Published Online First: Tuesday, September 15, 2015

WONDERAND VALUE

Kevin Patrick Tobia

Abstract: Wonder’s significance is a recurrent theme in the history of philosophy. In the Theaetetus, Plato’s Socrates claims that philosophy begins in wonder (thaumazein). Aristotle echoes these sentiments in his Metaphysics; it is wonder and astonishment that first led us to philosophize. Philosophers from the Ancients through Wittgenstein dis- cuss wonder, yet scant recent attention has been given to developing a general systematic account of emotional wonder. I develop an account of emotional wonder and defend its connection with apparent or seeming value. Recently, several philosophers invoke wonder to back non- eudaimonistic value judgments. I introduce methods to incorporate these judgments into a eudaimonistic moral framework. On the analysis presented, wonder requires its object to seem valuable, but whether the object is in fact valuable remains an open question. Wonder enraptures us with objects that might be of true or merely illusory value, grounded either in our own well-being or in non- eudaimonistic value.

Socrates: wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. . . . Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of Thaumas (wonder).

Plato’s Theaetetus (1871)

1 Introduction

The value of wonder is a recurrent theme in the history of philosophy. In the Theaetetus (155d), Plato’s Socrates claims that philosophy begins in wonder (thaumazein). Aristotle echoes these sentiments in his Metaphysics (982b); it is wonder and astonishment that first led us to philosophize. Wonder (as an emotion) is treated by a wide range of philosophers, from the Pre-Socratics through Aquinas; Descartes (1649 [1989]); Bacon (1605; 1620); Smith (1795); Kierkegaard (1845 [1988]); Nietzsche (1872 [2000]); Husserl (1936); Heidegger (1927 [1962]); and Wittgenstein (1965; 1969).

Res Philosophica, Vol. 92, No. 4, October 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2015.92.4.3 c 2015 Kevin Patrick Tobia • c 2015 Res Philosophica 2 Kevin Patrick Tobia

Yet little attention has been given to developing a general and systematic account of emotional wonder.1 Here I develop and defend such an account, drawing on wonder’s philosophical history and more recent work on the emotions. Of particular relevance here is my defense of wonder’s connection with apparent or seeming value. Philosophers, both historical and recent, have previously suggested that wonder relates to aesthetic value. But unlike sympathy, anger, disgust, guilt, or shame, wonder is not an emotion with obvious connections to other kinds of value, especially moral value. I start by developing an account of wonder as an emotion, drawing on historical and contemporary philosophy. I argue wonder requires (1) devoted attention to its intentional object, (2) interest in and (3) the seeming final value of its object, and (4) a positively valenced experience. I then explore further the account of the relationship between wonder and various kinds of seeming value. Analyzing recent work by Dworkin (2013); Wolf (2010); and Nussbaum (2006a) reveals that emotional wonder backs or drives certain moral judgments. Sometimes these judgments involve seeming non-eudaimonistic value (Nussbaum 2001), value not grounded in one’s flourishing. Because non-eudaimonistic moral theory is controversial, I explore various strategies for incorporating wonder’s presumably non-eudaimonistic seemings of value into a eudaimonistic moral framework. On the account defended, wonder requires its object to seem valuable, but whether the object is in fact valuable remains an open question. Wonder enraptures us with objects that might be of true or merely illusory value, grounded perhaps in our own well-being or in non-eudaimonistic value.

2 The Emotion of Wonder

We all (I hope) have felt emotional wonder throughout our lives. For many, these feelings often come from engagement with nature. Recall a childhood memory of a late night away from the city lights, sprawled out, back against the grass, enraptured by the stars above. Your eyes widen as you take in the astral view, perhaps even accompanied by a feeling of breathlessness. Or recall your first encountering of a fire, perhaps a campfire—engaging and amazing. The fire seems special, valuable, important, perhaps even ex- traordinary or mystical. As the flames dance, your attention does not waver. As you stare, feelings of wonder swell within. Indeed, a whole campfire may not be necessary; even a single candle flame is equally captivating and inspiring when given appropriate attention. Nature provides a sensible starting point for emotional wonder, but even a cursory reflection reveals a wider variety of wonder inspiring experiences.

1 My focus here and throughout is on the emotion of wonder. Ordinary language suggests other kinds of non-emotional wonder: “I wonder how long it takes to get there by bus”; “I wonder if he’ll like the birthday present”; “It’s no wonder she broke up with her.” Although there is an interesting analysis to give here, my focus is restricted to emotional wonder. Wonder and Value 3

FIGURE 1. Pines and Rocks, oil on canvas by Paul Cézanne, c. 1897 (original in color).

Rachel Carson, the environmentalist best known for Silent Spring (1962), also planned a book on wonder before her death. Her chapter titles indicate the breadth of wonder’s objects. As subjects of wonder, Carson cites “the sky, the woods, the sea, and the beauty in nature,” but also “the changing year, the world of tiny things, the miracle of life” (Moore 2005, 266). It seems that wonder is invoked by nature and beyond. Aesthetic objects, in particular, elicit wonder. Consider Krulwich’s (2014) recounting of his first viewing of a Cézanne (Figure 1): It was a woodland scene, a blur of greens, blues and pur- ples, a tumble of rocks in the foreground, tall pines, branch- ing into a blue sky, breaking up into arabesques . . . with a force that felt like a fist, it jerked my head to it—almost as if it were calling out, “You!”—like it knew me. Like it wanted to pull me to it and tell me something—something personal. But what? I had no idea. Nothing like this had ever happened to me. . . . It had power. As I moved closer, it tightened its grip. The boulders in the foreground were dark at the edges, light where the sun peeped through. The upper branches broke free and became little dabs of paint, applied in rhythmic strokes. Paint became tree; tree became paint. I knew nothing about painting, zilch about art history, but the crazy energy coming off that canvass felt like it was addressing some puzzle I already had in my head. I couldn’t stop looking. I barely moved. 4 Kevin Patrick Tobia

The emotion felt here is that of wonder. This is a passage worth keeping in mind as it references many important features of wonder. In fact, we see here all of those conditions I defend as necessary and sufficient for experiencing emotional wonder. Specifically, wonder requires (1) attending to the eliciting object; Krul- wich devotes conscious mental attention to the painting. This wonder- elicitor and wonder-experiencer relationship requires the experiencer’s at- tention (not merely his awareness); although the painting pulls him in, the experience of wonder requires Krulwich actually moving in (devoting attention, the unity of his cognitive processes, to the object). Second, wonder involves (2) a feeling of captivation or interest; Krulwich experiences the painting as part of an enticing, captivating “puzzle.” He is disposed to engage further with the object of wonder. In this most intense experience of wonder, Krulwich reports he “couldn’t stop looking.” Third, wonder involves (3) a seeming or judgment that the intentional object is valuable or important as an end. Krulwich’s experience of wonder is directed at the painting, which itself seems valuable. It is the object that has “power” and “crazy energy.” Its value or importance is not merely as means (e.g., to the end of Krulwich’s enjoyment or pleasure), but rather as an end itself. Whether or not it has actual value, it seems to have final value.2 Finally, wonder is accompanied by some (4) positively valenced affect. Krulwich’s emotional experience involves a “crazy energy”; the felt emotion is at least partly positive. It is an intense experience, but in no way is it a wholly negative or unpleasant one. To feel wonder is at least partly positive. Together, these conditions are those I defend as necessary and suffi- cient for experiencing (emotional) wonder. I will say much more about this preferred account of wonder later, but for now, the Cézanne passage helps to see that the stated conditions cohere with the ordinary usage and phenomenological experience of ‘wonder.’ For the present purpose, note that this passage also highlights that won- der is not evoked just by nature, but also by art and image. We may recall feelings of wonder at a broader range of artistic feats like an enthralling portrait painting or a marvelous orchestral performance; at achievements— like watching Usain Bolt shatter the world record in the 100 meters; at stories—especially legends, myths, and fantastic imaginings; at extraor- dinary natural objects and manmade constructions like the aptly named

