/V-?57 Report of

CTFS3 and CTG 51.21

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COMMANDM AM>HIBIOUS GROUP TWO Al6-3O) Care of Fleet Post Office Serial 046 San Francisco, California tiiiMSifiLO 2 April 1945

From: Commander Amphibious Group TWO (CTF 53 and CTG 51.21), To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, % Via : (1) Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet (CTF sl)# (2) Comrander FIFTH Fleet (CTF 50). (3) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas,

Sub ject: 810 JIMA Operation - Report of. Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confident ialLetter ,1 CL-45 # dated 1 January 1945 •

Enclosure: (A) Commander Amphibious' Group TWO (CTF 53 / and CTG 51.21) Report of 810 4BIA Operation. 1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith*.

2. A summary of the operation follows:

a) PREPARATION FOR THE ASSAULT

(1) The planning for the 380 JBiA operation commenced in October. A very complete set of photographs was available at that time which were augmented continually during the planning period. Excellent photographic coverage, was- provided. Early, in the planning period, Commodores McGOVERR and FLANAGAN, who had been designated as Transport Squadron Commanders, ? were ordered to PEARL HARBOR and their- presence aided materially in the early preparation of plans , -

(2) Practically all vessels assigned to the operation were new, with no combat experience. In many cases their late delivery from the build­ ing yards necessitated their proceeding to the Hawaiian Area without even the benefit of their indoctrinal training on the West Coast. As , opportunity permitted they were put through an intensive training sche­ dule in the Hawaiian Area, but the training time allotted was insuf­ ficient for real benefit, A beach party school was established at WAIMANALO and all beach parties given about five days training there which was most helpful.

(3) Three divisions of LCI(M)1 s became available for about three weeks before rehearsal and they were. utilized to the maximum extent in mortar fire training and the development of type methods of fire, particularly night interdiction fire* The methods and procedure developed here proved very satisfactory during the subsequent :a#isap]fc|*i)haSes •*£;•> / ti*|l !irif • Vi \ X .:¦\ 1¦'+) • * f

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TY/O Al6-3(3) - Care of Fleet Post Office Serial ?%£ .. , ~ *AtwJPran cisco, California

Subject: B/O JIMA Operation - Report of.

(4) A Corps Shore Party, consisting of the Bth Field Depot y was estab­ lished and conducted valuable training* Generous and adequate numbers of cranes, trucks, bulldozers, and other landing equipment were obtained and shipping space allocated for this most important adjunt of landing operations. 4

(5) A careful study was made of both the eastern and western beaches of IWO JIMA and plans were prepared for the landing on either side as the weather might dictate. It was apparent that the beaches and beach areas were of extremely soft and shifting sand, which, coupled with their- steep gradient arxl high banks just inshore, indicated that considerable difficulty would be experienced in landing vehicles. ? (6) In anticipation of this trouble a large number of runner sleds were provided. In addition the shore party developed and tested a means of hinging marston matting and assembled itin fifty foot units "accordion pleated" (see Pictorial Record page 13). Altogether more than eight miles of this matting vrere prepared and loaded on sleds in such a manner- as to make it available for quick use on the beaches. This proved to be a lifesaver and was responsible to a large degree for the early rapid supply of assault requirements.

(7) The loading in the Hawaiian . Area followed generally along standard pattern. APA's averaged about 500 tons and AKA's about 2200 tons. LST's carried the usual preloads of priority supplies and -naval ammunition. LSM's were loaded to a total of 260 short tons. Due to the excessive weight {40 tons) of the-M4A3 tank, plans for embarking these in LCM(3) !s in LSD's had to be changed. Some of the tanks were embarked in LCT's + and others in LSM's made available for the purpose.

(8) Five days were allotted to rehearsals in the Hawaiian Area and two days for rehearsals off TINIAN. These rehearsals were extremely benefi­ cial and were none too long.

