Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities

Antoine Levesques, IISS Research Fellow for South Asia with Desmond Bowen, IISS Associate Fellow for South Asia John H. Gill, IISS Associate Fellow for South Asia

May 2021

The International Institute for Strategic Studies Contents

Glossary 3 Executive summary 4 Introduction 5 Notes 7

1. Understanding doctrine and deterrence 9 1.1 The utility of nuclear doctrine 9 1.2 The nuclear taboo 10 1.3 Strategic stability and nuclear weapons 11 1.4 Concluding observations 13 Notes 15

2. India‘s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines 17 2.1 India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines 17 2.2 Challenges: proportionality assumption 18 2.3 Challenges: automaticity and escalation-management assumptions 19 2.4 Concluding observations 21 Notes 22

3. Risks from military capabilities 23 3.1 Comparing conventional forces 24 3.2 Nuclear forces: overview 27 3.3 Nuclear forces: Pakistan 30 3.4 Nuclear forces: India 32 3.5 Concluding observations 32 Notes 34

4. Risks from emerging developments 37 4.1 Sea basing nuclear weapons: intent and efforts 37 4.2 Risks to deterrence, crisis and arms-race stability 39 4.3 Other technological efforts and possible risks 41 4.4 Concluding observations 43 Notes 45

5. Nuclear stability, risk reduction and confidence 49 5.1 Confidence-building measures: promise and stagnation 49 5.2 Possible avenues forwards 50 5.3 Overcoming challenges 52 5.4 Concluding observations 53 Notes 54

Summary conclusions and recommendations 57 Notes 60

Annex 1: Pakistan’s nuclear forces 61

Annex 2: India’s nuclear forces 63

Annex 3: Status of India’s and Pakistan’s select missiles (conventional and nuclear) 67

Annex 4: India–Pakistan confidence-building measures 71 Index of figures and tables

Figure 1. Indicative components of strategic stability 11

Figure 2. Select high-level public official statements indicating the fragility of peace between 13 India and Pakistan and the intensity of rhetoric common during tensions

Figure 3. Select evidence from the body of public statements making up India’s nuclear doctrine 17

Figure 4. Select evidence from the body of public statements making up Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine 18

Figure 5. Evidence of the notion of inflicting unacceptable damage in India’s and Pakistan’s 19 bodies of doctrine

Figure 6. Evidence of persistent perceptions of incredibility in Pakistan’s and India’s respective 20 bodies of doctrine

Figure 7. The India–Pakistan–China border trijunction 24

Figure 8. IISS Military Balance summary assessment of India’s and Pakistan’s overall military 25 capabilities (excerpts)

Figure 9. Statement by India’s army chief officially disclosing the Cold Start doctrine 26

Figure 10. India’s notional missile ranges (excludes submarine-launched) 28

Figure 11. Pakistan’s notional missile ranges (excludes underwater-launched) 29

Figure 12. Select evidence of Pakistan’s threat perception from public military statements 30

Figure 13. Excerpts from the Pakistan military’s statements on the inaugural test-launches of the 31 Nasr and Shaheen-3 missiles

Figure 14. Select statements from India relating to sea-based nuclear deterrence 38

Figure 15. Select statements from Pakistan relating to sea-based nuclear deterrence 38

Figure 16. India’s and Pakistan’s defence budgets, 2010–20 41

Figure 17. The potentially most useful CBMs and other steps pertaining to nuclear deterrence 58

Table 1. Evidence of the national power gap between India and Pakistan 23

Table 2. Comparison of India’s and Pakistan’s military forces 25

Cover Left: Pakistan conducts the training launch of a short-range Hatf-9 Nasr missile, 24 January 2019 (Inter-Services Public Relations, Pakistan); Right: India conducts the flight test of a B-05/K-15 underwater-launched ballistic missile, undated (Getty).

2 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Glossary

ASAT Anti-satellite BMD Ballistic-missile defence CBMs Confidence-building measures FSD Full-spectrum deterrence IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ISPR Inter-Services Public Relations (Government of Pakistan) LoC Line of Control NCA National Command Authority (Government of Pakistan) NFU No first use NSAB National Security Advisory Board (Government of India) SPD Strategic Plans Division (Government of Pakistan) SSBN Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 3 Executive summary

This IISS primer examines nuclear deterrence stable mutual nuclear deterrence. Nuclear and stability in South Asia by separating per- expansion casts doubt on stated policies of ceptions from facts in order to assess the extent minimalism, risks a high-cost arms race in the to which India and Pakistan may be at risk from post-pandemic era and may put overall deter- imprudent or mistaken use of nuclear weapons. rence stability at risk.

The authors start from an uncomfortable China’s evolving profile as a nuclear-weapons truth: chance played an important ameliora- state is compounding India’s security chal- tive role in the February 2019 India–Pakistan lenges. Yet control over the drivers of the security crisis. India–Pakistan nuclear-deterrence and stability equation remains almost entirely in the India and Pakistan risk stumbling into using hands of leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad. their nuclear weapons through miscalculation or misinterpretation in a future crisis. Only India and Pakistan can choose to creatively overcome the challenges to adopting new risk- This primer presents evidence suggesting reduction measures, as an imperfect but realistic grave deficiencies and asymmetries in India’s stopgap until trust-building and eventual politi- and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines, which are cal dialogue make arms control possible. compounded by mutual disbelief, existing and emerging military capabilities, and This primer identifies a list of potentially use- the prolonged absence of related dialogue ful confidence-building measures (CBMs) and mechanisms. other practical steps both countries could take early on. India and Pakistan are seeking new technologies and capabilities that dangerously under- It concludes that a robust, trusted, reliable, mine each other’s defence under the nuclear deniable backchannel between their leader- threshold. Whatever they learn from past ships is the most promising means by which crises, the uncharted territory they are now India and Pakistan could achieve greater stra- exploring requires enlightened judgement tegic and nuclear-deterrence stability. This about their doctrines, their nuclear and con- is in their interests and operationalising it is ventional capabilities, and their unpredictable their decision. Such a mechanism should help implications in future crises. avoid or mitigate the costs of any future crisis as well as eventually help India and Pakistan India and Pakistan already possess sufficient to adopt new CBMs on the way to building nuclear weapons to ensure a robust, largely greater trust.

4 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Introduction

This study seeks to separate realities from misperceptions and restraint, and which was evidently clouded by mis- about India’s and Pakistan’s respective nuclear-weapons perceptions that could have led to miscalculation and capabilities, policies and doctrines. It is intended as a unintended escalation. This episode, in which chance primer on each country’s nuclear profile and offers rec- played an ameliorative role,4 challenged both countries’ ommendations for reducing the risks associated with the long-standing claims of being able to contain a crisis well presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia. ahead of any resort to nuclear weapons. Such claims Any failure of deterrence leading to a confronta- have been, at best, soliloquies, rather than resulting from tion between India and Pakistan could result in the dialogue between the two. first offensive use of a nuclear weapon since 1945 and The odds of deterrence failure in South Asia are potentially escalate into a broader nuclear exchange. higher than might be assumed based on the modest Neither side would truly win such a war, the conse- amount of public debate the issue receives both within quences of which, including the breakdown of the and outside South Asia. Relevant developments often nuclear taboo that has held for more than 70 years, move slowly and only briefly catch media attention, would extend far beyond the region. Unless national but in the long run produce significant cumulative survival were truly at stake, it is hard to see what effects. The publication of this primer has been timed security gains would warrant nuclear use.1 India and to coincide with the somewhat lower state of tensions Pakistan became nuclear-armed states when they both since 2019, which was marked by both the Pulwama– tested weapons in 1998. Balakot crisis and New Delhi’s decision to change the In February 2019, the worst security crisis between status of Indian-administered Kashmir.5 Depending India and Pakistan in a generation was a sobering on its longer-term economic implications for India and reminder of what is at stake.2 On 14 February, a suicide- Pakistan, the COVID-19 crisis can be expected at best bomb attack – for which the Pakistan-based Jaysh-e- to freeze or merely slow down the trends described in Mohammad (JeM) terrorist group claimed responsibility this report. Its contents can contribute to informed deci- – killed 40 Indian paramilitary personnel in Pulwama in sion-making, planning and debate by each country’s the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In retaliation, government well before they enter their next electoral India carried out an airstrike targeting what the Indian cycle in 2023–24. Following the worst of the pandemic government described as a major JeM training camp in and the resumption of in-person top-level diplomacy, Balakot, a town in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province prime ministers Imran Khan and Narendra Modi will of mainland Pakistan. Pakistan’s counter-retaliation have opportunities to hold substantive conversations resulted in the loss of an Indian aircraft and the capture on the sidelines of multilateral conferences. India’s first of its pilot. (He was later released.) There are reports that hosting of a G20 heads-of-government summit in 2023 India threatened to use, and possibly prepared, a small could take place in conducive regional conditions if number of conventionally armed ballistic missiles against India and Pakistan adopt new risk-reduction measures.6 Pakistan.3 During the crisis, both sides engaged in deter- This summit will be India’s highest-profile multilateral rence signalling that alternated between provocation diplomatic event during Modi’s second term.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 5 The IISS has a long track record of monitoring the India and Pakistan have suffered a diplomatic drivers of nuclear-weapons-related instability in South lost decade since the Mumbai terrorist attacks Asia with a view to informing policymakers both in November 2008 killed more than 166 peo- within the region and beyond. IISS publications and the ple. Missed opportunities for diplomatic Institute’s long-standing practice of convening meetings engagement have added to the unresolved of stakeholders in regional statecraft have kept a steady differences, irritants and broken promises focus on South Asia.7 The IISS has also offered many between the two sides, thus preventing the opportunities for India’s and Pakistan’s most influential political normalisation of their relationship. defence intellectuals to share informed perspectives on The progressive restriction of formal, informal nuclear matters.8 This primer therefore draws on more and backchannel communications for the pre- than just text-based open sources. The authors’ decade- vention, management and resolution of cross- plus experience of engagement with senior officials and border problems and crises has negatively experts on defence and strategic issues from both India affected the region’s strategic stability. and Pakistan intervenes when public evidence is incomplete or contradictory. They hope this approach will Since 2008, precious few low- or high-level make the analysis convincing to officials in the region, diplomatic or para-diplomatic initiatives by including those who have a stake in the issues without third parties seem to have convinced India being at the heart of the most secret decision-making. and Pakistan that the focus of their national This primer presents an assessment of the chal- nuclear complexes should be on lowering the lenges to nuclear deterrence and stability in South risk of deterrence failure. Calls for global dis- Asia. To retain focus, it does not consider trends and armament by the Global Zero campaign and crises involving nuclear weapons in other regions; past by former US president Barack Obama had no and present proliferation crises and their effects on the more practical impact on India’s and Pakistan’s region; the details of crisis-escalation dynamics before arsenals than they did on those of other coun- nuclear use occurs; China’s role in shaping the India– tries. Major powers outside the region are more Pakistan nuclear relationship; global nuclear diplo- distracted in 2021 than they were in 2008, let macy; or the socialisation (or ‘normalisation’) of India alone earlier in that decade (when some pro- and Pakistan as de facto nuclear-weapons states outside gress towards conflict resolution was recorded the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The authors do, between India and Pakistan). however, draw insight and caution from the growing body of Cold War scholarship, including that related A strong case can be made that India and to crisis management and arms control, as well as from Pakistan can overcome perceptions that their the professional experience of latter-day ‘cold warriors’. disputes are intractable and insurmount- This community of former officials with experience of able. But this will require both countries to the workings of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War give careful thought to what is truly in their includes two of the primer’s authors. long-term national interest, beyond short- There is no expectation that everyone – especially term political expediency. They should also those in South Asia – will share the assumptions, scope consider the ways in which nuclear weapons or conclusions of this report, which partly concentrates can both contribute to and undermine that on risk reduction. Pragmatism9 drives the authors to the national interest, including to the point of following assumptions: national extinction.

6 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Notes

1 Although estimates of losses vary with number of weapons Rainbow Publishers, and Zed Books, 2001); Executive Summary used, weapon yields, height of burst and other local factors, the of a simulation sponsored by the US Naval War College, 28–30 scale of millions of dead and injured in any exchange that goes January 1999: Bradd C. Hayes, ‘International Game ’99: Crisis in beyond a warning shot remains consistent. A detailed 2019 study South Asia’, Homeland Security Digital Library, https://www. by a group of independent scientists and experts estimated that, hsdl.org/?abstract&did=452968; and Paul D. Taylor, ‘India and depending on the weapon yields, between 55 million and 125m Pakistan’, Naval War College Review, vol. 54, no. 3, Summer 2001, people would be killed if India and Pakistan launched 100 and https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/4/. 150 weapons respectively at one another’s cities or at military 2 ‘The India–Pakistan security crisis’, IISS Strategic Comments, targets near cities. There would also be dramatic effects lasting vol. 25, no. 10, April 2019, https://www.iiss.org/publications/ decades on regional and global food supplies (aside from illness, strategic-comments/2019/india-and-pakistan; Tim Willasey- pollution and poisoned land). Earlier assessments concluded Wilsey, ‘How Close did India and Pakistan Come to War’, that several million people would be killed outright on each Cipher Brief, 18 March 2019, https://www.thecipherbrief. side and several million more would suffer serious injuries even com/article/pakistan/how-close-did-india-and-pakistan- if far fewer warheads were employed. Neither country has the come-to-war; ‘South Asia Post Crisis Brief’, Nuclear Crisis capacity to cope with human casualties on this scale, especially Group, June 2019, https://www.globalzero.org/wp-content/ as the loss of life would be compounded by enormous damage uploads/2019/06/South-Asia-Post-Crisis-Brief.pdf; see also to infrastructure and institutions. The resources of the entire official statements on the first anniversary of the events, such as global community would be insufficient to mitigate the scope Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Balakot airstrikes of the human loss and material damage. Beyond the immediate was a message that cross-border terrorism will not be a low- region, the 2019 study noted that the ash cloud resulting from cost option for the adversary, says Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath a serious India–Pakistan nuclear exchange would have global Singh’, 28 February 2020, https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare. effects, lowering planetary temperatures enough to cause aspx?PRID=1604642; and Imran Khan, ‘Address marking widespread crop failure and mass starvation across the world. “Surprise Day”’, Samaa TV, 26 February 2020, https://www. See ‘The Climatic Consequences of a Limited Nuclear War’, in youtube.com/watch?v=PKhpcobBo3M. Strategic Survey 2019 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2019), 3 Shishir Gupta, ‘A rare phone call, secret letter: How India pp. 45–54; Jonas Jägermeyr et al., ‘A regional nuclear conflict got Pak to release IAF’s Abhinandan’, Hindustan Times, 27 would compromise global food security’, Proceedings of the February 2021, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/a- National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. rare-phone-call-secret-letter-how-india-got-pak-to-release-iaf- 117, no. 13, 16 March 2020, pp. 7071–81, https://www.pnas.org/ s-abhinandan-101614411836282.html; and Sanjeev Miglani and

content/117/13/7071; Owen B. Toon et al., ‘Rapidly Expanding Drazen Jorgic, ‘India, Pakistan threatened to unleash missiles at Nuclear Arsenals in Pakistan and India Portend Regional and each other: sources’, Reuters, 17 March 2019, https://www.reuters. Global Catastrophe’, Science Advances, vol. 5, no. 10, 2 October com/article/us-india-kashmir-crisis-insight-idUSKCN1QY03T. 2019, https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/10/eaay5478; 4 The episode featured two fortuitous aspects: the Indian fighter for earlier estimates, see Thom Shanker, ‘12 Million Could Die pilot who was shot down made a safe landing on the Pakistani at Once in an India–Pakistan Nuclear War’, New York Times, side, allowing Pakistan to make a conciliatory gesture by 27 May 2002, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/27/world/12- returning him safely. Secondly, Pakistan’s counterstrike hit million-could-die-at-once-in-an-india-pakistan-nuclear-war. near a major Indian military target but did not cause any html; Matthew McKinzie et al., ‘The Risks and Consequences of significant damage or loss of life. Nuclear War in South Asia’, in Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian (eds), 5 Although significant armed violence persists on the India– Out of the Nuclear Shadow (New Delhi and London: Lokayan and Pakistan border, see data in ‘Changes in Jammu and Kashmir:

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 7 What are the strategic implications?’, in Strategic Survey 2020 IISS, 1999); Neil Joeck, Maintaining nuclear stability in South Asia, (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2020), pp. 148–59. Adelphi 312 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 1997); as well as 6 This is despite Pakistan not being part of the G20 and thus IISS, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of not attending the meeting. Shorter term, there is speculation Proliferation Networks (London: IISS, 2007). that Modi could travel to Pakistan to attend a summit of the 8 For instance, Brahma Chellaney, ‘The challenge of nuclear South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) arms control in South Asia’, Survival: Global Politics and countries in October 2021. Strategy, vol. 35, no. 3, 1993, pp. 121–36, https://www. 7 See, for example, ‘South Asia’s Nuclear Arms Race: Lessons of tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396339308442702?ne the Cold War’, in Strategic Survey 2013 (Abingdon: Routledge edAccess=true; and Zahir Kazmi, ‘Normalising the Non- for the IISS, 2013); Mark Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s proliferation Regime’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. Nuclear Dangers, Adelphi 443 (Abingdon: Routledge for the 57, no. 1, 2015, pp. 133–50, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ IISS, 2014); Hilary Synnott, The causes and consequences of South full/10.1080/00396338.2015.1008302. Asia’s nuclear tests, Adelphi 332 (Abingdon: Routledge for the 9 Hayes, ‘International Game ‘99’.

8 The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1. Understanding doctrine and deterrence

All nuclear-armed states face the challenge of devising a course, a doctrine could be little more than an elabo- nuclear doctrine. This is a statement by an authoritative rate deception, but to sustain such an approach would government source, in written or oral form, presenting be difficult and possibly counterproductive. A doctrine a policy on the state’s intent regarding the potential may not be binding on the government that issues employment of nuclear weapons, directed mainly at it, but it is a public statement against which a state potential adversaries. Such statements are an indicator might be judged, both nationally and internationally. of strategic thinking and provide a sense of the politico- Predictability is a valued commodity in international military behaviour a state might display in a crisis. The relations, particularly where there is a risk of state-on- armed forces of states with nuclear doctrines also adopt state violence. Doctrine, therefore, carries weight and statements charting their behaviour towards other state should be treated with respect. and non-state actors. For example, doctrine may indicate whether a state 1.1 The utility of nuclear doctrine would seek to target the other side’s military forces As a political declaration of intent directed mainly at in a counterforce (against its military) or counter- potential adversaries, a doctrine plays a key role in estab- value (against its cities and civilians) strike. Doctrine lishing a country’s overall deterrence posture. By con- can also express a state’s preferences concerning ‘first veying a threat of possible nuclear use, nuclear doctrine use’ (being the first of two adversaries to use a nuclear in particular can serve – along with a country’s physi- weapon in response to unbearable military losses), ‘no cal capabilities and military preparedness – to dissuade first use’ (NFU–using nuclear weapons only in retali- an adversary from aggression. The prime objective of ation to the adversary’s first use) and ‘second strike’ nuclear deterrence is to influence the calculation by (retaining enough nuclear weapons to strike back after the adversary’s leadership that if it were to undertake being struck). Doctrines often use descriptions of the aggression, the act would not succeed or go unpunished. scale (how big) and scope (how far) of the military A second purpose of nuclear doctrine is to dem- effect sought, ranging from the largest and widest to onstrate to the public that the government is commit- the narrowest and smallest (‘strategic’, ‘operational’, ted to safeguarding national security, and to provide ‘tactical’).1 These levels of analysis are in fact codepend- guidance to the civil and military public officials who ent and hard to separate in conventional conflict, let would be expected to act in the event of a crisis. Wide- alone if a nuclear war were ever fought, in which any ranging political support for a doctrine can strengthen nuclear use would have strategic effect. its validity, although a state should guard against fos- Publicly stated doctrines are unlikely to be compre- tering unrealistic public expectations that could lead hensive or complete. The Cold War demonstrated that to brinkmanship. Domestic opposition (separate from ambiguity is an essential part of deterrence, and states oversight), on the other hand, can have an undermin- can be expected to keep many secrets in the military ing effect. Nuclear doctrine can provide a point of focus domain.2 Nor is it possible to spell out the precise cir- for discussions in the national political class and civil cumstances of any future crisis or contingency. Of society about the costs and benefits of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 9 The final purpose of nuclear doctrine is to shape the response. This was the reasoning behind NATO’s aban- way a state is perceived by other countries, most of donment of its tripwire policy in the 1960s, for exam- which will not possess nuclear weapons themselves. ple. That policy mandated the deployment of all the Whether a nuclear-weapons state is seen as responsible Alliance’s forces, including its nuclear arsenal, to coun- will be at least partly determined by how it presents ter even a limited engagement with the enemy. The itself in its nuclear doctrine. The destructive capacity of tripwire policy was replaced by the Flexible Response nuclear weapons is such that the states possessing them strategy, which provided military options short of a bear a special responsibility to carefully consider where, nuclear response. It had become increasingly difficult to when and how they might be used. accept that a nuclear war would break out the moment There are no objective or internationally accepted opposing forces crossed the border, and therefore a criteria by which to judge nuclear doctrine. Nor is it doctrine seen as becoming incredible to the adversary possible to rate the effectiveness of a doctrine other was replaced by a policy that was intended to sow real than by the absence of war, up to the point at which doubt about the likely costs of war. doctrine fails and war breaks out. It is possible, how- There is no telling precisely when the leadership of a ever, to consider the risks a doctrine entails – par- nuclear-armed state would decide, after being attacked ticularly in relation to that of an adversary – and with conventional weapons by a nuclear-armed oppo- the possible misjudgements and misperceptions that nent, that the situation necessitated a nuclear response. could arise, with potentially dire consequences for It is much clearer, however, that once the nuclear taboo both sides. This is the purpose of the following chap- had been broken, escalation to nuclear retaliation would ters of this study. be far more likely, if not certain. The terms of the conflict would have changed irrevocably, and the calcula- 1.2 The nuclear taboo tion of whether the delivery of a crushing nuclear blow Because of their exceptional ability to inflict widespread was essential to safeguard the state would be a major damage and cause mass casualties, nuclear weapons are factor in every military decision. placed in a separate category from conventional arma- One aspect of this thinking is the prospect of the ments by both political leaders and the public. That has destructive power of nuclear weapons used in retalia- been the case ever since nuclear weapons were invented tion inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ on the aggressor. and used for the first (and only) time during the Second Exactly what would constitute unacceptable damage is, World War. however, open to interpretation and subject to many Since two nuclear bombs were dropped on Japan in variables. Unlike during the early phase of the Cold War, 1945, a taboo, especially among national political lead- today the threat of unacceptable damage may not nec- ers, has emerged against the use of any kind of nuclear essarily imply the total destruction of a society.5 There weapon.3 This covers not just weapons tested for may now be degrees of unacceptability. Those may large destructive yields since 1945, but also low-yield involve solely targeting command-and-control centres nuclear weapons. There has been a clear and abiding and other sites of national importance in a debilitating sense that the use of any nuclear weapon would be a attack. Even so, the notion suggests that the functioning strategic act, one that would fundamentally change of the state would be impaired to such a degree that its the nature of the conflict in which the weapon had will (and probably its capacity) to continue the conflict been used. would have been eviscerated. Contributing to the nuclear taboo are the concepts of The role of the potential infliction of unacceptable necessity and proportionality,4 which are cornerstones damage in nuclear deterrence carries two implications. of the laws of war and civilised conduct. It is widely Firstly, only the most extreme adversity can justify a agreed that there is a relationship between the scale and state in resorting to unacceptable damage, for example impact of a warlike act and the response it provokes, where the continued existence of the state or its vital and that a limited act does not justify an unlimited interests is in doubt.6 The other implication is to provide

10 The International Institute for Strategic Studies a guide to judge the optimal size and sophistication of a More narrowly, the question of ‘crisis stability’ nuclear arsenal: once two nuclear-armed states have the arises in circumstances when one of two adversaries is weapons to deliver unacceptable damage to one another under pressure to act militarily. Crisis stability refers to in a second strike, deterrence should remain effective. the factors influencing the balance between those two Acquiring more or better nuclear weapons may not be opponents in, and their ability to retain control over, necessary since it would exceed the requirement. Such a crisis. During the Cold War, minimising brinkman- measuring against sufficiency can help interpret the ship was a central feature of crisis stability under the notions of minimalism and credibility, which are com- nuclear threshold. That effort staved off nuclear war. monplace in nuclear doctrines. But this did not follow from simple mechanistic power relations. Conventional forces, by contributing to ‘con- 1.3 Strategic stability and nuclear weapons ventional deterrence stability’, are an essential part of Where nuclear weapons are present and unlikely to overall deterrence and strategic stability (see Chapter be removed, military planners and policymakers may Three). Strong conventional forces help to avoid plac- seek to achieve ‘strategic stability’ (see Figure 1). The ing undue reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons, term refers to a situation in which a kind of equilibrium either for full strategic effect or anything short of this to exists between two or more states such that none of achieve so-called ‘war termination’. Minimising risks to them feels at a significant disadvantage. Strategic - sta crisis stability requires level thinking about trade-offs bility derives both from evidence of a physical military and pathways for both escalation and de-escalation: capacity and from an assessment of associated political those must account for how confusion (‘fog’), friction resolve. During the Cold War, strategic stability was or biases7 can affect notions of self-worth or injured largely a function of how unlikely it was that surprise national pride and create ‘compulsions’ or ‘commit- attacks could occur between the United States and the ment traps’ to ‘appear tough’ and ‘settle scores’, as offi- Soviet Union. cials in private or press commentary sometimes put it.