2 Thanks to an anonymous referee for another popular example. This is an experiment from 2007. Joshua Bell, one of the world’s great classical musicians played violin anonymously in a Washington DC Metro stop during rush hour. The experimental question: “in a banal setting at an inconvenient time, would beauty transcend?” (Weingarten 2007). One Metro passenger, when interviewed, noted that “It was a treat, just a brilliant, incredible way to start the day. . . . Other people just were not getting it. It just wasn’t registering. That was baffling to me.” As an anonymous referee rightly notes, this quote gets at the “final value” criterion. It seems there is something wrong with those people who are not stopping to hear the extraordinary performance. Wonder and Value 5

“wonders of the world”; at life—the magic of another being with conscious- ness, experience, or sentience; at ideas—we may find wonder in the proof of infinitely many primes, in the concept of perfect equality of opportunity, or even (in an example perhaps closer to home) in philosophical puzzles and arguments themselves. Dworkin (2013) in his posthumous Religion Without God, reflects on his sense of wonder at both “great canyons” and the “latest discoveries of cosmologists and particle physicists.” We feel wonder at glittering stars, sparkling flames, and majestic waterfalls, as well as views of the resplendent deep sea, sprawling canyons, and soaring mountains. But like Dworkin we might also feel wonder at discoveries and ideas. Like Carson (1964), we might also feel wonder at time, change, or life itself. A number of appeals to wonder, including Dworkin’s and Carson’s, posit a wide range of wonder-inspiring objects. And though philosophers from Plato to Wittgenstein discuss wonder, there is no recent general, systematic account of the emotion.3 Thus, I begin by defending a view of wonder as an emotion, drawing on a range of historical and contemporary descriptions of wonder.

3 The Core Account of Wonder

Wonder at an object involves some positively valenced affect, attending to the object, finding it interesting, and it seeming valuable as an end. I now turn to an extended defense of each of the four necessary conditions of wonder. Before this, it might help to list the conditions formally and explicitly: A person, p, feels wonder at object x if and only if: [ATTENTION] p is attending to x; [INTEREST] p is interested in x; p is disposed to continue engaging with x; [VALUE] it seems to p that x is important or valuable as an end; x seems to p to have final value; [POSITIVITY] p’s experience includes positively valenced affect.4 3 Hepburn (1980; 1984) provides some foundations of an account of wonder, and Prinz (Forthcoming) has a planned project on wonder as an aesthetic emotion. The former provides only a sketch of wonder, while the latter (is unavailable, but) seems to defend a narrower conception of wonder, restricted to artistic and aesthetic appreciation. I am sympathetic to many of the claims of both these projects, but I aim to provide a broader analysis of wonder than these. There is another body of literature about wonder worth mentioning here that connects wonder and ethics, for instance, arguing that we should feel wonder at the other (person) (Irigaray [1993]; Young [1997]; Heinämaa [1999]; La Caze [2014]). I do not have space to analyze these accounts here, but there are important connections to consider here, particularly regarding the relation between wonder and moral value. 4 Here may be an appropriate time to briefly acknowledge the distinction between wonder and several similar emotions, chiefly those of awe and curiosity (cf. Fuller 2006). I treat this 6 Kevin Patrick Tobia

3.1 Attention The first defended condition of emotional wonder is ATTENTION: for p to feel wonder at object x, p must be consciously attending to x. I wish to stay neutral on contentious philosophical disputes involving attention. Thus, I will follow Mole (2011) for a working definition; attention is the unity of cognitive processes dedicated to an agent’s task (cf. Koralus 2014; Watzl 2011; Smithies 2011; Wu 2011). This is stronger than mere awareness or access consciousness; attention requires the unity of one’s cognitive processes.5 Historically, many conceptions of wonder depend on the viewer attend- ing to the object. For Heidegger, wonder is to marvel at an object. For others, wonder is a response to novelty (e.g., Mill 1865) or the unknown (e.g., Bacon 1605). For Spinoza (1675), wonder comes from contemplation. To marvel at something, revel in its novelty or mystery, or contemplate it all require attending to it. When we think of typical examples of wonder, they all seem to require attention. Wonder at the night stars, a majestic waterfall, a complex and beautiful mathematical theorem, or an impressive moral figure is felt only if we devote attentional resources to the respective object. To describe wonder without attention seems conceptually incoherent. Consider the following statements: “I felt a tremendous sense of wonder at the painting while I was thinking about what I should eat for lunch.” “The orchestra’s performance evoked a sense of wonder in Mohammed even though he was not paying attention to it.” It is worth noting that many other emotions do not require attention. I can feel anger or disgust even when I do not devote the unity of my cognitive processes to the object of the emotion. Consider the following statements:

issue much more thoroughly in Tobia Unpublished-b, distinguishing between wonder, awe, and curiosity (see also, Tobia Unpublished-a). For now, I will simply note what I take to be the key distinguishing features of these other two emotions. Unlike wonder, awe does not require interest in the object. If I feel awe at a sublime cathedral or a powerful sea-storm, the primary response is often one of fear or veneration, not one of interest or intrigue (cf. Prinz Forthcoming). Furthermore, awe definitively does not require positivity; experiences of awe can be entirely negatively valenced. Curiosity, on the other hand, might require something like INTEREST, but certainly does not require VALUE; we can feel curious about objects despite an absence of apparent value. Consider the ordinary language response to “why does it matter?” or “why do you care?”: “Oh, it does not matter, I am just curious.” Curiosity, too, need not be at all positive. Burning and unsated curiosity can be entirely negatively valenced. 5 The more important part of this working definition is unity of cognitive processes, and the less important part is devoted to an agent’s task. To require wonder to involve “a task” may be misleading since it is not clear that one experiencing wonder must be trying to do anything with the object at the time of their experience. Wonder and Value 7

“I felt a tremendous sense of anger at Manuel while I was thinking about my homework; what he did earlier in the day made my blood boil for the rest of the afternoon.” “The smell of feces evoked a strong disgust in Michelle, even as she tried to diminish it by focusing on other more pleasant thoughts.” Disgust and anger are strong examples of emotions that do not require attention to their objects, but many other emotions have this same feature. Guilt and shame might persist even when the agent is not attending to the object of these emotions. For slightly more controversial examples, consider joy or euphoria. It might be possible to experience these even as attention slips from the eliciting object; awareness of the object is sufficient for these emotions. Wonder is different from most other emotions; one cannot experience wonder at some object while not attending to it.

