sign in sign up
<<
Home , Ant tribe, Communism, Leadership core, Liu Qibao, Maoism, Other (philosophy)

ANALYSIS

CHINA’S “NEW ERA”

WITH CHARACTERISTICS

Intoduction

ABOUT by Angela Stanzel

The Chinese have long been obsessed For China-watchers, the congress of the Chinese Communist with strategic culture, power balances and Party (CCP) is a vital window into what will guide the geopolitical shifts. Academic institutions, CCP over the following five years. As the party’s highest- think-tanks, journals and web-based debates level meeting, it provides the floor for a game of musical are growing in number and quality, giving China’s breadth and depth. chairs that decides who stays, who leaves, and who enters the topmost ranks of the party, right up to the Politburo China Analysis introduces European Standing Committee. The general , who normally audiences to these debates inside China’s is also the Chinese president, now Xi Jinping, is usually expert and think-tank world and helps the reappointed for a second term; but successors also begin European policy community understand how China’s leadership thinks about domestic to be put in place. However, this time was different. The and foreign policy issues. While freedom “new” Politburo Standing Committee, which comprises of expression and remain seven members, will be too old in 2022 to continue, at least restricted in China’s media, these published if customary retirement rules are followed. sources and debates provide an important way of understanding emerging trends within China. China was in full preparation mode for the congress from November 2016 onwards. The line-up for the Politburo and Each issue of China Analysis focuses on a the question of the succession to Xi – including whether specific theme and draws mainly on Chinese he will stay on past 2022, the date which would mark the mainland sources. However, it also monitors end of his constitutional two five-year terms – were topics content in Chinese-language publications from and , which generating much speculation within and outside China. And occasionally include news and analysis that this party congress prompted particular interest because is not published in the mainland and reflects it would reveal how much power Xi actually has and how the diversity of Chinese thinking. successful his policy, and even ideological course, have been.

As expected, Xi succeeded in further cementing his position by appointing personal allies to the Politburo. He avoided contravening any rules around age. And he retained some top talent while clearly establishing his own dominance December 2017 2 ECFR/240 December 2017 www.ecfr.eu CHINA'S "NEW ERA" WITH XI JINPING CHARACTERISTICS 07/01/c_135481734.htm Xinhua 2 “Chinaurgesinnovativeapplication of ”, ecfr.eu/article/commentary_china_all_the_presidents_men Council onForeignRelations,26October 2017,availableat 1 Seealso:FrançoisGodement,“China: AllthePresident’smen”,European with in continuity was party congress are notnew.The debates these however, that out, points relations”. He power great of type a “new establish China’s ambitionto administration and US new the about debates on Chinese in particular a moreassertiveapproach.Sautinfocuses towards policy foreign low-profile traditional China’s from for China’s foreign policyorientationandXi’sturnaway Sautin examines theimplicationsofcongress Yevgen on impact significant a China’s policymaking. have to is concept era” “new reform era.howthe and thatofthepost-1976 He outlines totwopreviouseras–thatofMaoism to giveequal weight is era” theme “new ofthe key aspect course. Inhisview,the means for China’s what thisconcept ideological perspective into era” forChina,andputs “new the “thought”, of the on anotherelement focuses Mittelstaedt Jean Christopher quite whatmanyanalystshadexpected. not was still to enshrineXi’snewest constitution light onwhytheamendmentofCCP’s also sheds Holbig global orderaccordingtoitsnationalinterests. the about Xi’s personal powerandChina’s ambition to shape 19 at the events what explains She deriving fromit. and internationalimplications domestic as the aswell its widerideological analyses and Jinping Thought” “Xi the introduces Holbig Heike domestic andforeignpolicy. 19 the into what insights their offer authors the In thisissue, . acrossChinese characteristics istrulysoembedded with XiJinping therevivedideology whether speculate many observersto hasprompted This development and research in also includeXi’s“Thought”. reflected been will Now, it institutions, media,andcivilsociety. academic since has tightening characteristics.” “ withChinese in communismand their and tostrengthen principles Marxist party memberstoapply on hisfellow Xi called within China. Marxist principlesLastyear,forinstance, control andreviving Maoist and ideological by tightening CCP’s the strengthen to Xi hassought leader, paramount become to his since years, five past the In of ChinaAnalysis. issue present of the focus This isthe for aNewEra”–intothepartyconstitution. Characteristics Jinping Thought onSocialismwithChinese “Xi the enshrined hisnameandideas–moreprecisely, CCP congress, the heritage: atthe ideological his future in ensuring succeeded already has also central, andhe now for power. various factions,whichcompete over the th party congress means in terms of ideology and China’s means intermsofideology partycongress , 1July2016,availableat . http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016- th party congress tell us tell partycongress

2 Thisideological http://www. . 1 Xi is Xi or whetheritistheproductoffear. leaders, CCP andits trust inthe of product the is silence that more andmuted.Thequestionremainsofwhether to be appears society Chinese And indeed, society. Chinese control over increased seek campaigns way. Xi’sideological Xi isalsochangingChina in whether a morethoroughgoing be to congress, however,appears arising fromthe question key The years. five past the of trajectory policy foreign and 19 the many ways moreassertive.In is steadily Foreign policy a totalitarianapproach. from authoritarianismto drifting is policy Xi’s Chinahasbeengraduallychanging;itsdomestic dedicated tothe“XiJinpingThought”. is nowtoinclude line withtheparty’s ideology into younger bring the to bid The League. Communist Youth within universitiesandinthe efforts party’s increasing in particularonthe population, focusing control onChina’s younger ideological CCP’s tightening impact ofthe the Finally, JérômeDoyonanalyses China’s foreignpolicy. for a turningpoint constitute not trends, anddid preceding th party congress solidified Xi’s domestic Xi’s solidified congress party th beautiful” by 2050.2 These formulations are largely consistent The 19 party congress: with those of previous congresses, which often referenced the Its place in history centenary of the CCP, 2021, and of the People’s of China, 1949. However, the intermediate target of 2035 – which Heike Holbig envisages the “basic realisation of socialist modernisation” – is Xi’s innovation, with a view to breaking down the abstract The 19th National Congress of the Chinese vision of the “two centenary goals” into a more concrete, (CCP), which convened between 18-25 October 2017, made feasible work plan. headlines in the international press for enshrining “” in the party’s constitution. The move has been The rest of the report conforms to those of previous congresses, widely interpreted as a manifestation of the personal power detailing the envisaged economic, political, cultural, social, that Xi Jinping has amassed after only five years as China’s environmental, defence, “one country, two systems”, foreign , putting him on a par with policy, and party-building policy (sections 5-13; analogous to or even . While this personal power dimension is sections 4-12 in Jintao’s 2012 report). Yet Xi’s foreign and important, a close reading of official documents published in security policy goals were far more ambitious and detailed than the lead-up to, and emanating from, the 19th party congress those of previous leaders. They included the “dream of building reveals broader ideological messages, as well as the domestic a powerful military” (强军梦 qiang jun meng); the aspiration and international implications for the next five years and to build a “community with a shared destiny for mankind” (人 beyond. With its elevation of Xi’s new guiding ideology, the 类命运共同体 renlei mingyun gongtongti); and the objective CCP leadership signalled an end to the reform era as we knew of ensuring that “China will continue to play its part as a major it, proclaiming the advancement of a “strong” China that and responsible country, take an active part in reforming and would strive to shape the global order in accordance with the developing the system, and keep contributing national interest and its vision. Chinese wisdom and strength to global governance”.3

