Joint Force Quarterly

0116C1Display 10/3/97 1:17 PM Page 1 JFQJOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

What Is Jointness? Civil Affairs and MOOTW

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW Summer97 Military Innovation Joint Training: Taking Sides

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL 0216PGS 10/3/97 8:16 AM Page C2

Very near the heart of all foreign affairs is the relationship between policy and military power. —McGeorge Bundy

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AWord from the Chairman

In May of this year, Secretary Cohen and I appeared before the armed services committees of Congress to present the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. This report is the result of many months of hard work, incorporating extensive analysis by our brightest minds. The services and unified commands were integrated into the process at each step. It represents our best thinking to date about how to maintain a trained, ready force to support national objectives and prepare for an uncertain future.

The QDR process recognized that we face biological weapons, attacking information nodes, continuing instability in many parts of the world. or through terrorism. Resurgent nationalism, the challenge of new and Our analysis reaffirmed that having the abil- failing states, religious conflicts, and interna- ity to fight two overlapping, major theater wars is tional terrorism make the security environment essential in exercising global leadership. Although dangerous and unpre- we will not face a peer competitor in the near or dictable. The threat from mid term, regional powers and coalitions hostile the QDR process recognized weapons of mass destruc- to our interests, values, and allies still confront that we face continuing tion—unleashed by either a us. While some question a two-theater strategy, it rogue state or a terrorist or is clear that our ability to deter major conflicts, instability in many parts criminal organization—is of with the human tragedy and suffering they en- of the world growing concern. Because tail, is based upon our ability to project power on we are the dominant mili- a global scale and overwhelm adversaries rapidly tary power, potential adver- and decisively. saries may seek to counter our military superiority with asymmetric means, by using chemical or (continued on page 4)

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■ CONTENTS

1 A Word from the Chairman 39 Improving the Management by John M. Shalikashvili of Reserve Forces by John C.F. Tillson ■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET ■ CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MOOTW: 6 Letters to the Editor FOUR BALKAN SKETCHES JFQ 45 Joint Endeavor— ■ The Role of Civil Affairs 8 Report of the Quadrennial by Pamela J. Brady Defense Review by William S. Cohen 48 The National Support Element in Hungary 15 National Security in the by Bruce Castka 21st Century: The Challenge of Transformation 50 Transition of the by the National Defense Panel Sarajevo Suburbs by Kevin F. McCarroll and 20 The QDR Process— Donald R. Zoufal An Alternative View by Jim Courter and Alvin H. Bernstein 54 The Challenge of Civil-Military Operations 27 Whatever Happened to by John J. Tuozzolo Defense Industrial Preparedness? ■ by Ivars Gutmanis and John F. Starns 59 War Criminals—Testing the Limits of Military Force 34 The Sisyphus Paradox: by F.M. Lorenz Framing the Acquisition Reform Debate ■ OUT OF JOINT by Linda S. Brandt and Francis W. A’Hearn 66 What Exactly Is Jointness? by Lawrence B. Wilkerson

■ 69 Thinking About Revolutions PHOTO CREDITS in Military Affairs JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY The cover features F–15C at Jordanian air base (U.S. by Williamson Murray JFQ Air Force/Paul R. Caron). The front inside cover shows C–17 (U.S. Air Force/Andy Dunaway), patrol during Joint Guard (55th Signal Company, Combat Camera/ 77 Military Innovation and Angel Clemons), Marines, Kernel Blitz ’97 (Fleet Imaging Command, Pacific/Carl Richard), linehandlers Carrier Aviation—The on board USS Stout during replenishment in the Relevant History What Is Jointness? Atlantic (U.S. Navy/Joe Hendricks). The table of con- Civil Affairs and MOOTW

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW tents shows helicopter crewman sharing food with by Jan M. van Tol Summer97 Military Innovation Bosnian children (U.S. Navy/Chris Vickers). The back Leveraging Joint Training

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL inside cover captures soldiers in Tuzla (U.S. Army/ Larry Lane). The back cover renders M1A1 at Twenty- 88 On Machine Guns and nine Palms (2d Marine Division, Combat Camera/ R.L. Kigler), A–10 at Aviano for Deliberate Guard (U.S. Air Force/Steve Thurow), Precision Engagement landing craft moving to USS Denver (Fleet Combat Camera Group,Pacific/ by Price T. Bingham Jeff Viano), soldiers heading for Camp McGovern after air assault in Bosnia (55th Signal Company, Combat Camera/Tracey L. Hall-Leahy).

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SUMMER 1997 / NUMBER 16

91 Searching for Policy ■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN Coherence: The DOD Space 115 Louis Emil Denfeld Architect as an Experiment by Joan Johnson-Freese and ■ THE JOINT WORLD Robert Handberg 116 Organization, Lessons 97 Information Warfare Learned, and History at the Crossroads by Brian E. Fredericks ■ OFF THE SHELF 119 A New Paradigm for the Army: A Review Essay by F.G. Hoffman

121 ‘L’ Is for Logistics: A Book Review by Joseph E. Muckerman II

122 The Great War and the Birth of Armored Warfare: A Book Review by Williamson Murray 104 Leveraging Technology for Joint Training 123 War and Peace in the New by Jack Walker World Order: A Book Review by William H. Lewis 109 Leveraging Human Interaction for Joint Training 124 Cumulative Index (1996–97): by John Howard Eisenhour and Issues 13–16 Edward Marks

Joint Force Quarterly Hans Binnendijk Patrick M. Cronin Director Robert A. Silano Director for Strategy and Policy Analysis Institute for National Strategic Studies Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor Editor-in-Chief Consulting Editor

Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley Production Coordinator William A. Rawley Copy Editor Typography and Design Division U.S. Government Printing Office JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Art Director topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 128 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- for details). Please direct all editorial communications to: fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated Editor, Joint Force Quarterly employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- Fort Lesley J. McNair unified commands, and joint force development. rial is quoted from or based on its contents. Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- This publication has been approved by the Secretary of pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Defense. Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and e-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine ISSN 1070–0692 August 1997

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Joint Force Quarterly ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA (continued from page 1) Publisher We also see a continuing requirement for ADVISORY COMMITTEE forces to conduct contingency operations across the entire spectrum, from natural disasters and hu- LTG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA ■ National Defense University Chairman manitarian assistance to peace enforcement and noncombatant evacuations. While we will not sac- BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman rifice readiness for core warfighting missions, mili- VADM Dennis C. Blair, USN ■ The Joint Staff tary operations other than war will remain an important part of our strategy of engagement. A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College The Clinton administration’s strategy of Col K.A. Conry, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College shape-respond-prepare was fully reflected in the MG John S. Cowings, USA ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces QDR report. We shape the strategic environment with forward presence, combined exercises, secu- Brig Gen Jerry M. Drennan, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College rity assistance, and a host of other programs that BG Joseph R. Inge, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College keep us engaged in critical regions and help

Brig Gen William R. Looney III, USAF ■ Armed Forces Staff College defuse potential conflict. When necessary, we respond to crises through a combination of forward Col David M. Lumsden, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College deployed forces, pre-positioned equipment and Brig Gen Ralph Pasini, USAF ■ The Joint Staff supplies, and trained, ready forces which can rapidly move to the scene. MG Robert H. Scales ■ U.S. Army War College At the same time we must prepare for the fu- Maj Gen D. Bruce Smith, USAF ■ Air War College ture with a well-conceived, adequately funded

RADM James R. Stark, USN ■ Naval War College modernization program that provides the Armed Forces the right tools, right technology, and right systems to assure dominance over any opponent. EDITORIAL BOARD Joint Vision 2010, our conceptual template for fu- Hans Binnendijk ■ National Defense University ture joint operations, will help integrate new sys- Chairman tems with evolving joint doctrine to ensure that Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University they are synchronized for maximum effect. Throughout the review, we realized that we COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College could not sacrifice readiness today to generate Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University funds for modernization tomorrow. Our challenge

COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy was to find a way to do both. In order to fund current readiness and future modernization, we rec- Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University ommended significant personnel cuts in both the Col Robert J. Garner, USMC ■ Armed Forces Staff College active and Reserve components, for military as well as civilian strength. Most cuts will come from Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces the sustainment and infrastructure parts of the Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF ■ Naval War College force. With the increase in operational deploy-

Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College ments that has marked the post-Cold War period, we could not make deep cuts in operating forces ■ Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation and continue to support our strategy. William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College Reductions in personnel recommended in the QDR report represent genuine savings, but CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN ■ National War College those alone are not sufficient to fund the requi- John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago site level of modernization. As weapons systems LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute age and new technologies come on line, we must modernize to realize the revolution in military af- Lt Col Robert C. Owen, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College fairs. With constant budgets projected for the James H. Toner ■ Air War College foreseeable future, we must rely on increased effi-

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University ciencies to achieve the savings needed to become a 21st century joint force. COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA ■ Marine Corps War College Part of the answer to the funding dilemma is COL Terry J. Young, USA ■ U.S. Army War College additional base closures. Some infrastructure represents capacity we no longer need; with defense budgets down by 40 percent and forces cut by a third, we have reduced our bases by only 21 percent. Although politically painful, closing bases is A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

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Shalikashvili DOD (HeleneDOD C. Stikkel) Briefing the QDR Report. essential if we are to preserve a ready force and Critics have begun to question the assump- engage in prudent modernization. tions and conclusions found in the QDR report. Funding modernization will also demand a Some claim that their service or system warranted “revolution in business affairs” to increase the ef- greater attention and support. Others believe that ficiency of support and ac- the current force structure will fall below prudent quisition functions. The levels. Still others want deeper force cuts to pay implementing the Deputy Secretary of Defense for new, more advanced weaponry. The fact that recommendations in the is now heading the Defense this criticism is distributed so evenly across the Reform Task Force that will defense establishment suggests that the current QDR report will be neither recommend how to do that. review may be right on track. easy nor painless Outsourcing, privatizing, and Implementing the recommendations in the reducing the number of Fed- QDR report will be neither easy nor painless; real eral regulations under which change never is. But we must recognize that the we operate are important initiatives that will gen- health and vitality of the Armed Forces depend on erate real savings and enable us to achieve readi- both current readiness and future modernization. ness now and modernization soon. We cannot afford to sacrifice one for the other. To The QDR report is not the end of the process achieve the goal of a trained and ready force today but rather the start. Its recommendations are a and tomorrow, everyone—in Congress, the De- blueprint, but much remains to be done. At pre- partment of Defense, and the active, Reserve, and sent the National Defense Panel—an outside civilian components—has a key role to play. Only body comprised of defense experts chartered by by working together in a spirit of cooperation can the Secretary of Defense—is conducting an inde- we realize the greatness the Nation expects and pendent assessment as part of the QDR process deserves in the new century. and will release its own report at the end of the year. As the joint community continues to ex- JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI plore new practices and systems, we will refine Chairman our thinking to improve both the efficiency and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff effectiveness of joint operations.

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■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

A revolution really is underway. A few years But Murray is right on one point: the need for Letters... ago, some historians attacked this hypothesis with experimentation and critical scrutiny. Let’s do it. gusto: “It’s much too early to tell if big changes are But let’s do it more broadly, more quickly, and dif- THE NAVY’S RECORD afoot. We’re experts and can assure you this is no ferently than we are doing at present. Why don’t we To the Editor—Some points made by Douglas RMA,” and so on. Yet thankfully each essay gets put new technologies into the hands of the men C. Lovelace and Thomas-Durell Young in “Joint beyond the academic point of whether there is a and women in the services, free at least some of Doctrine Development: Overcoming a Legacy” (JFQ, revolution. They all accept that there is one and go them from the demands of readiness reporting, and Winter 96–97) misrepresented my efforts at the on to ask “what now?” The essays by Stavridis and push them to see if the technology works and how Naval Doctrine Command. It was not a response to Lwin address how an enemy might seek to deal changes in doctrine and organization could make it the spotty record of the Navy on doctrine. It was with our revolution. Gumahad, Echevarria, and work better? Why don’t we seize on ideas like the my own initiative and did not have universal support Morningstar each explore how the RMA will trans- “vanguard force” proposed by General Reimer in the command because many thought I was form doctrine and organization while Schneider of- and move the debate about the American RMA to wasting my time. Fortunately, the commander dur- fers an anthropological and cybernetic perspective. empirical trials—real tests? ing this period, RADM Fred Lewis, believed that it The common thread running through them is that —James R. Blaker was value added. it’s here, it’s big, and it’s a revolution. Science Applications My look at the evolution of naval doctrine It is an American revolution. Perhaps because International Corp. was an endeavor to convince my colleagues that it’s obvious, the authors do not waste much ver- it was not unwise or unprofessional to write down biage on where it’s taking place. They accept it’s an how the Navy intends to conduct its business. It OVER THE BOUNDING American revolution. What’s happening may, as WAVES was also an attempt to ensure that the great Stavridis and Lwin warn, trigger other RMAs or lessons of history are not lost (see my article enti- asymmetric counters by clever General Tzus (thus To the Editor—Your review of Creating a New tled “Developing Naval Doctrine...From the Sea,” we must be prudent about the course of our revolu- Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave in the JFQ, issue 9). When I got to the Naval Doctrine tion). Doctrine may, as Gumahad, Schneider, Spring 97 issue offered some interesting insights Command it was often said that navies have never Echevarria, and Morningstar explain, change into the Tofflers and their book yet failed to raise had any doctrine—hence most went about their around the world. But surely that only proves the a number of serious questions. Although I make no jobs without ever looking to the past. I set out significance of what we are doing. pretense of being able to resolve those questions, it to correct that misperception, which had nothing to Let’s get on with it. Each essay advocates may be useful to spell them out for the benefit of do with responding to outside critics of the Navy. moving forward, seizing the dynamics driving your readership. As for the comment that my work amounted change, and consummating this American RMA. Without doubt modern science has provided to unconvincing revisionism, I would say that the None implies we should do so mindlessly. Each rec- us with knowledge of natural phenomena that has jury is still out on that question. If the Navy goes ognizes the dangers associated with change. But produced dramatic changes in almost every facet about writing doctrine without any regard to the none recommends either turning back or trying to of human life. From genetic research which led past, then my efforts were in vain. If it is also look- hold off the future. Instead, a thread of pragmatic to biotechnological breakthroughs to physics which ing back before developing doctrine, then I would optimism runs through each of them. brought about innovations in the conduct of war, say it was convincing. Based on what I hear today That’s one of the interesting contrasts be- we approach the new century with possibilities that the Navy is examining what navies have done his- tween the introduction and the essays themselves. were once considered inconceivable. Few would torically. As to whether what I wrote was convincing Murray seems far more pessimistic and far less deny these advances though many thoughtful peo- to outsiders is beside the point since I never sought convinced that we can understand and control what ple would admit that the significance of such to influence external audiences. we’ve begun. Perhaps he’s correct. But maybe his changes in our lives remains enigmatic. —James J. Tritten doubt has something to do with his vocation. Histo- In Creating a New Civilization, Alvin and Heidi Former Academic Advisor to rians have trouble dealing with rapid changes— Toffler assert that modern technology has pro- Commander, Naval Doctrine Command with revolutions—since such upheavals defy conti- moted so many revolutionary changes that nuity and repetition. In nonrevolutionary times we civilization itself has been transformed. With little can turn to historians for explanations and what acknowledgment to dialectical thinkers such as CRASHING THROUGH they tell us normally makes sense. They are, after Hegel, Marx, and Engels, the Tofflers slightly alter THE BARRICADES all, among the best purveyors of wisdom that is the Marxian dialectical movement of history. For conventional. But in revolutionary times their au- Marx modes of production—dominant means by To the Editor—The prize winning essays in which humans sustain themselves in any given the RMA Essay Contest published in your last issue thority weakens and a historian’s claim that the situation we face today is “what the military of the in- historical period—determine the way of life. For (JFQ, Spring 97) are important markers of both the the Tofflers human history is best understood in direction and pace of serious thought on RMA. terwar years faced in 1923”—or that the future will be very much like the present—rings hollow. terms of a metaphor of waves: the agricultural, the Williamson Murray got part of it right in his intro- industrial, and finally the technological, the third duction—we need debate, experimentation, and wave. But the Marxian formulation of historical reasoned discussion on where we are going, and change is barely altered: an existing civilization is these essays are examples of how to do it. confronted and overwhelmed by a rising wave. Unlike Murray, however, I believe the signifi- WELCOMES Resistance to new forms of civilization by withering cance of the essays is not a diversity of views (that your letters and comments. elements of the old continues so that residual as- does tend to happen in a revolution!), but rather the FAX your correspondence to pects of the past continue until forced by circum- assumptions they share. Here are a few: (202)JFQ 685–4219/DSN 325–4219 or stances to surrender to the movement of history. send it on the internet to [email protected]

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET ■

Like the work of Marx, the wave is an interesting national security, but we must never lose sight of A CAPITAL OFFENSE? way of viewing history, but the metaphor should be the importance of knowledge of warfighting and the To the Editor—Although I find JFQ informa- seen for what it is. Like all metaphors there is the ends we seek to achieve. tive and interesting, one thing about it is disturbing. risk of distorting history by forcing ideas and facts In Creating a New Civilization, the Tofflers The term Marine—used to identify the Marine st into a preconceived framework. propose guidance for 21 century democracy. Corps, a group or unit of Marines, or an individual At the center of the Toffler third wave is infor- Alarmed over the collapse of consensus in contem- Marine—is always capitalized. Always. There is no mation, which is now available in a quantity and at porary America, they see the country beholden to such thing as “a marine.” No such animal. Capital- a pace unknown to primitive technological soci- majority rule that is not adapting to the increasing ize Marine, Marines, Marine Corps, U.S. Marine, eties. The authors also describe this process as diversity of the third wave. They suggest a form of U.S. Marines, U.S. Marine Corps, and United States “creating new networks of knowledge” that incor- electronic town hall meeting that will enable citi- Marine Corps in future issues! porate assumptions, hypotheses, images, and lan- zens to participate in political decisionmaking. Their —Maj Eric J. Kennedy, USMC (Ret.) guage codes. Their discussion of the knowledge very confusing discussion of the Founders and rep- Rock Island, Illinois system of the third wave obfuscates subtle but im- resentative democracy dismisses the fear of dema- portant distinctions. Careful reading indicates that goguery in Federalist Papers—according to the au- they do not differentiate between knowledge and thors a problem of an overly emotional public [EDITOR’S NOTE: Maj Kennedy’s letter raises a information or between knowledge and opinion. Al- response—by advocating a cooling off period be- point that may also concern other marines—as though modern technology is a conduit for informa- fore making decisions. A proper response to the well as soldiers, sailors, and airmen—on capitaliz- tion not all information is knowledge. Some infor- Tofflers would require an education in the nature of ing the names of services and servicemembers. mation, as the debate over censorship of the representative democracy, what Publius understood The only use of the term in question without an ini- information highway suggests, is foolish and even as refining the will of the people, and the delibera- tial capital M occurs when reference is made to an scurrilous and should not be confused with knowl- tive function of a legislature. Again, the question is individual or group of individuals. Thus the short edge. The greatest challenge facing the users of not whether the means to measure public opinion and long renderings of the name of a service (in electronic networks is processing available informa- exist, but what the consequences are for the public this case, Marine Corps, U.S. Marines, U.S. Marine tion or discriminating between the important and good if such changes are implemented. I fear for Corps) or any terms denoting a service as a whole the unimportant. Today thoughtful people have the stability and harmony of the Nation if such (here, the Marines) are always capitalized. But indi- more noise to filter in order to evaluate reality. changes are realized. vidual members of a service (such as marine or More significantly, we must not confuse gath- Technological change can be applied for bet- marines) are not. The ultimate (official) guide in ering information with acquiring knowledge. After ter or worse. To understand whether the fruits of matters of style makes this clear: information has been filtered, it must be understood modern science serve or harm us requires ponder- Marine Corps; the corps; in light of its relevance. The meaning of some- ing what is meant by better or worse—or some Marines (the corps); but marines (individuals) thing—whether related to human activity or theo- standard by which to guide such choices. The ad- —United States Government Printing Office Style Manual (1984) retical subjects—does not come simply from gath- vent of a technology does not prove its benefits. Since the inaugural issue of JFQ went to ering or distributing information. A physician’s The Tofflers confuse the relationship between tech- press in 1993, there has been a deliberate effort to transmission of medical information in mere sec- nology and the public good. Worse, they hinder follow a standard form of capitalization when refer- onds around the world to another physician be- posing important questions. Beware of false ring to the services and members of the Armed comes significant and beneficial because of their prophets and those who say more than they know. Forces. Therefore it is the U.S. Army or the Army, understanding of medicine. Obfuscating the pro- —Joseph E. Goldberg the U.S. Navy or the Navy, etc. Moreover, to strike a cessing of information with knowledge may blind us Director of Research, consistent balance in the pages of this journal, to the fact that there is no substitute for knowledge. Industrial College of the Armed Forces equal deference is given to designating an individ- The transmission of information and other techno- ual servicemember: soldier, sailor, marine, or air- logical innovations can have great advantages for man (as well as coastguardsman when appropriate). Subscribers to Marine Corps Gazette may expect to always see Marine capitalized just as readers of Airpower magazine may confront the term Airmen. This is an unabashed token of service culture. But in the spirit of jointness—not “parade ground” political correctness—JFQ seeks symme- try in using themes and symbols (even upper case Missing an issue? letters) in representing every service. Semper Fi.] Copies of back numbers of JFQ are available in limited quantities to members of the Armed Forces and institutions. Please send your request to the Editor at the address or FAX number listed on the masthead.

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Special: The Secretary’s Message Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review documentation By WILLIAM S. COHEN

uring most of the Cold War the United the modern technology and systems that will be States pursued a strategy of containing essential for our forces to successfully protect our the Soviet Union. In 1985, America ap- national security interests in the future. propriated about $400 billion for DOD D(in constant FY97 dollars), which constituted 28 Where We Are Going percent of our national budget and 7 percent of Work on the Quadrennial Defense Review our gross national product. We had more than followed a path that led from threat, to strategy, 2.2 million men and women under arms, with to implementation, and finally to resource issues. about 500,000 overseas, 1.1 million in the Re- We started with a fresh, unblinking look at serve forces, and 1.1 million DOD civilians. De- the world today and over the temporal horizon to fense companies employed 3.7 million more, and identify the threats, risks, and opportunities for about $120 billion of our budget went to procure- national security. In addition, we recognized that ment contracts. the world continues to change rapidly. We can- Since 1985, America has responded to vast not expect to comprehend fully or predict the global changes by reducing its defense budget by challenges that might emerge from beyond the some 38 percent, its force structure by 33 percent, time lines covered in defense planning and bud- and its procurement programs by 63 percent. gets. Our strategy accepts such uncertainties and Today, the DOD budget is $250 billion, 15 per- will prepare the Armed Forces to deal with them. cent of the national budget, and an estimated 3.2 From that analysis, we developed an over- percent of our gross national product. We now arching defense strategy to deal with the world have 1.45 million men and women under arms, today and tomorrow, identify required military 200,000 overseas, 900,000 in the Reserves, and capabilities, and define programs and policies 800,000 DOD civilians. Today, $44 billion is de- needed to support them. Building on national se- voted to acquisition from a smaller defense indus- curity strategy, we determined that defense strat- trial base employing 2.2 million workers. egy for the near and long term must continue to In making these reductions, we have care- shape the strategic environment to advance U.S. fully protected the readiness of our military to interests, maintain the capability to respond to carry out its currently assigned missions. But it the full spectrum of threats, and prepare now for has become clear that we are failing to acquire the threats and dangers of tomorrow and beyond. Underlying this strategy is the inescapable reality that as a global power with global interests to protect, the United States must remain engaged The Honorable William S. Cohen is the twentieth Secretary of Defense with the world diplomatically, economically, and and previously served three terms in the U.S. Senate. militarily.

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Cohen

After developing the strategy, we anchored its range of today’s requirements. At the same time, implementation in the fundamentals of military it invests in the future force with a focused mod- power today and in the future: quality people, ernization plan that embraces the revolution in ready forces, and superior organization, doctrine, military affairs and introduces new systems and and technology. We need quality people to operate technologies at the right pace. more complex technology and undertake more This approach reallocates resources and pri- complex joint operations. We need ready forces in orities to achieve the best balance of capabilities a world of sudden events that often will demand for shaping, responding, and preparing over the that our forces come “as you are” on a moment’s full period covered by the review. As part of that notice. The information revolution is creating a reallocation of resources, we will trim current revolution in military affairs that will fundamen- forces—primarily in the tail (support structure) tally change the way U.S. forces fight. We must ex- and modestly in the tooth (combat power). The ploit these and other technologies to dominate in result will be a force capable of carrying out battle. Our template for seizing on these technolo- today’s missions with acceptable strategic risk,

gies and ensuring military dominance is Joint Vi- while allowing us to stabilize our investment pro- documentation sion 2010, the plan set forth by the Chairman for gram in order to achieve the future joint force ca- military operations of the future. pabilities described in JV 2010. Our plan puts us A spectrum of feasible approaches is avail- on a steady and realistically executable trajectory able to sustain our current ability to shape and re- toward that force. We preserved funding for the spond to the world as we see it now, while prepar- next generation of systems—such as information ing the future force for the world of tomorrow. systems, strike systems, mobility forces, and mis- The Quadrennial Defense Review examined three sile defense systems—that will ensure our domi- alternative paths that differed in where they ac- nation of the battlespace in 2010 and beyond. cepted risks and emphasized investment over the Finally, DOD plans are fiscally responsible. near term, mid term, and long term. They are built on the premise that, barring a One path is to focus more on current dan- major crisis, spending is likely to remain rela- gers and opportunities. This path does not ignore tively constant. There is a bipartisan consensus in the future but sees today’s threats demanding America to balance the Federal budget by the year more attention and tomorrow’s threats far 2002 to ensure the Nation’s economic health, enough away to give us which in turn is central to our fundamental na- we preserved funding that will ample time to respond. tional strength and security. The direct implica- This option would main- tion of this fiscal reality is that Congress and the ensure our domination of the tain the current force American people expect DOD to implement its battlespace in 2010 and beyond structure exactly as is. defense program within a constrained resource But it would also result environment. The fiscal reality did not drive the in less investment in defense strategy we adopted, but it did affect our modernization—that is, a greater aging in major choices for its implementation and focused our platforms, few new systems, and a delay in fully attention on the need to reform our organization exploiting the revolution in military affairs. and methods of conducting business. Another path is to focus more on future dangers and opportunities. This path does not ignore What’s New? the present but sees greater dangers over the hori- First, the shape-respond-prepare strategy zon, including the possible emergence of a re- builds on the strategic foundation of past reviews gional great power. This path would devote more and our experience since the end of the Cold resources to building the future force. But to do War. We have determined that U.S. forces must be so would also require significant reductions in the capable of fighting and winning two major the- current force. This would sharply reduce our abil- ater wars nearly simultaneously. However, while ity to shape the international environment and the Bottom-Up Review focused primarily on that undermine our security commitments to our al- difficult task, we have also carefully evaluated lies while potentially encouraging aggressors. And other factors, including placing greater emphasis most importantly, it would erode our military ca- on the continuing need to maintain continuous pability, stress the troops, and put them at more overseas presence in order to shape the interna- risk in battle in the near term and mid term. tional environment and to be better able to re- The path we have chosen strikes a balance spond to a variety of smaller-scale contingencies between the present and the future, recognizing and asymmetric threats. that our interests and responsibilities in the world do not permit us to choose between the two. This approach retains sufficient force structure to sustain American global leadership and meet the full

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■ QDR REPORT documentation U.S. Air Force ( U.S. Air Force Ken Hammond)

The Quadrennial Defense Review has also forces to achieve new levels of effectiveness across placed much greater emphasis on the need to pre- the range of conflict scenarios. We want our men pare for the future, in which hostile and poten- and women to be masters of any situation. In tially hostile states will acquire new capabilities. combat, we do not want a fair fight—we want ca- This demands increased and stable investment in pabilities that will give us a decisive advantage. modernization in order to exploit the revolution JV 2010 describes four operational concepts. in technology and to transform the force towards Together they promise significant advantages in JV 2010. We must fundamentally reengineer our any operation or environment, something we call infrastructure and streamline support structures “full spectrum dominance.” At the heart of the vi- by taking advantage of the revolution in business sion is information superiority—the ability to col- affairs that has occurred in the commercial world. lect and distribute to U.S. forces throughout the We must focus on the future and not the past. battlefield an uninterrupted flow of information Only through such efforts can we realize the cost while denying an enemy’s ability to do the same. efficiencies necessary to recapitalize the force. Dominant maneuver. Having a full picture of Second, future forces will be different in char- the battlefield, advanced mobility platforms, and acter. The programs we are undertaking now to agile organizations, U.S. forces will be able to at- exploit the potential of information technologies tack enemy weak points directly throughout the and leverage other advancing opportunities will full depth of the battlefield. transform warfighting. New operational concepts and organizational arrangements will enable joint

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Precision engagement. Precision engagement The third new element is that our program is will enable U.S. forces to deliver the desired ef- going to be fiscally executable. For several years fects at the right time and place on any target. our defense program has suffered from unrealized Having near real-time information about the tar- expectations with regard to modernization. Fail- get, a common awareness of the battlespace for ure to address such problems would undermine responsive command and control, and the flexi- our ability to execute the strategy. For reasons de- bility to reengage with precision, U.S. forces will scribed in the report, projected increases in fund- be able to destroy key nodes of enemy systems at ing for modernization have continually been de- great distances with fewer munitions and less col- layed as modernization funds migrated to lateral damage. operations and support accounts to pay current Full-dimensional protection. Multiple layers of bills. While contingency operations have con- protection for U.S. forces and facilities at all levels tributed to the problem, they have not been the will enable U.S. forces to maintain freedom of ac- chief cause. Failure to address fiscal problems tion during deployment, maneuver, and engage- would undermine our ability to execute the strat-

ment. To achieve this goal, full-dimensional pro- egy. Therefore, an important corollary to the strat- documentation tection requires a joint architecture that is built egy and force choices in the review was a focus on upon information superiority and employs a full rebalancing our overall defense program, improv- array of active and passive measures. ing stability in that program, and fixing deficien- Focused logistics. By fusing information, logis- cies in service and defense-wide budgets to ensure tics, and transportation technologies, U.S. forces that modernization targets are met. will be able to deliver the right support at the right place on the battlefield at the right time. What’s Next? This will enable more effective delivery of tailored The first and most visible aspects of our plan sustainment packages to strategic, operational, to rebalance our programs are necessary modest and tactical echelons. The overall effect will be to reductions in military end strength and force reduce the amount of logistics support while en- structure. These reductions are offset in part by suring a more capable combat force. enhanced capabilities of new systems and stream- In sum, we will continue to seek the best peo- lined support structures. The savings that will re- ple our Nation can offer and equip them with the sult, combined with the program stability we can best technology our scientists and engineers can achieve from realistic expectations, will enable us produce. This technology to pay for the transformation of forces required the services have targeted will transform the way our by the strategy. To preserve combat capability and reductions by streamlining forces fight, ensuring they readiness, the services have targeted reductions can dominate the battlefield by streamlining infrastructure and outsourcing and outsourcing nonmilitary- with a decisive advantage at nonmilitary-essential functions. The result is a essential functions all times across the full spec- balanced, flexible force that has sufficient depth trum of operations from to support the strategy, that matches structure to peacekeeping and smaller end strength so that hollowness does not set in, scale contingencies to theater war. The key to suc- and that will continue to evolve toward JV 2010 cess is an integrated system of systems that will capabilities. give them superior battlespace awareness, permit- Highlights of QDR decisions include: ting them to dramatically reduce the fog of war. ■ The Army will retain 10 active, combat-ready di- This system of systems will integrate intelli- visions. It will also accelerate its Force XXI moderniza- gence collection and assessment, command and tion plan, which will revolutionalize combat capability control, weapons systems, and support elements. by enhancing battlefield awareness through modern in- It will connect the commanders to the shooters formation technology. A reduction of some 15,000 ac- and suppliers and make available the full range of tive duty personnel will be carried out by deactivation, information to both decisionmakers in the rear consolidation, and realignment of headquarters and and the forces at the point of the spear. support facilities to improve overall support to the combat organizations. Achieving such capabilities is not an easy task ■ The Army will restructure its Reserve compo- and cannot be done in one leap. It is a step-by- nent. It will shed some combat structure that provided step process involving the development of new for strategic depth during the Cold War which is now technologies, investment in new platforms and excess. It will also accelerate conversion of units from systems, new concepts, training and doctrine, and combat to combat support and combat service support formation of new organizational structures. But roles, relieving an important warfighting shortfall and these are not just ideas—we have already started enhancing the ability to support state missions. Adjust- down the road and we have tangible results. ments will result in a Reserve component end strength reduction of some 45,000 personnel.

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■ The Navy will retain 12 carrier battle groups and concluded that the fiscal year 2000 target could not be 12 amphibious ready groups but will reduce the number met within the current program budget. We are direct- of surface combatants from 128 to 116. The reduced ing additional funds to missile defense, but even with size of the surface fleet will be offset by newer and more additional funds, national missile defense will remain a capable systems coming on line. The Navy will reduce program of high schedule and technical risk. the number of attack submarines from 73 to 50, reflect- ■ The Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted ing changes in requirements. It will reduce the number the danger of asymmetric threats, ranging from nuclear, of F/A–18E/F aircraft to be procured from 1,000 to 548; biological, and chemical weapons to attacks via infor- transition to the joint strike fighter as soon as possible, mation warfare and terrorism. We will give increased with the goal of initial Navy production in fiscal year focus and funding to countering such threats. 2008; and retain the option to procure additional ■ The Quadrennial Defense Review studied a F/A–18 E/F up to a maximum of 785 if joint strike number of options regarding strategic nuclear forces. fighter development requires more time. Fleet reduc- The review concluded that the policy and strategy to tions, combined with streamlining overseas infrastruc- maintain nuclear forces are still correct and needed. In ture and the transfer of some combat logistics ships and line with congressional instructions we will maintain functions to the Military Sealift Command, will allow the START I force posture in the current budget while documentation the Navy to reduce active and Reserve end strength by the Russian Duma considers ratification of START II. To 18,000 and 4,100 personnel respectively. continue this in FY99 would require an additional $64 ■ The Air Force will consolidate fighter and million. We remain committed to START II and negoti- bomber units to streamline command structure and ating further reductions in a START III agreement after shift one active fighter wing to the Reserve. It will pur- START II is ratified. Savings from deeper strategic nu- sue an aggressive outsourcing plan that accelerates com- clear force reductions could free resources for national petition of support functions. The Air Force will reduce missile defense. its structure for continental air defense and handle the ■ Based on QDR analysis of our future needs ver- U.S. air sovereignty missions with other forces. The sus our remaining infrastructure, DOD will request au- fighter forces available for deployment to support the thority for two additional rounds of base realignment strategy will be 12 active and eight Reserve fighter wing and closure and for restructuring laboratories, research, equivalents. These initiatives will allow the Air Force to development, and test facilities. We will look for addi- realize a reduction of approximately 27,000 active duty tional opportunities to outsource many functions and personnel. The Air Force will proceed with the F–22 air- work with Congress to radically reengineer and deregu- craft program to replace the F–15 C/D air superiority ca- late DOD business practices. pability and perform air-to-ground missions. Consistent ■ Finally, a series of defense-wide program adjust- with its greater capability, the total number to be pro- ments will free up funds for increased investment in cured will be reduced from 438 to 339. key programs. ■ The Marine Corps will take modest reductions Modernization depends upon command, in end strength through a restructuring of support responsibilities. The Corps will maintain a three Marine control, communications, computers, intelligence, 4 expeditionary force capability to support the strategy. surveillance, and reconnaissance (C ISR) systems. MV–22 tiltrotor aircraft procurement will be accelerated The important, central role of these systems, and to meet the urgent need to replace aging medium-lift the large resources that must be devoted to them, capability, while the total number procured will be re- inspired a hard, sweeping look at our entire effort. duced to 360, consistent with the system’s superior ca- The general focus and amount of resources were pability. determined to be appropriate. We made a similar ■ The total active duty end strength will be re- study of munitions programs and found that duced to 1,360,000 (down 36 percent from 1989), with there is a high payoff for the large investment we 835,000 in the Reserve (down 29 percent from 1989). are making in precision weapons and that the Civilian personnel will decline to 640,000 (down 42 percent from 1989). focus and the scale of effort are appropriate. ■ We have decided to slow the Army theater high The transformation of our forces is an ongo- altitude area defense system because of serious technical ing process. JV 2010 provides a conceptual um- problems. Shifting the deployment date from 2004 to brella for long-range visions and plans developed 2006 improves the stability of the program, lowers risk, by the services and other DOD components, and allows us to explore using common components which are outlined in the QDR report. The U.S. with the Navy theater-wide missile defense program. military is committed to realizing joint and ser- Other theater missile defense programs remain on track. vice visions of modern warfare and is already tak- ■ National missile defense remains a high priority. ing a number of steps to do so. It is a total force The administration and Congress have agreed to keep effort, involving both active and Reserve compo- this program on an accelerated research and development path aimed at creating the option to make a deci- nent forces. By undertaking efforts ranging from sion on deployment possible as early as fiscal year 2000, studies and wargames to advanced concept tech- if the threat warrants. The goal of the program is to be nology demonstrations and experiments, the able to deploy an initial capability within three years Armed Forces are developing and testing concepts after the decision on deployment is made. QDR analysis and capabilities that will ensure their ability to transform for the future. Brief summaries of these efforts are included in the report.

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The final steps in preparing for the future, We are examining the best opportunities to essential to putting our program on a fiscally outsource and privatize non-core activities, but sound basis, are to shed excess infrastructure and many opportunities are restrained by regulations fundamentally reengineer business processes. and practices built up during the Cold War. We Downsizing infrastructure has fallen behind need to deregulate defense just as we have dereg- downsizing of force structure in spite of four base ulated many industries so we can reap the cost realignment and closure rounds. Since the first and creativity benefits of competition. A guiding base closure round, force structure has come principle is that the government should not per- down by 33 percent and will have declined by a form private sector-type functions, and this total of 36 percent when we finish the reductions should also be true of the defense sector unless a under the Quadrennial Defense Review. During compelling military need is demonstrated. the same period, we will have reduced domestic I have established a defense reform task force infrastructure by 21 percent measured by the re- to review the Office of the Secretary of Defense, placement value of physical facilities. In essence, defense agencies, DOD field activities, and mili- st

our combat forces are headed towards the 21 tary departments, and look for ways to consoli- documentation century, but our infrastructure is stuck in the date functions, eliminate duplication of effort, past. We cannot afford this waste of resources in and improve efficiency. The task force will con- an environment of tough choices and fiscal con- sult with Congress and business executives who straint. We must shed more weight. have successfully streamlined their corporations Although the savings from base realignment in recent years. It will also work closely with the and closure come slowly and require up-front National Defense Panel, the independent, con- costs, the savings are significant. Last year, we gressionally mandated board that is reviewing the began to receive annual Quadrennial Defense Review, and with the Vice I have established a task savings beyond the annual President’s National Performance Review. I have costs for the first four base directed the task force to submit its report and force to consolidate functions, closure rounds, and by findings to me by November 30, and I will act on eliminate duplication, and 2001 recurring savings will its interim findings as appropriate. exceed $5 billion every Many current DOD institutions and infra- improve efficiency year. The review found structures enjoy significant political support for that we have enough ex- their local economic contributions. However, the cess infrastructure to require two additional primary test must be their contribution to overall rounds of base closures for which we will seek au- military effectiveness. We must act now if we are thority. Included in the reduction must also be to have the resources to invest in modernization our research and development and test facilities, in the mid term and support capabilities to keep laboratories, and ranges. pace with military capabilities in the long term. We also need to take advantage of business This approach reflects administration efforts process improvements pioneered in the private to reinvent government and the commitment of sector. Over the past decade, the commercial sec- Congress to focus government on core functions. tor has reorganized, restructured, and adopted As a former elected official who has witnessed the revolutionary new business and management difficult transformation in communities affected practices in order to ensure its competitive edge by base closures, I fully appreciate the trauma in the rapidly changing global marketplace. It has that often is involved. But ultimately, we need to worked. Now DOD must adopt and adapt the decide what is more important: lessons of the private sector if the Armed Forces ■ keeping a maintenance depot in government are to maintain a competitive edge in the rapidly hands or putting advanced technology in soldiers’ changing global security arena. hands DOD has made much progress already in ■ protecting a facility or protecting our forces overhauling the defense acquisition system—with ■ preserving local defense contracts or promoting full support from Congress. Those efforts are pay- solid enlistment contracts. ing significant dividends, permitting us to get far These are stark choices—and while we must more for each dollar spent previously. We have make changes wisely and with compassion for also achieved savings through streamlining our civilians who have given years of faithful service, organizations and business practices; for example, we must also keep faith with the men and women replacing cumbersome and expensive systems for of the military. Over half of them have known minor purchases with simple credit card opera- only an armed force steadily shrinking in size. tions. However, we need to go much further and There is great uncertainty about the future. Yet, deeper, and we need congressional support. they perform magnificently as they serve our country abroad and at home. We must take care of them and their families and ensure that we have

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■ QDR REPORT

The strategy and the plan presented in this report will give us the military capability and forces we need throughout the 1997–2015 time frame and beyond. The plan balances the needs of the present with challenges of the future. Our program provides for the force to deal with present threats while also making available the resources to transform that force to one capable of seizing the opportunities and dealing with the threats of 2015. That transformation already has begun as outlined in joint and service vision plans and is being tested in warfighting experiments. The plan we have outlined is an integrated whole. It is based on a strategy, but we cannot

documentation carry it out without sufficient resources. Those resources exist in the DOD budget if we use them wisely. Doing so requires tough choices and changing the way we do business. It will require legislation in some areas and congressional support. Most of all, it requires a joint effort, focused on the goal of protecting our Nation as a whole and not the interests of any region, industry, or special interest. If we are not willing to do business in new ways, we need to face that fact and be prepared to pay more for less impact. Or we can decide to do less and be less as a nation. The Greek rhetorician Gorgias spoke of the great challenge of choosing, when choosing is most difficult, “to speak or not to speak, to do or leave undone,” and do so with “the indispensable virtues—prudence and firmness—one for choosing a course, the other for pursuing it.” America begins the new millennium as the sole superpower, the indispensable nation. The responsibilities are heavy and choices difficult. But with those responsibilities and choices come enormous benefits and opportunities. The QDR report sets forth a vision of what lies ahead as our Nation embarks on a new century—the dangers and possibilities—as endorsed by the President as com-

DOD (DOD R.D. Ward) mander in chief. It is not enough for us to speak; John J. Hamre briefing it is time to decide. The next generation will judge creation of the Defense us for our actions, not our words. Working with Reform Task Force, given them the best tools to do the jobs we ask. If Congress and by extension the American people, May 14, 1997. we take care of them, they will take care of us. we have chosen this course with prudence. We The report describes in detail the process we must now pursue it with firmness. JFQ followed, choices we made, our reasons for making them, and the benefits and risks inherent in This article represents an edited and abridged version of each. The report is laid out exactly as the review “The Secretary’s Message” that prefaced the Report of progressed, beginning with a description of the the Quadrennial Defense Review issued in May 1997. global environment. It reaches conclusions on the best strategy for achieving our national goals, and it describes a series of integrated options by which that strategy could be executed. It also an- alyzes the fiscal environment in which those options had to be considered. From our choice among those options flowed a series of structural and programmatic decisions required to implement the strategy.

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National Security in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Transformation By THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL

U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)

he United States is at a critical cross- have been born, non-state actors have become roads. The world of today bears little key players, economic power is ever more promi- resemblance to the recent past, and the nent, and technology is advancing at an in- world of tomorrow promises very dif- creased pace. These dynamics have led to entirely Tferent security challenges. While our military su- new dimensions in the character of warfare. We periority seems unassailable, there is no guarantee are thus faced with transforming national secu- that competitors will not emerge and put na- rity structures while not precipitously abandon- tional interests at risk in the future. In the meaning central military capabilities that have kept us time the old world order has shifted, new nations secure over the last quarter century. We ignore this summons at the Nation’s peril. To help meet the challenge Congress passed the Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996 The article was contributed by the National Defense Panel whose which required the Department of Defense to un- members are identified herein.

