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JP 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence

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JP 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Joint Publication 2-01.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting 9 January 2003 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) for joint intelligence organizations to implement the fundamental principles of Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, supporting the doctrinal guidance of JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, across the range of military operations. This JTTP publication describes the relationships and procedures necessary for intelligence support to joint targeting (including the operations and intelligence relationships) and roles and responsibilities at the national, combatant command, subordinate joint force, and component levels. This publication describes intelligence processes and procedures supporting the joint force commander (JFC) throughout all phases of the targeting cycle. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected JTTP to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other JFCs and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. 3. Application a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures i Preface not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: JAMES A. HAWKINS Major General, USAF Acting Director, Joint Staff ii JP 2-01.1 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................... vii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION TO JOINT TARGETING • Overview .................................................................................................................. I-1 • Targeting ................................................................................................................... I-1 • The Joint Targeting Process ....................................................................................... I-1 • Joint Targeting Integration ......................................................................................... I-2 • Nuclear Targeting ...................................................................................................... I-2 • Information Operations.............................................................................................. I-3 • Intelligence Organizations and Supporting Agencies .................................................. I-4 CHAPTER II INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDER’S OBJECTIVES, GUIDANCE, AND INTENT • Overview ................................................................................................................ II-1 • Objectives ............................................................................................................... II-1 • Guidance ................................................................................................................. II-1 • Intent ....................................................................................................................... II-2 • Measures of Effectiveness ....................................................................................... II-2 • Intelligence Contributions ........................................................................................ II-2 CHAPTER III INTELLIGENCE ROLE IN TARGET DEVELOPMENT, VALIDATION, NOMINATION, AND PRIORITIZATION • Overview ............................................................................................................... III-1 • Target Development ............................................................................................... III-1 • Target Validation .................................................................................................... III-7 • Nomination ............................................................................................................ III-9 • Prioritization .......................................................................................................... III-9 • Information Operations Considerations for Target Development ........................... III-10 iii Table of Contents CHAPTER IV INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS AND FORCE ASSIGNMENT • Overview ............................................................................................................... IV-1 • Intelligence Role in Capabilities Analysis ............................................................... IV-1 • Intelligence Role in Force Assignment .................................................................... IV-2 CHAPTER V INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO MISSION PLANNING AND FORCE EXECUTION • Overview ................................................................................................................ V-1 • Mission Planning ..................................................................................................... V-1 • Force Execution at the Operational Level................................................................. V-3 CHAPTER VI INTELLIGENCE ROLE IN COMBAT ASSESSMENT • Overview ............................................................................................................... VI-1 • Battle Damage Assessment ..................................................................................... VI-2 • Munitions Effectiveness Assessment ...................................................................... VI-4 • Reattack Recommendation (or Future Targeting Development)............................... VI-4 • Information Operations Considerations for Combat Assessment ............................. VI-4 APPENDIX A Targeting Support Services and Products ............................................................ A-1 B Target Development Example Checklist ............................................................. B-1 C Weaponeering .................................................................................................... C-1 D Intelligence Support to Time-Sensitive Targets ................................................... D-1 E Battle Damage Assessment Procedures ............................................................... E-1 F Law of Armed Conflict and Rules of Engagement Considerations in Targeting ........................................................................................................... F-1 G Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Policies on “Sensitive Target Approval and Review Process” and the Accompanying “Collateral Damage Estimation and Casualty Estimation Methodology” ............................................................ G-1 H Precision Engagement Collaboration Process ..................................................... H-1 J References .......................................................................................................... J-1 K Administrative Instructions ................................................................................ K-1 GLOSSARY Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................... GL-1 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................... GL-6 iv JP 2-01.1 Table of Contents FIGURE I-1 The Intelligence Process .................................................................................. I-2 I-2 Joint Targeting Cycle Phases ............................................................................ I-3 III-1 Target System Components and Elements ..................................................... III-3 III-2 Refining Components of the Petroleum,
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