A “strong” China: Xi Jinping’s political report Refurbishing the CCP’s guiding ideology: amendments to the party constitution Delivered over three and a half hours on 18 October, Xi’s report to the 19th party congress was not only significantly Although the ’s decision to enshrine Xi’s longer than those given by his predecessors guiding ideology in the party constitution was striking, its and – in 2002, 2007, and 2012 – but it was also precise formulation – “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism more ambitious in its agenda.1 After reviewing the work of with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习进平新时代 the outgoing Central Committee (section 1), Xi summarised 中国特色社会主义思想 Xi Jinping shidai Zhongguo tese the party’s prevailing doctrinal principles and new ideological shehuizhuyi sixiang) – did not fulfil the expectations of many orientation in two separate sections: the first, relatively brief, analysts, who had anticipated a more compact formula such as section established the CCP’s “historic mission” in a “new era” “Xi Jinping Theory” (理论 lilun) or even “Xi Jinping Thought” (section 2); the second, on the “Thought on Socialism with (思想 sixiang).4 These observers expected Xi’s status in the Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and the Basic Policy”, party constitution to equal that of Deng or Mao, both of whose covered the “major theoretical innovations” of the past five contributions gained these labels only after their retirement years and their practical implications for 14 areas of policy and death respectively. In fact, the formulation appeared to (section 3). have developed significantly since early 2017, when there were the first indications that Xi’s name might be enshrined in party Xi also extended the subsequent section of the speech (section statutes. 4) – which would normally introduce the party’s work plan for the next five years – to cover the next 33 years. Within this After months of speculation inspired by his acquisition in period, 2020, 2035, and 2050 serve as milestones. The CCP October 2016 of the title “core” (核心 hexin) leader, the CCP aims to secure “a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society” by 2020, and to develop China into a “great 2 The Chinese original uses the word “strong” here, but to avoid repetition, (强 qiang) modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong official English translators have used “great”. Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and (强 qiang), democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. 3 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of 1 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, sections 10-12. Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of th Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (决胜全面建成小康社 4 “Resolution of the 19 National Congress of the Communist Party of China 中国共产党 会夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利) (hereafter, Xi Jinping, “Secure a on the Revised Constitution of the Communist Party of China” ( 第十九次全国代表大会关于中国共产党章程修正案的决议 Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All ), Chinese Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with , 24 October 2017 (hereafter, CCP, “Resolution of the th Characteristics for a New Era”), speech delivered at the 19th National 19 National Congress of the Communist Party of China on the Revised Congress, 18 October 2017, Renmin Chubanshe, October 2017; an English Constitution of the Communist Party of China”). An English translation of translation of the speech is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ the full text of the resolution is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm. english/2017-10/24/c_136702726.htm. 3 4 ECFR/240 December 2017 www.ecfr.eu CHINA'S "NEW ERA" WITH XI JINPING CHARACTERISTICS rect 50be45cfb9659aa60b71c1e4ccb23f086f87fa8e3&scene=21#wechat_redi e9345987f6ba25373afc&chksm=f0376b82c740e294ff3746beffb1ef09c48 biz=MzI4MDExNzg3Nw==&mid=2659097752&idx=1&sn=940791c96e01 qq.com/s/c_911cpiDTzq1-OhkoqAuw; andhttp://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__ widely disseminatedviasocialmediaplatforms suchas com.cn/n1/2017/0728/c64094-29433685.html 的成长之路 7 “TheformativejourneyofGeneralSecretaryXiJinping”( Chubanshe, July2017,pp.1-9. Xi JinpingonJuly26”( implementing thespiritofimportantspeechheldbyGeneralSecretary the reformperiod.RenZhongwen(ed.)“Studyingandthoroughly Ziyang tojustifytheuseofprivateownershipandmarketmechanismsin 6 Theformulawasinventedin1987bythenCCPgeneralsecretaryZhao com/english/2017-08/31/c_136571815.htm ifykpysa2310300.shtml. 31 August2017,availableat: on October18”(中共中央政治局会议建议党的十九大10月18日召), 5 “ChineseCommunistPartyexpectedtoconvene19thNationalCongress more comprehensive concept Xi’s “thought”,a reference to names donotappearinthepartyconstitution–while higher rankthanJiangZeminorHuJintao–whosepersonal at a as at marks outXi arrived congress. Theformulationthey to compromiseonthenewguidingideologyfor19 the 26Julyspeechthatprovidedpartyeliteswithspace In hindsight,itmusthavebeenthe“newera”vocabularyof people’s pursuitofabetterlife. 袖 Cultural Revolutionandhailedhimasacharismaticleader( a biographyofXithatpraisedhisdevelopmentduringthe Study Times,after thisspeech, published partyjournal,the need forabetterlife( a neweraofsocialistmodernisationandsatisfythepeople’s to dosoforawhile,heargued,thetimehadcomeenact 义初级阶段 country remainedinthe“primarystageofsocialism”( fu qilai daoqiang qilaidelishixingfeiyue).Althoughthe ( growing rich[1978-2012]togettingstrong[2012onwards]” [1949-1976], up standing from rise “historic a experienced had provincial leaderson26July, Xistatedthatsince1949China of anewera. Inan“importantspeech”toministersand ideology hadshiftedfromgovernanceissuestothecreation In themeantime,focusofnewleadership’sguiding the party’s CentralCommitteeasacollective. concepts, thoughtsandstrategies”nottoXiindividuallybut published inAugust2017 attributedthesamesetof“new since early2014. However, anauthoritativeXinhuaarticle topics thatXihadoftencoveredinspeechesandconversations focus onstatecraftandgovernance( the party. Heappearedtosuggestthatthisthoughtwould would formthekernelofanewbodyguidingthoughtfor into asetof“newconcepts, thoughtsandstrategies”,thisspirit speeches” Xihadgivensince2012.Liarguedthat, ifdeveloped Committee –discussedthe“spirit”ofmultiple“important the 19 following and, – Office General CCP the of director Zhanshu, elevated gain would Xi that People’sLi Daily,the in published article a lengthy status. In May following the confirmed 从站起来、富起来到强起来的历史性飞跃 . lingxiu) whose personal “combat target” was to support the the support to was target” “combat personal whose lingxiu) th party congress, a member of the Politburo Standing partycongress, amemberofthePolitburoStanding ), StudyTimes,28July2017,availableat shehuizhuyi chuji jieduan) and would continue shehuizhuyichujijieduan)andwouldcontinue 学习贯彻习进平总书记7。26重要讲话精神 Englishversionavailableat 美好生活 http://news.sina.com.cn/zx/2017-08-31/doc-

7 meihaoshenghuo).

.

治国理政 ; thedocumentwas http://news.xinhuanet. http://cpc.people. 5 cong zhan qilai, cong zhanqilai, http://mp.weixin.

zhiguo lizheng), zhiguolizheng), 近平总书记 6 Two days Twodays ), Renmin

Xinhua th 社会主 party party - 领 ,

had successfully identified the new principal contradiction contradiction principal that characterisedthemostrecentperiodofdevelopment. new the identified successfully had to thedocumentsemergingfrom19 of thepeopleversusbackwardsocialproduction”. needs cultural and material ever-growing the was “between The principalcontradictioninthereformera, underDeng, andthebourgeoisie,itcentredonclassstruggle. Mao erawascharacterisedbythecontradictionbetween the socialistcause. AsallCCPmembershaveinternalised,the thereby further and society of changing the adapt to identifying thecurrentcontradiction, theCCPwillbeableto correctly By development. social of period each characterises contradiction such one Marxism, Sinicised of jargon the In contradiction” ( “principal new relates todialecticalmaterialism, particularlythenotionofa constitution party the in era” claim the “new behind The A new“principal contradiction” forthe“newera” reduce thelustreofhiscontribution. characters between“XiJinping”and“Thought”,seemsto formulation, whichinChineseincludesalmostadozen somewhat cumbersome Zedong Thought”.Butthelongand “Mao with par a on and Theory” Xiaoping “Deng above his contribution as putting be interpreted can “theory”, than China ontheRevisedConstitutionof CommunistPartyofChina”. 12 CCP,“Resolutionofthe19 Socialism withChineseCharacteristics foraNewEra”. Prosperous SocietyinAllRespectsand StrivefortheGreatSuccessof 11 XiJinping,“SecureaDecisiveVictory inBuildingaModerately Socialism withChineseCharacteristics foraNewEra”,section1. Prosperous SocietyinAllRespectsand StrivefortheGreatSuccessof 10 XiJinping,“SecureaDecisiveVictoryinBuildingModerately htm 2017, availableat: in depth” 9 “Graspingthenewcharacteristicsofprincipalsocialcontradiction constructions, orparticles,makingitrelativelyeasytomemorise. 8 Nonetheless,theformulacontainsnoinvertedcommas,adverbial the 21 qilai), domesticallyaswellinternationally, bythemiddleof his ambitiousagendaforChinato“growstrong”( and lendhimthemoralhighgroundfromwhichtoimplement “growing rich”. with Mao and Deng, the“architects”ofstages“standingup”and a par on him put They Marxism”. of “Sinification contradiction, laudedasthelatestachievementin status elevated Xi’s justify through referencetohisanalysisofthenewera’sprincipal documents official way, this In can thecontradictionbesolved. ” designedandcoordinatedbythepartyleadership “well-rounded humandevelopmentandall-roundsocial economic growthaloneisnolongerthesolution: onlythrough and abetterenvironment”. security, , and fairness law, of rule the , for needs forabetterlife”–including, inXi’s words, “demands inadequate development andthepeople’s ever-growing contradiction wastobefound“betweenunbalancedand social ”thatdominatedthereformera, thenew With theCCPhavinglargelysolvedproblemof“backward . st century. (深刻把握社会主要矛盾变化的新特点), http://news.xinhuanet.com/2017-10/20/c_1121833637. 12 Moreover, they bolster his political authority Moreover,theybolsterhispoliticalauthority th NationalCongressoftheCommunist Party of 10 The new formulation implies that Thenewformulationimpliesthat 11 主要矛盾 8 Xinhua th party congress, Xi partycongress,Xi zhuyao maodun). zhuyao maodun). , 20October 强起来 9 According According