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■ TRANSFORMATION

dertake “a comprehensive examination of the de- concepts. We also conferred with the National Se- fense strategy, force structure, force moderniza- curity Council, Department of State, and intelli- tion plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other gence community. And we have consulted with elements of the defense program and policies members of Congress and their staffs. with a view toward determining and expressing Simultaneously we set our staff to work—aug- the defense strategy of the U.S. and establishing a mented by experts and visionary thinkers drawn revised defense program through the year 2005.” from various disciplines—to develop a process The result of that effort was the Report of the that analyzed global and regional trends across a Quadrennial Defense Review which was released in range of political, demographic, economic, cul- May 1997. It embraced Joint Vision 2010 as a tem- tural, technological, military, and transnational plate for transformation and offered a strategy of phenomena. From that we conceptualized out- shape-respond-prepare allowing for the near si- comes that may characterize the world in 2020 (a multaneous conduct of two major theater wars as date far enough in the future to free us from cur- well as smaller scale contingencies. It assumed an rent programs and paradigms). annual DOD budget of $250 billion extended We considered four hypothetical points in over time and recommended no major changes this range: a world much like today extrapolated in the “above the line” force structure (divisions, forward to 2020; a more benign one in which sta- air wings, Marine expeditionary forces, and car- bility and international cooperation are the order rier battle groups). of the day; a world in which regional competitors

The Panel As a follow-on to the Quadrennial Defense Review, Congress—in the same act that guided National Defense Panel the review—mandated that an independent body known as the National Defense Panel undertake Philip A. Odeen [Panel Chairman]; President and CEO, BDM to further study strategies and structures to meet Corporation; served on the National Security Council Staff future challenges. In the and the Defense Science Board words of this legislation, the we conceptualized outcomes The Honorable Richard L. Armitage; President, Armitage panel should conduct “an Associates; served as both Assistant Secretary of Defense that may characterize independent, nonpartisan for International Security Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to review of the force structure the world in 2020 (to free the Newly Independent States that is more comprehensive us from current paradigms) than prior assessments, ex- General Richard D. Hearney, USMC (Ret.); Managing Director, tends beyond the Quadren- McDonnell Douglas-Europe; served as Assistant nial Defense Review, and explores innovative and Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps forward-thinking ways of meeting such chal- Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN (Ret.); President and CEO, lenges.” Given the scope of the challenge and the Technology of Strategies and Alliances; served as Vice panel’s view that only an open and informed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as commander process can produce the correct solutions, this ar- in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet ticle describes our efforts so far to meet its charge and give a preliminary idea of the direction the The Honorable Robert M. Kimmitt; Partner, Wilmer, Cutler and final report will take. Pickering; served as U.S. Ambassador to Germany and as The report of the National Defense Panel Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs will be forwarded to Congress in December 1997. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.; Director, Center for Strategic and In recent months we have gathered information Budgetary Assessments; served in the Office of Net and deliberated on national security issues which Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense the panel is charged to review. We traveled to Eu- General James P.McCarthy, USAF (Ret.); Olin Professor of rope and Asia to meet with the commanders in National Security, U.S. Air Force Academy; served as chief, their staffs, and many of their subordinate deputy commander in chief, U.S. European Command commanders. At the same time we met with allied and regional leaders and got their ideas on Janne E. Nolan; Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; served with the future of U.S.-regional relations. the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and with In turn we met with senior DOD officials, the Senate Armed Services Committee the Chairman and Joint Staff, service chiefs, and General Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret.); Vice President, L-3 leadership of the Reserve components; visited po- Communications Corporation; served as commander in litical-military exercises and wargames and lis- chief, United Nations and U.S.-ROK Combined Forces tened to the findings of participating experts; and Command and as Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army received briefings from future-oriented components of every service on various forward-looking

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National Defense Panel

F–16 being cleared for take off. U.S. Air Force (William U.S. Air Force B. Fallin)

Amphibious assault, Mogadishu. U.S. Air Force (Joanna U.S. Air Force Seltzer)

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■ TRANSFORMATION

increase in strength and introduce new chal- the nature of future wars and transform itself to lenges to global order; and a chaotic one in prevent, and if necessary, win them. And in paral- which instability, intense competition, and vio- lel, the military must be prepared to respond to lence are the norm. In light of discernible trends situations short of war—from peacekeeping to and possible future worlds derived from them, we countering terrorism—where its unique skills are scrutinized various grand strategies that the required to support national security interests. United States could undertake to ensure its inter- The future is unknowable. But that is no ex- ests and goals were still attainable in the first half cuse for inaction. A more prudent course—the of the next century. Again we received advice essence of a transformation strategy—is to experi- from many experts and innovative thinkers both ment, develop diverse and sometimes competing in and out of government. All this helped bring operational concepts, make the necessary prelimi- us to the central focus of determining what de- nary investments, and then play out the options. fense capabilities will be vital in the future. At some point when we can determine more precisely what our potential opponents are doing, Transformation Strategy how technology is developing, and where our key While we have yet to conclude the exact interests lie, we can reshape our forces and ex- findings of our study, it has become increasingly ploit those developments that promise success. apparent that a transformation strategy is needed As the panel continues its deliberations on to get beyond today’s se- emerging challenges, the security structures that transformation strategy is curity structures to those best deal with them, and barriers and enablers to the Nation will require by a better strategic future, it will explore: needed to get beyond today’s 2020. Though we are cur- ■ the altered conditions of conventional, uncon- security structures to those rently in a far more favor- ventional, and nuclear warfare in light of technological, the Nation will require by 2020 able strategic environ- cultural, political, and economic developments ment than during the ■ operations in space, to include making it more Cold War because of a sig- accessible while defending our assets and capabilities nificant superiority over any prospective near- there and on the ground, and the potential for commer- term competitor, the longer term is less certain. cial integration and exploitation The challenge confronting the Armed Forces ■ information systems and enhanced capacities of network centric computing which link disparate plat- is not just whether they can win two nearly si- forms and systems for synergistic effect multaneous major regional conflicts in the near ■ power projection and counters which an enemy term. It is whether the military—indeed the en- might invoke to limit our access and thus our strategic tire national security apparatus—can anticipate consequence

Meeting the security challenges of a new century...a decade of debate and evolution

Demise of Intertwined Technological advances Spread of global Changing Security Conditions Soviet Union economies and availability information systems

Cold War Post Cold War 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Evolving Security Paradigms Base ForceBottom-Up Commiss Review Roles and of the Arm Forces

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National Defense Panel

■ developments in urban warfare vis-à-vis demo- ■ Given that the future is in many ways unknown graphic trends affecting growth and human profile of and unknowable, how do we guarantee the agility and urban areas and the importance of cities as political, fi- flexibility to adapt to changing conditions in time? nancial, cultural, and psychological centers of gravity ■ How do we balance the ability to respond to ■ transnational developments in organized crime, contingencies with the experimentation and invest- drug trafficking, resource scarcities, and the prolifera- ments required to address tomorrow’s exigencies? tion of weapons of mass destruction ■ What changes should be made to insure that ■ homeland protection against asymmetries such our national security apparatus (beyond DOD itself) be as chemical/biological terrorism and information/infra- reorganized to better address contingencies and prevent structure attack future conflicts (or win should we fail to deter them)? ■ the role of Reserve forces in enhancing U.S. se- Ours is not an effort to size the force pre- curity and interests at home and abroad. cisely and define its structure in detail. That is In short, we are considering the entire range not possible given the uncertainties that we will of security issues, the changing character of war, confront twenty years out. Nor can we create spe- the shifting balance of international power, and cific plans for the experimental and developmen- the increasing complexity of a security apparatus tal efforts required. Indeed, with appropriate po- that extends well beyond the scope of traditional litical guidance, that is the responsibility of the military concerns. Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military services. The National Defense Panel can, Enlarging the Debate however, establish the context within which to The panel understands that it cannot solve frame the defense component of 21st century na- this array of issues by itself. It realizes that the tional security. The panel hopes to enlarge the de- change which may be in order must be informed bate by addressing the scope, direction, and pace by an intense debate that leads to correct policy of change necessary while simultaneously pre- decisions. But by formulating appropriate ques- serving the essential structures to meet contem- tions and proposing answers we hope to con- porary challenges. We hope to identify the kinds tribute to that debate. Those questions include: of capabilities that will make America as militarily ■ What does an era of dynamic strategic and tech- strong in the 21st century as it was in the 20th cen- nological change mean for future military capabilities? tury but with less risk and bloodshed. The panel ■ Which regions and global trends must be moni- aspires to contribute to a shift away from Cold tored to ensure change does not translate operationally War paradigms and toward a new national secu- into surprise? rity consensus—one that will ensure the Nation’s ■ How should shaping opportunities and lesser continued strength and role as a world leader. JFQ conflicts be balanced with preparations and capabilities required to fight and win the Nation’s wars?

Spread of global Continued small scale Transnational challenges information systems contingencies (environment, crime, etc.)

Future 21st Century National Security Directions and 94 95 96 97 98 Military Contributions p Commission on Joint Vision 2010 Quadrennial National Defense Roles and Missions Defense Review Panel of the Armed Forces

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■ The QDR Process— An Alternative View

By JIM COURTER and ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN

hese are hard times for those entrusted (MRCs) at the core of the Bottom-Up Review. Per- with crafting our national security strat- sian Gulf volatility and North Korean militarism egy. The international environment has make both conflicts plausible. Plausible too was undergone the kind of profound trans- the first Clinton administration’s assumption that Tformation which ordinarily takes decades if not either conflict might trigger the other, especially generations to unfold.1 Strategists have had to ad- if American forces appeared thinly spread. The just to a baffling number of challenges. In Iraq, So- possibility of war in Korea and the Gulf occurring malia, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, and the Straits of Tai- simultaneously dictated the size and shape of our wan events did not fit neatly into familiar forces and in part still does. categories of demands on military power. Since Yet while this large-scale planning was going 1989 circumstances that we thought could be ig- on the U.S. military became embroiled in one cri- nored instead demanded attention, thus com- sis after another which entailed deploying troops pelling the Nation to reassess its foreign and de- and spending money, not always to applause fense policies. Those charged with formulating from an inward-looking Congress. During these policy have had to adjust quickly: from the Base years the Armed Forces were called upon to pro- Force and the Bottom-Up Review to the Quadren- tect Iraqi Kurds who had fled to the Turkish bor- nial Defense Review (QDR). They still have a long der by enforcing a northern no-fly zone. In way to go and so has the United States as a whole. southern Iraq they had to enforce another zone Until its final months, the Bush administra- to protect Iraqi Shiites. In 1992, in the face of tion based security policy on the possibility that feuding warlords, U.S. forces participated in an ef- the disintegration of the Soviet Union might be fort to feed starving Somalis. In Bosnia they en- reversed. To meet such a prospect, military lead- forced another no-fly zone, then conducted puni- ers under the aegis of General Colin Powell devel- tive strikes against Serb targets, and finally joined oped the Base Force which was duly blessed by Implementation Force for Joint Endeavor to the Pentagon’s civilian leadership.2 The first Clin- maintain peace on the ground. After flying tens ton administration, recognizing the Soviet col- of thousands of flights over Bosnia, however, the lapse and watching Russia’s fragmenting periph- Air Force is still there as other forces remain on ery, abandoned the notion of “reversibility” and the ground. These are only the most conspicuous with the Bottom-Up Review shifted focus. Instead accomplishments, the “smaller-scale contingency of war on the plains of Europe, they envisaged a operations” as the QDR report refers to them. recurrence of conflict either in a still unsettled These deployments, however, have compromised Persian Gulf or on the Korean peninsula. These our ability to respond to two simultaneous MRCs. are the two implicit major regional conflicts Splitting the Difference Six months into President Clinton’s second Former Congressman Jim Courter, who chaired two rounds of base term the Pentagon is once again trying to adapt closings, now heads defense programs at the Alexis de Tocqueville strategic theory to reality. Under the guidance of Institution and Alvin H. Bernstein, founding director of the Secretary of Defense William Cohen it has issued George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, is research professor at the National Defense University.

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the much-anticipated QDR report. This compre- Given this environment and the enormous hensive study, reflecting lessons learned since the cost of preparing for every eventuality at once, fall of the Berlin Wall, has provoked an intense the report established priorities. Its authors con- public debate over the shape of sidered three options, although the report gives our foreign and defense policy.3 the impression that the first and second were the report’s greatest Its greatest strength is its thor- framed to lead ineluctably to the third. First, they weakness is apparent ough and insightful analysis of considered devoting limited defense funds largely likely future threats and of the to the development of a capability to counter when it attempts to match capabilities the Armed Forces residual short-term and mid-term post-Cold War extensive obligations with will need to meet them. The re- threats. This approach has the significant draw- port’s greatest weakness is ap- back of mortgaging long-term security when diminished resources parent when it attempts to rapid political change and, more importantly, ac- match the extensive obligations celerated technological development could intro- anticipated in the post-Cold War world with the duce new security challenges within a decade or diminished resources it recommends be allocated. so. That alternative, therefore, could not stand. In addition to the Gulf and Korean penin- The second option emphasized preparing for the sula scenarios inherited from the Bottom-Up Re- hazards of the long-term future at the price of review, the QDR report lists asymmetric attacks by duced present security and of consequent high nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, infor- risk if the worst of foreseeable crises occurred. mation warfare, terrorist acts, and environmental Since proximate threats are real, that alternative proved unacceptable as well. In the event the QDR report chose to split the difference between the two. This third option trades a limited reduction in both current defense capabilities and the ability to respond to short-term threats for the opportunity to invest in technology—the revolution in military affairs (RMA)—that would transform the Armed Forces over the long term to meet the challenge of an uncertain future.

Eventual Proliferation, Diminished Value The authors of the QDR report are convinced that the United States must preserve its near mo- nopoly of state-of-the-art technology and prepare for an RMA. Are they correct in view of the cost? Surely yes, because this is our forte. It served us well in Desert Storm, and we do not need to accept all the extravagant claims of what the new technologies will do to believe that nations which acquire key technologies and incorporate them in a coherent system—rather than use them to enhance their current capabilities—will enjoy advantages on tomorrow’s battlefield. Secretary Cohen The authors of the QDR report want to give briefing QDR report, the Armed Forces the technology that will dis- May 19, 1997. courage the re-emergence of a peer competitor DOD (HeleneDOD C. Stikkel) such as China (if it learns to turn wealth into military power) or, failing that, to prepare for any sabotage. In light of recent experience, it also sees challenges a competitor might present. While the need to retain the capability to field forces for there is no such threat on the horizon, the dizzy- smaller-scale contingencies that threaten chaos ing rate at which defense technology is develop- and that our elected leaders have required—such ing and the accessibility of commercial technol- as peace operations and a panoply of humanitar- ogy which has military implications will mean ian assistance operations. that potential enemies will be able to modernize their forces ever more quickly. Whether a state or a coalition, a technological peer that shared our doctrinal sophistication and incorporated new technology in appropriate

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■ THE QDR PROCESS

RAH–66 Comanche. DOD

and against platforms—surface ships and manned aircraft—that get us there. That is why the Nation must for the foreseeable future maintain the abil- vin Lynchard) ity to do what it does so well now: minimize the

y (Mar signatures of platforms as stealth technology does for B–2s and F–117s and amplify enemy platform signatures as do the data fusion capabilities of Aegis naval systems. Application of low-observ- ables technology to new weapon systems is not Combat Camera Imager solely the province of jet-aircraft designers: the F–117 stealth fighter. Army is developing its first truly stealthy combat helicopter, the Comanche, and the new attack operational capabilities would especially challenge submarine is expected to be the stealthiest under- our Armed Forces. Since the Mexican War the sea warship in history. United States has had to project significant forces The eventual proliferation of such technol- over great distances, maintain them abroad, and ogy will diminish its value to the Armed Forces. maneuver them effectively for extended periods to The report correctly aims at maintaining a lead in protect our interests and allies. The ability to do some of the most crucial areas while investing in this may decline in the immediate future to the developing counters to the technologies most extent that forward basing shrinks for economic likely to be used to our detriment. The revolution and political reasons. In the long run, an enemy in military affairs, the report also reasons, will en- that masters and integrates many new technolo- able the military to rely even less on manpower gies could threaten this capacity. Improvements in and thus reduce casualties. target illumination, information management, To maintain that lead, we must invest in and precision guided munitions will all be used to certain key technologies. Exploitation of space, greatest effect in the open areas our forces must management of information systems, target illu- traverse to reach remote theaters of operations mination for both strategic and operational defense, and precision will confer decisive advantages. The possibility of low-tech responses to high-tech capabilities and the gradual evolution

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F/A–18F Super Hornet. U.S. Navy (AdamU.S. Navy Plantz)

of technologies and their incorporation in a co- shrinking budget in technology for the long term herent system with appropriate doctrine suggest thereby shortchanging operational capabilities in that it is time to begin investing in long-term ca- the near term. Instead, they adopt a budget figure pabilities. We can- that seems appropriately modest and fudge on the QDR report has it right: national not reject technol- the dangers. The defense budget has declined by ogy, and a core some 38 percent since 1985 and the report as- security demands that we remain research and devel- sumes it will stabilize at about $250 billion a year on the cutting edge of technology opment strategy (in FY97 dollars) or 3.2 percent of GNP. Although should focus on such an allocation seems unlikely to meet the electronics (sen- threats the report’s authors foresee, they accept sors, emitters, and microprocessors), nanotech- the figure passively, stating that they settled on it nologies (microscopic mechanical and chemical because “the Nation is unlikely to support signifi- devices), energy (photovoltaic, compact storage, cantly more resources for national defense. In- and beam delivery systems), software (with an deed, we may yet face pressures to lower the DOD emphasis on software integration), and finally, as share of Federal expenditures. Under these cir- the report recommends, an industrial technology cumstances, it would be unrealistic to build a de- that will mass produce weapon components effi- fense program on an assumption that current re- ciently by working more closely with commercial source challenges could be solved by increases in industry so we can accommodate a production the DOD budget.”4 This may sound reasonable, surge in an emergency. but if the anticipated funding is inadequate for the tasks which the report assumes the military Investing a Shrinking Budget will perform, shouldn’t the report say so? Should- The QDR report has it right: national secu- n’t it explain which parts of the strategic vision rity demands that we remain on the cutting edge can be implemented and which can’t? One of developments in military technology. Budget should expect the Pentagon to make tough limitations, however, also enter into the equa- choices, but DOD also owes an assessment of how tion. The authors of the report have difficulty in much security $250 billion will buy and what reconciling defense priorities with the money they assume will become available. They should have tackled the risk of investing a large part of a

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the adequacy of current defense spending must still be addressed. The same is true of a QDR proposal for two additional rounds of the base closure process. After four such rounds between 1988 and 1995, about a fifth of our former Cold-War base structure has been designated for closure or consolidation. The QDR report proposes continuing the base closure process while extending it to realigning research and test facilities. Experience indicates, however, that it often takes years for the full savings potential of closures to be realized. Thus while savings from earlier rounds will continue to accrue it is improbable that new rounds would yield significant savings any time soon. Even if Congress reverses its recent decision and authorizes further closures, they would not be a panacea for present budgetary concerns.

Wielding the Axe Assuming the Pentagon puts the provisions of the QDR report into effect, how much will come out of the current operational hide of the Armed Forces to pay for future technology? The Army will lose an added 15,000 active duty personnel and 45,000 Reservists. Because the number of divisions will remain at ten, these already hollowing units will become more hollow unless there is a plan, unaddressed in the report, for a massive reorganization of the Army such as is described in a recent controversial book.5 The Navy will go from 128 to 116 surface combatants, lose U.S. Navy (F.E. Zimmerman)U.S. Navy (F.E. 23 of its 73 submarines, and have procurement of Port quarter view F/A–18E/Fs reduced from 1,000 to 548. It will also of USS Alexandria. have to give up 18,000 active personnel and level of global leadership or participation it will 4,100 Reservists. Overall, the Marine Corps loses support. The QDR report bows quietly to the bud- the least. It will take a modest reduction in per- getary limits it envisions, taking as an article of sonnel but retain its three expeditionary force ca- faith that the public will support only that desig- pability and receive slightly fewer new MV–22 nated level of expenditure. But on occasion the tiltrotor aircraft. public has proved persuadable when the Presi- Even the Army and Navy should consider dent and Congress presented the case com- themselves blest, however. The Air Force will lose pellingly along with the exigencies of the situa- a whopping 27,000 active duty personnel, shift tion. Public willingness to make sacrifices in order one active fighter wing into the Reserves, and get to reduce the deficit demonstrates that Americans only 339 new F–22s instead of 438. In addition, it still have the discipline to choose long-term over will acquire 13 joint surveillance and target attack short-term benefits. At present, however, no one radar system (JSTARS) aircraft instead of 19. Most in authority is making that case on defense. disturbingly, the QDR report calls for no further The QDR report correctly notes that signifi- production of the B–2 bomber, despite the find- cant savings can be achieved within the existing ings of the deep-attack weapons mix study that defense budget through outsourcing, reengineer- additional B–2s could be decisive in halting aging, and acquisition reform. Several groups have gression overseas. That the review’s axe should fall contended that over $10 billion could be saved most heavily on the Air Force is surprising given annually by outsourcing support functions. Such that service’s performance in the Gulf War. Cer- savings will only materialize over the years as old tainly the strategies for both MRCs are likely to be structures and processes are dismantled, and so fought with variants of the strategy used in Desert Storm where airpower played a key role in winning if not ending the war. The low number of casualties in the air and on the ground was largely

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due to rapid destruction of the enemy air defense Even the theoretical total available may well system and infrastructure and to crippling its abil- not be the actual number we can count on for ity to sustain ground forces in the south. This is combat. According to recent studies by the Rand the kind of strategy Americans will most readily Corporation, both smaller scale contingencies or accept in conflicts where the Nation’s interests are military operations other than war (MOOTW) se- at stake but not its survival. Accordingly, airpower riously detract from the ability of standing forces generally and stealthy aircraft in particular should to cover MRCs or counter unexpected aggression continue to receive the highest priority, not only by a rogue state.6 Some 90 percent of all such for MRCs but also to discourage regional aggres- smaller contingencies involve peacekeeping or sion by a rogue state bent on dominating its peace enforcement, which often demands equip- neighbors. It is difficult to imagine any future de- ment, skills, training, and doctrine that differ fun- ployment of U.S. forces—whether for peace opera- damentally from those needed for conventional tions such as Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda, or for a operations. Peace operations now require about 10 full scale conventional war—where the Air Force percent of Air Force flight hours (between 1991 will not play a dominant role. and 1995, 800,000 hours were dedicated to opera- Taking QDR reductions together with others tions such as protecting Somalis from starvation, made since the end of the Cold War, active duty Rwandans from tribal massacre, Iraqi Kurds and personnel will be cut by 36 percent, Reserve com- Shiites from Saddam Hussein, and various Bosnian ponents by 29 percent, and DOD civilians by 42 ethnic groups from each other). percent. At the same time the national missile de- These operations place asymmetrical defense will remain on an accelerated research and mands on subcommunities within the Air Force. development track because of executive and leg- While F–16s spend many hours patrolling no-fly islative branch decisions, with the objective of zones, for example, there are many more F–16s deploying a limited system as early as fiscal year available than E–3s, KC–10s, EF–111s, AC–130s, 2000—perhaps an overly ambitious target date. and EC–130s which in 1995 averaged between 88 The review, then, sacrifices size for modern- and 280 hours per aircraft in support of peace- ization. This choice may have been the least of all keeping while an F–16 spent 21 hours. RC–135s, possible evils, but unfortunate consequences will in particular, gave 65 percent of their 1995 flight follow. Reducing our forces hours to peace support reconnaissance. Aircraft MOOTW detract from the still further will make it all the such as E–3s and EF–111s are actually more heav- ability to cover MRCs or more difficult to reconstitute ily committed to flying operational missions now them in time to face an un- than during the Cold War. They devoted 40 and counter unexpected foreseen emergency or peer 60 percent of their 1995 flight hours respectively aggression by a rogue state competitor. It is hard to think to peace operations. of precedents for a democracy Pilots patrolling the skies over Iraq and rapidly rebuilding its forces. Bosnia get less time to hone their combat skills as Furthermore, personnel reductions, no matter peacekeeping operations provide few chances for how well staged, emit an unmistakable signal. air-to-air combat maneuver or placing ordnance Talented young men and women will almost cer- on target. The deterioration of combat skills of tainly shy away from careers in an enterprise that some of our pilots is already measurable. Add the is steadily shrinking in size and, therefore, in op- cost and the wear and tear on aircraft, and the portunities for advancement. The report notes ex- sometimes unprogrammed expense of these plicitly that these cuts may not be the final ones: smaller scale contingencies becomes more appar- future pressures may lead to further budget reduc- ent and troubling. tions. That makes choosing the military as a fu- The Army is also increasingly committed to ture a risky prospect. such tasks, which similarly hurts its combat skills and creates other problems. In addition to in- More Than Mere Cuts volvement in Iraq and Bosnia, for example, the There are also operational consequences to service has become heavily committed in coun- these cuts. As the review acknowledges, the con- ternarcotics activities in both Mexico and Colom- ventional conflicts we can envisage for the next bia and in controlling refugee flows from Haiti— decade will probably arise with as little warning when not actually reinstalling Haiti’s as those of the last ten years. They will be, in the democratically-elected government to power. It review’s words, “come as you are” wars, which we has also put troops on the ground for peacekeep- will fight with forces already in uniform—that is ing in Macedonia and Bosnia and worked with to say with fewer than in the past. the United Nations to support elections in Cam- bodia. Because the many peace enforcement missions in a chaotic international scene increasingly

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■ THE QDR PROCESS

strain combat skills, they are likely to stir new de- spate of pre-QDR articles argued that current force bates within the Army and DOD generally. These structure cannot even support missions required will focus on issues such as the appropriate ratio by the Bottom-Up Review.7 of active to Reserve components, the distribution The outcome of this effort ought to be pre- of light, heavy, and special operations forces, and cisely what the panel asserts: a much tighter link the needs of maneuver versus fire support. between strategy and the ability to implement it. Peace operations will demand more restric- Everything must be placed on the table—not just tive rules of engagement and closer civil-military hackneyed allegations of waste but some of the communications and cooperation than the indi- pet projects of the Pentagon and Congress—even vidual services are likely to find congenial. Most if that means treading on some VITs (very impor- of these operations do not play to strengths of tant toes). Not only the time but the opportunity the Armed Forces and demand a degree of doctri- has come as we determine how to maintain the nal flexibility at odds with post-Vietnam military most benign security environment that we have thinking as articulated first in the Weinberger enjoyed since the outbreak of World War I. JFQ doctrine and later in the Powell doctrine of overwhelming force which was validated in the Per- NOTES sian Gulf. The conventional mind is uncomfort- 1 Charles H. Fairbanks, “Introduction,” The National able with scenarios that call for tighter Interest, no. 31 (Spring 1993), pp. 5–8. civil-military links on the operational level, but 2 Sharon K. Weiner, “The Politics of Resource Alloca- that communication becomes necessary when tion in the Post-Cold War Pentagon,” Security Studies, political guidance cannot be stable or consistent vol. 5, no. 4 (Summer 1996), pp. 125–42. because of rapidly shifting conditions on the 3 See, for example, the press release by the Center for ground. One need only remember Lebanon and Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 19, 1997, and Somalia to imagine what may lie ahead. We John Hillen, “Kicking the Can Down the Road,” The ought thus to reckon with the possibility of an- Washington Times, May 29, 1997, p. A–16. 4 other round of strained civil-military relations. William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, p. 19. The debate has, in fact, been institutional- 5 Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: New ized by the Military Force Structure Review Act of Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (Westport, 1996 which established the National Defense Conn.: Praeger, 1997). Panel (NDP), a review group of formidable ex- 6 Jennifer Morrison Taw and John E. Peters, Opera- perts. In a thoughtful preliminary letter to Secre- tions Other Than War: Implications for the U.S. Army tary Cohen, NDP Chairman Philip Odeen wrote (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1995); that this group intends to examine, among other Alan Vick et al., Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military things, “whether there is insufficient connectivity Operations Other Than War (Santa Monica, Calif.: The between strategy, on the one hand, and force Rand Corporation, 1997). 7 structure, operational concepts, and procurement Dov S. Zakheim, “Tough Choices in Defense,” The National Interest, no. 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 32–43; Fred- decisions on the other.” It suggests that the re- erick W. Kagan and David T. Fautua, “Could We Fight a view’s program decisions and priorities would War if We Had To?” Commentary, vol. 103, no. 5 (May benefit greatly if they were more tightly linked to 1997), pp. 25–29; Zalmay Khalilzad and David a new comprehensive strategy and also that deep- Ochmanek, “An Affordable Two-War Strategy,” The Wall ening strategic concepts warrant “a more aggres- Street Journal, March 13, 1997. sive redesigning of [DOD] infrastructure,” presumably something beyond mere cuts in the services. The panel also faulted the review for not taking a sufficiently joint and combined view of the future and for preserving the dated service perspective on force structure. It believes the QDR report overemphasizes traditional force-on-force challenges at the expense of the potential danger posed by subnational entities.

The National Defense Panel has until the end of the year to shape its verdicts on the specifics of the latest Pentagon game plan into an official critique. The process will be crucial since the final DOD plan will guide security policy into the next century. Inevitably the panel will have to conduct its business against the charges leveled by well-intentioned critics or self-interested kibitzers since a

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Whatever Happened to Defense Industrial Preparedness? By IVARS GUTMANIS and JOHN F. STARNS U.S. Army Normandy, 1944.

he basic American approach to inter- only one of five episodes that offer lessons for national crises is nonmilitary, with re- policymakers and military planners. World War I sort to the use of force arising only taught that mobilization required sound plan- when vital interests are directly endan- ning and that a simple system of priorities can Tgered. This approach is reflected in the way the guide an effort until complex institutions are Armed Forces are armed and equipped. Tradition- needed. In World War II the Nation learned that a ally, the United States has not procured war rapid mobilization could not be achieved from a matériel from an extant dedicated arms manufac- standing start without prior planning. Emergency turing base. Instead, it has mobilized industry to organizations and controls must be in place. produce the means to fight the Nation’s wars.1 Korea was the first conflict that America fought Moreover, mobilizations have customarily been without a declaration of war and for which it at- directed by civilians, with military officers play- tempted to mobilize by expanding capacity. Then ing a relatively minor role. Vietnam demonstrated that in avoiding the short-term costs of mobilization readiness could Mobilizing for War be eroded. Finally, the Gulf War revealed that in- Although World War II is the best known industrial preparedness must be considered in each dustrial mobilization of the past century, it is and every scenario. Planning for the worst case does not assure readiness for lesser crises. The concept of industrial mobilization used Ivars Gutmanis is an industrial economist with the Hobe Corporation in World Wars I and II served the United States and John F. Starns directs the industrial resources department at reasonably well but was found wanting after the The Analytical Sciences Corp. ordeal of the Korean War. The major problem was

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■ INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS

23 of November 23, 1952, the Director of Defense Figure 1. Domestic Sources of Defense Matériel by Type Mobilization defined that base as, 1992 1996 2010 that capacity available to permit rapid expansion of aircraft production sufficient to meet military, war-supporting bombers 3 2 1 essential civilian, and export requirements in the fighters 5 4 2 event of a full scale war. It includes such elements as helicopters 4 4 2 essential services, food, raw materials, facilities, pro- related matériel duction equipment, organization, and manpower. ballistic missile defense 6 4 3 The resulting DOD program was predicated expendable launch vehicles 3 2 1 on the idea that industrial mobilization planning satellites 5 4 3 had to identify potential capacity shortages and rocket motors 8 8 3 propose corrective actions. It had several ele- strategic missiles 1 1 1 ments which included mobilization require- tactical missiles 8 8 8 ments, lead time, domestic production, and commercial conversion. tracked vehicles Mobilization requirements. The need to mobi- tanks 1 1 1 lize assumed the possibility of war in Europe be- armored personnel carriers 8 8 4 tween the United States and Soviet Union. While munitions operational planning was conducted for lesser con- small caliber 5 5 3 tingencies, the NATO scenario—considered by pol- cannon caliber 5 5 3 icymakers to be the most demanding—was used scatterable mines 2 2 1 for industrial preparedness planning. Whether in- pyrotechnics 1 1 1 fluenced by circumstance or choice, it was thought bombs 4 2 1 that in preparing for the worst-case scenario all mortars 3 2 1 lesser scenarios would be accommodated. artillery caliber 4 4 2 Mobilization lead time. Transition from peace propelling charges 2 2 1 to war could occur in days instead of weeks or fuses 22 13 8 months. Thus the industrial base could do little dispenser munitions 2 2 2 to meet immediate demands for production. naval guns 1 1 1 Domestic production sources. The United States tanks 3 3 2 could only rely on domestic production. Indus- demolition, grenades, mines 8 5 2 trial preparedness planners were required to es- rockets/warheads 4 3 2 tablish domestic sources for critical matériel. Commercial conversion. Demand for defense- Source: Defense Logistics Agency. unique matériel would require a large-scale conversion of commercial production to defense production. the lead time required to get matériel to the field. The industrial preparedness program was the Korea provided ample evidence of the problems keystone of industrial mobilization and would re- with a mobilization-only policy. In late 1952 the main in force with some modification until the Advisory Committee on Production Equipment early 1990s. It was maintained by civil servants in (Vance Committee), recog- DOD and other agencies. The ultimate beneficia- the breakup of the Soviet nizing the need for a more ries of the program—the Armed Forces—played cost-effective industrial base only a marginal role in its operation. Union also has led to changes than the policy of the day, in DOD industrial mobiliza- recommended that “a larger Current Trends productive capacity to pro- tion policies and funding The obvious but as yet incomplete collapse of duce military end items Soviet military power has radically altered our po- must be created...[so] that litical, economic, and defense policies vis-á-vis an it can be quickly expanded in the event of an arch-enemy of some fifty years standing. The emergency by merely adding manpower and breakup of the Soviet Union also has led to hours of operations.” 2 As a result, the Nation changes in DOD industrial mobilization policies adopted a mobilization base concept that remains and funding for industry-related activities and pro- in force today. Under defense mobilization order grams. As the Bottom-Up Review clearly stated, “the threat that drove our defense decisionmaking...is gone.” Indeed, the determining aspect of the current defense procurement environment is a reduced budget (see figure 2). During the 1980s an-

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The effects of reduced budgets on procure- Figure 2. Annual Defense Expenditures, 1920–2000 ment are also indirect. One may be abandoning the strategy to fight two nearly simultaneous 950 major regional conflicts. Such a change is likely 900 to come only after the completion of the Qua- 850 drennial Defense Review, but if adopted it could War II War World 800 further reduce defense expenditures related to the industrial base. 750 On the other hand, a diminished threat cer- 700 tainly has not rendered military power obsolete.

650 Nor has threat reduction created harmony within the community of nations. On the contrary, actual 600 and potential conflicts among both small and 550 large nations have escalated. Such situations threaten our security interests and increase the 500 likelihood of military operations. A few years ago

Billions 450 there was little or no indication of U.S. troops 400 being deployed to Bosnia. Clearly superpower con- Buildup in 1980s Vietnam War Korean War Korean frontation has been replaced by a nebulous mix of 350 nonspecific contingencies—in a word, uncertainty. 300 The White House and Pentagon have taken 250 initiatives to maintain a defense industrial base in the face of spending cuts and policy changes. In 200 June 1993, the Under Secretary of Defense for Ac- 150 quisition articulated four policy objectives for the 100 defense-related industrial base: 50 ■ supplying and equipping the force to meet national security objectives, policy guidance issued by the 0 Secretary of Defense, and the future-years defense programs 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 ■ sustaining production, maintenance, repair, and Projected logistics for military operations of various durations and (constant 1993 dollars) intensities ■ maintaining advanced R&D to ensure techno- Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994. logical superiority ■ reconstituting within a reasonable period the capabilities to develop and produce supplies and equipment to prepare fully for a war, national emergency, or nual defense spending averaged some $306 billion; mobilization. in 1989, the peak year, it was $327 billion. For To assure compliance, DOD made two radical FY97 it is estimated at $274 billion, and further re- changes that have resulted in a new procurement ductions have been debated in Congress and else- paradigm: regulatory reform and dual-use policy. where. Conversely, some call for an increase of These changes will directly involve the military in $50–60 billion over the current $39 billion. defense procurement and related decisions. Present and anticipated cuts in defense Another equally important development— spending have precipitated changes in procure- external yet impacting on defense acquisition—is ment, among them canceling development pro- the technological transformation of areas such as grams for new systems and reducing procure- design, engineering, prototyping, and production ment. In fact reductions in weapons acquisition of weapons systems and equipment. Taken either began in the mid to late 1980s. Since 1985 DOD individually or collectively, these developments has terminated over one hundred programs, in- will impose new and crucial procurement-related cluding the Navy A–X attack aircraft and EA–6B responsibilities on the military. electronic warfare aircraft, the Air Force F–16 fighter, the Army multiple launcher rocket sys- Regulatory Reform tem, and the follow-up early warning system. Many impartial experts charged that the de- Moreover, procurement of other systems also has fense acquisition process is cumbersome and that been reduced, including the Air Force B–2 bomber DOD contract management and administration and F–22 air superiority fighter, the Army Co- manche helicopter, and the Navy F/A–18E/F strike aircraft.

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costs could be significantly reduced. The Penta- specialists in procurement comes about with in- gon has concurred in this judgment and imple- creased use of a multiple award schedule. This re- mented a major effort to reform procurement. To quires the military to select the most appropriate do this, DOD has changed policies and issued reg- items from a catalog of commercial goods to meet ulations that include personnel from outside pro- their operational needs. In the past military per- curement circles with experience in employing sonnel represented only 6 percent of the over fielded weapons and equipment into the acquisi- 178,000 engaged in procurement. tion process. For example, the Secretary of De- Such initiatives will greatly increase both the fense issued guidance in 1995 that requires pro- presence and role of the military in the defense curement activities to be conducted by integrated acquisition process. However, the policy that de- product and development (IPD) and integrated mands the most active participation by both staff product teams (IPTs). These teams include mili- and line warriors is the dual-use technology and tary personnel—the actual or ultimate users of production concept. the matériel being procured. In the Secretary’s own words, “In the oversight and review Dual Use process...IPTs would be vertically integrated in The dual-use technology and production that they would be comprised of members from concept is one of the prime goals of procurement various staff and line levels.” 3 reform. As stated in the DOD “bible” on dual use: A number of specific initiatives will place the The DOD’s acquisition reform effort seeks to bring military squarely in the procurement process. One about a simplified commercial-style procurement sys- requirement calls for using tem that gives priority to acquiring commercial prod- so-called nondevelopment ucts and processes, and wherever possible eliminates F/A–18E. 4 items (NDI). Under NDI those unique contracting, technical, and accounting procedures the role of the requirements that form a barrier to greater military in acquisition is military/commercial integration. Toward that end, on substantially increased. An- February 24, 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry set other requirement involv- forth a dramatic vision for simplification of the way ing the direct participation the Pentagon buys military systems.5 of military personnel rather than acquisition McDonnell Douglas

Multiple launch rocket

system. (HeleneDOD C. Stikkel)

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Figure 3. DOD Budget Forecast by Category, 1983–2003

400

350 Military personnel 300

250 Operations and maintenance 200 Billions 150 Procurement 100 Other 50 RDT&E

0 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003

Projected (constant 1993 dollars)

Source: The New York Times and International Institute for Strategic Studies.

As part of the mandate, on June 29, 1994 the become dual-use until such a decision is ren- Secretary directed the services to use performance dered. For some major dual-use procurement the and commercial specifications and standards in- previous acquisition process will be applied. For a stead of military ones unless no practical alterna- large portion of goods and services procured tives exist. Those rare cases would require explicit under the dual-use provisions the purchasing ac- approval, a reversal of prior practice. tivity will take place in the field, and the respon- Applied to dual-use strategy this innovation sibility for accepting or rejecting such items will represents a new way of doing business. DOD in- rest with military personnel. The possible work- tends to remove the barriers between commercial load for such activities under the dual-use policy and defense industries and institute compatible is great. This may be seen from the anticipated development and acquisition processes. An inte- level of DOD procurement shown in figure 3. grated national industrial capability that achieves The concept of dual-use in defense-related “world-class” benchmarks for cost, quality, and production, services, and procurement presents cycle time will allow the Pentagon to exploit the attractive policy because of advances in the agile rapid rate of product development and the mar- manufacturing technologies. These gains render ket-driven efficiencies of commercial industry. the dual-use policy exceptionally applicable to fu- Commercial manufacturing processes will ture defense needs for matériel and services. lower product costs through economies of scale resulting from mass production as well as Agile Manufacturing economies of scope from repetition of processes The rapid increase in the technology and use across families of lower-volume products. More- of agile manufacturing allows DOD to acquire over, if advanced technologies are adopted and matériel when needed and at a reasonable cost. improved by commercial firms, military systems Agile manufacturing is a generic term for a number will also benefit. Finally, by strengthening those of competition-enhancing initiatives that include elements of the economic infrastructure on lean and flexible factories, networked information which DOD depends, successful commercializa- systems, and cross-boundary communications tion of defense technologies can increase the like- throughout and among various value chains.6 lihood that they will be accessible and affordable The vision was first described by the Agile for military use. Manufacturing Enterprise Forum held in 1991.7 Dual use, with its accompanying benefits, calls for technical judgments on the applicability of items to defense needs. In fact an item has not

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■ INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS throp throp Nor B–2s under construction. Agility is the capacity to flourish in periods of of conflict, mobilization planners do not know uncertainty, unpredictability, and recurrent whether to focus on desert, arctic, or tropical war- change, and agile manufacturing is the integra- fare. Nor do they know whether they will need tion of technology, battalions or corps. Since agile manufacturing so- agile manufacturing can overcome management, and lutions are designed for such uncertainty, they are workforce resources ideally suited as the framework for evaluating in- emerging problems in an era of in a coordinated, industrial responsiveness. uncertainty and reduced funding terdependent sys- One aspect of agile manufacturing is virtual tem. Under such a enterprise, which brings together personnel and system information equipment from several companies to design and flows seamlessly among manufacturing, engi- manufacture a product. Suppliers, contractors, neering, marketing, purchasing, finance, inven- and customers work together. Lead times are cut tory, sales, and research units. It also courses un- by the order of magnitude. Another contributor is broken between agile manufacturers and their information technology, which permits rapid ex- suppliers and customers. change of requirements and capabilities among Agile manufacturing assists defense planning vendors on all levels of the supply chain. as well as the procurement of defense-related Since agile manufacturing strives for highly goods. In addition, it can overcome emerging customizable products and rapidly configurable problems facing procurement management in an production processes, it erases distinctions be- era of uncertainty and reduced funding. tween the defense and commercial industrial Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has struggled to define the dimensions of the future threat. Absent a specific enemy or zone

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bases. Current dual-use strategy states that “fu- NOTES ture weapons systems must be consciously designed to use state-of-the-art commercial parts 1 Industrial mobilization is defined as “the process of and subsystems and to be built in facilities with marshaling the industrial sector to provide goods and integrated military and commercial production services, including construction, required to support military operations and the needs of the civil sector lines.” 8 Advocates do not claim that armored ve- during domestic or national emergencies. It includes hicles and commercial trucks will be manufac- the mobilization of materials, labor, capital, facilities, tured on the same production line; but they be- and contributory items and services.” See DOD Instruc- lieve components of military-unique items such tion 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management Policies and as engines can be produced in conjunction with Procedures, February 23, 1991, p. 15–7. commercial equivalents. But the dual-use vision is 2 Office of Defense Mobilization, Advisory Commit- limited to a stationary manufacturing process tee on Production Equipment, Production Capacity: A which, even when augmented by flexible sys- Military Reserve (Washington: Government Printing Of- tems, operates within a relatively narrow range of fice, January 1953), pp. 1, 29. 3 product options. The agile solution extends the Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, “Use of Integrated Products and Process Development and bounds of dual-use strategy by creating a produc- Integrated Product Teams in DOD Acquisition,” May 10, tion environment that permits rapid metamor- 1995. phosis of manufacturing resources where individ- 4 For a further discussion, see P. David Leech and ual tools and workstations can be resized and Ivars Gutmanis, “NDI Procurement Accounting and regrouped to respond to customer needs in near Tracking: Options and Implementation Plan, for the Of- real time. fice of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Pro- duction Resources),” report TR–5856–E (Arlington, Va.: The defense industrial base has played a criti- The Analytical Sciences Corporation, December 1993). 5 cal role in national security strategy because of its Department of Defense, Dual Use Technology: A De- ability to design, develop, and manufacture tech- fense Strategy for Affordable, Leading-Edge Technology (Washington: Government Printing Office, February nologically superior weaponry which provides 1995), p. 16. the Armed Forces with formidable capabilities. As 6 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage (New York: budget cuts affect force structure, they will also The Free Press, 1985). Porter uses the term to describe a impact on the defense industrial base. The Clin- way to disaggregate a firm into its strategically relevant ton administration has taken steps to maintain activities to understand the behavior of costs and an adequate industrial base in the face of declin- sources of differentiation. ing budgets. Some will change long-established 7 Agile Manufacturing Enterprise Forum, volume 1, rules and patterns of defense procurement, espe- An Industry-Led View: 21st Century Manufacturing Enter- st cially regulatory changes and dual-use policy. prise Strategy, and volume 2, Infrastructure: 21 Century To a significant extent, success in acquisition Manufacturing Enterprise Strategy (Bethlehem, Pa.: Lehigh University, 1991). reform depends upon the active participation of 8 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and military personnel in procurement. This is possi- Technology, Dual-Use Technology: A Defense Strategy for ble only with an understanding of new policies Affordable, Leading-Edge Technology (Washington: De- and elements of this reform. Equally critical is fa- partment of Defense, February 1995), p. 4. miliarity with radical advances in manufacturing technology as well as agile manufacturing and its relationship to another key element of acquisition reform, the DOD dual-use policy. Agile manufacturing seeks to reduce response time and increase manufacturing flexibility so that every customer order can be satisfied. Ultimately it would mean that the industrial base would never have to be mobilized. The potential of agile manufacturing will only be fully realized with the participation of the users—the Armed Forces. JFQ

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■ The Sisyphus Paradox: Framing the Acquisition Reform Debate By LINDA S. BRANDT and FRANCIS W. A’HEARN

isyphus, king of Corinth, was an intrigu- which were learned but seemingly overlooked or ing mythological figure banished by forgotten by policymakers and practitioners who Zeus to the nether regions of Tartarus. are occasionally lulled into thinking there is little There he was condemned for eternity to real difference between public and private sector Spush an enormous stone uphill only to have his practice. The debate and any meaningful reform strength fail near the summit and the stone roll accruing from it will be best served by reconsider- back down. His plight serves as a lesson for efforts ing these factors. Effective reform must occur in to streamline the way arms and equipment are the context of the governmental system in which developed and acquired. it operates. To grasp the structural impediments is Defense acquisition—or procurement as it is to ease the way for critical changes. commonly known—is the process whereby the services avail themselves of the technological in- The System novations and capabilities in the industrial base The defense acquisition process is firmly through expenditures of national treasure—a rooted in our system of government. Like the insti- process that continues to consume a significant tutions of which it is part, it is based on shared share of discretionary Federal spending. Various power and checks and balances. Congress, the proposals are being considered that could stream- White House, the Pentagon, and the services have line the system in which this process operates. vested interests and strong influences which are Like Sisyphus, the government has repeatedly exercised through the power and constraints im- tried to reform the acquisition process only to posed by oversight, direction, security needs, and find the stone rolling back. Though we rightfully fiscal wherewithal. The judicial system also plays a pursue reform we ironically do so in a system role, with courts hearing a range of challenges which, by the express intent of the American from small contract complaints to multi-million body politic, was not designed for efficiency. This dollar claims against the government (such as the is the Sisyphus paradox of acquisition reform and Navy A–12 aircraft program). As one observer is found in a number of precepts which both noted, acquisition begins with the “simple truth frame and illuminate an ongoing debate. that soldiers, policymakers, technicians, and politi- These maxims provide a perspective on a pol- cians all have a right to some say over weapons ac- icy dialogue too often bounded by exaggerated quisition.” 1 The paradox is that since each stake- claims or hopeless resignation. Some are lessons holder exerts only partial control over selected parts of the process no one controls all of it. Decisions to initiate major new projects in research, development, and production may be dri- Linda S. Brandt and Francis W. A’Hearn both teach at the Industrial ven by a variety of perceived threats, military ne- College of the Armed Forces. cessity, technological opportunity, or defense

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contracts in congressional districts, but the ultimate decisions about weapon systems are political. USS Arleigh Burke, first of its class with President Ronald Reagan’s resolution to embark on Aegis system. the Strategic Defense Initiative is a noteworthy case, but so is the Trident, which was shaped by the SALT negotiations, a national election, and influential personalities as much as security concerns. According to one argument, such decisions incorporate the pluralist paradigm wherein “political outcomes reflect the pulling and hauling of a multitude of interest groups.” 2 As with policy choices in virtually any other area of government, weapon systems and military force structure are fundamentally political outcomes. The defense acquisition system was designed with many goals in mind, but efficiency was not one of them, and notwithstanding public protes- tations to the contrary this is precisely how the American body politic would have it. How can this seeming paradox be? Historically, whenever the Federal Govern- ment has sought to purchase goods and services from the private sector, safeguards have been put in place to ensure that all bidders can compete for business. Equity and equal access are goals of the defense acquisition system, and no corporate giant or small business seeking to contract with the government would have it any other way.

