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Te People's Army? "e People's Army? Orthodox Soldiers and 10 Religious Dilemmas in the IDF Alongside the public debate regarding Israel’s ceremony of the state’s 53rd Independence Day social and economic divisions, which emerged (more than a decade ago!).1 along with a wave of protests last summer, another About a month after the Yizkor controversy broke discursive strand has also surfaced. It focuses on in the media, fuel was added by two further events. the impact of religion on Israeli society, with the "e first, the farewell letter of General Avi Zamir, IDF—as a manifestation of Israel’s complex human outgoing IDF head of human resources, in which mosaic—right in the eye of the storm. he urged the curbing of religious radicalization in In late spring 2011, Chief of Sta! Benny the IDF triggering a flare-up among both secular Gantz approved a standard version of the and religious groups. "e second was a study by Dr. Yizkor (Remembrance) prayer in military Neri Horowitz, commissioned by the chief of sta!’s commemoration ceremonies. His decision women’s issues adviser, which also warned against generated great controversy (and was later revised accepting rabbinic demands and further religious at the recommendation of a special committee radicalization in the IDF. In September 2011, the Gantz himself appointed ). "is was the latest in issue was once again a top news story when four a long-standing debate about which form of the religious o#cers’ course cadets were discharged— prayer should be used in o#cial IDF memorial and five more disciplined—after walking out of an ceremonies. Should it be the o#cial version event commemorating Operation Cast Lead, in stipulated in General Sta! Orders and based defiance of orders, when women soldiers went on on Berl Katzenelson’s eulogy in memory of the stage to sing. fallen in the Battle of Tel-Hai (“Yizkor Am Israel,” "e four were expelled from the o#cers’ course i.e., “May the Nation of Israel Remember”), or for refusing orders, failing to return to the hall, the version proposed by Rabbi Goren (“Yizkor and for expressing no remorse for their actions. Elohim,” i.e., “May God Remember”) the traditional Subsequently, other cases have surfaced, some religious version, which has gradually crept into involving local frictions and others of a more military texts, and has been in use since the o#cial ideological-political nature, including street THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 177 rallies and protests, speeches in the Knesset and the People" model advanced by David Ben-Gurion, discussions in the O#ce of the Chief of Sta!. All who maintained that the military was an apolitical of this illustrates the extreme tension that attends state body for which the obligation to serve must the integration and growing involvement of apply to every segment of the population in order religious soldiers in the IDF. to achieve equality. Instead of creating closed units for religious youth, basic mechanisms should be "is is not the first time charges of religious takeover instituted to enable religious soldiers to integrate or IDF radicalization have been raised. "e causes in the army and serve without jeopardizing and headlines that had fueled previous episodes are their faith and lifestyle.4 Ben-Gurion, however, quite similar to this most recent eruption. In 2008, consented to the request of Agudat Israel’s leaders, three religious soldiers were jailed after refusing to and already in 1948 had agreed to postpone the attend a course taught by a female instructor.2 In draft for yeshiva students defined under Toratam 2005, a headline shouted Omanutam (full-time Torah Study as Vocation). “IDF Presents: Modesty A primary At the time, only a few hundred students were Guards.” And there was objective of the classified as such. In 1977, with the ascent of Likud a public outcry in 2002 new pre-military and the establishment of a new coalition led by when Yoel Marshak, the preparatory Menachem Begin, the Haredi Agudat Israel party Kibbutz Movement’s colleges is to was approached to join the new coalition, and as head of the Department provide religious part of those negotiations it was agreed that the of Projects urged kibbutz young people a quota restricting the number of military service youth to aspire to and way to integrate Toratam Omanutam deferrals would be lifted. strive for o#cer roles in the into regular IDF Because of these political agreements, and despite army, “in order to prevent tracks special arrangements introduced into the IDF a situation in which a at its establishment (such as keeping kosher and few years from now the observing the Sabbath), in the early years of the majority of the junior state, the recruitment rate among the National- o#cer echelon would be manned by ‘skullcap Religious was lower than their share of the general wearers,’ [Orthodox men,]” a phenomenon that population. "is was primarily due to their anxiety he called inconceivable in a secular country.3 "ese that military service would