Figure 1. Indicative components of strategic stability

STRATEGIC STABILITY

120 116 DETERRENCE STABILITY 112 108 104 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STABILITY 100 96 CRISIS ARMS-RACE 92 STABILITY STABILITY 88 CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE STABILITY 84 80 Q 4 Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 2019: 2020: 2020: 2020: 2020: 2021: 2021: 2021: 2021: 2022: 2022: 2022: 2022:

SUB-CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE STABILITY China (Jan. 2021 WEO) China (Jan. 2020 WEO) AEs (Jan. 2021 WEO) AEs (Jan. 2020 WEO) EMDEs excl. China EMDEs excl. China (Jan. 2021 WEO) (Jan. 2020 WEO)

Source: IISS

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 11 ‘Arms-race stability’, another notion within strategic Outside their nuclear armouries, states may deliber- stability, refers to the factors that determine how states’ ately seek to manipulate risk. They may seek to increase accumulation of military capabilities can contribute to the imbalances between them to better play to their achieving or disrupting a sense of balance between them. national advantages and more likely prevail over the Strategic stability is neither a naturally occurring other in certain non-nuclear conflicts. There is evidence nor an irreversible condition. The inevitable imbal- that both India and Pakistan have made this judgement ances and uncertainties in any relationship mean that (see Figure 2). instability is more likely, especially when more than Such forms of warfare, which variably rely on com- two states are in contention. The perceived solid- binations of coercion, ‘compellence’ and ‘implausible ity of stability may wax and wane: thus, it is a goal deniability’ delivered in part through traditional and to be striven for and once achieved, it needs tending social media, can be known as ‘hybrid’, ‘fifth-gener- to. Strategic stability requires that national decision- ation’, ‘grey-zone’, ‘tolerance’ or ‘threshold’ warfare.8 makers see merit in the benefit while continuously Nuclear-armed states may be able to derive real or observing and assessing what is needed to maintain it. perceived benefits from such strategies, including Some level of trust and compromise between states is inducing US- and other third-party-led crisis manage- usually necessary to this end. ment. But these advantages are set against the risks Nuclear weapons play an important part in strate- of inadvertently reaching the point at which a crisis gic stability alongside politics, economics, security, becomes so intense that political and military lead- demography, history and culture. Successful nuclear ers become driven by specific considerations of using deterrence can induce strategic stability of a sort. nuclear weapons. Such strategies make strategic intent Deterrent postures and doctrines that are reciprocally harder to convey unambiguously: does evidence allow credible to each of the adversaries should have that for the attribution of the perceived aggression to the effect. One reason to acquire nuclear weapons, after all, presumed perpetrator? Was action taken for punish- is to compensate for or rectify a perceived conventional ment, tit for tat, or to induce a broader change of state military imbalance. behaviour? The historical evidence from states operating a Strategic stability may be harder to achieve and nuclear deterrent suggests that the introduction of precarious to maintain where there is an underlying assured second-strike capability by two adversarial political problem between states that they have failed parties provides a good measure of stability. Both India to resolve together, or that they have attempted to and Pakistan claim to possess a second-strike capabil- resolve by resorting to armed violence. In the South ity and have made clear their determination to reinforce Asian context, the dispute over Kashmir is an exam- the survivability (or relative invulnerability) of that ple of such a problem. The dispute’s diplomacy is a capability by seeking to place nuclear weapons on naval long-standing feature of both countries’ foreign poli- ships (see Chapter Four). cies. Domestic political polarisation or consensus both The very presence of nuclear weapons can, however, partly result from and influence it. More generally, per- also erode strategic stability by encouraging limited ceptions can undermine a sincere intent to build strate- conventional conflict. Academics and strategic plan- gic stability. One country’s search for strategic stability ners call this the ‘stability–instability paradox’. Larger- might be seen by another as the imposition of strategic scale war is too risky with nuclear weapons, so limited instability. Second-guessing the opponent and their state-on-state conflict or crises can become likelier. Such resolve, and planning for worst-case outcomes – some- crises can involve state-sponsored militias or militant thing that all militaries must do – can also encourage proxies (a means of undermining eventual ‘sub-conven- unhelpful speculation. Finally, the introduction of new tional deterrence stability’ existing between two coun- technology9 and isolated events, within or outside the tries’ non-regular and non-nuclear forces), which also control of the state, are other complicating factors (see raise sensitivity to alleged state-sponsored interference. Chapter Four).

12 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Figure 2. Select high-level public official statements indicating the fragility of peace between India and Pakistan and the intensity of rhetoric common during tensions

‘Such people [Pakistan-based terrorists] need to weapons. Even the media would bring out be taught a lesson. There is no question mark in reports about Pakistan having nuclear weap- it. But when, how and at what time, should be ons. So what do we have? Are we saving them decided based on our convenience … As we say, [nuclear weapons] for Diwali?’ no one tells the world what you do and what INDIA: Prime Minister Narendra Modi, 21 April 2019 happens inside a bedroom.’ INDIA: Minister of Defence Manohar Parrikar, 5 February 2016 ‘It’s no longer going to be hide and seek. If we have to go across, we will, through the air or the ‘We don’t itch for a fight, but if someone looks ground route or both. The red line has been very at the country with evil eye, we will gouge his clearly drawn as to what will be the future course eyes out and put them back in his hand, we have of action.’ that much power … There was no firing on the INDIA: Army Chief Gen. Bipin Rawat, 30 September 2019 border for the last three days because if they [Pakistan] fire once, we fire twice at them. … ‘If Pakistan does not stop its policy of state- Even if you are going to hunt a rabbit, be pre- sponsored terrorism, we reserve the right to pared to kill a tiger.’ pre-emptively strike at the sources of terror INDIA: Minister of Defence Manohar Parrikar, 26 November 2016 threat and this intent has adequately been demonstrated in our response during surgical strikes ‘The prime minister has summoned a meeting of and Balakot operation.’ the National Command Authority [NCA]. I hope INDIA: Army Chief Gen. M.M. Naravane, 31 December 2019 you know what the NCA means.’ PAKISTAN: Army spokesman, 26 February 2019 ‘Pakistan’s policy in a limited conflict – I am not talking of outright war, in a limited conflict, or in ‘This non-military preemptive action was specifi- limited attacks by India, look at the types that we cally targeted at the JeM camp.’ saw last year – Pakistan’s stated policy is ‘Quid INDIA: Ministry of External Affairs press release, 26 February 2019 pro Quo Plus’, which amplifies very clearly that we will not take it lying down, and we will get ‘India has stopped the policy of getting scared right back, plus a bit.’ by Pakistan’s threats. Every day, they [Pakistan] PAKISTAN: Lt-Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, NCA Advisor (and former Director-General, Strategic Plans Division), 6 February would make claims about having nuclear 2020, IISS meeting

1.4 Concluding observations circumstances, call for the most serious consideration. Nuclear doctrines are made to Nuclear doctrine and deterrence in both India last. India’s and Pakistan’s doctrines must be and Pakistan, as in all nuclear-weapons states, judged with reference to the universal values are subject to the considerations discussed in of necessity and proportionality. Those yard- this chapter. The concepts of necessity and sticks are just as relevant in South Asia as proportionality are cornerstones of the laws elsewhere.10 of war and civilised conduct. One implication is that changes to nuclear doctrine, while Strategic stability, if it is to be achieved on the possible owing to changes of truly strategic Indian subcontinent, will require the same

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 13 level of commitment to responsible state- Nuclear-armed states that resort to risk manip- craft as it does in other places. Specifically, ulation and use of force against each other below the nuclear threshold, South Asia’s below the nuclear threshold, in the expecta- nuclear-weapons states will need to resist tion of strengthening strategic deterrence, any urge to sustain instability for what can benefit from entering and sustaining private often appear to be short-sighted purposes dialogue on defence doctrines and postures. and in the self-deceiving hope that instability Risk reduction is not possible without a good can be contained to the initiator’s advantage. understanding of how and to what purpose Complacency, let alone complicity in allowing risk features in statecraft that could ultimately instability, could have terrible consequences. involve the use of nuclear weapons.

14 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Notes

1 For a simple exposition of the three levels of warfare, see UK 7 Such as hindsight bias (or assuming the next crisis will Government, Ministry of Defence, ‘Joint Doctrine publication resemble the previous ones), groupthink, mirror-imaging or 0-01: UK Defence Doctrine’, December 2014, pp. 19–21, https:// failures of imagination but also ‘confirmation bias’ (considering assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ hypotheses that are already held as true) or the ‘anchoring uploads/attachment_data/file/389755/20141208-JDP_0_01_ effect’ (placing undue weight on the first piece of information Ed_5_UK_Defence_Doctrine.pdf. For detailed discussion encountered). in the context of tactical nuclear weapons, see Jeffrey D. 8 John Chipman, ‘A new geopolitical challenge to the rules- McCausland, Tom Nichols and Douglas Stuart, ‘Tactical based order’, IISS Analysis, 16 November 2018, https:// Nuclear Weapons and NATO’, Strategic Studies Institute, US www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/11/challenge-rules-based- Army War College, 1 April 2012, https://ssi.armywarcollege. order; John Raine, ‘Iran: war on the threshold’, IISS Analysis, edu/tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-nato/. 5 August 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/08/ 2 Desmond Bowen, ‘Relevant Cold War Experience?’, in Rakesh iran-threshold-war; Lt-Gen. H.S. Panag, ‘Not full-blown Sood (ed.), Nuclear Order in the Twenty First Century (New Delhi: war but covert operations can help India keep Pakistan Observer Research Foundation, 2019), pp. 55–66, https://www. on the edge’, The Print, 21 February 2019, https://theprint. orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Nuclear-Order.pdf. in/opinion/not-full-blown-war-but-covert-operations- 3 Nina Tannenwald, ‘The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the can-help-india-keep-pakistan-on-the-edge/196098/; Rory Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use’, International Organization, Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Grey is the new black: vol. 53, no. 3, Summer 1999, pp. 433–68, https://www.cambridge. covert action and implausible deniability’, International org/core/journals/international-organization/article/nuclear- Affairs, 1 May 2018, vol. 94, no. 3, 1 May 2018, pp. 477–94, taboo-the-united-states-and-the-normative-basis-of-nuclear- https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/3/477/4992414; nonuse/EA04E0104A42C12FC785A70F301197CC. and ‘India engaged in 5GW to harm CPEC: ISPR’, Express 4 For an up-to-date discussion of proportionality in the context of US Tribune, 4 December 2020, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2 nuclear-weapons policy, see George Perkovich and Pranay Vaddi, 274581/1?fbclid=IwAR2tWjxVZ9hQabi6pIi4VDsqFdeRK ‘Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review’, Gnn_FvEwJNtTbsBkik25VETVzNNug4. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 January 2021, 9 Heather Williams, ‘Strategic Stability, Uncertainty and the p. 32, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/21/proportionate- Future of Arms Control’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, deterrence-model-nuclear-posture-review-pub-83576. vol. 60, no. 2, 2018, pp. 45–54, https://www.tandfonline.com/ 5 ‘“Mutual Deterrence” Speech by Sec. of Defense Robert doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2018.1448561. McNamara’, San Francisco, 18 September 1967, http://www. 10 For one acknowledgement from India and call to shift from

atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml. mutually assured destruction (MAD) to mutually unacceptable 6 By implication the circumstantial requirements are set very destruction (MUD), see Nitin Pai, ‘MUD, not MAD’, Acorn, high indeed for any use of nuclear weapons in a ‘limited’ 31 August 2009, http://acorn.nationalinterest.in/2009/08/31/ fashion, for example to signal resolve or to end a crisis. mud-not-mad/.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 15 16 The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2. India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines

India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines are reasonably 2.1 India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines well established but neither has been set out in a thor- India has a policy of NFU of nuclear weapons against all ough, clear and comprehensive manner. Those seeking nuclear-armed states, but with a commitment to retaliate clarity must rely on press releases, draft documents or in the case of any use of nuclear, or large-scale chemical on-the-record talks by senior officials. or biological, weapons against its territory or its armed There has been much academic speculation and forces anywhere. In 1999, India explicitly eschewed the interpretation over the years, along with some political recourse to a nuclear first strike. Irrespective of target or commentary and written reflections on the nuclear doc- nuclear yield, retaliation is characterised as massive and trines by retired senior officials. But the fundamentals designed to cause unacceptable damage (and therefore of the two doctrines are clearly delineated, with their war termination). There is no provision for graduated owners describing them as ‘credible’ and ‘minimum’. escalation. No one potential adversary is identified.1 India Notably, those two principles have, in recent years, reviews its doctrine periodically but has not revised it become less coequal, with both states placing greater since 2003 (there is woefully little public discourse about emphasis on credibility. this at home or abroad).2

Figure 3. Select evidence from the body of public statements making up India’s nuclear doctrine

‘[India pursues a] policy of “retaliation only” ‘There has been no change in India’s nuclear doc- … any nuclear attack on India and its forces trine. India is committed to maintaining credible shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear minimum deterrence and the policy of no-first weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the use of nuclear weapons.’ aggressor … India will not be the first to initiate INDIA: Minister of State for External and Parliamentary Affairs V. Muraleedharan, 4 March 2020 a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.’ ‘India espouses the policy of “No First Use” INDIA: Draft doctrine, 17 August 1999 against nuclear weapon states and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states.’ ‘Nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation INDIA: Foreign Secretary Harsh V. Shringla, 2 October 2020 … nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.’ ‘India, as a responsible nuclear weapon State, is INDIA: Reviewed doctrine, 4 January 2003 committed as per its nuclear doctrine, to maintaining credible minimum deterrence with the ‘[India has a] declared doctrine of no-first use posture of no-first use and non-use against non- and retaliation only.’ nuclear weapon States.’ INDIA: Ambassador (Retd) Shyam Saran, Chairman, National INDIA: Foreign Secretary Harsh V. Shringla, 22 February 2021 Security Advisory Board (NSAB), 24 April 2013

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 17 Figure 4. Select evidence from the body of public statements Pakistan has a policy of ‘full-spectrum deterrence making up Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine (FSD)’, designed to prevent conventional conflict at any level by the threat of nuclear first use in response ‘[Nuclear weapons will be used only] if the very to aggression. Pakistan’s first response may, and prob- existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake. … ably would, be conventional. It would resort to nuclear Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. In use in response to a ‘large-scale attack’. The full spec- case that deterrence fails, they will be used if: a) trum covers both short-range, low-yield weapons and India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part long-range weapons to cover the most distant targets in of its territory (space threshold); b) India destroys India, which is identified as the sole adversary. While a large part either of its land or air forces (mili- the capability to inflict unacceptable damage is inherent tary threshold); c) India proceeds to the economic in the full-spectrum approach, the threat of the use of strangling of Pakistan (economic strangling); and short-range weapons is meant to deny India the space d) India pushes Pakistan into political destabili- for limited conventional war. zation or creates a large scale internal subversion Neither doctrine includes a suggestion of pre-emp- in Pakistan (domestic destabilization).’ tion using nuclear weapons or a disarming first strike PAKISTAN: Lt-Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, Director-General, Strategic Plans Division, 2001 as policy.3 Nor is there explicit discussion of either counterforce or countervalue targeting.4 Both doctrines ‘Pakistan possesses a full spectrum of nuclear implicitly embrace the latter, without, in Pakistan’s weapons … with full range coverage of the large case, categorically excluding the former. Both sides Indian landmass and its outlying territories. assert the existence of a second-strike capability and, in There will be no place to hide.’ this context, both parties refer to the acquisition of sea- PAKISTAN: Lt-Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, NCA Advisor, December 2017, IISS meeting based capability to complete a triad of air-, land- and sea-based nuclear weapons. The doctrines include con- ‘Over the years Pakistan’s nuclear policy has siderations of command and control, the need for resil- transited to the concept of Full Spectrum Deter- ience and the desire for peace. rence (FSD) while remaining within the larger Clearly, the two doctrines are not symmetrical, philosophy of Credible Minimum Deterrence as a which is not surprising since the two states experi- response to the evolving nature of threat.’ ence radically different strategic situations. Broadly PAKISTAN: Lt-Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, NCA Advisor, 6 November 2018 speaking, India’s motivation for becoming a nuclear- armed state was to deter a nuclear-armed China5 (see ‘Pakistan’s nuclear capability operationalised also Chapter Three); it rejects the notion, popular with under the well-articulated policy of FSD com- some Western analysts, that the prestige of possessing prises of a large variety of strategic, operational nuclear weapons played a role. Pakistan’s convention- and tactical nuclear weapons, on land, air and ally inferior military position vis-à-vis India, a much sea, which are designed to comprehensively deter larger country, gave rise to the desire to compensate large-scale aggression against mainland Pakistan.’ for that imbalance by acquiring a nuclear equaliser PAKISTAN: Lt-Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, NCA Advisor, 6 February 2020, IISS meeting and deterrent. Analysis of the interplay between these doctrines leads to concern that, in a crisis leading to armed con- 2.2 Challenges: proportionality assumption flict, grave risks would arise. After their 1998 nuclear- The first issue involves the assumption of proportional- weapon tests, that concern was genuine during the ity. Proportionality is a criterion not obviously associated India–Pakistan crisis of 1999 (in the Kargil district of with weapons of mass destruction when the survival of Kashmir), as well as that of 2001–02 (a military mobilisa- the state is at stake and a defence of last resort is invoked. tion following a terrorist attack on India’s parliament). But it is relevant when conflict short of that existential The conclusions of that analysis are set out below. exigency is involved. There has been much focus on the

18 The International Institute for Strategic Studies possibility of an Indian land-force incursion into Pakistan Compared to his previous statements, this formulation after a terrorist attack on India that, it determined, was in amounts to a slight upping of Pakistan’s nuclear thresh- some way state-sponsored. In this context, Pakistan does old for use (see Figure 4). Yet if the taboo were broken not commit itself to using its nuclear weapons as a last this would open a Pandora’s box in respect of retalia- resort only. An Indian armed response of such weight tion. A contrary view could argue that proportionality and vigour as to come close to paralysing Pakistan should be measured in explosive power (measured in would call into question the survival of the state; but a kilotons equivalent of TNT explosive) not explosive limited attack with small-scale objectives amounting to material (nuclear as opposed to conventional), and that a punitive raid should not give licence for an unlimited the use of a small nuclear warhead to defend against a response involving the first use of nuclear weapons. superior conventional military force showed restraint. The potential disproportion arises in the doctrinally The thick red line of the taboo would nonetheless have possible use of ‘small’ nuclear weapons by Pakistan been breached, with unknowable consequences. against a land-force incursion, short of an all-out invasion, Disproportion also arises in the event of an Indian to halt it or signal greater nuclear escalation if it contin- response to the limited first use of nuclear weapons as ued. In a February 2020 presentation at the IISS, Lt-Gen. in the scenario described above, by massive retaliation (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, the architect and first director-gen- as stated by the policy, to cause unacceptable damage to eral of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), the sec- the opponent (see Figure 5). retariat of the country’s National Command Authority Both sides argue the logic of their case strongly in (NCA), and since 2013 an appointed advisor to the NCA, terms of deterrent effect, but what is striking is that both for the first time abroad indicated Pakistan’s -thresh also repudiate the credibility of the other’s potential use old for use might have risen to only ‘comprehensively in such circumstances. This disbelief originates largely deter large-scale aggression against mainland Pakistan’.6 from the sense of disproportionality in the eyes of those who are meant to be deterred. There is therefore a grave

Figure 5. Evidence of the notion of inflicting unacceptable damage risk of deterrence failure if the two parties consider the in India’s and Pakistan’s bodies of doctrine other side’s doctrine to lack credibility (see Figure 6). ‘Incredible’ doctrine is dangerous and destabilising. ‘Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable 2.3 Challenges: automaticity and damage.’ escalation-management assumptions INDIA: Adopted doctrine, 4 January 2003 Compounding the worry about disbelief is the deterrent

‘India will not be the first to use nuclear weap- narrative on both sides, which creates the impression ons, but that if it is attacked with such weap- of automaticity: ‘If X occurs and my doctrine says that ons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation in this circumstance nuclear weapons should be used, which will be massive and designed to inflict they must and will be.’ This syllogism is a risk common unacceptable damage on the adversary.’ to all nuclear-armed states. Tripwire responses are built INDIA: Ambassador (Retd) Shyam Saran, Chairman, NSAB, 24 on the back of red lines and standardised procedures. April 2013 Predictability can make a healthy contribution to deter- ‘Mutual trust, shared values and common rence but only provided a good level of shared under- objectives can enhance strategic stability, but standing exists between the putative opponents. Such the most important requisite is the mutual clarity of strategic expectations can be developed by conviction that using military force will result relying on identifiable threats to national survival (this in unacceptable retaliatory damage.’ is less likely in respect of hostile acts that fall short of PAKISTAN: Brigadier Zahir Kazmi, Strategic Plans Division materially affecting vital national interests). (SPD), 29 March 2017 (citing two senior policy analysts from the US and China), IISS meeting A prominent inconsistency between India’s and Pakistan’s doctrines is manifest in the implied

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 19 expectations of escalation and its management. For India, the doctrine speaks of a one-time, ‘one-rung’- ‘Nuclear weapons are weapons of only escalation to massive retaliation, to which no deterrence. They are not weapons for war further response is anticipated. For Pakistan, the FSD fighting. I find it difficult to comprehend posture is geared towards preventing conventional when someone proclaims he will use aggression at any level by threatening, at a minimum, them for conventional war fighting or if nuclear use of limited yield both as a signal and for he is attacked. Will the world community tactical effect. The implied expectation is that the ever allow you to use nuclear weapons aggression would then cease or that graduated nuclear like this? Pakistan’s statements show escalation would commence. an inappropriate understanding of the Releasing nuclear weapons on a conventional bat- employment of strategic weapons.’ tlefield would at a stroke change the nature ofthe INDIA: Army Chief Gen. Bipin Rawat, 30 September 2019 conflict and would take the parties into unknown territory in terms of escalation; there are no grounds for ‘If India’s doctrine is in-credible, what do I confidence that a ladder of escalation would be judi- make of it? … I am as perplexed perhaps as ciously and reciprocally mounted, step by step.7 But anyone else would be, that you project some such an approach is completely at odds with India’s documents as doctrine, then you start saying stated doctrine. The notion that nuclear escalation can these are not doctrine, then you start saying be managed is a fallacy implying a risk of vast propor- there is first use, then it is NFU [no first use], tions. India’s awareness of this is old and reflected in then there is a conditional NFU. So what is it its NFU pledge, which is partly inspired by the need exactly that the Indians want to do?’ to guard against this very risk. Pakistan has in recent PAKISTAN: Brigadier Zahir Kazmi, SPD, 29 March 2017, IISS meeting years come to recognise this, both above and below the threshold of nuclear use.8 This awareness could ‘A limited nuclear war is a contradiction in be self-serving, however, by also playing to Pakistan’s terms. Any nuclear exchange, once initiated, broader argument that India ought to be deterred from would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the any temptation to approach the nuclear threshold in strategic level. Pakistan would be prudent not the first place. to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and Figure 6. Evidence of persistent perceptions of incredibility in perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons.’ Pakistan’s and India’s respective bodies of doctrine INDIA: Ambassador (Retd) Shyam Saran, Chairman, NSAB, 24 April 2013

‘If India’s strategic planners consider ‘Tactical or strategic, [Nasr] is a nuclear Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence as a weapon. Our response would be absolutely bluff, whether as a professional assessment violent, if it is used, as per our existing policy.’ or succumb to the irrational pressures of their INDIA: Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC), 27 July 2011 political masters, and proceed to undertake further military misadventures, as is being threatened at regular intervals by the highest Below the threshold of nuclear use, as of 2020, levels of political and military leadership, Pakistan has shifted away from a stance where it saw South Asia, I am afraid is heading into a no space for conventional warfare. It now sees a little, catastrophic uncharted territory.’ undefined room for escalation (see Chapter One). This PAKISTAN: Lt-Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, NCA Advisor, 6 comes with a declared policy of ‘Quid pro Quo Plus’, February 2020, IISS meeting stating that it will counter conventional use of force by India ‘with a bit of a plus’,9 suggesting more bravado

20 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and greater cost imposition than tit for tat, stability claim to know the psyche of the other. The and de-escalation. After the 2019 crisis, India also sees idea that ‘those who need to know do know’ space for the use of military force under its perception is unconvincing in practice and may under- of Pakistan’s nuclear threshold on land, as well as at sea. mine politicians’ responsibilities for oversight Seeing such space opens inadvertent pathways to the and accountability. Mutual disbelief is also nuclear threshold through conventional means, how- affected by a degree of mirror-imaging, which ever light or pinpoint (‘surgical’). From one crisis to the is not exclusive to South Asia: one side pre- next they also risk ratcheting up the intensity of the use sumes too easily that it can second-guess the of military force. other’s coming actions because the latter is presumed to share similar interests and face 2.4 Concluding observations comparable dilemmas.