3.2 Interest The second condition of emotional wonder is INTEREST: for p to feel won- der at object x, p must be interested in x; p is disposed to continue engaging with x. Similar historical support can be provided for this condition as was provided for ATTENTION. Many have held that wonder is a response to what is novel, mysterious, or unknown (e.g., Mill 1865; Bacon 1605; Spinoza 1675). These, I contend, are all examples of that which we find interesting. For instance, imagine something novel or new, but in no way interesting. Such an object cannot inspire wonder. When we consider common examples of wonder, they all seem to involve the wonder eliciting object as seeming interesting, captivating, or engaging. This can be seen in one of the typical action tendencies of wonder; wonder often leads to further contemplation of the eliciting object. When we feel wonder at the Grand Canyon or a great work of art, we stare at it. When we feel wonder at an impressive philosophical theory or beautiful concept, we ponder it. Feeling wonder requires being disposed to continue engaging with the intentional object. To describe wonder without interest also seems conceptually incoherent. Consider the following statements: “I felt wonder when viewing the artist’s masterpiece and found it quite boring.” “I was not really interested in the proof of infinite primes and also found it wondrous.” There is an incompatibility between boredom or non-interest and wonder. Wonder at an object is inconsistent with the object seeming entirely boring. There may be a temptation to invoke a stronger condition than IN- TEREST. Wonder, some might think, requires its object to command one’s 8 Kevin Patrick Tobia interest or to seem not just interesting, but extraordinary. These sugges- tions go beyond my requirement of a felt interest and disposition to engage further. These suggestions are tempting, I think, because we often focus on examples of intense or extreme wonder, in which the object might always command our interest or seem extraordinary. But we cannot adequately defend these as necessary conditions, ones that are always met. I can feel wonder at a painting that I have seen numerous times (that is no longer seemingly “extraordinary”) or that does not seem to command my interest. Many of these tempting options (that wonder’s object must seem novel, mysterious, or extraordinary) are conditions that are often but not neces- sarily a part of wonder. For something to seem extraordinary, for instance, requires that it seem unusual, beyond the ordinary. This is not always the case with wonder. Some (e.g., Emerson 1836; Einstein 1931, 1932) profess we can feel wonder toward many things—or even toward everything. If so, wonder does not require its object to seem extraordinary (since, presumably, not everything can seem extraordinary). Descartes, too, held that the initial response of wonder can be felt toward something simply unfamiliar; the object need not seem extraordinary. By defending INTEREST rather than one of these stronger claims, I aim to capture a broader—and I think more accurate—picture of wonder. There is an important choice point here. By defending the weaker INTEREST condition, I allow for the defended conception of wonder to include a broader range of wonder experiences. However, those who insist that wonder must require its object to seem extraordinary or command one’s attention might prefer one of these stronger conditions.6

3.3 Value The third condition of emotional wonder is VALUE: for p to feel wonder at object x, it must seem to p (or p must judge) that x is important or valuable as an end. This condition might seem surprising at first; what does wonder have necessarily to do with valuing something as an end? I ultimately argue that wonder involves its object seeming valuable as an end, but first I begin by demonstrating a weaker claim: wonder at an object requires it seeming valuable (in a more general sense). That emotional wonder involves seeming value can be supported histori- cally. We see Platonic wonder involving a seeming of value. For Aristotle, wonder was an emotion devoted more to matters epistemic. But even for

6 A referee suggests that the “extraordinary” wonder experiences are better characterized as the paradigm rather than the extreme example of wonder (cf. Fisher 1998). I admit there is something memorable about extreme experiences of wonder, but I am unsure that they are undoubtedly the most common or paradigm experiences. A short nature walk may involve numerous moments of wonder, as might a daily routine of early-morning bird-watching. These may be less intense experiences, and I admit less individually memorable, than one’s first and only viewing of the Grand Canyon. But these are still experiences of wonder. Wonder and Value 9

Aristotle, wonder involved the value of knowledge (for the sake of knowl- edge). Descartes (1649 [1989]) and Mill (1865) saw wonder’s connection with a kind of admiration; to feel wonder toward some object involves ad- miring it or it seeming valuable. Heidegger (1927 [1962]), in distinguishing wonder from mere curiosity also noted a value element. More recently, Hepburn (1980; 1984) defends wonder’s connection with valuing. There seems to be a conceptual inconsistency in claiming some thing is the object of wonder, yet in no way seems valuable. Consider the following statements: “I felt wonder at the historical artifact and it did not seem important or valuable.” “Thinking about the existence of the universe inspired a sense of wonder, and all the while it never seemed the existence of the universe was at all valuable.” We do not feel wonder at that which seems valueless. It is worth noting that this is a claim that does not extend obviously to all other (positive) emotions. Feeling joy, ecstasy, or euphoria at an object does not obviously imply that the intentional or eliciting object seems valuable or important. As a thrill-seeker, I might feel a sense of joy from flying over a bump in the road quickly while driving. Does this imply that the bump in the road or my activity of flying over it seems valuable or important? This is not obvious. Whether this weak claim extends to other positive emotions is ultimately inessential since I wish to defend a stronger claim about wonder, one that certainly does not apply to a broader range of emotions. In this stronger claim I seek to capture an important element of wonder’s phenomenology. The experience of wonder is one strongly focused on the emotion’s ob- ject. This phenomenological recollection highlights an important aspect of wonder; it is premised on a special relationship between the object and its viewer, the experiencer of the emotion. For Husserl, the experience of won- der is the “experience of astonishment before the world,” which involves the wonderer, the wonderful, and wondering as the relation between the two (Kingwell 2000, 85). Dewey (1887, 262) describes wonder as “intellectual feeling . . . the attitude which the emotional nature spontaneously assumes in front of a world of objects, utterly incomprehensible as a purely personal or selfish feeling.” In Krulwich’s engagement with an engrossing Cézanne, we saw an expression of the object’s value; there is a wondrous beauty of the Cézanne itself, which seemed to have power and importance. In all these accounts and reports of wonder we see not just that wonder is object-focused; it involves a special kind of evaluation of the object. The object itself seems valuable; it seems to have final value. We should here note the distinction between eudaimonistic and non- eudaimonistic value. Following Nussbaum’s definition and spelling (2001, 10 Kevin Patrick Tobia