qiang qiang

contradiction must be modified, and with it the work China’s “New Era”: Between method of the party and the .5 Thus – as Xu Yaotong of continuity and disruption China’s National School of Administration has pointed out – the new era is the latest period in a long process that started Jean Christopher Mittelstaedt with of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.6 The era can be distinguished from periods by In his report to the 19th party congress of the Chinese its principal contradiction and the corresponding change in Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping, general secretary of governance methods. Hence, the president of the Chinese the CCP and China’s president, stated that “with decades Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Wang Weiguang, of hard work, socialism with Chinese characteristics has argues that at the core of the new era is a change in the crossed the threshold into a new era”.1 In a prominent principal contradiction.7 Jin Minqing, vice-president of article in the People’s Daily, former Politburo Standing CASS’s Academy of Marxism, echoes Wang, stating that the Committee (PBSC) member Yunshan argued that change of the principal contradiction reflects an essential the “new era” marks a new start for China.2 The eight judgement that is at the root of the new era.8 As such, an “make clear” (明确 mingque), meaning a clear process ideological judgement is the basis for the implementation to build a system with Chinese characteristics, and and establishment of the party’s and the state’s policies, as 14 “ensuring” (坚持 jianchi), guidelines ensuring a clear well as their long-term strategy.9 process, set the definition and basic policy of the new era respectively. Together, they resolve questions relating to The 19th party congress concluded that the main several issues: firstly, the logic of Chinese history, where contradiction of the new era was “between unbalanced and China stands, and where the country should go; secondly, inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing the practical theme of this era and its historical tasks, as needs for a better life”.10 Unbalanced and inadequate well as the framework of strategic management; thirdly, development is said to be at the root of and the type of development thinking that will be implemented; other problems that limit China’s future development.11 fourthly, the necessary spiritual attitude; and fifthly, the From the perspective of social demand and production, of China as a world power and of its contribution China will soon reach its aim of achieving a “moderately to humanity.3 As an ideology, the new era concept provides prosperous society”.12 However, simply satisfying the an ontological foundation and a terminological starting population’s “need for a material culture” has become point for the Chinese polity. Having been written into the insufficient. The most salient challenges are the regional CCP constitution, the new era ideology has far-reaching imbalances and structural flaws in development, as well as implications for China’s mode of governance, economy, the people’s increasing “demands for democracy, the rule of society, and foreign policy. law, fairness and justice, security, and a better environment”.

5 Wenzhao, “New Era: The New Historical Position of Socialism with The “principal contradiction” as modus operandi Chinese Characteristics” (新时代：中国特色社会主义新的历史方位), Daily, 23 October 2017, available at http://ex.cssn.cn/zx/201710/ t20171023_3676327.shtml. While the eight “make clear” and 14 “ensuring” frame it, 6 “The Rich Meaning of the New Thinking in the New Era” (新时代新思想 the “principal contradiction” (主要矛盾 zhuyao maodun) 的丰富内涵), Explaining to the Family Web (宣讲家网), 2017, available at defines the modus operandi of the CCP and the state in https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzA4NTMzNzEzMg==&mid=265281

4 7610&idx=1&sn=6eb14f992642db8997ffed2993725f3f&chksm=84331d89b the new era. The principal contradiction has changed four 344949f3179300bcb1e2695bed7dc33c141d90b7aa526ef3efae7fd81609ab7 times in the history of the CCP – in 1956, 1969, 1981, and 0378&mpshare=1&srcid=1031bp1scLH4djL8mKcWPDvj&scene=21#wech 2017. As Renmin University Tao Wenzhao notes, at_redirect. 7 Wang Weiguang, “The Action Program to Wrest a Great Victory in the since the characteristics of each era change, its principal New Era” (王伟光：夺取新时代伟大胜利的行动纲领), Torch of Thought (思想火炬), 2017, available at https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=Mz- I4MDExNzg3Nw==&mid=2659100402&idx=1&sn=dfe83cbf866b35bb2ec 1 “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress”, China 929e811f67b20&chksm=f03751e8c740d8fe1c652d58c517ea2fc6d6dce44d3 Daily, 2017, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnati 5d545536c2414ca18c0b9e90195b165cb&mpshare=1&scene=1&srcid=1103k onalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm. kON3Ss6M7gP5hmNjzP0&pass_ticket=36WqxVoGzQCpuqY1%2BgaIuOfp 2 , “Deeply Studying and Implementing Xi Jinping’s mzgVo3iVCRpCCvOFwtuZm4wdmyBFvDWr6TT2HI1V#rd. 深 Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” ( 8 Jin Minqing, “In a New Era Preserve and Develop the Action Guide of 入学习贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想 ), 6 November 2017, Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (新时代坚持和发展中 available at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2017-11/06/ 国特色社会主义的行动指南), Daily, 24 October 2017, available at nw.D110000renmrb_20171106_1-02.htm. http://gxrb.gxrb.com.cn/html/2017-10/24/content_1442386.htm. 党建网微平台 3 Party Building Online Micro-Platform ( ), “What Is the New 9 Xin Ming, “Correctly Understanding the Change of the Principal 什么是新时代？ Era?” ( ), 2017, available at https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__ Contradiction in Our Nation’s Society” (正确认识我国社会主要矛盾的变化), biz=MzA4OTQ1OTgwNQ==&mid=2680389013&idx=2&sn=3e00e4d47a People’s Daily, 3 November 2017, available at http://paper.people.com.cn/ 997be3a660d449d403d8ca&chksm=8a2d40a7bd5ac9b1f883503b4e0ea7 rmrb/html/2017-11/03/nw.D110000renmrb_20171103_2-07.htm. eee816a2d9ed13f93e82fb5ce2ffe0e55349e57390e7ee&mpshare=1&scene= 1&srcid=1105Ll3dyDusEddCDFa4ajEE&pass_ticket=tZM16MtQNpmBso 10 “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress”, China 9UqXkXRtKjHaNx7TWgaMYIdJXl1S3NnosWD%2BnAVRPSME7AMzIu# Daily. rd. 11 Writing Group, One Hundred Questions for Study and Tutoring on the th 4 Chen Jin, “Shenke Lijie Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhuyi Jinru Xin Shidai” 19 National Party Congress Report (党的十九大报告学习辅导百问) (深刻理解中国特色社会主义进入新时代), People’s Daily, 8 November (Beijing: Party-building Reading Materials Press, 2017), p. 23. 2017, available at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2017-11/08/ 12 “What Is the New Era?” (什么是新时代？), Party Building Online nw.D110000renmrb_20171108_1-07.htm. Micro-Platform (党建网微平台). 5 6 ECFR/240 December 2017 www.ecfr.eu CHINA'S "NEW ERA" WITH XI JINPING CHARACTERISTICS 2017, availableat and QualityEducation”( 16 “Delegatesofthe19 htm http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20171023/Articel01002GN. ( 15 WangDoudou,“RootingRuleofLawBeliefDeepwithintheSoul” 8f3b7e0a2dd9af8&scene=0#rd ebbb6fdddccce6cb64d98113578f197a8cc0b6c84608aa3240a782acd2025 2247487197&idx=1&sn=70bebd6972de51f683d3de0975772727&chksm= at 会治理格局 Governing, andSharing”( How toProduceaGovernanceStructureofTogetherConstructing, 14 JiangMing’anandYangJianshun,“JiangJianshun: Press, 2017). Tutoring Book( in WritingGroup(ed.),The19 Contradiction inOurNation’sSociety”( 13 LengRong,“CorrectlyMasteringtheChangeofPrincipal shows, books,andplays. movies, television better are demanding people that argues Politburo memberandministerofpropagandaLiu Qibao former addressed: also is life spiritual forabetter need The all childrenhaveequalopportunities. and that behind left is nobody that ensuring thereby school”, “having agood to from “havingaschool” a shift entails education” good Striving thateachandeverychildhasfair access to to “see policy. from education comes work. example Another legal citizens, and of education law, the the of propagation the governance istocoordinate for advancinglaw-based group leading established newly the of task the that argue scholars them. Thus, protect legal and consciously to activelydeploy also laws, but obey passively to for people The aimisnotonly cultivation”. of law “rule phrase the this idea using expressed The report needed. is also law” of rule in the “belief enough; is nolonger law the of law: the to novel approach era requiresa new the that scholars argue legal variety of system. legal the principal contradictionalsoinfluences goods suchaspolicingandhealthcare.Thechangeofthe and public guidance with providesthem the toconstructandgovern themselves, while for communities need the Social governancestresses innovation therefore and needs. variety ofinterests have awide that communities into diverse is divided society that idea onthe is based contradiction principal the of concept the that explain They constructing,governing, and sharing”. idea of“together report’s on the Jianshun haveelaborated Ming’an andYang scholars Jiang For example,insocialgovernance,legal the state. argues, thishasmajor policy implicationsforthepartyand Leng Rong, Centre, Research Literature Party Committee’s CCP Central the director of past. Asthe of the than those and produce to measure goods thataremoredifficult public of a set demanding and fractured, diverse more become has society that fact the of acknowledgment leadership’s the Hence, thechangeofprincipalcontradictionmirrors 读本) 19 Socialist Culture”( 17 LiuQibao,“PushingForwardtheProsperous andFlourishing htm 让法治信仰植根于灵魂深处 th https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzI4MDMyODMwMw==&mid= National PartyCongressReport:Tutoring Book( . . (Beijing:People’sPublishingPress,2017). ), ChinaConstitutionalismNet( 13