The doctrinal disparity between India and The reasonable yardsticks of necessity and Pakistan gives rise to risk and the real possibil- proportionality that underpin deterrence ity of miscalculation. Mutual perception of the and nuclear strategic stability (see Chapter doctrines appears to centre around incredibil- One) suggest that the use of nuclear weap- ity. That is not to say that the doctrines need ons should only be considered in extreme to be precisely aligned. But if Pakistan threat- circumstances when national survival is at ens a limited or low-level nuclear use (not first stake. Pakistan does not, however, commit to strike) against an incursion it equates with a using nuclear weapons only as a last resort ‘comprehensive large-scale aggression against or in extremis if the survival of its state were its mainland’ and India threatens massive in danger. The juxtaposition of India’s and retaliation for any use at all, the result could Pakistan’s doctrines risks the possibility of a be catastrophic. nuclear exchange in a situation far short of that ultimate contingency. Since the 2019 cri- Misunderstandings, misperceptions and sis, both countries see space for use of military misjudgements could well occur in a crisis, force under their respective perceptions of the however well the authorities on both sides other’s nuclear threshold.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 21 Notes

1 For an example of further discussion, see Rahul Roy- have taken particular note of the statement by India’s defence Chaudhury, ‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine: A Critical Analysis’, minister in August 2019: Rajnath Singh (@rajnathsingh), Strategic Analysis, vol. 33, no. 3, 2009, https://www.tandfonline. ‘Pokhran is the area which witnessed Atal-ji’s firm resolve com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160902790084. to make India a nuclear power and yet remain firmly 2 For a recent influential position in this debate, see the views committed to the doctrine of “No First Use”. India has strictly of a former head of strategic forces, B.S. Nagal, ‘Reassessing adhered to this doctrine. What happens in future depends India’s Doctrine’, National Security, vol. 3, no. 2, April–June on the circumstances’, 16 August 2019, https://twitter.com/ 2020, pp. 169–84, https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/ rajnathsingh/status/1162276901055893504, Tweet. national-security-vol-3-issue-2-colloquium-BNagal.pdf. There 3 Pakistani official analysts argue that India may undertake pre- has been particular controversy about India’s commitment emptive first strikes: see ‘Strategic instabilities in South Asia to its own NFU pledge, following statements originating in and Pakistan’s nuclear policy’, remarks by Imran Hassan at India. But evidence points to continued adherence by India to IISS, London, 28 May 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch? this pledge. On 16 March 2017, former Indian special envoy v=k0tv3qjLlPk&feature=youtu.be. of the prime minister of India for disarmament and non- 4 Amit Sharma, ‘Assessing India’s Nuclear Doctrine’, National proliferation issues, Ambassador (Retd) Rakesh Sood, offered Security, vol. 2, no. 1, January–March 2019, pp. 19–26, https:// a nuanced and comprehensive rebuttal of those doubts: ‘When www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/national-security-vol-2- people talk about changing NFU and moving to first use, it is issue-1-essay-asharma.pdf. For background, see Christopher not just a question of deleting one word, it comes with a whole Clary and Vipin Narang, ‘India’s Counterforce Temptations: range of paraphernalia associated with it. What is the kind of Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine and Capabilities’, International arsenal that you would have, if you were to engage in First Security, vol. 43, no. 3, Winter 2018–19, pp. 7–52, https://www. use? What is the kind of command and control that you would mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_a_00340. have, and what would be the delegation levels if you would 5 ‘Nuclear Anxiety: Indian’s Letter to Clinton On the Nuclear engage in First use? Looking at First use then what are the Testing’, New York Times, 13 May 1998, https://www.nytimes. kind of threats that you would need to deter by positing First com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letter-to- use? It takes you away from sole purpose and a whole host clinton-on-the-nuclear-testing.html. of other things. Which is why we have not gone down that 6 ‘Keynote Address and Discussion Session with Lt-Gen. (Retd) particular road, because going down that road would make Khalid Kidwai’, IISS, London, 6 February 2020, https://www. it inconsistent with the historical experience that I pointed iiss.org/events/2020/02/7th-iiss-and-ciss-south-asian-strategic- out.’ See ‘India’s nuclear doctrine and nuclear diplomacy’, stability-workshop.

address by Ambassador Rakesh Sood at the IISS, London, 10 7 For a traditional enunciation of the ‘escalation ladder’, see April 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5jN2_zW_ Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New MVk. For one view and analysis of the relationship between York, NY: Praeger, 1965). NFU and perceptions, see Bruno Tertrais, ‘No First Use, No 8 IISS discussions with Pakistani military officials since 2017. Deterrence’, Strafasia, 7 October 2019, https://strafasia.com/ 9 Keynote Address and Discussion Session with Lt-Gen. (Retd) no-first-use-no-deterrence/. Sceptics of India’s NFU pledge Khalid Kidwai’.

22 The International Institute for Strategic Studies 3. Risks from military capabilities

This chapter explores how India and Pakistan have Secondly, both sides’ capabilities are constantly evolv- matched their military means across the spectrum of ing. It is not clear, however, if new equipment is acquired, conflict to their statements of intent as defined in their or new tactics promulgated, as part of integrated strate- doctrines. Indian and Pakistani military capabilities are gies either within a single service (e.g., within the army) formidable in both the conventional and nuclear arenas. or across services (e.g., orchestrated between the army The chapter considers current (real or perceived) and and the air force).1 Some enhancements in hardware future conventional and nuclear capabilities in order also represent simple product improvements rather to reach a comprehensive view of deterrence and risk than substantive shifts in capabilities. Some acquisitions between the subcontinental rivals. seem driven by technological opportunities or bureaucratic impulses rather than by national strategy or stated Table 1. Evidence of the national power gap between India and military requirements (e.g., premature announcements Pakistan India Pakistan on missile-defence capabilities by Indian defence scientists or exploration of missiles with presumed ranges far Population (July 2021 est.) 1.339bn 238.2m beyond those needed to target China).2 GDP, 2020 (current US$) US$2.59trn US$303.4bn GDP per capita, 2020 US$1,877 US$1,482 Thirdly, although this primer is focused on the India– Defence budget, 2020 Pakistan dyad, China is a major factor in India’s secu- US$59.8bn US$11.3bn (constant 2015 US$) rity calculations, both conventional and nuclear. India’s Defence budget, 2020 US$64.1bn US$10.8bn (current US$) 1962 defeat in a brief border war against China has Sources: CIA World Factbook; IISS Military Balance+, January 2021, https://milbalplus. not been forgotten, and serious incidents3 along the iiss.org/ 3,500-kilometre Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 2013, Several broad points are worth noting before 2014, 2015, 2017 and 2020, as well as China’s military- assessing India’s and Pakistan’s capabilities. Firstly, modernisation programmes, reinforce New Delhi’s con- the potential for confrontation between the two coun- cerns about its northern neighbour. Similarly, China’s tries covers the entire spectrum of warfare from acts first nuclear test in 1964 was a major driver of India’s of terrorism (i.e., ‘asymmetric’ or ‘sub-conventional’) nuclear-weapons programme, and Chinese advances with varying degrees of attribution, to conventional in nuclear and missile technology continue to prompt combat in its many forms, to nuclear exchanges (see Indian responses. Furthermore, many in India have per- also Chapter One). Militant groups based in Pakistan ceived a growing collusion between China and Pakistan have been engaged in asymmetric warfare against over the past decade, heightening apprehension about India for at least three decades and Pakistani officials potential Sino-Pakistani cooperation in any conflict sce- claim that India sponsors subversion and violence nario. Many Indians thus see a ‘two-front war’ in which inside Pakistan, while the two countries’ armies have they would have to conduct active combat operations exchanged artillery and small-arms fire across the Line against Pakistan and China simultaneously as increas- of Control (LoC) in Kashmir with increasing frequency ingly likely.4 As a result, Indian analysts increasingly in recent years. discuss regional nuclear weapons in the context of

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 23 TAJIKISTAN CHINA

Shaksgam Valley (ceded by Pakistan to China)

GILGIT-BALTISTAN (PAKISTAN) Siachen Glacier

Aksai Chin (China Line of Control Administered)administered)

AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR LADAKH (PAKISTAN) (INDIA)

Islamabad

JAMMU AND KASHMIR (INDIA)

PAKISTAN INDIA

Note: map accurate as of March 2021 ©IISS

Figure 7. The India–Pakistan–China border trijunction Source: IISS

‘Southern Asia’ (i.e., the India–Pakistan–China triangle confrontation. Regarding equipment, this means the – see Figure 7). Despite these perceptions, Beijing has not relevant hardware (such as a particular tank type or offered any formal security guarantees to Islamabad on artillery piece) must be present in sufficient numbers to nuclear-weapons matters and the prospect of China issu- have a substantial impact beyond the tactical level (i.e., ing nuclear threats to India on Pakistan’s behalf seems beyond the immediate area of their employment). exceedingly remote. The stability of nuclear deterrence In the Second World War, for example, the Allies even- between India and Pakistan thus remains the exclusive tually deployed enough long-range fighters and devel- preserve of Indian and Pakistani decision-makers. oped apt tactics to provide armed escort to bomber fleets (also in large numbers) that had a significant impact on 3.1 Comparing conventional forces German manufacturing, fuel depots and transportation Conventional forces set the context for consideration of networks. In contrast, small numbers of modern pieces nuclear weaponry, but before examining each country, of equipment, such as 20–30 advanced attack helicopters, it is useful to define which aspects are truly significant would be useful locally, but would not alter the results in a comparison. For the purposes of this primer, those of a conflict involving two nations as large as India and aspects are procedures, weapons, tactics or organisa- Pakistan. Similarly, equipment must be embedded in tions that on their own or in combination could have a modern organisational and doctrinal framework. To a consequential, perhaps determining, effect on the use another Second World War example, the hardware outcome of an India–Pakistan war or major armed inventory of the German Army during the invasion of

24 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Figure 8. IISS Military Balance summary assessment of India’s and France in 1940 was in most cases no better than and often Pakistan’s overall military capabilities (excerpts) inferior to that in the Allied arsenal, but superior training, leadership, organisation and tactics in execution enabled INDIA a stunning victory. Simply upgrading individual items ‘India continues to modernise its armed of equipment, on the other hand, would be unlikely to forces, though progress in some areas remains produce a decisive change beyond the tactical battlefield. slow. The armed forces are oriented against Seen through this analytical lens, neither India nor both Pakistan and China, and violence on the Pakistan has a decisive qualitative conventional military Western frontier with China in 2020 raised edge. Both maintain large, professional, army-dominated tensions. There is growing focus on Indian military establishments with considerable experience in Ocean security. … India continues to develop its nuclear capabilities. In 2020 the first Chief counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. There are certain of Defence Staff was appointed, which may to be variations on a unit-by-unit basis, but they largely improve high-level coordination of military share the same strengths and weaknesses across all three planning. … Recent imports of foreign equip- services. Neither country has a significant advantage in ment have primarily been from the US and training, education, leadership or morale, and both can France, although India is also interested in implement their tactical doctrines. Joint (i.e., multi-ser- Russian equipment such as air-defence systems. vice) operations have traditionally been problematic for … However, the overall capability of India’s both countries, but Pakistan may have improved army– large conventional forces is limited by inad- air-force cooperation through its actions against militants equate logistics, maintenance and shortages of on its western frontier since at least 2004. This advantage ammunition, spare parts and maintenance per- could erode over time as experienced officers move to new sonnel. Though modernisation continues, many assignments and previous collaboration fades. Similarly, equipment projects have seen delays and cost although both armies have been heavily involved in COIN overruns, particularly indigenous systems.’ operations of various types for many years, it is not clear that this experience is directly transferable to large-scale PAKISTAN conventional combat against a peer competitor. ‘Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional forces Quantitatively, on the other hand, India’s armed forces have traditionally been oriented and struc- outnumber Pakistan’s in almost every respect. The Indian tured against a prospective threat from India. Army is over twice the size of its Pakistani counterpart in … Recruitment is good, retention is high and total manpower and fields 37 manoeuvre divisions com- the forces are well trained … Funds have been pared to Pakistan’s 22. The equipment differential is not as directed towards improving security on the stark but would still seem to give India a distinct advan- border with Afghanistan. Major investment in tage (see Table 2). Likewise, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has military nuclear programmes continues, including the testing of a nuclear-capable sea-launched Table 2. Comparison of India’s and Pakistan’s military forces cruise missile. The navy plans to increase surface 2020 India Pakistan Active military 1,458,500 651,800 combatants, patrol vessels, submarines (in col- Active paramilitary 1,585,950 291,000 laboration with China), maritime-patrol aircraft Army manoeuvre divisions 37 22 and UAVs [uninhabited aerial vehicles]. This Principal surface combatants 28 8 is to both improve combat capability and the Submarines 16 8 protection of sea-based nuclear weapons. The air Surface-to-surface missile launchers 69 165 force is modernising its inventory while improv- Artillery 11,003 4,595 ing its precision-strike and ISR [intelligence, Armoured fighting vehicles 7,088 6,067 surveillance and reconnaissance] capabilities’. Fixed wing 1,391 732

Source: IISS Military Balance+, January 2021, https://milbalplus.iiss.org/ Source: IISS Military Balance+, January 2021, https://milbalplus.iiss.org/

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 25 nearly twice as many combat aircraft as the Pakistan Air troops would have manned their defences. An Indian Force (PAF). The difference at sea is especially notable as ground attack under such circumstances would be unlikely the Indian Navy has more than twice as many submarines to achieve the desired rapid, low-cost success. In other and major surface combatants as Pakistan; it also has the words, India’s numerical superiorities would be unlikely to region’s only aircraft carrier, with at least one more to be manifest themselves in any decisive manner in the sort of delivered by 2022.5 Though by no means the only factor short conflict both sides envisage. Pakistan’s conventional driving Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons programme, India’s forces would thus likely suffice to contain an Indian ground numerical superiorities are clearly one of the most signifi- assault without resorting to nuclear weapons.8 cant and certainly one of the factors cited most frequently The Indian Army has attempted to mitigate its geo- by Pakistani officials and analysts. India’s acquisition graphic problem by proposing a limited-war strategy of conventional naval platforms to counter China in the of sudden, shallow thrusts by forces in place. This Indian Ocean is also creating anxieties for Pakistan. approach is popularly known as the Cold Start doctrine India’s numerical advantages, however, are decep- or ‘proactive operations’. Pakistan frequently cites Cold tive; simply counting tanks, fighters and frigates can Start as a sign of aggressive Indian intent and as the lead to erroneous conclusions. Firstly, India cannot leave rationale for its short-range, low-yield nuclear weap- its northern border unguarded. This requirement could ons, specifically the Hatf-9 Nasr multiple-launch missile occupy up to one-third of the army and a substantial system.9 Additionally, the Pakistan Army claims it has portion of the air force even if Pakistan and China are developed a defensive counter-strategy (called the ‘new not actively colluding. Secondly, much of India’s hard- concept of war fighting’) and is pursuing hardware ware inventory is obsolete or obsolescent, meaning that acquisitions to bolster its conventional forces specifi- the numbers do not necessarily equate to capacity. The cally in response to Cold Start. Lack of political approval IAF, for example, is sometimes described as being ‘in by New Delhi and the Indian military limitations men- crisis’ because of equipment deficiencies and numerous tioned above, however, mean that India will be incapa- other problems, according to a veteran analyst, while the ble of implementing such a doctrine, even if officially army faces serious shortfalls in everything from artillery sanctioned, any time in the foreseeable future.10 to ammunition.6 Thirdly, a poor record of inter-service The adversaries’ navies are not likely to be critical cooperation and serious deficiencies in logistics and factors in a scenario short of war. Moreover, the Indian mobility undermine India’s ability to employ its superior Navy, its personnel and equipment, especially its carrier, numbers. Finally, Pakistan enjoys a geographic advantage notwithstanding, is beset by serious structural limita- as most of its ground-combat formations are close to the tions that restrict its utility to a supporting role unless the border, while much of India’s offensive armoured power conflict were extended.11 The exception to this could be is garrisoned hundreds of kilometres away to the east. the introduction of submarines as nuclear-delivery plat- India has no incentive to attack Pakistan without provo- forms (see Chapter Four). cation, that is, no incentive for a sudden surprise strike or ‘bolt from the blue’ as it was popularly called during the Figure 9. Statement by India’s army chief officially disclosing the Cold War. Pakistani officials at the highest levels, however, Cold Start doctrine increasingly raise the possibility of an attack resulting from a supposed ‘false flag’ operation.7 They claim that India ‘The Cold Start doctrine exists for conven- would instigate or orchestrate a terrorist attack on its own tional military operations. Whether we have soil, against its own people, to create an excuse to attack to conduct conventional operations for such Pakistan. Nonetheless, the most probable scenario would strikes is a decision well-thought through, be Indian military action against Pakistan as punishment for involving the government and the Cabinet an attributed terrorist incident. Achieving strategic surprise Committee on Security.’ in such a scenario would be virtually impossible: by the INDIA: Army Chief Gen. Bipin Rawat, interview, 16 January 2017 time Indian ground forces closed in on the border, Pakistani

26 The International Institute for Strategic Studies India’s military-modernisation initiatives are not likely countries now readily admit the correlations between the to alter this capability assessment for the policy-relevant India–Pakistan and India–China dyads in broad strategic future. Although Pakistanis argue that India is engaged terms. In other words, India could face an acute nuclear in supposedly ‘massive’ military-modernisation efforts, dilemma: what could be considered ‘minimum’ in terms this impression is misleading.12 India’s defence budget of nuclear forces to deter Pakistan is insufficient to ensure has risen only marginally in recent years, but most of ‘credible’ deterrence against China. But officials in both the increase is consumed by manpower costs (including India and Pakistan reject as meaningless the notion that pensions), and defence spending has declined to approx- India could seek to designate more explicitly and exclu- imately 2% of GDP.13 In any case, defence expenditure sively some of its capabilities for China or Pakistan.16 cannot be the sole metric of military capability. Similarly, reports that India has been the world’s second-largest 3.2 Nuclear forces: overview arms importer in recent years are misleading.14 Most of India and Pakistan naturally surround their nuclear-weap- India’s various modernisation programmes as currently ons programmes with pervasive secrecy and intentional structured and executed will have at best local, marginal ambiguity. Much of what is known of their capabilities impact on the course of a future war unless they can be relies on estimates and reasonable supposition. Warhead concentrated at the decisive place and time. The acqui- numbers are particularly problematic. Recent estimates sition of 22 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters or 14 P-8I give Pakistan a slight edge with 160 warheads compared Neptune anti-submarine-warfare aircraft from the US are to 150 for India,17 but such a difference is hardly signifi- but two of many examples of what may be termed ‘niche cant in any strategic sense. These estimates are speculative modernisation’; that is, the procurement of small num- and could be off the true mark by a considerable margin. bers of high-profile systems, the strategic significance of Beyond numbers, geographical dispersion and possessing which in conventional conflict could be overplayed. missiles of the right range to be fired from an in-country Growing capabilities for the delivery of precision- point of origin to and over the border are more important. guided and stand-off munitions, on the other hand, even if India may have an advantage on these counts given the insufficient for a major conventional war, may create more size of its territory. But based on numbers of warheads escalatory options for both sides at the lower end of the only, the key is that the arsenal sizes are broadly equal as conflict scale. That is, national policymakers and military far as can be determined. Each country is thought to have commanders may be tempted to employ such munitions fissile-material stocks sufficient to produce more, perhaps because they seem neat and limited, apparently ideal tools twice as many, but neither is assessed to have done so at for a so-called ‘surgical strike’ with minimal consequences, present.18 Both countries’ weapons holdings are forecast to perhaps without even crossing international borders. The continue growing.19 manifold risks inherent in such thinking were evident in In the past, both countries were believed to store their the 2019 Pulwama–Balakot crisis. Intelligence is never weapons in ‘de-mated’ status, that is, with the warheads perfect; human, mechanical or software error can cause physically separated from their delivery systems and not unintended damage; and the governments on both sides fully assembled. This method of storage greatly reduced feel compelled to retaliate in a context where there are no the chances of unauthorised launch or theft of a useable obvious ways to prevent endless escalation. Nonetheless, nuclear explosive device. This barrier is being eroded, how- the acquisition of such precision-guided and stand-off ever, by developments in both countries: perceived imper- capabilities may widen the options for either side, creating atives for greater readiness (reducing the time required to additional dangers in a future crisis.15 assemble and mate warheads to delivery means – see also Additionally, there is a risk that Indian efforts to address Chapter Four); trends towards putting missiles in ready- its concerns about China, or its acquisitions intended to to-fire canisters; and Pakistan’s introduction into service reinforce its role as a major player on the international of the Hatf-9 Nasr ‘battlefield’ missile system, which would stage, could stoke Pakistani anxieties even if such develop- be deployed close to the front. Both countries rely on a ments are not aimed at Pakistan per se. Analysts in both mix of gravity bombs and ballistic missiles as delivery

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 27 means. Pakistan can also depend on cruise missiles. Some India and Pakistan place a high priority on ensuring regional analysts assert that a small number of the other the physical and other protection of their nuclear weap- side’s newest foreign-origin fighter aircraft may have a ons or their components against the threat of unauthor- nuclear role soon, if not currently. Such types include the ised use by renegades or non-state actors. This matters China-designed JF-17 Thunder aircraft of the PAF and the to deterrence stability given the absence of a framework IAF’s new French-made Rafale. Yet these claims are prema- between the countries to discuss the consequences of an ture in the absence of official confirmation.20 incident or non-state attack that could result in a large Neither side is believed to have pursued some of release of radiation likely to cross boundaries. Pakistan the weaponry deployed by the US and the Soviet and India’s commitments to securing their civil nuclear Union during the Cold War, such as nuclear artil- industries are both well documented.22 Yet like other lery shells, landmines (also called ‘atomic demolition nuclear-weapons countries, details of security arrange- munitions’), torpedoes or depth charges. Yet given ments surrounding their military capabilities are scarce. their existing and projected arsenals, both are capa- Commercial-satellite imagery records ongoing improve- ble of inflicting unacceptable damage on each other ments to perimeter security around military and associ- as adversaries. Both claim to currently have a second- ated fuel-cycle activities in both countries. Yet almost all strike capability, however fledgling, but neither at that is known about nuclear security comes from the very present can launch a counterforce first strike with any government agencies charged with providing that secu- assurance of success in preventing a second strike or rity. There is therefore little to no independent confirma- ending a conflict.21 tion and little independent oversight within either state

Figure 10. India’s notional missile ranges (excludes submarine-launched)

Agni-I Shaurya Nirbhay Agni-II Agni-III Agni-IV Agni-V 700 km 750 km 1,000 km 2,000 km 3,500 km 4,000 km 5,000 km

INDIA

In development

INDIA

Prithvi-I Prithvi-II 150 km 350 km

©IISS Select tested missiles only. Ranges depicted are based on launch to maximum range from inside each country’s land mass. Currently, for air-launched weapons, especially Sources: See Annex 3, p. XX SelectPakistan’s stand-off tested missiles, missiles which could be only. red from aboveRanges the sea, radius depicted also depends onare the range based of the aircraft on ring launch the weapon to and maximum the availability of air-to-air distance. refuelling. Sources: See Annex 3, p. 67

28 The International Institute for Strategic Studies apparatus. In Pakistan, terrorists assisted by rogue navy diminished.24 Pakistani officials have assessed that, as a personnel carried out attacks in 2011 on the Mehran navy result, Pakistan’s record on managing nuclear security base near Karachi, and in 2014 on the PNS Zulfiqar missile and safety is ‘as good, if not better than that of the US’.25 frigate in Karachi harbour.23 These incidents appeared to Following the period when doubts abounded,26 the view give credence to long-held fears about the military’s ina- that Pakistan has appropriate measures in place regard- bility to guarantee the physical security of the country’s ing its military programme is now more widely shared. nuclear arsenal. But since 2015, instances of terrorist vio- India’s arsenal is not known to have been the target of lence directed against the Pakistani state have consistently violent or spectacular attacks by terrorists.