Certainly there are other goals. Military ca- U.S. Navy (James R. Giusti) pability and national security are most assuredly primary cornerstones of the system. The Aegis cruiser, SR–71, and multiple launch rocket system were clearly products of broad-based national se- don’t want to sacrifice fairness in the pursuit of curity requirements and technological opportu- efficiency.” 4 nity. Affordability is a This element of the debate also belies a phe- consideration with performance, cost constraint, and nomenon which is more unique and appropriate the B–2 bomber (as to peacetime. Questions of efficiency were not interoperability are legitimate are questions about part of the debate over the Manhattan Project or aims of the acquisition system threat and mission). the effort to orbit an American satellite after the The new joint strike Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957. Questions about fighter seeks to fulfill the taxpayers’ return on investments clearly and needs across all the services and at least one Euro- rightfully were part of the discussions connected pean country. Thus performance, cost constraint, with canceling the A–12 program—particularly and joint and combined interoperability are legit- after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Thus just as Sisy- imate aims of the system. As one official has sug- phus was condemned to eternally roll the stone gested, “The current system is not broken. It is up the hill, the stewards of the public trust are well designed to accomplish the goals that the obligated every day and in every way to improve Nation values...[but it] represents trade-offs effectiveness and efficiency—in a system designed among competing, often contradictory goals and, for the former but indifferent to the latter. In fact, not surprisingly, works imperfectly as a result.” 3 It to do less would be unethical if not criminal, bar- is imperfect. Efficiency is not an inherent or ex- ring the issues of national survival or sovereign plicit feature of the acquisition system. Thus interests. Nonetheless, it is good to realize that when the Pentagon proposed rules in mid-1996 priorities and demands shift over time. Cost, under which contracting officers could bargain schedule, and performance are traditional criteria only with vendors they judged to be most com- by which we judge success in weapons develop- petitive, industry reacted with caution if not ment. Of these three factors, however, perfor- skepticism. As an officer of a large aerospace man- mance tends to dominate the most when we are ufacturer explained, “This is a sea change in how we do business with the government, and we

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■ ACQUISITION REFORM

planning for war (the ability of systems to over- boards and investigative panels under both De- come a potential enemy held sway throughout mocrat and Republican administrations have much of the Cold War). In time of conflict, pro- sought to eliminate excesses—real and imagi- gram schedules tend to overshadow other consid- nary—in government and defense acquisition. erations (such as quickly modifying and fielding Most reform initiatives have been nobly mo- the Patriot during the Gulf War). In prolonged tivated and have enhanced the system. They are periods of relative peace (the current situation) likely to influence the future political military cost becomes dominant. landscape. But these same efforts rest uneasily on Yet another paradox exists in this area. an implicit and potentially misleading founda- While the system is indeed designed for equity tion. In fact, each suggests that if we look hard and equal access, rules governing acquisition cre- enough, if we can muster sufficient creativity, a ate a procedure so complex that it raises barriers silver bullet will correct the ills of the system. But which can block competition. In fact, despite ob- no such solution exists in a democracy. Commer- jections to the contrary, defense contractors en- cial practice and other initiatives, however well trenched in the current system have only a lim- conceived and intentioned, must function in a ited interest in changing it. As long as this system based on public money, accountability, situation exists, DOD cannot expect to attract and trust. new technology-rich firms to the defense arena. Conventional wisdom depicts the defense acquisition system as comprised of three systems Acquisition Bashing that include the requirements process; the plan- Critics of the way the bureaucracy acquires ning, programming, and budgeting system systems and equipment have been fixtures on the (PPBS); and the acquisition management system, scene since the last century. Historically, some of which maps development phases and progress their charges have been well founded while oth- milestones from concept exploration through val- ers only make good headlines. Serious investiga- idation, engineering, production, deployment, tions were conducted into war profiteering in the and support. These systems are often portrayed as wake of World War I. Over the years critics have intersecting like three interlocked circles in a debated cost reimbursement and fixed-price con- Venn diagram. In reality they do not intersect at tracts. From the Hoover Commissions (1949 and all; they collide. 1953) to the Fitzhugh Commission (1970), Grace The systems clash because they are driven by Commission (1983), Packard Commission (1985), wholly different and potentially incompatible and Federal Streamlining Act (1994), review forces. The requirements process involves a threat and technological opportunity. PPBS is based on both time—the Federal budget calendar review

Patriot missile battery during Desert Shield. DOD

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cycle—and resource allocation. The acquisition reasonable standard enormous resources and a management system is based on milestones and relatively large share of the budget pass through approvals subject to progress, real or supposed. the defense acquisition system, which is highly The paradox is that these otherwise incom- visible in the economy. The consequences atten- patible systems must work together for reasons dant to these sums are far-reaching. Congress, which become equally clear when one examines taxpayers, and the media all rightfully demand to their intended outcomes. The requirements know how public funds are spent. At the same process helps determine what we will buy and time, expenditures and creation of jobs in various why. PPBS governs how much or how many we regions form powerful interests that determine will produce. Finally, acquisition management where the funds go. Thus stringent congressional shapes how we will actually develop these capa- oversight of the annual defense budget is not bilities. likely to abate. This is a structural reason why re- Yet another paradox associated with the de- forms that involve congressional prerogatives are fense acquisition system involves organizational frequently difficult to implement. structure and management practice. The system Contractors are also powerful players. They reveals a sort of organizational schizophrenia. are motivated not only by domestic markets but The defense establishment, like nearly all ele- the desire to expand internationally. Moreover, ments of the Federal Government, is structured as investment in the defense sector has historically a large functional bu- spun off innovations with benefits for society— stringent congressional reaucracy based on fa- such as surgical lasers and audio electronics, miliar models which anti-skid brakes for vehicles, jet propulsion for oversight of the annual defense grew out of the indus- commercial aviation—although there is conjec- budget is not likely to abate trial revolution. By the ture about the reverse phenomenon as commer- 1960s, however, govern- cial electronics, for instance, outpace military ment and private indus- investments in that area. Considering the tech- try began to discover the virtues of project man- nological breakthroughs derived from military agement as a structure and approach for research during World War II—radar, sonar, jet realigning functional experts into a dedicated propulsion, nuclear fission—it may not be un- team on programs like the Apollo, Polaris, and reasonable to ask whether market forces in the F–15. An unwillingness to disband functional or- private sector are likely to add analogous tech- ganizations and home base of expertise from nological breakthroughs in the 21st century ab- whence team members came, however, kept exist- sent public funding. In short, the sizable flow of ing management structures in place. Thus in the dollars through the national acquisition system 1970s and 1980s one saw both functional and yields a paradox of both promise and peril project management preserved simultaneously in which constitutes another facet of the defense various management schemes. acquisition policy debate. Today integrated product teams are being Despite persistent charges that the defense formed across the defense acquisition community acquisition system is catastrophically broken and (and private industry) for project management in need of being recreated, another quiet but and oversight. Like their historical antecedents, powerful paradox is apparent. This system con- they offer the virtues of dedicated project man- tinues to produce the world’s most effective and agement teams but again are often superimposed lethal systems. U.S. weapons are world class, gen- on extant functional organization structures erally highly praised by warfighters, and much in which are never dismantled. In the final analysis, demand within the global arms marketplace. both integrated teams and functional bureaucra- These are not surprising outcomes for a system cies work in an uneasy structural alliance by the based more on effectiveness than efficiency. efforts of dedicated people in what is arguably a Will we continue to produce world class sys- schizophrenic paradigm for both organization tems? Can we afford them in the future? How and management. will we specify our requirements in the face of ambiguous yet real threats? How persuasively will Big Money, Big Results we articulate such needs in a budgetary climate in In the contemporary environment of down- which defense and social priorities vie for finite sizing and dramatically reduced defense budgets, resources? These issues represent aspects of the defense acquisition projects claim sizable portions context of acquisition reform. How we address of the investment in national security. Current them is part of the challenge for policymakers long-range projections for the joint strike fighter, and practitioners alike. for instance, place the total value of that program at three-quarters of a trillion dollars—the largest in American history. Suffice it to say that by any

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Meanwhile, the current defense acquisition system with its complexity and endemically long cycle times hinders exploitation of this huge global source of new commercially-developed technologies. Declining investment in modernization only compounds the problem. This is a key aspect of the challenge confronting reform- minded policymakers seeking to provide the Armed Forces with superior capabilities.

In the final analysis it is useful to recall that as stewards of the public trust every member of the defense establishment has an obligation to find innovative, effective, and more efficient ways

nando Serna) to arm and equip the Armed Forces. Moreover, in- Fer telligent initiatives aimed at reforming that process will be more successful if they are grounded in the world in which they operate—a U.S. Air Force ( U.S. Air Force free-enterprise democratic society which is at once Virtual reality political, military, social, and economic. JFQ research. Future Warfare NOTES A final paradox deals with the relationship between acquisition and warfare. It is based on 1 Thomas L. McNaugher, New Weapons, Old Politics: the precept that conflicts in the next century will America’s Military Procurement Muddle (Washington: not be so much a matter of future determination Brookings Institution, 1989), p. 148. 2 as a reflection of decisions we are making or fail- Ethan Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Se- (New York: McGraw-Hill, ing to make today. curity: A Global Perspective 1992), p. 117. Product development cycles, particularly so- 3 Mark Cancian, “Acquisition Reform: It’s Not as phisticated defense systems with no analogous Easy as it Seems,” Acquisition Review Quarterly, vol. 2, counterparts in the commercial sector, take many no. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 189–90. years—even if anticipated streamlining initiatives 4 Anthony Velocci, “Sea Change Looming for De- shorten the process. Moreover, support and fund- fense Contracting,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, ing for high-risk/high-payoff technologies might vol. 145, no. 8 (August 19, 1996), p. 20. atrophy in a climate in which modernization becomes stagnant and the threats are difficult to define. In such a system, is the stealth innovation of the next century now in its formative stages in some government laboratory? Will we recognize it and commit scarce funds to nurture it? Or can we rely on the nondefense-commercial sector to supply the next technological breakthrough critical to post-modern warfare? Will that breakthrough emerge from market forces currently shaping commercial developments? Historically both critical defense and nondefense advances— nuclear fission, radar, lasers, high speed computing, jet propulsion—have been the products of defense and public sector support. In short, how we resolve debates over technological development, information warfare, and automated unmanned weapon systems will shape the nature of conflict and our capacity to deal with it well into the 21st century. There are indeed pressing imperatives to change the acquisition process. New technologies are being increasingly developed for the commercial marketplace using short cycle times to quickly incorporate new advances in products.

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Improving the Management of Reserve Forces By JOHN C.F. TILLSON

ebate over the role, composition, and units periodically execute the same operational employment of the active and Reserve missions as their active counterparts (for exam- components has gone on since the ple, Reserve combat and support units are operat- Revolution. Modern efforts to resolve it ing in and over Bosnia). Also, they perform to the Dbegan with the total force policy in 1970. In his same standards in operational readiness inspec- FY71 annual report on Reserve forces, Secretary of tions and win many total force flying competi- Defense Melvin Laird directed that the Reserve tions. Many Reservists serve more than 100 days components be considered part of the total force of active duty per year, generally in two to three available to achieve U.S. security interests. week increments. Through the 1970s they assumed a greater role in Army Reserve artillery and Special Forces national strategy and by the end of the decade units routinely perform to standard—although in were getting the equipment and resources needed fewer tasks than active units. Naval Reserve to maintain manning levels. squadrons and ships train to the same standards In the 1980s and 1990s the Reserve compo- as the active Navy. Airlift and combat search and nents improved their capabilities and increased rescue represent 100 percent of the available as- their support to active forces. Both equipment sets and have become the training standard. Ma- and training in Army Reserve combat and sup- rine Corps Reserve combat battalions were suc- port forces have been upgraded. Naval Reserve cessful in the Gulf War. Each service employed ships and aircraft squadrons have received mod- both Reserve units and individual Reservists effec- ern systems and training. Air Force Reserve tively in that conflict to provide increased levels fighter, tanker, and airlift squadrons have been of support in a range of missions. equipped with modern aircraft and funds to sus- Questions regarding the accessibility of Re- tain near-active capability. The Marine Corps Re- serve forces and their willingness to serve have serve has been organized, equipped, and trained largely been resolved. They were deployed success- to reinforce and augment the active component fully not just in the Gulf but in Panama, Somalia, and is increasingly integrated with active forces. Haiti, Kuwait, the Sinai, and Bosnia. The Presi- Active and Reserve component Air Force fly- dent’s willingness to mobilize Reservists and their ing units train to the same standards, although enthusiastic response has quieted most skeptics. active units train for more tasks. Reserve combat Congress resolved other mobilization issues by extending the length of time that Reserve forces can be called to active duty under a Presidential Se- John C.F. Tillson is a member of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources lected Reserve Callup (PSRC) to 270 days. Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses and formerly served in Despite success, problems remain. Relations the Office of the Secretary of Defense. between the active and Reserve components are

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■ RESERVE FORCES

at times dysfunctional, largely because of differ- and air groups, and active Marine Corps officers ent cultures. There is uncertainty about the forces and enlisted members, functioning as instructors needed to meet the demands of national military and inspectors, are responsible for the readiness strategy. The Army might have an of Reserve units. Some Naval Reserve ships are associate relationships excess of combat units but lack sup- commanded by active officers. port personnel. There might be Re- Associate relationships between the active between components serve forces either that are not and Reserve components have proven successful have proven successful needed or that are needed in the ac- in changing culture at unit level. Members of in changing culture tive component for crisis response or Army roundout brigades that worked closely with forward deployment. There might be active parent units report great satisfaction in Reserve forces that should be re- learning from their active counterparts while shaped or abolished. Some active forces could be preparing to go to war together. These and other eliminated or transferred to the Reserve compo- steps could be incorporated in individual service nents at substantial savings. The process for mo- practices to raise levels of cooperation and mu- bilizing and employing Reserve forces needs to be tual trust among members of both components. improved. They could increase Reserve readiness and, by in- [EDITOR’S NOTE: There are five active and volving people with new ideas from the civil sec- seven Reserve components. Each military service—the tor, enhance the level of innovation in the indi- Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast vidual services. Guard—has an active component. The Reserve com- Many of the initiatives below could improve ponents include the Army Reserve and Army National cooperation and trust between the components Guard, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air and already are practiced in some services. The Force Reserve and Air National Guard, and Coast Army is implementing some of them in National Guard Reserve. Consequently, terms such as Reserves Guard enhanced brigades. Most would also en- and Reserve forces refer generically to the Army, hance Reserve readiness and total force efficiency. Naval, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard Re- ■ Train active and Reserve forces to the same stan- serve as well as the Army and Air National Guard.] dard and require both to demonstrate performance to standard. Make active commanders accountable for Re- Changing Culture serve component readiness. Train Reserve units in fewer The first step is to change the culture of the tasks to recognize their limited time for training. Link active and Reserve components to enhance the units and tasks to specific contingency plans. effectiveness of the total force concept. This ■ Expand opportunities for members of one com- means influencing the beliefs, values, and wishes ponent to serve in the other to enhance Reserve readiness and mutual understanding. of each component with respect to the organiza- ■ Make active component duty with Reserve units tion, capabilities, and expertise of the other. career-enhancing by making it equivalent to command Cooperation and trust are central to the total time (for example, active Marine instructors and inspec- force. But lack of trust between the active and Re- tors assigned to Reserve units are selected by central serve components is an impediment. The result- command selection boards and receive command ing competition is dysfunctional. We can no credit). longer afford to maintain ineffective or overlap- ■ Ensure that management information systems ping capabilities because of poor cooperation or (in areas such as personnel and finance) operate seam- distrust among services or between components. lessly or handle members of both components under a Each service has improved. The Air Force single system. ■ Develop educational programs that promote in- trains and evaluates its active and Reserve units at tegration and mutual understanding of the history and the same facilities (such as Red Flag) and to the background of each component. same standard so that both components are con- ■ Simplify the transition for individuals and units fident in one another. The Air Force shows confi- between components. dence in the Reserves by assigning them missions ■ Conduct more integrated active and Reserve such as independent operations over Bosnia and component training such as that performed at Army allowing them to compete for new missions and combat training centers and in the Air Force through functions. Active and Reserve members of the Air air-to-air and bombing competitions. Force are enthusiastic about management prac- ■ Increase the number of full-time (either active tices that allow Reservists to take over specific or Reserve) commanders and staff officers in Reserve units, especially in early deploying units. functions or missions. In the Marine Corps, ac- ■ Adopt the Air Force notion of resourcing and as- tive duty officers command Reserve regiments signing missions to the Reserve whereby the components work together to identify the resources needed to perform Reserve missions to standard and also the additional resources to tackle more demanding missions.

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T illson U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)U.S. Air Force Air National Guard F–16 in northern Australia. Expanding Total Force Policy national emergency that arises with long warn- The next step is to expand total force policy ing, and eliminating or reshaping any Reserve by greater use of Reserve forces. Employment of forces unable to meet these new demands. them in recent years has been influenced by our History demonstrates that the Reserve com- experience during the Cold War and in Vietnam. ponents can perform critical jobs and are rapidly The Cold War threatened national existence and available on a voluntary or involuntary basis. required a large ready force. High readiness led This suggests they can often be used in lieu of ac- not only to a bias in favor of active forces but also tive forces. Reserve component forces were used to providing the Reserve components with the re- five times in recent years for major military oper- sources to maintain unprecedented readiness. The ations and were included in planning for the re- decision not to call up the Reserves during Viet- inforcement of Kuwait in 1994. They supported nam created an impression that they would only ground and air operations in Bosnia and Army be used in a conflict against the Warsaw Pact. The multinational force and observer missions in the end of the Cold War lifted the threat to national Sinai. Despite procedural and execution problems existence, yet the demands on our forces have in joint and service management structures, the steadily increased. This change in threat allows a Reserve units themselves performed successfully less stringent calculation of risk, demands to cut in all cases. defense spending, and increased potential for In the Gulf War many Reserve combat and “less ready” forces. Three complementary options combat support units demonstrated an ability to arise for the Reserve components in this environ- perform to standard with little post-mobilization ment: using some Reserve forces in lieu of active training. Two Army artillery brigades displayed forces to meet new security needs, preserving other Reserve forces at low readiness for a major

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Special Forces and Navy Seabee Reservists, Mountain Bee ’97. iano) U.S. Navy (JeffreyU.S. Navy S. V

their performance in combat. Other units such as basic national values and militia tradition. More- an Apache battalion, a Special Forces group, and a over, just as the decision to mobilize Reserves for Reserve mechanized brigade were mobilized and the Gulf War helped commit the public to the performed to standard in tests Nation’s objectives, their more frequent use also the decision to mobilize and exercises. Marine and Air can enhance links between the Armed Forces and Force combat units likewise per- the American people. Reserves can enhance links formed to standard in the Gulf. Expanding total force policy requires between the Armed Forces No Navy combat units were changes in planning and programming guidance used in the war. In each service for active and Reserve forces, in plans for using and the American people there was strong opposition in Reserves, and in the ways such forces are man- the active component to calling aged, trained, and resourced. The expansion of up Reserve combat units. Nevertheless, as General the total force policy thus calls for a number of Colin Powell told Congress, “The success of the changes to be made. First, convert force planning Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield and programming guidance to provide preference cannot be overemphasized.” for placing forces in the Reserve. For example, put The successful voluntary and involuntary combat and support forces in the Reserve if they use of the Reserve components has demonstrated exhibit the ability to meet performance standards their capabilities in a variety of contingencies. and deployment schedules suitable for assigned Given pressure to cut spending, new threats, and missions and if they are not required for forward the ability of Reserves to perform to the same presence or deployment. standard as active forces, it is appropriate to con- Second, explicitly plan to call up combat and sider changing force planning and programming support forces for every contingency—from peace guidance to give priority to Reserve over active operations to a major regional conflict (MRC). forces. This assumes that Reserve forces display Plan a balanced active and Reserve combat and their ability to do the job. Those that do not can be put in a low readiness status or eliminated. Such change would also be consistent with our

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T illson

support force for the first MRC to assure the avail- Realizing Potential ability of a similar force for the second. Plan for The last step is to examine new possibilities mainly active combat forces in the first MRC and and validate Reserve capabilities. There will be mainly Reserve combat forces for the second. Es- opposition to some of the above proposals. How- tablish a policy calling for routine PSRC use. De- ever, while none of the changes have to be made velop simplified PSRC planning and execution overnight, virtually all can be preceded by experi- procedures that, for example, require Reserve ments and pilot projects that investigate their po- units identified for early deployment to demon- tential. Proceeding in a reasoned, deliberate man- strate pre-mobilization performance to the same ner will generate support for change in both the standards as active units. Reserves scheduled for active and Reserve components. Assigning an later deployment must meet these standards after outsider to play a major role in the design, con- a designated period of post-mobilization training. duct, and evaluation of these changes will lend Call up Reserve forces as part of the initial force credibility to the results. or a rotation base (for example, deploy Air Force Decisions on the mix of active and Reserve Reserve fighter squadrons in parallel with active forces and on new roles and functions for the Re- units in a contingency; call up Reserve units, serves are difficult to make absent good data. Tests from civil affairs to infantry battalions, on a rota- can be conducted to assess the ability of both tion basis for peace operations). Assure the readi- components to perform to standard (such as readiness of Reserves for these missions by identifying ness for the range of military operations), devise units in advance. Plan for the use of volunteers— ways to achieve Reserve readiness levels more units and individuals, Reservists and retirees—in quickly, experiment with organizational and train- those operations including those for which PSRCs ing concepts and with increased levels of re- can be employed. For example, the Air Force sources, experiment initially with Army combat might accept volunteers for individual flying mis- maneuver brigades and Navy surface ships and sions while other services might call up entire carrier aviation, and establish pilot programs to units. Improve planning and execution proce- test new concepts (such as a multi-year plan for a dures so that PSRC authority can be obtained Reserve division to bring one maneuver brigade rapidly and applied efficiently. per year to a high level of readiness and to keep it Third, improve Reserve management and there for a year). training and provide added resources to enhance Reserve readiness and capabilities. Increase per- The United States is gradually adjusting to sonnel and unit stability by enlarging the number the challenges of the new strategic environment. of prior service personnel in Reserve units. Con- The most difficult changes may be taking place in sider offering benefits such as affiliation bonuses, the minds of the people, military and civilian, educational incentives, and enlistment contracts who must determine the direction the Armed that cover both active and Reserve service. Mod- Forces must take. Having won the Cold War, we ify Reserve compensation policy to take account do not have the shock of defeat to motivate of variations in the economy and to reduce tur- change quickly. Nor is it necessary. Precipitate ac- bulence through job tenure. Change the promo- tions to reduce our forces or make other dramatic tion system to avoid penalizing Reservists for changes could lead to serious problems. staying in one assignment for an extended pe- Nevertheless, if there is no major threat to riod. Provide income insurance to address dispari- our national security we can anticipate a steady ties in civilian and military pay in order to im- reduction in defense spending that will compel prove retention and willingness to perform us to make substantial changes in the size of our frequent tours of involuntary duty. forces. Improving the management of Reserve Give priority to early deploying units in allo- forces will increase their readiness and ability to cating deployable full-time support personnel. perform to standard. As their capabilities grow, Limit the frequency of unit reorganization since we can rely more on the Reserves at the expense commanders report that it destroys readiness and of the active component which will allow us to morale in Reserve units. Improve pre-mobiliza- maintain force structure at least cost. Moreover, tion training with the use of simulators, multi- greater reliance on militia forces in lieu of a large year scheduling, and close association with active standing military is consistent with the history units. Train specific Reserve units for peace and and traditions of the Nation. JFQ humanitarian relief operations so the Reserves can be used early. Improve plans and facilities for post-mobilization training. Ensure the availability of active and Reserve trainers. Organize training facilities for both components to ensure efficient post-mobilization training.

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Civil Affairs and MOOTW: y Aaron) Four Balkan Sketches Larr

Muslim residents, Jusici. Signal Company, Combat Camera ( Combat Camera Signal Company, th 55

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means of stimulating civil restoration and return to normalcy. GFAP also Joint Endeavor—The clearly outlined supporting IFOR tasks to be conducted on request and within the limits of assigned principal tasks Role of Civil Affairs and available resources. Some reconstruction, rebuilding, and demining By P AMELA J. BRADY operations that supported the military had a beneficial collateral effect on civilian reconstruction through road and bridge building. While some may regard this as mission creep, civil and nder the General Framework This cooperation between active military leaders came to understand Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and Reserve components created the that exclusive oversight of the military NATO deployed a combined basis for Reservists to take responsibil- provisions of the peace agreement Ujoint task force known as Im- ity for civil-military operations in a would only postpone re-establishing plementation Force (IFOR) to Bosnia- transparent manner. The IFOR com- normalcy and could prolong the need Herzegovina. It consisted of the 1st Ar- mander formed a principal staff direc- for an outside military presence. mored Division, which was designated torate known as combined joint civil CIMIC was involved on virtually Multinational Division North, while a military cooperation (CIMIC). Joint En- every level of rehabilitation and recon- British division controlled the south- deavor consisted of building consensus struction in Bosnia. Because of their west and a French division was as- and understanding among the Bosnian unique expertise and linguistic capabil- signed responsibility for the southeast people to implement GFAP. Here civil ities, CA personnel were instrumental part of the country (see map on next affairs negotiating skills were instru- in facilitating relations among NATO page). These multinational divisions mental. CIMIC was a vital link between forces, civil authorities, and various were put under the command and con- military and civilian efforts, especially factions of the population. CIMIC sol- trol of Allied Command Europe (ACE) as operations evolved from the entry diers had an operational grasp of the Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) which phase through implementation to tran- issues affecting Croats, Muslims, and functioned as the land forces com- sition to peace and then toward the de- Serbs. This understanding of local con- mand under IFOR. sired endstate. Planning shifted from ditions provided IFOR with a baseline One cannot overstate the impor- stressing rapid deployment of enabling on strengths and weaknesses of the tance of the military aspects of estab- forces, minimizing interference and civil sector and indicated the types of lishing and maintaining a zone of sep- promoting support for IFOR, and devel- civil-military operations that would be aration and freedom of movement. oping commissions for establishing effective. It helped establish, maintain, These tasks were instrumental in estab- and maintaining liaison with affected and influence relations among the mil- lishing a secure and stable environ- civilian organizations, coordinating itary, civil authorities, and the local ment that allowed Muslims, Serbs, and freedom of movement, leveraging the population as they focused on a unity Croats as well as both international capabilities of nongovernmental orga- of effort rather than the traditional and humanitarian organizations to ex- nizations (NGOs), private voluntary or- unity of command. ecute their obligations, particularly the ganizations (PVOs), international orga- Recognizing that the civil dimen- civilian aspects which included recov- nizations (IOs) and host nations, and sion was equally if not more important ery, reconstruction, repatriation, and identifying and transferring many civil- than the military, the London Confer- reconciliation. military tasks to nonmilitary agencies. ence of the Peace Implementation Joint Endeavor marked the un- While CIMIC was not chartered with Council established the Office of the precedented involvement of civil af- nationbuilding, it created institutions High Representative headed by former fairs (CA) in this NATO-led mission by providing niche and unique re- Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt. His which involved 36 countries. The 353d sources to civil agencies to facilitate mandate was to oversee the civilian Civil Affairs Command of the Army growth and ensure their success. implementation of GFAP and included Reserve and 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, It was during the transition to creating political and constitutional in- an active unit based at Fort Bragg, em- peace that the civil aspects of the ac- stitutions, fostering economic recon- barked on a joint endeavor of their cords became increasingly important struction and rehabilitation of infra- own which could set the tone for fu- and IFOR occupied a greater role in structure, promoting respect for ture missions of this type. supporting civil implementation. IFOR human rights, encouraging the return policy reflected this increased involve- of displaced persons and refugees, con- ment in civil tasks by allowing and en- tinuing humanitarian aid for as long as Lieutenant Colonel Pamela J. Brady, couraging the military to assist civilian necessary, and assisting with both free USAR, 353d Civil Affairs Command, agencies (as far as resources permitted and fair elections. served as CIMIC civil information and without detracting from the mili- officer during Joint Endeavor. tary mission) whenever possible as a

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representatives and industrial special- IFOR Areas of Responsibility ists on assessments to formulate action HUNGARY plans and build consensus among the Zagreb concerned parties. SLOVENIA Logistic The conditions for regional secu- Support HQ Nordic rity created by IFOR significantly in- CROATIA Brigade HQ U.S. Brigade HQ Russian creased and facilitated humanitarian Brigade HQ assistance throughout the country. Canadian Brigade HQ VOJVODINA Hundreds of NGOs, PVOs, and IOs Coralici were able to dispense aid on a larger Doboj scale because of the security and en- Ugljevik hanced freedom of movement pro- AmericanTuzla SERBIA vided by the military. This support was Dubrave Multinational British Sector Division furnished with measured, cautious, (North) and judicious constraints. For example, Zenica British Brigade HQ Sector Vlasenica U.S. Brigade HQ it was provided in cases where the mil- Sipovo itary had unique assets that were not Gornji Vakuf available in the civil sector, where mili- Sarajevo Italian Multinational Brigade HQ tary assistance would facilitate or dra- Turkish Division (at Zetra) Brigade HQ (Southwest) matically speed up the task, and where French military goals and objectives were satisfied—that is, to drive civil recovery Spanish MostarSector ADRIATIC Brigade HQ Main IFOR with execution of labor intensive pro- SEA Medugorje HQ Multinational jects to address employment of demo- Division ACE Rapid (Southeast) Reaction bilizing soldiers. Corps HQ The NGO/PVO infrastructure in French theater was mature. These unsung he- Brigade HQ (at Rajlovac) roes had been at work more than four LEGEND MONTENEGRO years and had developed an extensive Dayton agreement line network. CIMIC was anxious to coordi- Division headquarters nate with them to maximize mutual ca- ALBANIA pabilities. Theater-wide centers and computer discs with NGO/PVO spread- sheets facilitated such interoperability. Coordination of the myriad insti- As required by GFAP, and as a In Sarajevo, the International Council of tutional activities critical to the return means of giving both the military and Volunteer Agencies and CIMIC set up a of peace and stability in Bosnia was a civilians a venue to review and coordi- walk-in center as the focal point of NGO daunting task. Both Bildt and IFOR rec- nate reconstruction efforts, a joint civil coordination. Participants met regularly ognized that close coordination was commission was established in Sara- to discuss current operations, share in- vital to restoring political and eco- jevo as a template for representatives formation, and lodge requests for mili- nomic infrastructure in a secure envi- in Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Mostar. The tary and NGO support. Security briefs ronment. This relationship was en- commission consisted of a small head- and assessments were critical to working hanced by the role that CIMIC played quarters and functional working relations. Without security reinforce- in facilitating, coordinating, monitor- groups that focused on the constitu- ment, NGOs would probably reduce ing, and reporting on civil-military tion, freedom of movement, telecom- their risks by minimizing efforts. In ad- projects. CA personnel oversaw pro- munications, infrastructure, refugees, dition to security information, CIMIC jects to maximize interaction while en- and police. provided the NGO community with couraging independent initiatives Infrastructure subcommittees mine maps and awareness training. among the parties. Coordination also were formed for eight technical sub- CIMIC also coordinated intrathe- ensured that priorities were consistent groups: gas, electricity, water/sewer/ ater space available flights and ap- with policies of the host nation, Office solid waste, economic development, proval for transportation over military of the High Representative (OHR), Or- urban transport, roads and bridges, bridges. Through facilitating their entry ganization for Security and Coopera- cemeteries, and railways. Technical into theater, CA personnel created con- tion in Europe (OSCE), U.N. Mission in subgroups varied on the regional level ditions that leveraged NGO capabilities Bosnia-Herzegovina, U.N. High Com- depending on needs in a particular because bridge crossings were pivotal to missioner for Refugees, and a myriad area. CIMIC personnel were absolutely of governmental, civil, and interna- essential. They continually applied tional agencies working in theater. civilian knowledge, skills, and expertise while accompanying government

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Brady

the prompt movement of humanitar- commissions. It was directly involved the overall IFOR information campaign, ian and reconstruction equipment. In with developing voter registration, an- whose key themes and messages were some cases, by utilizing a joint move- alyzing loan approvals, and establish- geared to increasing the popular under- ment control center, military bridges ing plans and policy for reorganization standing and acceptance of the peace reduced the delivery time of relief sup- of Federation and Republic of Serbska accords. This was accomplished by vari- plies from five days to five hours. police forces in accordance with inter- ous means including a “meet the may- Through CIMIC coordination, national standards. ors” information campaign to explain NGOs became force and resource mul- While all these functions were im- the peace accords to local authorities tipliers. CA soldiers were especially portant to the restoration of Bosnia, a throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. adept at brokering and linking funds, major civil affairs focus for the first Mobilizing public support was dif- personnel, and equipment to the task eight and a half months of Joint En- ficult. It was obvious that the civil war at hand. One example of this was de- deavor was on supporting conditions among Muslims, Serbs, and Croats had mining the transit system in Sarajevo. for free and fair elections. Critical to major political overtones. The Serb In assessing public transportation, it success was continued public support leadership in particular was not swayed was found that the tram line was not for the IFOR mission, which would ulti- by economic incentives. The objective running because of land mines along mately affect the legitimacy of political of each faction was the territorial dis- the tracks. Demining the system was authorities. CIMIC engineers worked placement of ethnic enclaves. Despite important for the economy, freedom with both the Office of the High Repre- the show of force by IFOR, friction con- of movement, and the city’s return to sentative and the International Federa- tinued as evidenced by human rights normalcy. CIMIC expedited demining tion of Journalists to establish the violations and Serb migration. Such in- by contacting and facilitating the ar- Open Broadcast Network for free access stability is attributable to both self-de- rival of Norwegian People’s Aid, which to radio and television campaigning. In termination and a desire for sover- was geared for such operations. By conjunction with OSCE, the CIMIC eignty, issues which prove the value of using NGOs, CIMIC created conditions civil information office created an regionally oriented CA professionals. that allowed for the early restoration inter-entity editors’ forum to focus on One lesson of Joint Endeavor was of transport throughout the city. accuracy and fairness in reporting the the value of a civil-military coalition In addition to humanitarian agen- elections and improving cooperation. and the power of unity of effort versus cies, CIMIC augmented the staffs of Through such means civil affairs unity of command. Such missions re- several organizations such as OHR, personnel were successful in influenc- quire working with NGOs, PVOs, IOs, OSCE, World Bank, and International ing public opinion. Moreover, knowl- and host nation governments for the Police Task Force (IPTF). With expertise edge of language, history, and other fac- effective coordination and implemen- in banking, economics, law enforce- tors provided insights into ethnic tation of relief, recovery, rehabilita- ment, etc., 353d Civil Affairs Com- groups. Armed with this knowledge, tion, reconstruction, reconciliation, mand was instrumental in providing CIMIC served as a force protection ele- and repatriation. planning, operations, communica- ment by contributing valuable input to Civil affairs will become a critical tions, computer, administrative, and element as the civil-military interface logistic support to regional joint civil becomes more dominant than tactical elements in future peace operations. The international community will con- Separating Muslims tinue to rely on U.S. leadership and ca- and Serbs, Gajevi. pabilities, especially in planning and implementing large scale peace and humanitarian operations. Joint Endeavor is only the most recent example of such combined joint and international efforts. Great strides have been made toward securing peace in Bosnia through a consensus of views and a unity of effort. The future is promising because combat arms and civil affairs complement each other’s efforts in order to “secure the victory.” JFQ Signal Company, Combat Camera Signal Company, th 55

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addition, it is situated on a major north-south road network leading to The National Support Barcs and the Sava River crossing into Croatia at Zupanja. The railhead of Dombovar is also nearby. In early De- Element in Hungary cember 1995 U.S. forces began landing in C–130s at Taszar. Among the first el- By BRUCE CASTKA ements to arrive was the V Corps G-5 staff, which immediately met with leaders in Kaposvar/Taszar. It was essential that the Army immediately develop a capability in Hun- gary to support the deployment. Al- though years of NATO planning had included discussions of multinational logistic support operations, that option was not adopted for this operation. The British and French forces, which had been previously deployed in Bosnia, had logistical supply lines in place, with Split as the primary port of entry in Croatia. They were therefore assigned to southern Bosnia, the British in the southwest and French in the south. Having no previous ground presence, y Aaron) the United States was assigned to the Larr north with headquarters at Tuzla. Mov- ing tons of matériel overland became a challenge for USAREUR FWD with its forward support base at Taszar. Given the significance of civil- military cooperation in Hungary, Taszar barracks,

Signal Company, Combat Camera ( Combat Camera Signal Company, USAREUR requested a full civil affairs

Hungary th

55 complement with a lead element arriv- ing early in the new year. By the end of January 1996, CA Reservists were on- site and deployed in small, functional n autumn 1995, U.S. Army Europe It was important that the Hungar- tactical support teams. Several were (USAREUR) sought an efficient and ian government, military, and people fluent in Hungarian or had profes- expeditious means to insert the accept this mission. Accordingly, 353d sional expertise relevant to the deploy- IAmerican portion of Implementa- Civil Affairs Command was called ment area. tion Force into the former Yugoslavia. upon to support civil-military opera- Teams were located at strategic Several options were reviewed to in- tions at USAREUR Forward (FWD) points where the potential for misun- clude using ports along the Croatian headquarters, secure civil-military co- derstandings with local people was the coast to land the force from the sea. operation between U.S. forces and the greatest. One was attached to 29th Area Since the majority of personnel and Hungarian body politic, and win the Support Group at Taszar, a farming vil- equipment would come from Ger- support of the local population for lage astride a major U.S. installation. many, a decision was made to use a Joint Endeavor. Others were assigned to the critical land bridge through Austria, Hungary, V Corps G-5 took the lead in gain- main support route at Barcs, Hungary, and Croatia over rail and road net- ing requisite support from a country and 1st Armor Divisional Support Com- works. As a peace agreement became which only recently had been ruled by mand at Slovanski Brod, Croatia. An- more probable, USAREUR and V Corps a communist regime and was some- other team was assigned to a training conducted reconnaissance to locate a what skeptical of a foreign military site set up by 7th Maneuver Training staging base in Hungary as far forward presence. After considering several Command at Taborfalva, Hungary. to the area of operations as possible. sites, Hungarian facilities in the Kapos- These teams focused on supporting the var/Taszar region were selected. This local population as dozens of convoys Colonel Bruce Castka, USAR, is deputy area was chosen for its airfield, installa- carrying everything from food and chief of staff for logistics, 353d Civil tions, and other assets that could sup- water to Abrams tanks rolled through Affairs Command. port a logistical sustainment force. In the frozen countryside.

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Castka

Hungarian engineers near Sarajevo.

Glossary of Terms ACE Allied Command Europe ARRC ACE Rapid Reaction Corps CA civil affairs

CIMIC civil-military cooperation (Jean-Marc Combat Camera Schaible) Signal Company, th GFAP general framework agreement 55 for peace IFOR Implementation Force IO international organization national support element current on newspapers, CA personnel fostered IPTF International Police Task Force their status and role in supporting support, particularly in critical opera- civilian agencies responsible for imple- tional areas as American troops rolled NGO nongovernmental organization menting the peace accords. south during the winter. When con- OHR Office of the High Representative The second team conducted civil- cerns arose over their activities, the OSCE Organization for Security and military liaison at the county center local political establishment turned to Cooperation in Europe office complex located in downtown assigned CA teams to resolve them. PEC Provisional Election Commission Kaposvar. It was there that the Army The issues that surfaced were quickly coordinated with the commercial in- brought to the attention of USAREUR PVO private voluntary organization frastructure for support. Hungarian FWD for action. UNHCR U.N. High Commissioner for civilians made offers to provide all Within ninety days the Army Refugees classes of supply and services—from safely deployed 20,000 soldiers into its USAEUR U.S. Army Europe vehicle repair to dry-cleaning—which area of responsibility. Bolstered by the were forwarded to Army contracting. national support element in Hungary, Trade shows permitted contact with American troops brought a total cessa- vendors, establishing strong links with tion of hostilities within their sector. Three additional CA teams func- the local economy. Hungary, which now is being consid- tioned in direct support of USAREUR The third team conducted an ac- ered for membership in NATO, was FWD. One formed a civil-military op- tive campaign to influence the public. pivotal to that success. Its cooperation erations center at the tactical opera- It traveled throughout southern Hun- was evident throughout the mission tions center at Taszar which conducted gary visiting 75 schools and 40 town and is attributable, at least in part, to 24-hour operations seven days a week. governments. Meetings from the efforts by the civil affairs teams that It served as the civil affairs eyes and kindergarten through high school level sustained host nation support. The ears of the tactical operations center were highly effective in communicat- unique skills of CA personnel were ide- advising USAREUR FWD on all matters ing U.S. objectives to students and ally suited to generating effective civil- pertaining to deployment and employ- their parents. Hungary also has flour- ian-military cooperation and accom- ment of CA forces in theater. They ishing media outlets (print and televi- plishing the vital mission of securing kept the commanding general of the sion) and our soldiers made news peace in the Balkans. JFQ wherever they went. Through press conferences, talk shows, and local

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Federation police would be in full control of the areas concerned by D+91. Transition of the IFOR, OHR, and IPTF (through the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegov- ina) agreed that IPTF would take the Sarajevo Suburbs lead. According to their joint statement it was within the IPTF mandate By KEVIN F. McCARROLL and DONALD R. ZOUFAL to “oversee the preparation for and gradual transition to an integrated and representative Federation police force...from D+45 to D+90” while IFOR supported IPTF by maintaining ne early test of the Dayton was charged with coordinating activi- an “enhanced presence” in these areas. accords was the transfer of ties of all civilian agencies. While each The statement also indicated that areas around Sarajevo— organization was important to the public safety was the focal point of the Oknown as the “Sarajevo sub- peace process, three were especially transfer. Both the monitoring and con- urbs”—from Serbian to Bosniac con- critical to the transition: OHR, IPTF, trol of Federation police and Serb civil trol. This included the following and UNHCR. authorities during the 45-day transition opstinas (municipalities or counties) of Although IFOR was responsible were primary goals of the international Bosnia-Herzegovina: Vogosca, Centar, for providing a secure environment, community. The multiethnic character Novi Grad, Ilijas, Hadzici, Ilidza, and working relationships under IPTF were of pre-war Sarajevo was to be preserved Nova Sarajevo (Grbavica). These areas key to the transition. The transfer was in a stable environment. UNHCR were part of the front lines during the to occur at D+45 (February 4, 1996). As played a central role in encouraging war and fighting for control of them that date approached it was clear that Serbs to remain in place both during was intense. The transition and overall the parties would not be prepared in and after the transition. peace depended upon cooperation be- areas around Sarajevo. Prior to the tween civilian and military agencies. deadline there was increased consulta- The Police Also vital was the support of civilian tion between the IFOR commander IPTF was created by U.N. Security agencies that lacked logistics and com- and the high representative who had Council resolution 1035 in December munications early in the mission. Sup- primary responsibility for coordinating 1995. Member states were to con- port for managing civil elements of the transfer of authority. On D+45 tribute 1,721 police officers for the IFOR began with the deployment of they issued a statement indicating that mission. These monitors were not CA Reservists and creation of CIMIC at the suburbs would be transferred be- armed and had no executive authority. IFOR headquarters. tween D+45 and D+90 and that the Only a few tasks that GFAP assigned to IFOR under annexes 1A and 1B were traditional military responsibilities. Under the accords, the military tasks were to be completed by D+120, Sarajevo and Environs while civilian tasks had longer time- lines. Many agencies were given nonmilitary tasks which were functionally organized. OSCE was assigned responsibility for elections, while the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was charged with refugees and displaced persons. IFOR also created the Interna- tional Police Task Force to retrain the indigenous police consistent with democratic principles and OHR which

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin F. McCarroll, USAR, is assigned to the government team and Major Donald R. Zoufal, USAR, is public administration officer, 308th Civil Affairs Brigade.