党的十九大报告：辅导读本 http://news.xinhuanet.com/2017-10/22/c_1121838985. 推动社会主义文化繁荣兴盛 th NationalPartyCongressHeatedlyDiscussFair 十九大代表热议公平而有质量的教育 姜明安杨建顺：新时代如何打造共建共治共享社 ), Legal Daily th . NationalPartyCongressReport: 17 正确把握我国社会主要矛盾的变化 , 23October2017,availableat ) (Beijing:People’sPublishing 中国宪政网 ), inWritingGroup(ed.),The 党的十九大报告：辅导 ), 2017,available ), Xinhua

, 15 - A ), 16 14

associated meanings, and institutions are based on existing are based meanings, andinstitutions associated congress, in2012. 18 the since institutions to and transmitted speeches in his developed has Xi ideas governance the summary of as a past the break with era isnotasmuchatrue new that the PBSC member,Liinanessay Zhanshu notes and how. developed, be should of socialismthat the type identifying practices, thereby on prevailing a theorybased party tocreate courage ofthe the Era”, reflects for aNew Characteristics Chinese with on Socialism Jinping Thought “Xi that argues theory. He of source is the maintains, practice Characteristics Chinese with for Socialism School’s Central Pengzhi ofthe on XiJinping. AsFeng quo centred status of the interpretation an official is novelinestablishing new, it anything truly not create era does new While the Between continuityanddisruption era slogan. implications oftheshiftasbeingadirectresultnew practical the present to misleading be would However, it deepening. to from broadening internal; and to external from quantitytoquality;the a relativeshift implies contradiction principal the of change In variousareas,the dukan/qs/2017-11/01/c_1121886202.htm 程（修正案）》答记者 党第十九次全国代表大会秘书处负责人就党的十九大通过的《中国共产党章 “Constitution oftheChineseCommunist Party(RevisedDraft)”( Congress AnswersReporterQustions Regarding thePassageof 21 “HeadoftheSecretariatChinese CommunistParty’s19 763a96ca4fae87b&scene=0#rd 52e9c740dbffb164195ba2dd2cef2a5e305aa9ba87cee065a76937321 147&idx=3&sn=d0e456c563fafd5b1d2e8fb19120674a&chksm=f037 mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzI4MDExNzg3Nw==&mid=2659100 大旗帜 Journey” ( Characteristics foraNewEraIsGreatBannerGuiding 20 WangTingyou,“XiJinping’sThinkingofSocialismwithChinese rmrb/html/2017-11/09/nw.D110000renmrb_20171109_1-02.htm 代 Characteristics EnteringaNewEra”(全 19 LiZhanshu,“ComprehensivelyMasteringSocialismwithChinese htm ple.com.cn/rmrb/html/2017-10/25/nw.D110000renmrb_20171025_1-14. 跟上时代 18 FengPengzhi,“HaveTheoryAlwaysKeepupwiththeEra”( future. forthe party’s blueprint is the as it years five party constitutionisthusasmuchasummary of thelast people. the and lead party the to unite a manualforactiondesigned also but proclamation a political just not is report the that Firstly, WangTingyounotes underestimated. not be should a shiftthat represents neweraideology the Nonetheless, stresses theimportanceofcontinuity. and practices in existing rooted era is new the perspective, From this developments. for future justification and a principal contradiction,theystartedtoserveasevidence As practicesgaverisetotheneweraandachangeof congress. party recent the during contradiction principal of the change peaking inthe adjustments, in policy resulted society changing a of reality The precepts. and structures ), . People’s Daily ), TorchofThought( ), 习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想是指引新征程的伟 People’s Daily 20 The idea of a new era in the report and the report in the era a new of The idea , 9November,availableat ), ,2017,availableat 19 While the concept is new,itscontent, concept Whilethe , 25October2017,availableat 思想火炬 . ), 2017,availableat 面把握中国特色社会主义进入新时 . 18 As a newly appointed Asanewly http://paper.people.com.cn/ http://www.qstheory.cn/ http://paper.peo https:// 让理论永远

th 中国共产 National .

