Hamas and the Instrumentality of Violence in the Middle East
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HAMAS DIVIDED: TIME for a NEW POLICY? by Tally Helfont
Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes A Catalyst for Ideas Distributed via Email and Posted at www.fpri.org October 2010 HAMAS DIVIDED: TIME FOR A NEW POLICY? By Tally Helfont Tally Helfont is an FPRI research fellow. Her research focuses on Middle East-related issues and radical Islamic movements. She has also instructed training courses on behalf of K3 Enterprises in Civil Information Management to U.S. Military Civil Affairs Units and Human Terrain Teams assigned to Iraq and Afghanistan. September 2010 marked the beginning of renewed peace negotiations in the Middle East. The American-brokered talks took some time to restart—18-months to be exact—and its two primary participants, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, were reluctant at best. The parties met on three separate occasions: in Washington D.C. from September 1-2, in Sharm El-Sheikh from September 13-14, and at the Israeli Prime Minister's official residence in Jerusalem on September 15. It is difficult to say whether there was any tangible progress achieved during these meetings, but as it currently stands, the continuation of these efforts is uncertain, and some would even say, unlikely. The United States, on the one hand, and Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia on the other, are exerting significant diplomatic pressure to bridge the current gaps and bring the two sides back to the negotiating table. But what about those who seek to obstruct such efforts? Chief among this camp is the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. Through numerous statements and acts of violence, Hamas seemed intent on attracting attention during this period of negotiations. -
Both Sides Retaliate in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
Both sides retaliate in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict Johannes Haushofera,1, Anat Biletzkib,c, and Nancy Kanwisherd,1 aInstitute for Empirical Economics, University of Zürich, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland; bDepartment of Philosophy, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel; cQuinnipiac University, Hamden, CT 06518; and dMcGovern Institute for Brain Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 Contributed by Nancy G. Kanwisher, August 25, 2010 (sent for review June 30, 2010) Ending violent international conflicts requires understanding the imprisonment, blockades, and restrictions of movement by Israel causal factors that perpetuate them. In the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, against Palestinians. Any of these nonlethal forms of aggression Israelis and Palestinians each tend to see themselves as victims, engag- could either cause or constitute retaliation. Second, vector autore- ing in violence only in response to attacks initiated by a fundamentally gression asks whether killings of one side follow killings by the other and implacably violent foe bent on their destruction. Econometric side at a consistent time lag. However, given the lower level of or- techniques allow us to empirically test the degree to which violence ganization and technology of the various armed Palestinian factions, on each side occurs in response to aggression by the other side. Prior such time-locked responses may be difficult for Palestinians to ach- studies using these methods have argued that Israel reacts strongly to ieve; Jaeger and Paserman (8) suggest, alternatively, that Pales- attacks by Palestinians, whereas Palestinian violence is random (i.e., tinians may intentionally randomize the timing of their attacks not predicted by prior Israeli attacks). -
Reviving a Regional Approach
Reviving a Regional Approach Gilead Sher and Liran Ofek Despite the physical demarcation of the zone of the recent military !"#$!"%&%'!"()*%+**"(,-$&*.(&"/(0&1&-2(%3*()$!&/*$( !"%*4%(+*"%(+*..( beyond the geographical area and the ranges of the rockets shot from it. The operation illustrated the convergence of interests between Israel and 5$&)(-%&%*-2( 3'*\7(897:%(;"/*$(5)/*.(<&%%&3(*.=>'-'2(+3' 3('-(!" *(&9&'"( :.&7'"9(&( *"%$&.(&"/('"\;*"%'&.($!.*('"(%3*(*##!$%-(%!(:$!1!%*(&( *&-*[$*@( Moreover, after the operation, Israeli cabinet ministers spoke of the need to promote a regional initiative, either to achieve a long term solution concerning 0&1&- A and/or as an alternative to bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. 2 0&-(&(#!;"/&%'!"()**"( $*&%*/(#!$(&(:&$&/'91(-3'#%(M(#$!1(&(#$&1*+!$C( of bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians to multilateral $*9'!"&.(/'&.!9;*D(,-$&*.R-(!#[ '&.(-%&" *(%!+&$/(%3*(5$&)(F*& *(,"'%'&%'G*2( which is a proposed framework for multilateral engagement, has remained rather skeptical, and many still see it as a prescription for surrender more than an invitation to negotiations. 3 On the other hand, those who support a $*9'!"&.(#!$1&%()*.'*G*(%3&%(%3*(5$&)('"'%'&%'G*('-(1*&"%(%!(.*G*$&9*('"%*$*-%-( !11!"(%!(,-$&*.(&"/(-!1*(!#(%3*(.*&/'"9(5$&)(-%&%*-(H897:%2(>&;/'(5$&)'&2( I!$/&"2(&"/(%3*(J"'%*/(5$&)(81'$&%*-K2(&"/(%3&%(%!(%3'-(*"/2('%(-3!;./()*( reexamined as a framework for negotiations. L3*(5$&)(F*& *(,"'%'&%'G*(+&-(&""!;" */('"(MNNM2(O;-%()*#!$*(P:*$&%'!"( Q*#*"-'G*(>3'*./2(&"/(3&-(-'" -