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Their mandate, outlined in annex 11, at a premium. Also scarce were phone services. ARRC furnished expertise on included the following tasks: links, for example between IPTF head- developing the overarching plan, with ■ monitor, observe, and inspect law quarters and IFOR, the support base in CA Reservists providing input on the enforcement activities and facilities Zagreb, and field stations. In addition, local police and IPTF on the manage- ■ advise and train law enforcement radios, base stations, vehicles, and pe- ment of public safety. personnel troleum products were in short supply. The Federation Interior Ministry ■ assess threats to public order and ad- While the picture improved marginally was asked to submit a plan for public vise accordingly just prior to the transition, IPTF was a safety during the transition which pro- ■ advise on law enforcement restruc- fragile organization with limited assets, posed police saturation. The numbers turing and communications and logistic short- suggested were several times higher ■ facilitate assistance to law enforce- ages continued throughout the transfer. than the total existing Serb police force ment Given this situation, it was clear in these areas. In addition to a police ■ assist by accompanying law enforcement personnel. that IFOR support would be needed for force that was out of proportion to le- IPTF to carry out its responsibilities. gitimate public safety concerns, the Police monitors were required to Failure would present two undesirable Federation proposed policing tactics have at least eight years of law enforce- alternatives. Either the transition of that would have further intimidated ment experience. Some were initially the Sarajevo suburbs would be con- those Serbs who chose to remain, in- assigned from U.N. missions in the re- ducted without a credible force to cluding house-to-house searches and gion. All received a five-day orienta- monitor and control public safety ser- checkpoints to control access to transition at the support base in Zagreb vices or IFOR troops would have to fill tion areas. The size and tactics of the where their English comprehension the void. The first would have been proposed force were inconsistent with and driving abilities were tested. Given disastrous for the peace process and democratic policing practices under the differing theories and resources of the second would represent unaccept- GFAP and could have destabilized the the contributing states, policing skill able mission creep. public safety environment. It was clear levels and styles varied greatly. More- Beyond the enhanced presence that the Federation police would have over, a steady inflow of monitors was discussed in the joint statement, IFOR to be closely controlled and moni- never assured. assistance to IPTF during the transition tored. Given the limited IPTF man- The Secretary General’s report on took two forms. The first was help with power and logistic support, this pre- IPTF stated that it was to be headed by preparing the overall plan and the sec- sented a significant challenge. a commissioner in Sarajevo and in- ond was direct assistance in opera- By February 9 all major agencies clude 3 regional, 2 subregional, and 17 tional planning, management, logis- including IFOR agreed to the prelimi- district headquarters—plus 109 police tics, and training. This support was nary components of a plan. It was de- stations across the country. But the provided by CA personnel with public cided that transition of the suburbs number of stations was subsequently safety expertise and ultimately fur- would take place one opstina at a time. cut almost in half and little of the or- nished acting chiefs of both plans and That would allow IPTF and the sup- ganization was in place by February logistics for IPTF, operations assistants, porting agencies to focus on an indi- 1996. Although the commissioner, and trainers. vidual suburb and enhance the pres- deputy commissioner, chief of staff, Assigning CIMIC personnel to ence of police monitors in the critical and chief of operations had been ap- IPTF headquarters served two pur- days before and after the transfer. Care- pointed, they had not yet arrived. poses. First, it bolstered IPTF by provid- ful consideration was given to size, Three regional offices had been estab- ing management skills to an organiza- population, political environment, lished with minimal resources in Banja tion whose command structure was presence of vital public facilities, and Luka, Tuzla, and Sarajevo. Yet only a not fully formulated. Second, it en- threat assessments in selecting the handful of district and local stations sured a solid communication link be- order of transition. The plan coordi- had opened under an acting IPTF com- tween IFOR and IPTF headquarters. nated efforts of OHR, UNHCR, IPTF, missioner. The main headquarters had This link was invaluable in managing and IFOR. These included a joint infor- no staff and the Sarajevo regional operations related to the transition. mation campaign conducted by IFOR headquarters was being moved. The and OHR to build confidence in the personnel needed to monitor opera- Transfer Planning transition and encourage Serbs to re- tions were in short supply—fewer than The transition occurred in two dis- main in place. OHR also focused on 400 countrywide and under 200 as- tinct phases. The first involved an over- political structures to prevent inflam- signed to the area around Sarajevo. all plan assigning duties to OHR, IFOR, matory rhetoric and encourage adop- In addition to manpower difficul- IPTF, and UNHCR, and the second was tion of amnesty legislation to allay ties and almost no command and con- a supporting plan to integrate task force fears of former Serb soldiers who were trol structure, IPTF faced other critical operations under IFOR. CIMIC mem- considering remaining. deficiencies. Habitable office space was bers were integral to both. In preparing the plan it was essential to identify factors that impacted on public safety and that constrained the provision of safety

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IFOR prepared a plan to generally Europe’s Troubled Neighorhood increase its presence immediately before and after the transition of each op- GERMANY Vienna stina. CA Reservists from CIMIC also SLOVAKIA coordinated surveys of each area to

identify high impact civic improve- Budapest ments. These projects were intended to AUSTRIA build confidence and improve the qual- Graz ity of life. UNHCR opened local offices to provide relief, reconciliation, and safe havens in the transitional areas. The IPTF plan was the centerpiece SLOVENIA HUNGARY of the planning effort. With the overarching scheme in place identifying Ljubljana Zagreb roles and responsibilities of each com- Vicenza ponent, IPTF was left to devise a Feder- VOJVODINA Venice CROATIA ation policing strategy which fit into the overall plan. As noted, the task force had little staff on hand at the time of transition. Its emphasis was on REPUBLIC OF SERBSKA Tuzla ADRIATIC SEA SERBIA FEDERATION San Marino OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Ancona Sarajevo

Mostar REPUBLIC OF LEGEND ITALY SERBSKA Dayton agreement line

MONTENEGRO

Pointing out “hot spot” on election day, addressed various challenges Under the task force scheme the Sarajevo. to ensure the development of Federation was limited to 545 police- plans to closely integrate IFOR men in the transition areas. Each area U.S. Air Force (Benjamin M. Andera) and IPTF operations. CIMIC was allocated a maximum number. Au- staff members also used mili- thorized officers were issued photo tary assets to reduce logistics identification valid in only one area. assigning every monitor in the mission and communications shortages on For example, since 80 officers were is- area to the field. Moreover, it was not IPTF operations. sued badges for Vogosca, IPTF only had able to target recruiting on operational CIMIC personnel coordinated to monitor that number. or logistics specialties. An infusion of preparation of the IPTF portion of the In addition to reducing the num- experienced personnel and an ability transition plan. After deciding that the ber of officers, the plan controlled Fed- to integrate the civil police plan with operation would be phased and the eration police tactics. CA Reservists the military was essential for IPTF in order in which the areas would be working with the IPTF deputy commis- preparing an operational plan. transferred, IPTF prepared a timetable sioner prepared guidelines limiting the Public safety specialists from to maximize its impact on the transi- types of arms, searches, and check- CIMIC who augmented the IPTF head- tion process. However, even with all points and requiring prompt reports quarters staff provided requisite exper- IPTF resources focused on one opstina on arrest and detention. Only uni- tise. Working with the acting commis- at a time, it was clear that the police formed operations by trained person- sioner and his staff as they arrived in structure proposed by the Federation nel with IPTF-issued credentials were the mission area these CIMIC members would be overwhelmed. The only way permitted in the areas. These officers a few monitors could supervise the po- had an orientation on the guidelines lice was to cap their number, which be- before credentials were issued. came a key feature of the IPTF plan.

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Federation officers were inter- pressure on IPTF. Plans covered wide- was no widespread destruction. There viewed by IPTF prior to being issued spread civil unrest, fires, public utilities was only one fatality, a woman killed photo identification and signed a doc- emergencies, sniper attacks, detection by a booby-trap on the last day—an ument accepting individual responsi- of mines and unexploded ordnance, unavoidable event even with perfect bility under the guidelines. This and casualty evacuation. In addition to planning. Moreover, although there screening helped develop familiarity planning, CIMIC personnel helped ex- was violence, the transition was rela- and communication among monitors pedite the intake of new officers. They tively tranquil given the emotional na- and police. Public fears of the Federa- trained monitors at the civil police ture of the conflict. Significantly, it did tion police were allayed by the fact support base in Zagreb and helped the not derail the peace process, which is that IPTF maintained files on these of- United Nations accommodate more perhaps the best indicator of the tran- ficers. Moreover, this process also en- monitors. This augmentation together sition team’s success. sured ethnic representation among the with a change in deployment policies The transition could not have ad- police during the transfer (see figure). that funneled monitors into Sarajevo vanced without close cooperation be- A multiethnic presence was of both district reduced shortages in personnel, tween IFOR and IPTF. CIMIC linked practical and symbolic importance. especially later in the transition. the civil and military sectors and While screening was conducted Regarding command and control, served as the catalyst in establishing by IPTF it was managed and supported CIMIC personnel set up a joint opera- cooperation, contributing directly to by CA Reservists from CIMIC who tion center to coordinate IPTF opera- IPTF plans, and enabling the task force arranged for the military to photo- tions with those of IFOR during the to fulfill its mandate. The liaison con- graph police officers and prepare iden- transition at headquarters, Multina- ducted by CA personnel assigned to tity cards. The team managed logistics tional Division Southwest, the divi- CIMIC resulted in an exemplary IPTF and supervised the overall process. sional command responsible for Sara- and IFOR team. CIMIC also helped IPTF establish a jevo. CIMIC personnel arranged for a CA Reservists were uniquely qual- schedule and procedures for the transi- military communications link with the ified to be the link between civilian tion. The timeline required that one IPTF headquarters operations center. By and military agencies. Their experi- opstina be transitioned every six to creating the CIMIC center and linking ence enabled them to appreciate tasks seven days from February 23 to March it with military communications, IPTF assigned to civilian agencies under the 19. This allowed IPTF to focus person- improved its capability to coordinate accords. The public safety team had nel and resources on a specific area with IFOR. While only an alternate, dealt with similar problems in their two or three days before transition and this communications capability was everyday lives. Throughout the opera- reduce it shortly after, maximizing its valuable in emergencies. tion the IPTF commissioner acknowl- impact during critical times. This IPTF access to IFOR commu- edged that civil affairs personnel pro- Key resources like power stations nications is a good example of CA coor- vided capabilities in law enforcement, and water facilities were made patrol dination between civilian and military police training, and patrolling urban priorities by IFOR, allowing IPTF to organizations. It did not significantly areas. Thus they garnered credibility concentrate on the civilian populace tax the military communication net- with their counterparts, enabling work but greatly increased them to forge a critical link between the ability of IPTF to reach IFOR and IPTF. JFQ Ethnic Representation in Police Force its units in emergencies. Opstina Serb Croat Muslim Total Moreover, the presence of Vogosca 30 8 48 86 IPTF personnel in JOC and Centar 6 2 12 20 access to military communication at IPTF headquarters Novi Grad 3 3 29 35 gave IFOR instant access to Ilijas 24 15 50 89 key IPTF personnel and in- Hadzici 24 5 51 80 formation which was critical Ilidza 28 18 72 118 throughout the mission. Grbavica 9 13 68 90 The transfer of the Sara- jevo suburbs was not without problems. IPTF planning, however, was flexible and Federation police. CA planners enough and communication and coor- from CIMIC along with IPTF devel- dination between IPTF and IFOR ade- oped contingency plans, and crisis re- quate to meet the challenge. But over- sponse was coordinated with IFOR to all success is hard to measure. The further reduce personnel and resource number of Serbs who remained in these areas was smaller than hoped but not much more than expected. And while property damage occurred, there

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■ The Challenge of Civil-Military Operations By JOHN J. TUOZZOLO

ostilities in Bosnia-Herzegov- The Legacy of Tito part ethnically homogeneous. The ge- ina officially ended in De- Internal tensions were, however, ographic area now known as Bosnia- cember 1995 with the sign- substantially kept in check after 1945 Herzegovina remained a diverse soci- ing in Paris of the Dayton by the rise to power of Josip Broz Tito. ety populated by Muslims (who prefer Hpeace accords, which had been reached Despite the controversial role of Yu- to be called Bosniacs), Croats, and a month earlier. It was hoped that with goslavia behind the Iron Curtain, the Serbs. The ingrained beliefs, preju- this agreement not only would 60,000 country and its people prospered dices, mistrust, and ambitions of these members of IFOR arrive but also that under Tito’s dictatorship. In fact, under various peoples inevitably led to four peace would bring a chance for a once his special brand of communism, citi- years of bloody conflict. advanced society to regain its promi- zens were well educated and allowed To say that the war took its toll on nence. However, not long after its to enjoy many of the benefits of their Bosnian institutions presents only one arrival IFOR learned that there are sub- labors. Achieving worldwide fame, side of the story. Nearly all govern- stantive differences between peace- Sarajevo hosted the winter olympic ment functions and activities ceased keeping and peace implementation. games in the mid-1980s, although its except waging war. The impact was This article focuses on two civilian world-class ice rink is in near ruin and very different depending on one’s eth- functions that required substantial mil- has served as home to British forces. nic identity and where one lived. How- itary attention and resulted in a text- After Tito’s death no one could ever, the necessities of life were lacking book case of civil-military cooperation. keep the various factions together. The throughout the land. In short, if it was To achieve peaceful coexistence republics began breaking away from not for the hundreds of NGOs from several prerequisites were identified the central government, resulting in around the world and millions of dol- by the framers of the Dayton agree- new nations such as Slovenia, Serbia, lars in donations which they distrib- ment. Establishing a viable central and Croatia which were for the most uted, the people of Bosnia might have government along with its various el- perished by the thousands. ements was crucial. Also implicit was the need for a functioning legal system as well as elections which were mandated to take place within nine Greek soldiers guarding ballot months of the agreement or no later boxes in Zenica. than September 14, 1996. Success depended on cooperation among parties who agreed on very little, not only in the previous four years but throughout their history. IFOR was quickly confronted by this reality, which resulted in a civil-military challenge of epic proportions. Deep-seated ethnic feelings reflected a sharply divided population. During World War II, the Croatians had aligned themselves with Germany while the Serbs had fought with the Soviet Union, com- pounding an already difficult situation.

Colonel John J. Tuozzolo, USAR, is a member of 353d Civil Affairs Command; he served with IFOR/CIMIC and OSCE Combat Camera Squadron (Andy Dunaway) Combat Camera Squadron

mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina. ST 1

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T uozzolo Combat Camera Squadron (Lance Cheung) Combat Camera Squadron st 1

Voting in Mostar.

Processing absentee ballots.

IFOR thus faced a situation some- to the letter of the agree- what reminiscent of World War II but ment, the civilian imple- without a mandate to govern or restore mentation of the peace essential services. The peace agreement mandate could not be ac- and other accords assigned nation- complished without ac- building to civil agencies. For instance, tive participation by the OHR would reactivate the civil infra- military in civilian sup- structure and joint civilian commis- port organizations. sions dealt with communications, An unforeseen and vence D. Braswell)

transport, and economic development. lesser known concern was y (Mar Elections, however, were relegated to the judicial system. After the warring parties, international agen- four years of war and the cies, and OSCE. physical separation of the factions it was in dire The Military Role need of rejuvenation. Combat Camera Imager Stabilizing the situation, separat- Over two-thirds of the ju- ing and disarming the various parties, dicial positions were vacant, statutes laws to which all parties could agree and providing limited assistance, ade- were difficult if not impossible to lo- and no voter registration lists. OSCE quate security, and freedom of move- cate, and legal texts were nearly nonex- was overwhelmed by the task of regis- ment for all civilians as well as NGOs istent. Despite this state of affairs, nei- tering 3.5 million voters in Bosnia and charged with effecting the peace was ther the agreement nor the various 20 other countries. Virtually every left to the military. That mission NGOs envisioned helping this critical phase of the process required support. would develop into one of the most institution. CA personnel were the first Again, CA personnel proved valuable extensive civil-military operations in to identify this problem and immedi- for this NGO, which is not to say that U.S. and NATO history. Furthermore, ately render assistance using their civil- the military provided unusual services despite the concern over excessive ian expertise. or that the judicial and electoral sys- IFOR involvement (“mission creep”) If the judicial system was sick, the tems were driven by individuals in uni- and the effort to limit the military role electoral process was comatose. The form. Rather, this mission had become last country-wide election had been held in 1991. There were no election

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a cooperative civil-military engage- made, a quick assessment of the sys- the mandate by creating a bifurcated ment instead of a traditional exercise. tem and its needs had to be performed. administrative system for the election. This included conferences with prose- While OSCE was given the task of con- The Judicial System cutors, judges, and officials, which ex- ducting the election, the agreement During the Tito regime Yugoslavia posed the gravity of the problem. also set up the Provisional Election had a functioning judiciary, albeit In January 1996 the judicial sys- Commission (PEC) composed of repre- under communism. It had both crimi- tem was at best on life support. Nei- sentatives from each of the three war- nal and civil courts and an appellate ther faction could claim more than ring factions and four international process. There was criminal and civil one-third of the judges, but both representatives to govern the process. procedure as well as a criminal code, stated that the lack of a full compli- It is important to recognize sev- civil laws, and precedent. Also, consis- ment of judges was not the problem. A eral points regarding the electoral tent with a functioning judicial sys- shortage of law texts and equipment, process. The last national election had tem, courts on all levels had geo- usually computers, was of great con- been held in 1991. Since virtually graphic jurisdictional control and cern as was the geographic jurisdic- everything changed after that date the authority. They were active with a tional problem of crossing the con- purveyors of peace faced the following compliment of judges who tended to frontation lines. These lines were considerations: reflect the ethnic make-up of the gen- sanctioned, and in some cases actually ■ the central government was power- eral population. changed, by the peace agreement. Ob- less With war, the ethnic balance of viously case loads needed to be re- ■ there was no agreed upon election the judiciary favored the faction which viewed and cases transferred to the law, hence PEC had to fashion rules and controlled the area. A noted exception proper jurisdiction when appropriate. regulations was the Federation minister of justice, This last problem presented an ■ no voter registration data existed a Bosnian Croat. Moreover, through- ideal nonconfrontational area of dis- ■ Dayton prescribed that the 1991 out the conflict it became increasingly cussion. An agenda was agreed to after census serve as the base voter registration document difficult to keep the judicial system several preliminary meetings between ■ of the 3.5 million voters, over 1.5 going. Several by-products of the war the CIMIC lawyers and ministerial million had relocated according to U.N. es- caused its near total collapse. Foremost staffs. In March 1996 the two ministers timates was the fighting and destruction. For and their chief assistants met in the ■ over 20 foreign countries housed example, the high appellate court Bosnian Serb capital of Pale in a long refugee voters totalling approximately building in Sarajevo was a frequent tar- although cordial session. The ministers 750,000 get of Bosnian Serb shells from the sur- even caucused alone after the formal ■ of 7,000-plus polling places used in rounding hillsides. Even in the uncon- discussion. This historic meeting was 1991 many no longer existed tested areas the lack of resources followed by a second, again organized ■ freedom of movement was greatly became severe. In addition, some juris- and orchestrated by CIMIC personnel. restricted by the parties ■ transportation throughout the dictional disputes crossed the con- It was also proposed to the U.S. country was badly damaged by the war frontation lines. How could a Bosniac Agency for International Development ■ telecommunications across the con- judge expect a decree enforceable in a (USAID) that a full assessment of the frontation lines was limited to satellite Serbian held area to be acted upon? judicial system be made. CIMIC out- ■ parties often insisted that informa- Although the chief of CIMIC was lined the criteria for the assessment as tion be published in their own languages named in January 1996, the peace well as intended products. This was an ■ division lines between factions were agreement was silent on the judicial extensive undertaking with a view to- not always practical and agreement had to system. There were no civilian or mili- ward future assistance from USAID and be reached on exchanges of territory tary commissions to assess or revitalize other NGOs. Obviously this effort ■ controlling political parties in given this system. Failing to plan for an inte- would involve some nontraditional areas often were hostile to the democratic process grated judicial system became critical roles for the military. The project was ■ logistical support to the OSCE mis- when the Bosniacs arrested and sought endorsed by USAID and completed sion was limited to one small Swiss military to prosecute a noted Bosnian Serb gen- under the CIMIC staff. unit. eral and his assistant who were alleged to be war criminals but who had not Electoral Politics It was under these conditions that been charged by the International The Dayton accords mandated OSCE was asked to administer an elec- Criminal Tribunal. that the election would take place tion within nine months. The organi- The CIMIC staff included attor- within nine months of the agreement, zation was understaffed and inade- neys who identified problems in the an energetic goal for any emerging na- quately supplied in mid-February judicial system and made several rec- tion. In a country where the ruling fac- 1996. This is not to suggest that OSCE ommendations. The first was holding a tions rarely agree on anything, how- was incapable of conducting an elec- meeting between the ministers of jus- ever, these accords further complicated tion. Rather, it is indicative of the tice, one Croat and the other Serb, speed with which things had to occur who had not spoken in over four years. and of problems in creating a new mis- But before the contact could even be sion and acquiring workers from OSCE

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T uozzolo

member states. In fact, the mission included not only its headquarters in Sarajevo but also field offices and regional centers. Therefore OSCE had to open 32 offices in nine months and be prepared for an election no later than September 14, 1996. By the end of January 1996 IFOR was established and had nearly completed the major task of its mission: separating the parties and ending hostilities. Freedom of movement, however, was another issue as was transferring authority over territory from one faction to another. There was thus a return to normalcy in each region. How- ever, while the military could move about without fear, that was not necessarily the case for civilians or members of NGOs such as OSCE. Crossing various confrontation lines was perilous. In fact, by May 1996 the Bosnian Serb representative to PEC was still insisting IPTF and SFOR on a military escort to attend meetings members near in Sarajevo. This was in part out of a Kvezivici. concern for safety and in part to make

a statement about the pre-election en- Combat Camera (Angel Clemens) Signal Company, th

vironment. OSCE, recognizing that 55 total freedom of movement had not been achieved and not wishing to dis- rupt these meetings, reluctantly asked would vote where they lived in 1991. It then fell to OSCE not only to the Italian units in IFOR to continue While exceptions were allowed, they publish these rules but also to explain their escort services. were not concisely outlined. PEC them to registration officials and vot- In addition, each faction had its therefore had to decide whether indi- ers and incorporate them into the own rules on forming and regulating viduals could vote in and for the area registration process. What these rules political parties but the agreement in which they currently resided. If required, therefore, was that all regis- wiped the slate clean and passed this viewed from the Western democratic tration sites have complete lists of the issue to PEC. The only major condition standpoint, it would seem that voting 1991 census and forms to allow indi- set out in the agreement was the prohi- where one resides would be proper, viduals to register, decide where their bition against indicted war criminals or thereby disavowing the Dayton ap- ballots were to be counted, and if ap- individuals who would not submit to proach requiring the vote to be propriate obtain absentee ballots. Gov- the jurisdiction of the war crimes tri- counted where one previously lived. ernance in Bosnia is rather different bunal. While such people could not Implicit in this discussion was the idea from the American model. Municipal stand as candidates, they remained that allowing people to vote where authority is stronger than in the party leaders for several months, which they resided was tantamount to sanc- United States where each succeeding was a critical problem since the Bosnian tioning ethnic cleansing, as citizens level of government—local, state, Fed- Serb leader fell into this category. tended to relocate in ethnically homo- eral—is more powerful. In Bosnia, geneous areas. What evolved under however, these levels are somewhat the Voter Registration PEC was a complicated mixture of the reverse in their relationship to people The greatest hinderance, however, general rule and exceptions made in and their daily lives. Furthermore, po- was the issue of where (in what munic- favor of voters deciding where they litical parties exercise much more con- ipality) individual votes would be ap- wished to have their ballots apply. trol in the municipal governments plied. At least 1.5 million voters had These rules were complex and took de- than do local entities in our country. relocated. Obviously they were fleeing tailed explanation for even astute There also was the matter of voter the conflict. Some went to foreign party leaders to grasp. registration. As mentioned previously, countries while others moved to areas each registration site was to receive a controlled by soldiers of their own eth- full 1991 census list. For technical rea- nic background. The agreement con- sons, producing that list in a short time tained a general rule that individuals became monumental. While this list

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was stored in a computer, the census Given the available time and area more engaged in this traditionally civil- forms had been scanned using 1990s in which IFOR and OSCE operated, it ian process than was envisioned by ei- technology. Thus the information suf- was inevitable that mutual assistance ther the peace accords or IFOR. fered many inaccuracies. Furthermore, would be offered and received. Their the task of indexing individuals was missions were mutually dependent. Reconstructing and rejuvenating a burdensome because voters were en- Successful elections seemed to equate war-torn country is no simple task. tered by street in the same order that with a withdrawal of forces. By June Successful elections on the national census takers moved from one house to 1996, with less than three and a half and municipal levels are steps toward another. A massive administrative and months to go and with party enroll- stabilization. So, too, is a functioning logistical problem resulted that OSCE ment underway and voter registration judicial system. In both areas the skill could not have been prepared to meet. starting, logistical needs were increas- of civil affairs soldiers made an impor- The printed registration books coming. The staffs of both OSCE and IFOR tant contribution to peace. The mili- prised more than 50 small volumes per met to analyze and plan for various tary role in this process was aptly set which had to be distributed eventualities. termed Joint Endeavor. Within a short throughout the country together with These are just a few examples of time of their arrival, NATO and other millions of registration forms. How- the preparatory assistance IFOR ren- forces became part of a combined civil- ever, no commercial printer in Bosnia dered to OSCE. The campaign and vot- military endeavor. In the final analysis, or elsewhere in Europe could produce ing presented challenges for the elec- however, peace will only be secured them by the projected date for com- tion process including freedom of through cooperation by the world mencing voter registration. movement. In addition, there was a community, military forces, and the lack of communication both during the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. JFQ Cooperative Effort campaign and on election day. There Fortunately, IFOR became actively were no telephone land lines across the engaged with OSCE. Through CIMIC, confrontation lines. One could not call which had been working with OSCE from Sarajevo to Pale, just 20 miles, since February 1996, arrangements were using traditional phone lines since the made for printing the voter list, trans- call would cross the border into Bosn- portation to Sarajevo, and distribution ian Serb territory. The only way to of the census sets, as well as registration communicate was via satellite. This po- and absentee ballot request forms. It tential problem concerned OSCE and was a cooperative effort between IFOR IFOR with particular reference to at- and OSCE. To grasp the magnitude of tempted disruptions of campaign what was happening, one must envi- events or election day voting. sion a voting list that weighed over a Another important aspect of the hundred pounds and that required dis- electoral process in which IFOR be- tribution to over a hundred municipali- came actively engaged was education. ties and several foreign countries. Larger By June 1996 there were no country- municipalities received several sets of wide radio or television stations. In- these voting lists and the appropriate deed, Bosnian Serbs used NATO bomb- number of forms, all in preparation for ing of their television transmitters as registration day. an excuse for their inability to reach With no printers available, no re- the electorate. Accordingly, one can liable commercial truckers with the ca- understand how IFOR became in- pacity to deliver, and a partially de- volved in producing, distributing, and stroyed highway system, it is not broadcasting educational material. difficult to understand what would With each day OSCE became have happened if IFOR had not partici- stronger in its ability to administra- pated at this phase of the election tively hold an election. On the na- process. Within this context, the mili- tional level the election proceeded on tary role had changed from studied time without disruption. However, its distance to helpful engagement. OSCE political nature took on greater signifi- was offered military help in election cance and ultimately caused postpone- planning and logistic support. CA offi- ment of municipal elections. Despite cers in CIMIC became active members this setback, military personnel were of regional center staffs and OSCE headquarters.

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War Criminals— Testing the Limits of Military Force commentary By F.M. LORENZ

he coming year will see a has only a handful of indicted war critical phase in the interna- criminals in confinement; most are be- tional effort to bring peace lieved to be at large in the former Yu- to Bosnia and Herzegovina. goslavia. There have been public calls TStabilization Force (SFOR) has an ambi- for NATO to take an aggressive role in tious mission that will continue into apprehending them.1 Many political summer 1998. Although the war has pundits in the United States claim that ended, efforts to build institutions and there can be no peace unless these war promote reconciliation have faltered. criminals are brought to justice and that their very freedom is an impediment to refugee resettlement and rec- Very near the heart of all foreign affairs is the onciliation. Media reports indicate that NATO has often refused to take action relationship between policy and military power. when notorious suspects flout the law. —McGeorge Bundy As part of plans for its continued mission in Bosnia, NATO is said to be considering a new military policy on indicted war criminals. The promises of the Dayton peace This situation raises questions agreement are largely unfulfilled after about the limits of military force that more than a year and the region has must be viewed within the broader drawn into ethnic enclaves divided by context of U.S. foreign policy. This ar- the “inter-entity boundary line” and ticle addresses the following issues: long-standing hatred. A critical mile- What is NATO military policy with re- stone will come with local elections set spect to indicted war criminals? Is it for September 1997. consistent with both U.S. foreign pol- One of the most controversial as- icy and international law? Is it effec- pects of the peace process has been the tive? And if a new policy is adopted NATO policy for arresting those in- can it be implemented to promote pol- dicted by the International Criminal icy objectives in the Balkans? Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). After three years the tribunal Background The NATO military mission in Bosnia commenced in December 1995 Colonel F. M. Lorenz, USMC, holds the Marine Corps chair at after U.S. leadership made possible the the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and was senior first real cease-fire after four years of legal advisor for Operation Restore Hope.

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war. Dayton implemented U.S. policy ■ preventing the spread of the con- operations other than war (MOOTW).3 by seeking to unify Bosnia in a single flict into a broader Balkan war that could Creating a demilitarized “zone of sepa- multi-ethnic state. But the accords also threaten both allies and the stability of ration” in Bosnia is a clear and achiev- divided the country into two entities new democratic states in central and east- able military task. But enforcing the re- based on ethnic differences. An essen- ern Europe turn of displaced persons to their ■ stemming the destabilizing flow of tial component was creation of Imple- homes, guaranteed by Dayton, is a dif- refugees mentation Force (IFOR) to execute mil- ■ halting the slaughter of innocents ferent issue. Some have called for SFOR itary aspects of the agreement. The ■ supporting the key role of NATO in to enforce refugee resettlement. This initial zone of separation between enti- Europe while maintaining the U.S. role in summons for an easy military solution ties as well as the cease-fire and demo- shaping European security architecture. demonstrates a lack of understanding bilization provisions were enforced by A review of the Dayton agree- of the practical limits of force. IFOR. The civil terms of the Dayton ac- ment provides additional insight into SFOR has 31,000 troops in Bosnia, cords are much broader in scope. They U.S. political objectives. Its preamble and general security is within its capa- include the conduct of free and fair sets out the overall purpose: “to bring bility. But more than two million per-

commentary elections and establishment of an ef- an end to the tragic conflict” and to sons were displaced in Bosnia and fective national government. IFOR “promote an enduring peace and sta- Herzegovina during four years of war. achieved the key military objectives bility.” The military annex, 1A, de- Most vacated homes have been reoccu- scribes the mission in terms of cessa- pied by new residents and ethnic ha- military force has been used tion of hostilities, redeployment of tred still runs deep. Local citizens are simply not willing to allow a peaceful historically as an instrument forces, enforcement of the zone of separation, and establishment of military return of their recent enemies. More- of foreign policy commissions. The other annexes, over, Muslim authorities are reported 2–11, address civilian implementation to be planning a return of their own of the agreement under supervision of refugees to areas in Serbska that have during the first four months of the op- the high representative. Civilian tasks military significance, which is not lost eration. While the short-term political include monitoring elections, return- on local citizens. A SFOR patrol of a objectives of saving lives and stopping ing refugees and displaced persons, dozen men is not likely to stop an un- the war were clearly met, the long- promoting human rights, and creating armed crowd of 200 Serbs intent on term civil objectives have proven more an international police task force. burning Muslim homes. Although formidable. Few refugees have been Some analysts think that the political troops can provide added security and able to return home despite the and military goals established at Day- respond to known threats, it would promises made at Dayton. Local politi- ton are essentially irreconcilable. not be feasible to place a 24-hour cal leaders have created various barri- Many have noted contradictions: a armed guard on thousands of homes. ers including road blocks and a maze military objective to partition the The movement and return of refugees of red tape. But by and large, most citi- country and a political one to unify it is essentially a civilian task best left to zens simply refuse to live alongside into a multi-ethnic state. It should not the people and local officials. their recent enemies. SFOR has the re- be surprising that in the first year im- The United Nations and NATO sponsibility of building on the IFOR plementation of the agreement can be mandate into summer 1998. The chal- viewed as a military success but a po- ICTY was created by U.N. Security lenge will be to capitalize on past suc- litical failure. Still, U.S. involvement Council resolution 827 of May 25, cess and provide the stability to imple- has resulted in achievement of most of 1993. The declared purpose was to ment the civilian objectives of the the short-term objectives, and SFOR prosecute persons responsible for seri- peace process. will have an additional opportunity to ous violations of international human- Military force has been used his- provide a climate for peace. itarian law. The United Nations called torically as an instrument of foreign for all states to cooperate fully with the policy in a wide range of situations The Limits of Force tribunal4 and the Dayton agreement from war to “forceful persuasion” to Implementation of the Dayton ac- requires its parties to collude in the 5 humanitarian intervention. It is a fun- cords in Bosnia raises serious questions matter of indicted war criminals. At damental principle of foreign policy about the limits and effectiveness of the time of the accords some seventy that military means must be carefully military force in peace support opera- indictments had been returned, most 2 tied to overall political objectives. As tions. Not all of the Dayton objectives for Bosnian Serbs. But ICTY has no po- indicated in U.S. national security are amenable to a military solution. lice authority to search out or appre- strategy, there are five basic compo- Force is a blunt instrument more hend indicted war criminals. Like the nents of foreign policy at stake in the suited to war than to the complex NATO force it must enter with the per- former Yugoslavia: world of peace operations and military mission of the sovereign nation where ■ sustaining a political settlement that it operates. The international police preserves Bosnia’s territorial integrity and currently in Bosnia are unarmed and provides a viable future for all its peoples perform only advisory and training

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Bosnian supreme court building. IFOR apprehending Serb looters, Sarajevo. Joint Combat Camera Center

International Law There is no precedent for the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegov- ina. Historically, the trial of war criminals has been “victors’ justice” after international armed conflict. The occupying force maintains full control of

enz police and civil institutions. ICTY was created by the international commu- F.M. Lor F.M. nity while the conflict was still under way. In March 1996 Amnesty Interna- tional, a private human rights group, roles. Hence there is a natural ten- small, lightly armed SFOR elements issued “an open letter to IFOR com- dency to turn to SFOR to gain custody should attempt to apprehend heavily manders and contributing govern- of the criminals. guarded war criminals. ments” concerning the search for war There is no discussion of the mili- The policy on indicted war crimi- criminals. It criticized IFOR for “refus- tary policy toward indicted war criminals is only one part of the overall ing to search for persons suspected of nals in the Dayton agreement. The NATO military policy in the Balkans. genocide, other crimes against human- NATO force—first IFOR, now SFOR—is Though widely criticized in the media ity, and serious violations of humani- led by the U.S. commander but policy as unreasonably timid, the policy has tarian law.” The letter cited reports is set by the 16-member North Atlantic served well to maintain stability and that IFOR troops had encountered sev- Council (NAC). The policy for dealing keep the criminals on guard and rela- eral indicted individuals but failed to with indicted war criminals was care- tively isolated. It allows time for diplo- arrest them. It further maintained that fully formulated by NAC before the matic and economic initiatives to per- the IFOR failure to search for suspects first IFOR soldier set foot in Bosnia. mit the individual nations to turn violates the Geneva Conventions of The initial policy was part of the rules criminals over to the tribunal. Perhaps 19496 and Security Council resolution of engagement for IFOR. It essentially most important, NATO has a unified 827 and is inconsistent with Dayton. provides that indicted war criminals policy that sets effective limits on mili- Both the Dayton and Geneva will be apprehended if encountered by tary action. It is consistent with U.S. obligations with respect to indicted NATO personnel in the course of their political objectives, and the war has war criminals apply to the states in the normal duties. It does not permit ac- ended—at least for now. In that sense former Yugoslavia, not NATO itself. tion to hunt them down nor does it re- the policy has been highly effective. IFOR was not an occupying force in quire apprehension if prudence dic- Bosnia, and SFOR has the same status. tates otherwise. Few would argue that The NATO force is operating within

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sovereign nations that have given it to assault Aideed’s stronghold at the this option as an alternative or means permission to carry out the specific Olympic Hotel in October 1993 con- to be used in combination with mili- military tasks of Dayton. Searching for tributed to the disaster that led to a retary power. They also ignore a funda- suspects is not included. In fact, an versal of U.S. policy and withdrawal.7 mental principle of strategy laid down agreement had to be negotiated be- The collapse of U.S. policy in So- by Sun Tzu: It is better to subdue the tween NATO and Bosnia and Herze- malia was not due to a lack of political enemy without fighting than to be the govina to turn criminals over to ICTY direction. One day after the ambush of victor in a hundred battles. in the event they were apprehended by Pakistani peacekeepers in June 1993, U.S. policy, both economic and IFOR. There has been regular coopera- the Security Council called for the “im- diplomatic, has been most effective tion between NATO and ICTY, includ- mediate apprehension” of those re- when coordinated with NATO allies. ing security for investigative teams and sponsible.8 American forces were in- But there is at least one area where it creased in preparation for has evolved independently. The “equip there is no legal requirement for commando operations against and train” program for the combined NATO to actively pursue indicated Aideed and his faction. U.S. Am- Croat and Muslim Federation has pro-

commentary bassador to the United Nations ceeded despite opposition in Europe war criminals Madeline Albright went directly where there is a concern that more to the public to gain support for weapons will ultimately destabilize the temporary guard of alleged mass a tough administration policy.9 Her po- region. The first delivery of tanks and graves. In March 1996 IFOR delivered sition is worth noting because of her heavy weapons was made to the Feder- two Serb suspects being held in Sara- current role in formulating policy for ation army in December 1996 after all jevo to The Hague in response to a for- indicted war criminals in Bosnia. conditions were met. One of the last mal ICTY request. There is no legal re- As pressure mounted, the U.S. requirements was the removal from quirement for NATO to actively pursue commander with the most experience the Bosnian government of an individ- indicted war criminals, and the con- in Somalia, Lieutenant General Robert ual with known sympathies to Iran. duct of IFOR has been entirely consis- Johnston, USMC, suggested enlisting But there has been no effort to tie arms tent with international law. Aideed’s rivals to undercut his influ- shipment to the surrender of indicted ence. “Political pressure is the best way war criminals in Croat-held areas Lessons from Somalia to reduce Aideed’s power. If you end which may reveal something about the U.S. forces arrived in Somalia in up fighting him you play to his strong relative priority of U.S. objectives. December 1992 as part of a major in- suit.”10 These remarks were made just a America could be seen as favoring the ternational humanitarian intervention, week before the fateful assault at the Muslims and Croats by implying that Operation Restore Hope. The narrow Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu that left surrender of indicted war criminals is military mission at the outset was to 18 Americans dead. Despite clear polit- essentially a Serb problem. As in Soma- provide security for delivering relief ical direction, the policy proved to be lia, such perceptions can undermine supplies. After the mission was turned misguided and unsuitable for a region peace processes. A coordinated eco- over to the United Nations in May embroiled in tribal/ethnic conflict. Per- nomic and diplomatic strategy with 1993 it was extended to disarming the haps the most important lesson of So- the threat of military force stands the factions and rebuilding civil institu- malia is that military force should best chance of bringing the war crimi- tions. American forces remained on never be substituted for effective diplo- nals to justice. the scene under U.S. command to pro- macy. As an ironic footnote, Aideed vide military support. In the summer eventually died as a result of a battle The Scale of Justice of 1993 both the United States and the with his long-time adversary, Ali The ICTY role in Bosnia is unique United Nations underestimated the Mahdi Mohammed. The removal of because the process is designed not level of backing Mohammed Farah Aideed did nothing to restore peace to only to establish guilt or innocence Aideed would muster within his Somalia and the country is still divided but to contribute to the peace process fiercely loyal clan. Although vilified in by factional fighting itself. The war was still in progress the West he became a national hero when the tribunal was established, and and potential martyr when the head of Economics and Diplomacy some hoped that it would hasten an the U.N. mission put a reward on his Before considering a new military end to years of bloodshed. But the in- head. Soon the United States began policy it is essential to review the other dictment of Radovan Karadzic (the for- commando style operations to seize elements of U.S. national power avail- mer president of the Bosnia Serbs) and him. At that point it crossed what has able to influence action in the former Ratko Mladic (once the head of the since been called the “Mogadishu Yugoslavia. One is economic sanctions. Bosnian Serb military) failed to stop Line” by being perceived as supporting They played a major part in isolating one of the most brutal acts of the war, one faction by attacking the leadership the Serbs and forcing them to the bar- the slaughter of Muslim civilians at Se- of another. A failure to coordinate with gaining table at Dayton. But they have brinica in July 1995. ICTY did not the United Nations the final decision been underutilized in obtaining in- drive the Serbs to the peace table; it dicted war criminals. Those who de- was the fact that in November 1995 mand military action rarely mention

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for the Serbs, who view themselves as a nation of victims who must fight for survival. Even if the supporters of Karadzic and Mladic were to quietly watch their leaders be carried off by NATO troops, the certain result in Serbska would be to further radicalize the population and increase support for Karadzic’s party. A likely result would be hostage-taking by the Serbs and increasing military confrontation with SFOR troops. This pattern could easily be repeated should similar action be taken in Muslim or Croat areas

of Bosnia. Although the national elec- commentary tions may have solidified the control of the nationalist parties, there was little violence. This in itself may be a first step in national reconciliation.