21 th - Thus,

party

- the term “new era” is a linguistic device intended to provide a common terminological starting point. As discussed A “new type of above, policymakers, local , social groups, and relations” revisited individuals are already reimagining this plan and deploying its language to frame and legitimate their past and future Yevgen Sautin actions. New era terms are already used to restructure the party’s history.22 Western commentary in the wake of the 19th party congress Secondly, the new era is centred on Xi. While its solidification of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been quick to within the party constitution highlights its importance as crown Xi Jinping as China’s most powerful leader since a manual for action for the whole party, concerted action Mao Zedong. Xi’s ascent and apparent ability to push assumes a united understanding of the tasks at hand. Vice- through “historic changes”, as Chinese media describe it, minister for Wang Xiaohui argues that, while has invited the obvious comparison to ’s socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era difficulties in accomplishing his own legislative and reflects the wisdom of the whole party and summarises diplomatic agenda.1 When it comes to Chinese grand the people’s practices and experiences, Xi played a crucial strategy, there is speculation that China will abandon the role in its creation.23 Wang Tingyou contends that this is informal guiding principle in place since Deng Xiaoping an important accomplishment, since countries often fail to of “avoiding brightness, cherishing obscurity” (韬光养晦 modernise due to their of a .24 A signal to taoguang yanghui), meaning a low-profile foreign policy. It both cadres and society, the meaning of the new era is tied may now turn to favour a more visible and activist posture. to Xi, rooted in China’s achievements of the last five years, and cemented in the party constitution.25 In light of this, the This chapter surveys several senior Chinese academics significance of studying the party constitution is to build and think-tank researchers at China’s most prominent unity around Xi’s thinking and to integrate this thinking institutions. While by no means exhaustive, the selected into the process of modernising socialism.26 authors carry influential voices and represent research centres that are often asked to inform and communicate It would be a mistake to dismiss the new era as just an the CCP’s latest foreign policy thinking. These Chinese empty phrase. The new era should be conceived of within authors generally do not consider the 19th party congress to the framework of its inception, underlying past practices, be a watershed moment for the party’s approach to foreign and the vision it serves. Formalised during the 19th party policy, but rather to be another milestone on the long path congress, the ideology of the new era will have a considerable of China’s “rejuvenation” and its creation of a “new type of impact on policymaking in areas ranging from , great power relations.”2 social governance, and judicial reform to party-building and other areas. Feng Zhongping, deputy director of the prominent China Institutes of Contemporary 22 Qinggang, “The Focal Point of Deepening Party History Research” (深 (CICIR), argues that the overarching foreign policy goal of 化党史研究的着力点), Study Times, 17 November 2017, available at the Xi era continues to be establishing the aforementioned http://dzb.studytimes.cn/shtml/xxsb/20171117/30252.shtml. new type of big power relations.3 When it comes to the 23 “Authoritative Explanation: Why Does the New Thought Bear Xi Jinping’s Name?” (权威解读：新思想为何以习近平的名字命名？), Party , in order to avoid the so-called Building Online Micro-Platform (党建网微平台), 2017, available at Trap, China has agreed to unconventional diplomatic https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzA4OTQ1OTgwNQ==&mid=26 80388738&idx=3&sn=6afb4e355702fa0f91452c091b5151d7&chksm= formats such as the Mar-a-Lago Trump-Xi and 8a2d41b0bd5ac8a637b5365edd42e37124959c32770555b77a5c514e06 the earlier Obama-Xi summit at in California.4 0a6db309a73eafd623&scene=0#rd. Feng sees these summits as evidence that Chinese foreign 24 Wang Tingyou, “Wang Tingyou: Writing the Leaderhip Core into the Party Constitution Is the Requirement of the Era and the People” (汪亭 policy is willing to be creative, breaking out of traditional 友：领导核心写入党章是时代和人民的需要), 2017, available at https:// diplomatic constraints. mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzI4MDExNzg3Nw==&mid=2659100246&id x=4&sn=c57611ac74712e895118ccf9ed72f90e&chksm=f037514cc740d85adc caf0d129e3a828eaf552a5842085cc3643b37d8ef0d960fd7977f4339b&mpsh are=1&scene=1&srcid=1103z384gaOLAS41dv6sm8Tp&pass_ticket=yCu9Yq teCl4wuYbod%2B4CUS2MV4mKdLwVKRUDJCldpw5KGlkzMufxOHRWQt tfpLQ%2B#rd. 1 “Historic changes” as found in the , for instance, available at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1070429.shtml. 25 “Birth Record of the New Party Constitution” (新党章诞生记), Party Member (共产党员), 2017, available at https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz= 2 “New type of great power relations” has been explicitly championed by MzA4ODUzNjAxOA==&mid=2671062117&idx=3&sn=6fb8fcce7c02c3eda17 Xi Jinping, starting in late 2013. For more information, see: https://www. 6c453da6940e2&chksm=8ae92ad8bd9ea3ce063e1b723092fe35aea9161f57c brookings.edu/opinions/chinese-enthusiasm-and-american--over- 427418e86d0f8423909d7f9703c02674d&mpshare=1&scene=1&srcid=1103 the-new-type-of-great-power-relations/. xF27mHEGzB6bQtKYv6qn&pass_ticket=NumMXpq%2FZ2HE5xIUh0LsiP 3 Feng Zhongping (冯仲平), “The Heavy Burden of China’s Foreign Policy in OsZNq3TjwMqxJ4GHYgEifWDZyXJqKYhP7ULehJzDDt#rd. the New Era” (新时期中国外交任重道远. Xinshiqi zhongguo waijiao - 26 “Decision Regarding the “Chinese Communist Party Constitution zhongdaoyuan), CICIR Xiandai Guoji , August 2017. Hereafter, “The (Revised Draft)” of the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Heavy Burden of China’s Foreign Policy in the New Era”. Party” (中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会关于《中国共产党章程（修正案） 4 For a of the term “Thucydides Trap” and the limits of its 》的决议), Xinhua, 2017, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/2017- applicability to Sino-US relations, see Arthur Waldron’s article, available at 10/24/c_1121850042.htm. http://supchina.com/2017/06/12/no-thucydides-trap/. 7 8 ECFR/240 December 2017 www.ecfr.eu CHINA'S "NEW ERA" WITH XI JINPING CHARACTERISTICS to CompensateforitsWeaknesses”( 6 LiZhiye( www.ciis.org.cn/chinese/2017-10/23/content_40047927.htm Institute ofInternationalStudies,23October2017,availableat bufen zuidaliangdianshimingquetichutuidonglianggegoujian),China 部分最大亮点是明確提出推动两个构建 Congress ReportClearlyPromotestwoConstructs( 5 ChenXulong( commentary onBRI, that China’s stressing development is anunmistakable changeintonefromearlier but there projects, on specific on BRI, is notmuch detail writing there Aswithmost international opennessanddevelopment. Initiative (BRI) asChina’s signature contributionto and Road( China portraysthe“Belt xianzai hepingjianshezhe). ( and order a creatorofpeace and thatitwillnowbecome order, world the protects that Chinaalready underscored island.” can bean“isolated 21 in the in particularthat stressing problems cannotbesolvedunilaterally,withChenXulong that global all emphasised authors surveyed Chinese opening. The and further to globalisation is committed Xi’s remarks at the19 China’s globalroleandlimitations US-China relations. with Xiarecrucialtosolvingalitanyofproblemsfacing of Trump’s view thatgoodpersonalrelations opposite the exactly to be foreign leaders.Thisappears between good interpersonal relations tangible gains overthefarless concrete to importance greater much attaches leadership Chinese of Li’sthe commentary isthat standing. Theupshot or achancetoimprove development, China’s international consolidation,economic as state such national interests concrete , all served in the Deng under opening 1970s, orreformand in the US relations withthe of , in the normalisation Sino- split subsequent , in the treaty Sino-Soviet friendship signing ofthe the as such leadership, CCP the by enacted changes policy relations”. power of great type call a“new came to Xi has arrivedatwhat China’s foreignpolicy how of overview a historical CICIR, ofpresents Li Zhiye,director great powerrelations. and“fairtreatment”asthefoundationfor “mutual respect” the importanceof a Xinhuareporter,alsoemphasises to speaking onInternational Studies, China Institute director oftheforeignministry-affiliated Chen Xulong, models. development different for respect and integrity, territorial for respect respect, mutual by guided as future new keywordsemerged.FengseesSino-USrelationsinthe 19 to the is notnew,butinthelead-up relations” of greatpower type fora“new Beijing’s support Promotes twoConstructs”. 7 “OnChineseForeignPolicy,the19th PartyCongressReportClearly Strengths toCompensateforitsWeaknesses”. Guanxi, August2017.Hereafter,“China’s ForeignPolicyneedstoPlayits guo duiwaizhanluebujuxuyangchangbuduan), CICIRXiandaiGuoji 以前和平维护者，现在和平建设者 李志业 陈须隆 ), “China’sForeignPolicyneedstoPlay toitsStrengths ), “OnChineseForeignPolicy,the19 5 th party congress stressed that China partycongressstressed 中国对外战略布局需扬长补短 7 Tothatend,ChenXulong Shijiuda baogaozhongguowaijiao yiqianweihuzhe, heping st 一帶一路 century no country century 十九大报告中国外交 th 6 Li stresses that Listresses party congress th yidaiyilu)” Party . http:// zhong