(9) A very careful check was kept upon the Weather at IWO JIMA by all agencies concerned and during the movement to the objective it was ap­ parent that the primary plan of landing on the eastern beaches could be utilized.

b) ASSAULT PHASE

(10) On DOG Day all units arrived exactly on schedule. The weather was fine and the sea smooth. The debarkation of troops and the move­ ment of assault waves proceeded without hitch and the landing was effect­ ed on time. Excellent supporting gunfire was delivered, which is more fully described in CTF 51' s report. Practically- no enemy gunfire was .-.^..niuiiHh 2 COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWO Al6-3(3) Care of Fleet-*" Post Office §¥iWV^ '* C*Oif!l?1 :firanc: sco > California

Subject: IWO JBIA Operation - Report of. seen to fall among the boat waves during their approach to the beach*

(11) At the beach our troubles began. Many of the LVT's and LVT(A)'s. ¥ temporarily bogged dovm in the soft sand and were swamped by a steep, quick-breaking single line of breakers about four feet high. Some tanks stripped their tracks while trying to make a turn in this soft sand after debarkation from LSld!s. LCVP's and LCM's, although beaching initially without difficulty, were swamped either by a large wave break­ ing over their sterns or by a heavy backwash of surf rushing in over their ramps. These boats broached and by the end' of DCG Day the beaches # were almost completely blocked by various types of craft. (12) The ordinary salvage facilities provided by LCPR's were completely inadequate to take care of this situation and the subsequent clearing of the beaches was made extremely difficult by the fact that the surf quick­ ly filled these boats with sand and also built a bar of sand around them, (See Pictorial Record pages 8 & 9).

(13) Allbeaches were subject to heavy mortar fire, particularly GREEN and BLUE Beaches on the flanks. This fire persisted on all beaches for four days aril considerably longer on the northern beaches. Casualties in beach parties, shore parties, and shore party equipment were high and all work on the beaches was performed under difficult conditions.

(1U) The fine weather prevailing on DOG Day soon deteriorated- By DOG plus ONE the wind had veered around to the east and it bec^.i^ -.^possible to. discharge any landing craft smaller than LCT's. This ccriv.it: on pro­ ? vailed generally throughout the entire period, causing rough c.jzs in the transport areas, and creating anticipated difficulties in unloading. LCT's, LSM's, and IS^s were utilized to the maximum extent on a 24-hour basis. In the rough water they suffered considerable damage alongside, and a critical shortage of fenders and lines developed. But by the' de­ termination, adaptability, and cheerful effort of officers and crews', the work continued without stop throughout the entire unloading period.

(15) Considerable damage resulted also to these vessels on the beach. They were being called into small areas of clean beach flanked by wreckage of all types, and in many instances struck this wreckage or submerged obstacles, receiving considerable hull damage. A strong cur­ rent alpng the beach and poor holding ground caused a considerable num­ ber of broachings and the fouling of anchors of adjacent ships. In addition, cargo nets and beach flotsam of all types carried out by the swift undertow fouled screws of innumerable vessels while discharging cargo. «HCIASSttO COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWO Al6-3(3) Care of Fleet Post Office

- Subject; IVJD JIMA. Operation Report of.

(16) To meet this situation, the limited facilities of the Service and Salvage 'Group, the docking facilities of three LSD's, and the avail­ ability of the LCS(L)'s provided off each beach for salvage purposes, were taxed to the utmost. The Underwater Demolition Teams rendered valuable assistance in clearing the beaches, but there -was a definite 4 requirement for. a larger and better equipped salvage unit. Recommenda­ tions regarding this are made in subsequent parts of this report and willalso be made the subject of special correspondence.

(17) On DOG plus TWO Day it was considered that circumstances were such that general unloading could commence on- the next day, and on this assump­ tion, decision vas.made to launch pontoon barges carried by certain LST's. + Four barges had been launched on DOG Day for use by evacuation control LST's and these had functioned in a satisfactory manner. Therefore seven­ teen additional barges were launched in the afternoon and ear3y evening of DOG plus TWO. This proved to be an unfortunate decision. Weather conditions deteriorated with wind velocity increasing to 25 knots, with the result that the barges could not be used. Numerous barges on launch­ ing were unable to operate under their own power. The only anchorage then available would block the beaches, in use, and it became necessary that they either be towed by launching ships or by salvage vessels. In the existing seaway they could not be properly handled by LCI types or LCM's, and during the next three days they were a subject of much concern. They continually broke their moorings and went adrift, either on the beach where they not only blocked the badly needed beach access, but also set up a hazard to ships already beached, or drifted to sea to become a menace to navigation and a salvage problem. In future operations pontoon barges should not be launched unless or until a smooth -water anchorage area is available. The foregoing remarks apply in equal force to pontoon causeway # sections.