A New Policy Guarding suspected Military action in Bosnia similar site of mass grave to that initiated in Somalia could jeop- Signal Company, Combat Camera (Glenn W. Suggs) Combat Camera (Glenn W. Signal Company,

near Ceparde, Serbska. th ardize success to date and destabilize 55 the entire peace process. An effective policy will require diplomatic, economic, and military power. There are they were militarily and economically Serbska indicate that General Mladic six elements to be considered in devel- at a dead end. has been removed from office. The key oping a new NATO policy concerning Despite the low number of indi- indictees have been “branded with the indicted war criminals. viduals in custody ICTY has made his- mark of Cain,” serving as some mea- Develop clear political objectives. A toric gains in returning indictments for sure of retribution. major factor in the military success genocide and crimes against humanity. thus far has been a clear and narrowly- The world is witness to the daily testi- Elections defined mission. If there is to be a new mony of unspeakable brutality. Public Many observers contend that the mission it must be linked to political disclosure will likely have much the national elections in Bosnia were a objectives. It is not enough to seek the same effect as the truth commissions sham: The conditions for free and fair “arrest” of war criminals. This fails to in South Africa. The decision by Preto- provide sufficient guid- ria to create truth commissions rather military action in Bosnia similar to that ance to develop a coher- than conduct criminal trials was a ent military policy. If compromise designed to avoid further initiated in Somalia could destabilize combat operations to discord. Many defendants there will be the entire peace process search out and seize the granted amnesty, and the hearings indictees are to be di- themselves are expected to promote rected, that mandate reconciliation in a nation long torn by voting simply did not exist. There is must be crystal clear. Up to now the factional strife. Even without more ar- general agreement that the results force in Bosnia has received mixed po- rests the work of ICTY has resulted in a have solidified the hold of the nation- litical signals. One objective is to sepa- revival of international humanitarian alist parties. Much is at stake in the rate factions and another is to unify law and affirmed the customary un- local elections now set for September them. It may not be possible to do written law that binds all states to in- 1997. Precipitous military action by both at the same time. ternational standards of behavior. SFOR could easily inflame the already Develop a unified approach. The im- Although only a handful of in- deep ethnic hatred and confirm what pact of the NATO war criminal policy dicted war criminals are now in the many undecided voters have long sus- on coalition unity should not be over- custody of the tribunal there has been pected. The “international commu- looked. In Somalia many of the na- steady progress. The first sentence was nity” is out to destroy their hard-won tional contingents that were part of handed down in early December 1996. independence. This is particularly true the U.N. operation had their own or- Hopefully, shifting political loyalties in ders not to participate in the aggressive the former Yugoslavia will bring more efforts to apprehend Aideed. When arrests. Reports from the Republic of

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Representative in Bosnia has issued a warning concerning war criminals indicating that those who do not fulfill the commitments made at the negotiating table will not enjoy his support. Military action used in isolation is certain to enhance the status of the radical nationalist parties and make heroes of Mladic and Karadzic. A carefully crafted policy, coordinated with a military threat, has the best hope of bringing indicted war criminals to justice. In the first weeks of August 1997 the Clinton administration made a re-

commentary newed diplomatic effort in the Balkans. Time is running out on the plan to remove all U.S. ground troops from Bosnia by summer 1998. Ambassador IFOR lawyers meeting Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the

with local justice enz Dayton accord, was sent back to the officials. Former Yugoslavia with a direct mes- F.M. Lor F.M. sage. Unless Karadzic is removed from a position of influence he will be arrested. This effort was tied to a recent U.S. Rangers were under attack in Oc- obstacle to peace, but that argument military initiative, the special police in tober 1993 the Malaysian force had the weakens for most of the others. The di- Serbska being classified as a military only armored vehicles in Mogadishu visions that separate Bosnians are force and put under SFOR control. The capable of mounting a rescue effort. much deeper than the issue of indicted special police have been Karadzic’s pri- But they refused to engage pending ap- war criminals, and it is difficult to pre- mary protection, and this move could proval from Kuala Lumpur, and that dict what impact the arrest of ten, dramatically increase his vulnerability. took more than five hours. In Bosnia twenty, or sixty more would have. The real question is whether this action some elements of SFOR will be more Those who believe that apprehension will strengthen or weaken Karadzic’s vulnerable to retaliation from the Serbs will bring peace may not understand hand in the Machiavellian world of should there be a backlash to NATO the complexity of the situation. Serb politics. action to apprehend war criminals. Effectively use diplomatic and eco- Develop a military strategy. Once The headquarters of Karadzic is in the nomic elements of national power. Up to the political objectives are set a strategy French sector of SFOR, and military ac- now American diplomacy has been in- can be devised. There may be a range tion there would have to be carefully effective in apprehending war crimi- of options, from the status quo of a coordinated. A new policy has the po- nals. The pressure that forced the par- general military presence to increased tential to fracture the coalition unless ties to negotiate at Dayton has presence and patrols to decisive com- all national contingents are fully aware dissipated. But renewed efforts could mando raids on selected military head- of the risk and are prepared to take de- weaken nationalist parties and under- quarters. An effective military strategy cisive action. mine support for Karadzic and Mladic. will have to deal with civilian distur- Once a U.S. objective concerning The Byzantine political situation in the bances and hostage taking, all proven indicted war criminals is determined, Republic of Serbska may be ripe for a tactics of the Bosnian Serbs. It is impor- our allies must be consulted to develop shift in power. Economic sanctions tant to recall that SFOR has fewer a unified position. Not every NATO ally may be the most powerful means of troops today than IFOR and action in may find the same moral imperative in achieving policy goals in the former one part of the country is likely to pro- apprehending them. The following Yugoslavia. Serbia is reeling from years voke reactions elsewhere. A compre- questions should be included in the de- of sanctions and the government of hensive plan of action at the opera- bate. Can peace take hold without Milosovic is threatened. Although the tional and tactical level will be more war criminals in custody? Is primary sanctions have been removed, necessary. NATO willing to sacrifice short-term there is still the opportunity to link Choose the right force. After a strat- stability to make apprehensions? economic aid to the delivery of in- egy is devised it is necessary to ensure There is a major distinction be- dicted war criminals. The new High that we have the right force for the tween Karadzic and the lesser known mission. In Somalia in 1993 the United indicted war criminals who wield little States correctly recognized that the power and influence. A strong argu- mission changed from providing gen- ment can be made that Karadzic is an eral security to conducting assaults in

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urban terrain. Army special operations serving in Bosnia. Congress has sub- 3 Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task forces (Rangers) were tasked. There stantial misgivings about U.S. presence Force Commanders’ Guide to Peace Operations may be a requirement for a tactical he- there, and a bill has been introduced (Fort Monroe, Va.: Joint Warfighting Center, licopter assault on the heavily de- requiring the withdrawal of troops be- 1995), p. 45. 4 fended military headquarters of Mladic fore the date committed to by the ad- “All states shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law to im- or a commando raid on Karadzic’s cap- ministration. If there is to be a new pol- plement the provisions of the present reso- ital in Pale. With the right force and icy, the American people and Congress lution and the statute, including the oblig- mission we are well on the way to ac- must be prepared for combat deaths in ation of states to comply with requests for complishing the objective. the name of international justice. Such assistance or orders issued by a trial cham- Most soldiers are not trained for a position poses a dilemma because its ber under article 29 of the statute” (Secu- law enforcement. Battle skills are not public debate would likely erase any el- rity Council resolution 827, section 4). easily translated into crowd control. Vi- ement of surprise. 5 The military annex (1A) calls for par- olence and prompt action are stressed The current NATO policy concern- ties to the agreement “to cooperate fully in combat training but restraint and ing indicted war criminals in the with any international personnel, including investigators of the tribunal.” The parties

tact are required in peace support mis- Balkans is not the result of timidity or commentary included the Republic of Bosnia and Herze- sions. These factors can often be over- indifference. It reflects painful compro- govina, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegov- come with the right training and as- mise and recognition that not all our ina, Republika Serbska, the Republic of signment of achievable missions. The objectives can be immediately realized. Croatia, and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. initial U.S. contingent in Bosnia was Though often criticized and misunder- 6 These provisions require state parties comprised primarily of the 1st Armored stood, it has effectively served the ends “to search for persons alleged to have com- Division, a heavy force designed for of peace and stability in the former Yu- mitted, or to have ordered to be committed, mechanized combat in open terrain. goslavia. Still, the call for more decisive such grave breaches, and shall bring such Once it became clear that there was no action may increase. There is justifiable persons, regardless of their nationality, be- organized military opposition, the force concern that the ICTY mandate will ex- fore its own courts,” the courts of another was modified to include a greater mix pire without more individuals in cus- state, or an international criminal court (see Geneva Convention no. I, art. 49; no. II, of light infantry. Military police were tody. If the pursuit and apprehension art. 50; no. III, art. 129; no. IV, art. 146). added during national elections. The of indicted war criminals is to be an ob- 7 Robert Oakley and John Hirsch, Soma- U.S. force in Bosnia responded with jective in the conduct of peace opera- lia and Operation Restore Hope (Washington: flexibility to new tasks and is adequate tions, policies must be carefully devel- U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995); Kenneth for the present mission; but this could oped and executed. Finally, the mission Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned change overnight if hunting down war must not be assigned without the in- (Washington: National Defense University criminals is added. tention of seeing it through. An indeci- Press, 1995). On July 10, 1997 NATO policy on sive policy is worse than no policy at 8 Security Council resolution 837 did indicted war criminals took a new all and will ultimately undermine U.S. not mention Aideed by name but it clearly turn. British SFOR forces conducted a and NATO credibility. A coordinated applied to him. Jonathan Howe, the U.N. special representative, took prompt action military operation that killed one sus- approach that includes diplomatic, eco- by putting a price on his head, increasing pect and apprehended another. Both nomic, and military instruments of U.S. military efforts to apprehend him. individuals were well known and seri- power will be most effective in building 9 “The Security Council has responded ous impediments to peace in that sec- a lasting peace. JFQ by ordering the capture, detention, and trial tor, and careful coordination with of Mr. Aideed. Failure to take action would ICTY was required, including the NOTES have signaled to other clan leaders that the United Nations is not serious. Advocates of preparation of “sealed indictments” to 1 Theodor Meron stated, “given the mil- appeasement seem to forget that last year preserve the element of surprise. itary muscle IFOR now possesses, it is a dis- the United Nations tried to cooperate with NATO officials maintained that this grace that the principal indictees have not Mr. Aideed and his counterparts. It did not did not signal a change in overall pol- been detained, let alone delivered up to The succeed.” Reported in “Yes, There Is a Rea- icy, but there is no doubt that the Hague.” See “Answering for War Crimes: son To Be in Somalia,” The New York Times, Lessons from the Balkans,” Foreign Affairs, pressure on the indicted war criminals August 10, 1993, p. A-19. vol. 76, no. 1 (January/February 1997), has increased. 10 “Pentagon Changes Its Somalia Goals pp. 2–8. Have the will to carry through. If the as Effort Falters,” The New York Times, Sep- 2 “The political object is the goal, war is use of force involves increased patrols tember 27, 1993, p. A-1. the means of reaching it, and means can and pressure tactics U.S. troops must never be considered in isolation from its prepare for escalation and increased purpose,” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, risks. And if they conduct commando edited and translated by Michael Howard raids to apprehend Serb leaders they and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Uni- will be committed to combat. Defense versity Press, 1976), p. 87. See also Charles analysts may see a moral imperative in W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, Ameri- pursuing indicted war criminals, but can Foreign Policy, Pattern and Process, 5th ed. that view may not be shared by Ameri- (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). cans whose sons and daughters are

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■ What Exactly Is out of joint Jointness? By LAWRENCE B. WILKERSON

Jointness is not seamless. It will have as many seams as the fallibility of human nature and technology impose. Indeed, to regard seamlessness as an achievable attribute of military operations is arrogant and dangerous. It is the sort of attitude that commits assets to the wrong purpose, gets people killed needlessly, loses wars, and devastates peace operations. he last thirteen of my thirty-plus years When it is achieved jointness is not greater as a military officer have been spent in than the sum of its parts—it is at best the sum of joint duty assignments. For six years I its parts. In fact the sum is most often reduced by have actually taught the essentials of that inevitable human element which does not Tjointness at the intermediate and senior levels of understand or trust and therefore functions im- professional military education (PME), an experi- perfectly if at all, and the mechanical parts that ence which has provided many opportunities to seem to achieve a 60 percent success rate on a discuss the nature of jointness with students. What good day. And there will always be such factors, has come out of those human and mechanical, to contend with. jointness is not greater than the discussions is that joint- Jointness is not created by doctrine, joint or ness is understanding otherwise. It is brought about by people, good sum of its parts—it is at best broadly what your fellow and bad. Like most things in life, it is created the sum of its parts soldiers, sailors, airmen, more successfully by a higher proportion of good and marines bring to the people well trained in their service capabilities battle and trusting them and how to employ them. Words printed on to do it right and well—and their feeling the same paper, no matter how attractive, are largely mean- way about you. All frills and lobbying aside, the ingless in the greater scheme of things. Common essence of jointness is understanding and trust. tactics, techniques, and procedures are vital to As General Colin Powell stated in the first training. Just as critical to success in battle are edition of Joint Pub 1, “joint warfare is team people who while operating in accordance with warfare.” But what about seamlessness, synergy, their training can do exceptional things. Such acts, joint doctrine, interoperability, and all the other both large and small, are what bring order to con- buzzwords? Let’s examine some of the more fusion and win conflicts. One of the strangest prevalent ones. paradoxes of human behavior is that people ac- customed to studied routine must be capable of Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA, is deputy quick and decisive departure from that mind set director of the Marine Corps War College.

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to be repeatedly successful. Order must tend to chaos—indeed, teeter next to it with an exquisite sense of balance—in order to intuitively adapt, triumph, and endure. Jointness is not produced by the ability of systems to share information, ammunition, fuel, or a host of other things, though this capacity— interoperability—is a vital technical aspect of deep- ening trust. Faith in a buddy’s ability to help in a pinch is difficult to muster if one cannot even communicate. Of all the misunderstood and mis- defined components of jointness, interoperability is the most important. It is the technical side of trust. Without it trust evaporates quickly in the

heat of combat. out of joint True jointness is not imparted by fiat. It is created the same way as the bonds of combat: in the cauldron of shared dangers, decisions, and death. Henry V did not stroll around the camp- fires on the eve of Agincourt to instill doctrine in the hearts and minds of his men. “A little touch of Harry in the night” was far more complex than any directive or written instruction. It was also far more integral to the stunning victory gained by the English over the French on the following day. How does one teach jointness? Specifically, how do war and staff colleges—for the latter institutions are where jointness as described above truly fits into our PME system—best develop understanding and trust in students?

DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) For an answer I reviewed the seminars that my former students consistently rated hen a team takes to the field, highest. They turned out to be the sessions individual specialists come to- in which the students had to use their own expertise to sort out a complex politi- gether to achieve a team win. cal-military problem, then give an appreci- All players try to do their very ation of it as well as the solution. In some bestW because every other player, the team, and cases they had to execute that solution. the home town are counting on them to win. This ranged from contemporary case stud- So it is when the Armed Forces of the United ies of Urgent Fury (Grenada), Earnest Will (reflagged Kuwaiti tankers), Eagle Claw States go to war. We must win every time. Every (Iranian hostage rescue), UNISOM II (So- soldier must take the battlefield believing his or malia) to full-fledged crisis wargames that her unit is the best in the world. Every pilot must lasted several days, the most successful of take off believing there is no one better in the which dealt with the complex deployment sky. Every sailor standing watch must believe of U.S. forces to the West Bank to provide there is no better ship at sea. Every marine must humanitarian relief following massive refugee flows into that sector. All sessions hit the beach believing that there are no better were highly rated in each pedagogical cat- infantrymen in the world. But they all must also egory including learning jointness. believe that they are part of a team, a joint As I read and re-read the student cri- team, that fights together to win. This is our his- tiques, the connection became apparent: tory, this is our tradition, this is our future. that short of the cauldron of combat, the seminar can be as searing and instructive —Colin L. Powell, “Message from the Chairman,” in its own way, given the right context. in Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces (November 11, 1991)

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■ WHAT EXACTLY IS JOINTNESS?

That was a demanding situation confronted by a the finest, most efficient staff in the Armed team possessing diverse service capabilities in Forces—perhaps in the world. As the classic Greek which every member was well trained. An obser- dramatists warned, however, such excellence can vation by a former Commander in Chief Pacific, contain the seeds of its own destruction. Admiral William J. Crowe, drives this point The criticism offered here is not related to the home. In 1985, before becoming the Chairman, inordinate and largely American fear of the he remarked: “I want people for my staff who are dreaded general staff. Most people who harbor thoroughly proficient in their own service’s capa- such concerns today do not understand the very bilities. Everything else will follow.” Proficiency concept they protest. My argument is more closely in one’s own service capabilities is the sine qua related to what Douglas Southall Freeman called non of jointness. Without it “the odds.” In short, there are only so many truly proficiency in one’s own there can be no trust or un- excellent people in any enterprise and to concen- service capabilities is derstanding. The “every- trate them at a single point in an organization thing else will follow” de- may well create an imbalance of skill which en-

out of joint the sine qua non of jointness pends first on the individual dangers the health of the entire organization. The and second on the fre- efficiency and quality of the Joint Staff have to an quency and quality of his exposure to combat extent been achieved at the expense of service and the seminar room, the latter being all that is staffs and—while few admit it—to the great con- available in peacetime. sternation of the civilian staff serving the Secre- Trust and understanding are derived from tary of Defense who, by the very nature of their service competence. That is the only foundation appointed status, cannot match the energy and on which genuine jointness can be built. level of expertise of the Joint Staff. Threaten that and you threaten jointness. That is The Secretary’s effort to create a schoolhouse why the increasing power of the Joint Staff is so for civilians under the Defense Leadership and troublesome—not now or over the next year but Management Program is aimed in part at redress- for the future. Thus far that growing power has ing this situation. The lead paragraph of the di- not impinged upon the flourishing of separate rective issued on the program in April 1997 re- service cultures or the healthy competitiveness veals much: “This directive...establishes a which they naturally engender, but given its cur- DOD-wide framework for developing future civil- rent direction it will. ian leaders with a DOD-wide capability in an en- Even in apparently insignificant areas signs vironment that nurtures a shared understanding of the increasing power of the Joint Staff and the and sense of mission among civilian employees potential for abuse can be found. The proposed and military personnel.” introduction of PME learning objectives for force The growing power of the Joint Staff at the protection and risk management is a case in expense of service staffs may be nothing to point. The Joint Staff maintained that military worry about. The primary concern is that with education policy should be changed to reflect the declining quality of service staffs, the nur- specific PME learning objectives for these subject turing of service competence, which is the foun- areas; others held that such a sudden change dation of jointness, will fall off. Therefore, keep- contradicts good education policy. These oppo- ing a wary eye to that possibility might be wise. nents argue there is a more satisfactory way of Power corrupts, and absolute power—but you know evolving an area of educational focus, namely how the old aphorism goes. the subject area of emphasis method. Quality JFQ education is best served by gradual change that is carefully evaluated rather than by rapid-fire, knee-jerk change that often is rooted in political expediency (which is the atmosphere that influences decisions by the Joint Staff). In this instance the education community won the argument; however, the trend seems to be moving in the other direction. The momentum is on the side of the Joint Staff. This is not necessarily bad. After all, one objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to improve the Joint Staff—something that has been done remarkably well. Indeed, the Joint Staff is

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Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs (JamesCombat Camera Squadron D. Mossman) st 1 By WILLIAMSON MURRAY

he term revolution in military affairs This article suggests how one might think (RMA) is a buzzword inside the Beltway about RMAs of the past and the implications of and among academics interested in de- the historical record for the future. The views re- fense affairs. As Dennis Schowalter flect the influence, comments, and thoughts of Tnoted at a recent conference, “RMA has replaced 1 colleagues in the historical profession. TQM [total quality management] as the acronym First, historians have done relatively little of choice” among members of the Armed Forces. work on RMAs. Michael Roberts introduced the One suspects that much of this enthusiasm, idea of a single military revolution in his inau- which rests upon only the slightest knowledge of gural lecture at Queens University Belfast in 1955. the historical record, may distort as much as it Thereafter until 1991, interest in the military rev- helps in thinking about military change and in- olution was focused on the 16th and 17th cen- novation. Yet one must also admit that military turies; early modern historians argued among events of late suggest major changes in technol- themselves about whether there was such a revo- ogy and weapons with substantial implications lution and, if so, when it occurred and what form for conducting war in the next century. it took. That debate continues. Since the mid-18th century, however, military historians have con- centrated on other issues such as innovation, ef- Williamson Murray, professor emeritus at The Ohio State University, fectiveness, adaptation, organizational behavior, is the Charles A. Lindbergh Visiting Professor of Aerospace History or—the bread and butter of the profession—battle at the National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution.

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the strategy of Edward III to Blitzkrieg operations Figure 1. Possible RMAs in the light of what we call revolutions in military affairs. The crucial point is that the historical 14th century record is not yet in; and until there is detailed re- —longbow: cultural search on the subject most commentaries may be 15th century distortive. At a recent conference, I listed possible —gunpowder: technological, financial RMAs along with the driving forces behind them. 16th century Although not inclusive, it suggests the complexi- —fortifications: architectural, financial ties and ambiguities found in the historical record 17th century (see figure 1). —Dutch-Swedish tactical reforms: tactical, organizational, cultural The list suggests a number of points. First, given the enthusiasm for describing the coming —French military reforms: tactical, organizational, administrative RMA as technological, the historical record sug- 17th –18th centuries gests that technological change represents a rela- —naval warfare: administrative, social, financial, technological tively small part of the equation.2 Moreover, mili- 18th century tary history over the last eighty years offers many —British financial revolution: financial, organizational, conceptual cases in which forces with inferior technology —French Revolution: ideological, social have won conflicts. The record further suggests that the crucial element in most RMAs is concep- th th 18 –19 centuries tual in nature. In the breakthrough on the Meuse, —industrial revolution: financial, technological, organizational, cultural for example, the German advantage was a com- 19th century bined arms doctrine resting on a thorough and —American Civil War: ideological, technological, administrative, operational realistic appraisal of the last war. Their opponents late 19th century had not developed such a doctrine.3 —naval war: technological, administrative, cultural In fact there is only one example on the list of possible RMAs that is entirely technological: 19th –20th centuries nuclear weapons. But even here there is some am- —medical: technological, organizational biguity since the impact of nuclear weapons has 20th century been almost entirely political except for their first —World War I: combined arms: tactical, conceptual, technological, scientific use against the Japanese. Outside of great power —Blitzkrieg: tactical, operational, conceptual, organizational competition, nuclear weapons have not changed —carrier war: conceptual, technological, operational the nature of warfare. What the historical record implies, therefore, is that technology has played —strategic air war: technological, conceptual, tactical, scientific only one part in these revolutions, and frequently —submarine war: technological, scientific, tactical a relatively insignificant part. —amphibious war: conceptual, tactical, operational Secondly, the record suggests that historians —intelligence: conceptual, political, ideological and others using the concept should rethink RMA terminology. Even the idea of a series of revolu- —nuclear weapons: technological tions distorts history and misses a number of —people’s war: ideological, political, conceptual complex and ambiguous interactions. The current reading of the evidence indicates a linear series of discrete revolutions that are readily discernable and therefore easily managed.

histories. Modern historians quite simply have Military Revolutions not been very interested in military revolutions. Evidence, however, points in another direc- In a sparsely attended session at the March tion.4 There appear to be two distinct historical 1991 meeting of the Society of Military History, phenomena involved in radical innovation and Clifford Rogers suggested that there was not one change. The first can be called military revolu- military revolution but a series that reached from tions. These were by far the more important, for the middle ages to the present day. He said they they fundamentally changed the nature of war- may have begun as early as the 14th century and fare in the West. There appear to have been four continued with increasing frequency as one (two occurring at the same time): creation of the neared this century. Not surprisingly there has modern, effective nation-state based on organized been a rush to examine virtually everything from and disciplined military power in the 17th century; the French Revolution and the industrial revolution beginning at the same time during the period 1789–1815; and World War I, 1914–18. We might compare them in geological terms to earth-

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catastrophe of the Thirty Years War which devas- tated Germany and the sack of Antwerp where unpaid Spanish soldiers mutinied, thus under- mining Spanish policy in the Netherlands. The action of the Spanish soldiery reflected both their disobedience and the inability of the state to compensate them. The 17th century revolution created military organizations that in Machi- avelli’s conception not only imposed the laws but responded to them in civil as well as military terms. As the Swedish Articles of War in the early 17th century made clear, soldiers would dig when they were told to dig—a conception that had not always marked the performance of warriors in the Middle Ages. In the macro sense, the Euro- pean military organizations that emerged in the 17th century were more effective on both the battlefield and in the conduct of civil affairs because Naval Historical Center they were responsive to the orders of the state Battery Sherman, Vicksburg. bureaucracy. Once the state was able to collect taxes it could pay soldiers on a regular basis; in quakes. They brought with them such systemic turn, it demanded that soldiers maintain disci- changes in the political, social, and cultural are- pline on the battlefield and in garrison. We take nas as to be largely uncontrollable, unpredictable, for granted the discipline and responsiveness of and above all unforeseeable. Therefore those who Western military institutions and their imitators expect the “information revolution” to bring rad- (such as the Japanese and Indians); but the his- ical social and cultural changes—if they are cor- tory of South America and much of the Third rect—will find that the direction, consequences, World over the past forty years suggests that this and implications of such a revolution will be political relationship is not always a given. largely unpredictable for both society and mili- The French Revolution established the tary organizations. norms for the mobilization of economic, scien- Such “military revolutions” recast the na- tific, and popular resources. It interjected ideol- ture of society and the state as well as of military ogy and nationalism into the equation of war in organizations. By so doing they altered the ca- the West, and the ferocity of that combination pacity of states to project military power and al- goes a long way toward explaining the 25 years lowed the military to kill people and break of war that followed (the French Revolutionary things ever more effectively. and Napoleonic Wars) as well as the thirty-year “military revolutions” do not Moreover, these revolutions German war of 1914–45. Faced with foreign in- do not replace but rather vasion brought on by their own ill-considered replace but rather overlay overlay each other. Conse- policies, the political leaders of 1789 declared a each other quently, all the new technol- leveé en masse, which placed citizens and their ogy in the world will not goods at the disposal of the state for the dura- help an Iraqi army fight co- tion. The result was that the French tripled their herently on the modern battlefield because Iraqi army in less than a year and, although they re- society has not gone through the creation of a mained less effective in battle than their oppo- modern state, and the government lacks the ca- nents on a unit to unit basis, they could accept pacity to infuse its citizens with the fervor of the casualties and fight on a scale like no other 18th French Revolution. On the other hand, a Viet- century military formation. As Clausewitz noted: namese communist movement, which combined Suddenly war again became the business of the the revolutionary enthusiasm and fervor of the people—a people of thirty millions, all of whom con- French Revolution in a xenophobic culture, de- sidered themselves to be citizens....The people be- feated two great Western powers. came a participant in war; instead of governments These four military revolutions raise a num- and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation th ber of points. The 17 century revolution laid was thrown into the balance. The resources and ef- the basis for the modern state. Until that point, forts now available for use surpassed all conventional armies and navies were under only the loosest limits; nothing now impeded the vigor with which control of central governments. Their employers war could be waged, and consequently the opponents more often than not failed to pay the troops who of France faced the utmost peril.5 in turn looted and pillaged. The result was the

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win against superior Russian numbers. But neither side was willing to seriously mobilize national passions, manpower, and resources. It was left to the opposing sides during the Civil War in the United States, South as well as North, to combine the “benefits” of technology (the railroad, steamboat, rifled musket and artillery, and telegraph) with the French Revo- lution’s mobilization of the populace and national wealth. The result was a terrible killing war of four years which owed its duration to a combination of the three “military revolutions” that had occurred up to that time: the strength of the nation-state, its ability to mobilize society, and the enormous resources and new weapons of the industrial revolution. In many ways World War I reaffirmed the lethal combination of these revolutions. But in its own way that conflict was a profoundly revolution-

U.S. Army Military History Institute History U.S. Army Military ary event that fundamentally shattered The American front, the Western equilibrium with im- November 18, 1918. mense political, economic, and social It was not until adversaries were willing to consequences. The political consequences of the fight on the same terms, namely the national war itself, one could argue, did not end until the mobilization of resources and manpower, that autumn of 1989. But of all military revolutions, France was finally brought to heel. But its revolu- World War I should be regarded as the most revo- tionary example would be replicated by combat- lutionary in military terms. It involved creating ants in the American Civil War and later in the combined arms, exploitation tactics, strategic fierce killing contests of the two world wars in bombing, unrestricted submarine warfare, carrier this century. As suggested above, the French Rev- operations, and even amphibious war. Admittedly, olution would find an echo in far off Indochina in some aspects the weapons, technology, and tac- in the wars waged against the French and later tical concepts provided only a glimpse into the fu- the Americans. ture, but the glimpse was there nevertheless. Per- Concurrent with the French Revolution, the haps the best way to illustrate this point is to first stages of the industrial revolution were al- suggest that a British or German battalion com- ready underway in Britain. That upheaval mander from the battlefields of summer 1918 changed the entire economic underpinning of would have understood the underlying concepts British society and placed unimagined wealth in of the battlefields of 1940, 1944, and even 1991. A the hands of political leaders. The industrial rev- battalion commander of 1914, however, would olution did not provide the military with techno- not have had the slightest clue as to what was oc- logical improvements that helped its soldiers on curring in 1918: that was how far military affairs the battlefield; if anything the British army travelled in the course of four years. fought in a retrogressive fashion compared to the French. But while the revolution had little influ- RMAs ence on the battlefields of the Napoleonic wars, What then are military professionals to make it provided British governments with enormous of these great revolutions that have rocked the his- financial resources to cobble together and sup- tory of the West and the world since the 17th cen- port the military coalitions that eventually de- tury? Probably not much. At best, if they are able feated Napoleon. to recognize such events, they can hold on and The industrial revolution first influenced the adapt to trying and difficult times. History does battlefield during the Crimean War, when the rifled musket, telegraph, and steamship combined to allow Britain and France to deploy forces and

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suggest smaller phenomena that might best be Figure 2. Military Revolutions and RMAs termed RMAs. In these cases there is profound evidence that the right military institution and culture can gain a significant advantage. Preshock RMAs: longbow, Edward Ill’s strategy, If military revolutions are compared with gunpowder, fortress architecture earthquakes, we can think of RMAs as pre- and Military Revolution: 17th century creation of the aftershocks. During the process of developing modern state RMAs military organizations must come to grips Direct- and Aftershocks: Dutch and Swedish tactical with fundamental changes in the political, social, reforms, French tactical and organizational reforms, and military landscape; they innovate and adapt naval revolution, Britain’s financial revolution to—in some cases foreshadow—revolutionary Preshock RMAs: French military reforms (post Seven changes. RMAs involve putting together the com- Years’ War) plex pieces of tactical, societal, political, organizational, or even technological changes in new con- Military Revolutions: French and industrial revolutions ceptual approaches to war. The formula is rarely Direct- and Aftershocks: national economic and politi- apparent at the time, and even historians with ac- cal mobilization, Napoleonic way of war, financial cess to the documentary evidence find it hard to and economic power based on industrialized reconstruct the full concept. The results on the power, technological revolution of war (railroads, battlefield, however, make it chillingly clear which rifles, and steamboats) military organization has done better at innovat- Preshock RMAs: Fisher Revolution (1905–14) ing and adapting. Before proceeding we might want to look at where possi- Military Revolution: World War I RMAs take considerable time ble RMAs fit with the larger Direct- and Aftershocks: combined arms, Blitzkrieg, phenomena of military revo- strategic bombing, carrier warfare, unrestricted to develop even in wartime lutions (see figure 2). submarine warfare, amphibious warfare, intelli- There are several histor- gence, information warfare (1940–45), stealth ically interesting aspects of RMAs. First, most take considerable time to develop even in wartime; and peacetime RMAs even in the 20th century have taken decades. One can argue over the accuracy of applying the term revolutionary to con- tions that grappled with systemic and intractable cepts and capabilities that take such a long time problems in an atmosphere of fear, confusion, and to emerge. There is also the matter of perspective. ambiguity, it was not until the 1980s that histori- To the French and British what happened on the ans began to unravel what actually took place on Meuse in summer 1940 and afterwards undoubt- the battlefield between 1914 and 1918. edly appeared revolutionary. To the Germans the If the problems of adapting to wartime con- doctrine and capabilities that destroyed the Allies ditions are difficult, those involved in peacetime in the battle of France would have appeared revo- innovation are a nightmare. Michael Howard has lutionary. Moreover, what is clear today was not compared the military in peacetime to a surgeon apparent to those who fought then. For example, preparing for a series of operations at an un- many German officers in May 1940 would have known time and place under unidentified condi- attributed their success to the fanaticism that tions without the benefit of having previously Nazi ideology had infused into the fighting spirits worked on live patients.6 Rather, he must rely en- of their troops. And there would have been some tirely on what he has read and on incomplete legitimacy to that view, given German persever- and inaccurate models. Similarly, military organi- ance in crossing the Meuse despite casualty fig- zations are called on to function in the most try- ures in lead companies that reached upwards of ing circumstances, which simply cannot be repli- 70 percent. cated in peace. And they frequently have limited Originating an RMA in wartime is difficult resources to prepare and train. Yet the record, as enough. The combined arms revolution during demonstrated by the German campaign against World War I, which saw development of accurate Western Europe in 1940, suggests that some mili- indirect artillery fire with decentralized infantry taries have done better than others. The results of tactics that relied on fire, maneuver, and exploita- that were equivalent to what most would agree tion, emerged from the slaughter on the Western represents an RMA. Front in 1917 after three long years of learning. Here history contributes to thinking about And the details of that revolution were not en- what kinds of military institutions and cultures the tirely clear when the war was over, as the fate of the British and French in the interwar years un- derscores. In fairness to the World War I institu-

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worked by Generals Werner von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck in 1932 shortly before they took over direction of the army as commander in chief and chief of staff respectively, reflected actual conditions on the battlefield of 1918. Germany then built on that experience in a coherent, careful, and evolutionary fashion. There was nothing revolutionary about German armored tactics; they fit within a larger conceptual framework of combined arms that rested on exploitation, decentralized decisionmaking, and fire and maneuver—that is, the battlefield of 1918. This process of rigorously examining the past carried over into the German evaluation of current exercises and training. The French army took no such approach. The examination of the recent past was used to justify current doctri-

U.S. Navy nal trends. In other words, they knew Omaha Beach, the answer before they started looking. June 6, 1944. The British case was even more de- United States needs to prepare for the next RMA. pressing. It was not until 1932 that the chief of Historians tend to argue that military organiza- the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Lord tions are focused on the last war and thus have George Francis Milne, saw fit to establish a com- substantial problems with the next conflict; for ex- mittee to study lessons of the previous war. Ad- ample, the traditional image of a revolutionary mittedly the committee was given wide latitude: German army jumping into the future with its it would examine World War I and determine if Blitzkrieg tactics while the British and French, still its lessons were being adequately addressed in locked in World War I, failed miserably. manuals and training. Unfortunately its report Nothing is farther from the truth. Almost was submitted to the next chief, Field Marshal immediately after World War I, the Reichsheer, Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, and the under its first chief of staff and second comman- whole effort was deep-sixed since its critical re- der, General Hans von Seeckt, organized no fewer view of army performance in 1914–18 might than 57 committees to study what really hap- have made that service look bad. If the British did pened on the battlefield of 1918 in excruciating not get the revolution in armored and mecha- detail. He charged those examiners to produce: nized warfare right, critics like J.F.C. Fuller and short, concise studies on the newly gained experiences Basil Liddell Hart were further off the mark. In of the war and consider the following points: What fact, much of British failure on the battlefields of situations arose in the war that had not been consid- 1941–42 in North Africa was due to slavish read- ered before? How effective were our prewar views in ing of Fuller’s argument that armor operated best dealing with the above situations? What new guide- on its own. Yet there is another point regarding lines have been developed from the use of new RMA in land warfare during the early 1940s. weaponry in the war? Which new problems put for- Starkly put, recent research has stressed that the ward by the war have not yet found a solution?7 French army did a miserable job in training its soldiers to face the great test in 1940. Had its The crucial point is, as Seeckt’s last question units on the Meuse followed doctrine there is a emphasizes, that the Germans used a thorough good chance that the German infantry crossings review of recent military events as a point of de- on May 13 would have failed. parture for thinking about future war. If various military organizations misused or Moreover, the spirit of this examination de- misinterpreted history in the interwar period, pended on an attitude that Ludendorff expressed others completely rejected its relevance to the in his memoirs about visits to the front: “[Staffs] problems of the day. The Royal Air Force repudi- knew I wanted to hear their real views and have a ated history entirely and its leaders argued that clear idea of the true situation, not a favorable re- technology had rendered the past irrelevant. port made to order.”8 The result was that German doctrine, first crystallized in 1923 and then re-

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Murray

aircraft suffered unacceptable losses. Second, finding and hitting targets under anything other than perfect daylight conditions posed intractable challenges. As one naval officer noted of es- capades during World War I night operations, ...experience has shown that it is quite easy for five squadrons to set out to bomb a particular target and for only one of those five ever to reach the objectives; while the other four, in the honest belief that they have done so, have bombed four different villages which bore little if any resemblance to the one they desired to attack.9 Such lessons disappeared from the organizational memory of the Royal Air Force. The result of the unwillingness to learn from the past was that the British went into the war with almost a religious belief in the survivability of bombers and that finding and destroying targets, if a problem at all, would not be difficult to solve. Such belief in the irrelevance of the past became unwillingness to learn from the present. There were plenty of warnings in terms of exercises that suggested that the Royal Air Force was going to have a hard if not impossible time identifying and hitting targets at night or in bad weather. In turn, the confidence that bombers would always get through led British senior officers to go so far as to suggest that long-range escort fighters were technologically infeasible. They made this argument early in World War II with no technological or scientific evidence to support it. What occurred was a process by which their mental jump into the future without reference to the past caused them to minimize technological possibilities because those possibilities did not fit into their preconceived notion of the future. American airmen did not fare much better. At least Billy Mitchell, despite the stridency of his arguments, recognized the underlying lesson of the DOD air war in World War I: air superiority was required Airborne ambulance, Vietnam. before airpower could be effectively employed. But Rather than study air operations in World War I, by the early 1930s, airmen at the Air Corps Tactical one could leap into the future to base doctrine, School had discarded such realism and blithely ar- force structure, and employment concepts en- gued that great formations of self defending tirely on theoretical conceptions of what war bombers could fly deep into an enemy nation should look like. Such an approach had a crucial without the protection of long-range escort fight- and detrimental impact on the British strategic ers and only sustain acceptable casualties. The pro- bombing campaign during much of World War II. clivity to disregard the past as well as the present— One can argue that the lessons of World War I that is, a general disregard for an evidentiary-based were not entirely clear with respect to strategic approach to the preparation of military forces— bombing and its effects on an enemy nation. Two carried over to the war in the case of both forces. things were clear, however, from the aerial com- And they continued to execute their operational bat of 1914–18. and tactical frameworks well into 1943 despite un- First, such air operations required air superi- equivocal evidence of problems in their assump- ority. Absent that, bombers and reconnaissance tions and thus the results. In the end, the combined bomber offensive played a crucial role in World War II, and we should consider its achieve- ments when arguing that strategic bombing was

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an RMA. The cost in aircraft and crews, however, Finally, although technology is important it suggests an unacceptable price that was largely the is only a tool. If we connect it to a clear under- result of too many airmen accepting assumptions standing of the past and present, we can perhaps that past as well as present evidence suggested push our current capabilities into the future in an were substantially flawed. intelligent fashion and thus be on the leading The point is not to belittle the airmen of the edge of the next RMA. If we jettison history by interwar period. In fact this century is replete haphazardly leaping into an uncertain future, we with military organizations that preferred to im- may endure the same consequences as the airmen pose their peculiar models of war on conditions of World War II. In 1942 America had almost un- they confronted rather than learn from the past. limited resources and the will to “pay almost any To some extent all or- price and to bear any burden.” Those conditions all organizations will get certain ganizations will get may well not obtain in the future. JFQ certain things wrong things wrong about the next war about the next war; it NOTES has been the persis- 1 The author acknowledges the participation of Cliff tence of many military organizations to hold Rogers, Geoffrey Parker, John Lynn, Macgregor Knox, their course despite evidence to the contrary that Dennis Schowalter, Holger Herwig, Jonathan Bailey, and is inexcusable. The two most obvious cases are Allan R. Millett at the RMA conference which was held the British army during World War I and the at Quantico, Virginia, in April 1996. American military in Vietnam. 2 See among others the introduction by William A. Owens to Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: The Winning How should we adjust to the next RMA? Edge, edited by Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki First, no revolution has ever involved a leap into (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995), the future without a lifeline to past military con- pp. 3–17. 3 For the development of German armor doctrine, cepts and capabilities—particularly the recent see Williamson Murray, “Innovation in Armored War, “ past. We should not think that back to the future in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, edited by suggests anything other than a stab in the dark. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Those military organizations that have created Cambridge University Press, 1996). successful RMAs have tied development of the 4 The following line of argument owes much to the revolutions to a realistic understanding of the historians who met at Quantico in April 1996, in partic- past. That attention to lessons learned has gener- ular Clifford Rogers and Holger Herwig. ally been carried over into an evidentiary-based 5 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated analysis of current exercises and capabilities in by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: peacetime as well as in war. This is not to say that Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 592. 6 Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military organizations that have failed to use such an ap- History,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, proach have failed to adapt to the conditions of a vol. 107, no. 625 (February 1962) pp. 4–10. new RMA. The British army during World War I 7 James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von and the combined bomber offensive suggest that, Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, Kans.: Uni- given enough blood and treasure, even the most versity Press of Kansas, 1992), p. 37. obdurate military organization will eventually 8 Erich von Ludendorff, Ludendorff’s Own Story, Au- learn, but that hardly suggests a path we should gust 1914–November 1918, vol. 1 (New York: Harper and wish to retrace. Brothers, 1919), p. 24. Secondly, we must not believe that new con- 9 Quoted by Group Captain R.A. Mason in “The cepts or capabilities will negate the fundamental British Dimension,” Airpower and Warfare, edited by Al- fred F. Hurley and Robert C. Erhard (Washington: Gov- nature of war. Friction together with fog, ambigu- ernment Printing Office, 1979), p. 32. ity, chance, and uncertainty will dominate future battlefields as it has in the past. History certainly stresses that lesson, and for those who debunk history it is worth noting that various sciences— evolutionary biology, quantum physics, and most current mathematical research—emphasize that Clausewitz’s basic understanding of how the world works was correct. Friction will not disap- pear in the next century; it is a fact of life.

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Military Innovation and Carrier Aviation–

The Relevant History By JAN M. VAN TOL U.S. Navy USS Lexington.

ajor differences between the United The early 1920s found the United States with States and Great Britain in both the huge capital ship construction underway and ap- development and employment of proaching Britain in Mahanian splendor. A aircraft carriers and carrier aviation decade later, the battleship remained dominant Min the interwar years suggest how innovation was while the battle force was far smaller than antici- highly successful in the American case and much pated. Two carriers entered service and promised less so in the British. The only country with carri- to alter naval warfare, and six months after Amer- ers at the end of World War I was Britain. It had ica entered World War II carriers decisively used carrier-based aircraft to carry out the sort of changed the nature of the Pacific War. The most missions that characterized mature operations important development leading to this capability during World War II. Royal Navy leaders sup- took place in an era of disarmament and severe ported aviation in the fleet. Yet by 1939 Britain budgetary constraints. was outclassed by America and Japan because of Revolutions in military affairs are driven by its obsolete carrier aircraft. How was such a rever- the interplay of technological, operational, and sal possible? organizational factors. This article describes the historical evolution of British and American carrier aviation, with emphasis on those factors. An article in the next issue of JFQ will analyze how Commander Jan M. van Tol, USN, is commanding officer of USS O’Brien this revolution succeeded in America, why it was and formerly served in the Office of Net Assessment within the Office less successful in Britain, and the subject of mili- of the Secretary of Defense. tary innovation in general.

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Early Developments Wright and by Glenn Curtiss. The suit involved Improvements in battleship gunnery allow- the issue of whether the development of Curtiss ing accurate shooting beyond the horizon spurred ailerons infringed on Wright wingwarping tech- naval aviation. The period 1900–14 was one of in- nology for turning aircraft. In consequence, as tellectual ferment. Leaders such as Mahan and America’s entry into World War I approached, Luce fostered intellectual curiosity and experimen- Army and Navy air requirements could not be tation. It was the era when steam turbines, long- met by the civilian sector. range guns, fire control calculators, submarines, By 1914 European aircraft performance, radios, and oil-fired engines were introduced. more advanced than in America, led to expanded Aviation gradually acquired bureaucratic stand- military operations. The war offered great incen- ing within the Navy. In 1908 the Bureau of Equip- tive for improving performance and opportunity ment authorized purchase of aircraft for experi- to see what worked and what didn’t. By 1916 mental use (largely for spotting). In 1910 the both the U.S. Army and Navy were aware of the Secretary of the Navy designated an advisor for avi- growing usefulness of aircraft and their own lack ation matters. At the same of air readiness. In response Congress approved increased funding for aircraft and expansion of by 1916 both the U.S. Army time the influential General Board—composed of active training operations at Pensacola. It also permitted and Navy were aware of the and retired flag officers— the Navy to establish a separate Naval Flying Corps. The Secretary of the Navy further sug- growing usefulness of aircraft advised the Secretary that space for aircraft should be gested building a naval aircraft factory to develop provided in future scout prototypes and provide test data on costs and ships. The Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineer- schedules to industry. ing also told the Secretary that aircraft would play Air operations in 1917–18 foreshadowed key a major role in naval operations and recom- uses of airpower in World War II. Aircraft were in- mended that some Navy officers be taught to fly. creasingly employed to provide close air support, Noteworthy technological events occurred. defend against zeppelin bombing raids, bomb Eugene Ely made the first takeoff from and land- military targets such as sub pens and air bases, ing on a ship in 1910–11. Glenn Curtiss demon- and prevent an enemy from doing the same. strated the first successful seaplane. However, air- At sea, the Royal Navy converted several craft were generally poor in quality and often ships to carry airplanes and towards the end of crashed or were inoperable. Organizationally, in the war constructed “built-for-purpose” carriers. 1913, on recommendation of the General Board, Their operational roles were scouting and recon- the Navy established an organized air service. It naissance and attacking land targets. There was no noted that “an air fleet...had become a neces- thought of using aircraft against the German fleet sary adjunct to the Navy.” By 1914 there was a at sea, largely because the ordnance was not con- Director of Naval Aviation who routinely testified sidered powerful enough. The British also con- before Congress. ducted shore-based operations, including zeppelin Key individuals like Henry Mustin and John defense and coastal antisubmarine warfare patrol. Towers, both of whom served as battleship spot- The war revealed the relevance of aircraft to ters and were aware of the fire control problems accomplishing military tasks. This influenced of long-range gunnery, learned to fly. By 1914 many key individuals, not all naval. Leaders such they were commanding officer and executive offi- as Douhet, Trenchard (Royal Flying Corps, later cer respectively of the Pensacola Aviation Train- head of the Royal Air Force), and Mitchell (head ing Center, established to help organize an air ser- of aviation for the American Expeditionary Force) vice. There they met Captain W.S. Sims when his were convinced that mass destruction of targets squadron stopped en route to Mexico and in- by bombing would render static land warfare un- duced him to take along three seaplanes on a necessary. In Britain the Royal Air Force was cruiser. Sims had already made a name as an informed as a separate service in April 1918. In the novator and reformer after successfully opposing United States Mitchell’s advocacy of strategic the vaunted Mahan over a question of gunnery bombing and a separate air force stimulated de- and ship design. velopments in the Navy as well as the Army. Naval officers such as Sims and Mustin returned External Environment from Europe also convinced of the effectiveness Meantime in the industrial sector, aircraft of aircraft but with a different focus. development was crippled by prolonged litigation British and American officers worked closely over patent rights held by Orville and Wilbur together in 1917–18. Their collaboration was evidenced by the fact that a Royal Navy constructor provided the latest British carrier designs to the United States in late 1917. Yet almost immediately

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van Tol

after the war British and American carrier develop- In subsequent congressional testimony Mitchell ment diverged. Indeed there was considerable again argued for a unified air service, claimed air- Anglo-American rivalry during the interwar period craft could sink ships, and charged that the Navy so that particularly in the 1920s there was little oc- did not devote sufficient attention or resources to casion to share successes and failures. its air units. In response the General Board argued that the Nation could not afford to abandon bat- Comparative Experiences tleship-based forces in response to “mere theories The Royal Navy had the only carriers in 1919 as to the future development of new and untried and were far ahead in carrier aviation. Senior offi- weapons.” That was partially undercut by sena- cers wanted a dozen to support a large battle tors such as William Borah (a champion of new fleet. Based on their wartime experience, they naval technology including aircraft) and officers had definite ideas on missions: scouting, spot- such as Fiske, Fullam, and Sims. When Sims testi- ting, fighting, and torpedo attack as well as air fied in 1921 that he “would not abandon battle- group composition. Institutional acceptance of car- ships altogether,” he was certainly less than confi- riers as an integral part of the battle fleet was dent about their future role. The issue was much greater among senior British officers than particularly salient because construction of battle- their American counterparts. This was likely due ships authorized on the eve of the war continued. to the Royal Navy having very recent experience Organizationally, the Bureau of Aeronautics with combat at sea and with actual use of carriers. was formally authorized by Congress in July But political and budgetary constraints soon 1921. Its first chief, Rear Admiral William Mof- made it clear that there would be no large postwar fett, a key individual, immediately formed a staff battle fleet. In early 1919 the cabinet adopted a of experts including future flag officers such as “10-year rule” that envisioned no major war for a Bellinger, Radford, and Land. Soon after, Admiral decade and was the basis for drastic cuts in de- Sims wrote Moffett to stress the importance of fense. In particular, construction of most large close organizational cooperation with the Naval ships was canceled, including battlecruisers equal War College, which was crucial in developing in size to USS Lexington. Nonetheless, in July 1920 naval aviation, as was the bureau’s involvement the Admiralty Staff Conference released a report with both academe and industry. calling for at least five carriers, three for the home fleet and two for overseas commitments and refit- External Environment ting. This helped drive later negotiations on carrier After the war the prospect of an expensive limits in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. naval arms race between the U.S. and British Organizationally the Royal Naval Air Service navies dismayed both nations and provided the was subsumed under the Royal Air Force in 1918. impetus for an arms control conference. In 1921 The navy was effectively deprived of 60,000 avia- President Harding was elected on a platform tion experts. This would have severe repercus- which contained a popular naval disarmament sions for British naval aviation. plank. When the Washington Naval Conference In America aviation issues exploded into of 1922 was announced, it became clear that bat- public and congressional consciousness in 1919. tleships authorized in 1916 and still under con- Mitchell told the Navy General Board that a uni- struction would not be completed. Although the fied air service was inevitable and informed Con- conference focused on battleships, it placed quan- gress that air forces would supersede navies as the titative and qualitative restrictions on carrier ton- first line of defense. A former commander of nage. Among other provisions, America, Britain, naval forces in the Pacific, Admiral William Ful- and Japan were each allowed to convert two bat- lam, published an article suggesting that aircraft tlecruisers into carriers. This would have differing would become independent strike weapons be- effects on carrier forces, particularly by limiting yond their use as gunnery spotters and scouts. experimentation with carrier forces, which di- Sims, now president of the Naval War College, rectly affected carrier design. further incited the debate by charging that the The restrictions were not at first perceived as Navy—including its air component—was unready significant obstacles since for the signatories it in 1917. Many wrote about military aviation, but was a question of building up to the limit. The it appeared to be the public testimony of senior British understood that their carrier designs were champions that forced the issue to the forefront. unsatisfactory. Both treaties permitted scrapping In late 1920 the Navy conducted confiden- them and building other carriers to the negoti- tial bombing tests against an obsolete battleship ated limit, but political and economic realities well before the more famous 1921 Mitchell tests. The New York Times obtained damage photos and called for “a free and thorough discussion as to the effect of new weapons upon naval warfare.”

