International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 5

Tribe and Transition in Nigeria: The Role of Ethno-Political Organizations in The Transition from Military Rule to Democracy, 1993 – 1998 Okechukwu Ibeanu* Abstract-- This essay analyzes the role of ethno-political communities and clans of their members. Recognizing their organizations in Nigeria's quest for democracy. It inquires into incipient political aspirations, a 1935 Colonial Report how their interaction in the recent transition to democracy described them as “young men's clubs of a semi-political curtailed and/or exacerbated politically pertinent conflicts among nature”.[2] By the middle years of colonialism in Nigeria, ethnic groups. It is argued that the salience of ethno-political these “young men's clubs” were speedily coalescing into pan- organizations in Nigeria's recent transition rests, first, on the historical process of state making in Nigeria, specifically on the ethnic organizations like the Igbo State Union, the Hausa- insertion of ethnic groups in the structure of that state with Fulani Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa and the Yoruba Egbe Omo pertinent effects. Second, military rule and absence of democratic Oduduwa. These pan-ethnic organizations were to become political structures created "mobilizational gaps" that ethnic important actors in the democratic struggles of Nigerian organizations filled. Both factors are germane to a "conflict peoples against colonial rule, which culminated in dynamic" among ethnic groups at the political level of structures. independence in 1960. The salutary roles they played in this Ethno-political organizations purvey such conflicts. Two factors first wave of democratization in Nigeria, including the shaped the general role of ethno-political organizations in the dynamics of their relations with the colonialists and one transition: (a) the importance of various phases of the transition another, has been articulated by some studies.[3] Nevertheless, programme to power sharing among the ethnic leaders; and (b) divisions between ethnic group(s) associated with the incumbent the precipitate decline of Nigeria into authoritarian rule a few authoritarian regime (in-group) and other ethnic groups (out- years after independence, characterized by nearly three group). Both factors made for conflictive ethnic alliances. Still, decades of military rule, has also been blamed on the political 4 individual interests and maneuvers of civilian and military intervention of these ethnic organizations.[ ] Consequently, politicians alike, who led the ethnic alliances thrown up by the when the military seized power and banned all political parties transition, underlined the specific character of conflicts. in 1966, at least 26 “tribal and cultural associations” were also 5 Index Term-- Ethno-political organizations, transition, banned.[ ] authoritarianism, marginalization, conflict. Still, ethno-political organizations remain central in Nigerian politics generally, and in the recent process of ending I. INTRODUCTION authoritarian rule in particular. Some of the organizations that In this essay, we examine the relationship between ethno- emerged in this process include the Egbe Afenifere, literally political organizations and the transition from military rule to meaning persons wishing to protect their interests in civilian rule (democracy?) in Nigeria between 1993 and 1998. association with others and Egbe Ilosiwaju Yoruba We inquire into both how ethno-political organizations (Association of Yoruba Progressives) claiming to represent affected the process of democratization and how the process, Yoruba interests, the Mkpoko Igbo (Union of Igbos) for the in turn, influenced their role(s) in politics generally, and in Igbo, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People exacerbating or ameliorating political conflicts. (MOSOP) for the minority Ogonis, and the Northern Elders Ethno-political organizations are pan-ethnic formations Forum representing or perceived to represent Hausa-Fulani serving, or purporting to serve, the political interests of their interests. Some of them have coalesced into larger inter-ethnic members, their co-ethnics and ethnic homelands. They could and regional ensembles like the Southern Mandate Group be issue-specific movements or organizations pursuing more which purports to represent all ethnic interests in the south of diffuse and generalized ethnic interests. The political role of the country. The primary objective of this essay is to explain ethnic organizations has been well documented by observers the role(s) of ethno-political organizations in the transition to of Nigerian politics.[1] In fact, by the 1920s southern Nigeria democracy in Nigeria which began in 1986, when the then was awash with such organizations with immediate and military government of General Babangida announced its remote political aims, taking their names from respective transition programme. That attempt was botched, perhaps temporarily, with the annulment of the Presidential election in August, 1993. Three months later, the military led by General Sanni Abacha, a prominent member of the Babangida Okechukwu Ibeanu is Professor of Political Science at the University of government, seized power and promised to return the country Nigeria, Nsukka and former visiting Professor at King‟s College London. He to democratic government in 1998. was also the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the adverse effects of toxic wastes on the enjoyment of human rights.

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 6 II. ACADEMIC SIGNIFICANCE democratization process. For instance, it will be important to Various studies have examined transitions to democracy in know if ethno-political organizations are more active in some Africa, often situating them within the context of the so-called phases of the process than in others. In addition, there is need „third wave of democracy‟,[6] which refers to the recent to analyze the dynamics of their interactions, the character of experiences of eastern European, Latin American and African alliances and counter-alliances among them, as well as the countries.[7] factors determining the patterns of interaction. Although there are still many dissenting voices calling for Discussions of ethnic identity and its interface with politics in more rigorous examination of the concept of democracy[8], Nigeria is a long-standing one dating to the works of the dominant attitude is that the democracy on offer is settled, anthropologists who worked in the country during the colonial namely liberal/multi-party democracy. This attitude, in most period.[14] Many of these studies tended to romanticize ethnic cases, is both a reflection and a result of the renaissance and identities and the cultural, social and political systems of the resurgence of Tocquevillean and Schumpeterian notions of various ethnic groups. Colonial administrators often drew the democracy as institutional political arrangements and practices flak for being insensitive to the culture, history and language of the West, and democratization as the spread of those of the local people.[15] Increased autonomy for colonized institutions and practices to societies unfamiliar with them. peoples, especially in the cultural sphere, was widely This process is also seen as ineluctable.[9] Contrary to this advocated. In time, it was accepted in colonial circles that position, however, the originality of Africa's transitions is colonial rule by proxy, that is indirect rule through local undeniable.[10] Surely, extra-African influences have impacted Chiefs, was not only cheap and effective, but also good for the on Africa's transition, but democracy is not the preserve of any colonized.[16] It has been noted that this policy contributed nation or group of nations to be spread by proselytizing others. immensely to the emergence of ethnic politics in Nigeria.[17] To be sure, the reversals already being experienced in The next generation of studies emphasized the political- democratic transitions in some African countries and recline mobilization role of ethnicity in Nigeria's march to into authoritarian rule in others, suggest to us the need for a nationhood. Nigerian nationalists and expatriate writers re-examination of the democratic content of African influenced by them came to emphasize the positive transitions. One factor that many will agree is central to such a contributions of the various ethnic identities to the re-examination is ethnicity. The interface between ethnicity independence movement and the social and political and democracy has been a prominent theme in extant development of Nigeria.[18] This went against the grain of literature. Studies have focused on the reciprocal impact of mainstream modernization school that was dominant among ethnicity and multi-party democracy.[11] While some argue a Anglo-American writers in the 1950s and 1960s, which negative impact of ethnicity on democracy[12], others argue a viewed communalism (religious and ethnic) as a pre-modern positive (or potentially positive) link. What is still lacking, phenomenon that is bound to decline with technological and however, are in-depth studies of the concrete experiences of economic development. However, the persistence of multi-ethnic African societies in the light of transitions to communalism in “modernizing societies” like Nigeria led later democracy. That is the major concern of this study. In doing modernization writers to suggest that communalism may not this, we must realize that the political intervention of ethnic be transitory and anachronistic, but a permanent feature of groups in politics is not spontaneous. Ethnic groups act in social change in Africa.[19] What is put forward is an politics through their organizations. In fact, we know that „inevitability thesis‟ linking communalism and politics in ethnic organizations sometimes help to invent ethnic identities „modernizing‟ societies. According to Melson and Wolpe, in a in the first place. Such organizations as they functioned in culturally heterogeneous society, the competition arising from Nigeria's transition to democratic rule between 1993 and 1998 social mobilization will tend to be defined in communal constitute the focus of our analysis. terms.[20] What is then needed is a political strategy for Although the role of ethnic organizations in Nigerian politics managing conflicts arising from communalism.[21] has been long recognized by various studies, extant literature Later studies challenged this portrayal of ethnicity and only provides general treatments of this role.[13] There communalism as inherent and permanent in the African way remains a paucity of in-depth studies of the political role of of life. From the early 1980s, a near consensus was emerging ethnic organizations, particularly in relation to party politics. that ethnicity is a historically contingent, fluid and flexible Moreover, existing studies concentrate on the period of social form, which was “manufactured” or invented by colonial rule and nationalist struggles. There is an urgent need colonial administrators and constantly reinvented by the post- to update our knowledge in this regard. This means that the colonial African elite to serve political purposes.[22] level of existing knowledge about the role of ethno-political Specifically, writers on the Left of the ideological spectrum organizations in party politics is still largely incomplete. More saw ethnicity as the creature of the exploitative project of so, there is the specific need to explain the role(s) of ethno- colonialism and the manipulative politics of the petty political organizations in the recent transition to democratic bourgeoisie. In both cases, ethnicity serves a class project.[23] government in Nigeria. This study proceeds from a perceived It is its class purpose that assures the persistent politicization need to examine why ethno-political organizations are active of ethnicity in Nigeria.[24] in transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule in Nigeria, and what their roles are at different phases of the