(IS) On DOG plus ELEVEN surf conditions made all operations on the east­ ern beaches extremely hazardous. Meanwhile reconnaissances of the western beaches showed surf conditions satisfactory there. As soon as a by-passed enemy pocket of resistance had been mopped up, mines were cleared and a road constructed down to the southern extremity of the western beaches. The first ship ordered to discharge across these beaches was an ammunition ship, COLUMBIA. VICTORY, which was unloading by DUKY/'s. As she steamed for an anchorage in the lee of MOUNT SURIBACHI, a heretofore unlocate• i COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TIO Al6-3(3) Care of Fleet Post Office ScriLal Q A San Francisco, F California - Subject: IWO JIMA Operation Report of.

« (19) In spite of all the difficulties, both afloat and ashore, the un­ loading progressed very satisfactorily and by DOG plus SIX the daily rato of discharge had reached a total of approximately 3,000 tons. Most of the unloading, except as noted in preceding paragraphs,, was done over the eastern beaches although fulladvantage was taken of the western anchorage for unloading from transports and other landing craft whenever conditions warranted* By DOG plus FIFTEEN three transport squadrons, with the exception of a few corps and garrison loaded vessels, had com­ pleted unloading and had departed. (20) On 14 March (DOG plus TVJENTYTHREE) the Japanese resistance had been « reduced to a small pocket in the THIRD and FOURTH Divisions lareas of re­ sponsibility and a sizeable pocket at the north tip of the island,- and the U.S. Flag was raised on 1570 J&IA, • On 16 March (DOG plus TVffiNTXFIVE) all organized resistance was declared to have ceased. (21) Reembarkation was commenced immediately of the FOURTH Division, followed by the FIFTH Division and Corps. Withdrawal of the latter divi-* sion was delayed until a stubborn pocket of resistance in the northwest corner of the island had been cleaned out.

(22) On 26 Match the capture and occupation phase was declared to be completed, and responsibility for the defense and development of • 870 JIMA was assumed by Command er' Forward Area, ¦ (c) GENERAL NOTES AND CCMdENTS ON THE OPERATION # (23) Small Boat Control Having experienced difficulty in previous operations with small boats left in the area at night-' during the assault period, after parent ships had retired, a Small Craft Group was organized to administer and care for miscellaneous., small craft. Boats loft in the- area by retiring ships were directed to the Small Craft Group Commander for securing and berthing and messing "of crevra, for which two LST(M) *s. were available after DOG Day, This system proved highly satisfactory and is recommend­ ed for future operations. (24) Evacuation pf Casualties

The evacuation of casualties during this operation showed a marked improvement over any previous operations of this group. Great care had been taken in thoroughly briefing all medical personnel involved before the operation commenced and in providing special medic-e.l equipment such as whole blood, which was used here for the first time. Four LST's were outfitted for use as casualty evacuation ships and a large medical staff placed on board. Shortly after HOW Hour these vessels each launched one ¦mcumim CORIANDER /&PHIBIOUS GROUP TWO Al6-3O) Care of Fleet Post Office Serial 046 San Francisco, California

* **A?J!ftT~ "WllllfOperation - Report of. barge and 3x12 secured it alongside and moved to a position close to 1 the control vessel off each regimental beach. Casualties coming from the beach, principally in DUKW*s and LVT's, were taken aboard, the barge and thence, by crane to the LST where they were given early medical treatment and then evacuated to transports by LCVP's. During the opera­ tion these four vessels handled an approximate total of 6136 casualties and unquestionably contributed materially to saving many "lives. The OZARK (LSV 1) proved her worth in handling of casualties. Prior to the operation extra medical personnel had been placed aboard her and on her departure she evacuated a of total 407 casualties. # The lack of hospital facilities ashore was a source of constant concern because of the possibility' of bad weather prohibiting, embarkation of casualties. It is recommended that every effort be made, particularly in a situation such as this where rio suitable harbor was available, to establish hospital facilities ashore at the earliest practicable time. Transfer during darkness of casualties from the evacuation control LST's to designated APA's created difficulties which. require further solution. LCVP's used for this purpose in many instances had great dif­ ficulty in locating the vessel to which directed. Ships designated to receive casualties should display distinctive light groups for this pur­ pose at all"times except when danger of air raid or enemy gunfire exists. Transport Squadron Conmanders must take positive steps to assure that evacuation control LST's are kept fully informed regarding the designa­ tion of ships allocated for receiving casualties. As a general rule night transfers should be reduced to a minimum.