Figure 11. Pakistan’s notional missile ranges (excludes underwater-launched)

Hatf-6 Shaheen-2 2,000 km

Hatf-5 Ghauri 1,300 km

Hatf-4 Shaheen-1A 900 km

Hatf-4 Shaheen-1 750 km

Hatf-7 Babur-1B (cruise missile) PAKISTAN 700 km

Hatf-7 Babur-1A (cruise missile) 450 km

Ra’ad-2 600 km

Ababeel 2,200 km

Shaheen-3 2,750 km

In development Uncertain ©IISS

Hatf-1 and Hatf-9 Nasr Hatf-2 Abdali 70 km 200 km

PAKISTAN Hatf-3 Ghaznavi Hatf-8 Ra’ad 300 km 350 km

Select tested missiles only. Ranges depicted are based on launch to maximum range from inside each country’s land mass. Currently, for air-launched weapons, especially Sources: See Annex 3, p. XX SelectPakistan’s stand-off missiles missiles, which only. could Rangesbe red from above depicted the sea, radius alsoare depends based on the rangeon oflaunch the aircraft ring to the maximum weapon and the availability distance. of air-to-air refuelling.For air-launched weapons, radius Sources: See Annex 3, p. 67 depends on type of aircraft used and availability of air-to-air refuelling.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 29 3.3 Nuclear forces: Pakistan Figure 12. Select evidence of Pakistan’s threat perception from public military statements Although Pakistan is assumed to reserve a certain portion of its arsenal for gravity bombs delivered by fighter ‘Pakistan took the [Cold Start] doctrine seri- aircraft, it relies primarily on a broad array of ground- ously, because it had a direct bearing on our based ballistic missiles, now being supplemented by security, as well as to prevent destabilization air-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles (see in an environment of conventional asymmetry. Annex 1). Pakistan does not say how it would match … And when you are trying to hit Pakistan those weapons to the ‘strategic, operational and tacti- within 48 to 96 hours with tactical formations, cal’ contexts its doctrine describes.27 In addition to coun- eight to nine of them simultaneously, you are terforce attacks on military targets, these missile assets obviously looking at gaps on our side on the give Pakistan the ability to hit any Indian city should it tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, the idea follow a countervalue strategy implicit in its doctrine of [the] Nasr [short-range, low-yield nuclear- (see Chapter Two). India has more than 40 urban centres capable rocket system] was born.’ with populations above one million, and the potential PAKISTAN: Lt-Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, NCA Advisor, 23 March 2015 devastation of Gwalior or Bengaluru must be assumed to convey the same degree of deterrent threat as an ‘Growing quantitative and qualitative uneven- attack on New Delhi or Mumbai. Despite perfunctory ness in conventional and nuclear forces is public objections to Indian interest in missile defence a factor of instability … It is worth examin- (see Chapter Four), therefore, Pakistan has a profusion ing why would a State continue to spend so of major targets, both military and civilian, that it could much on conventional forces – which are the strike to inflict unacceptable damage, for the require- largest in the developing world … The con- ments of credible nuclear deterrence. ventional and heavily mechanized forces on Given the plenitude of vulnerable civilian and mili- Pakistan’s eastern frontiers can neither beat tary targets in India, two of Pakistan’s nuclear-deliv- the Himalayan terrain towards China nor the ery decisions are controversial because of the dangers marshy-water obstacles towards Bangladesh – posed by their respectively very short and very long their potential and poise is Westwards.’ ranges. First is the Nasr missile system. Consisting of PAKISTAN: Brigadier Zahir Kazmi, SPD, 29 March 2017, IISS meeting four missile canisters mounted on a wheeled trans- porter erector launcher, the Nasr can deliver a con- ‘[The National Command Authority] noted ventional or nuclear warhead to a range of 60–70 km. with concern certain destabilizing actions in Nasr is assumed to be in service with the military, as Pakistan’s neighborhood, which undermine official statements about training launches and exer- the objective of maintaining strategic stability cises have claimed since July 2017. The short range has in South Asia. These include the massive arms led many analysts to refer to the Nasr as a ‘tactical’ or build-up in the conventional domain, nucleari- ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapon, but Pakistanis insist on zation of the Indian Ocean Region and plans ‘short-range, low-yield’ as a descriptor. Russia and the for the development/deployment of BMD US are the only other nuclear-armed states attributing [ballistic-missile defence] systems.’ this purpose to any of their weapons.28 Nasr has been PAKISTAN: Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), 21 December 2017 advertised as an antidote to the Indian Army’s Cold Start doctrine and is thus proclaimed as a means of reinforcing deterrence.29 It is not clear, however, why The Nasr has raised several concerns among regional other air- or ground-launched systems (such as exist- analysts as well as outsiders.30 Above all, considering the ing short-range Hatf missiles or cruise missiles) could nuclear taboo (see Chapter One), the use of any nuclear not have performed this function from greater depth device, including the Nasr, would be strategic. That is, inside Pakistan. despite their short range and low yield, nuclear-armed

30 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Nasr missiles would not be tactical in impact or simply and if so at what stage of a conflict? Statements by limited to ‘battlefield effects’. Within this overarching Pakistani officials strenuously say that this would not consideration, the first concern relates to the possibil- happen under any circumstances. Could Pakistan’s ity that Pakistan could use nuclear weapons well before NCA assure against unauthorised use? Statements by national survival is at stake, perhaps for putative signal- Pakistani officials imply that it believes it could.32 Many ling purposes. (Other nuclear-armed countries may also observers have also highlighted the danger of theft or potentially deploy low-yield nuclear weapons, qualified, misappropriation if these systems were deployed in a for example in the UK case, as ‘significantly reduced crisis. The third issue is increased arsenal size. If the yield’ but placed on its submarines, not on land.)31 Nasr is intended for decisive battlefield effect, that is, Secondly, because it would have to transit to and beyond supposed signalling, Pakistan would need deploy in the field close to the battlefront, the Nasr dozens or hundreds more warheads to counter Indian poses particularly worrying command-and-control armoured thrusts. problems. Pakistan’s leadership could face what is The final concern about theNasr is that, as a dual-capa- termed the ‘use it or lose it’ dilemma: in the confu- ble (conventional and nuclear) system, it is an example of sion of war, the country’s NCA might fear losing pre- what one scholar calls the ‘discrimination problem’33 on cious nuclear assets to mishap or enemy action before the tactical battlefield. That is, how would Pakistan react they could be used for their stated purpose. An addi- if Indian forces, intentionally or not, attacked a Nasr bat- tional concern relates to delegation of launch author- tery? This would create an obvious risk, as Indian forces ity. Would launch be delegated to local commanders, could not know if the Nasr was carrying conventional or nuclear warheads, but Pakistani decision-makers might Figure 13. Excerpts from the Pakistan military’s statements on the perceive such a strike as an attack on the country’s strate- inaugural test-launches of the Nasr and Shaheen-3 missiles gic assets and decide to respond accordingly. ‘[Nasr] has been developed to add deter- Pakistan’s second controversial nuclear-delivery rence value to Pakistan’s Strategic Weapons decision is the 2,750-km-range Shaheen-3 (Hatf-6) bal- Development programme at shorter ranges. … listic missile. This has been explained as necessary the [first] test [of Nasr] was a very important because India might base active nuclear missiles at a milestone in consolidating Pakistan’s strategic proposed missile test site in the Andaman and Nicobar deterrence capability at all levels of the threat Islands34 or because of Pakistani suspicions about an spectrum. … in that hierarchy of military oper- India–Seychelles agreement to jointly develop a very ations, the Nasr Weapon System now provides small naval facility on Assumption Island (although Pakistan with short range missile capability in Seychelles is out of the Shaheen-3 range). Nothing has addition to the already available medium and been constructed at either site thus far and, given the long range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles vulnerability of numerous military facilities and urban in its inventory.’ centres across mainland India, neither of these alleged PAKISTAN: ISPR, 19 April 2011 island targets seems consistent with an ability to inflict unacceptable damage for deterrence purposes.35 ‘Pakistan today conducted a successful test Furthermore, such missiles cause concern as, if turned launch of Shaheen-III Surface to Surface in the opposite direction, they have the range to strike Ballistic Missile, capable of carrying nuclear Israel and other targets in the Middle East (including as and conventional warheads to a range of 2750 far as Djibouti, which hosts Chinese, French, Japanese Kms. The test launch was aimed at validating and US bases) and the northern Indian Ocean region. various design and technical parameters of the weapon system at maximum range.’ 3.4 Nuclear forces: India PAKISTAN: ISPR, 9 March 2015 Gravity bombs delivered by aircraft remain a more prominent part of India’s nuclear arsenal than

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 31 Pakistan’s. But India also has a growing portfolio of postulated as necessary for deterrence (see missiles for nuclear delivery. Although its array of mis- Chapter One). Both sides could choose to siles is less diverse than that of its western neighbour, remain focused continuously on what mini- it fields a mixture of medium-range systems that could mum, or failing that, what sufficiency, means be employed against Pakistan, and longer-range vari- in their doctrines, which both claim all three ants that would be aimed at Chinese targets, as well as words – credible, minimum and deterrence. several potentially dual-purpose cruise missiles (see From the outcome of this decision, they could Annex 2). India’s nuclear military capabilities reflect choose to also consider what capability they its doctrine by concentrating on the country’s ability may have in excess of the requirement to deter to absorb a first strike and still be able to retaliate mas- their potential adversary in a nuclear crisis. sively (survivability). As far as is known, India has not yet developed a nuclear warhead for a cruise missile, Several serious risks lurk in extant capabilities, but it could invest in one for the various versions of the such as the discrimination and command-and- Indo-Russian BrahMos (‘Brahmaputra-Moscow’), with control problems associated with Pakistan’s a range of over 400 km, or for the indigenous Nirbhay, short-range, low-yield Nasr system, as well with a range of 1,000 km, which is currently undergoing as Pakistan’s desire to be able to target every testing. Unlike Pakistan, India is not assessed to have a inch of India. The discrimination problem con- short-range, low-yield battlefield nuclear-delivery sys- cerns both countries’ dual-capable ballistic and tem.36 Such weapons would be inconsistent with India’s Pakistan’s cruise missiles: one could carry a doctrine, including for demonstration-of-resolve pur- conventional warhead, but the adversary could poses. India has eschewed the ‘tactical nuclear-weapon’ not discount the possibility that it was carrying path. But potentially dual-capability systems blur the a nuclear one. Confusion can precipitate deci- line between conventional and nuclear conflict and thus sions based on worst-case assumptions. create scope for misperception and risk.37 In some cases, technological opportunities and 3.5 Concluding observations bureaucratic compulsions seem to override considerations of strategy in nuclear-weapon- India’s numerical advantage in conventional related acquisitions, announcements and forces is not enough to guarantee a decisive deployments. Proclaiming aspirational goals victory in the sort of short war both sides or exaggerating capabilities, for instance, cre- expect. Moreover, India has neither reason nor ates concern on the other side, undermining interest to attack Pakistan in the absence of a minimalism and spurring arms-race instability. severe provocation. Such a provocation would most likely come from terrorism or militancy India’s legitimate requirements vis-à-vis at scale, thus creating a direct connection, China and its determination to play a major potentially even a shortcut, between asym- global role complicate the bilateral nuclear metric warfare and the potential for nuclear dynamic by creating strategic anxieties for release. Despite the then army chief’s com- Pakistan. That is, Indian actions designed ments about his service’s Cold Start doctrine, to deter China (such as development of the doubts persist about its political sanction by Agni-V missile – see Chapter Four) can be seen, India’s leadership and implementation by the from Islamabad’s perspective, as increasing military as a whole or the army alone. the threat to Pakistan. Governments in New Delhi and Islamabad can choose to research The capabilities each side already possesses the facts of this situation as China becomes an are enough to inflict the unacceptable damage ever-greater driver of India’s national security.

32 The International Institute for Strategic Studies The threat of misperception and miscalculation battlefield effect or to strike strategic targets. based on consideration of capabilities alone The acquisition of new capabilities, or even (but in addition to those set out in the pre- the retention of old, outmoded capabilities, vious chapter) remains dangerously high, could compound unpredictable circumstances raising the horrific possibility of nuclear- in which India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weap- weapons use across three basic scenarios: ons would undermine rather than strengthen to send a supposed signal, to achieve a deterrence.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 33 Notes

1 India is expected to inaugurate joint theatre commands in 2021, htm?dtl/33329/Transcript_of_Virtual_Weekly_Media_Briefing_ which could help it reach this goal. See Rahul Singh, ‘First joint by_the_Official_Spokesperson_11th_December_2020. commands to be launched by May’, Hindustan Times, 17 February 8 Shashank Joshi, ‘India’s Military Instrument: A Doctrine 2021, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/first-joint- Stillborn’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 36, no. 4, 2013, commands-to-be-launched-by-may-101613500932277.html. pp. 512–40, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0 2 These issues are explored in detail in Yogesh Joshi and Frank 1402390.2013.766598; Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘Indian Military O’Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia (Washington DC: Georgetown Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia’, University Press, 2019). In Pakistan’s case, there is virtually no Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 38, no. 5, 2015, pp. 729–72, https:// civilian political oversight of the military and scientific nuclear www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.101447 establishment. 3; and George Perkovich and Toby Dalton, Not War, Not Peace? 3 Antoine Levesques, ‘Why India and China need to turn down (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 73–103. heat on simmering border dispute’, IISS Analysis, 13 July 9 Baqir Sajjad Syed, ‘Nasr Pours Cold Water on India’s Cold Start 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2017/07/china-india- Doctrine: Bajwa’, Dawn, 6 July 2017, https://www.dawn.com/ border-dispute; Antoine Levesques, ‘India–China tensions: news/1343581. what next for India?’, IISS Analysis, 30 July 2020, https://www. 10 Maimuna Ashraf, ‘Pakistan’s Consolidating Conventional iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/07/sasia-india-china-tensions; and Deterrence: An Assessment’, South Asian Voices, 7 December Antoine Levesques, ‘A new normal for India–China tensions?’, 2018, https://southasianvoices.org/pakistans-consolidating- IISS Analysis, 18 September 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/ conventional-deterrence-an-assessment/; and Meenakshi Sood, analysis/2020/09/sasia-india-china-tensions. ‘Pakistan’s (Non–Nuclear) Plan to Counter “Cold Start”’, 4 A ‘collusive threat’. See Indian Army, ‘Land Warfare Doctrine – Diplomat, 25 March 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/ 2018’, December 2018, p. 2, http://www.ssri-j.com/MediaReport/ pakistans-non-nuclear-plan-to-counter-cold-start/. Document/IndianArmyLandWarfareDoctrine2018.pdf. 11 Roy-Chaudhury and Solanki, ‘India: defence spending and 5 Nick Childs, ‘Propelling India’s aircraft-carrier procurement’, p. 172. India’s ‘small-deck carrier quandary’ is ambitions’, IISS Military Balance blog, 4 November 2019, not new; see Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Aircraft carriers and the Indian https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/11/ Navy: Assessing the present, discerning the future’, Journal of india-aircraft-carrier-ambitions-uk-cooperation. Strategic Studies, vol. 10, no. 2, 1987, https://www.tandfonline. 6 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Troubles, They Come in Battalions: The Manifold com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402398708437294. Travails of the Indian Air Force’, Carnegie Endowment for 12 For a recent overview of the argument, see, for instance, Ashley International Peace Brief, April 2016, https://carnegieendowment. Tellis, ‘India: Capable but Constrained’, in Gary J. Schmitt (ed.),

org/files/Brief-Indian_Air_Force.pdf; and Rahul Roy-Chaudhury A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of and Viraj Solanki, ‘India: defence spending and procurement’, Key US Allies and Security Partners (Carlisle, PA: US Army War in Andrew T.H. Tan (ed.), Research Handbook on the Arms Trade College Press, 2020), pp. 119–54, https://carnegieendowment. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), p. 173. org/files/India_-_Capable_but_Constrained.pdf. 7 Pakistan Mission to United Nations, ‘Statement by the Prime 13 Roy-Chaudhury and Solanki, ‘India: defence spending and Minister of Pakistan H.E. Imran Khan to the Seventy-fifth procurement’, p. 168. Session of the UN General Assembly’, 25 September 2020, 14 ‘USA and France dramatically increase major arms exports; https://pakun.org/09252020-02.php and Government of India, Saudi Arabia is largest arms importer, says SIPRI’, SIPRI, 9 Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Transcript of Virtual Weekly March 2020, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/ Media Briefing by the Official Spokesperson (11th December usa-and-france-dramatically-increase-major-arms-exports- 2020)’, 12 December 2020, https://mea.gov.in/media-briefings. saudi-arabia-largest-arms-importer-says.

34 The International Institute for Strategic Studies 15 Pakistan has criticised the October 2020 Basic Exchange and assessment, see Christopher Clary and Ankit Panda, ‘Safer Cooperation Agreement (BECA), which establishes reciprocal at Sea? Pakistan’s Sea-Based Deterrent and Nuclear Weapons sensitive geospatial information-sharing between the US and Security’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 3, Fall 2017, pp. Indian militaries, linking the agreement to perceived threats 149–68, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/016366 to strategic stability. See Government of Pakistan, Ministry of 0X.2017.1370344?journalCode=rwaq20. Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Release’, 27 October 2020, http://mofa. 24 Influential Indian experts periodically warn that unlike a gov.pk/press-release-362/. state, jihadists intent on provoking the use of nuclear weapons 16 For one example of the ‘bifurcation’ idea, applied specifically between India and Pakistan may not be deterred by the threat to India’s nuclear-weapons doctrine, see Joy Mitra, ‘Beyond of unacceptable damage. Current Nuclear Doctrine Debates: Addressing India’s Two-Front 25 Tom Hundley, ‘India and Pakistan are quietly making nuclear Challenge’, ORF Issue Brief, no. 394, August 2020, https://www. war more likely’, Vox, 4 April 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018 orfonline.org/research/beyond-current-nuclear-doctrine-debates/. /4/2/17096566/pakistan-india-nuclear-war-submarine-enemies. 17 Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘World Nuclear 26 Greg Miller, Craig Whitlock and Barton Gellman, ‘Top-secret Forces’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2020 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, U.S. intelligence files show new levels of distrust of Pakistan’, 2020), https://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198869207/ Washington Post, 2 September 2013, https://www.washingtonpost. sipri-9780198869207-chapter-010.xml. com/world/national-security/top-secret-us-intelligence-files- 18 Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris and Julia Diamond, show-new-levels-of-distrust-of-pakistan/2013/09/02/e19d03c2- ‘Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018’, Bulletin of the Atomic 11bf-11e3-b630-36617ca6640f_story.html; and Mark Fitzpatrick,

Scientists, vol. 74, no. 5, 2018, pp. 348–58, https://www. ‘Pakistan’s nuclear dangers – Why I changed my view’, IISS, 19 tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2018.150779 March 2014. 6?needAccess=true; and Hans M. Kristensen and Matt 27 ‘Keynote Address and Discussion Session with Lt-Gen. (Retd) Korda, ‘Indian nuclear forces, 2018’, Bulletin of the Atomic Khalid Kidwai’. Scientists, vol. 74, no. 6, November 2018, pp. 361–6, https:// 28 The US assigns to those nuclear weapons a sub-strategic purpose. www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2018.1533 They are intended for battlefield or tactical use. Hans M. Kristensen 162?needAccess=true. See also Ashley J. Tellis, ‘A Troubled and Matt Korda, ‘Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 2019’, Bulletin of the Transition: Emerging Nuclear Forces In India And Pakistan’, Atomic Scientists, vol. 75, no. 5, 2019, pp. 252–61, https://www. Hoover Institution, 5 November 2019, https://www.hoover. tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1654273. org/research/troubled-transition-emerging-nuclear-forces- 29 Mansoor Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons india-and-pakistan. and their Impact on Stability’, Carnegie Endowment for 19 Kile and Kristensen, ‘World Nuclear Forces’, pp. 364, 369. International Peace, 30 June 2016, https://carnegieendowment. 20 As of April 2021, Pakistan has 122 JF-17 Thunder and India org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-their- 18 Rafale. India’s Ministry of Defence annual report released impact-on-stability-pub-63911. in 2019 refers to the Rafale as providing ‘strategic deterrence’ 30 See, for instance, Ben Barry, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear to the Indian Air Force. See Government of India, Ministry of Weapons: Practical Drawbacks and Opportunity

Defence, ‘Annual report 2018–19’, 16 July 2019, https://www. Costs’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 60, no. mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/MoDAR2018.pdf. 1, 2018, pp. 75–81, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ 21 Joshi and O’Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia, p. 153. full/10.1080/00396338.2018.1427365. 22 IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security, ‘Statement 31 UK House of Commons, Select Committee on Defence, ‘Defence of India by Ajit Kumar Mohanty’, 10 February 2020, https:// – Eighth report’, 20 June 2006, https://publications.parliament. www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/20/02/cn-278-india.pdf; and uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmdfence/986/98605.htm. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Pakistan’s 32 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 17 Nuclear Security Regime’, 8 February 2020, http://mofa.gov.pk/ September 2012, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. wp-content/uploads/2020/02/NSRFinal08-02-2020.pdf. php?id=2150. 23 The attacks were defeated, but in the first two P-3C Orion 33 ‘Nuclear entanglement’ is a largely synonymous term also patrol aircraft were destroyed. For a comprehensive used. See Vipin Narang, ‘The Discrimination Problem: Why

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 35 Putting Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons on Submarines IsSo 35 Rutland Island in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Dangerous’, War on the Rocks, 8 February 2018, https:// Assumption Island in Seychelles are small: areas of 121 and 11 warontherocks.com/2018/02/discrimination-problem- square kilometres respectively. putting-low-yield-nuclear-weapons-submarines-dangerous/; 36 Some in Pakistan, however, have made the unproven assumption and James M. Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement: that India’s Prahaar short-range (150-km-range) ballistic missile How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems is under development as a nuclear-delivery system. See, for Raises the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War’, International example, Zahir Kazmi, ‘SRBMs, Deterrence and Regional Stability Security, vol. 43, no. 1, Summer 2018, pp. 56–99, https://www. in South Asia: A Case Study of Nasr and Prahaar’, Institute mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec_a_00320. of Regional Studies, Islamabad, October 2012, https://www. 34 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Objections academia.edu/6596900/CONTENTS_Introduction_1_SRBMs_ in Setting up of Missile Testing Range in Andaman and DETERRENCE_AND_REGIONAL_STABILITY_IN_SOUTH_ Nicobar Islands’, 7 August 2013, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/ ASIA_A_CASE_STUDY_OF_NASR_AND_PRAHAAR . PrintRelease.aspx?relid=97820. 37 Joshi and O’Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia, p. 25.