30), “eudaimonistic” value is value grounded in a human’s welfare or interests, “In a eudaimonistic ethical theory, the central question asked by a person is ‘How should a human being live?’ The answer to that question is the person’s conception of eudaimonia, or human flourishing, a complete human life.” Eudaimonistic value is tied to one’s personal aims and projects, while non-eudaimonistic value is not. One might be tempted to argue that wonder necessarily involves the eliciting object seeming non-eudaimonistically valu- able. Wonder is an object-focused emotion and, as such, it might appear the seeming value is one of the object. I do not wish to defend this stronger claim since there are some examples of wonder in which the seeming value appears purely eudaimonistic. If I compose a musical piece and feel wonder at it, as an object of my achievement, it seems the value of the musical piece is grounded in my flourishing.7 Many objects of wonder seem to be valuable as eudaimonistic ends. Nevertheless, wonder sometimes involves a non-eudaimonistic value seeming. Nussbaum (2001) suggests wonder is one of the most and one of the only non-eudaimonistic emotions. Dworkin (2013) provides another example connecting wonder to non-eudaimonistic value. I will discuss these claims about wonder in section 4, but for now I aim to merely defend the necessary and sufficient conditions of wonder. Since wonder does not necessarily involve the eliciting object seeming non-eudaimonistically valuable, I will not discuss this aspect further here. A related and tempting effort to capture this aspect of emotional wonder might be to claim wonder requires finding its object intrinsically valuable. Though initially appealing, this condition is also too strong. We can, I think, feel proper wonder at objects that seem to have only extrinsic value. If I am told that the pen I view is Lincoln’s (Kagan 1998), I might feel a sense of wonder with the pen as my object. But this might be a seeming of purely extrinsic value. For other examples we can consider certain wondrous achievements. When I feel wonder at the achievement of running the first sub-four-minute mile, it seems not that the object has intrinsic value, but rather that it has purely extrinsic value.8 Now I argue for a different necessary value claim: wonder requires its object seeming to have final value or to be valuable as an end. Here it is important to keep Korsgaard’s helpful distinction between intrinsic/extrinsic and final/instrumental value in view (1993). Wonder sometimes involves its

7 This is another example in which the object of wonder need not be extraordinary or command one’s attention. Of course, we should also note that we might feel other emotions here as well, like pride or magnanimity. Some of these cases might involve only pride or magnanimity, but others could involve both these and wonder. 8 As a referee notes, the suggestion that wonder could be experienced toward a broad array of objects, including Lincoln’s pen, may seem to make the idea of wonder trivial. One response to this worry is to recall that wonder toward an object does not necessarily imply that object’s actual value. Perhaps the only objects “worthy” of wonder are those that are actually valuable. Wonder and Value 11 object seeming intrinsically valuable (e.g., wonder at life), but other times it involves it seeming extrinsically valuable (e.g., wonder at Lincoln’s pen). On the other hand, wonder at an object does require it seeming to have final value (as an end) rather than it seeming to have merely instrumental value (as a means). Here again, when we consider some typical examples of wonder, they all seem to involve finding the object as seeming valuable as an end. When I feel wonder at a great work of art, I find it aesthetically valuable, not as a means (e.g., to my pleasure) but as an artistic achievement—an end in itself. Sometimes the object of seeming value is unclear; when I feel wonder at a vision of outer space it might be nebulous as to what exactly I am responding. Yet whatever seems valuable seems valuable as an end. Here a foreseeable objection might arise. When I feel wonder at the stars, an objector might say, it does not seem the stars are valuable as an end since it is unclear for what end the stars are supposed to have seeming value. I feel the initial force of such an object, but to properly reply to it requires full commitment to an imagined or recalled experience of wonder at such an object. To feel wonder at the stars could occur in a number of different ways. When I sincerely reflect on how this might actually go (or has gone), all of my experiences do involve a seeming of final value. For instance, if I feel wonder at the view of the stars, captivated by their aesthetic beauty, they seem to have final aesthetic value. The seeming value is not purely instrumental; there just seems something amazing about these stars. There is another way in which an objector might be thinking about feeling wonder at the stars. Perhaps, when viewing the stars, I begin thinking about how small I am in such an amazingly large and impressive universe. If anything seems to have value as an end, says this objector, it is whatever I now think about. Perhaps understanding the nature of the universe or the brute fact of existence itself seems to have final value. If this is the case it is important to note that the stars are no longer the objects of wonder. It is the comprehension of the universe or the fact of existence that is wonder’s object and, as such, it is one of these objects that seems to have final value. An object that often evokes wonder, like the stars, might inspire thinking about another object of wonder, like “understanding the universe.” If stars inspire attending to thoughts of cosmic wonder, it is the thought of the cosmos that is now the object of wonder, not the stars. Before rejecting the claim that wonder requires its object seeming valuable as an end, it is important to ensure we are focused on the actual object of wonder in our thought experiments. Again, when we describe wonder without the object seeming valuable as an end, this appears conceptually incoherent. Consider the following statements: 12 Kevin Patrick Tobia

“I felt wonder at Cézanne’s painting; it seems to make so many people happy, yet nothing seems valuable about it itself.”9 If we truly felt wonder at a painting, but learned the painting no longer made many people happy (or that it lost all its seeming instrumental value in some other way), I think we would still feel wonder at it and still find it valuable. Objects of wonder are those that seem to have at least some final value.

3.4 Positivity The final condition of emotional wonder is POSITIVITY: for p to feel won- der at object x, p’s experience must include positively valenced affect. The positivity of wonder can be found in a number of philosophical accounts from Plato’s to Heidegger’s.10 Using the same method as above, we can see a conceptual tension when we consider experiencing wonder without any positive affect. Consider the following statements: “I felt wonder upon viewing the great work of art; it was a miserable experience with no associated positive feelings at all.” “I felt wonder at the starry night sky; there was no positive or negative aspect. I didn’t feel anything at all.” The first of these examples speaks against the view that wonder could include no positively but some negatively valenced affect. This statement seems incoherent; wonder cannot be a purely negatively valenced affective experience. The second of these examples provides a less clear example. In this statement, wonder involves neither positively nor negatively valenced affect. Of all the emotions, wonder might be one of the best candidates for a numb emotion. Descartes (1649 [1989]) famously noted that wonder (l’admiration) is “not accompanied by any change in the heart or the blood, such as occurs in the case of the other passions” (353).

9 As a referee rightly suggests, this sentence seems less strange: “I felt wonder at Cézanne’s painting; yet nothing seems valuable about it itself.” The reason, I suspect, is that we can describe a feeling of wonder once felt, but conclude later that the object of wonder is not actually valuable. What my account claims is not possible is to feel simultaneously experience wonder toward an object while the object appears not at all valuable. That kind of sentence does seem more incoherent: “When I felt wonder at Cézanne’s painting nothing seemed valuable about it itself.” 10 This is the condition about which I am least confident; I think there is a more plausible case that wonder may sometimes be experienced without POSITIVITY than without any of the other conditions I’ve defended. However, the rest of section 3.4 articulates my defense of POSITIVITY. This condition has at least one other benefit that cannot be considered further here: this distinguishes wonder from awe and curiosity. These latter two emotions certainly do not require POSITIVITY and at the very least, reflecting on the positivity of an experience might serve as a useful heuristic to distinguish between kinds of emotional experiences. Wonder and Value 13

Yet, I am most sympathetic to those who hold that to properly have an emotional experience requires some valenced affective component or hedonic tone. When we reflect on what it is to feel wonder, it seems the experience must be one that includes a minimal positively affective component. It is not just strange, but incoherent to say, “I felt joy, but there was no positive feeling associated with the experience” or, “I felt anger, but there was no negative feeling associated with the experience.” I sympathize with those who hold that in the same way it is incoherent to claim, “I felt wonder, but there was no positive feeling associated with the experience.”11