اﻟ ﻣرآزاﻟ ﻔ ﻟ ﺳط ﯾ ﻧ ﯾ ﻟﺣ ﻘوﻗ ﺎﻹﻧ ﺳﺎن PALESTINIAN CENTRE for HUMAN RIGHTS the Dead I
ال مرآزال ف ل سط ي ن ي لح قوق اﻹن سان PALESTINIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS The Dead in the course of the Israeli recent military offensive on the Gaza strip between 27 December 2008 and 18January 2009 17 years old and belowWomen # Name Sex Ag Occupation Address Date of Date of Place of Attack Governor Civilian/ e death attack ate milit ant 1 Mustafa Khader Male 16 Student Tal al-Hawa / Gaza 27-Dec-08 27-Dec-08 Tal al- Gaza Civilian Saber Abu Ghanima Hawa/Gaza 2 Reziq Jamal Reziq al- Male 21 Policeman al-Sha'af / Gaza 27-Dec-08 27-Dec-08 Arafat Police Gaza Civilian Haddad City/Gaza 3 Ali Mohammed Jamil Male 24 Policeman Al-Shati Refugee 27-Dec-08 27-Dec-08 Arafat Police Gaza Civilian Abu Riala Camp / Gaza City/Gaza 4 Ahmed Mohammed Male 27 Policeman Al-Shati Refugee 27-Dec-08 27-Dec-08 Al- Gaza Civilian Ahmed Badawi Camp / Gaza MashtalIntellige nceOutpost/ Gaza 5 Mahmoud Khalil Male 31 Policeman Martyr Bassil Naim 27-Dec-08 27-Dec-08 Al-Mashtal Gaza Civilian Hassan Abu Harbeed Street/ Beit Hanoun Intelligence Outpost/ Gaza 6 Fadia Jaber Jabr Female 22 Student Al-Tufah / Gaza 27-Dec-08 27-Dec-08 Al-Tufah / Gaza Gaza Civilian Hweij 7 Mohammed Jaber Male 19 Student Al-Tufah / Gaza 27-Dec-08 27-Dec-08 Al-Tufah / Gaza Gaza Civilian JabrHweij 8 Nu'aman Fadel Male 56 Jobless Al-Zaytoon / Gaza 27-Dec-08 27-Dec-08 Tal al-Hawa / Gaza Civilian Salman Hejji Gaza 9 Riyad Omar Murjan Male 24 Student Yarmouk Street / Gaza 27-Dec-08 27-Dec-08 Al-Sena’a Street Gaza Civilian Radi / Gaza 10 Mumtaz Mohammed Male 37 Policeman Al-Sabra/ Gaza 27-Dec-08 27-Dec-08 -
Palestinian Forces
Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -3270 • Fax : 1 (202) 457 -8746 Email: [email protected] Palestinian Forces Palestinian Authority and Militant Forces Anthony H. Cordesman Center for Strategic and International Studies [email protected] Rough Working Draft: Revised February 9, 2006 Copyright, Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. May not be reproduced, referenced, quote d, or excerpted without the written permission of the author. Cordesman: Palestinian Forces 2/9/06 Page 2 ROUGH WORKING DRAFT: REVISED FEBRUARY 9, 2006 ................................ ................................ ............ 1 THE MILITARY FORCES OF PALESTINE ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 2 THE OSLO ACCORDS AND THE NEW ISRAELI -PALESTINIAN WAR ................................ ................................ .............. 3 THE DEATH OF ARAFAT AND THE VICTORY OF HAMAS : REDEFINING PALESTINIAN POLITICS AND THE ARAB - ISRAELI MILITARY BALANCE ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 4 THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY FORC ES ................................ ................................ .......... 5 Palestinian Authority Forces During the Peace Process ................................ ................................ ..................... 6 The -
Using a Civil Suit to Punish/Deter Sponsors of Terrorism: Connecting Arafat & the PLO to the Terror Attacks in the Second In
Digital Commons at St. Mary's University Faculty Articles School of Law Faculty Scholarship 2014 Using a Civil Suit to Punish/Deter Sponsors of Terrorism: Connecting Arafat & the PLO to the Terror Attacks in the Second Intifada Jeffrey F. Addicott St. Mary's University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Jeffrey F. Addicott, Using a Civil Suit to Punish/Deter Sponsors of Terrorism: Connecting Arafat & the PLO to the Terror Attacks in the Second Intifada, 4 St. John’s J. Int’l & Comp. L. 71 (2014). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. USING A CIVIL SUIT TO PUNISH/DETER SPONSORS OF TERRORISM: CONNECTING ARAFAT & THE PLO TO THE TERROR ATTACKS IN THE SECOND INTIFADA Dr. Jeffery Addicott* INTRODUCTION “All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing.”1 -Edmund Burke As the so-called “War on Terror” 2 continues, it is imperative that civilized nations employ every possible avenue under the rule of law to punish and deter those governments and States that choose to engage in or provide support to terrorism.3 *∗Professor of Law and Director, Center for Terrorism Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law. -
The Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation: Threatening Peace Prospects
The Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation: Threatening Peace Prospects Testimony by David Makovsky Director, Project on the Middle East Peace Process The Washington Institute for Near East Policy February 5, 2013 Hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Deutch, and distinguished members of the subcommittee for this wonderful opportunity to testify at your very first session of the new Congress. The issue of unity between Fatah and Hamas is something that the two parties have discussed at different levels since 2007 -- and certainly since the two groups announced an agreement in principle in May 2011. Indeed, a meeting between the groups is scheduled in Cairo in the coming days. One should not rule out that such unity will occur; but the past failures of the groups to unite begs various questions and suggests why unity may not occur in the future. While the idea of unity is popular among divided publics everywhere, there have been genuine obstacles to implementing any unity agreement between Fatah and Hamas. First, it seems that neither Fatah -- the mainstream party of the Palestinian Authority (PA) -- nor Hamas wants to risk what it already possesses, namely Hamas's control of Gaza and the PA's control of its part of the West Bank. Each has its own zone and wants to maintain corresponding control. Second, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas has not been willing to commit to a Hamas demand for the end of PA security cooperation with Israel in the West Bank, which has resulted in the arrests of Hamas operatives by the PA. -
PPP Projects in Israel
PPP Projects in Israel Last update: January, 2021 PPP Projects in Israel 1) General Overview The current scope of infrastructure investment in the State of Israel is significantly lower than comparable PPP in Projects Israel countries around the world. This gap can be seen in traffic congestion and the low percentage of electricity production from renewable energy. Therefore, in 2017, Israel’s Minister of Finance appointed an inter-ministerial team to establish a national strategic plan in order to advance and expand investments in infrastructure projects. According to the team's conclusions, while in OECD countries the stock of economic infrastructure (transportation, water and energy) forms 71% of the GDP; in Israel it constitutes only 50% of the GDP. 1 PPP PROJECTS (Public Private Partnership) One of the main recommendations of the team was to substantially increase the investment in infrastructure by 2030. According to the team's evaluation, Such projects feature long-term where the present scope of infrastructure investments is maintained, the agreements between the State and a concessioner: the public sector existing gap from the rest of the world will further grow; in order to reach transfers to the private sector the the global average, a considerable increase of the infrastructure investments responsibility for providing a public in Israel is required through 2030. infrastructure, product or service, PPP in Projects Israel The team further recommended to, inter alia: develop a national including the design, construction, financing, operation and infrastructure strategy for Israel; improve statutory procedures; establish maintenance, in return for payments new financing tools for infrastructure investments and adjust regulation in based on predefined criteria. -
Hamas and the International Human Rights Law
Hamas and the International Human Rights Law What are the legal consequences of a designated terrorist organization becoming the governing entity of a recognized state? April, 2015 Report presented by: Jerusalem Institute of Justice & Regent Law Center for Global Justice, Human Rights and the Rule of Law P.O. Box 2708 Jerusalem, Israel 9102602 Phone: +972 (0)2 5375545 Fax: +972 (0)2 5370777 Email: [email protected] Web: www.jij.org Acknowledgments The Jerusalem Institute of Justice would like to thank S. Ernie Walton, Esq. Administrative Director and the students of Regent Law Center for Global Justice, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law, Regent University for contributing this research paper to our advocacy efforts. JERUSALEM INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 2 APRIL 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 4 Is the International Human Rights Law Biding on Non-state Actors? 5 International human rights laws should apply to non-state actors 5 IHRL should apply to non-state actors such as Hamas 6 The Rights and Duties of States Whose Governing Authority Is a Designated Terrorist Organization 13 Establishing Statehood under International Law 13 The Rights and Duties of Recognized States 14 Potential Consequences of a Terrorist Organization as the Governing Authority in a Recognized State 16 Conclusion 22 JERUSALEM INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 3 APRIL 2015 INTRODUCTION This memorandum answers two legal questions: (1) Whether the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is subject to international human rights law; and (2) what are the legal consequences if a designated terrorist organization becomes the governing entity of a recognized state? JERUSALEM INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 4 APRIL 2015 IS INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BINDING ON NON-STATE ACTORS? Ideally, each state would address and resolve all human rights issues and violations within its own borders. -
Ministry of Information : 97 Israeli Violations Against Palestinian