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would later preclude it. The treaties also created fleet is to be appreciated.” And writing in 1922, expectations about progress in disarmament and Sims stated: “If the rules of the game are not naval arms control. That contributed to a climate right...the conclusions drawn from the maneu- in which it became difficult to convince America vers are sure to be erroneous.” and Britain to buy “unnecessary” items such as To square simulations with experience, the additional carriers or, in the Royal Navy, scrap- faculty regularly corresponded with aviators in ping extant carriers for newer ones which incor- the fleet to stay abreast of lessons learned from porated lessons learned. actual operations. Game results were often veri- The British had four carriers in 1922, but be- fied by experience from fleet problems. With the cause of the 1919 halt in capital ship building establishment of the Bureau of Aeronautics a sim- they had no large battlecruiser hulls to convert. ilar exchange developed. The bureau supplied Instead they used cruisers, HMS Courageous and projections on the technical performance charac- HMS Glorious, which had small aircraft capacity teristics of future systems and the college helped and limited space to accommodate larger aircraft. evaluate ship and aircraft designs. In the United States, treaty restrictions—cou- The Naval War College played other roles in pled with tight budgets and the availability of large fostering aviation. It contributed to scenarios used battlecruiser hulls that would otherwise have been in fleet problems and supplied ideas to be tested scrapped—led to selecting USS Lexington and USS in the fleet. One example is the circular fleet for- Saratoga for conversion. Being the furthest along in mation devised by Commander Chester Nimitz construction, they would entail the least cost. The and successfully introduced to the fleet in 1923. availability of these hulls would be This symbiotic relationship gave Newport substan- in simulations the Naval fortuitous for diverse unanticipated tial credibility in testing concepts through simula- reasons. They could accommodate tion absent real opportunities to do so. The col- War College examined many larger and heavier aircraft, lege was also the forum through which officers various operational and support more ordnance and avia- were exposed to and forced to consider the impli- technical problems tion fuel storage, and operate in bad cations of airpower. Seminal papers by Moffett, weather. That contrasted with the Mustin, and others were regularly presented. Since limits the Royal Navy would find in attendance at Newport marked mid-level profes- smaller carriers. But the conversions were slow and sional success, students returning to the fleet in expensive, with neither ship becoming available senior ship and staff positions had a growing ap- until 1927. How could carrier aviation concepts be preciation of aviation. That influence was bol- tested in the interim? The answer was found in stered in 1925 when Admiral Coontz advocated to part at the Naval War College. the Chief of Naval Operations that “all students at the U.S. Naval Academy be given a course in aero- Naval War College nautics” and that although “all graduates may not In 1919 Admiral Sims initiated a process be able to qualify as...naval aviators, the great whereby the potential of naval aviation could be majority can...become familiar with...the of- established systematically through tactical and fensive and defensive employment of aircraft.” strategic simulations. He sought to address how In simulations the Naval War College exam- aviation should be based, supported, and might ined various operational and technical problems be used given the anticipated developments in and questions. Most interesting were simulated aeronautics. Sims guided a rigorous refining of carrier operational concepts. Between 1920 and two kinds of games. The first, strategic in nature, 1925, a number of tentative conclusions based on were called “chart maneuvers” and explored the these were reached: issues of a war with Japan. The second, tactical, ■ The Lanchester model of battleship effectiveness were “board maneuvers.” They were conducted did not apply to carriers. The former delivered ordnance on a large tabletop and compared the military in steady streams while carriers delivered “pulses” of value of different tactical formations, offensive power. and defensive concepts, and force mixes. ■ Carriers, once in range of an enemy, were to Sims noted the importance of connecting strike immediately. It was also essential that the first tar- wargaming rules with actual data and conditions: gets be enemy carriers in order to gain air superiority “Air tactics are of utmost concern to the college, over an enemy fleet. ■ The key measure of effectiveness (MOE) for car- and only from actual work done in the field can rier strike was numbers of aircraft in the air, presumably we hope to formulate definite and sound ideas because the amount of ordnance available was a direct concerning them.” Furthermore he noted: “In op- function of that. Naval War College studies in the early erating aircraft in chart maneuvers and game 1920s suggested that strike potential was maximized board exercises, various rules are applied which when aircraft were launched quickly from a number of must of necessity be in close agreement with ac- smaller carriers. tual conditions if the true value of aircraft to the

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USS Saratoga. U.S. Navy

as the prime means of delivering ship-killing ordnance. But the board did not so much reaffirm battleship dominance as it recognized the uncertainty of aircraft as strike weapons. This was supported by recommendations from the Chief of Naval Operations for steady funding of aircraft programs, conversion of both USS Lexington and USS Saratoga, as well as authorization for a built- for-purpose carrier. U.S. Navy These events pressured the Navy to demonstrate the practicality of the ideas pushed by naval aviators and supported by simulations. Pro- ■ Carriers had many weaknesses. They had to be ponents knew they had to show results both to close to enemy formations to launch and recover planes fend off demands for an independent air service due to the short range of bombing aircraft. Moreover, and to influence Navy resource allocation issues. wind direction dictated the general flight operations course. A key individual, Captain J. M. Reeves, now entered the story. He arrived at Newport in spring Practical Experience 1924 and for the next year headed the tactics de- In 1924 the Navy established a Special Policy partment with responsibility for simulations. He Board of the General Board. It was directed to then took a “catch-up” observer course for non- consider the status of aircraft and the future of aviators at Pensacola. The Chief of Naval Opera- the battleship. The board consulted aeronautical tions appointed Reeves commander of Aircraft authorities including the National Advisory Squadrons, Battle Force, in September 1925 Committee on Aeronautics which indicated that which gave him an organizational role. A month aircraft “maximum performance...may be in- later he was directed by the commander in chief, creased about 30 percent by future develop- Battle Fleet, to develop “strategy and tactics of ments.” That modest projected growth and the the air in its relation to the fleet.” Thus the theo- lack of practical experience and verification of retician/wargamer was given resources and offi- ideas suggested in the Naval War College simula- cial encouragement to experiment and test ideas tion caused the board to recognize the battleship freely in the field.

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Reeves started with the simulation conclu- dive-bombing, later used throughout World War sion that the number of aircraft in the air was the II, was established (though it was not clear that key MOE for strike effectiveness. His problem was the method would kill ships given the weak ord- how to maximize that number. For him, the tech- nance of the period). Contemporary reports also nical problem of the carrier air strike concept was noted more combined dive-bombing and torpedo how to reduce the long per-plane launch/land tactics against ships armed with antiaircraft guns. times. He examined the launch/land process in These developments had an organizational detail. Before, each plane was put below after consequence. Reeves’ old job as commander, Air- landing in case the next one missed the arresting craft Squadrons, Battle Force, became a flag billet wires and crashed into those on deck. Reeves in- in September 1927. vented a movable deck carrier, which obviated the need to move to and from the hangar deck. American Developments Once all planes were recovered, they were moved Admiral Moffett, reappointed chief of the aft, refueled, rearmed, and ready to launch. Bureau of Aeronautics in March 1925, was the Navy’s point man in the political battle against General Mitchell and his congressional supporters. He approved publicity including risky non- stop seaplane flights between California and Hawaii as well as visits by the airship Shenandoah across the country in September 1925. Both events ended with fatal accidents and were cited as evidence of Mitchell’s charges of naval negli- gence and incompetence (which soon culminated in his court-martial). In response, President Calvin Coolidge created the Morrow Board to examine the future of aviation and government involvement. After lengthy hearings the board rejected the idea of a unified air service and unified aircraft procurement. It called on Congress to authorize procurement of 1,000 planes over five years to sustain the aircraft industry and provide the Army and Navy with modern planes. It also recommended that aircraft carriers and naval air stations be commanded by naval aviators. The motivation U.S. Navy for the last item is unclear. Did the board con- DT–2 from USS Langley clude that such assignments required knowledge with torpedo and By August 1926 Reeves recommended that possessed only by aviators, or that viable com- rigged parachute, 1926. the official status of USS Langley be changed from mand and career opportunities should be pro- experimental to “full-fledged combatant” and vided for aviators? Giving ship command to avia- that its complement of aircraft be doubled to 28. tors would bestow greater institutional A year later his successor reported, “Commander acceptance by the then-dominant, more tradi- Aircraft Squadrons believes that he can operate in tional surface warfare community. time of war 48 planes from the carrier.” In mid-1926, the Battle Fleet commander in From mid-August 1926 aviators on board USS chief noted that there was “a lack of statistical Langley were “devoted to intensive study by prac- tactical data in connection with aerial operations tical operations of aircraft tactics.” One innovative and...of any system or well-defined doctrine for tactic examined was dive-bombing, which seemed the employment of aircraft in major operations.” to address the problem of accurately hitting tar- At the same time, the Bureaus of Aeronautics and gets (though it was unclear that this was a purely of Construction and Repair differed on the design Navy development). In October 1926 Reeves had a of the built-for-purpose carrier recommended by squadron of aircraft carry out such an attack on an the 1924 Special Policy Board. The General Board alerted battleship squadron. It was witnessed by asked the Naval War College for assistance. the fleet commander in chief, Admiral Hughes, Simulation in 1926–27 specifically addressed who promptly became a strong proponent of issues dividing the Bureaus of Aeronautics and of naval aviation. By December the accuracy of steep Construction and Repair. The staff of the Naval War College determined that it was essential that carriers be able to arm and service planes on deck rather than exclusively in the hangar and that

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van Tol

they have open ventilated hangar decks for ser- its existence under severe budgetary constraints, vicing which precluded interference with flight relying heavily upon strategic bombing doctrine, deck operations. It later specifically recom- which it argued supplanted many roles formerly mended construction of “large high-speed vessels, carried out by armies and navies and at lower cost. probably of 23,000 tons and 33 knots.” This came to be called “air substitution.” The In June 1926 Secretary of the Navy Curtis Royal Air Force consistently convinced Whitehall Wilbur postponed further construction pending of the merits of its case, which further constrained exercises scheduled to take place after the com- other service budgets. In particular, the Royal missioning of USS Lexington and USS Saratoga in Navy was unable to replace outmoded aircraft car- 1927. Moffett unsuccessfully objected, arguing riers until the late 1930s. The Royal Air Force, that a delay would put the Navy largely responsible for procuring naval aircraft, loss of aviation personnel at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Britain bought as few as possible in order to buy more air- and Japan. The Secretary agreed craft for its principal strategic bombing mission. separated the Royal Navy to revisit his decision after the This further militated against acquiring more or from wartime lessons December 1926 dive bombing larger carriers to accommodate more aircraft. demonstration and rigorous There were other organizational conse- analysis by the Naval War Col- quences. Loss of technically-minded aviation per- lege as noted above. He established a special re- sonnel effectively separated the Royal Navy from view board to weigh new evidence. The instruc- its corporate memory of wartime lessons. All tions to the board stated that it was “necessary to naval links with the aviation industry were cut. assume certain risks in the purchase of new equip- There was no mechanism for institutionalizing ment and be willing to assume these risks if we ex- aviation in the service. There was no way to es- pect to advance.” tablish bureaucratic equivalent of the Bureau of Moffett persuaded Rear Admiral David Taylor Aeronautics. All this made it impossible to con- to include Moffett, Reeves, and Captain H.E. duct any significant study of the future role of Yarnell (the future first commanding officer of naval aviation. USS Saratoga) as board members. The review The loss of naval aviators who believed in quickly found that the key issue was what kinds carrier potential eliminated the counterweight to of aircraft to put on carriers. Congress had acted the gunnery community. Coupled with dramatic on the recommendation of the Morrow Board increases in the effectiveness of surface gunnery and authorized procurement of 1,000 planes over (with spotting aircraft) in the 1920s, that materi- five years. But what kind? ally affected conceptions of how aircraft should be The board suggested that acceptance of car- used. While the navy did reestablish a Fleet Air rier aviation as a primary strike weapon was far Arm with junior officers in 1921, it strongly re- from universal. It rejected the concept of a single sisted separateness. Aviators served alternate tours scout/fighter/bomber and identified six priorities: between Fleet Air Arm and the rest of the Royal ■ fighter planes Navy. Nonaviators commanded carriers because ■ battleship/cruiser spotters good seamanship was the key aspect of command. ■ scout/reconnaissance planes The practical effect was that no “band of commit- ■ dive bombers ted enthusiasts” could form an internal lobby. ■ level bombers But Royal Navy carrier development was not ■ torpedo planes and patrol seaplanes hindered by organizational problems alone. The The priority given to fighters and spotters technical aspects of British carrier design were de- suggests that carrier aircraft were primarily seen ficient in ways that had a cascading effect. Carri- by the board as the means of achieving air superi- ers were by nature expensive, durable ships; thus ority for spotting during engagements between design decisions had long-lasting consequences. battleship forces. The board had the luxury of Moreover, those decisions also dictated key as- considering multiple specialized aircraft because pects of carrier aircraft design. Consequently, de- of the large congressional authorization. Other- velopment of carrier aircraft in the 1930s was wise it might have been forced to decide which heavily shaped by carrier design decisions made types to recommend and hence made a skewed long before much operating experience had been selection not necessarily based on operational acquired. Since aircraft were then relatively short- tactical requirements. lived, particularly during a period of rapid technological change, there was a premium in having British Developments large carriers with large margins for accommodat- Organizationally, establishment of an inde- ing newer aircraft and their support requirements. pendent Royal Air Force had pernicious effects, Both America and Japan had large hulls which both direct and indirect. Those were aggravated could be converted into carriers while Britain did by financial problems. The service had to justify

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not. The other way to accommodate unforeseen search aircraft which meant extra crew for naviga- changes in requirements was with a budget that tion at sea and, in turn, reduced aircraft perfor- allowed for replacements, a luxury Britain lacked. mance. Moreover, search area coverage deter- Even when the coming war resulted in much mined the number of scouting aircraft embarked, greater defense spending, urgent competing prior- which in turn became important relative to air- ities permitted only one additional carrier to enter craft capacity. the fleet prior to 1940, while urgent Royal Air British officers never developed the vision of Force defensive requirements limited production carrier strike that Mustin and Reeves had on the resources available for improved naval aircraft. American side. The dominant concept was that One key early technical judgment bedeviled the battle line would win the decisive battles. The British carrier development. The Royal Navy did lessons of World War I, particularly Jutland, drove not adopt carrier deck parks; when not engaged in thinking on aircraft. Once reconnaissance planes flight operations, aircraft were stowed below. Thus located an enemy fleet, it had to be prevented hangar size became a determinant of carrier air- from eluding the battle force. Torpedo attack by craft capacity and characteristics and drove opera- aircraft was regarded as the best way of slowing tional cycle times. The hangars were closed rather an enemy to allow the battle line to destroy it, than open, so aircraft engines had to be warmed with spotter aircraft and long-range gunnery. The up on deck. But hangar size was impossible to fighter role was protecting vulnerable spotters. alter after the fact. Another major problem was Ironically, the Royal Navy studied the question of limited aviation fuel storage and inability to battleship vulnerability to aircraft repeatedly dur- retroactively install special fuel tanks. Even had ing the 1930s but did not consider it a serious aircraft capacity been increased, it would not have problem, at least until December 1941. been possible to support the larger airwing. This The focus by the Royal Air Force on strategic problem only got worse as more powerful engines bombing not only contributed to neglect of naval were developed. Flight deck gear was sadly defi- aviation but rejection of the role of close air sup- cient. The Royal Navy did not install an effective port for the army. Dive bombing was thus not ex- deck barrier until 1939. This affected flight opera- plored, leaving the Royal Navy unable to experi- tions because aircraft required more deck space for ment with a technique that had the potential to launch and landing, which drove an apparent re- deliver ordnance against ships without virtually quirement that aircraft be below between landings assured destruction of the delivery aircraft. and brought up sequentially for launch. Since this These tactical considerations, coupled with procedure was key, carriers could not expedi- the technical limitations and requirements noted tiously launch large strikes. Moreover, since the above, led to deployment of multi-purpose planes British could not see how to overcome this prob- (because of space limitations) with two or three lem they presumed other navies had a similar one. crew (due to navigation and observation require- Admiralty documents dismissed claims about ments) and poor performance (from mandated American aircraft capacities into the 1930s. Flight low launch/landing speeds and added crew deck limits also imposed key technical features on weight) save for exactly those features which the aircraft design including slow launch and landing Royal Navy considered most important for tacti- speeds. These technical requirements conflicted cal purposes—long range/endurance for scouting with desirable tactical characteristics. That was and, for torpedo planes, carrying heavy weapons. not crucial in the biplane era, but the Royal Navy Indeed, in the mid-1930s it depended largely on a was unable to modify ships to accommodate the single aircraft type to do reconnaissance, spot- powerful monoplanes of the mid-1930s. ting, and torpedo attacks. Its fighters did not Unlike America and Japan, Britain did not have to be high performance since the Royal confront a major naval enemy in home waters. Navy did not anticipate a fleet action in range of By the 1930s the threat seemed to be a small Ital- land-based aircraft; and from experience it pro- ian fleet and a handful of powerful German sur- jected that all naval aircraft were inherently low face ships. In dealing with it, Royal Navy think- performance. Some British fighter designs were ing was heavily influenced by World War I. The even multi-mission. operational problem bedeviling the British then Thus perversely, the Royal Navy carefully was reconnaissance. Since the Royal Air Force considered what it wanted carrier aircraft to do controlled all landbased aircraft and stressed tactically and thoroughly integrated them. In strategic bombing, the Royal Navy did not have 1931, for example, one British publication noted long-range, land-based patrol planes for maritime that although America was “considerably ahead reconnaissance. Carriers required their own of our Fleet Air Arm in the techniques of operating aircraft from catapults and carrier decks, their efficiency in reconnaissance is not up to our current standard.” In the early 1930s the Royal Navy

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Launching seaplane at Pensacola in 1915. U.S. Navy

apparently had no reason to believe it was mis- flight and hangar decks, and moving planes on taken; it assumed the limitations it faced were deck at night and in bad weather needed to be re- universal, did not believe many American claims, fined, but the main problem had been addressed. and lacked mechanisms for critical analysis. In However another problem—at the center of the particular, there was no budget to procure mod- carrier revolution—remained: how should multi- ern carriers and aircraft, no technical staff to work ple carriers be used? with industry and test aircraft designs, and no By early 1927 Reeves already had the notion method to weigh operational concepts for em- of employing multiple carriers as the core of a ploying carrier aircraft. When the Royal Navy re- fast-striking force and argued for concentration. alized how far behind its Fleet Air Arm was it was Based on the wargames in 1926–27 at Newport, too late to recover. Wartime carriers lacked the he was convinced of the need to deliver a knock- punch of their American counterparts and many out blow against enemy airpower in the opening British air groups flew U.S. aircraft. minutes of any confrontation between carrier Only in the late 1930s could Britain do what forces. This again implied that carrier aircraft Reeves and USS Langley had done in 1927. Given could kill carriers. Whether that meant sinking the different evolution of its carrier aviation, the them or merely rendering them incapable of air Royal Navy was never able to consider the next operations by, for example, punching a hole in step in carrier development—multiple carrier op- their wooden decks was not clear. erations. The U.S. Navy, on the other hand, had USS Lexington and USS Saratoga were commis- been simulating such operations since the early sioned in 1927 but had problems requiring a year 1920s and exercising them since 1929. to fix, including how to run a deck park with more than the handful of aircraft USS Langley operated. Multiple Carrier Operations The ships finally prepared to go to sea for Fleet For the U.S. Navy the problem of launching Problem IX in 1929, the initial test of multiple car- the maximum number of aircraft from a single riers launching significant numbers of aircraft. carrier was nearly solved by the end of 1927. Spe- Each ship had over a hundred planes. The large cific technical issues such as limiting aircraft damage from arresting gear, refueling aircraft on

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aircraft complement allowed great flexibility, espe- test operational concepts. But it is not clear what cially when compared with Royal Navy carriers. might have happened without the treaty—many In Fleet Problem IX, USS Saratoga, with more battleships might have been built or Con- Reeves in command, detached from the main gress might have approved the wrong type of car- force and made the famous dive-bombing raid on rier. The Taylor Board recommended in 1927 that the Panama Canal, though archival records indi- five 13,800-ton carriers of USS Ranger type be built. cate that USS Saratoga was detached from the bat- Had that actually occurred, the United States tleship force only because the destroyer escorts might have found itself stuck like Britain, with lacked the fuel to keep up. There was no inten- platforms that could not easily accommodate sub- tion for the carriers to operate as an independent sequent developments. At the same time, given strike force. Admiral Pratt, commander in chief that the key metric was aircraft in the air, such a U.S. Fleet, did not consider the exercise realistic choice was not obviously wrong. Congress saw no enough to draw major lessons from it. reason to increase the number of carriers while The aftermath was interesting, however. This further limits were being considered for the 1930 problem was followed by a critique presided over Geneva talks. By the early 1930s economic distress by Pratt. The force commander of the USS further constrained military spending. Saratoga group noted, “When we learn more of The fact that gaming at Newport did not sig- the possibilities of the carriers, we will come to an nificantly affect carrier aviation in the 1930s is acceptance of Admiral Reeves’ plan which pro- puzzling. Because the lack of existing assets to vides for a very powerful and mobile force...the test single and multiple carrier propositions did nucleus of which is the carrier.” not preclude Newport from simulating them in Carriers were accepted as fleet units. A Bu- the 1920s, one can ask why multiple carrier oper- reau of Navigation requirement that line officers ations were not analogously simulated in the pass detailed exams on naval aviation and aircraft 1930s. Whether gaming and fleet exercise interac- characteristics was evidence of institutional action on carrier operations continued, the fact re- ceptance. Yet carriers were not seen as indepen- mains that in 1941–42 the Navy tried to answer dent strike platforms outside the naval aviation questions by trial and error which ostensibly lent community. As Commander John Towers told the themselves to prior simulation. Should multiple General Board in late 1929, “We can’t drop a 500- carriers operate singly or in task groups? How pound bomb on a battleship.” should air groups be composed? With respect to Debate ensued over carriers as independent fighter interception, how can enemy bombers be strike forces versus their role supporting the battle detected and effectively attacked? line. Focus on the strike mission meant fewer de- Nonetheless, there was progress in develop- fensive assets over the bat- ing carrier aviation during the 1930s. Moffett, of little thought appeared to be tleship assets they sup- the Bureau of Aeronautics, and Chief of Naval ported. This question was Operations Pratt consistently argued before the given to multiple carrier never satisfactorily ad- General Board that the aim of naval aviation was employment because of the dressed during the 1930s, in to “bolster the offensive power of the fleet and of part because of the scarcity advanced base expeditionary forces.” As Moffett Washington Naval Treaty of carriers and limited air- stated, “The primary function of the main body craft capabilities. Moreover, of carriers is certainly to increase the major attack little thought appeared to be given to multiple power of the fleet....” The mid-1930s fast battle- carrier employment—especially when aircraft per- ship design offered the promise of combined car- formance improved—because of restrictions im- rier-battleship strike forces. posed by the Washington Naval Treaty and politi- One barrier to recognizing strike effectiveness cal considerations. The Naval War College was the relative impotence of carrier aircraft as a simulation-fleet empirical testing failed to work strike weapon. In the 1930s dive bombers could as well as it had in the 1920s. deliver two 100-pound bombs, and torpedo With respect to treaty constraints, the Wash- bombers could carry a 2,000-pound torpedo but ington agreement limited total carrier tonnage. By were highly vulnerable to fighters and anti-aircraft choosing to convert USS Lexington and USS gunnery because of their bombs. The problem was Saratoga, the Navy had little tonnage for follow-on that carrier aircraft were not yet shipkillers. carriers, reflected in the unsatisfactory design of The solution was found partly in more pow- the light carrier USS Ranger. It was not possible to erful engines. World War I had shown that fast, build many large (as opposed to light) carriers to rapidly climbing fighters had a tactical advantage. It was assumed that U.S. carrier fighters would inevitably engage land-based Japanese aircraft, but the need for strong engines was not only driven by military needs. Commercial aviation expanded

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USS Shaw exploding, December 7, 1941. U.S. Navy

rapidly. While the 1920s saw civil aircraft largely The cumulative effect of these developments used for barnstorming and mail service, reliable was that the United States possessed a potent al- instrument flying and an expanding infrastruc- beit latent strike capability by 1941. It was latent ture made air transport viable and created a de- because, although individual carriers had some of mand for high performance aircraft and engines the capacity envisioned by Reeves during trials on which led to a profitable industry. USS Langley, the concept of multiple carriers as an Institutionally, the Bureau of Aeronautics independent striking force remained untested. (and the Army) fostered development of aircraft Moreover, there was little sign that aviators them- technologies by industry, including radial engines selves consistently held that vision, judging by and aeronautical streamlining. Military and civil early carrier operations in 1942. requirements reinforced each other. Performance The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was the rapidly improved throughout the decade until, by first operational use of carriers as foreseen by 1937, the SBC–4 dive bomber carried a 1,000 Reeves (the Royal Navy raid in 1940 on Taranto bomb almost 600 miles with a maximum speed was conducted by a single carrier). Strikingly, the of 237 miles per hour with interesting technical U.S. Navy took some time to follow the enemy results. These required greater takeoff and landing lead. Despite the devastating Pearl Harbor raid speeds. That validated the need for greater takeoff and other Japanese operations, the Navy fought and landing speeds or longer distances. Higher in single carrier task groups for another year. performance drove up fuel consumption and Even at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal, task called for added fuel storage capacity. These fac- groups were split (except for USS Hornet and USS tors had obvious implications for carrier design. Enterprise at Midway). It was only after the experi- Again, the fortuitously large size of USS Lexington ences of 1942 that multi-carrier task groups be- and USS Saratoga accommodated these develop- came the fleet standard. By then the ability of ments. The Royal Navy was not so fortunate. carrier aircraft to kill ships and defend carriers There were also operational consequences. was incontrovertible as was the vulnerability of Carrier aircraft could now deliver ship killing ord- battleships to air attack. The revolutionary effects nance. For scouting purposes, greater speed and of naval aviation had become clear. JFQ longer range permitted faster searches of far larger areas. Moreover, range could be traded for pay- This article is directly based on a study entitled “The load, allowing scouts to carry bombs and a given Introduction of Carrier Aviation into the U.S. Navy and aircraft to perform different missions, thus influ- the Royal Navy: Military-Technical Revolutions, Organi- encing air group composition. It also meant a zations, and the Problem of Decision” by Thomas C. Hone, Mark D. Mandeles, and Norman Friedman, which radio-equipped scout could detect an enemy, re- was conducted for the Office of Net Assessment within port its position, and attack immediately. Given the Office of the Secretary of Defense in July 1994. the imperative to strike enemy carriers at once, A book-length version of the original study will be this was an important capability. published by U.S. Naval Institute Press.

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Prisoners with captured machine gun, 1918.

On Machine Guns U.S. Army Military History Institute History U.S. Army Military and Precision Engagement By PRICE T. BINGHAM

lthough technological developments Machine guns transformed warfare by vastly can lead to immense changes in the increasing infantry firepower. The experience in conduct of war, it is hard to antici- European colonial wars of the last century pate what form these changes will strongly suggested that greater firepower made it take.A The machine gun illustrates the tremendous too costly for massed infantry or horse cavalry to impact of innovative technology on land warfare. cross a killing zone only a few hundred meters Precision engagement could dwarf the influence wide. The immense advantage of weapons such of that weapon. Examining the introduction of as the one produced by Hiram Maxim moved Hi- the machine gun will help frame the questions laire Belloc to quip: we must address today in making the changes necessary to exploit technology and avoid the Thank God that we have got catastrophic errors that European armies made The Maxim gun and they have not when the machine gun was initially fielded. The lethal firepower of six Maxim guns ex- plains why the British suffered only 48 dead at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898 while the Lieutenant Colonel Price T. Bingham, USAF (Ret.), Dervishes lost over 11,000. As Edward Arnold was formerly chief of the doctrine division in the noted, “In most of our wars it has been the dash, Airpower Research Institute at the Center for the skill, and bravery of our officers and men that Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education.

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Bingham

have won the day, but in this case the battle was engagement capability. Such power would make it won by a quiet scientific gentleman living in possible to destroy vehicles in a killing zone over Kent.” Although Sir Edward realized the implica- two hundred kilometers deep, coinciding with the tions of what had happened, many did not. JSTARS field of vision. Recognizing the role vehicles play in modern land warfare as well as the im- Morale Versus Technology pact weapons like the machine gun had in creating While there was some appreciation that im- a killing zone only a few hundred meters wide, the proving the lethality of firepower would demand role of precision engagement in future land war- changes in warfighting, European armies were un- fare becomes obvious. able to ask the right questions. Not surprisingly, When an enemy learns that we can see and answers to the wrong precisely target vehicles—as the Iraqis discovered questions prevented at Al Khafji—it may be increasingly reluctant to World War I revealed that three them from anticipating attempt movement, not unlike soldiers who are men and a machine gun can stop innovations that new reluctant to move across an unswept minefield. technology provided. As enemy fear of traveling in vehicles increases, a battalion of heroes The French in particu- the ability to maneuver operationally or resupply lar failed to grasp how diminishes. Moreover, an enemy will lose much improved firepower might affect offensive opera- of the mobility, firepower, and armored protec- tions. Not having asked the right questions, they tion essential to modern land warfare. arrived at answers that put too much emphasis on Once mechanically paralyzed, an enemy morale versus technology and strengthened the must depend on foot and animal power like pre- conviction that the offensive spirit of their sol- industrial armies. Yet our forces can take advan- diers would suffice. But the experiences of World tage of 21st century technology which gives them War I revealed the limits of the human element dominant maneuver capabilities. Faced with such when it became clear that “three men and a ma- overwhelming disadvantages, most organized re- chine gun” can stop a battalion of heroes. sistance would collapse. Then our combined in- Only after sustaining immense casualties formation, firepower, armored protection, and while attempting to cross the killing zones on the maneuver dominance should assure victory at rel- battlefield of 1914–18—made possible by devel- atively little cost. To borrow from Belloc: opments in firepower such as the machine gun— did armies make dramatic changes in warfighting. Thank God that we have got By the end of World War II technological changes Precision engagement and they have not led to the end of horse cavalry and to the advent of mechanized vehicles for mobility, armored We must learn what changes are needed for protection, and firepower. The armies of today our forces to exploit surveillance and precision have further increased their reliance on vehicles engagement to deny an enemy use of its vehicles. not just on the battlefield but across the entire The development of the machine gun reveals theater. This dependence on vehicles to wage war both the importance and difficulty of determin- helps explain how precision engagement tech- ing those changes. We learn from that example nologies can change warfare far more than the that changes required by surveillance and preci- machine gun. sion engagement capabilities will rely on what Some technologies vital to realizing the po- questions we ask and our thoroughness in an- tential of precision engagement are found in air- swering them. borne ground surveillance. In particular, the joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) The Right Questions has greatly extended the distance at which we We must begin by asking if we have the tools can see and target enemy mobile land forces. Its to evaluate the effectiveness of surveillance and unprecedented performance in the moving target precision engagement technologies and to train indicator mode makes it possible for this type of personnel to use them. Both evaluation and train- surveillance to accurately detect, locate, and track ing require the ability to accurately simulate vehic- enemy vehicles crossing a vast area in real-time, ular movement on a massive scale. They also re- even in darkness and bad weather. quire accurate simulation of how connectivity and battle management affect our ability to rapidly tar- Surveillance and Targeting get large numbers of moving vehicles. Simulating When surveillance and target attack capability the destruction of enemy vehicles is not enough is combined with progress in airborne battle man- by itself because, like mine warfare, the impact of agement, sensor-to-shooter connectivity, and precision munitions optimized to attack moving vehicles, the military will have an awesome precision

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Firing TOW missile. Marine Division, Combat Camera (E.J.Marine Division, Combat Camera Young) d 2

precision engagement will the ability to achieve surprise and intensity to be determined by enemy maximize the intimidation of an enemy and min- perceptions of the threat imize friendly exposure. and its influence on the be- Understanding how to exploit the advantages havior of enemy soldiers. of precision engagement makes it essential to ask Given the right tools what changes will be needed in land and air we must ascertain which forces. We must determine how a vehicle killing systems—fighters, bombers, zone with a depth greater than two hundred kilo- Marine Division, Combat Camera (E.J.Marine Division, Combat Camera Young) d

2 helicopters, or missiles—or meters is likely to influence close-in battle and Toting anti-armor combinations of systems thus the air and land forces used to fight it. Given missile system. can best deliver precision that an objective of precision engagement is creat- munitions against moving vehicles tracked by ing operational paralysis—that is, the conditions JSTARS. Such decisions will require looking at re- for truly dominant maneuver—we must learn sponsiveness, basing availability and vulnerabili- whether inflicting paralysis could make mines and ties, and delivery cost to include the risk of loss hand-held weapons the principal close-in threat for manned aircraft delivery. Closely related to to land forces. This will determine, in turn, the the issue of which delivery platforms offer what kind of protection vehicles need and whether advantages is the question of what types of muni- weapons should be optimized for neutralizing tions are best for performing precision engage- dug-in infantry as opposed to killing tanks. ment against moving vehicles. Since a primary goal of precision engage- Precision engagement clearly puts the Armed ment is operational paralysis, it is important to Forces in a position to exploit truly immense ask how munitions should be optimized to de- changes in warfighting. It is equally apparent that stroy a moving vehicle in the dark or poor visibil- it will require major adjustments in doctrine and ity. Answering this question organization as well as weaponry. Fortunately, we an objective of precision requires knowing if achiev- are better prepared for a test of professionalism engagement is operational ing the requisite precision today than when the machine gun was intro- depends on being able to ex- duced. The proof will come in the questions we paralysis—the conditions for ploit signatures created by ask and our willingness to act on the answers re- dominant maneuver vehicular movement. (Here gardless of the resulting changes. JFQ we might ask if the anti-radi- ation missile, which uses radar emissions for terminal guidance, provides a suitable requirements model for a precision munition attack on moving vehicles.) Determining the best option will also require gauging the influence of munition footprints on battle management and connectivity requirements as well as

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Pathfinder, Vandenburg Air Force Base. Lockheed (Russ Underwood)

Searching for Policy Coherence: The DOD Space Architect as an Experiment By JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE and ROGER HANDBERG

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n an era of declining resources, the search for from Redstone Arsenal to the National Aeronau- ways to control and reallocate expenditures tics and Space Administration (NASA) in ex- has become more focused. Pentagon re- change for support to field additional divisions, sponses to cost cutting have varied depending but only after a protracted and heated battle Ion the matter at hand. With regard to military which reached the White House. Assurances were space the answer has involved forming specialized sought that the future role of the Army in space organizations, a time-honored means of dealing was not being relinquished, only von Braun and with change. Organizational reform can represent his expertise. The Army and Navy still advance a major attempt to introduce change or a mecha- the same demands in their vision statements. nism for deflecting real change. This article exam- The institutional memory of the Army is ines the potential of the recently established Of- even longer given disputes with the Air Force fice of the DOD Space Architect. over tactical air support during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the heyday of Strategic Air Com- Prologue mand. In response to a perceived neglect of their Reform in the area of military space began in needs by the Air Force, large rotary wing air forces 1993 at the direct instigation of key chairmen of were organized under Army control, partially congressional committees. Interestingly, several recreating the air forces of World War II. Depen- studies completed around that time did not find dence on support from another service is a situa- organization to be a problem. Control and cost tion that most fervently seek to avoid. savings, it was decided, could be achieved by Solving military space coordination involved other means.1 Reorganization did not become a several iterations, with the solution ultimately priority until other remedies coming down to creating two staff positions and the Air Force was reassured were exhausted. However, one board. The posts of Deputy Under Secretary Congress expressed concern of Defense for Space and the DOD Space Architect that the space architect over the apparent inability or were both chartered in early 1995. But the Joint would function within its unwillingness of the services Space Management Board (JSMB) did not take to coordinate their space ef- shape until late 1995 after lengthy discussions on own reporting chain forts, which led to delayed membership and authority or—as one participant program implementation and put it—on the seating plan. The board grew to 26 budget overruns. Congress wanted a plan that re- members to prevent any potential player from lated space programs to funding requests. This being excluded by design or inadvertence. Conse- concern was not resolved for two and a half years quently, it largely became a vehicle for the major as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, defense members to meet and the minor ones to raise agencies, services, and Department of State questions or objections. Given the group’s size, worked through the various aspects of the prob- the adage that “he who takes notes deciphers the lem.2 decisions that were made” became a reality. Pol- The challenge was compounded by fears ex- icy guidance, if any is forthcoming, will likely be pressed publicly by the other services whenever reduced to the lowest common denominator. the Air Force sought to become the decision- The restructuring of military space manage- maker for all military space activities.3 Histori- ment essentially ended by adding more players cally the Air Force has been the dominant space to the process and introducing more layers of bu- service, a preeminence established by its continu- reaucracy for military space programs to pene- ing interest and spending rather than because it is trate. Among the services no programs were either the exclusive or even primary user of space transferred, consolidated, or eliminated; and no systems. As users each service has an interest in further space staff positions were established. the availability and flexibility of such systems. Rather than taking risks, the players tacitly Thus while willing to allow the Air Force to as- agreed to simply keep what they had, especially sume the lead, the other services are unwilling to the smaller ones. The victory of the weaker play- forego a space role altogether. Their priorities ad- ers came only insofar as the so-called “space mittedly lie elsewhere and space represents an ex- czar” was pushed into relative irrelevancy in ploitable asset rather than an end in itself. This is terms of actual decisionmaking. The Air Force a factor that favors the Air Force in the long term. was reassured that any space architect would Historically, it was the Army that turned over function within its own reporting chain. The Werhner von Braun and his German rocket team congressional mandate has been met in principle and on paper even though the result is more bureaucratic than programmatic coordination. That Joan Johnson-Freese teaches international security studies at Air War protective response has a familiar ring because College and Roger Handberg is director of the Center for Space Policy defense budgets decline while pressures to per- and Law, University of Central Florida. form often increase. Protecting the stake of every

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Johnson-Freese and Handberg

SPACECOM command center, Cheyenne Mountain. U.S. Air Force (Carol U.S. Air Force Floyd) NASA Space Shuttle Discovery.

service in space and its relative budget share were The DOD Space Architect derives his author- critical goals and were achieved, if not entirely to ity from a memo issued by the Under Secretary of the satisfaction of all services at least enough to Defense for Acquisition and Technology in 1995 meet their essential needs. that defines his responsibilities as consolidating space missions and systems, eliminating vertical Space Architect stovepiping, integrating acquisition and future The organizationally more tenuous new po- operations, and thereby improving space support sition, the DOD Space Architect, must be viewed to military operations. But in reality his office is against a backdrop of interservice politics. It less robust when it comes to the fine print: “the might be less tenable over the long haul, with architect will have significant influence over ac- continued support from above and a consequent quisition decisions but will have no direct acqui- decline in parochialism from below. Tradition has sition authority per se....For day-to-day activity, shown, however, that as the original senior in- the architect will coordinate directly with the per- cumbents depart, attention and commitment to forming organization.”4 such a position by their successors who have no The DOD Space Architect is linked to subor- stake in it will wane. They will have programs of dinates or equals for purposes of coordination. their own to support, thereby allowing the return The only command line extends to his reporting to military space politics as usual. authority, namely, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.

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the role of the Space Architect in implementation would be minimal, fundamentally that of a monitor. However, moving MILSATCOM architecture to the services proved difficult, and the architect’s office needed to play an active role. Indeed, another full year of transition planning was scheduled, indicating a reluctance on the part of the stakeholders to accept the architecture without hesitancy. In reality, they were not compelled to embrace it at all. Frankly, the DOD Space Architect is a staff position with no direct lines to command authority (see figure on opposite page). In a hierarchy such as the military, that can be an Achilles heel of fatal magnitude because one bargains from a position of known weakness. That is especially a problem for a position with high external (congressional) expectations for success. Rather than responding, any service unhappy with his plans or advice can feel relatively safe stonewalling or appealing to higher levels of authority beyond the access of the Space Architect. That type of DOD NAVSTAR global day-to-day grinding down by opponents is what positioning system. undermines such “coordinating” positions over the long haul. The former CEO of Avis, Robert Townsend, By virtue of his place in the hierarchy, the who has earned a reputation as a management DOD Space Architect has no real constituency. consultant, made an observation that seems to Service space chiefs relate to their services while apply in this situation: the Space Architect competes with the comman- The thing that shows up a problem on an orga- der in chief, U.S. Space Command (CINCSPACE), nizational chart is the dotted line...some compro- who speaks as an operational commander, a mise has been made in the organization. Some prob- much more authoritative role. CINCSPACE has lem has not been faced, it has not been solved, and it indicated that his command is entrusted with 6 is an unsatisfactory solution. You can look at an orga- most military applications. In addition, he leads nizational chart and just pick the problems without the effort to develop joint space doctrine that will even knowing what the company does...by looking expand the utilization of space from a single asset at the dotted lines. They are a sign of a problem, sign to an aggregate of capabilities, a much-needed of muddy thinking, sign of compromise, and a sign of philosophical step forward. Moreover, as dis- unhappiness, frustration, and mediocre performance.5 cussed earlier, when such positions are created by civilian officials who depart—either voluntarily Townsend’s comment identifies the problem or in a routine political reshuffling—the positions with the space czar’s position—he does not com- become less tenable. Subsequent under secretaries mand or control anything, contrary to the im- will arrive with their own agendas on how to pression conveyed by his title. achieve the coordination demanded by Congress, The first architecture developed was released or at least on how to appear responsive. in August 1996 and deals with military satellite There are serious problems with placing the communications (MILSATCOM). It is to be fol- position under the rubric of acquisition because it lowed by architectures on space control and satel- may exacerbate an already difficult situation lite operations. Originally it was thought that the since that office is “buying” rather than prioritiz- office of the DOD Space Architect would develop ing goals. Theoretically, such decisions should be several alternatives for presentation to JSMB, made before reaching the acquisition level. If not, which would choose among them, but that was the problems worsen since priorities have not not feasible because of the cumbersome nature of been agreed upon. With a declining budget (rela- the board. Instead a single architecture was de- tive to inflation), that is a recipe for disaster both velped to pass to the services for consideration in fiscally and operationally. acquisitions. Furthermore, it was envisioned that The DOD Space Architect is further weakened and confused by the fact that the other new position, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space, has leverage over the space acquisition

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Johnson-Freese and Handberg

DOD Space Organizational Relationships

Joint Space Management Board

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Other Government

Air Force Deputy Under Secretary Commercial Acquisition Executive of Defense for Space

International

DOD Space Architect

Joint Staff

U.S. Space Command Air Force NavyArmy Air Force

Source: Department of Defense Space Program: An Executive Overview for FY 1998–2003 (March 1997).

process. Beyond the new positions is the realm of The Lesson space in the intelligence community. The DOD Although the intent of this analysis is not to Space Architect assists the deputy under secretary dwell exclusively on the negatives, the Space Ar- and submits proposed archi- chitect does appear to have been deliberately de- the space architect was tectures to his office; this new signed to be anything except a central player in official also has responsibility deliberately designed military space. The responsibilities implied by his for formulating a national se- title and charter are not matched in reality with to be anything but a central curity space master plan that either authority or muscle, especially in terms of player in military space apparently provides a frame- budgetary clout. The office will likely produce work for future architectures highly competent, technically sophisticated archi- developed to fit into joint tectures which will be viable only as long as all space doctrine. There are lots of plans but little ev- parties concur or sufficient political will exists idence of change. above the level of the DOD Space Architect to en- Furthermore, the plan’s recommendations on force the plan through real budget choices. space-based warning, reconnaissance, and intelli- At the second Space Policy and Architecture gence systems compete with advice from others Symposium held in February 1997, laudatory within OSD, such as the Assistant Secretary of De- comments abounded on the efforts to develop fense for Command, Control, Communications, MILSATCOM architecture. It was emphasized and Intelligence who has direct access to key par- that the process provided a forum for healthy ticipants in decisions on the system. Meanwhile, discussion. But the jury is still out on the issue of other players such as the Defense Mapping transition, and that will determine whether the Agency and the Navy have initiated projects architecture is a legitimate basis for planning or which compete with programs being developed within the office of the DOD Space Architect.