-

prominently in Chinese debates among international debates in Chinese prominently figure US of Trumpandthe Discussions starkly realistterms. continue toviewtheworldin actually experts foreign policy Union, Chinese European the as partners such strategic and neighbours with relations forging “win-win” talk of that foralltheofficial ruanshili).” Such thinkinghighlights ( power soft style can have“Chinese it before itshardpower Thus Chinafirsthastostrengthen of hardpower. foundations on the solely rests power soft as alackofsoftpower.In West’s his view,however,the of China’sforeignpolicy weaknesses one ofthe Li identifies global power. there isstillalotofwork to bedonemakeChina a true on piracyandterrorism, Organisation andcooperation Security the through results have brought efforts international aspirations. He saysthat,althoughChina’s its all meet to abilities lacks the country still the that out Li Zhiyepoints responsibility, global greater part toassume on China’s an eagerness internationally. Despite model in promotingitsdevelopment China’s growingconfidence as well.This points to states countries butdeveloped notonlyfordeveloping is useful and experience model 8 “TheHeavyBurdenofChina’sForeign PolicyintheNewEra”. both theUSandJapan. Wei Da, a more liberal-minded contain help thatNorthKoreacould believe China. They a strong,nuclear-armedNorth Koreaasanetpositivefor Korean nuclearimpasse,hardlinevoicesinChinasee the to In regard stand-off. the to importance of similar level a not attached authorshavegenerally region, Chinese -Pacific for Washingtoninthe issue pressing most the the NorthKoreannuclearandmissileprogrammesare China that to communicated US hasclearly the Although The Koreanpeninsula BRI summitinBeijingwasseenassomewhatencouraging. latest of view. Japan’satthe Beijing’s pointparticipation come aroundto and Tokyowill Delhi that bothNew hope is there thorny, but particularly andJapanasbeing ( and adjusttoChina’s rise toprominence not willingtoaccept that theUS,EU,India, Feng alsobelieves and Japan are a strategicpartnershipwiththeEU. to forge a desire express and they US) the not so of do (they for global as aforce EU the describe commentaries unfavourable towardstheChinesepeople. and with Chinathatarebothdeep-seated “values” issues in bringingup persist states member individual China, but vis-à-vis ” strategic “American-style vocal frustrationwiththeEU,whichmightnothavean also is There significantly. changed not China has towards policy US policy, for an“AmericaFirst” called Trump has that, while relations scholars. Feng Zhongpingbelieves 崛起 jueqi).singleoutrelationswith Several publications 中式软实力 8 Nevertheless, zhongshi scholar, on the other hand, that such a position is Feng Shaolei, a professor at Normal University, dangerously irresponsible, and that in fact North Korean believes that China has to tread delicately with Russia due nuclear provocations US and Japanese goals.9 In Wei to the latter’s sensitivities about its economic disparity with Da’s view, China has limited room for manoeuvre. Further China.13 Feng also believes that conflict between the US provocation by , such as testing a hydrogen and Russia is not necessarily in China’s interest as some bomb above ground, Wei Da believes, will pose a difficult Chinese Russia-watchers argue. China relies on global choice for China, between implementing sanctions, which stability and markets and would be adversely affected by could truly cripple the North Korean regime, or considering further escalation. a military “resolution” to the crisis. Out with the old, in with the ... old? Taiwan In the era of Trump and Brexit, the Chinese authors Most Chinese analysts continue to see Taiwan as a major surveyed are not shy about criticising Western countries problem for Beijing. The standard view is that third parties for their volte-face on or the US withdrawal (the US or Japan) are using differences in cross-strait from the on climate change. There is also relations as a means to put pressure on China.10 Wei Da undeniably a growing confidence that China can assume offers a more nuanced argument on Taiwan.11 The author a leading global role and serve as an example not just for believes that in the next five years there is the possibility of developing countries but for the entire world. Despite a military conflict over Taiwan but only if the US disengages the buoyed expectations of the Xi era, Chinese experts from cross-strait relations. He identifies China’s growing nevertheless admit that China is still lacking the means overall strength and the complete paralysis in cross-strait to fully realise its ambitious goals, something which is relations as possible factors. However, the potential scenario particularly true in defence and diplomacy. For the past two where military use of force is most likely would involve the decades, the overarching theme of reporting on China has US becoming a completely disinterested, neutral party to been that of China’s rise. It appears that China has already the conflict. The author Wei Da concludes that as long as risen – but can China now provide international leadership the status quo persists, Beijing will continue to support a beyond just ? Beijing’s rigid Sea stance, peaceful unification. border tensions with India, and growing criticism of the EU and US suggest that the “new type of great power relations” Russia proposed by China looks a lot like the old one.

Sino-Russian relations have received more attention in the Western press following the growing international isolation of Russia. Feng Zhongping too makes a special note of Russia and , whom Xi has met 22 times according to the author. China and Russia have formed a strategic partnership, but the framework for the partnership is “no alliance, no confrontation, not directed at a third party” (不结盟，不对抗，不针对第三国 bujiemeng, buduikang, buzhendui disanguo). Beijing welcomes more cooperation, especially on economic matters, but there is no desire for an alliance with Moscow. Wang Honggang, a researcher from CICIR, urges China to study closely the recent deterioration of relations between Moscow and Washington, suggesting that China is not interested in openly challenging the US in a Putinesque fashion.12

9 Wei Da (伟达) “After the 19th Party Congress, three (Chinese Foreign Policy) Tendencies” (十九大后三套关系走向 shijiuda hou santao guanxi zouxiang), Lianhe Zaobao, 5 October 2017, available at http://www.chi- naelections.org/article/1970/246940.html. Hereafter, “After the 19th Party Congress, three (Chinese Foreign Policy) Tendencies”. 10 “China’s Foreign Policy needs to Play to its Strengths to Compensate for its Weaknesses”. 11 “After the 19th Party Congress, three (Chinese Foreign Policy) Tendencies”. 13 Feng Shaolei (冯绍雷), “Dealing with Russia, China doesn’t Flaunt its Position” (面对俄罗斯，中国一点都不摆阔 miandui eluosi, zhongguo yid- 12 Wang Honggang (王鸿刚), “Seeking New Type of Strategic ian dou bu baikuo) quanqiuhua weilai: zhonguo de mianlin de tiaozhan Opportunities” (寻求新型战略机遇 xunqiu xinxing zhanlue jiyu), CICIR yu juese zhuanhuan, 2 November 2017, available at http://mp.weixin. Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, August 2017. qq.com/s/rpCgvXNNQhc6VVjiYDHGgw. 9 10 ECFR/240 December 2017 www.ecfr.eu CHINA'S "NEW ERA" WITH XI JINPING CHARACTERISTICS net.com/politics/2017-04/14/c_1120806695.htm Chinese CommunistParty,13April2017, availableat 划 3 “Mid-tolong-termplanforthedevelopment ofyouth”( Beijing, CentralPartyLiteraturePress, 2017. Jinping guanyuqingshaonianhegongqingtuan gongzuolunshuzhaibian), Communist YouthLeague”( 2 “CompilationofXiJinping’sremarksonyouthandthework content/7002d916-bd47-11e7-b8a3-38a6e068f464 1 “ChineseuniversitiesracetoembraceXiJinping’stheories”, closer tothegroupsitistargeting. by getting lives moreeffectively to controlyoungpeople’s the CommunistYouthLeague.In both casesthepartytries and reformof university management over youth:reformof CCP’s supervision the reforms thataimtostrengthen recent on two focus will article overall trend,this To examinethis supervision ofonlinecontent. control overschools,andbetter approaches, better socialist of diffusion education, political of involve astrengthening of theireconomicsituationorhealth.Achievingthisisto improvement the coming before training ofyoungpeople, and moral ideological in April2017, isthe published youth”, of development plan forthe “Mid- tolong-term party-state’s thisdirection,thefirstpriorityof direction. Reflecting groups andyouthmorebroadlyin a positive funnel these to way as the isseen education ideological strengthening perspective party-state’s From the cities. Chinese in large finding jobs having ahardtime graduates to young refers artists, “ant-tribe” ( or the so-called new economy,youngmigrantworkers, actors ofthe ( force” a “negative become that could groups on specific focus and China’syouth. Communist Party(CCP) Chinese the between relationship of aclose necessity the emphasising published, was League” Youth Communist the work of the and remarks onyouth Congress a“CompilationofXiJinping’s In run-uptothe the to bringtheparty-statecloseryoungergeneration. broader tendency,whichstartedbeforethe19 is partofa work oncampuses ideological strengthened Jinping Thought”. “Xi to thisnew dedicated institutes research of creation the announced universities 20 Chinese more than the partyconstitution.In the daysthatfollowed Era”, which wasincorporatedinto Characteristics foraNew Chinese on Socialismwith Thought Jinping “Xi the (CCP) introduced Party Communist Chinese for the principles guiding on the Jinping’s report Xi president 19 At the 负能量 2016—2025 Jérôme Doyon and China'syouth Xi JinpingThought , fu nengliang) if not managed properly, including: properly, if notmanaged nengliang) , fu th 年 party congress in October 2017, Chinese congress inOctober party , 30October2017,availableat , zhongchangqiqingnianfazhanguihua 2016-2015nian),

