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Afghanistan - Page 8 Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan August 2009 NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan - page 8 Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan August 2009 First Deputy Command Training Advisory MoI Strategy page 15 Group-Police - page 9 page 16 Cover Illustration by Air Force Staff Sergeant Jeff Fitzmorris. CSTC-A is making the transition to CSTC-A/NTM-A with the addition of the NATO Training Mision on September 10. The new organization will include many Coalition Partners Back photo by Sgt. Matthew C. Moeller. An Afghan national army soldier from the 6th Kandak looks out over a remote river valley from an Afghan National pPolice outpost in Konar province, Afghanistan. Alliance forces have been mentoring ANA and ANP members on military and civil operations to help quell violent extremists in the region. 20 16 The Enduring Ledger is a monthly publication of the Department of Defense and Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A). This publication is released monthly by the CSTC-A Public Affairs Office, Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan. In accordance with DoD Instruction 5120.4, this DoD magazine is authorized publication for members of the U.S. military overseas. Contents of The Enduring Ledger are not necessarily the official view of, or endorsed by the U.S. government or DoD. COMISAF Tactical Directive The Commander of NATO’s at every level – down to the most junior International Security Assistance Force soldiers. I expect leaders to ensure this (ISAF), General Stanley McChrystal, is clearly communicated and continually issued a revised Tactical Directive on 02 reinforced. July 2009. The Tactical Directive provides This directive does not prevent guidance and intent for the employment of commanders from protecting the lives of force in support of ISAF operations and their men and women as a matter of self- updates the previous version issued by the defense where it is determined no other previous commander in October 2008. options are available to effectively counter This directive also applies to all U.S. the threat. forces operating under the control of U.S. We will not isolate the population from Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A). us through our daily conduct or execution of combat operations. Therefore: Our strategic goal is to defeat the Any entry into an Afghan house should insurgency threatening the stability of always be accomplished by Afghan Afghanistan. Like any insurgency, there is National Security Forces, with the support a struggle for the support and will of the of local authorities, and account for population. Gaining and maintaining that the unique cultural sensitivities toward support must be our overriding operational General Stanley A. McChrystal, local women. imperative – and the ultimate objective of Commander, U.S. Forces, No ISAF forces will enter or fire upon, every action we take. Afghanistan/International Security or fire into a mosque or any religious or Assistance Force, Afghanistan We must fight the insurgents, and will historical site except in self-defense. All use the tools at our disposal to both defeat and limit the use of force like close searches and entries for any other reason the enemy and protect our forces. But air support against residential compounds will be conducted by ANSF. we will not win based on the number of and other locations likely to produce The challenges in Afghanistan Taliban we kill, but instead on our ability civilian casualties in accordance with are complex and interrelated, and to separate insurgents from the center of this guidance. Commanders must weigh counterinsurgencies are difficult to win. gravity – the people. That means we must the gain of using CAS against the cost of Nevertheless, we will win this war. I have respect and protect the population from civilian casualties, which in the long run every confidence in the dedication and 20 coercion and violence – and operate in a makes mission success more difficult and competence of the members of our force to manner which will win their support. turns the Afghan people against us. operate effectively within this challenging This is different from conventional I cannot prescribe the appropriate environment. Working together with our combat, and how we operate will determine use of force for every condition that a Afghan partners, we can overcome the the outcome more than traditional measures, complex battlefield will produce, so I enemy’s influence and give the Afghan like capture of terrain or attrition of enemy expect our force to internalize and operate people what they deserve: a country at forces. We must avoid the trap of winning in accordance with my intent. Following peace for the first time in three decades, tactical victories – but suffering strategic this intent requires a cultural shift within foundations of good governance, and defeats – by causing civilian casualties our forces – and complete understanding economic development. or excessive damage and thus alienating the people. While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching operational issue – clear-eyed recognition that loss of 16 popular support will be decisive to either side in this struggle. The Taliban cannot militarily defeat us – but we can defeat ourselves. I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails risks to our troops – and we must work to mitigate that risk wherever possible. But excessive use of force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater risks. We must understand this Photo by TSgt Parker Gyokeres reality at every level in our force. A member of a Georgia National Guard Police Mentor Team hands candy to children I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize in Kabul, Afghanistan. CSTC-A Police mentor teams regularly perform presence patrols with Afghan National Police units to teach them proper techniques. www.cstc-a.com 3 The Enduring Ledger CSTC-A/NTM-A will be a Huge Step Forward By MG Richard P. Formica working side by side. CSTC-A Commanding General CSTC-A/NTM-A will focus on two lines of operation while we continue to CSTC-A’s task is to build sustainable resource the fielded force: capacity and capability in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). We • Ministerial and institutional have set out to achieve this task - in close development collaboration with our Afghan partners • Generate the force – as a joint and coalition command. We are assigned to USCENTCOM but under We will execute ministerial the operational control of U.S. Forces – development through the CSTC-A Afghanistan. We are joint because we portion of the staff as NATO did not have Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, assign tasks associated with ministerial and civilians in our ranks. We are a development to NTM-A. When the MG Formica coalition with the contribution of eight NATO ISAF Joint Command (IJC) stands coalition partners – bilaterally serving up it will assume responsibility for the 96.8K; focus our ANP reform efforts; in CSTC-A. We are better for their development of the fielded force line of and then grow the ANA and ANP to presence. operation. appropriate levels when approved by our Soon, CSTC-A will evolve its This transition will enable us to focus capitals and the Joint Coordination and organizational structure as we stand on our two lines of operation. We will Management Board – JCMB. up the NATO Training Mission – be able to do both better. And the ANA/ So – we have much to do. All of this Afghanistan. This will be a huge step ANP units will benefit from having organizational change cannot become forward as it provides an opportunity to regional commanders responsible for internally focused. The reason for harness the many benefits that NATO has their development as they implement these changes must remain focused on to offer in the development and training enhanced partnering. Afghans – and our commitment to build of the ANSF. CSTC-A/NTM-A will be the the sustainable capacity and capability Our plan is to do this as an integrated supporting command to the supported of the ANA and the ANP – so that they staff with distinct CSTC-A and NATO IJC. We will continue to provide the can provide security and stability to functions. The CSTC-A CG and his necessary resources to the fielded forces the Afghan people. We will do this – senior enlisted leader will be dual- – and we will concentrate our energies on together – CSTC-A/NTM-A under the hatted as the COM/CSM NTM-A. He developing the ministries and institutions direction and guidance of ISAF and with will have a two-star NATO deputy and and on generating capable forces. This the ANSF – one team together. a U.S. deputy. We will function as one will be of significant importance as we integrated headquarters with CSTC-A accelerate the growth of the ANA to Yak Team Wahed! and NATO officers, NCOs, and civilians 134K; continue growth of the ANP to 4 The Enduring Ledger www.cstc-a.com New CSM Continues Commitment to Afghan Training By CSM Larry S. Turner marksmanship and battle focus training as we continue to CSTC-A Command Sergeant issue NATO weapons. Their weapons are only as good as Major the soldier’s ability to use them. Driver’s training is another First and foremost I would important factor. Taking an Afghan National Policeman like to say thank you for the or Soldier from driving a civilian vehicle to driving an up- warm welcome I have received armored HMMWV can create a real challenge. We must while transitioning into this ensure that driver’s training and proper licensing are being command. I am honored to be adhered to, and lastly we must be sure that After Action the Command Sergeant Major Reviews(AARs) are being conducted after each and every of CSTC-A.
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