(25) Control of Unloading; Operations #

Headquarters for unloading operations were consolidated in U.S.S. AUBURN as soon as it was practicable to do so. Commencing on DOG plus SEVEN Day the senior commanders of LST's, LSM's, and LCT's present moved aboard with their staffs and set up headquarters. Later, prior to the time the Port Director was to assume responsibility for discharging of garrison shipping, his headquarters were also established aboard the AUBURN, where he remained until his facilities were available on shore. This procedure enabled the Attack Force Commander to keep close control over all unloading and also provided the Port. Director with experience so that the transfer of unloading responsibility was effected with maxi­ mum efficiency-. It simplified control and greatly, reduced the communica­ tion traffic load. 1 This procedure is recommended for future use. (26) Reembarkation Procedure

Vilhen the responsibility of all garrison unloading was transferred

"' ** • ¦•'¦¦ it ./"/"Ij,1M .<. .' .i COMAE)ER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWO Al6-3(3) Care of Fleet Post. Office Fr Serial 046 . %I,v* ,§£& ancisco > California

Subject: IV© JBIA. Operation - Report of. to the Island Commander,, on DOG; plus TTOJTYFOUR, a definite allocation of unloading "craft and .beaches was made tt> the Port Director for gar­ rison use. Remaining craft and beaches were retained for troop reem­ 4 barkation, which proceeded concurrently with unloading operations of garrison forces. This arrangement resulted in a minimum of confusion and expedited overall accomplishment of the operation. One beach and control party from an assault transport squadron was retained for use during troop reembarkation, since GroPac beach party did not include sufficient .personnel to' take over- bath troop reembarkation and garri­ son unloading functions. . v\ # (2?) Pontoon Barges and Causeways

¦ The difficulty with pontoon barges -and causeways have been'dis­ cussed elsewhere in this report and also in the report of CTF 51» In future operations the following instructions should govern:

(a) They not be launched in rough sea conditions* (b) If any doubt exists, a few should be launched at 'art ime until operating conditions are definitely determined.

(c) Procedure should be developed for assuring that engines are in operating condition prior to launching. (d) A towing bridle should be provided. The sharp edges of pon­ toon sections quickly chafe through ordinary towing geai> # (^) Allbarges and causeways should have their numbers clearly painted on both sides and on the deck for identification in case of breakdown and subsequent salvaging., N\ (f) Plans should prescribe a definite anchorage and beach area for these structures. (2&) Salvage Organizations

The rough weather and treacherous beach conditions created a beach salvage problem which far exceeded the capacity of the usual organiza­ tion set up to handle it. As our operations progress toward the Japanese homeland, rough weather conditions willgenerally prevail and immediate- steps should be taken to perfect and xatpand our beach salvage organization. COMMAMDEK £J>HIBIGU3 GROUP TttO Al6-3(3) Cara of Fleet. Post Office 0^ * California f¥4.^#tftf* M 3^ 300

Subject: BVO JBCA. Operation - Report of.

A special beach salvage group should be organized, Vessels of that group should include small tugs, YTIMs, LCI types, and specially- equipped LCM's carrying pumps, shallow water diving units, and under­ water burning outfit. This organization would be augmented during the assault phase by LCP(L) Ts or LCPR rs provided by .Transport Squadron Com­ t manders for minor salvage work on their own beaches. •

In addition to the above, each assault transport should provide a mobile repair unit capable of above-water welding and minor hull and engine repair to landing craft afloat; (29) Prevention of Alongside Damage # In the rough sea conditions prevailing at BTO JBIA the LST^s", • LSM's, LCT's, and simller craft suffered extensive damage while along­ side larger vessels. All available fenders were soon carried away and makeshift fenders proved inadequate. Cane fenders themselves caused considerable danage because of their small pressure area. Mounting .lugs for causeways and pontoon barges on the sides, of LST'swere a par­ ticular source of damage to vessels and smaller craft alongside. In future operations it is most iiiiportant that each large ship and LST be provided with suitable fenders or small camels* (30) Beach Control