36 The International Institute for Strategic Studies 4. Risks from emerging developments

India and Pakistan are slowly developing advanced submarine on deterrence patrol with nuclear weapons technologies that could change their overall nuclear- ready at any time to credibly target both Pakistan and weapon postures and affect strategic stability if they China (see Figure 14).1 This strategy is designed to pro- were introduced into their military inventories. These vide India with a secure ability to retaliate in the event efforts, which are largely concentrated on delivery of a first nuclear strike by either of its two potential means, reflect global trends towards larger arsenals, adversaries. India’s effort is focused on the acquisition more mobility (ballistic missiles), more sophistication of nuclear-powered submarines able to launch nuclear- (cruise missiles) and generally more payload ambigu- armed ballistic missiles (SSBNs). ity or higher speeds. Efforts pertaining to nuclear deter- The Indian Navy’s inventory currently only includes rence are principally directed at basing nuclear weapons one SSBN type, with more being built. In November at sea on-board naval platforms in the Indian Ocean. 2018, India’s SSBN, the Arihant, carried out its first The momentum which affects the research and develop- ‘deterrent patrol’, in an undisclosed area of the Indian ment, as well as industrial and force structuring relat- Ocean, marking the culmination of a 30-year national ing to these emerging technologies, is separate from that effort.2 Related defence-industrial and infrastructure- relating to existing capabilities (see Chapter Three). development work to create a sea-based nuclear deter- Technology has been central to nuclear strategy since rent include a land-based command-and-control system; the advent of nuclear weapons in the 1940s. Its impact, submariners trained on foreign nuclear-powered attack positive or negative, on strategic and nuclear stability submarines (SSNs) for more than a generation; a capa- is context-dependent and can therefore change. During bility to produce highly enriched uranium, plutonium the Cold War, the introduction of new technologies by and other materials for naval reactors; and short-range, the US and the Soviet Union stabilised nuclear deter- submarine-launched nuclear-capable missiles with a fit- rence between them overall, fostering, for instance, ting warhead. missile-defence arms control (the 1972 US–USSR Anti- India is closer to having a secure sea-based second- Ballistic Missile Treaty) or prompting the other side to strike capability than Pakistan. Officially, India claims catch up and, after some time, neutralise the first coun- the November 2018 patrol completed ‘the establish- try’s narrow advantage. On the flip side, new technolo- ment of the country’s survivable nuclear triad’. Yet this gies complicated crisis management and fostered arms is at best premature and well below the ‘secure-second- racing. India and Pakistan could face a similar dilemma, strike’ criteria: the Arihant’s 750-km-range K-15 ballistic exacerbating their already troubled relationship since missiles can currently only target the Pakistani coast, at they became overtly nuclear-armed in 1998. the risk of being hit by pre-emptive fire against the ship.3 Furthermore, one submarine does not make an effective 4.1 Sea basing nuclear weapons: intent and secure deterrent. Middle-range operators of sea-based efforts nuclear deterrents such as France or the UK deem that India aspires to ‘continuous-at-sea deterrence’ (CASD), three or four boats are necessary for CASD. India will that is, the ability to retain in the long term at least one need time to reach, let alone exceed, such numbers.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 37 Figure 14. Select statements from India relating to sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) could enter nuclear deterrence service by the mid-2020s. This could result in delays to ‘India’s first indigenously built nuclear pro- reported even-longer-range sub-surface-launched mis- pelled strategic submarine named “Arihant” siles in development, which mirror the land-based Agni meaning “Destroyer of the Enemies” was series.4 So even by the end of this decade, India is likely launched today, 26 Jul 09, at the Ship Building to require a ‘bastion’, that is, a protected loitering zone Center, Visakhapatnam. India has thus joined for its SSBNs, in the Bay of Bengal.5 For all these reasons, a select group of nations which have the the Arihant is therefore something of a test bed. Many technological capability to build and operate Indians are sober about the task ahead, including in the nuclear propelled submarines.’ navy, whose leadership is focused on creating an oceanic INDIA: Ministry of Defence, 26 July 2009 conventional force (including nuclear-powered attack submarines) with otherwise limited resources to counter ‘Deterrence is provided at both nuclear and China in the Indian Ocean region.6 Several reported acci- conventional levels, including in the maritime dents have also raised concerns about safety and relia- domain. The Indian Navy will contribute to bility.7 Yet India’s direction of travel is clear. national deterrence strategy. … India is devel- Figure 15. Select statements from Pakistan relating to sea-based oping sea-based nuclear deterrence, in accord- nuclear deterrence ance with its nuclear doctrine. The Indian Navy will operate the SSBN to reinforce ‘The Naval Strategic Force … is the custo- nuclear deterrence, supported by correspond- dian of the nation’s 2nd strike capability, [it] ing operational capabilities and procedures for will strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible optimal deployment, in keeping with national Minimum Deterrence and ensure regional policy.’ stability.’ INDIA: Maritime Security Strategy, 23 October 2015 PAKISTAN: ISPR, 19 May 2012

‘The submarine recently returned from its first ‘INS Arihant is not a new development which deterrence patrol, completing the establish- would suddenly threaten strategic stability ment of the country’s survivable nuclear triad of the region. … Pakistan’s Full Spectrum … [The Prime Minister] stress[ed] the signifi- Deterrence is a loaded concept with the ability cance of the successful deployment of INS to handle wide array of threats.’ Arihant for the completion of India’s nuclear PAKISTAN: Lt-Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, NCA Advisor, 6 November 2018 triad … [India] has transformed scientific achievement of nuclear tests into establish- ‘Within the context of nuclear deterrence, ment of an immensely complex and credible the concept of credible minimum deterrence nuclear triad, and dispelled all doubts and (CMD) is widely adhered. It implies a recko- questions about India’s capability and resolve nable force of survivable nuclear weapons in this regard.’ that would deter an adversary from initiating INDIA: Prime Minister’s Office, 5 November 2018 military action against a nation’s vital interests. “Minimum” in this context pertains to the value of deterrence force. The concept is, how- The next submarine, which was launched for sea tri- ever, dynamic in nature. Credibility of a state’s als in 2017, is expected to be commissioned into ser- CMD would be strengthened or weakened by vice in 2022. Two others will follow but this is only the asymmetry between nuclear forces. Full likely to happen from the middle of the decade. There spectrum deterrence (FSD) aims to deter the is no official timeline for others. A 3,500-km-range K-4

38 The International Institute for Strategic Studies outside India, although Pakistan created a headquarters enemy from aggression whether the threat to for its Naval Strategic Forces Command in 2012. In 2017, the security of a state emanates from a con- Pakistan test-launched a 450-km-range Babur-3 cruise ventional or strategic source. It is a qualitative missile from an underwater platform, announcing that response to an ominous military doctrine and it had thereby proved it was on the way towards a ‘cred- its scope ranges from conventional to strategic ible second-strike capability’.8 Pakistan is unlikely to and tactical levels. … Most reliable, effective achieve a true submarine-launched cruise-missile capa- and assured second strike is considered to be bility in the near future. In 2015, it placed an order for a submarine deployed nuclear capability … eight Chinese diesel submarines with air-independent Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) is the propulsion technology, which allows the boats to stay authority delegated with responsibility of sea submerged for longer periods than other diesel–electric based nuclear forces. While operational control propulsions but for far shorter periods than nuclear-reac- of NSFC rests with the National Command tor ones. The Chinese submarines (known in Pakistan as Authority (NCA), administratively it falls the Hangor class), four of which are to be built in Pakistan, under Chief of the Naval Staff … Completion will not be available until at least 2022. In the meantime, of nuclear triad would enable Pakistan Navy to a torpedo-tube launch configuration of the Babur-3 may reinforce strategic deterrence in the region.’ afford Pakistan compatibility for testing with diesel–elec- PAKISTAN: Maritime Doctrine, 20 December 2018 tric submarines, including the five currently in its inven- (unreleased) tory equipped with 550-mm-diameter tubes.9 ‘To stabilise while we were developing the first-strike options, on land and air, it was very 4.2 Risks to deterrence, crisis and arms-race clear, that they would have to be stabilised by stability the possession of a reasonable second-strike India’s and Pakistan’s existing land- and air-based capability … The moment you show a stra- second-strike capabilities have a stabilising effect on tegic gap, for example, the absence of sea- nuclear deterrence. Both countries could expect an addi- based or submarine-based weapons, there is tional stability dividend by placing nuclear weapons on at least theoretically an incentive for the other sea platforms, if they were only designed for second side to take out your first-strike options, and strike. But this could be decades away. Early progress therefore survival of the nuclear capability has been limited and comes with an identifiable family demands that there be a reliable second-strike of risks relevant to both countries and compounded by capability, just in case that kind of an incentive current levels of secrecy and ambiguity. Weaker India– is available to the adversary.’ Pakistan deterrence stability overall and in crisis situ- PAKISTAN: Lt-Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, NCA Advisor, 6 ations, as well as more arms racing, are likelier in the February 2020, IISS meeting coming years as a result.

Compared to India, Pakistan’s intent regarding sea- Deterrence stability based nuclear deterrence is less definite, with ambigu- Little is known of India’s and Pakistan’s respective ous expressions of both assertiveness and minimalism. command-and-control policies at sea.10 As the credibil- But Pakistan is slowly developing the elements that, if ity of nuclear-deterrence patrols is a function of discreet combined, could amount to a sea-based nuclear-weapon submersion over large distances, two-way communica- capability. Even a token capability would, owing to its tion between a submarine and the land-based political crudeness, pose inherent risks. Pakistan’s FSD definition leadership is restricted in peacetime. During crises, com- could yet include the maritime domain. Analysts who pletely disrupted communications could disallow firing are convinced that Pakistan may already have nuclear- missiles whose security systems require external author- tipped missiles on some surface ships are rarely found isation. This raises a delegation risk. In such a situation,

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 39 delegation to commanding officers on-board would be levels of distrust between the two militaries could be necessary. Such uncertainty clouds confidence both in compounded by the confusion of crisis, robbing both the opponent’s resolve and in overall deterrence. sides’ leaders of the confidence to rule out, a priori, In India, delegation is a sensitive question and is nuclear ordnance. There is an awareness of this prob- rarely openly discussed. The country has set itself a tall lem regionally,15 but no agreement between India and order of permanent, land-based civilian control of its Pakistan to address it. Pakistan’s deployment of the deterrent as part of a wider institutionalised civil–mili- Babur-3 missile on any of its present or future diesel– tary status quo. Even if some analysts contrast India’s electric submarines would present a discrimination and Pakistan’s situations, Pakistan’s dilemma is similar: challenge given its official dual-capable designation. the NCA Employment Control Committee headed by A separate risk to crisis stability originates from the prime minister exercises primacy. The delegation the higher readiness of nuclear weapons deployed on challenge could increase if Pakistan deployed nuclear undersea platforms, making them more rapidly use- weapons on-board naval vessels without having redun- able even in the event of misunderstanding or miscom- dancies to its single-known very-low-frequency (VLF) munication, accidental launch or even a rogue captain. communications facility near Karachi.11 India is under- Once loaded onto submarines, nuclear warheads stood to have redundant very- and extra-low-frequency remain mated to their vertical-launch ballistic missiles. one-way transmitters.12 Quantum encryption and sat- Since the early 2000s, there has been an understanding ellite-based relays may relieve both countries of some that neither country keeps its weapons systems ready of the challenge. But in the region this technology will for use in peacetime. This risk likely currently only likely mature more slowly than the ability to place concerns India. Pakistani officials variably describe this nuclear weapons on naval platforms. The central ques- mating arrangement as a fact or at least a necessity, con- tion would remain whether Indian and Pakistani lead- cluding that India is behaving irresponsibly by keeping ers, in the last resort of severed communications, would missiles mated in this way.16 (Pakistan is not known to trust their submariners. have responded by changing the readiness of any of its nuclear forces.) India’s command-and-control practice Crisis stability reportedly calls for the mating to take place on land At sea, the discrimination problem (see Chapter Three) at the first indications of a crisis, before the submarine could pose a double risk to crisis stability. The first heads out to sea, where undisclosed safety and security discrimination challenge concerns nuclear weapons procedures, analysts argue, are in place.17 This leaves being carried by conventionally powered submarines.13 open the possibility that the boat could be at sea with- Without an SSBN programme, Pakistan’s only option out nuclear weapons, thus raising a discrimination risk. to operationalise a deterrent at sea would be to place In February 2019, India’s naval strategic forces played nuclear weapons on conventionally powered ships, an active role in a crisis for the first time. Pakistan claimed most likely submarines. This could complicate India’s that India deployed the Arihant as part of early coercive calculations of proportionate use of force in a crisis moves at sea against Pakistan. A year later, Pakistan’s involving a blockade by its navy coupled with a robust Lt-Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai even speculated ‘whether anti-submarine campaign. Dangerous escalation could India contemplated the use of nuclear weapons from follow India unintentionally hitting a Pakistani subma- a second-strike platform even before its first-strike rine carrying nuclear weapons because Pakistan may options’.18 India has not denied the Arihant deployment. conclude that its strategic assets had been attacked.14 Corroborating commercial-satellite evidence has sur- The other discrimination challenge at sea concerns faced since.19 Other Indian Navy ships were reassigned incoming missiles in a crisis. Unable to identify the war- to missions focusing on Pakistan, reportedly including head of a dual-capable missile (cruise or ballistic) fired a search for a Pakistani conventional submarine.20 It is from a naval platform or destined for one, either side not known whether Pakistan’s exceptional NCA meet- may guess and second-guess incorrectly. The current ing on 27 February 2019 discussed a nuclear maritime

40 The International Institute for Strategic Studies dimension to the situation.21 As India’s sea-based deter- existing plans to deploy any number of nuclear weap- rent grows, however, Pakistan will find it all the easier ons on naval platforms, it may choose instead to place to allege nuclear coercion at sea by its rival in future an even greater emphasis on its land-based second- crises. This will be to India’s detriment unless Pakistan strike nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s occasional claims to unveils a complete naval-nuclear-weapon capability. save costs by indigenising development and expertise24 are altogether unconvincing. It is also doubtful that Arms-race stability Pakistan could afford to acquire SSBNs.25 The slow pace of India’s nuclear-powered- and armed- submarine programme and lack of mirroring Pakistani 4.3 Other technological efforts and step changes limits the risk of a surprise capability gap possible risks between the two countries (unlike between the US and Beyond the maritime domain, any overview of emerg- the Soviet Union during the Cold War). Moreover, even ing strategic risks in South Asia is incomplete without a discussion of emerging developments in the space Figure 16. India’s and Pakistan’s defence budgets, 2010–20 and cyber domains. New risks to nuclear deterrence 60 stability will occur only if such capabilities become formally part of both countries’ military inventories 50 and involve attacking or defending against the other’s 40 military nuclear infrastructure. Short of this, these

30 capabilities are at best prototypes or demonstrators in various stages of research, development or testing, 20 with no actual impact on nuclear deterrence narrowly Constant 2015 US$, billions

10 defined. However, they could affect strategic deterrence, of which nuclear weapons are only a dominant 0 INDIA PAKISTAN part. As such, advanced emerging capabilities require the sober judgement of professional analysts and plan- 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 ners to overcome simplistic worst-case scenarios and © IISS Source: IISS Military Balance+, January 2021, https://milbalplus.iiss.org/ engineers’ claims appearing to alter the spirit or letter of nuclear doctrine, including India’s and Pakistan’s before the pandemic, each country was aware of the oth- minimalism claims. Separately, the quest for such capa- er’s slowing rates of economic growth and the resulting bilities highlights the growing importance of China as defence-budget austerity likely to affect their nuclear- a factor in India and Pakistan’s deterrence relationship. weapons-procurement road maps. The COVID-19 crisis is almost certain to entrench and accentuate those The space domain trends.22 Both countries face difficult choices about their India’s introduction of working strategic missile plans to extend nuclear deterrence seawards. But neither defences could conceivably help diminish the impact is likely to change its broad strategic course. of a limited, medium- or long-range-missile attack from Yet fewer funds or escalating full life-cycle costs23 Pakistan (or China). The introduction of even locally could spell less predictability and more anxiety for both limited missile defence by India would alter the situa- sides, especially if one felt compelled to both spend less tion of mutual vulnerability between the two countries and keep up with the other’s perceived naval nuclear in a way that could weaken nuclear deterrence stabil- plans. Both countries could be tempted to make com- ity between them. Furthermore, Pakistan has never promises on safety or security in order to prove to launched a strategic missile and India has never inter- the other that they have a credible capability. Finally, cepted one outside its own tests, so the impact on crisis should Pakistan, whose economy is smaller and grow- stability or escalation is unknown. Motivated by anxie- ing more slowly than India’s, have to downsize any ties about both Pakistan and China, India follows three

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 41 pathways to missile defence. The most recent develop- including Beijing and Shanghai. There has been spec- ment is the decision in 2018 to purchase five regiments ulation that India will mount the more advanced of the S-400 Triumf surface-to-air-missile system from manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) technology Russia.26 Since the early 2000s,27 India has worked on for the longer-range Agni-VI currently in develop- two domestic programmes: the Prithvi Air Defence ment but untested.33 The growth of China’s strategic (PAD/Pradyumna) system for high altitude (max. 80 missile defences could precipitate India’s efforts to km) and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for achieve MRVs. All of India’s research in MIRV technol- lower altitude (max. 30 km).28 Despite some successes, ogy appears driven by concern about China and, given those systems unsurprisingly failed to meet their high- India’s NFU pledge, the possibility of it using a future end objectives during testing, delaying any introduc- MIRV capability for a first use is remote. Pakistan, on tion into service. It is also unclear whether and how the other hand, could put MIRVs to first use, given its India’s indigenous and foreign systems could func- nuclear doctrine (see Chapter Two). tion together. Pakistani officials openly spurn missile In India, two high-profile demonstrator programmes defences on affordability and efficacy grounds. among the country’s future-technology pursuits could India and Pakistan are also seeking to mount several disrupt nuclear deterrence stability if India matured nuclear warheads on a single ballistic missile (a tech- them into actual military capabilities and identified nology generically known as multiple re-entry vehicle circumstances for use against Pakistan’s (or China’s) or MRV), posing a serious risk to deterrence stability. nuclear intelligence, surveillance, target-acquisition Given Cold War precedents, these efforts are unsurpris- and reconnaissance infrastructure. Firstly, India became ing: each seeks to breach better and more cheaply the the world’s fourth country to demonstrate an anti- opponent’s defences in case they decided on nuclear satellite (ASAT) capacity in March 2019.34 Other than strikes. This could require additional fissile material for ‘defending [India’s] assets in space’ against ‘rogue sat- the warheads, although existing stocks may allow for ellites’ and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),35 this (see Chapter Three). Pakistan first tested theAbabeel Indian officials have not detailed the strategic rationale missile in January 2017, claiming it could carry multi- for this test (or its underlying efforts),36 but they do not ple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) deny India’s intent to compare favourably with China technology.29 If Pakistan tested reliably and introduced as a technology competitor. India’s chief defence tech- the Ababeel into service, it would increase the overall nologist has claimed an ASAT capability ‘beyond 1,000 size of the country’s arsenal, depending on the number km’.37 Besides generating space debris, analysts have of as yet undisclosed warheads the missile may carry.30 pointed to the limitations of India’s test.38 But the test India also appears to be working on MIRV options for has aroused Pakistani concerns given the country’s its longer-range Agni-series missiles. Other than state- own growing reliance on (Chinese-launched) satellites, ments by past defence scientists (about funded design including for defence purposes.39 India and Pakistan work)31 and a recent head of strategic forces (on the do not have bilateral measures in place to avoid target- aspiration),32 India has made no official announcement ing each other’s satellites (although proposals to limit on MIRVs. There are reports that the 5,000-km-range ASATs elsewhere have so far been unsuccessful).40 Agni-V, which is due to enter the armed forces inven- Secondly, India’s civilian space organisation and min- tory in 2021, could be MIRV-capable. Indian analysts istry of defence have conducted flight tests of a missile- sometimes point to India’s successful record at plac- mounted experimental hypersonic vehicle. These are ing multiple satellites in orbit from its civilian space being developed and acquired elsewhere (including in launcher as evidence of a present capability of sorts. China) to provide strategic conventional-strike options Adding this feature to its land-based mobile launch- using high speed to defeat defences. India’s most recent ers, which would operate from deep within peninsular attempt successfully took place in October 2020. There India, could further reduce the Agni-V’s vulnerability, is no evidence of Pakistan seeking or researching such a as it seeks to target China’s eastern-seaboard cities, hypersonic capability.

42 The International Institute for Strategic Studies This comes amid nascent national debates in the Relatedly, there is early evidence of India’s and region over the desirability of hypersonic weapons. Pakistan’s interest in acquiring national artificial-intel- They may have destabilising potential if they induce ligence (AI) capabilities for defence purposes. In 2019, ambiguity about the target or payload or prompt the India’s defence minister announced a road map to defendants to raise the alert levels of their own missile develop 25 AI products for national security by 2024.44 and strategic forces.41 The context of the Indian sub- In 2020, he mentioned AI as part of key technology continent adds to the challenges: regional analysts, not trends in a speech marking one year since the February just from Pakistan, increasingly insist that any resort to 2019 security crisis.45 Pakistan inaugurated a facility hypersonic weapons between contiguous neighbours for applying AI to air-force operations in 2020.46 While India and Pakistan could also have considerable stra- AI may feature in both countries’ future conventional tegic effects: the launch-to-impact interval would be so operations, neither country is likely to rely heavily on short that it could leave little to no time for the defend- AI to assist decision-making for some years. At pre- ing side’s leadership to assess and mitigate the threat. sent, no evidence or reports link AI to either country’s This confusion risk, along with destructive potential, nuclear weapons. may deter against use in the subcontinent. India has also never used its supersonic missile BrahMos against 4.4 Concluding observations Pakistan. Use of a higher-speed missile first therefore looks unlikely in the near term. India’s effort to build a sea-based assured credible second-strike capability is slowly creating The cyber domain a new regional strategic reality, especially The possibility that India or Pakistan could use cyber since its first deterrent patrol in 2018. Pakistan weapons to disable or disrupt the other’s nuclear capa- could follow using conventional ships, which, bilities remains a far-off prospect. But both country’s while more affordable, may increase the risk militaries are acquiring both offensive and defensive of misperception. Nuclear deterrence stability cyber capabilities outside the nuclear-weapons domain in South Asia now requires consideration of as part of their modernisation plans. These could play the reality and perception of action–reaction a part in an escalatory pathway leading to nuclear- cycles in the much wider Indian Ocean region. weapon use. The momentum in India for the formation This theatre – far larger than the Indian sub- of a joint cyber force is driven by consideration of China, continent – is characterised by the growing but any such capability could be turned against Pakistan presence of the navies of all five established as a ‘non-kinetic’ option alongside use of other military nuclear-weapons states. As India’s sea-based force. Little is known about India’s or Pakistan’s cyber deterrent grows, Pakistan will find it all the military doctrines, actual capabilities or operations.42 But easier in future crises to allege nuclear coer- both country’s efforts can be assumed to be directed at cion at sea by India. least in part towards the other. As in most other nuclear- armed states, however, India’s and Pakistan’s respective India and Pakistan have also embarked on nuclear command-and-control infrastructure is kept research and development in the space and separate from other networks, offering both harder and cyber military domains, with a bearing on better identifiable targets for cyber measures, ultimately nuclear deterrence. Any resulting nuclear- enhancing the reliability of nuclear command and con- and non-nuclear-threshold capabilities carry trol. In Pakistan, military-led cyber-defence and -secu- risks to nuclear deterrence; they could par- rity capabilities are partly located in the SPD. In India, ticipate in precipitating crisis escalation unin- there is growing public awareness that using cyber tentionally, encourage arms racing and, in means to compel Pakistan below the nuclear threshold Pakistan’s case, lead to greater reliance on its could risk uncontrollable escalation.43 nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 43 Taken separately, these emerging develop- enough for lower-level or temporary insta- ments may appear deceptively manageable bility to be bearable, as India and Pakistan because they are slow-moving and at early progress towards secure second-strike capa- stages. Except for India’s SSBNs, no new bilities. By this logic, their deterrence rela- capabilities are formally entering military ser- tionship would stabilise with time as that of vice and being explicitly directed against the other nuclear-armed states did before them. other’s nuclear arsenal. But taken together, The ambivalent role of technology in the evo- the strategic whole is greater than the sum of lution of relationships between other, older the parts. nuclear powers may also give some well- placed assurance that greater instability can Since before India’s and Pakistan’s 1998 somehow be successfully managed reactively nuclear tests, South Asia’s strategic stability and pragmatically in South Asia. has been the product of actual capabilities, perceptions of those by the other side and Yet if greater instability from emerging tech- anticipations of future potential capabilities. nology-driven trends is likely and to be man- Missile flight tests, for example, more often aged, it will require ever more high-level denote immature capabilities.47 That fact can policy attention and separation of fact from be overshadowed by reading too much into mere perceptions. As an alternative, it may be how the timing of such tests relates to the less costly to safely arrest or alter the course of bilateral political–diplomatic context of the such emerging trends now, rather than once moment. Given the emerging, technology-led they overdetermine the cost–benefit analy- developments, this interplay will continue, sis of options in a future crisis. Such think- sustaining old anxieties or raising new ones. ing based on counter-anticipation is not new: soon after 1998, analysis from outside the Most analysts in the region acknowledge region had encouraged thinking of alterna- the risks from emerging, technologically tive pathways to weaponisation, including to driven developments. But in both countries, reduce risk.48 the legitimisation of such national efforts is primarily established as a response to the Seeking and reaching negative security assur- opponent’s own efforts (and in India’s case, ances at sea may be a useful step: could, for there is additionally the growing considera- example, assurances be exchanged to avoid tion of China). The belief is also entrenched crisis-escalation anxieties related to naval in the region that nuclear deterrence is strong platforms?

