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Iran's Reserve of Last Resort Iran’s Reserve of Last Resort UNCOVERING THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS GROUND FORCES ORDER OF BATTLE MARIE DONOVAN, NICHOLAS CARL, AND FREDERICK W. KAGAN JANUARY 2020 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary assem Soleimani’s death, the prospect of further • The IRGC Ground Forces are organized around Q US-Iranian military escalation, and the reemer- headquarters that are meant to coordinate the gence of large protests in Iran in recent months raise operations of Iranian paramilitary forces and sup- the question of Iran’s capacity to conduct military port the Quds Force’s use of proxy groups such as operations beyond its borders while suppressing dis- Iraqi Shi’a militias abroad. sent within them. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces are Tehran’s reserve • Their basing in Iran indicates a primary focus on of last resort for both internal and external security suppressing internal unrest and waging irregular challenges. They fought extensively in Syria in 2015–16 warfare in the rear of an invader rather than on and could be used to crush domestic opposition in defending against an invasion conventionally. the last extreme, although they have not yet fully taken on that role. • Their organizational structure and the pattern of Their capabilities are limited by both their need their operations in Syria suggest that they might to remain available to meet internal challenges to be challenged to coordinate large-scale (multi- regime survival and their reliance on other paramili- division) operations abroad and possibly at home. tary forces to fill out their ranks. They would likely be challenged to handle a large-scale regional conflict at • The fact that the Iranian leadership has not yet the same time as major domestic unrest, potentially had to use them on a large scale to suppress grow- forcing the regime to choose between maintaining ing domestic unrest suggests that the regime still internal stability and continuing some external mil- has a potent reserve force to ensure its survival itary operations. even if the unrest grows considerably, as long as it does not also face a requirement for large-scale military operations abroad. 1 Iran’s Reserve of Last Resort UNCOVERING THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS GROUND FORCES ORDER OF BATTLE Marie Donovan, Nicholas Carl, and Frederick W. Kagan he killing of Qassem Soleimani has focused operation.4 The operational units of the IRGC Ground T attention on the branch of the Islamic Revolu- Forces seem not to have participated directly in that tionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that he commanded— crackdown, however. They appear to be the only cate- the Quds Force. The Quds Force is the IRGC’s gory of forces with an internal security mandate held external operations arm and has conducted the most entirely in reserve during this crisis. well-known attacks against American and other Iran’s leaders committed some of those forces to international targets including, most recently, order- Syria only at the height of combat operations in 2015 ing the rocket attack that killed one American and and 2016, moreover. The regime leadership’s appar- wounded several others in Kirkuk, Iraq, on Decem- ent reluctance to use the IRGC Ground Forces in the ber 27, 2019.1 The Quds Force is only a small portion most severe internal crackdown since the revolution of the IRGC’s combat power, most of which resides and even in the largest military operation Iran has in the divisions and brigades of the IRGC Ground conducted beyond its borders since the Iran-Iraq Forces, however.2 Soleimani commanded the Ira- War suggests that it sees the IRGC Ground Forces as nian effort to help Syrian despot Bashar al Assad a reserve of last resort. We therefore must consider crush Syria’s rebellious population, but Soleimani the scale and capacity of these forces and at what drew on regular IRGC combat units to support the point the regime might have to choose between sup- Quds Force at the peak of that fight.3 porting foreign activities and ensuring its domes- Soleimani’s death calls into question the future tic security if protests worsen as external security of the Quds Force’s dominance over Iranian mili- requirements rise. tary operations abroad. Its new commander, Esmail The Critical Threats Project at the American Ghaani, has nothing like Soleimani’s presence and Enterprise Institute has therefore developed an influence. The regular IRGC forces may come to order of battle of the IRGC Ground Forces to help play a more significant role in shaping and conduct- make that assessment. An order of battle is a list of ing Iran’s activities around the region. It is therefore units, their relationships to one another, equipment, urgent to understand the organization and capabili- structure, leadership, and locations. The basic order ties of the regular IRGC units. of battle presented in this report gives insight into The regime’s