3.5 Sufficiency I have thus far defended each of the four conditions I take to be necessary for experiencing emotional wonder. Analysis of emotions is a tricky business, and I recognize there might be competing conceptions of wonder that vary from the one defended here. At various points I suggested weaker or stronger forms of my necessary conditions that some might find more appealing. Section 3.1 to section 3.4 demonstrate why I prefer the defended conditions, yet I hope there is room for readers whose conceptions of wonder might differ slightly. Outlining sufficient conditions of an emotion is a hard task, and because the remainder of my project depends far more on a defense of the conditions as necessary, I will not devote much time defending my four conditions as jointly sufficient. Nevertheless, I provide a preliminary defense here. One way to start is to consider a series of thought experiments in which an emotional experience involves all of my four necessary conditions, save one. We will see that these experiences fall short of what we would characterize as emotional wonder. Furthermore, when we add the final necessary condition, wonder seems to be achieved. First, consider an example of an agent, p, and an object, x, satisfying all the conditions, except for ATTENTION. In this case, p’s experience involves x seeming valuable as an end, p’s being interested in x, and p’s experiencing positively valenced affect, but p is not attending to x. Such a case might occur, for example, if p is visiting an art museum and attends to a painting, enjoying a positively valenced experience in which p finds a painting valuable and interesting. Once p removes attention from the painting, she might still find it valuable and interesting (satisfying VALUE and INTEREST) and may experience positive affect (satisfying POSITIV- ITY). If all the while she is attending to something else, say at her child’s nagging request to leave the museum, we cannot say she is experiencing

11 An alternative way to characterize wonder’s positivity is to claim that wonder requires a special sort of positive glow. For example, Krulwich’s perception of “crazy energy” associated with the painting comes from his engagement with the wondrous object. There is a kind of positive rush that comes from relating to an object of wonder. Great thanks to a referee for this suggestion. 14 Kevin Patrick Tobia wonder at the painting—or at all. This is true even though p is still aware of the painting. Yet, if she returns her attention to the painting and enjoys a positive experience in which she finds it valuable as an end and interesting, we more confidently say she now experiences wonder. Next, consider an example in which p experiences x in such a way satisfying ATTENTION, INTEREST, and POSITIVITY, but not VALUE. In this case, p is attending to x, is interested in x, and experiences positively valenced affect. Yet, it is not true that x seems to p to have final value. In the strongest case, p might find x not valuable at all or in any way. For a tougher counterexample, p might find x valuable, but not as an end; perhaps p finds x valuable merely instrumentally, as a means. Perhaps p is competing in a competition; p has to estimate correctly the number of pieces of candy in a jar. In this case, p devotes attention to the puzzle, finds it interesting, experiences some positively valenced affect, yet does not find the puzzle valuable as an end; p just wants to win the competition. Here we say (rightly) that p does not experience wonder while playing the game. Though p might experience curiosity, to feel wonder p must also find the eliciting object valuable as an end. If we imagine p did also find the puzzle valuable as an end, we begin to (rightly) think p feels a sense of wonder toward it.12 There are other experiences of puzzles that might fall short of wonder experiences by not satisfying VALUE. For instance, p might devote attention to a positively valenced experience of investigating a magic trick, where p is interested in the trick. If p only values the trick as a means, say because her father will pay her if she is able to solve it, we do not think p experiences wonder. But if p values the trick as an end, perhaps as something magical with final value, we do think p experiences wonder while viewing the trick. Next, consider an example in which p experiences x in such a way satisfying ATTENTION, VALUE, and POSITIVITY, but not INTEREST. In this case, p is attending to x, values x as an end, experiences positively valenced affect, yet does not find x interesting. For an example containing just these conditions, we can return to the viewing of a painting at a museum, perhaps taking the perspective of the child dragged along to an exhibition. The child might devote conscious attention to a painting, note that it seems valuable as an end, experience positively valenced affect, and yet find the painting utterly boring. He has no intention of engaging further with the painting and it is far from captivating. In this case, the valuing of the object as an end need not be merely respectful; the child might legitimately find the painting valuable as an end, yet totally uninteresting.

12 To find a puzzle valuable as an end is quite strange and this might be hard to conceive. Consider, as a more convincing example, a different kind of puzzle-game: creating a perfect winning NCAA bracket. The odds are staggeringly low, with more than 9.2 quintillion combinations. The “perfect bracket,” as an end itself, is just the kind of thing that could inspire a sense of wonder. For another possibility, consider the most complex mathematical problems; these problems and puzzles often appear valuable as ends. Wonder and Value 15

This often happens at the end of an experience of wonder. After looking around a museum all day, formerly wonder-eliciting objects might still seem valuable as ends, but you are no longer interested in them or disposed to engage with them. You might feel wonder at them again if you return in a few weeks, but for now, even if you devote attention to them, experiencing positively valenced affect and recognizing their seeming final value, you are no longer interested and do not experience wonder. Finally, consider an example in which p experiences x such that ATTEN- TION, VALUE, and INTEREST are satisfied, but POSITIVITY is not. In this case, p is attending to x, finds x valuable as an end and interesting, but p’s experience is characterized by purely negatively valenced affect or no affect at all. It is in these kinds of cases when I find it most plausible that p might nevertheless experience wonder, and, as such, the POSITIVITY condition is one that I am most willing to weaken. Part of the reason may be that wonder is a highly cognitive emotion.. But if we imagine a case that meets the prior description, I think we see that POSITIVITY also matters. Imagine I am in a church. I find the church interesting and seemingly valuable as an end, and I devote attention to the church. Yet, my affective experience is purely negative; perhaps I am terrified of the church. If the affect is purely negatively valenced, I think a better description for the felt emotion is awe rather than wonder.13 If we change the example such that you feel even a bit of positively valenced affect, I think we can then more confidently say that you feel wonder at the church. There is another way in which ATTENTION, VALUE, and INTEREST could be satisfied, but POSITIVITY denied. This is the case in which p experiences no positively valenced affect and no negatively valenced affect. For an example of this, take any previous example of wonder and subtract the affective component of the experience. Would I still feel wonder at the Mona Lisa if I felt no affect and it was simply true that I was disposed to engage with it further, found it valuable as an end, and devoted attention to it? The reaction to this question will depend heavily on one’s preferred theory of emotion. Some strong cognitive theorists (e.g., Nussbaum 2001) might be fine with such a result; you can experience wonder regardless. Other theorists of emotion (e.g., James 1890) might insist one cannot experience an emotion without any kind of affective component. This is an important dispute, but it is one inessential to the present aim. I find that emotional wonder ought to include an affective component, but I recognize the appeal of certain cognitive theories of emotion and their increasing popularity (De Sousa 2013). Thus, realizing this as the

13 I do not have the space here to properly distinguish between awe and wonder. Awe might require ATTENTION, but it quite clearly does not require INTEREST and POSITIVITY. An awe-inspiring object seems valuable but also terrifying. These sublime objects do not typically dispose us to engage further, but often to retreat in fear. And their experience is inherently partly negative. 16 Kevin Patrick Tobia most contentious condition of wonder, I stand by it as part of my account, but acknowledge that some may find it less plausible. The POSITIVITY condition can be given up without harm done to the later work of the paper. The exploration of wonder’s connection to seeming value in section 4 does not depend on it. It is important to recognize the limits of philosophical analysis, especially analysis of emotional phenomena. Here I have defended a core conceptual analysis of the emotion of wonder. The account draws both from the philosophical tradition and the ordinary phenomenological experience of wonder. Next, I look more closely at wonder’s connection with seeming value.