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 7 Apart from the general link between ethnicity and politics, the The most important significance of this study is that even in more specific interface between ethnicity and democracy has the context of the liberal democratic project, what remains also been a prominent theme in the research literature. Studies largely lacking in existing studies is analysis of the specificity have focused principally on the reciprocal impact of ethnicity of ethnicity in on-going democratic transitions in Africa. and multi-party democracy.[25] Some argue that multi-party There is need to analyze the impact of ethnicity not only on democracy reinforces ethnicity, and therefore there is a the overall process of transition, but also its different negative impact of multi-partism on ethnicity.[26] But others phases.[31] There is yet a dearth of in-depth studies focusing insist that ethnicity has a positive link with multi-party on the role of ethno-political organizations in Nigerian politics democracy, and that democracy offers an auspicious context generally, and in the recent transition to democracy in for the management of ethnicity, particularly through a policy particular. To be sure, a number of studies have recorded the of equalitarian pluralism. These differences suggest a social and political roles played by ethnic associations in divergence of theoretical orientations.[27] Still, perhaps as many West African cities.[32] Likewise, the role of ethnic crucial, they point to the need to study the link between associations in important political developments in Nigeria, ethnicity and democracy concretely, based on the historical especially in the colonial period, has been noted by various experiences of multi-ethnic societies. It is by so doing that we studies.[33] These associations, which arose in the colonial can understand the seeming Janiform association between urban setting, provided a network of communication for democracy and ethnicity, whereby their reciprocal impact is information flow between the urban and rural areas [34], which sometimes salutary and at other times debilitating. has been very essential in maintaining ethnic solidarity and Still, discussions of the link between democracy and ethnicity giving ethno-political organizations a high profile in national only make sense in their conceptual contextualization of politics. democracy. Egwu points out that most analysts do not The growth of ethnic associations has been linked to the seriously address the kind of democracy that transitions character of the colonial urban setting. It has been argued that produce.[28] The tendency is to assume democracy as a settled the high incidence of socio-economic frustration is a central matter, namely its liberal/multi-party form. Certainly, the element in the motivational complex that leads to ethnic dominant inclination among academics, policy-makers and the identity.[35] Moreover, competition for scarce resources and general public in Nigeria is to think of democracy in terms of opportunities among people of different ethnic identities in a its multi-party form. Thus, implicitly and explicitly democracy contact situation is at the heart of ethnic conflicts.[36] Above is portrayed as a once-for-all thing, having to do with setting- all, the pattern of spatial concentration of ethnic groups in a up and operating those institutions of governance associated contact situation has a profound bearing on not only ethnic with developed capitalist countries. This outlook has a lot to conflicts but also the emergence of ethnic associations. It has do with the resurgence since the end of the cold war of been shown, for instance, that the segregation of blacks in Tocquevillean and Schumpeterian notions that associate American urban areas was important in the rise of the Black democracy with institutional political arrangements Power Movement.[37] originating from the West and spreading to the rest of the The colonial urban centres of Nigeria were, therefore, the world.[29] cradle of ethnic associations. First, they offered little socio- It is not difficult to see that this is a re-incarnation of economic security to the teeming population that migrated “modernization”. But more importantly, this conception of from the rural areas.[38] In addition, the scarcity that democracy is predominantly institutional. It only tangentially characterized life in the colonial urban setting led to fierce recognizes the actions of social forces in the constitution and socio-economic competition. According to Nnoli, operation of “democratic” institutions. When Western The net effect of the intense socio-economic competition democratic institutions are merely transplanted into Africa, a arising from scarcity and inequality in colonialNigeria, dangerous gap often develops between these institutions and was the insecurity of individuals regarding their outcome. the democratic struggles of the people. This gap is often filled First, there was insecurity resulting from the search for by various undemocratic and anti-democratic forces, such as limited job opportunities and social services. . . . Once the ethnic, religious and other millenarian and pseudo- political members of a particular group gained access to the best organizations that manipulate and feed on the fears and jobs and other resources, they used their positions to find deprivations of the people. In time, the “democratic” jobs for others or at least to pass on news of job institutions become distorted and converted into instruments opportunities to them. The repercussions were felt in of authoritarianism. The recent case of Zambia, where unequal levels of unemployment, income and in differing President Chiluba has detained opponents and barred his degrees of social status among the communal groups. closest challenger for the Presidency, former President Attempts by each group to escape the negative Kaunda, from contesting the next election, is instructive. consequences of this phenomenon led to the further However, this is not an acceptance of the opposing argument strengthening of communal associations.[39] that cultural and civilizational traits of non-Western societies Second, the character of ethnic residential settlement in make Western values like democracy a source of conflict, both Nigeria's colonial urban centres fostered ethnic associations. A within such societies and between them and the West.[30] policy of keeping the ethnic groups divided and separated became a hallmark of colonial administration. The emergence