lead to the corruption stories and many similar ones in the last decade of religious youth through their exposure to an have captured headlines and provoked agitated undesirable environment of cultural and social responses. Several recent events—their severity, influences they perceived as negative. intensity, and the sentiment manifest in reactions to them—have been noteworthy. After the War of Independence, the Nahal battalion served as the primary framework for the integration "e historical relationship between religion and the of religious-Zionist youth in the army, thanks to military has largely been influenced by the "Army of 178 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE the program’s unique features, a combination "ey encouraged National-Religious youth to stand of military training, agricultural training, and at the forefront of the national project, to settle settlement. Although Kerem B’Yavneh Yeshiva was and protect the land, and to defend the territories established in 1953, it was only in 1965, following already liberated.8 "e establishment of the protracted negotiations between National- Hesder Yeshivot was a great boost in logistical and Religious faction rabbis and army commanders, a technical terms, and the founding of Gush Emunim historic compromise was reached, which granted provided the spiritual motivation and drive behind the yeshiva recognition as a Hesder (arrangement) the increase in the number of yeshiva student IDF Yeshiva.5 As part of the compromise, the army recruits. Nevertheless, in the early 1980s, despite committed to assign religious recruits designated a substantial increase in the number of National- Hesder students to closed, homogenous units and Religious yeshiva recruits, shorten the active duty period of their service, in a both sides remained IDF leadership scheme similar to the Nahal. In return, the rabbis frustrated. The army complained agreed to table their demands for exempting all leadership complained that most yeshiva students from military duty.6 that most religious religious inductees did not enroll "e establishment of the Hesder Yeshivot was not inductees did in o#cer courses, were the only factor leading to increased recruitment not enroll not prepared to assume rates among religious Zionists. "e Yom Kippur in o!cer command responsibilities, War, which led to the negotiations over the terms courses of a ceasefire—including the possibility of Israeli and, in general, served demobilization from the Suez Canal and the Golan much shorter terms Heights, thereby threatening the territorial integrity than required in the of “the Greater Land of Israel,” was the catalyst for the regular training program. founding of the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) Conversely, religious movement in 1974. Gush Emunim’s ideology was inductees expressed an eagerness to join combat based on the teachings of Rabbi Abraham Yitzhak units and to become o#cers, but their abbreviated Hacohen Kook and his son Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook. program made these positions di#cult to achieve. "ey believed that the establishment of the Jewish At the time, many of the graduates of National- state contained a messianic, redemptive meaning Religious educational institutions (more than 70%) that had evinced their key tenets, divinely inspired who chose to join the army as general recruits, took commandments to settle, annex and safeguard o! their skullcaps during their military service, “Greater Israel.”7 Gush Emunim members saw which alarmed their parents and teachers. themselves as the vanguard with a mission to point A desire to change the situation led to reinvigorated the right way to other Zionists, arouse the Jewish thinking about integration strategies, and in 1987, People of Israel and snap them out of their weakness. the first religious pre-military preparatory college THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 179 (Mechina) was established in the Shomron region number of religious-Zionist IDF recruits in general, settlement of Eli.9 "e primary objective of these new and into combat units and command positions in colleges was to prepare religious soldiers to assume particular. Although the social composition of the leadership positions in the IDF by providing a robust IDF is a well-kept secret, partial data indicate that, in religious-ideological program designed to orient 1990, the share of religious combat soldiers among them to cope with secular influences. At the same graduates of advanced infantry o#cer training time, high-level IDF o#cers engaged in discussions courses was 2.5%, by the end of the 1990s it was with the Hesder Yeshiva leaders to extend the scope around 15%, in 2008 it reached 26%, and in the of Hesder programs, so that the length of religious latest infantry o#cers course it was 42%. (According soldiers’ military service could be extended to to the 2010 Israeli Statistics Abstract, in 2009 the approximate the length of the regular service period.
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