4 Wonder and Value

De Sousa (2013) claims emotions are purportedly “antagonists of ratio- nality,” but, “they play an indispensible role” in determining our goals, social and moral lives, and moral education. Wonder seems less apt than other emotions to be characterized as an antagonist to rationality. This may be in part because wonder, like curiosity, may be seen as an epistemic emotion (Goldie 2010). If wonder is often felt where knowledge is absent, as, for example, Bacon (1605) held, wonder can be seen as instrumental to rationality; wonder encourages investigation of and mental engagement with unknown elements of our environment. We could flesh out this ac- count in a number of ways, but one possibility would be to see wonder as a heuristic that helps us identify objects in our environment of seeming value worthy of investigation. Under this view, wonder might even be a benefit to rationality. De Sousa (2013) also claims that emotions play an indispensible role in determining our social and moral lives. It does not seem, however, that all emotions play a role in our social and moral lives, nevermind an indispensible one. Others argue that certain emotions should not play a role in our social and moral lives (e.g., Nussbaum 2004). Nevertheless, although I do not wish to take a stand on the relevance of all emotions to morality, I argue there is an important role for wonder in our social and moral lives. As a first pass, wonder is important to our moral and social lives since to wonder at x entails x seems valuable or important as an end. Identifying what seems valuable may be worthwhile in itself but also because it plau- sibly leads to identifying what is really valuable. It is important to recall that my claim that wonder involves seeming value is distinct from the claim that wonder is the perception of actual value. Wonder is not necessarily a faculty of perceiving value, as wonder may be felt toward something meretricious. This is true whether one is an objectivist or subjectivist about value. Wonder and Value 17

Of course, wonder might be felt toward something that is actually valuable; in fact, it might be often be the case that wonder is felt toward what is truly valuable. There is a danger here when we begin discussing what emotions may or might reveal. As Kauppinen (2013) notes in a review of Audi’s Moral Perception (2013), “‘mays’ and ‘mights’ abound” frequently in the discussion of emotional perception. That wonder might constitute a perception of value could strike some as a claim so safe that it is uninteresting; any emotion might constitute a perception of value. But I am making a stronger claim about wonder. I do not claim that wonder always (or ever) reveals true value, but wonder necessarily involves a seeming of final value. To feel wonder at some thing, one must find that the thing valuable as an end. I suspect this is unique to wonder; it is not obvious that any other emotion—save perhaps love—necessarily involves its object seeming to have final value. Some emotions involve value judgments that the object is good. For instance, ecstasy might necessarily include the feeling of judgment that its object seems good (or pleasurable) and love might necessarily include that its object seems good. But the sense of value expressed by wonder is different. Ecstasy might involve the feeling that one’s experience of the object is valuable. Wonder’s value seeming is about its object. The phenomenology of wonder is of perceiving something valuable, not of experiencing something valuable (cf. Husserl 1936). This is why in some cases we can feel wonder toward things we know very little about; the feeling of wonder does not necessarily include how or why the object seems valuable, but merely that it does seem so. Wonder’s seemings of final value are not unimportant. In fact, several philosophers take wonder’s seemings of final value to support claims in normative ethics. In many cases, these philosophers appear to take wonder to involve seemings of not just final value, but of non-eudaimonistic final value, value not grounded in a human person’s welfare or flourishing. For philosophers who want to draw on emotions for support or constitution of moral reasons or requirements but who reject non-eudaimonistic moral theories, wonder appears to present a challenge.14 I turn to more modern moral philosophy, arguing three philosophers (Dworkin, Wolf, and Nussbaum) invoke wonder in support of the value of certain objects which we have a non-eudaimonistic moral reason or duty to preserve, promote, or respect (objects that are intrinsically valuable, “good for nothings,” and complex life forms, respectively).15 I conclude by

14 Here, as elsewhere in the paper, I make no claims about wonder’s relation to actual (final) value; though wonder involves finding its object to seem valuable, its object might ultimately have no (objective or subjective) value. As will be seen, several philosophers make claims that relate wonder seemings to (actual) moral value. 15 In general, these seemings of value that support non-eudaimonistic moral theory appear to be seemings of moral value. However, in some cases (e.g., Dworkin 2013) these might be seemings of other kinds of value (e.g., aesthetic value). This is unclear, and stipulating 18 Kevin Patrick Tobia offering strategies for incorporating wonder’s sometimes non-eudaimonistic seemings of value into a purely eudaimonistic moral theory.

4.1 Non-Eudaimonistic Wonder Seemings and Moral Philosophy Now consider three examples from recent moral philosophy in which emo- tional wonder is invoked as support for the existence of non-eudaimonistic moral considerations, reasons, or requirements. First, consider Dworkin’s (2013) account of religion without God. Dworkin argues that one can have a religious perspective without be- ing a theist. To have a religious perspective, according to Dworkin, is to believe that “inherent, objective, value permeates everything, and that the universe and its creatures are awe-inspiring, that human life has a purpose and the universe order”(1). Dworkin’s is an account of non-eudaimonistic value that invokes wonder in its defense: We find much in the natural world beautiful: breathtaking canyons, gorgeous sunsets, prowling jaguars, and the little white rose that the poet says breaks your heart. To a naturalist this beauty is just a matter of our reactions to these sights: the pleasure we take in them. To the religious attitude they are discoveries of innate beauty: they are wonderful in themselves, not in virtue of how they strike us. (45) Importantly, Dworkin insists on the existence of intrinsic, non-eudaimo- nistic value. What distinguishes those with the religious view is that “there is wonder or beauty or moral truth or meaning or something else of value in what they experience. Their reaction is produced by a conviction of value and a response to that conviction; it cannot be accurately understood without recognizing that a real value is its object” (43). Furthermore, these value judgments, backed by wonder, support moral judgments. We have (non-eudaimonistic) moral reasons to value, preserve, or protect these natural wonders. We can find similar appeals to wonder supporting non-eudaimonistic value in Nussbaum’s defense of the dignity of (human and non-human) life (2006a; 2006b). Nussbaum (2006a) claims, “If we feel wonder looking at a complex organism, that wonder at least suggests the idea that it is good for that being to persist and flourish as the kind of thing it is” (349). Wonder at this object involves finding it valuable, not for our own ends but for its own sake. Although Nussbaum invokes the concept of “flourishing,” this that these are seemings of moral value would be both textually insincere and unnecessary to the present argument. What is clear, however, is that the authors treated here take whatever (non-eudaimonistic) value seeming wonder involves to support moral reasons, duties, or commitments. For example, even if Dworkin (2013) finds wonder to involve non- eudaimonistic seemings of (e.g., the Grand Canyon’s) aesthetic value, he more clearly takes these to support judgments of moral reasons or duties (e.g., to preserve the Grand Canyon). Wonder and Value 19

is not eudaimonistic value. Wonder is a non-eudaimonistic emotion for Nussbaum (2001) and it is because animal life is not human that we need another (non-eudaimonistic) argument to support its moral importance. For Nussbaum (2006a), this non-eudaimonistic value recognition of wonder leads to (non-eudaimonistic) moral reasons and duties to such valuable forms of life. As Bendik-Keymer (2010) argues, it is non-eudaimonistic wonder (rather than, e.g., eudaimonistic sympathy) that is foundational to Nussbaum’s account of moral dignity. For a final example we can turn to Wolf, who argues for “the possibility of things being good for reasons that are not ultimately grounded in their contribution to anyone’s welfare” (2010, 48). This is another appeal to non-eudaimonistic value. Again, we see an invocation of wonder at least in conjunction with, but more likely in support of, related moral conclu- sions: “The world seems full of things of immeasurable value, including objects and environments of the natural world, works of supreme human accomplishment, not to mention people themselves” (55). Furthermore, we have moral reasons to value these: “it is a kind of good fortune to be able to interact with these . . . appreciating their value . . . our early acquaintance with a poem or a novel or a painting—like our early acquaintance with a person—has the character of a discovery of something valuable in itself.” Wolf suggests there are moral reasons to promote these “good-for-nothings.” Great painters, for instance, have (moral) reasons to paint even if these paintings will not contribute to anyone’s welfare. Here we have three examples of modern moral philosophers invoking emotional wonder in defense of non-eudaimonistic value and associated (non-eudaimonistic) moral reasons or requirements. But both the existence of non-eudaimonistic value and especially non-eudaimonistic moral theory are highly controversial (for the former, see Hobbes 1650; Hume 1751 [1998]; Moore 1903; Dewey 1939; for the latter, see Ayer 1936; Hare 1952; Broome 1991). I will not present an argument against the possibility of non-eudaimonistic moral theory. Instead, I take that such moral theory is controversial for so many philosophers as sufficient to motivate the next sec- tion, in which I seek to incorporate wonder’s sometimes non-eudaimonistic seemings into a purely eudaimonistic moral theory.16 I consider several strategies to provide further comfort to skeptics of non-eudaimonistic moral theory: assuming a relation between wonder’s seemings (of some- times non-eudaimonistic value) and actual moral value or reasons, how can a committed moral eudaimonist accommodate wonder into his or her normative theory?

16 There are other hybrid theories that I will not have space to discuss here. For example, we might have a moral theory that recognizes both eudaimonistic and non-eudaimonistic value. 20 Kevin Patrick Tobia

4.2 Strategies for a Eudaimonistic Interpretation A number of moral philosophers argue for a relation between emotional perceptions or seemings and moral judgment. Some (e.g., Audi 2013) argue that emotions are forms of moral perception. Others (e.g., Greenspan 1988) have argued emotions can constitute moral reasons. There is not nearly enough space for a discussion of how emotional seemings relate to moral judgment or moral truth. For the present purposes, I assume emotional seemings can provide some support for moral conclusions. This can be further described in a number of ways (e.g., seemings, veridical perceptions, evidential support), but for those who do not share any of these assumptions, the following argument can be thought of as premised on a conditional: if wonder’s emotional value seemings support, constitute, or indicate actual moral values, reasons, commitments, or considerations, can all of these seemings (including apparently non-eudaimonistic value seemings) be accommodated into a eudaimonistic moral theory? I present three strategies for such a task. A first strategy to help the eudaimonistic moral theorist accommodate wonder’s sometimes presumably non-eudaimonistic seemings of value is to argue that these non-eudaimonistic wonder seemings are really eudai- monistic seemings. When it appears that a wondrous object has non- eudaimonistic seeming value, this is really a seeming that the object has final, eudaimonistic value. The phenomenology of perceiving certain objects that seem to have final value might not be drastically different from that of perceiving that those objects have intrinsic or non-eudaimonistic value. The conceptual distinction between final value and intrinsic value is one often missed (Korsgaard 1993). That there is a conceptual distinction between these kinds of values need not imply that there is a phenomenological distinction. It might be that it is at this point that we reach a limit of phenomenology; it seems the objects have some kind of (eudaimonistic or non-eudaimonistic) final value, but we need to use other tools and methods to determine which one (if either) they truly possess. As a second strategy, we could recall that the epistemological or percep- tual seeming of value involved in experiencing wonder does not entail the metaphysical existence of value and that these seemings are not necessarily veridical. The eudaimonist could argue that non-eudaimonistic seemings of wonder never imply or support claims of (non-eudaimonistic) actual value or true claims of actual value. For instance, a non-eudaimonistic value seeming about, for example, the Grand Canyon does not support a moral reason to preserve it, while a eudaimonistic value seeming about it could. How this can be done in a principled, non ad hoc, fashion is a more difficult question. Wonder and Value 21

The third strategy is one I consider most promising. This is to place certain non-eudaimonistic seemings of value into a eudaimonistic norma- tive framework by reassessing the role of emotional wonder. Although Nussbaum (2001) claims wonder is one of the most non-eudaimonistic emotions, she also notes wonder’s special ability to bring objects into our sphere of concern. In this way, feeling wonder could involve a seeming of non-eudaimonistic value, but as we engage further with the object and con- tinue to value it to the point of incorporating it into our moral framework, it transitions into our domain of eudaimonistic concern. Wonder’s initially non-eudaimonistic seemings of value ground or support our eudaimonistic moral ends. In this way, the seeming value of an object of wonder might sometimes be non-eudaimonistic, but upon accommodating this seeming into our normative theory, it supports a eudaimonistic moral claim. When we feel non-eudaimonistic wonder at natural beauty, works of art, or complex forms of life, we have eudaimonistic moral responses to preserve, appreciate, or dignify (if we have moral responses at all). These responses are ones that grow from what is now our eudaimonistic moral concern for these objects. Wonder might begin with seemings of non-eudaimonistic value, but it is only when we recognize wonder’s objects as part of our conception of the good life that the relevant moral considerations arise. Dewey (1887) held that to lose the feeling of wonder is “to lose the sense of the universality and objectivity of mind; it is to sink back contented into one’s own subjective possessions, and thus commit intellectual suicide” (262). Wonder is certainly responsive to objects and concerns initially outside of our own sphere. And wonder sometimes involves the sense that such objects are non-eudaimonistically valuable. This sensation, that there is a great and immense world of value inde- pendent from our interests, can be intimidating. As Schopenhauer notes, “If the heavens at night actually bring innumerable worlds before our eyes, and so impress on our consciousness the immensity of the universe, we feel ourselves reduced to nothing” (1818 [1844], 205). But one power of wonder is to bring inside this immensity that seemingly exists outside. In the face of such a wondrous vision, continues Schopenhauer, “there arises the immediate consciousness that all these worlds exist only in our repre- sentation. . . . The vastness of the world . . . now rests within us. [We are] not oppressed but exalted by its immensity.” Wonder might begin with a sense of immensity and seemingly external, independent, non-eudaimonistic value. But if it concludes morally, it concludes eudaimonistically, this value resting within us, now our value. Philosophy begins in wonder, marvel at a world of value worthy of investigation; and philosophy ends in wonder, marvel at our world of value worthy of our continued concern, interest, and admiration. 22 Kevin Patrick Tobia

4.3 Further Questions About Wonder and Value Here I have provided just a sketch of some ways in which wonder’s non- eudaimonistic seemings of value can be incorporated into eudaimonistic moral theory. There are undoubtedly many more avenues to pursue with respect to wonder’s relation to moral value and morality, more generally. Wonder, an emotion of interest, can prompt radically different action ten- dencies; on the one hand wonder might induce passive contemplation of its object, while on the other might induce active investigation of and interaction with its object. Is “contemplative” or “investigative” wonder morally preferable? Does this depend on other morally relevant features of the scenario? Does wonder leave us improperly or immorally disconnected from other important aspect of life? In Arendt’s words (Rubenstein 2008, 20–21), is wonder an escape from reality; does thaumazein obstruct dox- azein? As Descartes noted (1649 [1989], 349–350), wonder is a passion we experience “before we know whether or not the object is beneficial to us.” What is the right way to interpret emotional perceptions with such a characteristic? Should we seek to correct our experiences of wonder so that they have the appropriate objects? Is wonder, as Rachel Carson (1964) might have it, always a motivation toward non-destruction? Or might wonder sometimes motivate radical, idealistic, and perhaps even destructive projects? These and many other possible questions about wonder, the emotions, and morality are worth further exploration. For now I have pursued one main line of inquiry, exploring one connection between wonder’s seemings of final eudaimonistic and non-eudaimonistic value and moral theory. It is worth recalling before concluding that I do not take wonder to be an entirely or necessarily good emotion. For one, there are many more questions about wonder to investigate before such a determination could be made. Additionally, the defended account requires only the wonder’s object seem valuable as an end. Whether wonder indicates objects of true or merely meretricious value is an open question. And this seeming value might be of eudaimonistic or non-eudaimonistic (true or meretricious) value. Greenblatt (1992) provides an important analysis of the ability of wonder to lead to both inspiring and horrifying outcomes. With my conclusions comes the important corollary that wonder is a topic worthy of further investigation and continued evaluation.

5 Conclusion

Bertrand Russell had given a talk on the then new quantum mechanics, of whose wonders he was most appreciative. He spoke hard and earnestly in the New Lecture Hall. And when he was done, Professor Whitehead, who presided, thanked him for his efforts, and not least for ‘leaving the Wonder and Value 23

vast darkness of the subject unobscured.’ (Oppenheimer 1955, 102) To conclude an essay on wonder might appear inherently problematic since conclusions often involve a definitive, final closing. In this case, it might appear that in concluding, I suggest that after defending wonder’s necessary and sufficient conditions and exploring wonder’s relation with seeming value there is little left to be said. But there is something troubling about such an account of wonder. Perhaps to see the emotions, values, or world so reductively or so clinically is to see these without wonder. This is a worthy thought expressed both philosophically in, for example, Wittgenstein and Nietzsche (Hall 2010; Sherry 2013) as well as in Rosenzweig (1921 [1953]), but also poetically; Robert Hass’s Meditation at Lagunitas (2004). Hass opposes the feeling of wonder against the dismal reductive conclusion that “everything dissolves: justice, pine, hair, woman, you and I.” And Wordsworth (1798) cautions, “[o]ur meddling intellect [m]is-shapes the beauteous forms of things:—We murder to dissect.”17 But the trouble here, I believe, lies not with the reduction or analysis or clinical dissection, but rather with the required finality. Wonder involves engaging further with objects of seeming final value, even as we come to know more about them. Wonder might sometimes push us toward knowledge, but it always indicates what seems interesting and valuable. Thomas Edison (1911) puts the compatibility of wonder and naturalism more strongly: “We shall learn things of ourselves, which will be full of wonders, but none of them will be beyond the natural.” This is perhaps too strong, but the more modest point is that wonder does not necessarily cease upon explanation or analysis. But it would cease if we no longer found the intentional objects interesting or important as valuable ends. Wonder persists through conclusions but not through final closings, those that hold the subject is no longer interesting or important.

17 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this Wordsworth passage. Some might wish to defend another necessary condition of wonder related to this idea: wonder cannot involve a purely clinical experience with the object, any kind of murderous dissection. I believe this is essentially captured by my account in the requirement that the object seem to have final value. This is different from a requirement that we simply believe that an object has final value. It might be the case that we attend to an object, are interested in it, merely believe it has final value, and have a positive experience, yet do not experience wonder. This seems possible in the case of a detached, clinical dissection of an object. However, if we require that the object must also appear valuable, this indicates the kind of connection between object and wonderer that overcomes this issue of murderous dissection. Wordsworth (1798) advises, “Enough of Science and of Art,” and recommends instead to “come forth, and bring with you a heart [t]hat watches and receives.” While a purely clinical relationship with an object might threaten wonder I do not think this is because wonder and intellectual engagement are inherently opposed. Instead, it is because certain forms of myopic clinical engagement lose sight of and fail to appreciate the true beauty, goodness, or value of the object studied. Wonder is compatible with watching and receiving, but also with investigating and appreciating (1798). 24 Kevin Patrick Tobia

Fortunately, the requirement that conclusions must be a finalclosing point is one untrue of many disciplines, especially philosophy. It is worth recalling once more wonder’s special relationship with this discipline. For Aristotle, wonder is what first leads to philosophizing. For Plato, the beginning and process of philosophy involve wonder; we could say philosophy begins and ends (or, really, continues) in wonder. We might endorse Marcel’s even stronger claim: a philosopher remains a philosopher only if he or she retains the capacity for wonderment (1963, 12). The arguments presented here do not support a result nearly this strong; philosophy might begin and persist in a multitude of ways, some of which do not involve wonder at all. Yet, one cannot help but think that at least part of philosophy ought to include the pursuit of and further engagement with that which seems to have final value. Wonder, as defended here, could serve as one guide for such projects. Given wonder’s historical philosophical importance it is a topic worthy of rigorous analysis. More questions remain, but I suspect wonder will not be destroyed by pursuing them—or even by answering them. It is my hope that such attentive investigation will continue while seeking to ascend from unobscured darkness to greater understanding.

Kevin Patrick Tobia E-mail : [email protected]

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Acknowledgements Great thanks to three anonymous reviewers, Richard Elliott, Lorenzo Greco, Joshua Hordern, Guy Kahane, Sam Liao, Erasmus Mayr, Aaron Meskin, Alex Plakias, Sarah Protasi, Rebekah Rust, Martha Nussbaum, Tobias Tan, Bastian Stern and audiences from the University of Oxford, University of Leeds, University of London, the Oxford Research Center in the Humanities, and the Experimental Philosophical Aesthetics group. Wonder and Value 25

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