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 8 of “sabon garis” (strangers‟ quarters) in the colonial urban possible”.[46] Such parties tend to favour indirect membership centres of Northern Nigeria, ostensibly to “protect” through other primary organizations, even though direct Hausa- Fulani culture from the destabilizing incursions of membership is not abandoned, while nation-wide branches other “tribes” epitomized this policy.[40] replace the caucuses. Zucarelli has shown the emphasis on The net effect of these two conditions is the burgeoning of collective party membership to be true also for Senegal, noting ethnic associations. For one thing, these associations provided that “collective membership continues to be a feature of co-ethnics the much needed social security and welfare political life in this country”, as has R. Molteno for services, and equipped them to compete with members of Zambia.[47] In fact, Gonidec generalizes indirect party other ethnic groups. In this regard, education was particularly membership to the whole of Africa: important, and both Coleman and Sklar, among others, have . . . as in the case of elections, membership is rarely an recorded in details the commitment of ethnic associations to individual act, maturely deliberated. Allowance must be made providing education for young Nigerians from the 1940s.[41] for the structures of African societies, particularly in the For another thing, segregated residential areas assured ethnic traditional environment, which is quantitatively the most associations a recruitment and power base. In time, the rapid important. As in the past, the social group in which the growth in the membership and activities of these associations individual is most closely integrated, that is to say the family, made it possible for them to coalesce into pan-ethnic, national the ethnic group, sometimes the religious organization, plays a organizations such as the Igbo Federal Union (later Igbo State role of capital importance and exerts a pressure on those who Union), Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Organization of the might be tempted to adopt a political standpoint different from descendants of Oduduwa, the mythical founder of the Yoruba that of the group. In fact, it is the group much more than the nation) and Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa (Northern Congress), individual which belongs to the party. . . . To a certain extent, and as such into potential political actors. we may even say that African politicians favour this tendency, The politicization of ethnicity and of pan-ethnic organizations because it allows a manipulation of votes destined to facilitate has been explained in terms of rivalries, sometimes personal their political ascension.[48] rivalries, among the emergent elites of Nigeria's ethnic groups, This is a rather sweeping generalization. Still, it raises a very especially the three dominant ethnic groups - Hausa-Fulani, important issue that is germane to understanding the link Igbo and Yoruba from the 1940s.[42] However, individual between ethnicity and democratization in Africa, namely the rivalries for political power are too superficial and voluntary relationship between the individual and the community, to explain the insertion of ethnic organizations into politics. especially the ethnic group, in African politics. Often the issue For one thing, such rivalries did not always run along ethnic is posed as one of “either or” - either the individual or the lines. For another, it cannot explain the persistence and community. We think that it is more correctly a question of importance of ethno-political organizations in Nigerian which is dominant. Without doubt, the individual is dominant politics. More fundamental explanations attribute the in the liberal democracies of the West, while the community politicization of ethnicity and pan-ethnic organizations to class tends to be dominant in Africa. factionalism within the petty bourgeoisie and comprador At least two strands of explanation have been adduced for this. bourgeoisie in struggles to control production,[43] and the First, some observers attribute it to the limited penetration of character of Nigeria‟s post-colonial, capitalist state.[44] commodity (capitalist) relations, leading to the persistence of The strongest expression of the politicization of ethnic attachments to pre-capitalist formations like ethnic group, and organizations in Nigeria is to be found in party formation. a concomitant non-appearance of the atomized, formally free Most studies have argued the point that in an attempt by the individual.[49] However, if this is the explanation, it should be various ethnic elites/petty bourgeois and comprador factions expected that ethnicity would be higher where there is less to take over political power, they transformed ethnic commoditization in Africa. In that case, the rural areas of organizations into political parties, converted ethnic Africa should experience more ethnicity than urban areas. We organizations into a recruitment base for party loyalists, and know that this is not the case. Instead, there is a wide split existing nationalist parties into ethnic factions. The consensus that urban ethnicity is the dominant manifestation histories of the three dominant political parties in Nigerian in Africa. Rural ethnicity appears as a very recent politics in the 1950s and 1960s namely, the Northern Peoples phenomenon. Congress (NPC), National Council of Nigerian Citizens The second explanation attributes the dominance of the (NCNC) and Action Group (AG) are particularly community and ethnic group over the individual to the illustrative.[45] instrumentalist role of ethnicity to the acquisition and Nonetheless, what is always left out in these studies is the maintenance of power in Africa is widely argued on both the place of structure and type of parties in understanding the link Left and Right of the ideological spectrum. It is the between ethnic organizations and Nigerian political parties. manipulation and use of ethnicity in pursuit of class, elite or We think that this dimension is very important. It seems that individual interests that accounts for the prominence and the tradition of Nigerian political parties, which is not persistence of ethnicity in African politics. While this is not unconnected with their early beginnings, is that of mass, necessarily wrong, for there is clear evidence that politicians Socialist parties of the continental European-type, which is often make political capital out of the ethnic identities of their “directed to organizing as large a proportion of the masses as

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 9 people, we still think that this instrumentalist explanation is colonial era it passed into the hands of a pseudo-bourgeoisie too voluntary to be fundamental. (petty and comprador bourgeoisie), fervently desirous to We argue that ethnic groups are inserted into the state in become economically dominant, this state became for its Africa with pertinent effects.[50] Therefore, their role is not controllers a powerful instrument for acquiring private wealth; reducible to the mere will of politicians. Nor can we reduce it a monstrous instrument in the hands of individuals and their to the extent of penetration of commodity relations. We think co-ethnics for pursuing private welfare to the exclusion of that the state in Africa, or more correctly the peripheral others. capitalist state, is a specific form of the capitalist state. We Two things emerge logically from the above points. One, the also think that the dominance of the community (clan, state in Nigeria principally deals with its members as social ethnicity, religion, etc.,) over the individual is written into the agents of ethnic groups (not as free, individual and equal very genetic material of this kind of state. It is in fact in the citizens), and the power of that state exists as prebends character of this state that the interface between ethnicity and parceled out to ethnic groups instead of a unified, objective democracy, as well as the salience of ethno-political and independent entity standing above society and expressing organizations in Nigeria's recent transition are to be found. the corporate existence of the people-nation. Two, being the exclusive tool of those in power (who are agents of ethnic ETHNO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND groups), defending their prebends becomes a very DEMOCRATIZATION: A THEORETICAL fundamental and charged issue; politics becomes an APPROACH overriding and war-like exercise waged among ethnic groups. We think that the most important gap in existing knowledge Ethno-political organizations are the phalanxes in this war. about the link between ethnicity and democracy, as well as the There is a second, but less fundamental explanation for the importance of ethno-political organizations in Nigeria's recent importance of ethno-political organizations in the recent transition is the under-articulation of the character of the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Nigeria. Nigerian state. The salience of ethno-political organizations in Authoritarian rule is marked by many years of ban on political the recent transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in parties and muzzling of independent organizations and power Nigeria has to be located at two levels: one remote, centres in society. This state of affairs leaves ethno-political fundamental and primary, and the other immediate, exterior organizations as the most potentially effective organizations and secondary. that could emerge quickly and with minimal prompting as The fundamental explanation has to be sought in the character political liberalization is embarked on by an authoritarian of the peripheral capitalist state, which is how we characterize regime. This is so for two reasons. For one thing, their the Nigerian state. First, this state has to be understood in recruitment base exists, fixed and exclusive to them. For terms of the genealogy of capital accumulation worldwide. another thing, the catalyst for them to emerge is readily This state emerged at the stage of extensive (rather than present namely, elites preying on the fears and anxieties of intensive) growth of capital. This is the stage of ordinary people to mobilize them for political ends by raising internationalization of capital. At this stage, there is really no the spectre of ethnic domination. need for the complete dissolution of pre-capitalist social The role of ethno-political organizations varies with different forces, symbols and institutions as in the stage of intensive phases of the transition process. Nnoli identifies four phases in growth of capital.[51] Consequently, there was a great deal of the contemporary wave of transition to democracy in Africa, preservation effect on these social forces, symbols and and analyzes the character, dynamics and significance of institutions in a new symbiosis with capitalism, especially ethnic conflicts during each of the phases. The phases are: (1) where they made it possible for capital accumulation to the phase of pressure on authoritarian regime by pro- proceed without hindrance. As a result, the emergence and democracy forces; (2) phase of formulating a programme of hegemony of the market-oriented, formally free and transition to democracy; (3) phase of implementation of the autonomous individual as the subject of economic and programme; and (4) phase of institutionalization of political organization was either blocked or only partially democracy, including the first post-transition election. actualized. The net effect of this is that the vast majority of According to him, at each of these phases the character of Nigerians, whether in the urban or rural areas, still exist as ethnic conflicts differs.[53] And so also, we think, the role of agents of pre-capitalist social forces, principally, but not ethno-political organizations, which are major purveyors of exclusively, ethnic groups. ethnic interests. Even in the same phase, their role could differ Second, resulting from the history of its constitution as a depending on the course of events. For instance, Nnoli notes specific moment of global capital, we see that this type of state that at the phase of formulating the transition programme, is not an objective force standing above society and holding its their importance depends on whether the option of antagonisms in a balance, like the state that emerged from the constitutional conference or that of sovereign national establishment of capitalism in Europe.[52] Rather, it is a state conference is adopted.[54] constituted principally for conquering and holding down the We propose that in line with the character of the post-colonial peoples of Nigeria. As such, ab initio there was no question of state and the role of ethnicity in its politics, ethno-political evolving and routinizing principles for the non-arbitrary use of organizations will be most active at phases involving power that state by those that control it. And when in the post- sharing. At such phases, the attention of ethno-political