2 Xi called in particular for the party to party in particularforthe called Xi 习近平关于青少年和共青团工作论述摘编 3

https://www.ft.com/ . 蚁族 . http://news.xinhua , yizu), which 中长期青年发展规 th

Congress, 1 , Xi This -

recently by the CCP’s disciplinary organ. by the After aninquiry recently highlighted universities within issues the The goalistosolve opinion. online public on socialmediaandtosupervise present in ordertobemore branches byusingnewtechnologies party of the supervision methods traditional political the Italsocallsforfurtherintegrationof among students. members more recruit and departments, and classes CCP grassrootsorganisations,inthevarious develop should Partycommittees party organisationsoncampuses. of strengthening for the alsopushed meeting December of universityteaching,the content In addition tothe and culturalexceptionalism. historical to playin preserving Chinese were henceforth universities role the out set values, this Western of influence the counter CCP in2013 to the by launched speak” successors”. “socialist its functionoftraining the system, emphasising country’s university the vision of leadership’s the detailed workinuniversities”.Thepresident thought political 2016,on In December “National meeting Xi chairedthe Universities underCCPleadership road-for-xis-mass-line-campaign-an-assessment/ October 2014,availableat the RoadforXi’sMassLineCampaign: AnAssessment,”ChinaBrief,23 the masses.Formoredetailsonthisissue see:JérômeDoyon,“TheEndof members andcadres,toensurethat theorganisationremainscloseto guiding) wasannouncedinDecember 2012.Itaimstodisciplineparty 8 The“Eight-pointRegulation”( t20170615_101124.html CCDI, 16June2017,availableat 届中央第十二轮巡视公布 7 “Publicreportforthe12 education process”. 6 “XiJinping:TheWorkonPoliticalThoughtshouldrunthroughtheentire including, forexample,“universalvalues”or“pressfreedom”. listed anumberoftopics,whichwerenottoberaisedinpublicdiscussions, in 2013ordertoresisttheinfluenceofWesternvalues.Thecampaign 5 The“sevendon’tspeak”( process” Work onPoliticalThoughtshouldrunthroughtheentireeducation com//2016-12/08/c_1120082577.htm guocheng), Xi Jinping:basixianzhengzhigongzuoguanchuanjiaoyujiaoxuequan entire educationprocess”( 4 “XiJinping:TheWorkonPoliticalThoughtshouldrunthroughthe among cadres. frugality promote to aim is ”, whose “Eight-point the to paid respect insufficient be to considered it what highlighted CCDI cited ,the prestigious and cadres.In some institutions,includingthe party cells over lower-level university partycommittees organise anyactivities.Itcallsformoresupervisionof and donot empty are often that party cells It describes on campuses. party’s presence the of under-development the criticising reports” “rectification (CCDI) published Inspection Central CommissionforDiscipline the 29 universities, within many months,takingplace lasting 6

Xinhua 4 In line with the campaign of the “seven don’t “seven the of campaign the with Inline 8 , 8December2016,availableat

. , shibajiezhongyangdishi’erlunxunshigongbu), th https://jamestown.org/program/the-end-of-the- 习近平：把思想政治工作贯穿教育教学全过程 roundofinspectionsthe18 七不讲 中央八项规定 http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201706/ , qibujiang)campaignwaslaunched 5

. , zhongyangbaxiang Hereafter,“XiJinping:The . http://news.xinhuanet. th Congress”(

十八 , 7

In addition, the CCDI appears to have gone beyond its simplification of administrative control but also increasing core mission of supervising party cadres, as the reports internal controls, through strengthened party cells, in both also criticise an alleged lack of morality among faculty public and private universities.14 In this configuration the members, in particular at Beijing Normal University. party sits at the centre, supervising both the administrative In fact, this move precedes the introduction of new and academic work of the universities. According to recent supervision committees – under the leadership of the Chinese media the CCP’s centralisation efforts also now CCDI – which will expand the scope of its disciplinary apply to foreign-funded universities.15 efforts beyond the party itself, so as to include all state employees, such as academics.9 For Zhang Lifan, a famous historian who regularly intervenes in both Chinese and foreign media, this “partyfication” (党 In line with these criticisms, and coming a few months 化, danghua) of universities follows a “two-track system” after the “National meeting on political thought work in of capitalist financing on the one hand, as the universities universities”, the ministry of education released a new have to be active in fundraising, and communist-type official document targeting university management.10 It political control on the other. For Zhang, this is contrary aims to transform university management so as to develop to the spirit of an academic institution, running the risk of a world-class higher education system in China. According universities all becoming “party schools.”16 to Guan Peijun, deputy chair of China Association for Higher Education, reaching this goal requires going beyond Reaching youth beyond campus “empty talk” on university and realising that this autonomy is not a counterweight to state intervention, The strengthening of party-state control over Chinese if it is well managed.11 Guan states that the party-state’s youth is not, however, limited to universities. In the last intervention should be rethought in order to be more few years, the party has launched a massive overhaul of its effective. youth organisation, the Communist Youth League (CYL), to improve its performance in reaching and mobilising young Contradicting each other somewhat, several Chinese people. commentators argue that academics ought to have more autonomy to manage their own affairs, for instance As early as 2015, investigation teams were sent to the pursuing their own, independent, research, but at the central CYL as part of Xi’s anti- campaign same time making sure that internal supervision is launched in 2013. The CYL was accused of “becoming strengthened.12 Zhong Binglin is chair of China Association more and more bureaucratic, administrative, aristocratic for Higher Education and professor at Beijing Normal and entertainment-oriented.”17 This led to a reform University. He notes that Chinese universities are too proposal for the League, which was adopted by the CCP dependent on state funding while at the same time they Politburo Standing Committee in August 2016. The lack the necessary internal control and “-constraints” to “Proposal on the Reform of the Central Youth League” manage themselves.13 emphasises the Party’s control over the League and reforms of its leadership organs. It noted that the CYL The new document hence calls for more standardisation was getting farther away from young people and that, to of universities’ supervision, especially when it comes to reverse this trend, the organisation’s units had diplomas and human resources, so as to prevent corruption to be strengthened. Hence a key element of this proposal and “amoral behaviour”. It emphasises the need for is: “shrinkage at the top and replenishment below” (减上 补下, jianshangbuxia). It means that the upper echelon of 9 The establishment of this new supervision commission was announced the organisation, the most “bureaucratic and aristocratic in late 2016. For more details on this issue see: “Discipline and punish: Party power under Xi”, European Council on Foreign Relations, March ones”, according to the proposal, are to be streamlined, 2017, available at http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_analy- sis_discipline_and_punish_party_power_under_xi_7205. 14 “Opinions of the ministry of education and five other ministries as to 10 “Opinions of the ministry of education and five other ministries as to deepening the reform towards streamlining administration, deepening the reform towards streamlining administration, delegation of delegation of power, strengthening and improving service power, strengthening regulations and improving service within within universities.” universities” (教育部等 五部门关于深化高等教育 领域简政放权放管结合优 15 “Beijing vies for greater control of foreign universities in China”, 化服务改革的若干意见), Ministry of education et al, 31 March 2017. Financial Times, 19 November 2017, available at https://www.ft.com/ 11 “Innovation of the internal management structure in higher education: content/09ecaae2-ccd0-11e7-b781-794ce08b24dc?segmentid=acee4131- theory and practice” (高校内部治理体系创新:理论与实践, gaoxiao neibu 99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754ec6. zhili tixi chuangxin: lilun yu shijian), Exploration and Free Views, Vol. 8 16 “Strengthening ideological control over universities, what does Xi 2017. Jinping actually fear?” (加强高校意识形态管控，习近平到底怕什么？, jiaq- 12 “Innovation of the internal management structure in higher education: iang gaoxiao yishi xingtao guankong, Xi Jinping daodi pa shenmen?), Voice theory and practice”; “The academic problem and the administrative of America in Chinese, 20 December 2016, available at https://www.voa- problem in university management” (大学治理中的学术问题和行政问题, chinese.com/a/io-20161219-china-higher-eduction-brainwash/3641857. daxue zhili zhong de xueshu wenti he xingzheng wenti), Caixin, 18 html. December 2016, available at http://china.caixin.com/2016-12- 17 “The 2nd Central Inspection Team Gives Feedback Regarding the 18/101028156.html. Hereafter, “Innovation of the internal management Circumstances of the Special Inspection of the Central Communist Youth structure in higher education: theory and practice”. League,” Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 4 February 2016, 13 “Innovation of the internal management structure in higher education: available at http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yw/201602/t20160203_73930.html, theory and practice”. accessed on 20 February 2016. 11 12 ECFR/240 December 2017 www.ecfr.eu CHINA'S "NEW ERA" WITH XI JINPING CHARACTERISTICS 19 CompilationofXiJinping’sremarks onyouthandtheworkof 2016. 革方案 18 “ProposalontheReformofCentralYouthLeague”( reach youngpeoplebothonlineandoffline. to and methods means new with control political classical increasingly mixes tools isneverquestioned,theparty-state organisationsascontrol anditsyouth of thepartyitself centrality the past, notesZhangLifan. in the Hence, while might losecontactwiththenewgeneration,ashappened concerned thatit deeply appears party-state Overall, the including rapmusic,orcartoonvideos. in CYLpropaganda, culture of pop in theincreasinguse ignored. cannot be that CYL, which forXiisa“battlefield” of the online presence and moreeffective an increased implies also style of change This “cadres”. rather thantheir people young of “friends” the be should CYL cadres by Xi,the transformed. Asnoted organisation isalsotobe of the The working style activities areorganised. wise, tothecellsatcountylevelandbelow, wheremost budget- and personnel given, be to is emphasis more while taps-youth-culture-to-hook-millennial-cadres-idUSKCN1C00HC article/china-congress-entertainment/insight-rap-and-the-party-china- cadres”, 20 “Insight:RapandtheParty:China tapsyouthculturetohookmillennial Communist YouthLeague. , gongqingtuanzhongyanggaigefang’an),CentralCYL,2August , 16October2017,availableat 19 This new working style is now visible now is working style Thisnew 18

