Les Ateliers De L'éthique
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LA REVUEDUCREUM DE L’ÉTHIQUE DE ATELIERS LES VOLUME 3NUMÉRO1 PRINTEMPS/SPRING 2008 ISSN 1718-9977 COMITÉ ÉDITORIAL/EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Direction : Martin Blanchard, CRÉUM ([email protected]) Charles Blattberg, CRÉUM Mira Johri, CRÉUM Rabah Bousbaci, CRÉUM Julie Lavigne, Université du Québec à Montréal Ryoa Chung, CRÉUM Robert Leckey, Université McGill Peter Dietsch, CRÉUM Christian Nadeau, CRÉUM Francis Dupuis-Déri, Université du Québec à Montréal Wayne Norman, CRÉUM UNE REVUE MULTI- Geneviève Fuji Johnson, CRÉUM Christine Tappolet, CRÉUM DISCIPLINAIRE SUR LES Axel Gosseries, Université de Louvain-la-Neuve Luc Tremblay, CRÉUM ENJEUX NORMATIFS DES Béatrice Godard, CRÉUM Daniel Marc Weinstock, CRÉUM POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES ET Joseph Heath, Université de Toronto Bryn Williams-Jones, CRÉUM DES PRATIQUES SOCIALES. 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PRINTEMPS/SPRING 2008 A MULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL ON THE NORMATIVE CHALLENGES Vous êtes libres de reproduire, distribuer et communiquer les You are free to copy and distribute all texts of this journal under OF PUBLIC POLICIES textes de cette revue au public selon les conditions suivantes : the following conditions: AND SOCIAL PRACTICES. • Vous devez citer le nom de l'auteur et de la revue • You must cite the author of the text and the name of the journal • Vous ne pouvez pas utiliser les textes à des fins commerciales • You may not use this work for commercial purposes • Vous ne pouvez pas modifier, transformer ou adapter les textes • You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work Pour tous les détails, veuillez vous référer à l’adresse suivante : For all details please refer to the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/legalcode http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/legalcode ISSN 1718-9977 Article: 79 È 87 Bibliography: 88 Notes: 88 È 89 ABSTRACT In this paper, I present a non standard objection to moral impartialism. My idea is that moral impartialism is questionable when it is committed to a principle we have reasons to reject: the 79 principle of self-other symmetry. According to the utilitarian version of the principle, the benefits and harms to the agent are exactly as relevant to the global evaluation of the goodness of his action as the benefits and harms to any other agent. But this view sits badly with the “Harm principle” which stresses the difference between harm to others and harm to the self. According to the deontological version, we have moral duties to ourselves which are exactly symmetrical to our duties to others. But there are reasons to believe that the idea of a duty to the self is not VOLUME 3 NUMÉRO 1 coherent. PRINTEMPS/SPRING 2008 ARTICLES: RÉSUMÉ Dans cet article, je présente une objection non standard à l’impartialisme moral. Ma thèse est SELF-OTHER ASYMMETRY que l’impartialisme est douteux lorsqu’il admet un principe que nous avons des raisons de reje- ter: le principe de la symétrie soi-autre. Selon la version utilitariste de ce principe, les bienfaits et RUWEN OGIEN les torts faits à l’agent sont d’exactement la même importance à l’évaluation globale du bien CNRS, PARIS d’une action que les bienfaits ou les torts faits à tout autre agent. Mais cette théorie s’harmo- nise mal avec le « principe de non-nuisance » qui insiste sur la différence entre un tort fait à autrui et à soi-même. Selon la version déontologique, nous avons des devoirs moraux envers nous- mêmes exactement symétriques à nos devoirs envers autrui. Mais il y a des raisons de croire que l’idée d’un devoir envers soi-même n’est pas cohérente. The clause “whether in your own person or in the person of any other” is a non-equivocal affirmation of self-other moral symmetry. Suicide or masturbation are “moral crimes” according to Kant, partly because of their supposed moral symmetry with killing and sexual abuse. Finally, one could even say that virtue ethics is based on self- other symmetry because it values equally care to others and self-care. Actually, this is Michael Slote’s master argument in favour of virtue ethics3, and it raises a perplexity concerning the scope of my criti- cism of self-other symmetry. SOME PERPLEXITIES Many philosophers deny that impartiality could be all there is to If virtue ethics is committed to self-other symmetry, as Michael Slote ethics. According to them, a morality limited to impartiality would claims, and if virtue ethics does not belong to the class of impartia- be unrealistic, globally irrelevant to our lives and even repugnant in list moral theories, as some moral philosophers would probably say, some cases. then by objecting to self-other symmetry, the target could be larger I present another kind of objection to moral impartiality, less than moral impartialism. It could include virtue ethics as well, or melodramatic if I may say. My idea is that moral impartiality is ques- some versions of it at least. It could make my argument less limited tionable when it is committed to a principle we have reasons to reject: than I have suggested. But there are other perplexities. the principle of self-other symmetry. Self-other symmetry seems to be a very important feature of But what is self-other symmetry? many moral theories, but, at the same time, one can find elements of ARTICLES self-other asymmetry in these theories. Think of the “Harm principle” SELF-OTHER SYMMETRY put forward by John Stuart Mill. According to Mill: “The only part Self-other symmetry is a basic commitment in many moral theories, of the conduct of anyone which he is amenable to society is that which but it takes different forms depending on the global structure of the concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his inde- 80 theory. pendence is of right absolute. Over himself, over his own body and 4 ARTICLES One could say, for example, that utilitarian theories are based mind, the individual is sovereign” . In more concrete words, according on self-other symmetry because, according to theses theories, the to the Harm principle, one can be morally or legally permitted to do benefits and harms to the agent are exactly as relevant to the global to oneself what one is not permitted morally or legally to do to others, evaluation of the goodness of his action as the benefits and harms the most striking example being, again, suicide as opposed to killing. to any other agent 1. And one could say that deontological theories The “Harm principle”, as a kind of self-other asymmetry, goes against of Kantian flavour are based on self-other symmetry because, accor- the utilitarian general commitment to self-other symmetry. ding to them, we have moral duties to ourselves, which are exactly One could have expected that Mill, being a prominent representative symmetrical to our duties to others. The famous second main for- of utilitarianism, would also be a prominent supporter of self-other mulation of the categorical imperative, in the Groundwork of the symmetry. But for him, the harms to the agent are not as relevant to Metaphysics of Morals, also called the “Formula of Humanity”, stres- the global evaluation of the goodness of his action as the harms to ses this symmetry as explicitly as possible: any other agent. So, he is not a supporter of self-other symmetry Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in after all. your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as According to Michael Slote, Kant is also guilty of inconsis- a means but always at the same time as an end2. tency in his treatment of self-other symmetry5. On the one hand, Kant LES ATELIERS DE L’ÉTHIQUE È V. 3 N. 1 È PRINTEMPS/SPRING 2008 claims that we should apply to ourselves exactly the same moral rules Kant’s moral system or of Slote’s version of virtue ethics. I just want we apply to any other person. He argues not only for the wrongness to present reasons to reject some forms of self-other symmetry and or impermissibility of killing others but for the wrongness or imper- other reasons to endorse some forms of self-other asymmetry. missibility of suicide as well. And this is clearly a commitment to self-other symmetry. FORMS OF SELF-OTHER ASYMMETRY But for Michael Slote, this view sits badly with what Kant Self-other asymmetry expresses itself in different ways. The most says about the absence of duties to pursue one’s own happiness 6. For well-known are Kant, the concept of duty applies only in case we are reluctant to do 1.