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 10 organizations turns from the authoritarian regime (its phases of the transition process, the targets of their activities overthrow or maintenance) to one another. Once the in order of importance are likely to be as follows: democratization process moves into phases involving the Phase I: The government/regime, pro-democracy sharing of economic and, particularly, political power among organizations, other ethno-political organizations and co- ethnic groups, ethno-political organizations are bound to ethnics outside and inside the ethnic homeland. become very active, raising the tempo of both conflicts and Phase II: Members of the constitutional conference, other cooperation among them. These are most likely to be the ethno-political organizations; pro-democracy organizations, phases of formulation and implementation of a transition and co-ethnics outside and inside the ethnic homeland. programme. If those phases dovetail into periods of national Phase III: Political parties and candidates, co-ethnics inside economic difficulties, the activities of ethno-political and outside ethnic homeland; other ethno-political organizations will be even more marked because of scarcity organizations, members of adjacent ethnic homelands and and consequent competition. members of non-adjacent ethnic homelands. Two factors govern the interaction among ethno-political organizations in the process of transition to democracy. First ETHNO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NIGERIA: at the phase of pressure, i.e. phase 1, the critical factor is the AN ETHNO-REGIONAL PROFILE ethnic character of the authoritarian regime, that is the ethnic The basis of communalism in Nigeria is often unstable and group or groups from which the regime draws support. The mercurial. The critical defining factors may be clan, ethnic battle line is most likely to be drawn between ethno-political group, state, region or religion. However, ethnic identity organizations of the regime and those of the opposition. remains the most politically important factor in communalism. Secondly, at the phases of formulation and implementation of Thus, Nigeria's approximately 250 distinct ethnic groups the transition programme, an added factor intervenes to articulate their interests and attempt to fill them politically. determine the character of alliances and counter-alliances. Still, often, ethnic identity exists in complex relationships with That is, the history of inter-ethnic relations in the country.[55] other factors in defining communalism in Nigeria. Sometimes That is to say, an ethno-political movement is likely to take communalism is defined along the lines of ethno-regional into consideration past political interactions between its ethnic identity, as in the case of the North, South and Middle Belt. At group and other ethnic groups as a basis for cooperation. other times it is defined in terms of ethno-religious groupings However, this factor is less important than the need to capture as in the Moslem North and Christian South. Other defining or retain power. In other words, it is a movement's assessment factors include minority versus majority ethnic groups, and of its chances in the power play, rather than fixed notions of numerous sub-ethnic identities like the Ika Igbo, Egba Yoruba, its relationship with other ethnic groups and their etc. Ethno-political organizations in the recent transition to organizations, that is crucial. democracy reflect this multi-faceted character of Finally, in pursuing its objectives, the activities of ethno- communalism. Table 1 shows a vast array of ethno-political political organizations and the targets of such activities will organizations. The most important factor defining them is vary with different phases of the transition to democracy. At clearly ethnic identity. But in some cases, sub-ethnic and the pressure phase, their activities will be essentially that of regional factors come into play. For example, there is the Ika sensitization and awareness cultivation, aimed at either National Summit and the Ondo Central Forum representing pressuring the authoritarian regime to democratize or to sub-ethnic interests of the Ika Igbo and Ondo Yoruba sustain the regime. At the phase of formulating the transition respectively. At another level, unlike the southern parts of the programme, activities of ethno-political organizations country, most ethno-political organizations in the north tend to continue to emphasize sensitization of the public to the need to represent the interest of the entire region, rather than the protect the interests of the ethnic homeland. At the phase of interest of specific ethnic groups, even if the Hausa-Fulani are implementing the programme, particularly during elections, principal actors in these organizations. Indeed, Sklar has their activities tend to emphasize mobilization. The message is rightly noted that “among the major Nigerian ethnic groups, usually the need to vote massively for the chosen party and only the Hausa do not as a rule form tribal unions, which may candidates that will protect the interests of members of the reflect the primacy of Islam as an integrative factor in Hausa ethnic group and the ethnic homeland. society”.56 In fact, Islam constitutes a powerful integrative Concomitantly, the targets of their activities, that is the social factor not only in Hausa society, but also in the north as a groups or political structures that form the focus of the whole. The dual character of communalism in the North, pressure applied by ethno-political organizations, also vary which involves both ethnic and religious identities, has had the with different phases of transition. Generally, their targets will effect on how both the North and other parts of the country include the following: (a) The government/ regime; (b) other define the region as an ethno-political grouping. Sometimes, ethno-political organizations; (c) pro-democracy the North is defined as the Hausa-Fulani, at other times it is all organizations; (d) members of the constitutional conference; the ethnic groups living in areas above the Middle-Belt, and (e) co-ethnics in the ethnic homeland; (f) co-ethnics outside still at other times the North is used in reference to the old the ethnic homeland; (g) members of adjacent ethnic Northern Region, which includes the Middle-Belt (Figs. 2 and homelands; (h) members of non-adjacent ethnic homelands; 3). (i) political parties and candidates for elections. At the various

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 11 Another important but more recent factor in defining of origin could, and does become, an important factor in communalism in Nigeria is State of origin. States are political- understanding the activities of ethno-political organizations. administrative units that replaced the erstwhile Regions from For instance, during the Babangida transition, among the four 1967. In that year, 12 States were created out of the four Igbo States of Abia, Anambra, Enugu and Imo, only Anambra Regions. Since then, the number has risen to 36 with the State consistently voted for the Social Democratic Party. The creation of six new States in 1996. State identities interlock other three States supported the National Republican with ethnic identities in the political arena. As a result, State Convention (see Figs. 4 and 5).

T ABLE I SOME RECENT ETHNO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NIGERIA Organization Interest 1. Anioma Forum Western Igbo 2. Atunluse Yoruba 3. Committee for Unity and Understanding South 4. Eastern Mandate Union South East 5. Egbe Afenifere Yoruba 6. Egbe Ilosiwaju Yoruba Yoruba 7. Egbe Omo Yoruba Yoruba 8. Esan Forum Esan 9. Idoma National Forum Idoma 10. Igbo Elders Forum Igbo 11. Ijaw Nationality Protection Organization Ijaw 12. Ijaw National Congress Ijaw 13. Ika National Summit Ika-Igbo 14. Ire-Akari Yoruba 15. Izu Umunna Igbo 16. Lagos Democratic Forum Lagos Yoruba 17. Middle Belt Congress Middle Belt 18. Mkpoko Igbo Igbo 19. Movt. for the Survival of Ogoni People Ogoni 20. New Dimension Yoruba 21. Nigerian Peoples' Movement South-East 22. Northern Committee of Elders North/Hausa-Fulani 23. Northern Consultative Group North/Hausa-Fulani 24. Northern Elders Forum North/Hausa-Fulani 25. Oha-na-eze Igbo 26. Ondo Central Forum Ondo Yoruba 27. Southern Mandate Group South 28. Southern Minorities Group Southern Minorities 29. Yoruba Obas and Leaders of Thought Yoruba

Fig. 1. Principal ethnic groups in Nigeria Fig. 2. Different Perceptions of the North – Old Northern Region

