the Marine Corps—is ready to and officer populations underscores meet, fight, and defeat any future threats. how the human element of war remains Author Anthony Piscitelli leverages his the most important variable in any years of State Department and academic conflict. One should be forgiven for experience to map the evolution of the thinking that parts of the book serve as Marine Corps’s approach to war in justification for MCDP-1, Warfighting. the post–Vietnam War era, all the Yet, despite providing an excellent while highlighting the personalities analysis that explores how the Corps

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