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■ SPACE ARCHITECT

simply an academic exercise. Legacy programs particularly space transportation studies, which and already-planned modernization programs futurists have used to generate a cottage industry. provide near-term spikes in implementation, be- Change will occur but much more slowly than de- yond cultural and turf issues. sired by Congress, which will probably revisit the With regard to congressional interest, the ob- issue in several years to discover what went ject was a realistic long-term plan for military wrong. The answer then, as now, will be that good space activities that would be followed within rea- people cannot make untenable systems work, es- son to maximize declining budgets. However, ini- pecially when budgets decline. The DOD Space Ar- tial indications are that developed MILSATCOM chitect is not an experiment that failed; the condi- architecture is based on optimistic projections of tions just were not ripe for such a position. JFQ its cost and hence is not a near-term money-saver. Congress is unlikely to endorse a plan that is ex- NOTES pensive in the near term in hope of long-term sav- 1 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, ings. Furthermore, an enforcement mechanism is Science Policy Research Division, “Military Space Pro- needed. Congress may have to act, at least in grams in a Changing Environment: Issues for the 103d terms of having the services include architecture Congress,” prepared by Marcia S. Smith, 92–879SPR in building individual program objective memo- (December 1, 1992); and U.S. Government Accounting randa (POMs) and future years defense programs Office, National Security and International Affairs Divi- (FYDPs). Members of Congress want the office to sion, Military Space Programs: Comprehensive Analysis succeed. Perhaps the irony is that Congress wants Needed and Cost Savings Available, GAO/NSIAD–94–164 DOD to adhere to a plan subject to its own some- (April 14, 1994). 2 times fickle annual review. A succinct summary of the negotiations and problems is found in John L. Insprucker III, “The New DOD Without some form of enforcement, imple- Space Management Process: A Critical Analysis” (Maxwell mentation is unlikely given the history of defense Air Force Base, Ala.: Air War College, April 1996). acquisition. Past broad-based acquisition reform 3 Steve Watkins, “Space Chiefs Assail McPeak Plan,” has been characterized by dramatic public ges- Air Force Times, April 18, 1994, and Steve Weber, tures: initial successes and ultimate ineffectuality “Lionetti Defends Army’s Space Role,” Army Times, Au- once the spotlight is shifted.7 The issue is not even gust 29, 1994, p. 30. willful resistance in particular (though that has 4 Ibid. occurred), but rather the effects of inertia. Chang- 5 Robert Townsend, Still Further up the Organization, ing work habits is difficult even where organiza- Nightengale-Conant Audio, 1989. 6 tional leadership is highly motivated. Given a cri- Howell M. Estes III, “Space and Joint Space Doc- trine,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 14 (Winter 1996–97), sis or near crisis atmosphere at higher levels, p. 61. follow-through becomes hard, especially if the old 7 See Brenda Forman, “Wanted: A Constituency for system works. It might function more efficiently Acquisition Reform,” Acquisition Review Quarterly, vol. 1, or cheaply with reform, but that is next week’s no. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 90–99. problem. Unfortunately, next week never comes— 8 Robert K. Steele and Peter L. Portanova, “EELV: the issue is how to handle the problem now. New Acquisition Strategy for a New Launcher,” Aero- In at least one instance of motivated leader- space America, no. 7 (July 1996), pp. 38–43. ship, however, near-term programmatic success in acquisition reform has shown promise. The suggestions raised concerning control and reduction of costs associated with space rather than reorganization have made headway. Indeed, the Air Force evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) program has focused on streamlining the developmental acquisition strategy to bring down launch costs.8 A specific directive as part of that strategy is to limit the management bureaucracy. If support and momentum can be sustained until the vehicles are built, something meaningful will have been accomplished, though the vehicles will then likely be absorbed into “the system.”

Fads come and go, but policy evolves slowly. The common preoccupation of the bureaucracy is logrolling to protect one’s interests. The architectures developed will probably take their place among the growing body of space policy studies,

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Information Warfare

at the Crossroads By BRIAN E. FREDERICKS U.S. Navy Information center aboard Aegis cruiser. he issuance of DOD Directive S3600.1, against a full range of threats. It covers offensive “Information Operations,” in Decem- and defensive information warfare and states a re- ber 1996 opened a new phase in infor- quirement to collect, process, and disseminate an mation warfare. Ever since a highly uninterrupted flow of information to conduct in- Tclassified, limited distribution directive was re- formation operations. leased over four years ago, information warfare has continued to mature within the defense es- Evolution of Information Warfare tablishment. The recent directive captures these DOD Directive TS3600.1 formally launched changes, including a concept of information op- the concept of information warfare in 1992. As erations to take us into the next century. with many other policies, it offered general guid- Information warfare has influenced strategic ance. Its broader implications have emerged over thinking and also received notable attention in time through studies, wargames, and confer- the literature. Joint Vision 2010 spells out a for- ences. From the outset, wider understanding of ward-looking conceptual template to establish a information warfare was limited by security con- force that can dominate the future battlefield siderations.1 The lack of authoritative details on its role in the public domain was underscored by the prolonged absence of an approved unclassi- Colonel Brian E. Fredericks, USA, heads the Information Operations fied definition. Division in the Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate at In January 1994 the first significant govern- Headquarters, Department of the Army. ment explanation of information warfare was

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contained in the annual report of the Secretary of While command and control warfare focuses Defense. Although not providing a definition, the on enemy military command and control when report stated that information warfare: military force is applied, it is that dimension of in- consists of the actions taken to preserve the integrity formation warfare occurring outside the domain of of one’s own information systems from exploitation, the traditional battlefield that has generated the corruption, or destruction, while at the same time ex- greatest attention and is widely viewed as having ploiting, corrupting, or destroying an adversary’s in- the greatest promise. Technological developments formation systems and, in the process, achieving an in electronics, communications, electro-optic, and information advantage in the application of force.2 computer systems, together with the application of established disciplines like psychological opera- This description clearly underscored the of- tions and military deception, offer new ways to fensive and defensive aspects of information war- achieve national security goals. As has been noted, fare. Furthermore, the report stated that it is an information warfare could destroy the ability of a integrating strategy which enables a force to act society to wage war without firing a shot by wreck- more decisively, thus increasing the likelihood of ing its information infrastructure. In an era of in- success while minimizing both casualties and col- formation warfare territory offers no sanctuary, lateral effects. Perhaps the most comprehensive borders are traversed undetected and in millisec- discussion of this subject was contained in A onds, and targets are anywhere.6 Future targets will Strategy for Peace: The include not only military systems but also bank- joint doctrine presents command Decisive Edge in War ing, telecommunications, power grids, transport, published by the Joint and control warfare as a subset and pipeline networks. Staff in 1996. It states The ability to deny an enemy the means to of information warfare that information war- conduct war by destroying its information sys- fare applies across a tems has a profound deterrent effect. Information range of military oper- warfare has the potential of filling a void between ations on every level of warfare. While it is only sanctions and lethal force. Its deterrent value in- one instrument of national power, information creases as a potential enemy grasps its effective- warfare contributes to deterrence by defusing ness and our willingness to use it. As one senior crises and delaying or eliminating the use of officer characterized the challenge of information force. Defensive information warfare integrates warfare: “[It] is to get inside [an enemy] decision and protects information and its systems though loop, to change his perception so that clearly be- offensive information warfare affects enemy in- fore he decides to start a conflict he knows deep 3 formation and information systems. down he is going to lose.” 7 Information warfare has critical links to com- Defensive information warfare has steadily mand and control warfare, which is defined in garnered recognition in recent years. As the De- CJCS Memorandum of Policy 30 (March 1993) as: fense Information Systems Agency found in 1996, The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), more than 95 percent of DOD worldwide military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), telecommunications needs are satisfied by com- electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction mu- mercial carriers, and the defense establishment is tually supported by intelligence to deny information an integral part of a growing global information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command infrastructure that transcends industry, media, and control capabilities, while protecting command and the military. Defensive information warfare and control capabilities against such actions. identifies and protects vulnerabilities that arise from this increased reliance on the worldwide in- Joint doctrine presents command and con- formation infrastructure. trol warfare as a subset of information warfare Creation of the Presidential Commission on employed in operations that specifically attack Critical Infrastructure Protection in 1996 under- and defend the command and control target set. scored heightened awareness of the need for a na- Designed as an essential part of overall theater tional strategy for assuring the continued opera- campaign plans, command and control warfare is tion of vital infrastructures. These include implemented during “joint military operations telecommunications, finance, electrical power, when U.S. military forces unilaterally or as part of water, pipelines, and transportation systems. An an allied/coalition force are opposed or threat- increasing reliance on high technology is the ened by an organized military or paramilitary thread linking these systems. The threats fall into force.” 4 Its stated purpose is to “decapitate the two categories: the more traditional physical enemy’s command and control from his body of threats and those emerging from “electronic, force, to paralyze them and invalidate any poten- radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on tial advantage the adversary may have.” 5 the information or communications components that control [the] critical infrastructures.” 8 The

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Fredericks

of both opportunities and vulnerabilities resulting from the information explosion, DOD found that the concept transcends the military. If the real promise of offensive information warfare is in both peace and the initial stages of crisis, then its success will require direct National Command Au- thorities involvement and close coordination and participation by various government agencies. Similarly, the most daunting challenge is not the impact of defensive information warfare on military effectiveness, but rather the vulnerabilities of the national infrastructure. The global information explosion is a double-edged sword. Just as we can target an enemy, an enemy can target us. The more sophisticated we become the greater our vul- y Viano)

fer nerabilities. As the Joint Security Commission reported in 1994: “If instead of attacking our military systems and data bases an enemy attacked U.S. Navy (Jef our unprotected civilian infrastructure, the eco- Rimpac ’96. nomic and other results would be disastrous.” 9 Another dimension of information warfare is stated goal of the President’s commission is to the influence of the media such as CNN. The in- propose solutions to keep pace with evolving formation revolution, with live reports from the threats in a rapidly changing technological envi- battlefield, has transformed warfare. The graphic ronment. An integral part of the commission’s portrayal of conflicts in near real time has intensi- charter is to establish a comprehensive outreach fied revulsion around the world to the death and program with the private sector which owns and destruction of war which an enemy can exploit. operates many of the critical infrastructures. The U.S. Government must remain fully engaged This civilian involvement gets to the core of in media wars by transmitting its own message, the recent evolution of information warfare. Con- ceived as an internal response to take advantage

The Realm of Information Operations

Military Operations C2W

Flexible Deterrent Options

Diplomacy Diplomacy

Conflict Prevention Information Warfare (occurs during crisis conflict) Information Assurance (continuous)

Stability Increased Pre-Conflict War War Stability Operations Competitiveness Termination Operations Information Operations (across the entire spectrum of operations)

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particularly early in a crisis. This is key to a suc- Under this new construct information warfare is a cessful information warfare deterrence policy. subset of information operations. Information Clearly information warfare is a national warfare is now specifically limited to activities issue transcending DOD, but no overarching na- conducted during “times of crisis or conflict.” In- tional policy exists. The national security strategy formation operations are intended to deter con- issued in February 1995 briefly touched on the flict, protect DOD information and information defensive component of information warfare: systems, and, if deterrence fails, attain specific ob- We also face security risks that are not solely military jectives against an enemy. Clearly the promise of in nature....The threat of intrusion to our military information operations as contained in the new and commercial information systems poses a signifi- directive is in its potential to defuse crises. cant risk to national security and is being addressed.10 By adopting information operations, DOD has embraced terminology that is acceptable in Key Elements the interagency arena and promulgated a concept The Office of the Assistant Secretary of De- that can better ensure that its information opera- fense for Command, Control, Communications, tions policies and plans are fully integrated into and Intelligence (C3I) gave consideration to issu- national security objectives and strategies. Infor- ing a revised version of DOD Directive TS3600.1 mation operations take into account the fact that in 1996 with three objectives. First, given the other agencies tended to distance or even disasso- broad interest in information warfare, the goal ciate themselves altogether from the term warfare. was to ensure its classification level did not limit Outside DOD the information warfare concept widespread distribution. Sec- was previously viewed as overly fixated on crisis and conflict. By now embracing information op- clearly the promise of ond, the directive was designed to both accommodate erations, DOD, in partnership with other agen- information operations is in internal DOD requirements cies, can truly address the full range of military operations including what JV 2010 refers to as its potential to defuse crises and facilitate critical interagency coordination. Finally, peacetime engagement. DOD adoption of infor- it clearly needed to empha- mation operations is particularly relevant to the size the full potential of information warfare military’s role in addressing the vulnerabilities of throughout the range of military operations with our national information infrastructure and the a primary focus on preserving the peace and de- need to develop a coherent national strategy to terring conflict escalation. Using these objectives improve our posture in this area. as guidelines, the directive was rewritten, coordi- Information assurance. The directive rein- nated, and officially approved in December 1996 forces DOD interest in the protection arena by by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Key aspects formalizing information assurance, defined as in- of it are as follows. formation operations: Classification. Although the directive is classi- that protect and defend information and information fied, much of it is unclassified, including key defi- systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, au- nitions. The original classified definition of infor- thentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. mation warfare found in the previous directive This includes providing for restoration of information hampered initial DOD efforts to instill awareness systems by incorporating protection, detection, and re- of the military implications of reliance on infor- action capabilities. mation technology with growing sophistication The term originated within the Office of the and connectivity. This created a void that defense Secretary of Defense but has received widespread analysts and others filled with a myriad of unoffi- acceptance throughout the government and in- cial unclassified definitions. That effort led to the creasingly in industry. misperception that DOD lacked a coherent direc- Warfighters require instant, reliable access to tion in this area. As information operations ma- diverse information including secure video tele- ture, it is likely that the next version of the direc- conferencing, detailed imagery from national tive will in fact be unclassified. sources, and intelligence, logistics, and other data Revised conceptual framework. A basic change from various locations. There is a growing aware- in the new directive is the establishment of infor- ness among commanders—both those deployed mation operations vice information warfare as and in the CONUS deployment and sustaining the overarching conceptual framework. Informa- base—that it is no longer sufficient to simply es- tion operations now encompasses those activities tablish communications and automation links. across the full range of operations designed to ex- Now they must recognize and act to minimize in- ploit the opportunities and vulnerabilities inher- herent vulnerabilities in systems. While the mili- ent in military dependence on information. tary has traditionally secured classified information, particular attention is needed for unclassified

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Unmanned aerial vehicle. iano) U.S. Navy (JeffU.S. Navy V

but sensitive information pertaining to personnel, between the civil and military sectors is blurred. logistics, and financial matters. Disruption of such Coordination across the government and with information can adversely impact on planned and the private sector must occur daily, not just dur- ongoing operations. ing crisis. Information assurance as a subset of in- Within DOD, each service has established a formation operations provides this framework computer emergency response capability and vul- with a comprehensive strategy that, through a nerability assessment teams to complement the team approach, protects not only DOD and gov- earlier efforts of the Defense Information Systems ernment equities but also proprietary interests of Agency. This has been driven by necessity, given the civil sector. the explosion of computers at every level of com- Sensitive information operations. The directive mand down to the tactical. The Army, for exam- terms information operations activities that de- ple, deployed teams from the Land Information mand special review and approval as sensitive in- Warfare Activity to Bosnia in order to identify formation operations. Such operations involve and help alleviate vulnerabilities in its deployed those activities that require either approval by the automated information systems. Secretary of Defense or coordination in the intera- DOD Directive S3600.1 recognizes that just gency arena. They can be offensive or defensive; as DOD is confronting the new challenges and and because they involve complex legal and policy perhaps leads the rest of government, a coherent issues, they require national-level coordination. vulnerability assessment and emergency response program is necessary which transcends the government and embraces the civil sector. The seam

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For example, an enemy attack on a commercial The focus is to generate opportunities to deter or system that manifests itself in a DOD network defuse a crisis by applying advanced information raises issues that call for both interagency coordi- technology to influence world opinion and the nation and improved links with the private sector. leadership of potential enemies. Although the sensitive information opera- Civil affairs and public affairs. Given the tions concept is in the formative stage with the lessons learned in Haiti and Bosnia, both civil af- specifics still under development, elements of the fairs and public affairs also contribute signifi- approval process exist. A psychological operations cantly to information operations. Coordination campaign must have interagency approval before of public affairs and information operations plans implementation by CINCs. In Haiti, prior to and ensures that public affairs supports the overall ob- during Uphold Democracy, all psychological op- jectives of a commander. The focus is on provid- erations products were approved through the Na- ing a timely, accurate flow of information to ex- tional Security Council process.11 As sensitive internal and internal audiences. Similarly, civil formation operations procedures evolve, they will affairs activities can supports the objectives of in- provide a better mechanism to synchronize all information operations by influencing or control- formation operations activities, both offensive ling indigenous infrastructures in foreign areas. and defensive, in support of national security. Civil affairs is particularly important to informa- Human dimension. As information warfare de- tion operations because such activities involve in- veloped, the role of people in general and indi- terface with key organizations and individuals. vidual personalities as a pivotal component of information systems emerged. An objective of The Way Ahead information operations is to shape the environ- We stand at an information operations cross- ment and influence decisions. Ultimately, it is roads. Now that the lengthy coordination and somewhat contentious process that went into formulating this new concept is over, emphasis must be put on developing a campaign for a full appreciation of information operations inside and outside of DOD. This must be a team effort involving the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, services, and CINCs. Several important steps must be taken. Draft joint information warfare doctrine must be revised to accommodate information operations. Thought should go into refocusing doctrine for information operations that includes the full range of military operations and recognizes its critical interagency implications. This process

Jerry Morrison) is now underway with the draft of Joint Pub 3-13, on ( Information Warfare. The concept of command and control warfare served DOD well in applying the lessons of the Gulf War. Now with the refocusing of information warfare on crisis and conflict, it is appro- Combat Camera Squadr st 1 priate to examine whether it should subsume and Preparing Patriot replace command and control warfare, which is batteries, Roving focused on a single albeit important target set, Sands ’97. people who make decisions based on information command and control. There are, however, other from information systems. In this regard, the im- important information target sets warfighters can portance of psychological operations to informa- attack and must protect to achieve the full impact tion operations has been recognized and its con- of information warfare. Having one term that tributions have been validated in operational captures the warfighting component of informa- deployments. As an integral part of every recent tion operations will simplify the explanation and contingency—Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and promote understanding of information warfare. Bosnia—psychological operations have been Vulnerabilities in the information infrastruc- called the flexible deterrent option of first choice. ture have a direct impact on national security. In- formation assurance would provide timely, accurate, and relevant information wherever and whenever needed. Protecting information is receiving increasing attention in DOD as evidenced

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by both standing computer emergency response agencies of government as well as the private sec- capabilities and vulnerability assessment teams. tor. The ongoing Presidential Commission on However, this mission transcends the defense es- Critical Infrastructure Protection holds great tablishment and even the Federal Government, promise. While DOD must actively participate in for most of the infra- this initiative and fully implement follow-on rec- information assurance recognizes structure is in the pri- ommendations, it does not have the lead. vate sector. The Presi- This directive requires change in policy and the need for collaboration dential commission is doctrine, and it is important that information op- in protecting infrastructures a first step toward de- erations be quickly and uniformly embraced veloping a national across DOD. Supporting documentation should strategy, and DOD be revised to incorporate the latest lessons of the must remain intensely engaged in formulating global information explosion. Terminology in the and implementing commission recommenda- new directive is easily understood, so the empha- tions. Information assurance recognizes the need sis should be placed on implementation, not infor collaboration in protecting national and de- terpretation. DOD must now focus on exploiting fense information infrastructures. DOD must new opportunities against potential enemies and focus on reducing its vulnerabilities each day as prevent exploitation of the Nation’s inherent vul- well as in time of crisis. The Assistant Secretary of nerabilities. JFQ Defense (C3I) has taken the lead in developing an information operations master plan which em- NOTES phasizes the importance of information assurance. 1 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science A range of organizations has emerged to ad- Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture dress information warfare. Each service has its for the Battlefield (Washington: Office of the Under Sec- own information warfare center, and several joint retary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Octo- agencies have been established including the ber 1994), p. B–16. Joint Command and Control Warfare Center. 2 Les Aspin, Annual Report to the President and Con- These organizations have defensive as well as of- gress (Washington: Government Printing Office, January fensive responsibilities to broadly address infor- 1994), p. 244. mation operations and not simply information 3 Joint Staff, Information Warfare: A Strategy for Peace: warfare. Redesignating some if not all of these or- The Decisive Edge in War (Washington: Joint Staff, 1996), pp. 4–5. ganizations to reflect this broader focus rather 4 Joint Pub 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and than information warfare will help institutional- Control Warfare (C2W), p. I-6. ize information operations. It will also reinforce 5 Jim Gray, “Turning Lessons Learned into Policy,” the goal of information operations, as expounded Journal of Electronic Defense, vol. 16, no. 10 (October in the new directive, to “secure peacetime na- 1993), p. 88. tional security objectives, deter conflict, protect 6 Bruce Wald and G.A. Federici, Defending the Civilian DOD information and information systems, and Information Infrastructure: Does DOD Have a Role? (Alex- shape the information environment.” As part of andria, Va.: Center for Naval Analysis, April 1995), p. 4. the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments, 7 John J. Sheehan, speech at the activation cere- the Joint Staff—in concert with the unified com- mony of the Joint Command and Control Warfare Cen- ter, San Antonio, October 13, 1994. mands and services—is examining how best to 8 Bill Clinton, Executive Order 13010, Critical Infra- organize for information operations. structure Protection (Washington: White House, July 15, 1996), p. 1. The publication of an information opera- 9 Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A tions directive sustains the momentum generated Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central by the development of information warfare. More Intelligence (Washington: Joint Security Commission, importantly, it builds on the realization that in- February 28, 1994), p. 103. formation warfare is not an exclusive DOD do- 10 Bill Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engage- main. If the potential of offensive information ment and Enlargement (Washington: Government Print- operations lies in deterrence and defusing crises, ing Office, February 1996), pp. 12–13. 11 Henry H. Shelton, PSYOP Support to Operation Up- interagency coordination is essential. Creation of hold Democracy (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: XVIII Air- sensitive information operations recognizes that borne Corps, May 4, 1995), p. 6. some activities entail legal and policy issues that transcend defense concerns and require national- level approval. Similarly, those aspects of defensive information operations—now known as information assurance—must involve other

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Leveraging Technology for Joint Training By JACK WALKER U.S. Army (LanceU.S. Army Cheung)

he promise of modeling and simula- training, it will not fulfill its potential unless joint tion for training is being fulfilled with and component commanders understand what the introduction of updated models. the technologies represent, what they can and Better simulations are also on the way cannot do, and how to integrate them into tradi- Tas object-oriented models—with greater flexibility tional instructional methodologies. and full interoperability—come on line in the The technologies can control and reduce next five years. But another revolution is occur- costs, deliver education and training on demand ring, albeit with less fanfare. It involves leverag- or just in time, tailor delivery to individual stu- ing new educational technologies—beyond mod- dent needs with simultaneous language transla- eling and simulation—to meet the needs of joint tion, provide training certification, reduce or elim- education and training. While this innovation inate safety concerns in hazardous training, and will have a significant impact on education and enable students to collaborate without leaving their duty stations; in some cases, they may fully participate from home. When these technologies Major General Jack Walker, USA (Ret.), who commanded infantry, are integrated with models, simulations, and more aviation, and armor units during his military career, is president and traditional classroom methods the payoff will be chief executive officer of Cubic Applications, Inc. better trained joint and combined forces.

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Technologies and Applications Computer-based instruction generally in- Although there is no generally accepted tax- cludes a broad range of hardware and software; onomy of educational technologies, they can be the term is usually synonymous with computer- classified as embedded training, computer-based based training. Although computer based-instruc- instruction, distance learning, and hybrids. One tion has been around for more than a decade, re- area in which the military is ahead of industry is cent excitement over its vast potential and embedded training, which is defined as a training application to a wide audience is related directly capability designed or built into operational sys- to the proliferation of multimedia personal com- tems. Its key feature is allowing participants to puters. These computers with powerful processors use the same equipment in training as is em- and built-in audio and video are found in most ployed operationally. Rather than practice tank military units and many homes. No longer must gunnery on a simulator, for example, embedded computer equipment be procured exclusively for instructional purposes. Instead, computers devoted to administration, operations, and logistics Figure 1. Embedded Training can be used for individual and collective training. This means managers of education and training programs who are considering the development Advantages Disadvantages of computer-based instruction often do not have ■ unit/individual trains on operations ■ initial capital cost to factor in the considerable initial capital outlay systems ■ effects on equipment/weapons to buy hardware but can devote their limited re- —direct skill transfer characteristics sources to courseware development. —dependable access to training system Computer-Based Instruction A common way of delivering computer-based instruction is compact disks (CD–ROMs). Cheaply reproduced and with a large capacity for storing data, CD–ROMs permit the incorporation of audio training permits the tank crew to practice in their and video into computer-based instruction, mov- assigned tank with little or no external support. ing the standard from simple page turning (con- In effect the tank becomes a simulator and the sisting of text and graphics) to multimedia applica- crew gets instant feedback on their performance. tions with sound, graphics, animation, and video While each service emphasizes embedded reinforcing the learning experience. The results: training—the current Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, lessened training time, increased retention, consis- has stated that all new systems must have embed- tent presentation, and enthusiastic students. ded simulation—the Navy Aegis combat training When pre- and post-test and records man- system (ACTS) is especially impressive since it agement functions are included, computer-based permits full-up training of the Combat Informa- instruction allows students and trainers to diag- tion Center team on the Aegis system at sea or in nose individual needs (preventing the waste of port. In addition to team training, individual op- time on instruction with which students are fa- erator training is also embedded in the ACTS les- miliar), test mastery of content to the required son control program. standards, and even report course progress, com- Embedded training offers many advantages pletion, and difficulties with courseware or con- over a stand-alone simulator, including access by a tent to course managers. Even better, the avail- training audience and the direct ability of graphical course authoring software, such as Toolbook, permits the computer-literate interactivity is one key transfer of the learning experience from training to operations. But em- (not only programmers) to learn quickly to create to successful computer- bedded training initially can be more courseware (though functions such as records based instruction expensive since the system compo- management and advanced animation require nents must be engineered to with- programming familiarity). For several years the stand the same physical conditions Air Command and Staff College has provided as the operational system. Also, the additional both faculty and students with the opportunity weight of the training system can affect range and to do just that, and its graduates depart with fuel consumption, a significant consideration for CD–ROMs containing useful tools and tutorials aircraft. Moreover, the training may not require a created by faculty and students. simulator for each operational system. Interactivity is one key to successful computer-based instruction. Well-designed interactive courseware reinforces learning and requires students to participate via a graphical user interface that allows students to intuitively navigate

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through courses and use computers without hav- military education institutions and intermediate ing to know much about them. And students set and senior service colleges which draw students the pace of instruction with the freedom to inter- from all services and varied experiences could rupt it at any time and return to the same point benefit tremendously from this kind of applica- when desired (bookmarking). tion, as could institutions involved in multinational educational programs. Figure 2. Computer-Based Instruction Another technological contribution to joint training is focused on the U.S. Special Operations Command, which has the task of providing spe- Advantages Disadvantages cial operations forces (SOF) professional military ■ can use computer systems already on ■ initial development cost education to more than forty thousand personnel hand serving around the world with unified com- ■ powerful multi-media capabilities mands. Recently the Joint Special Operations ■ lower life cycle costs than traditional Forces Institute began developing a program for a instruction series of fully interactive multimedia courses, ini- ■ can include full testing and records tially delivered on CD–ROM. keeping Various technologies can be grouped under ■ advanced authoring skills not required the rubric of distance learning, broadly defined as instruction without the physical presence of a teacher, from traditional correspondence courses to audio and video conferencing. Much of the interest in this area involves using the Internet and A major concern with computer-based in- intranets to deliver instruction. Although there struction is the up-front investment for design are many examples of educational and training and development. There is no accepted rule of uses of the Internet, perhaps the most ambitious thumb for comparing the cost of developing inter- is an effort by the governors of 18 western states active courseware with platform instruction. But to use the Internet to create a “virtual univer- what is certain is that the cost of repeatedly deliv- sity”—the Western Governors University. ering platform instruction—for faculty and student time, per diem, and overhead—quickly pays Distance Learning for the initial investment in courseware. In the Not surprisingly, there is excitement in mili- case of one joint education project, the life cycle tary education and training circles over distance cost of presenting a 30-hour program of instruc- learning. Using the Internet as a means to deliver tion in a classroom was four times the estimated courseware allows students to participate from outlay for delivering it on CD–ROM, including de- their duty stations or homes. Internet access is be- velopment. Well-designed courseware is easily up- coming increasingly available and inexpensive, dated as the content changes. While application of this technology is powerful and Figure 3. Distance Learning-Internet has been demonstrated, its educational use—especially in Advantages Disadvantages professional military educa- ■ Internet access widely available ■ security considerations tion—is only now being recognized. This challenge offers ■ can replicate some collaborative ■ technology restrictions on size of files aspects of traditional instruction decreases multimedia capabilities the possibility for tremendous payoffs in joint and ■ enhanced records management ■ risk of system overload functions combined warfare. Education involves both cognitive learning (knowledge) and affective learning (attitudes) and attempts to prepare students to face situations and solve and the hardware requirements are minimal; in problems not yet defined.1 Computer-based in- fact, it is difficult to purchase a personal com- struction can contribute to education as well. puter today without a modem or network card One important application is in the area of (hardware necessary to access networks like the knowledge levelers, interactive courseware which ensures that all students are at a baseline level of knowledge and proficiency before beginning expensive resident education. Joint professional

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Internet). The Internet is becoming a powerful re- Other distance learning includes audio and search tool, so courseware which uses it for deliv- teleconferencing, with instructors appearing live or ery can also take advantage of its research capa- on tape. Among them are the Navy CNET elec- bilities. And Internet courseware authoring tronic schoolhouse network (CESN), a two-way languages are available that automatically track multipoint secure video and audio network; the student performance and provide course directors government education and training network, a with formatted, pre-addressed electronic mail one-way video, two-way audio satellite-based sys- messages to encourage student progress. tem; and the Army teletraining network, a two- The most obvious disadvantage of the Inter- way audio and video structure with connectivity to net in delivering military courses is the lack of CESN. Depending on the network and hardware, available, reliable, easy-to-use security.2 The De- video teleconferencing can provide collaborative fense Information Systems Agency has estimated aspects missing in other applications of advanced educational technologies. But unlike CD–ROMs, students must avail themselves of training when it Figure 4. Distance Learning-Conferencing is scheduled rather than when it is personally con- venient. This is a problem when the segments of a Advantages Disadvantages training audience are separated from each other or from the source of instruction by many time ■ enhanced collaboration and ■ access to network node required instructor/student interaction (or large capital cost) zones. Moreover, unless an audience has access to a network site, the capitalization cost of this form ■ several networks already in place and ■ requires instructor training of distance learning can be prohibitive. And in- available ■ live delivery difficult when target structors must be specially trained in order to un- audience spans many time zones derstand its capabilities and limitations. Some problems associated with technology can be overcome by hybrid combinations. For example, interactive multimedia CD–ROMs are being produced with basic courseware that in- that there were some 250,000 “attacks” on DOD cludes Internet connections in the software. This computer systems in 1995.3 For the time being, allows students to download updates, research only unclassified (non-sensitive) courses should topics in depth, or communicate with course be considered for Internet delivery. Even with managers. Both performance testing and records passwords and other measures to secure access to management functions can also be accomplished. courseware sites, hackers could electronically pen- A related hybrid application will combine Inter- etrate any Internet site and damage files or com- net-based instruction with Internet-based tele- promise records. conferencing. As with all forms of distance learning, interaction among instructors and students is limited Hybrid Applications on the Internet, although as bandwidths increase It is possible to replicate collaborative aspects and hardware improves, the impact of these limits of seminar-based instruction by designing simula- may be diminished. Furthermore, currently avail- tions (via CD–ROM) in which computers in able combinations of band- essence play other parts. Such collaborative simu- width, computers, and com- lations may be expensive to develop but are video teleconferencing can munications hardware and tremendously effective. The disks can be tailored provide collaborative aspects software severely constrain to allow students to play many roles and can il- missing in other educational the size of files that can be lustrate the effects of actions on virtual players. downloaded quickly—and Computer smart tutors can also provide technologies this means a judicious use of some interaction with instructors missing in sim- animation, video, and sound ple page-turner computer-based instruction. An in Internet courseware.4 Studies show that stu- example of this potential is the S2 trainer, a simu- dents lose patience when they have to wait more lation on CD–ROM developed by Northwestern than twenty seconds for the next screen. Since University to train National Guard battalion in- audio and video files can take several minutes to telligence officers.5 Students working individually download, for the next few years at least most In- on personal computers act as intelligence officers ternet-delivered instruction will consist primarily and are provided planning guidance by the bat- of text and still graphics. And finally, some experts talion commander and operations officer. More- believe that the future viability of the Internet it- over, they plan a tactical operation and complete self is at risk as global demand for access increases an intelligence estimate. Responses trigger video geometrically each year. and audio clips in which subject matter experts suggest alternative approaches and relate relevant

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anecdotes, in effect getting an instant, on-line The Betamax was better than VHS but where is it after action review. A similar program for brigade now? For other than technical reasons VHS came operations officers is also under development. to dominate the video market. The pace of change, especially that involving computers, makes it not Successful Applications only difficult to predict when hardware or software Those responsible for joint education and will be developed but the direction which major training programs should keep a few simple rules changes will take. Large capital investments in a in mind in considering how to best integrate this single educational technology are problematic be- confusing array of educational technologies. cause of the risks of obsolescence.

Whether we recognize it or not, the next Figure 5. Hybrid Applications generation is here in the lieutenants, junior NCOs, and privates whose familiarity with computers, video games, and other technologies Advantages Disadvantages makes them bored with passive learning. More- ■ combination of technologies may miti- ■ depending on technologies selected, over, we are moving toward a military with more gate disadvantages of single systems may be expensive electrons but fewer people. Education and train- ■ less risk of being locked into single ing demands will increase, especially in the joint technology which may be leapfrogged arena, as force size declines. The answer must be career-long learning that leverages appropriate technologies to create and sustain high-impact, cost-effective education and training. And there is more over the horizon. For ex- “If you build it, they will come” works best on ample, DOD is examining generation after next baseball diamonds and interstate highways, not in collaboration, visualization, and information man- education and training. Often, especially when agement technologies, many with applications for unanticipated funds becomes available, there is a education and training. Joint commanders will strong trend to buy hardware, believing that face the challenge of sifting through technological courseware can always be developed later. This glitter, looking for those few nuggets that can pay can result in impressive technical capabilities off in a well-trained, ready force. JFQ with little or no content. Instead, courseware design and planning for necessary hardware should NOTES be integrated in a single vision. 1 Perhaps the best practical discussion of the differ- “Put this course on a CD–ROM” is a great way to ences between education and training is contained in create bad courseware. The strengths of new educa- volume 10, “Application to Education,” of Air Force tional technologies are only realized when courses Handbook 36-2235, Information for Designers of Instruc- are designed from the outset to match educational tional Systems (November 1, 1993). objectives with methods of delivery for target au- 2 The secret Internet protocol router network may re- diences. Although courses often are digitized, the solve some of these concerns as it becomes more widely most effective way to capitalize on one’s invest- available. ment is by involving professionals in instructional 3 U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Secu- systems design—the systems approach to train- rity: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose In- creasing Risks, report AIMD 96-84 (May 1996). ing—at the outset. Early participation by those 4 An excellent (and humorous) example of using the trained in systems design during the definition Internet for education and training can be both seen and analysis phases will help specify the need for and heard at http://www.sageinteractive.com/overview. programs, clarify education and training objec- html. Note that these files can take several minutes to tives, analyze an audience and the learning and download. resource environment, and develop a strategy to 5 For a description see http://www.ils.nwu.edu/ leverage technologies to meet requirements. The ~vantomme/S2/S2Top.html. old adage—garbage in, garbage out—applies. CD–ROMs may just store more garbage. Clicking the “next page” button doesn’t make a course interactive. Adult learning theories point to the fact that most adults learn better in an active rather than passive environment; they must perform tasks to reinforce the lessons. Well-designed courseware requires the learner to participate frequently in the process and control the pace and sequence of instruction.

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Leveraging Land Warrior. Human Interaction for Joint Training By JOHN HOWARD EISENHOUR and EDWARD MARKS U.S. Army

esert Storm was clearly a battlefield in a noncombatant evacuation operations, no-fly classic sense. Similar conflicts may lurk zone enforcement, peace enforcement, maritime in the near future, and the Armed sanctions enforcement, counterterrorism opera- Forces are quite properly pursuing tions, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, Dtraining programs to deal with them. At the same and disaster relief.” time, however, challenges will emerge outside the Effective high level training for most small boundaries of the battlefield. These are small scale contingency operations must differ from scale contingency operations (as noted in the Re- conventional training in the same way these oper- port of the Quadrennial Defense Review) that require ations differ from warfighting. The contrast arises capabilities which both differ from and are allied from the need for the joint commander and his to warfighting. Such actions include “show-of- staff to operate differently during the planning force operations, interventions, limited strikes, and conduct of such operations. To varying de- grees, depending on the exact nature of the operation, obligations must be discharged by coopera- John Howard Eisenhour, a former career DOD senior executive, and tion rather than command. Human interaction Ambassador Edward Marks, a retired foreign service officer, frequently between more or less equals is the primary mode participate in joint exercises conducted for senior level staffs. of implementation.

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Striking a Balance delegated. Moreover, these severe limitations will There should be a better balance between continue for years—until artificial intelligence de- pre-scripted events and human interaction in velops greater sensitivity to complex human high-level command post exercises. This concern arrangements and relationships. is based on an apparent decision to rely primarily In many exercises for higher level staffs the on old fashioned training techniques derived lack of attention to forging appropriate working from computer-driven force-on-force models for relationships with the range of players in modern high-level staffs who are increasingly involved in small scale contingencies is a major shortcoming operations which call for more human interac- in training higher level joint staffs. The only way tion with outside elements rather than less. of correcting this deficiency is to give equal em- The current trend toward conducting joint phasis to other training techniques in exercises. and coalition operations in the real world should Human interaction must be made a major feature lead naturally to emphasis on interaction with of the experience. This is not a unique idea since other human beings in training sessions simply some exercises conducted by U.S. Pacific Com- because more leaders are involved. Moreover, as mand (PACOM) have featured human interaction made clear in the QDR report, the present reality for the past several years. is that we can expect to engage in small scale Classroom and seminar training in negotiat- contingency operations most of the time. Such ing techniques and in human and organizational operations involve an even greater number of ac- behavior will help. But adults generally learn better tors than major theater wars, as all sorts of in an active environment than a passive one. They friendly national and international officials, non- must complete some action to absorb the lesson. state players, and members of the private sector Obviously, computer software should be gain importance. used in cases when it can provide an appropriate Regardless of the number of actors—and thus response, and prior preparation of other docu- coordination—involved, the characteristics of ments and devices should be maximized; but modern small scale contingency operations also such actions alone are unlikely to provide a suffi- suggest relatively more human ciently realistic challenge for a senior staffer to human role playing is interaction vice pre-programmed perform the needed reinforcing tasks. The actions action/reaction. A recent com- of one party are almost always influenced by necessary to create a valid parison of these operations with those of others if only in terms of the exact se- interactive experience conventional warfare from a quence of steps to be taken. In a higher head- standpoint of information needs quarters training setting, accommodating this re- showed that the former requires ality translates into adjusting content as well as more difficult, softer analysis of far more nonmili- the timing of stimuli sent by the control group to tary factors to support consensus decisionmaking the training audience. Thus human role playing and transparency of action. These attributes sug- is necessary to create a valid interactive experi- gest a great deal of human conversation to secure ence and should be pursued vigorously. data and communicate results. For a better balance between scripted events It is surprising, therefore, that parts of the and human interaction in high-level exercises, it joint training system involving higher level staff is necessary to focus on the exercise planning exercises are deemphasizing human interaction process, management structure (the organization in favor of prepared scripts and computer based of exercise control groups), and the most efficient methods to replicate every action and relation- way of using experts in conjunction with mem- ship, both physical and human. This assumes bers of the Reserve components for the human what works for lower level training applies interaction portion. equally to higher levels. Such a shift in technique Planning will not result in the most useful training of higher level staffs for the tasks they are most Successful exercises depend on effective likely to face. planning in various areas. With regard to human interaction, four key factors will improve the The Premise final product. Most important is an early and in- There are limits to both the quality and tense effort to create a truly plausible scenario to quantity of human interaction that can be simu- engage an audience. Participants in high-level ex- lated effectively in highly scripted and computer- ercises are mature adults who have difficulty re- based training. More critically, by definition ex- lating seriously to weak scenarios regardless of the changes between senior human officials and their amount of command direction applied. respective organizations involve considerable ne- gotiation. The outcome of these conversations is not predetermined or the interactions would be

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Figure 1. Standard Control Group

Exercise Director

After Action ReportControl Group Director Senior Mentor

Commander Opposition Forces Simulation Control Chief Controller Administrative Support Briefing Support

Site Control Team(s) Joint Doctrine Scenario Manager Training Objectives Scenario Event Tracking

Exercise Events Model Support Intelligence Support Logistics Support Special Staff Supported CINC LNOs Supporting CINC LNOs Role Players

Good stories are frequently hard to develop final challenges are best constructed on the spot because of real world sensitivities, so this step re- based on the scenario as it has developed. mains a challenge. But scenario preparation is as Finally, high-level command post exercises essential as defining training objectives and, in should not be linked directly to field training ex- an effort to maintain plausibility, it may be neces- ercises of any type. Because of the funding for sary to slight a desirable objective occasionally. field training, troop availability, and safety re- Keeping a training audience intellectually in- quirements, planning at that level must be car- volved in a scenario is especially important when ried out far in advance. These prior solutions con- it comes to the participation of senior officers strain thinking by a training audience to the whose active engagement has a critical impact on extent that related command post exercises are how an exercise is handled by succeeding levels. not taken seriously. The next important planning action is recruiting real experts to organize and conduct the Control Groups human interaction with a training audience. The The common title of this entity—a joint or choice of people should be scenario-dependent, combined exercise control group—is unfortu- and they should be drawn from among govern- nate. The mission of the control group should be ment officials, consultants, and others depending to wrap a training audience in the environment on available funding and security requirements. in which it is supposedly operating according to This use of government officials and specialists the scenario. The cocoon analogy is perhaps the from other sectors can be economical because their most apt. participation can often be obtained for the price of CJCS Memorandum 3500.03 (June 1, 1996) their travel and expenses. The key is making prescribes a particular structure for exercise con- arrangements for expert participation well ahead trol groups (figure 1). This hierarchical organiza- of time, before their supervisors determine that tion, with emphasis on control rather than pro- they are too critical to be released. The best ap- duction of training challenges, should be replaced proach is to identify individuals with the appropri- by a simple, relatively flat structure (figure 2). ate background and request them by name rather But duplicating all the impulses that would than tasking organizations for general assistance. impact trainees in a real situation is impossible. Another issue is avoiding overplanning the Nevertheless, if the control group is organized details of the final stages of the exercise. While ad- along functional lines based on an assessment of vance preparation of documentation is important, all elements of the environment faced in that sce- it must be recalled that details of the later steps nario, a reasonable replication of the types of is- are largely determined by precise audience actions sues that would arise can be created. Some as- in the early stages. Thus, except for timeliness in pects—such as the next higher headquarters, completing the process and baseline data, the

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Figure 2. Alternative Control Group

Exercise Director

After Action ReportControl Group Director After Action ReportControl

Administrative/Technical Support Chief Controller Site Control Team(s)

Intelligence Support Subordinate Forces Opposition Forces Higher Headquarters Media All Other Role Players

subordinate forces, and the media—will always be periods, and comprised of military and civilian present, while others may be either major or personnel of all ranks and stations. Such a range of minor players depending on the nature of the people will do their best when grouped around a problems at hand. The important point is that task rather than an organization intended for the organization and content of the control other purposes. To be efficient they must be decen- group should be designed to support the specific tralized and minimize formal review procedures. scenario rather than some stan- Tailoring the organization of a control group the control group should dard structure outlined in CJCS to the story to be projected rather than to the no- Memorandum 3500.03. tion of control over a training audience creates an be designed to support One example of the impact of entirely different atmosphere within the control the specific scenario the standard structure was the re- apparatus. Its focus is on painting the correct story quirement in a recent PACOM ex- in a rich, efficient way. Coordination between ercise to have a distinct opposi- groups develops quickly, and many additional tion force commander organization with separate challenges for a training audience can be prepared computer simulation equipment during an exer- based on the details of the group’s performance as cise focused on humanitarian assistance opera- the exercise progresses. One or two controllers tions. Given that there was a large intelligence or- whose focus is the overall conduct of the exercise ganization capable of acting as an enemy in cases and communication with the client training audi- where hostile activity was relevant, the need for ence and higher authorities can ensure that the an opposition force group was questionable. And control group’s activities fit overall objectives. during the planning, the very existence of that group led to demands to add more such activity Experts to the scenario. When properly organized, real experts as- In sum, exercise control groups should be sisted by Reservists (especially those with civil af- designed around the various functions that will fairs and similar experience) can identify an enor- influence the problem faced by a training audi- mous number of scenario-relevant challenges that ence rather than around organizations repre- can be transmitted to a training audience. Many sented in the exercise, computer equipment used will be derived from the preplanned actions; that to simulate certain aspects of an exercise, doc- is, they will emerge from the moves made by the trine, briefing requirements, or other technical training audience in response to challenges considerations, all of which have prominent planned in advance. Exercise managers can then places in the standard structure. Not only is that choose which to pursue based on the demon- structure extraordinarily expensive but it can lead strated needs of a training audience. to distortion of the problems to be projected to a This interactive process can add dramatically training audience. to the intensity, breadth, and educational value Control groups should not be regarded as mil- of exercises for a training audience. That audience itary organizations which need a great deal of formal internal management. They are relatively small, assembled from disparate bodies for short

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Desert Punch. U.S. Navy (Kurtis Cantiberos) U.S. Navy (Kurtis

normally includes people who will be subject to to direct the play of the role of ambassador and the host different impulses from the control group because country in a target country and use members of the of their positions on the staff. This would be the media and nongovernmental organizations to simulate case in the real world since each staff section con- their unique roles. ■ centrates on its relationships with different inter- Organize portions of the control group around experts, assigning less highly qualified Reservists and nal and external actors. others to committees chaired by such people. Thus the control group should make the ex- ■ Assign responsibility for broad segments of the ercise valuable to individual trainees and not just scenario to each committee, leaving it up to the expert to a training audience as a whole. Moreover, as a in charge to determine which assigned roles will be decentralized world, exercises must use e-mail, played and the best methods given the capabilities of phones, and face-to-face meetings more than for- the people assigned. Examples include grouping to- mal messages and orders sent to the central con- gether all external national and international policy trol points. This means a greater level of stimula- functions or having one committee handle all regional tion from the control group is tailored to the actors depending on the sources of action according to specific interests of the individual trainee or staff the scenario. Some groupings, such as next higher headquarters and subordinate forces, should always be section. present. While it is optimal to have a large cadre of ■ Encourage maximum coordination among com- real experts in the control group to provide such mittees and reassign supporting personnel to other interaction, the cost is prohibitive. Experience in committees as the scenario develops and needs change. recent PACOM exercises demonstrated some ways ■ Insist that control group personnel strictly fol- to maximize the use of experts: low simple rules aimed at maintaining transparency and proper roles when conducting human interaction ■ Recruit people by name well in advance based with a training audience. on their special expertise in scenario areas. For example, ■ Rely on the expert committee chairs to schedule use a country desk officer from the Department of State and manage the work of others assigned to their committees based on the needs of the subgroup.