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 12 depending on the course of events. Certainly, the phase of political liberalization by the military is conducive to the emergence of ethno-political organizations. The many years of ban on political parties and muzzling of organized opposition by the military encouraged the prompt emergence of pan- ethnic organizations during the transition (Table 1). During the General Babangida transition, as soon as the ban on political activities was lifted on 3rd May, 1989, about forty political associations emerged. Most of them were linked to existing ethnic organizations. Out of this number, however, only 13 sought registration with the National Electoral Commission (NEC) as political parties later that year. The breakneck speed at which these associations emerged had convinced many observers of the activities of ethnic organizations prior to May, 1989. Indeed, in refusing recognition to all the 13 Associations that applied for Fig. 3. Different Perceptions of the North – Excluding the Middle Belt registration as political parties, Babangida, the then military Head of State, accused them of operating “underground” prior to the lifting of the ban on politics, and of “relapse” into ethnic cleavages. According to him, Some of the most disturbing aspects of the political process during the pre-registration period were indeed sonorous echoes of our historical experience. Old lines of cleavage- ethnic, geopolitical, religious and class- surfaced in bold relief in the new political associations. These "new breed" associations, which were expected to transcend those lines of cleavage and promote issue-based politics, instead relapsed into debilitating in-fighting, each group within itself.[57] However, it should be pointed out right away that even though the ethnic factor remained strong in the emerging parties during the Babangida transition, many discerning observers believe that he only used it as an excuse to pursue his “hidden Fig. 4. States of Nigeria: Ethnic Distribution transition programme”, which was his self succession in office. Nnoli has noted that at the phase of formulating the transition programme their importance depends on whether the option of constitutional conference or that of sovereign national conference is adopted.[58] Indeed, the Nigerian experience strongly suggests that the constitutional conference approach to transition in Africa, more than the sovereign national conference, is very conducive to the activities of pan-ethnic organizations and ethnic conflicts. The National Constitutional Conference (NCC) set up by the Abacha government in 1994 quickly adopted an ethnic character as the “leaders” of various ethnic groups and other constructed ethno-geographic groupings (Southern Minorities, Southeastern Minorities, South, Middle Belt, Far North, etc.) formulated their platforms for the conference. The bulk of the Yoruba elite represented by the Egbe-Afenifere and Egbe-Ilosiwaju Yoruba, called for a boycott of the NCC on account of the annulment of the June

Fig. 5. Ethnic support for the SDP and NRC in the 1993 Presidential election 12 Presidential election won by Chief Abiola. In April 1994, the Conference of Yoruba Obas (Yoruba traditional rulers) III. ETHNO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PHASES and Leaders of Thought met in Ibadan under the chairmanship OF TRANSITION of Oba S. K. Adetona, Awujale of Ijebuland (ruler of Ijebu The role of pan-ethnic organizations in the transition is Yorubas). The conference was attended by twenty-four other contextualized by the different phases of the transition Obas and representatives of Egbe-Afenifere, Egbe-Ilosiwaju process. Even in the same phase, their role could differ Yoruba, Lagos Democratic Forum, Ire-Akari and other ethnic

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 13 organizations in Yorubaland. The communiqué from the authoritarian regime (its overthrow or maintenance) to one meeting insisted that “the June 12 1993 election should be another. Once the democratization process moves into phases declared, and the winner of that election sworn in; it is only involving the sharing of economic and, particularly, political after that has been done that the Yoruba race will participate power among ethnic groups, pan-ethnic organizations are in any conference; The Yoruba race should present a single bound to become very active, raising the tempo of both memorandum to such constitutional conference”.[59] The conflicts and cooperation among them. By Nnoli's taxonomy, Ibadan conference also set up a committee of 18 persons, with these are most likely to be the second and third phases during Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the former Head of the Economic which a transition programme is formulated and implemented. Commission for Africa, as Chairman, to harmonize the In the period leading up to the 1993 Presidential election, positions of the various Yoruba groups. there were strong indications that an alliance between Igbos At about the same time, Igbos were also articulating their and Yorubas would emerge to challenge the Hausa-Fulani. position on the Constitutional Conference through two Calls for a “handshake across the Niger” were widely made by umbrella organizations - Mkpoko Igbo (Igbo Assembly) and both Igbo and Yoruba ethnic leaders. This led to the formation Oha- na-eze (People's Assembly). Although there were calls of the Committee for Unity and Understanding (CUU). for Igbos to boycott the Constitutional Conference in Associated with this Committee were such names as the deference to June 12, most of the political big-wigs opted for veteran politician and nationalist Mokwugo Okoye, Chief C. participation and submitted an “Igbo memorandum” to the C. Onoh, former Governor of Anambra State, Major General National Constitutional Conference Committee (NCCC). At (Retired) David Jemibewon, former military governor of Oyo the end of a pre-conference seminar held in Enugu, Mkpoko State, Chief Bola Ige, former governor of Oyo State, Chief Igbo resolved to end “Igbo marginalization”. It also suggested Michael Ajasin, former governor of Ondo State, among many the continuation of Nigeria as a federal system, but to be others. But in 1992, as the Presidential election approached, reorganized along a six-region structure, reduction of the the Babangida government banned the CUU because, as many powers and responsibilities of the federal government, review Southerners believed, it posed a danger to the political of revenue allocation in favour of derivation and the hegemony of the Hausa-Fulani. However, with later restructuring of the armed forces into regional commands. developments in the transition process, notably the National Supposedly, these are the areas that would hit the Constitutional Conference, attempts were made to revive the Hausa- Fulani hardest. Those who attended the conference CUU. Other attempts were made to renew the trans -Niger included Chief Ojukwu, veteran politician Sam Ikoku, Dr. handshake, such as the meetings sponsored by General Alex Ekwueme and Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Ogoni rights Obasanjo, the former Head of State, and Chief Sam Mbakwe, crusader and leader of the Movement for Survival of Ogoni former governor of Imo State. The strongest move in that People (MOSOP). The same general tone characterized the direction, however, is the Southern Solidarity at the National position of the minority ethnic groups, especially in the South: Constitutional Conference, which was able to force through end to marginalization, revenue allocation based on derivation the principle of rotational Presidency against strong opposition and an ethnic minority Presidency. by Northern delegates. A sole agenda did not emerge from Northern or Hausa-Fulani In pursuing their objectives, the activities of pan-ethnic ethic organizations. Its position tended to be reactive to those organizations and their targets vary with different phases of of other ethnic organizations. The main reason for this appears the transition to democracy. At the pressure phase, their to be the fluidity of the North as an ethno-geographical area. activities will be essentially that of sensitization and Sometimes it is seen as conterminous with the former awareness cultivation, aimed at either pressuring the Northern Region, which includes the entire Middle Belt. At authoritarian regime to democratize or to sustain the regime. other times, it is used to refer to the old Northern Region but At the phase of formulating the transition programme, excluding the Belt (See Figs. 2 and 3). Even more fluid is activities of ethnic organizations continue to emphasize identification of “Northerners” with the North. Sometimes, sensitization of co-ethnics to the need to protect the interests non-Hausa-Fulani ethnic organizations accept a “one-North” of the ethnic homeland. At the phase of implementing the (the so-called Arewa) classification. But at other times, they programme, particularly during elections, their activities tend are vehemently opposed to it. This appears to support Nnoli's to emphasize mobilization. The message is usually the need to finding about the fluidity of ethnic boundaries and the vote solidly for the chosen party and candidates that will instrumentalist role of ethnic identity by individuals.[60] Still, protect the interests of the ethnic group. pan-ethnic organizations from the North, such as the so-called Concomitantly, the targets of their activities, that is the social Kaduna Mafia, remain very active in the transition process, groups or political structures that form the focus of the sometimes working for Northern solidarity and at other times pressure applied by ethnic organizations, also vary with pursuing separate, ethnic-specific agendas. different phases of transition. Generally, their targets will It seems clear to us that in line with the character of the post- include the following: (a) The government/ regime; (b) other colonial state and the role of ethnicity in its politics, pan- ethno-political organizations; (c) pro-democracy ethnic organizations are most active at the phases of transition organizations; (d) members of the constitutional conference; to democracy involving power sharing. At such phases, the (e) co-ethnics in the ethnic homeland; (f) co-ethnics outside attention of pan-ethnic organizations turns from the the ethnic homeland; (g) members of adjacent ethnic