Although operating under unusually difficult conditions at IWO JJUA and under heavy enemy gunfire, it is considered that the coordina­ tion between beachmasters and the offshore control vessels was not satisfactory. The following specific points require improvement: #

(a) A simplified visual system of calling boats to the beach limst be provided. This must include lights for night signalling and range lights for the beaching of larger craft. (b) A more positive means must be established by control vessels of determining at night what landing craft are in their vicinity waiting for beaching instructions. Particularly during the early phases of assault, night signalling is dangerous and must be kept to a minimum. Radio communication proved only partly satisfac­ tory. On one beach the control officer had an LCPR tender, which cruised the area and contacted orally each arriving craft. This proved very satisfactory.

(c) Allrequests from the troops on shore for materials or sup­ plies must be channelized through the control vessels. In this operation as in preceding ones, there has been a marked tendency UnbLflOkSirf'** COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWO Al6-3(3) Caro of Fleet Post Office 3&2.|1*146 ftft£f1%^\Francisco, California

Sub ject : HfO JEIA Operation. - Report of.

for troop commanders to send their requests direct to the ships concerned or to the higher echelons without notification to the control officer and embarked troop representative. This results 4 in loaded craft arriving at the control vessel without any know­ ledge for their need on the part of the control officer. (31) Beach Partie

The beach condition at IWO JBIA stressed the weakness of our pre­ sent beach patty organization. Practically all members of the beach parties were engaged in their first combat experience.. The beach con­ « ditions were unusually tough and would have challenged the resourceful­ ness and efficiency of the most highly trained organization. Successful beach operation under these conditions is an extremely difficult task and itis believed essential that permanent organizations be set up to handle this problem.

Initially itis recommended that a small group of key beach party personnel be constituted and trained in all angles of rough -water work and th&t during an operation they be placed in complete charge of the beaches, supplemented* by the required personnel of, existing beach parties now aboard transports. Ultimately an organization should be built up corresponding more or less to that of the underwater demolition • teams. ' Such an organization would become highly skilled in beach party work, • and would develop a high morale and esprit de corps which is now definitely lacking in beach party organizations. When an operation was in prospect, beach party units could be designated for each beach from this organiza­ tion* During an operation these beach parties ,would remain in control « of the beaches until such time as the garrison .forces took over, there­ by eliminating the confusion and inefficiency now existing at that period resulting from beach parties being withdrawn when their ships leave.

(32) Shore Parties The preceding remarks apply equally to the need for well trained and experienced shore parties.. The shore party problem is without ques~ tion one of the most important and the toughest problems connected with amphibious operations. Its coirunander must be an extremely capable, forceful, and resourceful officer with great organizational ability.

Although the initialassault requirements must necessarily be on call from the separate divisions, it is believed desirable that the Gorps shore party assume control from the outset in order to provide the necessary coordination of the supply problem. As at both SAIPAN and IWO JIMA, difficulties may be experienced on one group of beaches and the entire supply for all troops ashore routed over only one or two beaches. CORIANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWO A16^3(3) Carts of Fleet Post Office ancisco, California - Subject: IWO JIMA. Operation Report of.

The Corps shore party should be a permanently and separately organized force not subject to the call of any division commander for combat purposes. During this operation the division shore parties were made up largely of replacement troops for the division. This worked fine for a short period but these replacements were i soon called up by their division commander, and ultimately resulted in undesirable delays 1 in beach and dump unloading. (33) Mortar Gunboats

The successful use of mortar, gunboats throughout the early days of the assault was one of the outstanding features of this operation. # The standard procedures developed during the training period proved adequate and, the fire.from these vessels was quite accurate and extreme­ ly effective. (d) CONCLUSION

(34) This operation was an extremely difficult one, not only for the troops ashore, but for the ships afloat, and particularly for the smaU craft and personnel engaged in the ship-to-shore moveußnt. Many new problems were encountered, and many lessons learned. In spite of these, however, the work went ahead and the job was accomplished in splendid fashion. It is with great pride that Ipay tribute, not only to the FIFTH Amphibious Corps for its heroic assault and capture of EfO JIMA,, but to the other, officers and men of this task force viho, although many of them were engaged in their first operation, accomplished- their tasks with determination, resourcefulness and disregard of personal danger that was an inspiration to behold. +

H* W. HILL.

­ "MUMifim io COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GEOUP TWO Al6-3(3) Care of Fleet Post Office Serial 046 San Francisco, California

Subject: IWO JB.IA Operation - Report of.

4 DISTRIBUTION: Advance copies to: ComPhibGrp 7 (1) Cominch (Via Airmail) (1) ComPhibGrp 11 (1) Cincpac (Via Airmail) (3) ComPhibGrp 12 (1) ComsthFleet (Via Airmail) (l) ComPhibGrp 13 (I) ComPhibGrp 14 (1) ComGenPOA (l) ComASCU, PhibGrp 2 (l) CinCSWPA (1) ComTransßon 15 (l) # Com3rdFleet (l) ComTransDiv 44 (1) Com7thFleet (l) ComTransDiv 45 (1) ComSoPac (1) ComTransßon 16 (l) ComServPac (1) ComTransDiv 47 (l) JICPOA (1) ComTransDiv 48 (l) ComFwdArea (1) ComLSTFlot 21 (l) Com3rdPhibFor (l) ComLSTGrp 18 (l) Com7thPhibFor (1) ComLSTFlot 29 (1) ComPhibsPac (5) ComLSMFlot 5 (l) AdComPhibsPac (1) ComEsCarForPac (l) ComGenXArniy (1) ComTransßon 11 (1) ComGenFMFPac (2) ComTransDiv 32 (1) AdComFMFPac (1) ComTransDiv 33 (1) ComGenlllPhibCorps (l) ComLSTFlot 13 (l) ComGenVPhibCorps (2) CNO (1) ComGen3rdMarDiv (1) Naval War College (l) ComGen4thMarDiv (1) Army Navy Staff College (1) # ComGenstMferDiv (1) Marine Corps School, i^iantico (3) IsCom BiD JJMk (1) C & GS Leavenworth (1) ComASCU, PhibsPac (1) ComdtMarCorps (1) ComPhibGrp 1 (1) R. Adiru A. G. KIRK (1) ComPhibGrp 3 (1) ComPhibTraPac (10) ComPhibGrp 4 (1) ComPhibTraLant (5) ComPhibGrp 5 (1) AmphTraßase, Ft. Pierce (1) ComPhibGrp 6 (1) File (1) L^MMviLdC^ H. Lf TALLMAN, Commander, Flag Secretary, Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TW( (CTF 53 and CTG 51«21 j REPORT OF IHO JIMA OPERATION CONTENTS CONTENTS (a),(b) INDEX OF RECOMMENDATIONS (c),(d) PART (I) - LIST OF DIRECTIVES .(l)_l - # PART (II)- COMPOSITION OF FORCES (A) Composition of- Transport Group ABLE _ - (TG 51.12) **» - — (n)«i to 2 (B) -Composition of Task Force FIFTYTHREE (H)-3 to 9 PART (III)- OPERATIONS (A) Loading : . (III)-Ito 2 - • - (B) - General Narrative ..* (IIl)-3 to 15 (C.) - Unloading Operations (IIl)-l6to 20 (D) -Miscellaneous Comments and Recommendations- (III)-21 PART (IV)- NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT — (A) - Narrative of Fire Support by LCI Types (IV)-lto 4 (B) Comments and Recommendations on Fire Support Employment of Gunboat, Mortar, and 5-inch Rocket LCI»s (IV)-5 to 7 (C) - Narrative of Naval Gunfire Support # - after Departure CTF 51 (IV)~8 (D) Comments and Recommendations for Fire Support ~~­ (IV)~9 - to 10 PART (V) -AIR SUPPORT (V)-lto 13 PART (VI)- MEDICAL (A) - Narrative — (VI)-lto 3 (B) Comments and Recommendations (VI)~4 to 13