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■ To keep everyone together, stop work and con- bureaucratic prerogatives. Mistakes that may be duct a detailed oral review on the status of the scenario made concerning such matters are not the focus for control group personnel in direct human contact of seasoned commanders who are concentrating with a training audience at least twice a day. on mission definition and accomplishment. Doctrine While warfighting scenarios are internally One fear over human interaction in high complicated, small scale contingency operations level exercises is that solutions negotiated be- are usually externally complex because of their tween role players and trainees will violate doc- diverse casts of military and nonmilitary charac- trine or some policy, either because of trainee in- ters. The more involved a small scale contingency experience or a different agenda on the part of becomes—as in military operations other than role players, especially those representing other war or complex emergencies—the more human organizations or disciplines. This concern is often interaction with outside agencies is required. dealt with by pre-scripting responses, whether In such cases security concerns—the primary placed in the computer or not. Exercise designers responsibility of military commanders—must be see the reduced reality of this style of higher staff coordinated with priorities such as humanitarian assistance, refugee management, reestablishing government, human rights, food, etc., that are largely the responsibilities of U.N. agencies or non-governmental organizations. Moreover, the overall mandate for an operation often will be a result of international negotiations, with all the ambiguity common to such agreements. In addition, each actor involved—including the military component—will have marching orders from its respective governing authority. In such instances success will only be achieved by paying constant attention to operational transparency and cooperation—to “herd- ing the ducks along.” Training exercises, especially for senior staff, must reflect this operational reality and also include a large dose of problem solving. Less reliance on traditional pre-scripted, computer-based training techniques

U.S. Air Force (Chris Steffen) U.S. Air Force is appropriate. The role of doctrine Roving Sands ’97. in such problem solving is less important. Plausible, challenging scenarios, efficient training as the price of correctness. Thus while a and flexible control groups, and well-conducted one-day seminar game with a small group of se- human interaction can help prepare higher head- nior officers is often frank and inventive, larger quarters staffs to deal with likely developments in scale exercises may not have such virtues. the future. JFQ This concern is unjustified because senior commanders favor challenging training and do not want mistake-free experiences for their staffs. The problems that normally confront these staffs are not lofty matters of national strategy nor issues acutely influenced by doctrine. Instead they tend to be concerned with proper procedure and

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OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN■

Admiral Louis Emil Denfeld (1891–1972) Chief of Naval Operations

VITA orn in Westborough, Massachusetts; graduated from Naval Academy (1912); commanded USS McCall (1919); served aboard S–24 submarine (1923–24); commanded Destroyer Division 11 (1935–37); aide to Chief of Naval Operations (1939); commanded Destroyer Division 18, then Destroyer Squadron 1 (1939–41); served on staff of commander, Atlantic Fleet Support Force (1941); assistant Bchief, Bureau of Navigation (1942); led Battleship Division 9 (1945); appointed chief, Bureau of Personnel (1945); commanded Pacific Fleet and all U.S. forces in the area (1947); appointed Chief of Naval Operations (1947); detached from duty by the Secretary of the Navy (1949) and retired (1950); died in Westborough, Massachusetts.

The entire Navy. . . is gravely concerned whether it will have modern weapons, in quality and quantity, to do the job expected of the Navy at the outbreak of a future war. We have real misgivings over the reductions that are taking place in the Navy today....It is not so much the reduction in congressional appropriations that worry us....Our concern is with the arbitrary reductions that impair, or even eliminate, essential naval functions. It is not so much a question of too little appropriated money, but how we are allowed to invest that money....Limitations are imposed without consultation, and without understanding of the Navy’s responsibility in defense of our maritime nation. I am an advocate of airpower....I am also a proponent of strategic air warfare. There has been no objection raised by the Navy to the development of the B–36 to the point where its value as a weapon might be thoroughly evaluated....However, it is illogical, damaging, and dangerous to proceed directly to mass procurement without evaluation to the extent that the Army and Navy may be starved for funds and our strategic concept of war frozen about an uncertain weapon. The procedure leading up to the cancellation of the carrier United States is another exemplification of the improper operation of unification.

—Statement by Louis E. Denfeld before the

House Armed Services Committee Naval Historical Center (October 1949) Portrait by Alicia Rhett.

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Despite existing positive working re- efficiency. Among the potential princi- Organization lationships between senior civilian offi- ples mentioned are the following: cials and military officers the institu- ■ Both staffs work for the Secretary of OSD AND tional links between OSD and the Joint Defense—OSD forms his civilian staff while Staff are not well defined. The governing the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs, and the Joint THE JOINT STAFF directive is outdated and most officials Staff comprise his military staff. A report issued in May 1997 on re- are unable to define their relationships in ■ Related management processes should organizing the Office of the Secretary of other than personal terms. Significant be mutually reinforcing and, where possible, Defense (OSD) contained a number of concern also was voiced over the roles of integrated into a single headquarters process. ■ Activities subordinate to each staff findings bearing on the relationship be- OSD and the Joint Staff in areas such as should be mutually supporting and, where resource allocation, operational and con- tween OSD and the Joint Staff. The re- possible, consolidated. port, The Office of the Secretary of Defense: tingency planning, and requirements Creating a New Organization for a New Era, and acquisition. In sum, this lack of defi- To address the above issues, the re- which was prepared by Hicks and Associ- nition denies DOD the benefits of syn- port proposes that the Secretary and ates, has been provided to Congress. Its ergy between its two chief staffs. Chairman establish a working group to recommendations on OSD organization Several causes are identified for this develop detailed recommendations and call for creating a position of assistant problem. First, the role of the Joint Staff update relevant directives. Finally, the re- secretary for intelligence and realigning appears to be better defined after passage port indicates that the effort to imple- the functions of a new assistant secretary of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, though it ment its recommendations on reorgani- for command, control, and communica- is still evolving; in contrast, the OSD role zation would require “a sustained tions beneath the Under Secretary of De- is less so. Moreover, some remnants of commitment of two to three years.” JFQ fense for Acquisition. Among its notable older patterns of behavior on the part of Joint Staff remain (such as the desire to recommendations is that the primary Lessons Learned role of OSD is “to lead, not to do.” work through military disagreements be- Moreover, the report indicates that: hind closed doors) and some civilian officials cling to outmoded concepts that JOINT CENTER ■ OSD is a staff and advisory component, not an operating component erect barriers between civilian and mili- The Joint Center for Lessons ■ tasks and activities involving resource and tary activities. Basic tensions embedded Learned (JCLL) has been expanded to in- program management should be assigned to oper- in civil-military relations also are present. clude an operational branch at Fort Mon- ating components This report is only intended to initi- roe. To make the joint universal lessons ■ assignment of resource and program ate an analysis that would be necessary learned system (JULLS) more friendly to management responsibilities within OSD should to compare the organizational capabili- be regarded as a last and temporary resort. its users, the center has begun the trans- ties of each staff, their respective man- fer of the master JULLS database from the The following particulars on OSD agement processes, and their subordinate Joint Staff to the Joint Warfighting Cen- and the Joint Staff are based on the re- elements. Such an analysis is required to ter. This move was highlighted by publi- inform decisions on areas of duplication, port’s executive summary. cation of the first Joint Center for Lessons personnel requirements, opportunities Centralization of authority within Learned Bulletin. It included articles on OSD and strengthening joint structures for closer coordination, and the goals for the JULLS database and its relationship are perhaps the most significant trends in organizational reform. Given the sequen- to CJCS commended training issues and defense organization since 1947. Both tial attention paid to joint structures in the universal joint task list (UJTL) opera- trends share the common objective of the mid-1980s, and the closer attention tional level tasks. The bulletin also had a improving unity of effort and reducing to OSD in the late 1990s, the report “Golden Nuggets” section with signifi- the relative autonomy of the military de- points out that a more holistic and coor- cant JULLS submitted during 1995. The partments. Today there are two key staffs dinated development of civilian and mil- next issue is scheduled to be published in in the higher headquarters of the defense itary staff capabilities in the future would autumn 1997. establishment. And while OSD and its constitute a significant breakthrough. JCLL has been working with the subordinate elements are under pressure The definition of the desired OSD/ combatant commanders to execute a to reduce in size, some joint structures Joint Staff relationship can only be initi- quality review of the current JULLS data- are being encouraged to expand. ated by dialogue among the Secretary and base to refine existing information and The need to better define roles, Deputy Secretary and the Chairman and archive outdated and irrelevant JULLS. functions, and relations between OSD Vice Chairman. The potential for dia- The JULLS database will be limited to a and the Joint Staff is an urgent issue to logue is not to solve a major problem but compilation of lessons learned submitted be considered by the Secretary of Defense rather to clarify relations between OSD after August 1, 1990, plus 373 lessons and the Chairman. Specifically, how can and the Joint Staff in the post-Goldwater- from Just Cause (Panama 1989–90). The the two staffs work together more effec- Nichols era. The objectives of this process initial step in this project was to send the tively without compromising their re- are to attain at a new sense of the OSD existing JULLS database to the CINCs respective roles, how can management role as well as to promote greater unity of sponsible for their submission in order to processes be coordinated for greater effi- effort and maximum efficiency. determine which lessons should be ciency, and how can the potential for un- Top civilian and military leaders archived. JULLS returned by CINCs will necessary duplication be reduced? should start that dialogue on the key be put in the master database after being principles which govern OSD/Joint Staff relations, identify objectives for cooperation, and pursue opportunities for greater

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linked to UJTL and categorized as doc- to the termination of operations on No- central and east Europe after the collapse trine, organization, training, material, vember 2. This monograph, based on re- of communist regimes. The monograph leadership development, or personnel in search in Joint Staff files and interviews, details the activities of the Joint Contact nature. These links are an innovative ap- contains an index and maps. Team Program which was created for this proach to administering the database and The other volume, which was mission by U.S. European Command. were outlined by the Joint Staff in Febru- written by Robert T. Cossaboom of Air Both titles are available by writing ary 1997. Mobility Command, is entitled The Joint to: Director for Joint History, Office of The key objectives of this effort are: Contact Team: Contacts with Former Soviet the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ■ Archive lessons learned which are no Republics and Warsaw Pact Nations, Room 1B707, The Pentagon, Washing- longer relevant to future operations or have al- 1992–1994. It describes the assistance ton, D.C. 20318–9999. JFQ ready been incorporated. These selected JULLS provided by the Armed Forces to states in will no longer be distributed to CINCs but will be placed in a separate database for researchers seeking historic information. ■ Link all remaining lessons learned with UJTL using JULLS software to help mili- INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES tary planners review lessons in the context of a NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY given mission task. ■ Remedial action project lessons will not be archived, but rather maintained in the active database until resolved within this program. After refining the database it will be made available via SIPRNET. Research on the most efficient software with which to interface the database remains underway. 1997–199Symposia 8 The system is slated to be ready by the second quarter of 1998. Plans for the JCLL master database include using the system as a repository and reference source for the results of the TOPICAL SYMPOSIUM current Joint Vision 2010 assessment. This “U.S. Engagement Policy: Options for the Future” will assist in synthesizing assessment re- October 7–8, 1997 sults and facilitate JV 2010 coordinating authorities, the services, and CINCs in their assessment/experimentation efforts. Anyone interested in the history PACIFIC SYMPOSIUM and organization of the Joint Warfight- February 10–11, 1998 ing Center is invited to visit its home page on the Internet which also serves as an excellent search engine with hyper- text links to all lessons learned databases EUROPEAN SYMPOSIUM and points of contact ([email protected]). May 5–6, 1998 For copies of the bulletin or details on the Joint Center for Lessons Learned, contact CDR Pat Clark, USN, at (757) 726–6158 / DSN 680–6158. JFQ

History For further information and registration material on the above events, please contact: THE JOINT BOOKSHELF National Defense University ATTN: NDU–NSS–SY Two new monographs have been re- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) leased by the Joint History Office. Opera- tion Urgent Fury by Ronald H. Cole is an Fort Lesley J. McNair account of planning for and execution of Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 operations on Grenada in 1983. It fo- Telephone: (202) 685–3857 / DSN 325–3857 cuses on the involvement of the Chair- Fax: (202) 685–3866 / DSN 325–3866 man, Joint Chiefs, and Joint Staff in Internet: [email protected] planning and directing such operations. It also discusses the combat operations incident to the evacuation of noncom- batants after the October 12, 1983 coup Information on symposia is available via the National Defense University World Wide that removed the Grenadian leader, Web server. Access by addressing http://www.ndu.edu. Symposia programs and Maurice Bishop, and deals with events up registration material are normally posted on the server 90 days prior to events.

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■ THE JOINT WORLD Look for JFQ on the Joint Doctrine Web Site http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine

For more information about the Joint Doctrine Web Site, contact the Joint Doctrine Division, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), at (703) 614–6469 / DSN 224–6469.

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old thinking and old structures can only be well as MOOTW. Last, the airborne-air as- A NEW PARADIGM a temporary expedient; new capabilities sault group is designed for forced entry demand their own organizations and opera- and economy of force operations and FOR THE ARMY tional culture. MOOTW; highly mobile, it has three 700- To satisfy the demands put on the man infantry battalions with organic air A Review Essay by Army, Macgregor emphasizes the need attack assets. Elite light infantry elements F.G. HOFFMAN for ground forces to be prepared to per- are augmented by helicopter assault bat- form the tasks Caesar assigned to his le- talions drawn from a corps level general gions—to win wars, restore order, and support aviation group. Breaking the Phalanx: preserve a stable and prosperous peace. Macgregor recognizes that reorga- A New Design for Landpower in He disparages the idea that landpower is nizing the Army into these groups is not the 21st Century being eclipsed by a revolution in military revolutionary but would spawn change by Douglas A. Macgregor affairs. It is “not a question as to whether at the start of a new RMA. He supports Foreword by Donald Kagan landpower is essential to U.S. strategic Army programmatic efforts to move to- Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997. dominance, but rather how landpower wards Force XXI, yet stresses the need to 283 pp. $65.00 should be reorganized” to operate jointly push aggressively for training, educa- [ISBN 0–275–95793–4] with both airpower and seapower to tional, doctrinal, and organizational maintain this dominance. To do so, the changes that will realize the full potential Army must encourage initiative, develop of the information age. efeat of the Greek phalanx by the more flexible and adaptive fighting for- In addition to restructuring the DRomans at Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C. mations, and field fast-paced combined 10-division Army into 26 combat groups, provides the metaphor for thinking arms assets as JTF components. the author aligns the geographical bal- about restructuring the U.S. Army in this The author spurns the traditional ance of land forces. He foresees three new book by Douglas Macgregor. As the focus of Army force structure, the divi- heavy combat groups and one airborne- debate over the revolution in military af- sion, and advocates a new paradigm for air assault group in Europe and one heavy fairs (RMA) evolves, the assumption that executing dominant maneuver. This recon strike group in Korea. He allocates a airpower and precision munitions are the would involve a transition from indus- similar unit to maintain our presence in predominant instruments of power in- trial age warfighting to prepare for Kuwait and bolster deterrent capabilities creases. Given the agenda of the recent conflicts in which chaos is supreme, in the region. The net effect of his force Quadrennial Defense Review, many ob- weapons of mass destruction are om- laydown is a reduction in forward deploy- servers believe landpower will be the nipresent, and dominance of the battle- ment by almost 50,000 soldiers. loser on the technocentric battlefield space is paramount. As some forces return home, two with its long range strike systems, robots, To meet these challenges, Macgre- powerful corps are provided to U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles, and sensors. gor poses criteria for force design: Atlantic Command for power projection Breaking the Phalanx sets out to challenge operations outside the continental that assumption. It criticizes both out- ■ smaller in size and more numerous in quantity United States. A flexible deterrent corps moded concepts and force structure and of 6 or 7 airborne-air assault and 2 light proposes transforming the Army into a ■ warfighting functions at lowest level to generate “radical autonomy” recon-strike groups is also created, and a 21st century legion to meet the strategic decisive force corps composed of 10 to 12 requirements for landpower dominance. ■ modular structure for adaptation and task organizing heavy combat groups supported by both Macgregor argues that the Army rocket artillery and aviation strike assets must undergo a dramatic change (break ■ operational and tactical mobility to facilitate dispersion and concentrate effects provides combatant CINCs with a force its own phalanx) by adjusting to the of decision. ■ sustainable for extended periods. emerging patterns of information warfare Despite a balanced approach regard- and the initial stages of a revolution in This information-age force will be ing technology, Macgregor goes over- military affairs. He chides “the Army’s comprised of combat groups. The author board with advice on how to pay for en- passion for centralization” and a procliv- spells out four types organized around a hanced landpower. He finds that the ity for conducting war “by remote con- C4I battalion under a brigadier general, proliferation of unmanned autonomous trol.” Such restrictions create severe dis- with 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers. The heavy vehicles, cruise missiles, and quiet diesel advantages in the information age and combat group is his force of decision and boats raises serious questions about the are incompatible with successful efforts has three combined arms battalions with vitality of new Navy concepts for littoral by the private sector to reengineer in the armor and mechanized infantry units of warfare. Noting that naval forces are face of competition and new technology. equal size—132 tanks in the former and ideal targets for weapons of mass destruc- As he states: 132 armored vehicles in the latter. The tion while conducting forced entry, he Trained and organized for a style of heavy recon strike group is intended for concludes that forces that rely upon large war that has changed very little since World close and deep maneuver; with 126 tanks, industrial age platforms like carriers have War II, current Army organizational struc- 153 armored vehicles, and organic air at- to depend on a vast array of costly defen- tures will limit the control and exploitation tack assets, it is similar to the heavy com- sive systems. In addition to being risky of superior military technology and human bat group but could operate ahead of such and capital-intensive, they are not as use- potential in future operations. Attempts to units, shaping the battlespace with Army ful a deterrent as land forces because graft large scale technological change onto and Air Force deep battle systems. The “forces that must position hundreds of light recon strike group has 126 armored miles away . . . are not likely to be a credi- gun systems and 160 light armored vehi- ble deterrent.” F.G. Hoffman is the author of Decisive Force: cles and can be air lifted to conduct maneuver and contingency operations as The New American Way of War.

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The weakness of Breaking the Pha- lanx is its lack of a strategic framework or a substantive assessment of national interests to support proposed shifts in resources. The author presents a strong historical argument but no conclusions based on an analytical framework. What is the impact of cutting 50,000 forward deployed troops, and how would such a reduction square with the conclusion that land forces are superior for deterrence? Although Macgregor’s argument for a strong landpower component is conclusive, the lack of a strategic context precludes making serious decisions or tradeoffs in defense planning. There remains, however, much util- ity in a work that forcefully argues for a need to temper the current American in- fatuation with technology. There is a good deal with which to agree, particularly the caution that “military strategy based primarily on ships, planes, and U.S. Army precision-guided missiles forfeits military flexibility and courts strategic irrelevance This assessment is based on a pro- Navy and $4 billion from disestablishing in the 21st century.” Conventional land found and pessimistic assertion that National Guard divisions. The Navy forces armed with tanks and armored strikes at the heart of our foreign policy F/A–18 program is the biggest target, but fighting vehicles will not accomplish and defense policy—the ability to influ- aircraft carriers, destroyers, and assault every future mission. While Breaking the ence events far from home. “The realities amphibians are also sacrificed. Had the Phalanx offers a more agile and adaptive of the RMA,” the author asserts, “rein- author not focused exclusively on land- structure for such forces, its combat force America’s need for regional partners power applications of RMA he might groups in and of themselves do not fit who can provide access without resort to have recognized that the same technolo- the bill across the conflict spectrum. potentially costly forced entry opera- gies and similar organizational arrange- Macgregor makes a compelling case tions.” Without the Army in regions of ments apply in the other services and for reorganizing the Army. But his lim- vital interest, U.S. forces are unlikely to offer greater mobility and force protec- ited familiarity with naval warfare—in- gain access in future conflicts because of tion. Apparently only the Army and po- cluding new technology and programs threats from weapons of mass destruc- tential enemies are positioned to reap the that support the description of littoral tion and cruise missiles against vulnera- RMA whirlwind. operations in Forward...From the Sea or ble, industrial age Navy platforms. “In The author has an excellent grasp of the Marine concept outlined in Opera- contrast,” Macgregor continues, “dis- history but has done only cursory re- tional Maneuver from the Sea—undermines persed, highly mobile ground forces pre- search, much of it drawn from press ac- his conclusions. Such ideas contribute as sent poor targets for these weapons and counts. His experience provides a wealth much to dominant maneuver and force land based aviation can operate from of background for assessing future land- protection as would a modern legion, al- protected locations beyond the range of power capabilities but clearly runs short beit with capital investments. these weapons.” Based exclusively on an when evaluating a full mix of operational With fewer Americans stationed analysis of Southwest Asia, he concludes capabilities. Accordingly, the capabilities overseas, U.S. strategic interests dictate a that joint operations that are not depen- of the other service are sometimes mis- continuing need for rapidly deployable dent primarily on sea-based forces have a stated. Cost data is generally adequate forces able to arrive at points far distant greater chance of success. “Critical port save for cases such as the V–22, whose from our shores prepared to fight. That and airfield facilities can then be isolated, price is exaggerated and mission limited might require operating from sea bases to attacked, and seized from the land more to getting the Marines to the beach. reduce vulnerabilities and increase ma- cheaply, efficiently, and at less risk to Naval officers will agree that technology neuver space, but we should not have to American lives than from the sea.” proliferation challenges more traditional operate at the whim of another country. With such a limited view of the po- approaches to sea-based operations. But All the land forces in the world are tential for RMA applications at sea, read- there are many concepts, experiments, worthless if they cannot be projected ers should not be surprised that the au- and technology demonstrations that ashore and sustained. A nation that can- thor identifies naval programs as the overcome such challenges. Soldiers and not create its own opportunities and pro- largesse to pay for defense investments in marines should not argue over the need ject power to protect its interests is not a the next millennium. Among current de- for land forces in the next century. In viable global power. JFQ fense programs regarded as weak in terms fact, leading combat developers from of their strategic justification, Macgregor both services join in support for the con- identifies $150 billion in potential sav- tinued relevance and strategic flexibility ings. Some $120 billion comes from the of ground forces.

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‘L’ IS FOR LOGISTICS A Book Review by JOSEPH E. MUCKERMAN II

The Big ‘L’: American Logistics in World War II An Industrial College of the Armed Forces Study Edited by Alan L. Gropman Washington: National Defense University Press, 1997. 447 pp. $28.00 [ISBN 0–16–048668–8]

or every thousand books published on F military strategy, one deals with logistics—that is, with the creation and sus- Anzio, March 1944. tainment of military power. This lack of attention is troubling because, as the in- Naval Historical Center troduction to The Big ‘L’: American Logis- tics in World War II reminds us, “The United States used a logistics strategy to resources of an entire country were mar- under the rubric of the Big ‘L’ on Korea, build armaments in depth rather than in shalled and deployed to achieve national Vietnam, the Cold War, and the Gulf width.” That conflict was won by the Al- security objectives. The argument is fre- War. That would yield valuable lessons lies because America became the arsenal quently made today that Big ‘L’-type lo- learned and assist in developing grand of democracy. Britain and the Soviet gistics are passé. Since the 1980s the cho- strategy for the next century. The authors Union held off the Axis powers long rus has been: “We will never again of this volume on World War II offer a enough for the United States to assemble mobilize on a large scale and, in fact, fu- model for examining the balance of ends that arsenal and thereby brought vastly ture wars will be come-as-you-are and and means—strategic requirements and superior military potential to bear against off-the-shelf events.” logistic capabilities—for succeeding gen- Germany and Japan. To overcome this ingrained aversion erations of war college students. If we The Big ‘L’ is logistics writ large. The to the study of logistics, the Industrial pay proper attention to the Big ‘L’ there volume opens with an essay detailing the College of the Armed Forces—which will not be a strategy-resource gap and fits and starts of industrial mobilization sponsored the symposium that led to this our national security will be assured. JFQ and goes on to document economic mo- book—should produce a series of studies bilization, the building of the U.S. infrastructure, the lend-lease program (and how it gave us a leg up in the months leading up to Pearl Harbor), and logistics in the European and Pacific theaters—the For your reference shelf... combat payoff. One can’t read this record of A new edition of Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, wartime logistics without being im- The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 1997, is now available. This pressed, even awed. Yes, mistakes were illustrated 450-page volume provides a comprehensive made, delays occurred, and opportunities were lost because generating the power summary of details on joint planning and execution that can- to wage war takes time. Again and again not be found elsewhere. It presents an overview of the play- the refrain from both the European and ers, processes, and procedures used in the joint arena as well Pacific theaters was that logistics consid- as a wide range of reference material of interest to joint erations constrained strategic possibilities staffs as well as officers in the field and fleet. and strategic decisions drove logistic requirements. Thus it was and thus it al- AFSC Pub 1 can be found on the Internet (at www.afsc.edu) and also can be ways will be. accessed through the Joint Electronic Library. Copies are for sale from the Superinten- But The Big ‘L’ is more than a trea- dent of Documents at $38.00 each by writing to: U.S. Government Printing Office, tise on wartime logistics. It portrays the Washington, D.C. 20402, or phoning (202) 512–1800 [GPO stock no. 008–020–01422–2]. development of grand strategy—how the In addition, it may be purchased from the Defense Automated Printing Service (DAPS) for $14.00 by contacting Don Mruk in San Diego, California, at (619) 556–7187/ DSN 526–7187 or Everett Morton in Norfolk, Virginia, at (757) 444–7724 / DSN 464–7724 Colonel Joseph E. Muckerman II, USA (Ret.), (extension 19). JFQ served as director of emergency planning in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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H. Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller still dom- summer of the war. Finally, tank advo- THE GREAT WAR inate the landscape, distorting as much cates, particularly Fuller, may have hin- as informing the debate. dered as much as helped initial employ- AND THE BIRTH OF J.P. Harris, senior lecturer in the De- ment of armored fighting vehicles. Harris partment of War Studies at the Royal Mil- demolishes Fuller’s claim that his “Plan ARMORED WARFARE itary College, Sandhurst, has written a 1919” represented a revolutionary ap- A Book Review by splendid study that has linked diverse proach to warfare; in fact Harris empha- threads to place the development of ar- sizes that there was “gross overstate- WILLIAMSON MURRAY mored warfare in the British army in a ment” and a general unwillingness in coherent and intelligent framework. And Fuller’s arguments to recognize what had that framework examines the problem of happened during the German spring of- Men, Ideas, Tanks: the tank from inception through to the fensive of 1918. Haig at least had the British Military Thought and outbreak of World War II. This is an im- sense to realize that no matter how use- Armoured Forces, 1903–1939 portant study because it examines the in- ful the tank might prove, they “could by J.P. Harris stitutional and intellectual processes of only succeed as part of a force ‘of all arms Manchester University Press: adaptation and innovation in war as well in proper combination’”—something Manchester, 1995. 342 pp. $79.95 as peacetime. What makes Men, Ideas, Fuller never fully recognized. [ISBN 0–7190–3762–X] Tanks: British Military Thought and Ar- After the war the debate between moured Forces, 1903–1939 particularly armor advocates and the army leadership useful for Americans is that it is a story of grew ever more hostile. By and large Lid- ince military institutions so rarely get initially successful innovation under the dell Hart and Fuller won exchanges in Sto practice their profession, military pressure of war, followed by growing fail- the popular press and the literature of de- history provides the uncertain and am- ures that would exercise a baneful influ- fense analysis through their pens and ar- biguous laboratory for thinking about ence over British efforts during World guments. But in fact their overwhelming the business of preparing for war. How War II. Harris is never afraid to express a emphasis on the tank as a war winner by uncertain and ambiguous that laboratory strong opinion; in my view that is a great itself was as distortive as the general fail- can be is suggested by the constant and strength, though there are moments ure by the army to address the problems steady expansion of our knowledge of when one may well disagree with aspects raised by the war. One criticism of Men, events even as far back as World Wars I of his argument. But overall the research Ideas, Tanks is that it is probably too kind and II. In fact one could argue with con- is impeccable, criticisms of the historical to an army hierarchy that all too often siderable justification that it has only wisdom generally on target, and the ef- refused to examine the lessons of the last been in the last two decades that military fect of his thesis clear, incisive, and at war with enthusiasm. The first lessons historians really have begun to unravel times brilliant. In fact, Harris has com- learned committee formed in the British what happened in the final years of bined a solid grasp of secondary sources army did not appear until 1932, 12 years World War I. with detailed and careful research in after Hans von Seeckt organized some 57 Worse for lay readers as they at- British army records. different committees in Germany to tempt to make sense of the welter of The traditional view of armored study World War I. But the criticism that opinions, there is also the difficulty of warfare development in Britain has Harris levels against the military reform- periodization—that the Great War began depicted a few lonely, brilliant individu- ers and the damage that they managed to in 1914 and ended in 1918, the interwar als—Liddell Hart and Fuller in particu- do while inflating their own reputations period began in 1919 and ended in 1939, lar—leading the charge against trog- is right on target. and so forth. Yet the generals of 1919 did lodytes in the War Office—first to This is an important book for any not suddenly recognize that their institu- develop the tank and thereby to avoid officer interested in peacetime innovations had entered a wholly new period the terrible killing battles of 1917 and tion. It suggests the dangers ahead—that with the ending of World War I and that 1918 and then to innovate during the in- any advantage in military affairs is a they would thereafter have to innovate terwar period to prepare for the next war. wasted resource unless it is accompanied and prepare for the next war in an aus- Thereafter the struggle resumed with by diligent, serious, and honest study of tere climate. In fact, to fully grasp the Fuller, Liddell Hart, and their allies fight- both the past and present. Harris has evolution of armored warfare one must ing a valiant and losing battle against en- done a great service by laying out the de- look at the period from the early 1900s trenched orthodoxy. Much of that tradi- velopment of the tank in real rather than to 1939 in its entirety and place the tional picture was already in tatters imagined parameters. JFQ events of peacetime and war in a single before Harris arrived on the field. But he developmental framework. places armored development within a Finally, in dealing with armored general framework and combines a num- warfare, particularly in Great Britain, ber of problems which historians have there is a third and equally substantial examined only in the specific. obstacle. The shadows cast by both Basil The book shows that the tank got enthusiastic support from Douglas Haig welcomesJFQ your letters from the first. Moreover, Harris indicates and comments the considerable difficulty the British ex- Fax your correspondence to perienced in trying to fit a new weapons system into an increasingly complex tac- (202) 685–4219/DSN 325–4219 Williamson Murray is coeditor of Military tical framework. It was not clear how the or via e-mail to [email protected] Innovation in the Interwar Period and The tank could help British infantry and ar- Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. tillery break the deadlock until the last

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WAR AND PEACE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER A Book Review by WILLIAM H. LEWIS

Civil Military Operations in the New World by John T. Fishel Foreword by Fred C. Woerner Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997. 269 pp. $65.00 [ISBN 0–275–94797–1]

s many recent military interventions A demonstrate, the United States often lacks a clear strategic vision of the political military end state for multinational peace operations. The basic components of national strategy must be involved: ends (objectives), ways (concepts to be applied), and means (resources to be allocated). As John Fishel observes in Civil Military Oper- y Lane)

ations in the New World, “More than ever Larr in future operations we need to determine what our political military objectives will U.S. ( be when war is finally terminated.” He be- Peace dividend. lieves that the principles of war should be applied to peace operations of the complexity and variety that have claimed U.S. and traditions. In Desert Storm the Na- agenda, resulting in a “disconnected pol- involvement in the post-Cold War world. tional Command Authorities were un- icy and strategy between the military and At the heart of the Fishel thesis is clear on the course to follow once Iraqi civilian agencies of the U.S. Government.” the indispensable role that civil affairs—a forces were ejected from Kuwait. While Civil Military Operations is an invalu- function largely vested in the Army Re- encouraging Shiite and Kurdish dissi- able contribution to the growing body of serve—and other combat support and dence, they wanted to avoid the political literature on peace operations. One fun- service support capabilities can play in fragmentation in Iraq; yet no contin- damental flaw in the Fishel thesis, how- shaping post-conflict political and eco- gency plan existed to provide emergency ever, is his contention that every peace nomic situations. A specialist in the aid for civilians caught up in the fighting. operation must be contemplated within realm of civil military operations (CMO), Fishel is encouraged by the skill and the framework of war termination. U.S. he provides case studies which support imagination with which CMO planning goals may involve rescue/humanitarian his rigorous look at how CMOs were or- was organized at the outset of the Kuwait assistance (Rwanda), peace monitoring ganized and introduced at each stage of crisis. However, he concludes that an al- (Western Sahara), separation of rival operations in Panama, Kuwait, Northern most unbridgeable gulf exists between forces (the Sinai and Bosnia), and peace- Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Most CMO in- joint force commanders and CMO plan- making (Bosnia again). In those cases it volvements proved of limited success in ners on dealing with war termination. In would be a stretch to claim that Ameri- shaping post-war environments. Fishel Panama, Desert Storm, and Provide Com- can involvement—in concert with the attributes these unsatisfactory outcomes fort, basic CMO doctrine was only par- forces of other nations—was of the tradi- to lack of precision in establishing de- tially observed, reflecting failure to prop- tional imposed-war termination genre. sired political military end states. erly integrate combat forces and civil As we have recently witnessed, the justi- In Panama the United States failed affairs specialists. fication and purposes for which multina- to specify the nature or style of democ- There are also important lessons for tional forces are introduced in crisis racy it wanted to succeed Noriega. Plan- senior policymakers. As Fishel reminds us, situations are varied and complex. Unfor- ners at the Departments of State and De- the U.S. political leadership expressed tunately, there is no silver bullet in CMO fense assumed that simply holding free great expectations for establishing democ- doctrine that addresses all these com- and unfettered elections would prove de- ratic institutions in Somalia, Haiti, and plexities and organizes the resources to cisive in entrenching democratic values Bosnia. However, no meaningful guide- cope with them. JFQ lines were forthcoming on the nature or type of democratic institutions to foster. William H. Lewis is professor emeritus Moreover, the end state envisioned by at The George Washington University. planners did not reflect the political

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Courter, Jim The QDR Process—An Alternative Cumulative Index (1996–1997) View, no. 16 (Summer 97), ISSUES 13–16: CONTRIBUTORS pp. 20–26 Cusick, John J. In Search of Focused Logistics, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 125–27 A’Hearn, Francis W. Bingham, Price T. The Sisyphus Paradox: Framing On Machine Guns and Precision Davis, Jacquelyn K. the Acquisition Reform Debate, Engagement, no. 16 (Summer 97), The Looming Alliance Debate no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 34–38 pp. 88–90 over Nuclear Weapons, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 80–86 Ahrari, M.E. Binnendijk, Hans Riding the Toffler Wave: A Book A Strategic Assessment for the Review, no. 15 (Spring 97), 21st Century, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 141–43 pp. 67–68 NATO, European Security, and Beyond, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 54–56 Blaker, James R. Overseeing Cross-Service Trade Offs, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 37–40 Brady, Pamela J. Joint Endeavor—The Role of Civil Affairs, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 45–47 Brandt, Linda S. The Sisyphus Paradox: Framing the Acquisition Reform Debate, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 34–38 Donley, Michael B. Prospects for the Military Builder, Carl H. Departments, no. 13 (Autumn 96), Keeping the Strategic Flame, no. 14 pp. 58–62 Andre, David J. (Winter 96–97), pp. 76–84 Culture and Warfare—Whither Drago, Steven R. Decisive Force: A Book Essay, Casper, Lawrence E. Joint Doctrine and Post-Cold War no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 104–08 Knowledge-Based Warfare: Military Intervention, no. 14 A Security Strategy for the Next (Winter 96–97), pp. 106–10 Barry, Charles L. Century, no. 13 (Autumn 96), Creating a European Security and pp. 81–89 Echevarria, Antulio J., II Defense Identity, no. 15 (Spring 97), Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality: pp. 62–69 Castka, Bruce A Revolution in Military Theory, The National Support Element in no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 29–36 Belknap, Maggie Hungary, no. 16 (Summer 97), The Force-on-Force Model: An pp. 48–49 Eisenhour, John Howard Anachronism in the Information Leveraging Human Interaction for Age, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 116–19 Clawson, Patrick L. Joint Training, no. 16 (Summer 97), Middle Eastern Military pp. 109–14 Bernstein, Alvin H. Dynamics: A Book Review, no. 13 The QDR Process—An Alternative (Autumn 96), pp. 111–12 Estes, Howell M., III View, no. 16 (Summer 97), Space and Joint Space Doctrine, pp. 20–26 Clay, John S. no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 60–63 The Fifth Service Looks at Thucydides and the Teaching of Doctrine, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), Fogleman, Ronald R. Strategy: A Review Essay, no. 14 pp. 29–33 The Air Force and Joint Vision (Winter 96–97), pp. 126–27 2010, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), Cohen, William S. pp. 24–28 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 8–14

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Fredericks, Brian E. Hillen, John Jones, David C. Information Warfare at the After SFOR—Planning a European- Past Organizational Problems, Crossroads, no. 16 (Summer 97), Led Force, no. 15 (Spring 97), no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 23–29 pp. 97–103 pp. 75–79 Joseph, Robert G. Grange, David L. Hoffman, F.G. The Impact of NBC Proliferation Forgotten Mission: Military A New Paradigm for the Army: on Doctrine and Operations, Support to the Nation, no. 15 A Review Essay, no. 16 no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 74–80 (Spring 97), pp. 108–15 (Summer 97), pp. 119–20 Joulwan, George A. Graves, Howard D. Johnson, Jay L. Doctrine for Combined Emergence of the Joint Officer, The Navy in 2010: A Joint Vision, Operations, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 53–57 no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 17–19 pp. 46–49 Gumahad, Arsenio T., II The New SHAPE of the Atlantic The Profession of Arms in the Alliance, no. 15 (Spring 97), Information Age, no. 15 pp. 57–61 (Spring 97), pp. 14–20 Kross, Walter Gutmanis, Ivars Single Port Management, no. 14 Whatever Happened to Defense (Winter 96–97), pp. 53–57 Industrial Preparedness? no. 16 Krulak, Charles C. (Summer 97), pp. 27–33 Doctrine for Joint Force Habiger, Eugene E. Integration, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), Strategic Forces for Deterrence, pp. 20–23 no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 64–69 Lewis, William H. Signal Company, Combat Camera (Nicholas J. Blair)Signal Company,

Halter, Irving L. th War and Peace in the New World Knowledge-Based Warfare: 55 Order: A Book Review, no. 16 A Security Strategy for the Next (Summer 97), pp. 123 Century, no. 13 (Autumn 96), Johnson, Rodney L. Link, Charles D. pp. 81–89 Forgotten Mission: Military 21st Century Armed Forces—Joint Hanauer, Larry Support to the Nation, no. 15 Vision 2010, no. 13 (Autumn 96), EUCOM and Sub-Saharan Africa, (Spring 97), pp. 108–15 pp. 69–73 no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 103–07 Johnson-Freese, Joan Locher, James R., III Handberg, Robert Searching for Policy Coherence: Taking Stock of Goldwater- Searching for Policy Coherence: The DOD Space Architect as an Nichols, no. 13 (Autumn 96), The DOD Space Architect as an Experiment, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 10–16 Experiment, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 91–96 Lord, Carnes pp. 91–96 To Wage a War of Words: A Book Review, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 109–10 Lorenz, F.M. War Criminals—Testing the Limits of Military Force, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 59–65 Lovelace, Douglas C., Jr. Joint Doctrine Development: Overcoming a Legacy, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 94–100 Lwin, Michael R. General Tzu’s Army: OPFOR of the Future, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 44–49 Marks, Edward Leveraging Human Interaction for Joint Training, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 109–14 U.S. Navy

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McCarroll, Kevin F. Olynyk, Stephen D. Transition of the Sarajevo Suburbs, Ukraine as a Post-Cold War no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 50–53 Military Power, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 87–94 Messervy-Whiting, Graham WEU Operational Development, Owens, William A no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 70–74 Overseeing Cross-Service Trade Offs, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 37–40 Morningstar, James K. Technologies, Doctrine, and Peay, J.H. Binford, III Organization, no. 15 (Spring 97), Correlating Medical Forces pp. 37–43 Forward, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 70–74 Muckerman, Joseph E., II ‘L’ Is for Logistics: A Book Review, Perry, Charles M. no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 121 The Looming Alliance Debate over Nuclear Weapons, no. 15 Murray, Williamson (Spring 97), pp. 80–86 The Great War and the Birth of Armored Warfare: A Book Review, Pipp, Donald C. Roberts, Mark J. no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 122 In Search of Focused Logistics, Hardening Overseas Presence: no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 125–27 Force Protection, no. 14 The 1996 RMA Essay Contest, (Winter 96–97), pp. 117–20 no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 6–7 Powell, Colin L. The Chairman as Principal Sapolsky, Harvey M. Thinking About Revolutions Military Adviser: An Interview, Interservice Competition: The in Military Affairs, no. 16 no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 29–36 Solution, Not the Problem, no. 15 (Summer 97), pp. 69–76 (Spring 97), pp. 50–53 Powers, Earl W. Knowledge-Based Warfare: Sawyer, David A. A Security Strategy for the Next The Joint Doctrine Development Century, no. 13 (Autumn 96), System, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 81–89 pp. 36–39 Price, David E. Schneider, James J. Leadership: Some Thoughts Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity, on the Military Circa 2025, no. 13 and the Promise of Information (Autumn 96), pp. 97–99 Warfare, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 21–28 Prueher, Joseph W. Rethinking the Joint Doctrine Selva, Paul J. Hierarchy, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), Knowledge-Based Warfare: pp. 42–45 A Security Strategy for the Next Century, no. 13 (Autumn 96), Warfighting CINCs in a New Era, pp. 81–89 no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 48–52 Shalikashvili, John M. Redden, Joseph J. A Word from the Chairman, Why Training Counts: A Book Joint Doctrine: The Way Ahead, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 1, 4–7; Review, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 10–12 no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 1, 4–6; no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 1, 4; p. 128 Reimer, Dennis J. no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 1, 4–5 National Defense Panel Dominant Maneuver and Precision National Security in the Engagement, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), Sheehan, John J. 21st Century: The Challenge of pp. 13–16 Next Steps in Joint Force Integration, no. 13 (Autumn 96), Transformation, no. 16 Rinaldo, Richard J. pp. 41–47 (Summer 97), pp. 15–19 Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Nunn, Sam Real Soldiers Do MOOTW? no. 14 Shelton, Henry H. Future Trends in Defense (Winter 96–97), pp. 111–16 Coming of Age: Theater Special Operations Command, no. 14 Organization, no. 13 (Autumn 96), Robb, Charles S. (Winter 96–97), pp. 50–52 pp. 63–66 Examining Alternative UCP Structures, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 85–93

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Walker, Nancy J. EUCOM and Sub-Saharan Africa, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 103–07 Welch, William G. The Everyman’s Joint Library: A Review Essay, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 128–30 Wells, Gordon M. Deep Operations, Command and Control, and Joint Doctrine: Time for a Change? no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 101–05 Wheelock, Kevin R. Review Criteria for the Logistic Plan, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 128–33 Whetstone, Shawn C. Joint Training for MOOTW: U.S. Navy (Stephen Batiz) A Book Review, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 140–41

Snider, Don M. Tillson, John C.F. White, John P. Emergence of the Joint Officer, Improving the Management of Defense Organization Today, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 53–57 Reserve Forces, no. 16 (Summer 97), no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 18–22 pp. 39–43 Starns, John F. Wilkerson, Lawrence B. Whatever Happened to Defense Tuozzolo, John J. What Exactly Is Jointness? no. 16 Industrial Preparedness? no. 16 The Challenge of Civil-Military (Summer 97), pp. 66–68 Operations, no. 16 (Summer 97), (Summer 97), pp. 27–33 Willis, T. LaMar pp. 54–58 Stavridis, James Knowledge-Based Warfare: A The Second Revolution, no. 15 Security Strategy for the Next (Spring 97), pp. 8–13 Century, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 81–89 Steffens, Thomas W. Knowledge-Based Warfare: Winner, Andrew C. A Security Strategy for the Next The Looming Alliance Debate Century, no. 13 (Autumn 96), over Nuclear Weapons, no. 15 pp. 81–89 (Spring 97), pp. 80–86 Stocker, Jeremy R. Young, Thomas-Durell Jointness in Defence of the Realm: Joint Doctrine Development: A Review Essay, no. 15 (Spring 97), Overcoming a Legacy, no. 14 pp. 137–40 (Winter 96–97), pp. 94–100 Strickland, Frank B., Jr. Zoufal, Donald R. It’s Not About Mousetraps— Transition of the Sarajevo Suburbs, Measuring the Value of Knowledge no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 50–53

for Operators, no. 13 (Autumn 96), U.S. Navy (James Slaughterhaupt) JFQ pp. 90–96 Thomas, William C. van Tol, Jan M. Operation Kingpin—Success or Military Innovation and Carrier Failure? no. 15 (Spring 97), Aviation—The Relevant History, pp. 120–24 no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 77–87 Tiersky, Ronald Walker, Jack French Military Reform and NATO Leveraging Technology for Joint Training, no. 16 (Summer 97), Articles published in JFQ are listed in the Restructuring, no. 15 (Spring 97), Air University Index to Military Periodicals. pp. 95–102 pp. 104–08 In addition, a complete cumulative index of issues 1–16 can be found on the Internet at http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/jfq/jfq.html.

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■ A NOTE TO READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

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