44 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Notes

1 Ajai Singh, ‘Submarines are game changer in maritime warfare: 9 Ankit Panda, ‘Pakistan Conducts Second Test of Babur-3 How’s India placed’, Financial Express, 27 June 2019, https:// Nuclear-Capable Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile’, www.financialexpress.com/defence/submarines-are-game- Diplomat, 1 April 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/ changer-in-maritime-warfare-hows-india-placed/1620806/. pakistan-conducts-second-test-of-babur-3-nuclear-capable- 2 Indian Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Prime Minister felicitates submarine-launched-cruise-missile/; and Hundley, ‘India and crew of INS Arihant on completion of Nuclear Triad’, 5 Pakistan are quietly making nuclear war more likely’. November 2018, http://pib.nic.in/PressReleaseIframePage. 10 For other nuclear navies, delegation covers at least three aspx?PRID=1551894. different types of arrangements, details of which are often 3 Manoj Joshi, ‘INS Arihant’s deterrence patrol: More hype unknown: the submarine has the physical – but not legal – than necessary’, Observer Research Foundation, 6 November ability to launch nuclear weapons even without a valid order; 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/ins-arrogant- the submarine has launch authority in extreme circumstances deterrence-patricks-more-hype-than-necessary-45427/. with specific guidance (e.g., letters-of-last-resort type 4 Rajat Pandit, ‘Arihant’s N-capable missile “ready to roll”’, Times instructions); or the submarine has full launch authority, of India, 25 January 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ whereby the submarine commander can do as he sees fit. See india/india-successfully-test-fires-k-4-submarine-launched- also Jeffrey G. Lewis and Bruno Tertrais, ‘The Finger onthe missile/articleshow/73589861.cms; and Sandeep Unnithan, Button: the Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear- ‘A peek into India’s top secret and costliest defence project, Armed States’, CNS Occasional paper, no. 45, February 2019, nuclear submarines’, India Today, 10 December 2017, https:// pp. 24–9, https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/ www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20171218- uploads/2019/02/Finger-on-the-Nuclear-Button.pdf. india-ballistic-missile-submarine-k-6-submarine-launched- 11 Usman Ansari, ‘Pakistan Unveils VLF Submarine drdo-1102085-2017-12-10. Communications Facility’, Defense News, 16 November 5 W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar, Growth of Naval Power in the Indian 2016, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2016/11/16/ Ocean: Dynamics and Transformation (New Delhi: National pakistan-unveils-vlf-submarine-communications-facility/. Maritime Foundation, 2016), p. 106, http://maritimeindia.org/ 12 ‘India to be second country to use ELF facility’, Hindu, 20 May View%20Profile/636154745898022561.pdf. 2017, https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Hyderabad/india- 6 The costs of the SSBN programme are not charged to the navy’s to-be-second-country-to-use-elf-facility/article18517424.ece. budget but those associated with the SSNs are. See Sandeep 13 Neither side has nuclear weapons on-board potentially Unnithan, ‘Buy within the budget: the new prioritisation vulnerable surface ships. Since 2004, India has used surface mantra’, India Today, 7 February 2020, https://www.indiatoday. ships as test beds for the 350-km-range Dhanush nuclear- in/india-today-insight/story/buy-within-the-budget-the-new- capable ballistic missile. The last such test occurred after the

prioritisation-mantra-1644149-2020-02-07; and ‘Navy Chief: Arihant submarine entered service, but before the SSBN’s first We are building a combat ready, credible and cohesive Indian official deterrent patrol. Pakistan has not made such tests from Navy’, Bharat Shakti, 3 December 2019, https://bharatshakti. surface ships. See ‘“Dhanush” ballistic missile successfully in/navy-chief-we-are-building-a-combat-ready-credible-and- test-fired’, DD News, 24 February 2018, http://ddnews.gov. cohesive-indian-navy/. in/sci-tech/%E2%80%98dhanush%E2%80%99-ballistic-missile- 7 Dinakar Peri and Josy Joseph, ‘INS Arihant left crippled after successfully-test-fired. “accident” 10 months ago’, Hindu, 8 January 2018, https:// 14 Some but not all of the risk could be mitigated through www.thehindu.com/news/national/ins-arihant-left-crippled- observation by India of the likely single, identifiable onshore after-accident-10-months-ago/article22392049.ece. point where warheads would be loaded onto submarines. 8 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 9 January 15 For India, see, for example, Abhijit Singh quoted in Hundley, 2017, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=3672. ‘India and Pakistan are quietly making nuclear war more

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 45 likely’. For Pakistan, see, for example, briefing byCaptain Aqeel 26 The system is designed primarily to defend against enemy Akhtar, Visiting Research Fellow for South Asia (Strategic aviation. Russian media reported that in 2018, China Affairs), IISS, 24 January 2019, London, https://www.youtube. successfully tested the system against a ‘simulated ballistic com/watch?v=noDxRt59GOs. target’. See Minnie Chan, ‘Chinese missile force puts new 16 Captain Aqeel Akhtar, ‘Nuclear submarines shift strategic balance Russian S-400 air defence system to the test’, South China of Indian Ocean’, IISS Analysis, 29 January 2019, https://www.iiss. Morning Post, 27 December 2018, https://www.scmp.com/ org/blogs/analysis/2019/01/nuclear-submarines-indian-ocean; see news/china/military/article/2179564/chinese-missile-force- also briefing by CaptainAqeel Akhtar, 24 January 2019. puts-new-russian-s-400-air-defence-system. 17 Yogesh Joshi, ‘Angles and Dangles: Arihant and the Dilemma of 27 In 2001, India shifted its stance toward being supportive of US India’s Undersea Nuclear Weapons’, War on the Rocks, 14 January BMD plans. See ‘India backs Bush’s missile defense shield’, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/angles-and-dangles- CNN, 11 May 2001, https://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/ Arihant-and-the-dilemma-of-indias-undersea-nuclear-weapons/. asiapcf/south/05/11/india.armitage.pakistan.zhu/. 18 ‘Keynote Address and Discussion Session with Lt-Gen. (Retd) 28 Rajeev Bhutani, ‘Operationalisation of India’s Ballistic Missile Khalid Kidwai’. Defence’, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, 2017, https:// 19 Sean O’Connor, ‘Satellite images reveal Indian nuclear cenjows.gov.in/pdf/Operationalisation-of-India.pdf. submarine’s movements’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 3 October 29 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 24 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_2406646-JIR. January 2017, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. 20 ‘Pakistan had kept one of its most advanced submarines php?id=3705.

hidden after Balakot strikes, Indian Navy detected it after a 30 Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor Ahmed, ‘Pakistan, MIRVs, and 21-day search’, OpIndia, 23 June 2019, https://www.opindia. Counterforce Targeting’, in Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler com/2019/06/pakistan-had-kept-one-of-its-most-advanced- and Shane Mason (eds), The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs (Washington submarines-hidden-after-balakot-strikes-indian-navy- DC: Stimson Center, 2016), pp. 149–75, https://www.stimson. detected-it-after-a-21-day-search/. org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Lure_and_Pitfalls_of_ 21 ‘PM Imran chairs meeting of National Command Authority MIRVs.pdf; and Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, ‘Indian Missile Defence in Islamabad’, Dunya News, 27 February 2019, https:// Development: Implications for Deterrence Stability in South dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/480258-PM-Imran-to-chair- Asia’, Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 2, Summer 2015, pp. 29–46. National-Command-Authority-meeting-today. 31 ‘India’s nuclear deterrence capacity is in place, the country 22 For India, see, for instance, Roy-Chaudhury and Solanki, can sleep well: Defence research chief’, NDTV, 4 May 2013, ‘India: defence spending and procurement’, pp. 166–82. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indias-nuclear-deterrence- 23 The UK’s national auditor, for example, estimated in 2019 that capacity-is-in-place-the-country-can-sleep-well-defence- the cost of disposing of each of ten nuclear-powered submarines research-chief-521179. See remarks by Lt-Gen. (retd) B.S. Nagal taken out of service amounted to US$125m alone; see ‘Nuclear in ‘India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine and Danger’, submarines: MoD criticised over submarine disposal’, BBC event transcript, Stimson Center, 17 January 2019, p. 15, https:// News, 3 April 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-47792539. www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/EventTranscript_1_17_

24 Off-the-record discussion segment, SVI conference, Islamabad, IndiaNuclearAsia.pdf. November 2018; for full report of on-the-record segments, see 32 B.S. Nagal, ‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy’, in A.K. ‘Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability in South Asia’, Singh and B.S. Nagal (eds), Military Strategy for India in the 21st conference report, Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, Century (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2019), p. 220. 6–7 November 2018, https://thesvi.org/report-of-the-two- 33 Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath Sankaran, ‘India’s Slow and day-international-conference-organized-by-the-svi-on- Unstoppable Move to MIRV’, in Krepon , Wheeler and Mason, november-6-7-2018/. The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs, pp. 119–47; and Joshua T. White and 25 Anjum Sarfraz, ‘Importance Of Nuclear Submarines For Kyle Deming, ‘India’s MIRV Program and Deterrence Stability Pakistan’, Eurasia Review, 2 July 2019, https://www. in South Asia’, in Michael Krepon et al. (eds), Deterrence eurasiareview.com/02072019-importance-of-nuclear- Instability & Nuclear Weapons in South Asia (Washington DC: submarines-for-pakistan-oped/. Stimson Center, 2015), pp. 177–203, https://www.stimson.

46 The International Institute for Strategic Studies org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Deterrence_Instability_ 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india- WEB.pdf#page=177. successfully-test-fires-nuclear-capable-hypersonic-missile- 34 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘India Joins Select shaurya/story-6OVLkT6uXueovpkKniuxGK.html; Manpreet Group of Nations, Destroys Live Satellite in Low Earth Sethi, ‘The hype over hypersonics’, Hindu, 27 January 2020, Orbit’, 27 March 2019, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-hype-over- aspx?PRID=1569563. hypersonics/article30659477.ece; and Nagal, ‘India’s Nuclear 35 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Postage Stamp Doctrine and Strategy’, p. 221. Released on A-SAT: India’s First Anti Satellite Missile’, 42 A rare high-profile recent example was the Pakistan military’s 15 September 2020, https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare. public attribution to ‘Indian intelligence agencies’ of what it aspx?PRID=1654607; and Government of India, Ministry of called a ‘major cyber attack’. SeeInter-Services Public Relations Defence, ‘DRDO at Republic Day Parade 2020’, 26 January Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 12 August 2020, https://www.ispr. 2020, https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1600622. gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=5806. 36 Office of the Defence Minister of India (@DefenceMinIndia), 43 Sidharth Kapoor, ‘Not a bloodless option for India’, Hindu, ‘Raksha Mantri Shri @rajnathsingh inaugurated the Anti 4 July 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/not- Satelite Missile Model during his visit to @DRDO_India a-bloodless-option-for-india/article28275541.ece; see also Bhawan in New Delhi today’, 9 November 2020, Tweet, https:// M.K. Narayanan, ‘The best among limited options’, Hindu, twitter.com/DefenceMinIndia/status/1325755129484570624. 1 November 2016, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/ 37 ‘Interview: Secretary, department of defence R&D and lead/The-best-among-limited-options/article14990381.

chairman, Defence Research and Development Organisation, Dr ece?homepage=true. G. Satheesh Reddy’, Force India, June 2020, http://forceindia.net/ 44 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘India to achieve interview/secretary-department-defence-rd-chairman-defence- USD 26 Billion Defence Industry by 2025: Raksha Mantri’, research-development-organisation-dr-g-satheesh-reddy/. 17 September 2019, https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare. 38 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘India’s ASAT Test: An Incomplete aspx?PRID=1585366. Success’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 45 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Balakot airstrikes April 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/15/ was a message that cross-border terrorism will not be a low- india-s-asat-test-incomplete-success-pub-78884. cost option for the adversary, says Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath 39 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, Singh’. 10 February 2011, https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. 46 ‘Air Chief inaugurates Center of Artificial Intelligence & php?id=1668; and SUPARCO, ‘Press Release: Pakistan’s First Computing in Islamabad’, Radio Pakistan, 27 August 2020, National Communication Satellite Launched Today’, 12 https://www.radio.gov.pk/27-08-2020/air-chief-inaugurates- August 2011, http://www.suparco.gov.pk/downloadables/ center-of-artificial-intelligence-computing-in-islamabad. PAKSAT%201R%20Press%20Release.pdf. 47 For details of extensive testing the UK deterrent underwent, 40 Timothy Wright, ‘Do ASATs mean less security in see, for instance, ‘Operational Selection Policy 11 – Nuclear space?’, IISS Military Balance blog, 17 March 2020, Weapons Policy 1967–1998’, National Archives, November

https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/03/ 2005, p. 13, https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/ india-anti-satellite-weapon-space-security. information-management/osp11.pdf. 41 Prashasti Singh, ‘India successfully test-fires nuclear capable 48 Synnott, The causes and consequences of South Asia’s nuclear tests, hypersonic missile Shaurya’, Hindustan Times, 3 October p. 71.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 47 48 The International Institute for Strategic Studies 5. Nuclear stability, risk reduction and confidence

The current and future risks relating to existent capa- is central to nuclear doctrine, as well as establish routi- bilities and emerging technology-driven developments nised channels of communication. They can help reduce identified in the two previous chapters add to the ear- misperceptions by introducing a level of transparency lier worries raised by assessing India’s and Pakistan’s that is comfortable to both sides. At present there is doctrines. This chapter examines what, if anything, can almost no formal contact between the military establish- be done to address and minimise those risks, assuming ments of India and Pakistan. Other than the presence of that negotiated arms control is unlikely in the short or defence advisers in each capital there is no mutual exer- medium term. If achieving trust is also too tall an order, cise observation, no staff talks or visits, no staff college it may at least be possible to enhance confidence.1 This exchanges, sporting events or other means of interact- will require the pursuit of CBMs and other options to ing.4 In contrast, by the end of the Cold War, the Soviet address the risks arising from mistrust and mispercep- Union and the US had achieved levels of mutual mili- tions. This chapter will focus on nuclear and military tary transparency unthinkable only two decades earlier. CBMs, outlining existing measures, assessing their util- This was accomplished through political will borne out ity and offering suggestions for enhancing the India– of realism and pragmatism, a prospect that is worth Pakistan CBM regime. consideration for India and Pakistan. Flaws, gaps and challenges notwithstanding, given 5.1 Confidence-building measures: promise the requisite political will, the extant suite of India– and stagnation Pakistan CBMs provides a foundation for reducing the CBMs remain a tool of first choice to promote trust or at propensity for confrontation and ‘lengthening the fuse’5 least help dispel mistrust and misunderstandings within in the event of a crisis. Though CBMs by themselves the context of the nuclear-deterrence relationship. guarantee nothing, they may create firebreaks dur- Nuclear and military CBMs between India and Pakistan ing a crisis, allowing time for diplomacy to interrupt a have a long history2 (see Annex 4), but the implemen- spiral into conflict.6 Moreover, the process of consulta- tation of some has been patchy and agreed channels of tions involved in implementing and evaluating CBMs communication have often been neglected during crises. on a periodic basis in times of normal levels of tension The two countries have also explored various ‘civilian’ would, at a minimum, provide an invaluable mecha- CBMs such as people-to-people contacts, commercial nism for increasing understanding, reducing suspicions connections and diplomatic exchanges. Although help- and, ultimately, enhancing stability. ful in the broader bilateral relationship, such measures The key India–Pakistan military CBMs currently in are unlikely to affect the core dynamics shaping nuclear place resulted from serious crises in 1986–87 and 1990 deterrence and its weaknesses in the region. in which military movements raised fears of surprise Nuclear and military CBMs can be beneficial in attack.7 In April 1991, in the aftermath of these experi- addressing the lack of transparency between the two ences, the two sides agreed to a set of measures intended militaries. Such CBMs can supplement unilateral to prevent airspace violations, to provide prenotifica- statements,3 enhancing understanding of intent, which tion of military exercises and to revive a telephonic

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 49 hotline between the two Directors General of Military Beyond the 1988 non-attack agreement, a visit to Operations (DGMOs) in the respective army headquar- Lahore in February 1999 by then Indian prime minister ters.8 These agreements have been largely successful in Atal Bihari Vajpayee produced a joint statement at the reassuring each side and in limiting, if not eliminating, prime-ministerial level and a memorandum of under- the concerns about surprise attack that were previously standing (MoU) – conjoined as the Lahore Declaration. associated with large military training exercises. Among other steps, this document called for ‘bilateral The two sides subsequently developed a protocol to consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doc- use the DGMO hotline every Tuesday to maintain con- trines, with a view to developing measures for confi- tact and exchange routine information, but the line is dence building in the nuclear and conventional fields’ theoretically available 24/7 and has occasionally been as well as ‘appropriate consultative mechanisms’ to employed in unusual or emergency situations (includ- ensure effective implementation.11 The Pakistan Army’s ing in February 2021).9 At the same time, the airspace intrusion across the LoC later that year and the resultant and exercise agreements lack detail and verification Kargil War understandably halted progress, but the two mechanisms, making them subject to possible abuse, governments subsequently concluded agreements on while the DGMO hotline is often shut down when it reducing the risk of accidents related to nuclear weap- is most needed. During the February 2019 crisis for ons (2007, extended in 2012 and 2017) and on the preno- instance, the two DGMOs did not talk for several weeks tification of ballistic-missile flight tests (2006); they also despite the high level of tension and military action by reaffirmed their moratorium on nuclear testing (2004). both sides. Nor has the hotline link been very effective The foreign-secretary and expert-level talks conducted in curbing the dramatic increase in ceasefire violations to reach these agreements constituted in themselves a along the LoC since 2013. A hotline connecting the two significant instrument of nuclear confidence building.12 foreign secretaries has no schedule for regular calls and has seemed moribund in crises.10 5.2 Possible avenues forwards In addition to strictly military CBMs, India and Although the Lahore MoU is now over 20 years old, it Pakistan have developed several agreements specifi- and the ensuing bilateral agreements provide a founda- cally related to missile and nuclear issues. The most tion upon which the two sides can build to reinvigorate enduring and rigorously observed of these is the and expand their existing CBM regime. The potential 1988 Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against list of new or enhanced measures regarding nuclear Nuclear Installations and Facilities, under the provi- weapons and their delivery means is rich with oppor- sions of which India and Pakistan have undertaken not tunities, especially as some steps would merely require to destroy or damage the other’s installations and facili- the modification of existing agreements to account ties (such as power and research reactors) either directly for recent developments in technology and doctrine. or indirectly. Both governments have been scrupulous Possibilities the two sides could consider include but in providing the required lists of facilities on 1 January are not limited to the following: every year. As the lists seldom change and are assumed not to include all possible targets of concern (especially Modernise the 1988 non-attack agreement those related to nuclear weapons), this agreement is now largely symbolic, but it is not insignificant that both par- Add very-low-frequency/extremely low-fre- ties have adhered to the exchange stipulation every year quency (VLF/ELF) transmitting stations to the regardless of the state of bilateral relations (e.g., after list of facilities not to be attacked. As the two the December 1999 hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight sides are in the process of extending nuclear by Pakistani militants or in the wake of the November deterrence seaward, VLF/ELF communications 2008 terror attack in Mumbai). Abandoning any of these will be crucial to ensuring proper command measures would seriously degrade bilateral relations and control. Placing these transmitters on the and alarm outside powers. respective non-attack lists would thus help

50 The International Institute for Strategic Studies address concerns about unauthorised use of relevant evidence about decommissioning submarine-launched nuclear weapons. these systems would be a valuable contribution to reducing mutual suspicion.20 Agree that such facilities will be avoided during conventional conflict.13 Establish one or more nuclear risk-reduction centres (NRRCs) that would be jointly manned Expand the agreement to cover major civilian- on a 24/7 basis. As detailed in a 2004 study, infrastructure targets (such as large dams), the one or more NRRCs would provide each party destruction of which would result in environ- with a dedicated, secure means of notifying the mental and humanitarian catastrophe.14 other about activities that might be misinter- preted; a channel for exchanging information as Add ‘a mechanism to share information about agreed in existing security arrangements; and a terrorist threats to facilities covered by the forum for clarifying ambiguous events on the agreement’.15 territory of the other side. NRRCs could also be platforms for consultations on the imple- Add a provision to prevent cyber attacks on mentation of existing CBMs.21 The NRRC idea the listed facilities.16 is ambitious and some analysts caution that ‘attempting to establish an NRRC-like -struc Add cruise missiles to the ballistic-missile- ture could be a recipe for failure’. However, testing prenotification agreement such an institution could be envisaged as the Both countries are actively developing and deploying ultimate goal with perhaps an enhanced ‘hot- arsenals of cruise missiles, some of which have or could line-plus’ communications link connecting key have nuclear warheads. India and Pakistan closely watch nuclear organisations (such as a branch of each each other’s missile activities, so including cruise missiles national command authority) as an interim in the prenotification regime would reduce the suspicions measure.22 The hotline-plus arrangement could and concerns that often surround live testing. Notification also include an exchange of liaison officers to could also include when multiple launches are planned reduce the risks of misperception. (these are currently permitted within the notified- win dow without prior announcement).17 Similarly, the two Conclude a bilateral agreement on MIRV sides could agree not to conduct any missile tests what- warheads and ballistic-missile-defence soever during periods of heightened tension or crisis, as (BMD) deployments designed to curb unbri- tests are seen as designed to intimidate the opponent.18 dled nuclear development that is more osten- tatiously driven by technology rather than Other measures by policy or doctrine (see chapters Three and Four). This is also an ambitious proposition. Formally announce the withdrawal of out- The Indian decision to purchase Russian S-400 dated, nuclear-capable short-range ballistic Triumf systems complicates any such pro- missiles from service, specifically the older posal. But as several Indian, Pakistani and Indian Prithvi-I and Pakistani Hatf-1 sys- international observers have suggested, the tems, which have not been tested in at least two could consider limitation options that the last 15 years. Both sides will eventually would build confidence and reduce costs.23 need to retire these weapons in any case and could make a virtue of necessity by doing so Conclude an incidents-at-sea agreement. transparently according to a jointly agreed India and Pakistan have discussed this before, schedule.19 A dialogue about how to exchange but have never reached a formal agreement.24

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 51 Such an agreement would likely not address enclaves’. Recognition of the need for educa- nuclear weapons at sea, but institutionalising tion of the wider public about the implications procedures to reduce the possibility of mari- of nuclear weapons is growing in the region.28 time accidents and misunderstandings would be very beneficial and would establish routi- The topics for such dialogues are many: the effects nised channels of communication to enhance of nuclear detonations specific to South Asia in both understanding and transparency. a regional and global context; the utility of transparency measures such as ‘open-skies’ proposals on joint Join the existing multilateral arrangement employment of remote-sensing technologies; future on fissile-material confidence building ‘to CBMs or arms-control opportunities;29 and respective facilitate multilateral information-sharing and terminologies relating to nuclear- and missile-related promote best practices for the safe and secure behaviour,30 doctrines, force structures, nuclear safety management of civilian plutonium stockpiles’ and security, reassurance on alert levels, targeting ques- through the International Atomic Energy tions, cyber threats or the effect of advanced conven- Agency (IAEA)’s 1998 Guidelines for the tional weaponry. Management of Plutonium.25 In practice, however, if both countries joined, the step would 5.3 Overcoming challenges only affect India since Pakistan has no civilian The path to strengthening India–Pakistan CBMs is not plutonium. The measure would also not apply an easy one. Obstacles include suspicion about CBMs to either country’s military plutonium stocks. in general – in particular, a perception that accepting a CBM is somehow equivalent to granting a concession to Establish cooperative border-management the enemy. CBMs can also be seen incorrectly as a dis- measures to interdict possible illicit trafficking cussion intended primarily to assuage the concerns of in nuclear or radiological materials.26 Such an foreign audiences rather than serving genuine national agreement could be part of a comprehensive, interests.31 Furthermore, what outsiders regard as ‘no- written and institutionalised enhancement of risk, high-gain arrangements’ can easily be seen as ‘low- border-management procedures. gain, high-risk arrangements’ by politicians in New Delhi or Islamabad.32 The few serving or retired per- Activate and sustain a dialogue on strategic sonnel with relevant experience can also suffer from a issues between Indian and Pakistani think degree of ‘CBM fatigue’, as they see little progress after tanks affiliated with their respective- gov two decades of discussion and occasional agreement.33 ernments. An agreement for such exchanges For others, particularly those involved in politics or eve- was signed in 2008 between India’s Manohar ryday foreign- and defence-policy matters, nuclear con- Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies frontation may appear worrisome but so unlikely as not and Analyses and Pakistan’s Institute for to warrant excessive investment of time and attention. Strategic Studies Islamabad, but the proposed At the same time, a pro-nuclear cacophony frequently exchanges never occurred.27 A forum of this drowns out those who advocate nuclear sobriety, mini- nature could address issues that are too sen- malism and even sufficiency, especially in times of crisis sitive for discussion in formal government- when emotions can run high on both sides and worst- to-government meetings and could produce case analysis prevails.34 At a deeper level, many in the joint studies that inform official deliberation region use ‘trust deficit as an excuse’ to reject CBMs.35 as well as broader public debate in each coun- Trust can be seen as a necessary precondition for engag- try. It could also assist in publicising informed ing in confidence building, but this is to misunderstand discussion about nuclear weapons beyond the purpose of CBMs, which is to actually lay a founda- New Delhi and Islamabad’s small ‘strategic tion upon which trust may be constructed.36

52 The International Institute for Strategic Studies While any nation engaged in a CBM process must Yet a new set of military and nuclear CBMs reconcile legitimate concerns about secrecy with the is needed. New agreements are required to promotion of stability, there are at least two challenges update or complement older ones in a frame- in the India–Pakistan case. First is the role of China: work of mutual confidence or comprehension Pakistan’s principal ally is a rival and perceived as a between the two countries’ top leaders first. growing security threat in India, imposing demands on The purpose of such a framework would be to India’s nuclear and conventional armaments. China’s minimise risk – both assumed and inadvert- presence thus complicates the development of bilateral ent – and strengthen nuclear deterrence by India–Pakistan CBMs: it creates linkages to the wider providing both a renewed letter and spirit for Indo-Pacific frame of reference at a time when major strategic confidence through greater transpar- powers’ emerging corresponding strategies can appear ency and communication.39 to underplay the relevance of India–Pakistan nuclear deterrence stability and its challenges. Considerable political will on both sides will Second is the challenge of crafting a suite of nuclear be critical to establishing new bilateral CBMs. and missile CBMs in a situation of conventional asym- Political will from the top communicated with metry and sub-conventional warfare. This challenge as little rhetoric as possible,40 through bureau- explains why Pakistan has failed, since 1998, to convince cracies and militaries on both sides, could India to adopt a ‘strategic restraint regime’ as both a set make CBMs a prelude to and component of of practical proposals and a mindset. Even if many in a resumption of bilateral political dialogue. Pakistan exaggerate the conventional disparity, the two The armed forces on both sides have repeat- sides must decide when/how to disaggregate nuclear edly demonstrated the ability to undertake and conventional military CBMs and when/how to challenging tension-reduction tasks (such as combine them to mitigate the dangers of nuclear con- implementing ceasefires or withdrawing from frontation.37 Finally, the two governments must deter- forward positions) in a professional manner mine the best mix of incremental improvements and when they have governmental instruction and high-profile political or military gestures to promote backing to do so. Without such political will, CBMs.38 Attuned to but not irredeemably trammelled any stand-alone official dialogues pertaining by their respective domestic political scenes, New Delhi to defence doctrines and related nuclear issues and Islamabad would have to promote CBMs not only will be impossible. within their broader polities, but also within the bureaucratic and military institutions that will be charged with Until such talks take place, the two govern- sincere and rigorous implementation. ments can consider using, reinvigorating or expanding existing measures to manage 5.4 Concluding observations the current high levels of tensions across the Kashmir LoC, in nuclear issues and in the An often-unsung achievement of successive broader relationship. One or the other may governments in both India and Pakistan has find it helpful to implement creative unilat- been the seriousness and consistency with eral CBMs to initiate a virtuous cycle of stabil- which they have upheld CBMs agreed either ity even if officials in the region are sceptical. before their 1998 nuclear tests or just after- These could include reaffirming commitment wards. The contribution of those pre-existing to the existing moratoria on nuclear test- and persisting CBMs to nuclear deterrence ing. They could also include concentrating and stability cannot be overstated. The longer on avoiding accidents rather than on arms they persist, the greater the concern would be reduction or limitation, which are foreseeably if any were abandoned. unpalatable to both countries.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 53 Notes