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 14 homelands; (h) members of non-adjacent ethnic homelands; called on him to hand over to Abiola. At that point, the (i) political parties and candidates for elections. These country was at the threshold of an ethnic civil war. propositions are partly demonstrated by the character of party A critical factor that governs the interaction among pan-ethnic support during the Presidential election of 1993. As Fig. 5 organizations in the transition process is the ethnic character clearly shows, Hausa-Fulani North voted solidly for the NRC of the authoritarian regime, that is the ethnic group(s) from and Bashir Tofa, while the Yoruba West voted massively for which the regime draws (or is perceived to draw) its major Moshood Abiola. There is a strong suggestion therefore that officials and support. The battle line is most likely to be drawn the candidates ventured into other ethnic homelands only between pan-ethnic organizations of the regime and those of when they have consolidated their control of their ethnic the other ethnic groups, reflecting the inherent tendency for bases. The slight discrepancy appears to be the victory of ethnic competition to be defined in terms of in-groups and out- Abiola in Tofa's home State of Kano. However, Tofa's loss of groups. The aversion of a civil war over the annulment of the Kano went side-by-side his almost total control of the Hausa- June 12 election is not unconnected with the inclusion of Fulani States including Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina and Bauchi. many Yorubas, including number two man Diya, Ministers Moreover, the radical politics of both Kano (and Jigawa) and Jakande, Onagoruwa, Awolowo, etc., in the Abacha regime. Kaduna States is well-known. In fact, we can say that the Later changes in the ethnic composition of the regime, which States voted for the ideological Left of Centre Social saw the exit of many Southerners, particularly Yorubas, led to Democratic Party and not for Chief Abiola as a candidate. even greater anti-North cooperation among Southern ethnic organizations and to what the North sees as a “gang up” IV. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION AMONG ETHNO- against it. Since Southerners see the North, in particular the POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS Hausa-Fulani, as having controlled successive military An important consequence of the character of the Nigerian governments in the country, many leaders of ethnic state is that politics is a primal, war-like exercise among organizations in the South saw the transition to democracy in ethnic groups, using pan-ethnic organizations. The inability of Nigeria as entailing wresting power from the North/Hausa- the state to build consensus and the pervasiveness of state Fulani. violence and insecurity deepen the siege mentality among pan- Ending marginalization by the military, and by extension the ethnic organizations. In fact, the language of their leaders has North, became the clarion call of ethno-political organizations had a tendency to be bellicose. For example, in August 1994 in the South. Their goal, they claimed, was to end the Mr. Forster Ogala representing Ekeremor, Sagbama and exclusion of co-ethnics and ethnic homeland(s) in the scheme Southern Ijaw Local Government Areas of Rivers State in the of things in the country. To illustrate, the Eastern Mandate National Constitutional Conference (NCC) organized by the Union claimed that its goal was to address the “. . . perennial Abacha government to draft a new constitution in 1994, issue of marginalization and the unjust character of the polity warned that Ijaws, according to him the fourth largest ethnic which sets different standards for different peoples, depending group in Nigeria, would go to war if their pleas for justice on their geo-political and ethno-cultural axis”.[62] The same went unheeded by the Federal Government.[61] In like manner, sentiment was expressed by Mkpoko Igbo (Igbo Assembly) in the leaders of the oil-rich Ogoni communities in Rivers State the aftermath of the removal of Rear Admiral Allison threatened to secede from the country on account of the Madueke as Chief of Naval Staff and member of the “exploitation” and ecological damage that oil exploration has Provisional Ruling Council. He was, prior to his removal, the visited on the ethnic group. And in the crisis that followed the only Igbo member of the Council. The Mkpoko Igbo regretted annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election, which the “marginalization” of the Igbo, one of the three major was won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola, a Yoruba, many leaders of ethnic groups in the country. that ethnic group threatened to go to war if Chief Abiola was Obviously, for ethno-political organizations of the South not allowed to exercise his mandate. Even the appointment of ending marginalization became the euphemism and metaphor Chief Ernest Shonekan, also a Yoruba, as Head of an Interim for winning and sharing political power. It is interesting that National Government (ING) in August, 1993 did not assuage marginalization is not posed as the marginalization of civil the Yorubas. Their “Leaders of Thought” met in Ibadan on society by authoritarian military regimes. Instead, it is posed August 31, 1993, declared the Shonekan government as the marginalization of ethnic groups. This is a clear illegitimate and reaffirmed their support for the result of the evidence of the importance of ethnic organizations in the June 12 Presidential election. Four days later, Egba national transition. In fact, the transition is only minimally seen as one rulers met under the Chairmanship of the Olumo of Egbaland from the military to civilians, or from authoritarian rule to (Traditional ruler of the Egba Yoruba) and called on democracy. Instead, it is seen predominantly as formulating Shonekan, who incidentally is an Egba, to resign and hand new plans for sharing power among ethnic groups. Here the over to Chief Abiola. Later in September, Chief Shonekan Presidency is the prized trophy. Often, the target of the requested and got an audience with the Oba (traditional ruler) animosity is the North as a geo-political entity, and the Hausa- of Lagos at which he canvassed the support of Yorubas for the Fulani as an ethnic group. They are accused of having ING. The Oba did not as much as give a reply to Shonekan's dominated the country politically for a very long time, and of address. Instead he handed him a written reply in which he being unwilling to give others a go. Thus, of the twenty-nine pan-ethnic organizations we have identified (Table 1), twenty-