https://www.reuters.com/ 20 共青团中央改 .

Notes

13 14 ECFR/240 December 2017 www.ecfr.eu CHINA'S "NEW ERA" WITH XI JINPING CHARACTERISTICS Notes About the authors

Angela Stanzel is editor of China Analysis and a policy fellow This paper does not represent the views of on the Asia and China Programme at the European Council ECFR, but only the view of its authors. on Foreign Relations. Before joining ECFR, she worked for the BMW Foundation and the International Affairs Office Copyright of this publication is held by the European of the Koerber Foundation in Berlin. Prior to that, Angela Council on Foreign Relations. You may not copy, worked in Brussels for the German Marshall Fund of the reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content United States (Asia Programme) and in Beijing at the German from this publication except for your own personal Embassy (cultural section). Her research work focuses on the and non-commercial use. Any other use requires prior foreign and security policy of and south Asia. You written permission. can reach her at [email protected]. © ECFR 2017 Jérôme Doyon is an associate fellow at the European Contact: [email protected] Council on Foreign Relations and a Chiang Ching-kuo postdoctoral fellow, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) China Institute. He works on Chinese domestic politics, including politics, the , as well as issues related to and minorities. He is the author of “Négocier la place de l’islam chinois: Les associations islamiques à Nankin sous l’ère des réformes”, (L’Harmattan: Paris, 2014). Before joining ECFR he was a junior researcher at Asia Centre and editor of China Analysis in 2011-12.

Heike Holbig is professor of political science with a focus on Chinese and east Asian area studies at Goethe University Frankfurt. In addition, she is an associate senior research fellow at GIGA German Institute for Global and Area Studies in Hamburg. Her research focuses on state-society relations, the legitimation of authoritarian rule, and the changing role of ideology, as well as on other current issues at the intersection between China’s political and economic transformation. Holbig holds a PhD in Chinese Studies from .

Jean Christopher Mittelstaedt is a DPhil candidate in politics at the University of Oxford. Interested in the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and law in China, he focuses on the reimagination of state institutions through constitutional development during the Cultural . Mittelstaedt graduated with a bachelor of laws in international politics from , China, and obtained a master’s degree in human and humanitarian action from Sciences Po Paris.

Yevgen Sautin is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Cambridge. He previously earned a master’s degree from the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago. Sautin spent a year as a David L. Boren Fellow, pursuing advanced study at University of Taiwan. Prior to that, he was a junior fellow at the Carnegie for International Peace in Washington, DC.

15 16 ECFR/240 December 2017 www.ecfr.eu CHINA'S "NEW ERA" WITH XI JINPING CHARACTERISTICS • that defineitsactivities: ECFR hasdevelopedastrategywiththreedistinctiveelements andvalues-basedEuropeanforeignpolicy.effective promote informeddebateonthedevelopmentofcoherent, conduct cutting-edgeresearch,buildcoalitionsforchange,and pan-European think-tank.Launchedin2007,itsobjectiveisto The ABOUT ECFR www.compagniadisanpaolo.it Compagnia diSanPaolo This issueofChinaAnalysiswasproducedwiththesupport www.ecfr.eu to individualsorinstitutions. other think-tanksandorganisationsbutdoesnotmakegrants values-based EUforeignpolicy. ECFRworksinpartnershipwith These donorsallowustopublishourideasandadvocatefora national governments,companiesandprivateindividuals. ECFR isaregisteredcharityfundedbycharitablefoundations, •  •  and MabelvanOranje. countries. TheCouncilischairedbyCarlBildt,EmmaBonino on policyideasandhelpwithECFR’s activitiesintheirown withadviceandfeedback forces, membersprovideECFRstaff a year. Throughregulargeographicalandthematictask member statesandcandidatecountries–whichmeetsonce decision makers,thinkersandbusinesspeoplefromtheEU’s distinguished Councilofover250members–politicians, A pan-European Council. reaches out to strategic media outlets. reaches outtostrategicmediaoutlets. debates, and“friendsofECFR”gatheringsinEUcapitals; publishes policyreports;hostsprivatemeetings,public a pan-Europeanfocus.ECFRproducesoriginalresearch; out innovativeresearchandpolicydevelopmentprojectswith researchers andpractitionersfromalloverEuropetocarry ECFR hasbroughttogetherateamofdistinguished debate, advocacyandcommunications. in Europeancapitals,andprovidesaplatformforresearch, European presenceputsusatthecentreofpolicydebates perspectives ofawiderangeEUmemberstates.Ourpan- allowing theorganisationtochannelopinionsand in Berlin,London,,Paris,Rome,SofiaandWarsaw, Uniquely amongEuropeanthink-tanks,ECFRhasoffices Developing contagious ideas that get people talking. Developing contagiousideasthatgetpeopletalking. A physicalpresenceinthemainEUmemberstates. European CouncilonForeignRelations ECFR has brought together a ECFR hasbroughttogethera (ECFR) is the first (ECFR)isthefirst

[email protected] London W1W5PA,UnitedKingdom 159-165 GreatPortlandStreet,London 4th Floor,TennysonHouse, on ForeignRelations(ECFR), Published bytheEuropeanCouncil ISBN: 978-1-911544-40-1 © ECFRDecember2017 European CouncilonForeignRelations the priorwrittenpermissionof commercial use.Anyotheruserequires except foryourownpersonalandnon- way thecontentfromthispublication reproduce, republishorcirculateinany Foreign Relations.Youmaynotcopy, held bytheEuropeanCouncilon Copyright ofthispublicationis its authors. Relations, representsonlytheviewsof of theEuropeanCouncilonForeign positions. Thispaper, likeallpublications Relations doesnottakecollective The EuropeanCouncilonForeign