1 Can also sometimes also be called ‘reassurance’. See, for example, 7 The 1986–87 ‘Brasstacks Crisis’ is named after the Indian army Michael Krepon, ‘Nuclear-Armed Rivalry in Southern Asia’, Arms exercise that sparked it. Control Wonk, 13 December 2020, https://www.armscontrolwonk. 8 A hotline had been established after the 1971 India–Pakistan com/archive/1210453/nuclear-armed-rivalry-in-southern-asia/. war, but had fallen into disuse. 2 For two recent forward-looking sets of proposals, in the context 9 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Joint Statement’, of risk reduction, see ‘Urgent Steps to De-Escalate Nuclear 25 February 2021, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage. Flashpoints’, Global Zero, 27 June 2017, pp. 7–8, https://www. aspx?PRID=1700682; and Government of Pakistan, ‘Pakistan, globalzero.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NCG_Urgent- Indian DGMOs agree to strict observance of bilateral Steps_June-2017.pdf; and Michael Krepon, Travis Wheller and agreements’, Radio Pakistan, 25 February 2021, https://www. Liv Dowling (eds), Off Ramps from Confrontation in South Asia radio.gov.pk/25-02-2021/pakistan-indian-dgmos-agree-to- (Washington DC: Stimson Center, 2019), https://www.stimson. strict-observance-of-bilateral-agreements. org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/OffRamps_Book_R5_ 10 The hotline was used during the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan; WEB.pdf. see Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘On 3 In India, for instance, an influential Group of Ministers report India–Pakistan Foreign Secretary Level Talks in New Delhi’, in 2001 recommended a ‘white paper on the Indian nuclear 17 January 2006, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings. programme’, but this had not been implemented yet; see htm?dtl/2730/on+indiapakistan+foreign+secretary. Government of India, ‘Report of the Group of Ministers on 11 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Lahore Reforming National Security’, 2001, p. 122, https://www. Declaration February, 1999’, 2 February 1999, https://mea.gov.in/ vifindia.org/sites/default/files/GoM%20Report%20on%20 in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999. National%20Security.pdf. 12 Tanvi Kulkarni, ‘India—Pakistan Nuclear CBMs: A New 4 One measure occasionally taken is to invite the other’s Approach’, South Asian Voices, 19 May 2016, https://southasian in-country defence adviser to military exercises as observer voices.org/india-pakistan-nuclear-cbms-a-new-approach/. alongside other foreign-military diplomatic colleagues. 13 University of Ottawa, ‘Ottawa Dialogue makes further Although this is not directly relevant to nuclear deterrence, recommendations for India–Pakistan nuclear agreements’, 22 it helps promote contacts between militaries, which overall December 2011, p. 5, http://ssms.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/vfs/. can help dispel institutional mistrust. See, for instance, horde/newsfeed/000301_001324577320_Copenhagen_ENG%20 more recently and symbolically, Kamran Yusaf, ‘In a first, (2).pdf . Indian diplomats attend Pakistan Day parade in Islamabad’, 14 Toby Dalton, ‘Modernize the South Asia Nuclear Express Tribune, 23 March 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/ Facility “Non–Attack” Agreement’, Stimson Center,

story/1667651/1-first-indian-diplomats-attend-pakistan-day- 28 June 2017, https://www.stimson.org/content/ parade-islamabad/. modernize-south-asia-nuclear-facility-non-attack-agreement. 5 Manpreet Sethi, ‘Nuclear Arms Control and CBMs: Prospects 15 Ibid. and Challenges’, in Feroz Hassan Khan, Ryan Jacobs and 16 Toby Dalton, ‘What’s the Future of CBMs in South Emily Burke (eds), Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Asia?’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 26 Decade (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), May 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/26/ p. 116, https://nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/ what-s-future-of-cbms-in-south-asia-pub-63679. Nuclear+Learning+in+South+Asia_June2014.pdf. 17 Frank O’Donnell, ‘Launching an Expanded Missile 6 Jehangir Karamat and Shashi Tyagi, ‘CBMs in South Asia’, Flight-Test Notification Regime’, Stimson Center, Dawn, 19 March 2012, https://www.dawn.com/news/704035/ 23 March 2017, http://www.stimson.org/content/ cbms-in-south-asia. launching-expanded-missile-flight-test-notification-regime.

54 The International Institute for Strategic Studies 18 Pravin Sawhney, ‘War and Peace’, Force India, December 2011, Treaty’, Stimson Center, 5 September 2017, https://www. http://forceindia.net/bottomline/war-and-peace/. stimson.org/content/time-consider-trilateral-asian-abm-treaty. 19 For a rare Indian view, see Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Pakistan’s 24 IISS, ‘Transcript: 17th Asia Security Summit: The IISS Nuclear Sabre-rattling: Tactical Nuclear Weapons are Unusable Shangri-La Dialogue: Special Session 4: Competition and during War’, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 29 January Cooperation in The Indian Ocean Region’, 2 June 2018, p. 10, 2020, https://www.claws.in/pakistans-nuclear-sabre-rattling- https://www.iiss.org/-/media/images/dialogues/sld/sld-2018/ tactical-nuclear-weapons-are-unusable-during-war/. Pakistan documents/competition-and-cooperation-in-the-indian-ocean- officially recently rejected the idea of unilateral retirement; see region-sld18.ashx?la=en&hash=5DB42B55B32DBBB284B51F7F ‘Keynote Address and Discussion Session with Lt-Gen. (Retd) 7C0310D99B2AD38E. Khalid Kidwai’, pp. 24–5. 25 International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Communication 20 Feroz Khan and Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Let’s Stop Being Received From Certain Member States Concerning Their Policies MAD, Move to CBMs’, Times of India, 11 September 2011, Regarding the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549’, 16 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/ March 1998, pp. 12–17, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/ all-that-matters/Lets-stop-being-MAD-move-to-CBMs/ files/infcirc549.pdf; and Hannah Haegeland, ‘Sharing Nuclear articleshow/9939854.cms. Information’, Stimson Center, 27 July 2018, https://www. 21 Teresita C. Schaffer, ‘Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in stimson.org/content/sharing-nuclear-information. South Asia: Working Group Report’, Center for Strategic 26 Dalton, ‘What’s the Future of CBMs in South Asia?’ India’s and International Studies, 1 May 2004, https://www.csis. Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership and Pakistan’s

org/analysis/nuclear-risk-reduction-centres-south-asia; Centre of Excellence and Nuclear Security may be able to Gen. (Retd) Jehangir Karamat, ‘The Burden of Power’, Force envisage some form of limited cooperation, to this effect or India, October 2003, http://forceindia.net/guest-column/ more likely, as a result. guest-column-jehangir-karamat/the-burden-of-power/; Rafi 27 ‘Accord to exchange security information signed with India’, Zaman Khan, ‘Nuclear Risk-Reduction Centers’, in Michael Dawn, 5 February 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/287983/ Krepon (ed.), Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia (New York, accord-to-exchange-security-information-signed-with-india. NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 171–81; and Ali Ahmed, 28 Off-the-record breakout discussion at the IISS Missile Dialogue ‘NRRC: For the Nuclear Doctrine Review’, Indian Defence Initiative 2020 convened virtually on 9 September 2020. Review, 20 June 2014, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/ 29 Mohammed Arshad Chaudhry and K.C. Cariappa, ‘How nrrc-for-the-nuclear-doctrine-review/. Cooperative Aerial Monitoring Can Contribute to Reducing 22 Harry I. Hannah, ‘A Hotline between National and Nuclear Tensions Between India and Pakistan’, Cooperative Monitoring Command Authorities to Manage Tensions’, Stimson Center, 8 Center Occasional Paper 22, December 2001, https://www. August 2018, https://www.stimson.org/content/hotline-between- sandia.gov/cooperative-monitoring-center/_assets/documents/ national-and-nuclear-command-authorities-manage-tensions; sand98-050522.pdf; John H. Hawes and Teresita C. Schaffer, and Steven E. Miller, ‘Nuclear Hotlines: Origins, Evolution, ‘Nuclear Risk Reduction and Cooperative Aerial Observation’, Applications’, paper presented to the 75th Anniversary Nagasaki in Krepon (ed.), Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia, pp. 125–44;

Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project, Nagasaki, 29 October Manpreet Sethi, ‘Nuclear Arms Control and CBMs: Prospects 2020, https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Steve- and Challenges’, pp. 111–19; and Jay Wise, ‘Satellite Imagery, Miller-Nuclear-Hotlines-WP-20201029.pdf. Remote Sensing, and Diminishing the Risk of Nuclear War in 23 Sadia Tasleem, ‘No Indian BMD for No Pakistani MIRVs’, Stimson South Asia’, United States Institute of Peace Special Report Center, 2 October 2017, https://www.stimson.org/content/ 434, November 2018, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/ no-indian-bmd-no-pakistani-mirvs. Some have even proposed files/2018-11/sr_434_satellite_imagery_remote_sensing_and_ trilateral limitations among India, Pakistan and China: Sitakanta diminishing_the_risk_of_nuclear_war_in_south_asia.pdf. Mishra, ‘A Triangular MIRV Restraint Regime in Southern 30 Comparing and contrasting national lexicons of nuclear Asia’, Stimson Center, 7 June 2017, https://www.stimson.org/ strategy over time, as national capabilities evolve, can help content/triangular-mirv-restraint-regime-southern-asia; and narrow doctrinal misunderstandings. Distinctions between Happymon Jacob, ‘Time to Consider a Trilateral Asian ABM terms such as ‘first strike’, ‘second strike’ and ‘first use’ are

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 55 reliably mutually understood by India and Pakistan. Others Secretary-level talks begin’, Dawn, 28 December 2004, https:// come too close to red lines as ambiguity plays an active part www.dawn.com/news/378281; for analysis, see Feroz Hassan in deterrence and definitions risk entailing permissiveness Khan, ‘Strategic Restraint Regime 2.0’, in Michael Krepon under a certain threshold. But this can be part of wider efforts and Julia Thompson (eds), Deterrence Stability and Escalation to establish the boundaries beyond which the two sides would Control in South Asia (Washington DC: Stimson Center, 2013), not press threats. Discussion of what constitutes a ‘responsible’ pp. 161–74, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file- nuclear state may provide groundwork to such discussions. See attachments/Deterrence_Stability_Dec_2013_web_1.pdf; on the Sebastian Brixey-Williams and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Nuclear ‘mindset’ associated to such a regime, see Imran Hassan, ‘South Responsibilities – A New Approach for Thinking and Talking Asian arms control and Pakistan’s nuclear diplomacy’, remarks about Nuclear Weapons’, British American Security Information by Imran Hassan at IISS webinar, London, 23 June 2020, https:// Council (BASIC) / Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and www.iiss.org/-/media/files/events/2020/transcript-of-colonel- Security (ICCS) Report, 1 November 2020, https://basicint.org/ imran-hassan-public-webinar--23-jun-2020--south-asian-arms- report-nuclear-responsibilities-a-new-approach-for-thinking- control-and-pakista.pdf?la=en&hash=584BEF67500BE3E43C68 and-talking-about-nuclear-weapons/. 24248EA63CAC4EA5AC8B. 31 Michael Krepon, ‘Nuclear Risk Reduction: Is Cold War 38 Toby Dalton, ‘Beyond Incrementalism: Rethinking Approaches Experience Applicable to Southern Asia?’, in Krepon (ed.), to CBMs and Stability in South Asia’, Stimson Center, 30 Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia, pp. 7–18. January 2013, https://www.stimson.org/content/toby-dalton- 32 Stephen Philiip Cohen, ‘India, Pakistan and Kashmir’, beyond-incrementalism-rethinking-approaches-cbms-and-

remarks presented at the University of Texas, December 2001, stability-south-asia; and Debak Das, ‘Review: India, Pakistan https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ and Incremental CBMs’, Institute of Peace and Conflict cohens20011201.pdf. Studies, 30 January 2013, http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select. 33 For Pakistan’s perspective, see discussion segment in ‘Keynote php?articleNo=3820. Address and Discussion Session with Lt-Gen. (Retd) Khalid 39 For a recent, straightforward case, see, for example, from India, Kidwai’. Manish Tewari, ‘India and Pakistan must talk – on nuclear 34 Manpreet Sethi, ‘Back to Basics: Pledging Nuclear Restraint’, issues’, Hindustan Times, 28 October 2019, https://www. Stimson Center, 17 July 2017, https://www.stimson.org/ hindustantimes.com/analysis/india-and-pakistan-must-talk- content/back-basics-pledging-nuclear-restraint. on-nuclear-issues/story-kRSuP1RKime7Bal5I54onJ.html; for a 35 Kulkarni, ‘India–Pakistan CBMs: A New Approach’. similar call at expert level, see also from India, Arun Prakash, 36 ‘Track-1.5’ dialogues involving serving government or quasi- ‘Neighbours’ mind games: India, Pakistan must initiate government officials meeting to discuss difficult issues can also dialogue between nuclear experts’, Indian Express, 19 February help build or sustain trust. 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/ 37 Pakistan proposed what it called a ‘strategic restraint regime’ india-pakistan-nuclear-weapons-army-balakot-6274778/. in 1998. It has not been formally released but its likely 40 In 2019 for example, such rhetoric was particularly sharp, even itemisation appeared in 2004 in ‘Pakistan proposes 20 CBMs: personal, between the prime ministers of India and Pakistan.

56 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Summary conclusions and recommendations

This primer examines nuclear deterrence and stabil- and should be respected not least for its ability to commu- ity in South Asia by separating perceptions from facts nicate clearly to opponents a set of foundational stances in order to assess the risk of India and Pakistan using concerning how a state views nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons as a result of deliberate, separate steps circumstances under which it would consider using them. seeking, but ultimately failing, to avoid that outcome. To domestic and other foreign audiences, doctrine also In doing so, its authors hope to have demonstrated that carries a message about how seriously nuclear-armed this subject matter, important though rarely urgent, is states would take breaking the taboo on nuclear use that neither too difficult nor too secret to explore. Itmay has held since 1945. There is no indisputable yardstick even embolden regional political leaders to embrace for judging nuclear doctrine. It participates in but does their responsibilities at the helm of their nuclear-armed not guarantee strategic stability: the notion of an equilib- states, for their countries’ sake above all. rium of tension resistant to disruption. Strategic stability, The primer finds that the risks of a mistaken- cata which includes crisis and arms-race stability, helps the strophic nuclear-deterrence failure between India and avoidance of the risk of war. But it does not correspond to Pakistan are too high to let chance play the same role a single end state or end point. Achieving strategic stabil- in the next security crisis as it did in February 2019. At ity requires constant tending and careful attention on a its core, the evidence assembled suggests that grave regular basis. This includes considering how the acquisi- deficiencies in and asymmetries between India’s and tion of new systems might bolster or undermine a deter- Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines are compounded by mutual rent relationship and the avoidance of provocative or disbelief, existing and emerging military capabilities, and short-sighted steps that might stoke instability or devalue the prolonged absence of related dialogue mechanisms. the credibility of nuclear doctrine. The argument starts from an examination of the utility The second chapter places those universal consider- of nuclear doctrine and the desirability of strategic stabil- ations in the context of South Asia. A textual analysis of ity. This enables an assessment of India’s and Pakistan’s India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines finds that they nuclear doctrines. From this foundation, centred on are not symmetrical. The requirement for proportionality India’s and Pakistan’s intent to defend themselves with is undermined in that relationship even if Pakistan’s posi- nuclear weapons, it is possible to identify some of the tion, as stated in February 2020 at the IISS, is that nuclear risks presented by both sides’ existing military capa- weapons would only be used in response to ‘large-scale bilities and by emerging technological developments, aggression’. This is compounded by a presumption of especially in the maritime domain. The closing discus- automaticity and overly optimistic assumptions about the sion introduces possible avenues for preserving nuclear management of nuclear escalation. The doctrinal dispar- deterrence and preventing unintended nuclear risks ity or inconsistency raises the real risk of miscalculation. through renewed confidence building. The juxtaposition of India’s and Pakistan’s respective Chapter One uses a universal perspective about doctrines risks the possibility of a catastrophic nuclear nuclear deterrence to affirm the usefulness of nuclear doc- exchange taking place at a time far short of extreme cir- trine since the Cold War. Nuclear doctrine carries weight cumstances when national survival is at stake.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 57 The third chapter examines how India and Pakistan of understanding (see Figure 17). This remains true have matched their military means across the spectrum despite the inbuilt limitations of CBMs and their cheq- of conflict to their statements of intent as defined in their uered history in South Asia. By relying, for example, on doctrines. This starts with a necessary discussion of transparency measures, both countries could communi- their conventional weaponry, which in a military esca- cate their nuclear doctrines more clearly. lation could establish a pathway to the nuclear thresh- Figure 17. The potentially most useful CBMs and other steps old. Neither side has a significant qualitative edge even pertaining to nuclear deterrence if India outdoes Pakistan by every measure of quantity. Modernise the 1988 Agreement on the The nuclear weaponry of both sides is capable of inflict- Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear ing unacceptable damage on the other. This obviates the Installations and Facilities need for much more. Both have a fledgling second-strike Update the missile-testing prenotification capability, but neither can launch a counterforce first regime to include cruise missiles strike with any assurance of success at present. Pakistan’s short-range, low-yield Nasr system and its stated desire Withdraw outdated, nuclear-capable short- range ballistic missiles from service to deploy missiles that reach every corner of India intro- duce new risks and cast doubt on claims of minimalism. Establish one or more nuclear risk- The fourth chapter concentrates on emerging capabili- reduction centres ties. The development of new technologies can have both Connect key nuclear establishments stabilising and destabilising effects on strategic deterrence. through an enhanced hotline system Possessing an assured second-strike capability at sea can be Conclude an agreement(s) on limited a contributing factor to stability. In India’s and Pakistan’s MIRV technology and BMD deployment cases, this prospect is still far off: efforts to place nuclear Conclude an incidents-at-sea agreement weapons on maritime platforms are driven by India’s strat- Activate the agreement on strategic egy and its road map, the design of which is clearer and the dialogue between government-affiliated implementation faster than Pakistan’s. Pakistan could still think tanks seek a token deterrent at sea. At the same time, these two Join the IAEA’s existing multilateral national efforts to create sea-based nuclear platforms pose arrangement on fissile-material confidence risks to nuclear deterrence, of unintended crisis escalation, building greater arms racing (despite the COVID-19 pandemic) Establish cooperative border-management and, in Pakistan’s case, greater reliance on its nuclear measures to interdict trafficking in nuclear weapons. Trends in the cyber and space domains (includ- materials ing BMD, placing multiple warheads on a single missile, Seek and reach negative security ASAT capacity or hypersonic missiles) are partly a reflec- assurances at sea tion of India’s double challenge of ensuring stable deter- Start and sustain informal bilateral discus- rence towards both China and Pakistan. Sober analysis can sions on risk in national defence identify which of these threshold capabilities may become Start and sustain informal bilateral discus- viable military options. Until then both countries can gain sions on nuclear strategy including its from sharing understandings about which longer-term lexicon dangerous prospects it would be in their interests to avoid. Start and sustain a backchannel for crisis The fifth chapter assesses what more, beyond existing management, confidence building and measures stabilising nuclear deterrence, can be done to resolution of outstanding issues address all these risks. If the prospects of outright arms Track 1.5 diplomacy involving senior control and building political trust appear too remote, security and other trusted officials in their adopting a new realistic and diverse set of military and private capacity nuclear CBMs could help build an up-to-date framework Source: IISS

58 The International Institute for Strategic Studies New CBMs or official/semi-official dialogues per- that is not affected or interrupted by incidents in the taining to defence doctrines and related nuclear issues relationship requires trusted envoys speaking with the have their best chances of success when undergirded authority of a mandate conferred by their national by political will or as part of a revived high-level politi- leader. Only such a mechanism can accommodate flex- cal dialogue. Until then creative options are needed. ibly the mix of statesmanship, unilateralism, incremen- Unilateral steps, coordinated between the two countries talism, coordination, implicit reciprocity, discretion and or not, may be possible. Envoys may have more suc- deniability required to narrow differences; reduce the cess concentrating on avoiding accidents rather than dangerous role of chance in crisis management; and on arms reduction or limitation, which are unpalatable build confidence as a prelude to hoped-for trust. In to both countries. The administration of US President February–March 2021, reports emerged of efforts in this Joe Biden in Washington has generally committed direction3 backed by the countries’ leaderships,4 marking ‘American nonproliferation leadership’ to ‘reducing a significant change from, possibly even a reappraisal the dangers posed by nuclear weapons’1. In its 2021 of recent years. If those include a backchannel, as some Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development reports indicate,5 they could help bypass each side’s offi- and Foreign Policy, the UK commits ‘to reduc[ing] ten- cial sensitivities and enable them to preserve face, while sions in South Asia, by encouraging regional dialogue acknowledging three principal points: on nuclear responsibilities, and by working with states there to understand and respond to safety and security the centrality and legitimacy of India and threats to the region’.2 Such approaches may encourage Pakistan’s mutual ability to deter each other India and Pakistan (among others) to take creative steps with nuclear weapons; of their own in this direction. Ultimately, only India and Pakistan can find a solution the need to do so recognising that nuclear to avoid the imprudent or mistaken use of nuclear weap- weapons are instruments of last resort, the use ons in their next crisis: they should consider reviving an of which can only be contemplated in extreme uninterrupted backchannel. Beyond their own experi- circumstances where the survival of the state ence in the early 2000s, India and Pakistan could draw is in danger; and inspiration from the contact mechanism established by Robert Kennedy and Georgi Bolshakov in 1961, however the desirability of mutual nuclear vulnerabil- imperfect it may have ultimately been. A backchannel ity as a factor in strategic stability.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 59 Notes

1 US White House, ‘Interim National Security Strategic Guidance’, goodwill letter to Pakistani counterpart: minister’, Reuters, 3 March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ 23 March 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan- statements-releases/2021/03/03/interim-national-security- india/indian-premier-modi-writes-goodwill-letter-to- strategic-guidance/; see also ‘2020 Democratic Party Platform’, pakistani-counterpart-minister-idUSKBN2BF2RM; and Gibran 27 July 2020, p. 81, https://www.demconvention.com/ Naiyyar Peshimam, ‘Pakistan army chief says ready to bury wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2020-07-31-Democratic-Party- hatchet with India for peace’, Reuters, 18 March 2021, https:// Platform-For-Distribution.pdf. www.reuters.com/article/pakistan-india-idINKBN2BA1Q3. 2 UK Cabinet Office, ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The 5 Praveen Swami, ‘A Secret ISI-RAW Channel, Talks Since Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and 2018: What Led to India-Pakistan LoC Ceasefire’, News 18, Foreign Policy, 16 March 2021, https://assets.publishing. 23 March 2021, https://www.news18.com/news/india/a- service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ secret-isi-raw-channel-talks-since-2018-what-led-to-india- attachment_data/file/969402/The_Integrated_Review_of_ pakistan-ceasefire-3563711.html; ‘Fahd Husain, ‘Indian offer Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy. led to “quiet” talks on all major issues’, Dawn, 25 April 2021, pdf, p. 85. https://www.dawn.com/news/1620230/indian-offer-led-to- 3 Shishir Gupta, ‘Behind India–Pak breakthrough, months of quiet-talks-on-all-major-issues; Nirupama Subramanian, ‘In secret back channel talks led by Doval’, Hindustan Times, 26 build-up to ceasefire thaw, NSA Doval met ISI chief in UAE last February 2021, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/ year’, Indian Express, 28 April 2021, https://indianexpress.com/ behind-india-pak-breakthrough-months-of-secret-back- article/india/in-build-up-to-india-pakistan-ceasefire-thaw- channel-talks-led-by-doval-101614296272990.html; and Baqir nsa-doval-met-isi-chief-in-uae-last-year-7291712/; and UAE, Sajjad Syed, ‘Pakistan, India agree on LoC ceasefire’, Dawn, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 26 February 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1609468/ ‘UAE welcomes ceasefire between India and Pakistan in pakistan-india-agree-on-loc-ceasefire. Kashmir’, 28 February 2021, https://www.mofaic.gov.ae/en/

4 Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam, ‘Indian premier Modi writes mediahub/news/2021/2/28/28-02-2021-uae-ceasefire.