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 15 six claimed to oppose the political domination of the Hausa- former Representative at the United Nations and a prominent Fulani. It is usually argued that of ten Heads of State and Hausa-Fulani leader, provides a rather curious theory of the Government that the country has had since independence, perceived Hausa-Fulani “domination” of Nigerian politics. seven are Northerners, five of them coming from the Hausa- According to him, “God, by a supreme design gave the Hausa- Fulani ethnic group. That ethnic group as a collective is said to Fulani the gift of leadership; the Yorubaman diplomacy and have been at the apex of political power for about twenty-two the Igboman trade”.[64] Another Northern leader, Ango of the country's 35 years of independence. Still, they hold Abdullahi, a Professor and former Vice-Chancellor of tenaciously on power as shown by the annulment of the June Ahmadu Bello University, attributed the North's “domination” 12 Presidential election won by a non-Hausa-Fulani. to its numerical strength and countered calls on the North to Other evidence put forward by politicians from the South to relinquish power by arguing that “Northerners whose only buttress their claim of Northern/Hausa-Fulani domination remaining asset is their numerical abundance are being included the character of the military regimes organizing the blackmailed to accept political arrangements which would transitions (Appendix 1). Nigerians from outside the North further weaken their relevance in their own country and their believe that the North too visibly dominates these regimes. own territories. This obviously should not be acceptable”.[65] For instance, in April, 1996, over two hundred “Northerners” The ethnic domination thesis, which is generally subs cribed to were said to be in very top positions in the military regime, by pan-ethnic organizations, culminated in the decision of the including Directors General, Managing Directors of Federal National Constitutional Conference to enshrine the principle parastatals, Ministers, senior military commanders and the that the Presidency would rotate between the North and South Head of State himself. In addition, even in the emergent in the new Constitution after an acrimonious debate that political parties during the long process of transition that pitched the North against the South. The initial proposal, began in 1986, the North has always sought to corner the sponsored by Southern Delegates to the Constitutional crucial positions. Most of the frontrunners in the Presidential Conference, notably Dr. Alex Ekwueme, former Vice- election primaries that was nullified by Babangida in 1992 President to Shehu Shagari, was to divide the country into six were Northerners/Hausa-Fulani. They include Umaru ethno-geographical zones, and for the Presidency to move Shinkafi, Adamu Ciroma, Shehu Yar'adua, Jerry Gana and around among them. Mahmood Tukur. As if to confirm these claims, of the five Apparently bowing to ethno-political pressures, General Sani political parties recognized by the Abacha government on Abacha in his Independence Day speech on October 1, 1995, September 30, 1996, three are led by Northerners. They are accepted the principle of rotation for not only the Presidency the United Nigerian Congress Party (Isa Mohammed), but also five other “national” offices namely, Vice-President, Democratic Party of Nigeria (Sule Ahmed) and Grass Roots Prime Minister, Deputy-Prime Minister, Senate President and Democratic Movement (Gambo Lawan). The other two Speaker of the House of Representatives. The country has also parties, the Committee for National Consensus and the been divided into six zones for that purpose to wit, North East, National Centre Party of Nigeria are led by elements from North West, Middle Belt, South West, South East and Southern minority ethnic groups, namely Dr. Abel Ubeku and Southern Minorities. The issue however remains which zone Chief Don Etiebet respectively. should be the first to produce the president. This sentiment, However, the other ethnic groups are far from agreed on which was relatively subdued during the Presidential elections which should take over from the Hausa-Fulani. Consequently, of 1993 because of disagreements between the Igbos and Chief Emeka Ojukwu, ex-leader of the Biafran secession Yorubas in the SDP over the Abiola ticket, became very attempt (1967-1970), argued that it was the turn of the East to strong in the aftermath of the annulment of the Abiola victory. produce a President because both the North and West have That singular act of annulment by the Babangida regime had had their fair shares of the nation's Presidency and it was just convinced many Southerners, including Igbos, that ending fair that the East should be allowed to produce the next authoritarian rule must necessarily involve wresting power President. On their part, the Southern minorities, an ethno- from the North. The feeling was that Abiola, a Yoruba geographic group recently “reinvented” from the Willink Moslem with strong, long-lasting business and political ties Commission's Special Development Areas, think that it is time with the North, was denied victory simply because he was not for them to wrest power from the three major ethnic groups. from the North. At least this is what many southern ethno- But, in the southeast the group is split on how to relate to the political leaders made their co-ethnic believe. Still, what Igbo. While the Akobo-led group wants nothing to do with the remained unclear was whether Babangida was pursuing a Igbo, the Lulu Briggs Group thought otherwise. According to North/Hausa-Fulani agenda or a Babangida one. This is even Briggs, “the (civil) war came, we thought the Igbo were our more important when we remember that Babangida also mortal enemies. We have now seen the Hausa-Fulani and the disqualified a number of Northern/Hausa-Fulani Presidential Yoruba and we now know the difference”.[63] On their part, candidates who were poised to secure the nominations of both many Yorubas insist that nothing else is feasible until Chief the SDP and NRC in 1992. Also, pleas from many eminent Abiola is allowed to exercise his June 12 mandate. Northern leaders for Abiola to be sworn in as President at the Hausa-Fulani leaders rationalize their political “dominance” as height of the June, 12 crisis fell on deaf ears in Aso Rock. necessary to balance the domination of the economy and There is a second factor that intervenes to determine the bureaucracy by the South. Alhaji Maitama Sule, Nigeria's character of alliances and counter alliances among ethno-

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 16 political organizations, especially in the phases of formulation Perhaps, it also explains the crosscutting ethnic membership and implementation of the transition programme. That is the of many political parties in the transition process. For history of inter-ethnic relations in the country.[66] This means instance, notwithstanding that many Nigerians perceived the that past interaction among ethnic groups determines whether NRC to be a predominantly Hausa-Fulani party, the party the relation between ethno- political organizations in the on- counted many Southerners, including the party chairman, going transition will be marked by cooperation or conflict. A Chief Tom Ikimi, among its fold. The same was true of the relationship of conflict and/or suspicion is likely to arise if in SDP, which was perceived as having a strong southern the past conflict among two ethnic groups crossed a threshold inclination. There, Babagana Kingibe, a Northerner, though of irreversibility.[67] For instance, the threshold was crossed in not of the Hausa-Fulani stock, was so important that within a Igbo-Yoruba relations in 1941 over the crisis in the Nigerian space of one year he progressed from party chairman to a Youth Movement (NYM) involving Nnamdi Azikiwe, presidential candidate, and having been defeated in the Obafemi Awolowo, Ernest Ikoli and Akinsanya. Akinsanya, primaries, was still able to become Chief Abiola‟s running an Ijebu-Yoruba backed by Azikiwe and Igbos, lost out in a mate. power struggle to get on the Governors Executive Council to Since it is in elections that power sharing is settled in the Ernest Ikoli, an Ijaw supported by Awolowo and other transition process, ethnic organizations see elections as Yorubas.[68] principal to the survival of the ethnic group. It is important The relationship between Igbo and Yoruba ethno-political that candidates sponsored by ethnic organizations garner as organizations in the transition process clearly demonstrates many votes as possible in the ethnic homeland. This not only this point. In spite of calls for a common agenda in the spirit ensures the solidarity of the ethnic group, it is also important of the “handshake across the Niger”, there is still a strong in post-election struggles for power and spoils within the mutual suspicion between them. Indeed, there is an Igbo party. It is not therefore surprising that ethnic bloc voting saying that when a handshake gets to the elbow, it becomes a appears to persist in Nigeria's transitional elections. During the wrestling match. And so it did. When it came to sharing Babangida transition programme (1986-93), in spite of the offices on the Abiola ticket, the trans-Niger handshake turned two-party system ethnic voting was still clearly discernible. into a wrestling match for spoils of office. Thus, some Igbo For instance, Hausa-Fulani States tended to support Bashir leaders, notably Chief Emeka Ojukwu and Chief Arthur Tofa in the Presidential election of 1993, while Yoruba States Nzeribe, both Social Democratic Party (SDP) members during supported Abiola en bloc. Of eight Hausa-Fulani States, Tofa Babangida's botched transition programme, withdrew their came first in 5 (62.5%), while Abiola was first in three. In the support for Abiola's candidacy in the run up to the 1993 Yoruba States, Abiola came out tops in all five States. On the Presidential election, ostensibly because Abiola did not choose other hand, both the Northern and Southern minorities where an Igbo as his running mate. They criticized the Abiola- mainly in support of the SDP, though support for the party Kingibe ticket as Moslem-Moslem, and urged Igbos to support was stronger among the minorities of the North. The Igbos, Alhaji Tofa who chose an Igbo, Sylvester Ugoh, to be his the only one of the three major ethnic group that had no Vice-Presidential candidate. Chief Abiola tried to mollify this Presidential candidate, were mainly in support of the NRC sentiment by his promise to appoint an Igbo to the post of which chose an Igbo, Dr. Sylvester Ugoh, as its Vice- Secretary to Government of the Federation, should he be Presidential candidate. elected President. But Chief Ojukwu mocked this by saying V. CONCLUSIONS that a Secretary is one who serves tea at meetings. More To summarize, this paper has argued a number of points about recently at the pre-NCC seminar organized by Mkpoko Igbo the role of pan-ethnic organizations in the recent transition to in March, 1994, the Izu Umunna (Kindred Meeting), one of democracy in Nigeria. First, the post-colonial character of the the organizations affiliated to Mkpoko Igbo, circulated a Nigerian state and the centrality of ethnicity to this state document titled What Ndigbo must know about Southern explain the prominence of pan-ethnic organizations in Solidarity and a United Nigeria. In it they dismissed the idea transition to democracy in Nigeria. Second, in Nigeria's of southern solidarity, arguing that the Yorubas have always transition to democracy, pan-ethnic organizations were most betrayed the Igbos. It continued: “While Ndigbo studiously active at the stages involving the power distribution. That laboured to build this country, the Yorubas like termites means the stages of drawing up and implementing the secretly, silently and consistently at the foundation of this transition programme. Third, because the Hausa-Fulani of the country, (sic) claimed Igbo prizes under southern North are perceived to be the ethnic group of the military solidarity”.[69] regime in power, and by extension beneficiaries of power, However, the history of inter-ethnic relations between the two alliances tend to be formed between pan-ethnic organizations ethnic groups is less important than the need to wrest power of the Yoruba and Igbo against them, notwithstanding the from the North and to retain same. In other words, it is a problematic history of relations between the Yoruba and Igbo. movement's assessment of its chances in the power play, Finally, behind the front of solidarity and common interests of rather than fixed notions of its relationship with other ethnic the ethnic homeland that Nigerian pan-ethnic organizations groups and their organizations, that is determinant. This put up, class and personal political calculations are central to probably explains the strong solidarity between Yorubas and their raison d'etre. Igbos at the National Constitutional Conference (NCC).