response to the most recent round of the capabilities the Iranian leadership apparently large-scale protests in Iran underscores this urgency. values most in the IRGC Ground Forces—specif- The regime moved much more rapidly to using bru- ically the ability to organize, plan, and oversee the tality and lethal force against protesters in November conduct of military, paramilitary, and internal secu- 2019 than it had in any previous protest suppression rity operations beyond the scale of what the Quds 2 IRAN’S RESERVE OF LAST RESORT MARIE DONOVAN, NICHOLAS CARL, AND FREDERICK W. KAGAN Force can handle outside Iran and what Iran’s Law Challenges and Limitations of an IRGC Enforcement Forces (LEF) and Basij can manage Order of Battle inside the country. Laying out even the most basic order of battle of the IRGC Ground Forces is surprisingly difficult. Neither The IRGC Ground Forces in the Context official Iranian websites nor independent analysts of Iran’s Security Services have offered a full listing of the IRGC’s conventional units, although some sites have partial compilations.7 The Iranian regime maintains four overlapping secu- The Iranian government has clearly sought to make rity services, all but one of which (the Artesh) are the task of compiling this information difficult, in fact, present in almost every province of the country. All by ensuring that IRGC units have a minimal internet have some internal security role and have deployed presence.8 This attempt at secrecy is somewhat odd elements to fight in Syria. for a formally structured military organization that is Iran’s conventional military, the Artesh, has army, far from covert. navy, and air force components similar to those of any Important questions thus remain unanswered, such other country’s conventional forces and an air defense as exactly how the various units relate to one another, branch. It is responsible for defending Iran’s territory the relationship between Ground Forces operational and has historically vied with the IRGC for resources units and provincial units (a distinction we will con- and control over conventional military capabilities. sider in somewhat more detail presently), and even the The IRGC also has an air force and naval forces locations of some units. The peacetime manning and of its own, in addition to its ground forces, partially equipment levels of these units are also unclear. This duplicating the Artesh services.5 The two forces had report therefore does not attempt to determine how been differentiated until recently by the IRGC’s ori- brigades might be subordinated to divisions or draw entation on defending the Islamic Revolution that conclusions about the strength or combat effective- Ayatollah Khomeini began in 1979 and the Artesh’s ness of IRGC Ground Forces units in general. focus on defending Iran’s borders, a distinction that has steadily eroded over the past few years.6 The IRGC also controls the Basij Organization—a Methodology vast enterprise including ideological youth move- ments and highly trained, quasi-professional paramil- Iranian efforts to conceal the IRGC Ground Forces’ itary units, among other elements. The IRGC relies on structure have been only partially successful. Ground Basij units to fill out its own ranks. The IRGC itself is Forces units have fought and taken losses in Syria, and further divided into operational units—the divisions Iranian media has reported those losses along with and brigades presented in this report—and territorial the unit affiliations of many of the deceased. Units units, which are aligned with Iran’s provincial and dis- regularly announce changes of command, and their trict boundaries. commanders often speak at local and regional events. Both the Artesh and the IRGC report through IRGC officials sometimes announce which units par- the Armed Forces General Staff directly to Supreme ticipate in certain exercises and often describe and Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, bypassing the Iranian praise the actions of particular units helping in disas- president, who is not in the military chain of com- ter responses. Careful compilation and analysis of mand. The president nominally controls Iran’s gen- such atomized bits of information over several years darmerie, the LEF that falls under the purview of the have made possible the basic order of battle pre- interior minister whom the president appoints. The sented below. LEF is the regime’s first line of defense against pro- This project also used the extensive discussions of tests and civil unrest. the activities of IRGC combat units and their leaders 3 IRAN’S RESERVE OF LAST RESORT MARIE DONOVAN, NICHOLAS CARL, AND FREDERICK W. KAGAN in the Iran-Iraq War published by the IRGC itself to The headquarters’ elements themselves are thus glorify its role in that conflict and Iranian publications likely the most salient parts of the IRGC Ground about their evolving military doctrine and force struc- Forces, as they are intended to be the units of organi- ture.
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