60 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Annex 1: Pakistan’s nuclear forces1

Summary to carry multiple warheads. The service status of the Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons capability consists of Shaheen-1A and Babur-1B is uncertain. land-based and air-delivered weapons. Along with Of the Pakistan Air Force’s 44 F-16A/B MLU Fighting land-based medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, Falcon aircraft at least some are assumed to have the Pakistan also operates the Babur ground-launched cruise ability to deliver nuclear gravity bombs, while the missile, while the Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile has Mirage III aircraft, of which the air force has an esti- likely entered the air-force inventory. Islamabad also mated 39 in inventory, have been used in the test- appears to be pursuing a submarine-launched nuclear- launches of the Ra’ad and Ra’ad-2 dual-capable cruise armed cruise-missile capability; test launches of a sub- missiles, and may now have a limited operational capa- marine-launched variant of the Babur cruise missile bility with the former. continued in 2018. The National Command Authority The Pakistan Navy continues development work on (NCA), led by the prime minister, is responsible for the the submarine-launched Babur-3 cruise missile, which operational control of the country’s nuclear-weapons has been in test since 2017. inventory, with the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) managing the deployed systems and the associated security Forces requirements. The director-general of the SPD is always The Pakistan Army deploys its nuclear/dual-capable an army officer. short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in Strategic Missile Groups (SMGs) under the control of the corps- Equipment level Army Strategic Forces Command (AFSC). Based Pakistan’s land strategic forces are estimated to include on official reporting2 it seems that these groups are each more than 60 surface-to-surface launchers for nuclear- responsible for specific missile types3 and are probably capable missiles. Around 30 are used for the short-range regiment or brigade sized. It is not clear from open- ballistic missiles Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) and Shaheen-1 (Hatf- source material if the Babur cruise missiles, and shorter- 4). Another 30 are allocated to medium-range ballistic range systems such as Abdali or Nasr, have a similar missiles; Ghauri-1 (Hatf-5), Ghauri-2 and Shaheen-2 (Hatf- organisational structure. 6). An unknown number are also used for close-range In the air force, No. 9 Squadron, equipped with the ballistic designs Abdali (Hatf-2) and Nasr (Hatf-9) and F-16A/B MLU aircraft and based at PAF Base Mushaf, for the Babur-1/1A (Hatf-7) ground-launched cruise mis- and No. 7 Squadron, equipped with the Mirage III and siles. Pakistan has at least two additional medium-range based at PAF Base Masroor, may both have some form ballistic designs under development: the Shaheen-3 and of nuclear role, given their proximity to the Sargodha Ababeel, the latter of which is said to have the capability and Masroor weapons-storage complexes respectively.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 61 Notes

1 IISS Military Balance+, March 2021, https://milbalplus.iiss.org/. 3 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 2 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 1 February 8 May 2010, https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. 2018, https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=474. php?id=1283.

62 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Annex 2: India’s nuclear forces1

Summary The Indian Air Force is believed to have assigned a India’s nuclear capabilities are principally land based, secondary nuclear role to a small number of its fighter though submarine-launched systems are in develop- squadrons, often estimated as between two and four.2 ment and some of India’s combat aircraft might be This would imply a total force of approximately 80 air- nuclear-roled. The principal operational capability craft; some combination of the Mirage 2000s, Jaguar IS resides in the Prithvi and Agni families of short- to inter- and Su-30MKI may have the ability to deliver nuclear- mediate-range land-based ballistic missiles, with inter- armed gravity bombs. There is speculation that either continental-range versions currently in test. In addition, or both of the Su-30MKI or India’s newly inducted some Indian Air Force assets (such as Mirage 2000H or Rafale aircraft may be intended to have a dual-capa- Su-30MKI fighters) may be tasked with a nuclear role. ble land-attack cruise-missile capability, but there has A naval component is now entering service with the been no official confirmation of this plan (see also pp. Arihant class of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile subma- 28 and 32). rines. Command authority for India’s nuclear weapons The Indian Navy currently operates one nuclear- rests with the Political Council of the Nuclear Command powered ballistic-missile submarine, INS Arihant, Authority, chaired by the prime minister, while opera- which is fitted with four launch tubes, each capable of tional control lies with Strategic Forces Command (SFC), carrying three K-15 short-range submarine-launched a tri-service command established in 2003. The post of ballistic missiles (SLBMs). A second boat in the class, SFC commander-in-chief is held on a rotating basis by a INS Arighat, is currently awaiting commissioning, and three-star military officer from one of the three services, there are plans for a further two hulls to be built to a and manages and administers all nuclear forces through stretched design (S4) with eight launch tubes. A larger, separate army, air-force and navy chains of command. longer-ranged SLBM design, the K-4, is also currently under development. In addition to these submarines, Equipment the navy also operates a single surface ship as a test bed India’s land strategic forces are estimated to include at for the Dhanush ship-launched ballistic missile (a nav- least 54 surface-to-surface launchers for nuclear-capa- alised variant of the Prithvi missile family). ble missiles. Of these, 42 are believed to be road-mobile launchers assigned to short-range Agni-I (12) and Forces Prithvi-II (30) missiles and a separate 12 are rail-mobile 333 Missile Brigade is headquartered at Kamptee, launchers for the medium-range Agni-II and interme- Nagpur, probably with the Prithvi-II launchers, hav- diate-range Agni-III missiles. Several further intermedi- ing been formed in the early 1990s to take the Prithvi-I ate- and intercontinental-range ballistic-missile designs missile into service. The formation of two new missile (Agni-IV, Agni-V and Agni-VI) are in development, brigades was authorised in 2003.3 The location of 334 although none are believed to have entered service Missile Brigade’s headquarters is unclear from open- yet. In late 2020, the Indian government approved the source material, but may be at Secunderabad in central Shaurya hypersonic missile for deployment. India. It is likely that 334 Brigade controls the Agni-I

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 63 launchers. 335 Missile Brigade was formed by at least The unit assignment of the Agni-III is unclear. Given 2008 and appears to be headquartered at Secunderabad past practice, it might be reasonable to expect that a new (Telangana) with control over the rail-mobile Agni-II missile brigade was stood up to operate the new missile. launchers. However, there is no open-source reporting on the forma- Each brigade is believed to comprise a number of bat- tion of a new brigade in the appropriate time frame. Given talion-sized subordinate missile regiments, numbered that it is a rail-mobile design, like the Agni-II it may simply in accordance with the brigade to which it belongs (e.g., have been assigned to the 335 Missile Brigade as well. 3341 Missile Regiment, 3351 Missile Regiment, 3352 Although media sources often refer to additional Missile Regiment). It is possible, if not probable, that Missile Brigades/Groups (including 222, 332, 336, 444 a number of these regiments are geographically dis- and 555), there is no obvious official sourcing in the persed from their respective brigade headquarters; 3341 public domain to confirm their existence, and it may be Missile Regiment, for example, is reportedly based in that some or all of these designations represent plans Assam in Northeast India. that ultimately did not come to fruition.

64 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Notes

1 IISS Military Balance+, March 2021, https://milbalplus. pp. 217–25, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0 iiss.org/. 0963402.2020.1778378. 2 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, ‘Indian nuclear forces, 3 ‘Army to deploy Agni missiles’, Rediff India Abroad, 23 September 2020’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 76, no. 4, July 2020, 2003, https://www.rediff.com/news/2003/sep/23agni.htm.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 65 66 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Annex 3: Status of India’s and Pakistan’s select missiles (conventional and nuclear)

Designation Type Launch Maximum NASIC status Status Nuclear Latest Official range1 (est. launcher (IISS 2021) warheads test description (km) number) (2020)2 (2020)3 (2010–)

PAKISTAN Shaheen-34 Ballistic Land 2,750 ‘Not yet deployed’ In development 2021 Flight test Ababeel5 Ballistic (MIRV) Land 2,200 ‘Not yet deployed’ In development 2017 Flight test* Hatf-6 Shaheen-26 Ballistic Land 2,000 In service (<50L) In service 18 2019 Training launch Hatf-5 Ghauri 7 Ballistic Land 1,300 In service (<50L) In service 24 2015 Training launch Hatf-4 Shaheen-1A8 Ballistic Land 900 (Not in report) Uncertain 2021 Flight test Hatf-4 Shaheen-19 Ballistic Land 750 In service (<50L) In service 16^ 2019 Training launch Hatf-7 Babur-1B10 Cruise Land 700 (Not in report) Uncertain 2018 Test Ra’ad-211 Cruise Air 600 (Not in report) In development 2020 Flight test* Babur-312 Cruise Sea (sub-surface) 450 (Not in report) In development 2018 Test fire Hatf-7 Babur-1A13 Cruise Land 450 (Not in report) In service 12^ 2021 Training launch Hatf-8 Ra’ad14 Cruise Air 350 (Not in report) In service 2016 Flight test Hatf-3 Ghaznavi15 Ballistic Land 300 In service (<50L) In service 16^ 2021 Training launch Hatf-2 Abdali 16 Ballistic Land 200 No status given In service 10 2013 Test fire Fatah-117 Ballistic Land 140 (Not in report) In development Conv. 2021 Test flight Hatf-9 Nasr18 Ballistic Land 70 No status given In service 24 2019 Training exercise Hatf-119 Ballistic Land 70 No status given In service - - INDIA Agni-VI Ballistic - 6,000 ‘Design phase’ In development Untested - Agni-V20 Ballistic Land 5,000 ‘Not yet deployed’ In development 2018 Test fire Agni-IV21 Ballistic Land 4,000 ‘Not yet deployed’ In development 2018 User trial K-422 Ballistic Sea (sub-surface) 3,500 ‘Not yet deployed’ (4L) In development 2020# Test fire 2017 Agni-III23 Ballistic Land 3,500 In service (<10L) In service 8 User trial (2019 F#) Agni-II24 Ballistic Land 2,000 In service (<10L) In service 12 2019# User trial 2019 Nirbhay25 Cruise Land 1,000 (Not in report) In development Development flight trial (2020 F##)

Shaurya26 Ballistic (H) Land 750 (Not in report) In development 2020## Test fire

K-1527 Ballistic Sea (sub-surface) 700 In service (12L) In service 12 2018## Test fire Agni-I28 Ballistic Land 700 In service (<75L) In service 20 2018 Test fire training

Prithvi-III Dhanush29 Ballistic Sea (surface) 400 In service (2L) In service 4 2018# Test fire training

Land, air, sea In service: land, Joint test launches/test BrahMos30 Cruise (surface and 400 (Not in report) Conv. 2020 sea (surface) fire (land/air/sea–surface) sub-surface) Prithvi-II31 Ballistic Land 350 No status given In service 30 2020## Test fire Prithvi-I32 Ballistic Land 150 No status given In service - - Prahar/Prahaar33 Ballistic Land 150 No status given In development Conv. 2018 Flight test Pinaka Mark-234 Artillery Land 75 No status given In development Conv. 2019 Flight test Key * First officially acknowledged test ## Test reported in other media reports only F Reportedly failed # Official media acknowledgement only/no Conv. Conventional warhead only L Launcher number government statement H Hypersonic ^ Figure for missile family (Pakistan) Note: on SSBN missiles: India’s K-15, though only reportedly (not officially) tested, is presumed in service on theArihant after India declared completion of a deterrent patrol (November 2018). One test is officially reported for the 3,500-km-range K-4 in 2020. The 5,000-km-range K-5 is reported in early development.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 67 Notes

1 Maximum figure-based known range based on official 9 In 2008, the missile was officially assigned by Pakistan a releases (see notes) or if underlined, the NASIC 2020 report: 700-km range. This has since been reduced to 650 km. See see National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) in Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 18 collaboration with the Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile November 2019, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. Analysis Committee (DIBMAC), ‘Ballistic and Cruise Missile php?id=5507; and Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, Threat’, 11 January 2021, https://www.nasic.af.mil/News/ ‘Press Release’, 25 January 2008, https://ispr.gov.pk/press- Article-Display/Article/2468163/nasic-dibmac-release- release-detail.php?id=491. unclassified-missile-assessment/ and https://media.defense. 10 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 14 gov/2021/Jan/11/2002563190/-1/-1/1/2020%20BALLISTIC%20 April 2018, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. AND%20CRUISE%20MISSILE%20THREAT_FINAL_2OCT_ php?id=4693. REDUCEDFILE.PDF. At times, sources use qualifiers indicating 11 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 18 a possible extended range beyond the figure provided. February 2020, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. 2 Figures are those for launchers when provided in NASIC php?id=5625. 2020 report. 12 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 29 3 In addition to those figures, India and Pakistan are estimated March 2018, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. to also have respectively at least 64 (48 + 16) and 40 (36 + 4) php?id=4660. aircraft-dropped and other nuclear warheads. All figures for 13 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, missile types/families estimates as provided and annotated by 11 February 2021, https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. the following source: Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, php?id=6043. ‘World Nuclear Forces’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2020 (Oxford: Oxford 14 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 19 University Press, 2020), pp. 364, 372, https://www.sipri.org/ January 2016, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. sites/default/files/YB20%2010%20WNF.pdf. php?id=3163. 4 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 20 15 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 3 January 2021, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. February 2021, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. php?id=6019. php?id=6035. 5 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 24 16 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 15 January 2017, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. February 2013, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. php?id=3705. php?id=2242. 6 The missile’s first training launch, in 2008, was assigned a 17 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 2,000-km range. This has since been reduced to 1,500 km. 7 February 2021, https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.

See Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, php?id=6004. 23 May 2019, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. 18 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, php?id=5308; and Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, 24 January 2019, https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. ‘Press Release’, 21 April 2008, https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release- php?id=5173. detail.php?id=333. 19 Pakistan Army, ‘Journey from Scratch to Nuclear Power’, 7 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 15 https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/journey-scratch-nuclear- April 2015, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. power.php. php?id=2835. 20 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Successful Test 8 Inter-Services Public Relations Pakistan, ‘Press Release’, 26 Firing of Long-Range Missile Agni V’, 10 December 2018, March 2021, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail. https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1555405; and php?id=6104. Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘India launches

68 The International Institute for Strategic Studies New Generation Strategic Missile AGNI-V’, 19 April 2012, https://www.newindianexpress.com/specials/2018/aug/19/ https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=82371. nuke-capable-submarine-launched-missile-operationalised- 21 ‘N-capable Agni-4 missile successfully test-fired off Odisha coast’, india-in-select-triad-club-1859992.html. DD News, 23 December 2018, http://ddnews.gov.in/sci-tech/n- 28 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Annual Report 2018– capable-agni-4-missile-successfully-test-fired-odisha-coast. 19’, July 2019, p. 100, https://www.mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/ 22 ‘India successfully test-fires K-4 ballistic missile’, DD News, 20 files/MoDAR2018.pdf; and ‘India successfully test-fires nuclear January 2020, http://ddnews.gov.in/national/india-successfully- capable Agni-1’, DD News, 6 February 2018, http://ddnews.gov. test-fires-k-4-ballistic-missile; and ‘India successfully test-fires in/sci-tech/india-successfully-test-fires-nuclear-capable-agni-1. K-4 submarine-launched nuclear capable missile’, Press Trust 29 ‘“Dhanush” ballistic missile successfully test-fired’, of India/India Today, 24 January 2020, https://www.indiatoday. DD News, 24 February 2018, http://ddnews.gov.in/sci- in/india/story/india-successfully-test-fires-k-4-submarine- tech/%E2%80%98dhanush%E2%80%99-ballistic-missile- launched-nuclear-capable-missile-1639940-2020-01-24. successfully-test-fired. 23 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Annual Report 2017– 30 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘BrahMos 18’, February 2019, p. 81, https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/ Supersonic Cruise Missile Successfully Test Fired from Indian files/AR1718.pdf; ‘Nuclear capable Agni-III missile fails in Navy’s Stealth Destroyer, INS Chennai’, 18 October 2020, maiden night trial’, New Indian Express, 1 December 2019, https:// https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1665630; www.newindianexpress.com/states/odisha/2019/dec/01/nuclear- ‘India successfully test-fires BrahMos supersonic cruise capable-agni-iii-missile-fails-in-maiden-night-trial-2069737.html; missile’, DD News, 21 May 2018, http://ddnews.gov.in/

and Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Fourth Test Flight national/india-successfully-test-fires-brahmos-supersonic- of Long Range Missile Agni-3 Successful’, 7 February 2010, http:// cruise-missile; and BrahMos Aerospace, ‘India successfully pibmumbai.gov.in/scripts/detail.asp?releaseId=E2010PR221. launches BRAHMOS missile from underwater’, 20 March 2013, 24 ‘DRDO successfully conducts Agni II missile’s night trial for http://www.brahmos.com/newscenter.php?newsid=166. first time’, Hindu, 16 November 2019, https://www.thehindu. 31 ‘India successfully test fires Prithvi II ballistic missiles’, Times com/news/national/agni-ii-missile-drdo-successfully-conducts- of India, 17 December 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes. night-trial-for-first-time/article29993943.ece; and ‘India test com/india/india-successfully-testfires-two-prithvi-2-ballistic- fires medium range nuclear capable Agni-II missile’, DD missiles/articleshow/79764112.cms; and Government of India, News, 20 February 2018, http://ddnews.gov.in/sci-tech/ Ministry of Defence, ‘Prithvi-II Missile Hits Target in a Flawless india-test-fires-medium-range-nuclear-capable-agni-ii-missile. User Mission’, 12 August 2013, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/ 25 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Successful Trial PrintRelease.aspx?relid=97980. of “Nirbhay” Sub-Sonic Cruise Missile’, 15 April 2019, https:// 32 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Integrated pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1570660; Vivek Guided Missile Development Programme’, 5 March 2003, Raghuvanshi, ‘India’s Nirbhay cruise missile test fails’, Defense https://archive.pib.gov.in/archive/releases98/lyr2003/ News, 12 October 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/ rmar2003/05032003/r0503200324.html. asia-pacific/2020/10/12/indias-nirbhay-cruise-missile-test-fails/; 33 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘Successful

and Government of India, ‘India test-fires “Nirbhay” missile Flight Test of Prahar’, 20 September 2018, https://pib.gov.in/ successfully’, DD News, 8 November 2017, http://ddnews.gov. Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1546844; and Government of in/sci-tech/india-test-fires-nirbhay-missile-successfully. India, Ministry of Defence, ‘DRDO Launches “PRAHAAR” – 26 ‘India successfully tests nuclear-capable Shaurya missile’, Surface to Surface Tactical Missile’, 21 July 2011, https://pib. Hindustan Times, 3 October 2020, https://www.hindustantimes. gov.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=73407. com/india-news/india-successfully-tests-nuclear-capable- 34 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ‘DRDO shaurya-missile/story-fkYlozVJ5oq1MWO26GOwNN.html. successfully flight-tests Pinaka Missile System off Odisha 27 ‘Nuke-capable submarine-launched missile operationalised, coast’, 19 December 2019, https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare. India in select triad club’, New Indian Express, 21 August 2018, aspx?PRID=1596959.

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 69 70 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Annex 4: India–Pakistan confidence-building measures

Name Description Date agreed

Exchange of List of Prisoners Between India A comprehensive list of nationals of each country lodged in the 21 May 2008 and Pakistan (including civil prisoners and other’s jails is exchanged each year, on 1 January and 1 July.1 fishermen)

Agreement Between the Republic of India Allows for immediate exchange of information between India and February 2007; extended in and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Pakistan if an accident occurs that relates to nuclear weapons.2 2012 for five years; then in Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating February 2017 to 2022 to Nuclear Weapons

Agreement Between the Republic of India Each country must notify the other 72 hours in advance of October 2005; extended on and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on conducting any ballistic-missile flight tests. Test missiles must not 27 December 2011 Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic be close to either of their borders or the Line of Control.3 Missiles

MoU between Indian Coast Guard (ICG) and Aims to promote cooperation between the ICG and PMSA October 2005; extended in Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA) through the exchange of information about maritime activities. February 2016 Communication link established.4

Lahore Declaration Sets out India and Pakistan’s commitment to resolving the issue 2 February 1999 of Jammu and Kashmir peacefully: strengthening dialogue processes; taking steps to reduce accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons; developing CBMs; and advancing the goals of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.5

India–Pakistan Joint Declaration on the Both countries agree not to develop, produce, acquire or use 19 August 1992 Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons chemical weapons.6

Code of Conduct for the Treatment of Ensures that the facilities, privileges and immunities guaranteed 19 August 1992 Diplomatic/Consular Personnel in India and to diplomatic and consular agents under the Vienna Conventions Pakistan on diplomatic and consular relations are upheld.7

Agreement Between Pakistan and India on Both countries will take steps to ensure that further violations of 6 April 1991 Prevention of Air Space Violations and for each other’s airspace do not occur.8 Permitting Over Flights and Landings by Military Aircraft

Agreement on advance notice on Each country must give the other advance notice on any 6 April 1991 military exercises, manoeuvres and troop exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements it undertakes to movements avoid a crisis situation through misunderstanding of the other country’s intentions.9

Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Agreement that India and Pakistan exchange a list of their December 1988 against Nuclear Installations and Facilities respective nuclear facilities on 1 January annually.10 Between India and Pakistan

Agreement for the Establishment of a Joint Promoting cooperation for mutual benefit in areas of economics, 10 March 1983 Commission Between the Government of industry, education, culture, technology and tourism.11 India and the Government of Pakistan

Treaty Between the Government of Provides for the distribution of water of the Indus River between 19 September 1960 India and the Government of Pakistan India and Pakistan.12 Concerning the Most Complete and Satisfactory Utilisation of the Waters of the Indus System of Rivers

Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities 71 Notes

1 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Exchange 7 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Code of of list of prisoners between India and Pakistan’, 1 January 2021, Conduct for Treatment of Diplomatic/Consular Personnel in https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33358/exchange+o India and Pakistan’, 19 August 1992, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ f+list+of+prisoners+between+india+and+pakistan; Dipanjan LegalTreatiesDoc/PAB1225.pdf; and ‘India, Pakistan agree to Roy Chaudhury, ‘India, Pakistan exchange list of prisoners resolve issues about treatment of diplomats’, Hindustan Times, based on 2008 agreement’, Economic Times, 1 January 2019, 30 March 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/ https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india- india-pakistan-agree-to-resolve-issues-about-treatment-of- pakistan-exchange-list-of-prisoners-based-on-2008-agreement/ diplomats/story-TQzmQQ50DT7BrjK8SVC6sN.html. articleshow/67334191.cms. 8 ‘Agreement between Pakistan and India on Prevention of Air 2 ‘India, Pakistan extend pact on reducing risk of nuclear weapon- Space Violations and for Permitting Over Flights and Landings related mishaps’, Hindustan Times, 20 February 2017, https://www. by Military Aircraft’, 6 April 1991, https://www.stimson.org/ hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-pakistan-extend-pact- sites/default/files/CBMHandbook3-1998-i-pagre2.pdf. on-reducing-risk-of-nuclear-weapon-related-mishaps/story- 9 ‘Agreement on advance notice on military exercises, wDPadxZwnKzCXnKoMbiG5N.html#:~:text=According%20 manoeuvres and troop movements’, United Nations to%20the%20pact%2C%20which,accident%20relating%20to%20 Treaty Collection, 6 April 1991, https://treaties.un.org/doc/ nuclear%20weapons.&text=India%20and%20Pakistan%20 publication/unts/volume%201843/volume-1843-i-31420- on%20Monday,a%20period%20of%20five%20years. english.pdf. 3 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Agreement 10 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of on the prohibition of attack against nuclear installations Pakistan on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles’, and facilities between the Republic of India and the Islamic 3 October 2005, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/ Republic of Pakistan’, 31 December 1988, https://mea.gov.in/ PA05B0591.pdf. Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/PAB1232.pdf. 4 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Extension 11 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Agreement for of MOU between Indian Coast Guard and Pakistan Maritime the Establishment of a Joint Commission between the Government Security Agency’, 26 February 2016, https://mea.gov.in/press- of India and the Government of Pakistan’, 10 March 1983, https:// releases.htm?dtl/26426/Extension+of+MOU+between+Indian+ mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/PA83B1100.pdf. Coast+Guard+and+Pakistan+Maritime+Security+Agency. 12 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Indus 5 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Lahore Waters Treaty’, 19 September 1960, https://mea.gov.in/ Declaration February, 1999’, 2 February 1999, https://mea.gov.in/ bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6439/Indus; and ‘India, Pakistan in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999. and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’,

6 ‘India–Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons’, NTI, 19 United Nations Treaty Collection, 23 December 1960, https:// August 1992, https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/ treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTs/Volume%20419/ india-pakistan-agreement-on-chemical-weapons/. volume-419-I-6032-English.pdf.

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