Ministry of Information Government Media Office Ministry of Information : 97 Israeli violations against Palestinian journalists in latest aggression on Gaza The Government Media Office - Ministry of Information has documented an unprec- edented attack against press freedom by the Israeli occupation army in its most re- cent offensive against the Gaza Strip last May. The Office reported more than 97 violations against Palestinian journalists and their homes, vehicles and media offices. This attack is intended to suppress the truth and cover up Israeli violations against the Palestinian people by silencing the media or preventing media workers from as- suming their role, as the Israeli occupation government believes it has immunity from prosecution and accountability and acts above international law and norms, especially as no perpetrator of crimes against journalists and civilians have been p r o s e c u t e d . In a report, the office’s Monitoring and Follow Up Unit said that such violations marked an increase in violence against journalists and media organisations by Israeli occu- pation compared with the 2008, 2012, and 2014 onslaughts against the Gaza Strip. During its aggression on Gaza, Israeli occupation forces perpetrated several severe and grave violations against journalists and media outlets that amount to war crimes. The vast majority of these attacks were complicate crimes that have widespread short-and long-term consequences, paralyzing some media outlets for long periods of time. Total of Violations 97 06 22 56 12 01 Damaged Damaged Hous- Damaged Media Injury Martyr Press Cars es of Journalists Institution 47 Palestinian journalists killed since 2000 Since 2000, the Israeli occupation has killed 47 Palestinian journalists and media workers. -
Suicide Terrorists in the Current Conflict
Israeli Security Agency [logo] Suicide Terrorists in the Current Conflict September 2000 - September 2007 L_C089061 Table of Contents: Foreword...........................................................................................................................1 Suicide Terrorists - Personal Characteristics................................................................2 Suicide Terrorists Over 7 Years of Conflict - Geographical Data...............................3 Suicide Attacks since the Beginning of the Conflict.....................................................5 L_C089062 Israeli Security Agency [logo] Suicide Terrorists in the Current Conflict Foreword Since September 2000, the State of Israel has been in a violent and ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, in which the Palestinian side, including its various organizations, has carried out attacks against Israeli citizens and residents. During this period, over 27,000 attacks against Israeli citizens and residents have been recorded, and over 1000 Israeli citizens and residents have lost their lives in these attacks. Out of these, 155 (May 2007) attacks were suicide bombings, carried out against Israeli targets by 178 (August 2007) suicide terrorists (male and female). (It should be noted that from 1993 up to the beginning of the conflict in September 2000, 38 suicide bombings were carried out by 43 suicide terrorists). Despite the fact that suicide bombings constitute 0.6% of all attacks carried out against Israel since the beginning of the conflict, the number of fatalities in these attacks is around half of the total number of fatalities, making suicide bombings the most deadly attacks. From the beginning of the conflict up to August 2007, there have been 549 fatalities and 3717 casualties as a result of 155 suicide bombings. Over the years, suicide bombing terrorism has become the Palestinians’ leading weapon, while initially bearing an ideological nature in claiming legitimate opposition to the occupation. -
Backgrounder on Hamas
APPENDIX F International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy (Canada) Backgrounder on Hamas Appendix F – Backgrounder on Hamas1 Hamas is a radical Sunni terrorist organization that employs political and violent means to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in Israel.2 The origins of the movement lie with the Muslim Brotherhood,3 an Islamist organization founded in Egypt in 1928, and led by early Islamist figures such as Hassan el-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Starting in 1967 and continuing throughout the 1970’s, the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood gained popularity amongst the people of Gaza via communal activism, religious preaching and education.4 With the outbreak of the first intifada5 against Israel in 1987, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood moved beyond its basis as a social and religious group establishing Hamas as an Islamist alternative to the secular nationalist resistance led by the PLO. Through its Charter, Hamas clearly states its objectives of establishing an Islamic state in all of Palestine. To realize this goal, the organization relies upon the use of violent jihad, the education of the Palestinian population in its Islamist ideology, providing social services, and promoting the liberation of the “Palestinian land” as an individual duty of Muslims everywhere. Objectives, Strategies, and Structure In its Charter, Hamas describes itself as a “distinct Palestinian Movement which owes its loyalty to Allah, derives from Islam its way of life and strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch