Published Online First: Tuesday, September 15, 2015 WONDER AND VALUE Kevin Patrick Tobia Abstract: Wonder’s significance is a recurrent theme in the history of philosophy. In the Theaetetus, Plato’s Socrates claims that philosophy begins in wonder (thaumazein). Aristotle echoes these sentiments in his Metaphysics; it is wonder and astonishment that first led us to philosophize. Philosophers from the Ancients through Wittgenstein dis- cuss wonder, yet scant recent attention has been given to developing a general systematic account of emotional wonder. I develop an account of emotional wonder and defend its connection with apparent or seeming value. Recently, several philosophers invoke wonder to back non- eudaimonistic value judgments. I introduce methods to incorporate these judgments into a eudaimonistic moral framework. On the analysis presented, wonder requires its object to seem valuable, but whether the object is in fact valuable remains an open question. Wonder enraptures us with objects that might be of true or merely illusory value, grounded either in our own well-being or in non- eudaimonistic value. Socrates: wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of Thaumas (wonder). Plato’s Theaetetus (1871) 1 Introduction The value of wonder is a recurrent theme in the history of philosophy. In the Theaetetus (155d), Plato’s Socrates claims that philosophy begins in wonder (thaumazein). Aristotle echoes these sentiments in his Metaphysics (982b); it is wonder and astonishment that first led us to philosophize. Wonder (as an emotion) is treated by a wide range of philosophers, from the Pre-Socratics through Aquinas; Descartes (1649 [1989]); Bacon (1605; 1620); Smith (1795); Kierkegaard (1845 [1988]); Nietzsche (1872 [2000]); Husserl (1936); Heidegger (1927 [1962]); and Wittgenstein (1965; 1969). Res Philosophica, Vol. 92, No. 4, October 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2015.92.4.3 c 2015 Kevin Patrick Tobia • c 2015 Res Philosophica 2 Kevin Patrick Tobia Yet little attention has been given to developing a general and systematic account of emotional wonder.1 Here I develop and defend such an account, drawing on wonder’s philosophical history and more recent work on the emotions. Of particular relevance here is my defense of wonder’s connection with apparent or seeming value. Philosophers, both historical and recent, have previously suggested that wonder relates to aesthetic value. But unlike sympathy, anger, disgust, guilt, or shame, wonder is not an emotion with obvious connections to other kinds of value, especially moral value. I start by developing an account of wonder as an emotion, drawing on historical and contemporary philosophy. I argue wonder requires (1) devoted attention to its intentional object, (2) interest in and (3) the seeming final value of its object, and (4) a positively valenced experience. I then explore further the account of the relationship between wonder and various kinds of seeming value. Analyzing recent work by Dworkin (2013); Wolf (2010); and Nussbaum (2006a) reveals that emotional wonder backs or drives certain moral judgments. Sometimes these judgments involve seeming non-eudaimonistic value (Nussbaum 2001), value not grounded in one’s flourishing. Because non-eudaimonistic moral theory is controversial, I explore various strategies for incorporating wonder’s presumably non-eudaimonistic seemings of value into a eudaimonistic moral framework. On the account defended, wonder requires its object to seem valuable, but whether the object is in fact valuable remains an open question. Wonder enraptures us with objects that might be of true or merely illusory value, grounded perhaps in our own well-being or in non-eudaimonistic value. 2 The Emotion of Wonder We all (I hope) have felt emotional wonder throughout our lives. For many, these feelings often come from engagement with nature. Recall a childhood memory of a late night away from the city lights, sprawled out, back against the grass, enraptured by the stars above. Your eyes widen as you take in the astral view, perhaps even accompanied by a feeling of breathlessness. Or recall your first encountering of a fire, perhaps a campfire—engaging and amazing. The fire seems special, valuable, important, perhaps even ex- traordinary or mystical. As the flames dance, your attention does not waver. As you stare, feelings of wonder swell within. Indeed, a whole campfire may not be necessary; even a single candle flame is equally captivating and inspiring when given appropriate attention. Nature provides a sensible starting point for emotional wonder, but even a cursory reflection reveals a wider variety of wonder inspiring experiences. 1 My focus here and throughout is on the emotion of wonder. Ordinary language suggests other kinds of non-emotional wonder: “I wonder how long it takes to get there by bus”; “I wonder if he’ll like the birthday present”; “It’s no wonder she broke up with her.” Although there is an interesting analysis to give here, my focus is restricted to emotional wonder. Wonder and Value 3 FIGURE 1. Pines and Rocks, oil on canvas by Paul Cézanne, c. 1897 (original in color). Rachel Carson, the environmentalist best known for Silent Spring (1962), also planned a book on wonder before her death. Her chapter titles indicate the breadth of wonder’s objects. As subjects of wonder, Carson cites “the sky, the woods, the sea, and the beauty in nature,” but also “the changing year, the world of tiny things, the miracle of life” (Moore 2005, 266). It seems that wonder is invoked by nature and beyond. Aesthetic objects, in particular, elicit wonder. Consider Krulwich’s (2014) recounting of his first viewing of a Cézanne (Figure 1): It was a woodland scene, a blur of greens, blues and pur- ples, a tumble of rocks in the foreground, tall pines, branch- ing into a blue sky, breaking up into arabesques . with a force that felt like a fist, it jerked my head to it—almost as if it were calling out, “You!”—like it knew me. Like it wanted to pull me to it and tell me something—something personal. But what? I had no idea. Nothing like this had ever happened to me. It had power. As I moved closer, it tightened its grip. The boulders in the foreground were dark at the edges, light where the sun peeped through. The upper branches broke free and became little dabs of paint, applied in rhythmic strokes. Paint became tree; tree became paint. I knew nothing about painting, zilch about art history, but the crazy energy coming off that canvass felt like it was addressing some puzzle I already had in my head. I couldn’t stop looking. I barely moved. 4 Kevin Patrick Tobia The emotion felt here is that of wonder. This is a passage worth keeping in mind as it references many important features of wonder. In fact, we see here all of those conditions I defend as necessary and sufficient for experiencing emotional wonder. Specifically, wonder requires (1) attending to the eliciting object; Krul- wich devotes conscious mental attention to the painting. This wonder- elicitor and wonder-experiencer relationship requires the experiencer’s at- tention (not merely his awareness); although the painting pulls him in, the experience of wonder requires Krulwich actually moving in (devoting attention, the unity of his cognitive processes, to the object). Second, wonder involves (2) a feeling of captivation or interest; Krulwich experiences the painting as part of an enticing, captivating “puzzle.” He is disposed to engage further with the object of wonder. In this most intense experience of wonder, Krulwich reports he “couldn’t stop looking.” Third, wonder involves (3) a seeming or judgment that the intentional object is valuable or important as an end. Krulwich’s experience of wonder is directed at the painting, which itself seems valuable. It is the object that has “power” and “crazy energy.” Its value or importance is not merely as means (e.g., to the end of Krulwich’s enjoyment or pleasure), but rather as an end itself. Whether or not it has actual value, it seems to have final value.2 Finally, wonder is accompanied by some (4) positively valenced affect. Krulwich’s emotional experience involves a “crazy energy”; the felt emotion is at least partly positive. It is an intense experience, but in no way is it a wholly negative or unpleasant one. To feel wonder is at least partly positive. Together, these conditions are those I defend as necessary and suffi- cient for experiencing (emotional) wonder. I will say much more about this preferred account of wonder later, but for now, the Cézanne passage helps to see that the stated conditions cohere with the ordinary usage and phenomenological experience of ‘wonder.’ For the present purpose, note that this passage also highlights that won- der is not evoked just by nature, but also by art and image. We may recall feelings of wonder at a broader range of artistic feats like an enthralling portrait painting or a marvelous orchestral performance; at achievements— like watching Usain Bolt shatter the world record in the 100 meters; at stories—especially legends, myths, and fantastic imaginings; at extraor- dinary natural objects and manmade constructions like the aptly named 2 Thanks to an anonymous referee for another popular example. This is an experiment from 2007. Joshua Bell, one of the world’s great classical musicians played violin anonymously in a Washington DC Metro stop during rush hour. The experimental question: “in a banal setting at an inconvenient time, would beauty transcend?” (Weingarten 2007). One Metro passenger, when interviewed, noted that “It was a treat, just a brilliant, incredible way to start the day. Other people just were not getting it. It just wasn’t registering.