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 17 In conclusion, pan-ethnic organizations as they operated in is suggested is that the dominant form of their struggle is the Nigeria's transition distorted the democratization process, and pursuit of the interests of ethnic leaders, deflected as the this effect is still being felt in the persistence of ethnic general interests of the ethnic homeland. In the final analysis, alliances and agitations against ethnic marginalization. By what we call for are two fold. First, there is need for a clear- professing and pursuing the bogus interests of ethnic groups, cut ethnic policy for Nigeria based on equity and equality of they mask the personal interests of their leaders and distort the ethnic groups. And second, there is need to address and profoundly exploitative character of social relations in redress class inequalities across ethnic boundaries. These are Nigeria, not only among ethnic groups but also among classes. the fundamentals of true democratization in a multiethnic This is not to suggest that the struggle of pan-ethnic society like Nigeria. organizations is always devoid of social justice. Rather, what Appendix Northerners holding prominent positions in the Abacha government, April, 1996 NAME POSITION General Sani Abacha (Kano) Head of State, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Defence Minister (Northerners have been occupying this post from Ribadu to Abacha) Maj. Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar (Niger) Chief of Defence Staff Maj. Gen. Alwali Kazir (Borno) Chief of Army Staff Vice-Marshal Femi John Femi (Kogi) Chief of Air Staff Ibrahim Coomasie (Katsina) Inspector General of Police Justice Muhammadu Uwais (Kaduna) Chief Justice of Nigeria

Justice Babatunde Belgore (Kwara) Chief Judge of the Federal High Court Muktar Mohammed Dodo Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court Dr. A. Yadudu (Kano) Special Adviser to the Head of State on legal matters Adamu Mohammed (Bauchi) Special Adviser on Drugs and Fraud Control Babagana Kingibe (Borno) Minister of Internal Affairs Ismaila Gwarzo (Kano) National Security Adviser Zakar Ibrahim (Katsina) Director-General, National Intelligence Agency (NIA) Air Vice-Marshal Idi Musa Director-General, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Brig. Gen. Ahmed Abdullahi (Kano) General Officer Commanding 1st Mechanized Division, Nigerian Army, Kaduna Col. M.B. Kwuembe (Benue) Principal Staff Officer to the Head of State Col. A.M. Jibrin Aide de Camp (ADC) to the Head of State Maj. Hamza M. Mustapha (Borno) Chief Security Officer to the Head of State Dr. Sadiqque Wali Personal Physician to the Head of State Maj. Gen. L.A. Onoja (Benue) General Officer Commanding 3rd Amoured Division Brig. Gen. S.V.L. Malu General Officer Commanding 82 Division, Enugu (now Commander of ECOMOG Forces in Liberia) Col. Ibrahim Sabo Director of Military Intellegence David Attah (Benue) Chief Press Secretary to the Head of State Hajiya Maryam Abacha (Kano) Head of the Family Support Programme (FSP) Nuhu Aliyu Deputy Inspector General of Police Operations Umar Faruk Abdullahi Head of Corporate Affairs Commission Gidado Idris (Kaduna) Secretary to the Government of the Federation Dr. Hamza Zayyad (Katsina) Chief Executive, Bureau of Public Enterprises Shaibu Kazaure Head of Public Service Commission Lt. Gen. Mohammed Haladu (Kano) Minister of Industries Hassan Adamu (Adamawa) President, Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) Kabir Chafe Minister of State for Petroleum Resources Dalhatu Bayero (Kano) Group Managing Director, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Kashim Hashim (Kano) Director-General, Ministry of Petroleum Resources Yusuf Ali Managing Director, UNIPETROL (a petroleum company) Abba Gana (Borno) Managing Director, African Petroleum (former British Petroleum)

121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS I J E N S International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 18 Gen. Yakubu Gowon (Plateau) Chairman, National Oil Company (Nolchem) Mainasara Sada Director-General, Federal Ministry of Finance Uba Ahmed (Bauchi) Minister of Labour Ahmed Gusau (Sokoto) Sole Administrator, Nigeria Labour Congress Dr. Mohammed Abba Ayi Managing Director, National Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF) Sahabu Dange Comptroller General, Immigration Service Garba Abass Comptroller General, Prisons Service Brig. Gen. Sam Ango Sole Administrator, Customs Service Musa Umar Area Comptroller of Customs, Idiroko Border Post in Ogun State Abubakar Nasiru Comptroller of Customs, Tin Can Island Port (Nigeria's largest Port) Mohammed Abubakar Police Area Commander, Murtala Mohammed International Airport (Nigeria's largest airport) Group Captain Ibrahim Kefas (Taraba) Military Administrator, Delta State Air Vice-Marshal G.Y. Kontagora Air Officer Commanding, Training Command (Niger) Air Vice-Marshal A. Daggash Commandant, Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) Maj. Gen. T.M. Shelpidi (Bauchi) Defence Headquarders Representative on the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) Col. Dauda Komo Military Administrator, Rivers State Col. Yakubu Bako Military Administrator, Akwa-Ibom State Col. Ahmed A. Usman Military Administrator of Ondo State Col. A. Muazu Military Administrator, Sokoto State Col. M. Attah Military Administrator, Anambra State ** The Military Administrators of all oil producing States are Northerners. The Police Commissioners of Lagos, Ogun, Delta, Anambra, Rivers, Ondo and Akwa-Ibom States are Northerners for strategic reasons Maj. Gen. Musa Bamaiyi (Kebbi) Chief Executive Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Maj. Gen. Ishaya Bamaiyi (Kebbi) Commandant, Lagos Garrison Command Prof. Ignatius Ayua (Benue) Director-General, Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Mohammed Gambo Jimeta Minister of Agriculture Maj. Gen. Muhamadu Buhari Chief Executive, Petroleum Trust Fund Dr. Mohammed Liman Minister of Education Lt. Gen. J. Useni Minister, Federal Capital Territory Maj. Gen. A.K. Adisa (Kwara) Minister of Works and Housing Hamza Ibrahim Minister of Power and Steel Kaloma Ali Minister of Solid Minerals Jidith Attah Minister of Women Affairs Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Gumel (Jigawa) Minister of Transport Rilwanu Lukman (Kaduna) Secretary General, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Source: The News, 8th April, 1996

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