• ~ - PART (VII)-,-AEROLOGY (VIl)-lto 6 PART (VIII)- SMOKE mm (VIIl)-l PART (EC) COMMUNICATIONS (IX)-lto 10 PART (X) - FCECE BEACHMASTER REPORT (A) - - ­ Assault Unloading flli"j?tf" ~.~ 00-1 to 2 (B) *¦ Comments and Recommendatilijtp U*L-M-4& #1Kl^^t^^? Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JBIA (Contents) - PART (XI)- DAMAGE (A) - Operational Damage to Landing Craft (XI)-lto 2 (B) Repairs to Danaged Landing Craft (XI)-3 PART (XII) - CHRONOLOGY OF SHIPS PRESENT IWO J33/IA DURING PERIOD COMPHIBGRP 2 SOPA IWO JB/IA (9-28 MARCH) - (XIl)-lto 8

PICTORIAL RECORD OF LANDING ON IWO JIMA 1 to 26

#

#

x "¦''¦' '}'} *»* ;'y Action Report r ComPhibGrp 2 - IWD JBIA INDEX OF RECOMMENDATIONS - - - - - Air Support Request Net, secondary, assignment of •» (V)-5 Amphibious Group Commander to command Tractor Flotilla - - (III)*21 Amphibious Support Force Commander, duties of after D~Day - (iv)-9 — • ASCU, officer complement of- - ­- . -.-,-• (V)-2 ASP, consolidation of -----.--*~ i» (V)~5 Bulldozers, TD*-18, standard equipment for_ ~ assault — shore parties -«-.-.• : (X)-*3 Casualties, additional medical personnel. on LSVts for handling (VT)~S Casualties, assignment of additional LCVP's by ~ * « TransDiv Comdrs, for handling .- .- - (VI)~5 ,-«¦» * Casualties, disposition of v«hite it (VI)-6 Casualties, install cargo port in LST(H) »s for handling •* - (Vl)<-4 Casualties; larger loading platform on AH's for handling ~ (Vl)-5 Casualties, movies of medical— — facilities-— in -chain of- — - evacuation of ¦--*-­ (Vl)-*5 Casualties, specially prepared barge for handling at LST(H) »a- (VI)-4 Casualties, sufficient bed "space ashore for - — (Vl)-5. Casualties, TransDiv Coirdr, reports of---.-~~-— - — (Vl)-6 Causeway, pontoon •r (X)-5 CentComTWO and PACCA3X, monthly compilation of changes — (!X)-6 Code, Joint Assault, bring up to date - — -.-- (lX)-6 Code, simple for voice circuits ---«--- (!X)-6 Communications, Beach' Party, miscellaneous recommendations-— (X)-7 Control, Fire Support, division of -~~*• (IV)-9 ECM, provide for LST, LCI, LSM Flotilla Commanders - ; (IX)-8 Fenders and camels to reduce unloading damage - — - — ­ (Xl)-3 Firefighting Units, mobile ¦* ? — *«.•;•-.•-' (X)-5 Frequencies, air support, assignment .of -:-- ?.•--.•; (V)-5

Gunfire Support, ComGen Landing Force arid officer - — - - --'- - ­ controlling in same, ship •*¦. ---. '-, /- (IV)~9

Illumination, star shell (IV)-9 Intelligence Platoons, Radio, use of -- (IX)-7

Loading, high priority ammunition in LST f s (III)-17 Loading into LST's and LSM's by transports (III)-l6 Loading of garrison assault units in assault troop — — shipping < (III)-l6 ~ Loading of LSM's ?*irfr (III)-16 1111 lIAW11" ll*PI

Action Report. ComPhibGrp 2 - E7O JEiA (Index of Recommendations)

— ~--— — - ­ Markers, - - -— (X)-5 beach ? -:—: Marstori Matting, prefabricated' on sleds, for assault— divisions - (X)-4W-4 Medical complement of LST(H)*s - -: -¦ (VI)T4 Mortar LCI Unit, protection by DD (IV)-6

NAN ' ¦ (EC)-7,8 Operating rooms, in LST(H) »s, installation of additional (Vl)-4 Organization, Administrative, for small —craft (III)-21 Padeyes on LCT's for securing to LSTrs (Xl)-2

Radio Equipment, allowance for AGG (lX)-7 RCM ­ — '¦- (K)-8 » Repair parties in LSD*s - «- (Xl)-3 Repair, small craft, LCM for : r — (Xl)-3 Repairs, voyage, small craft --< - *­*¦ (III)-21 Rocket, Stabalized, use of (lV)-7 SVO Spin — 4 Rockets, 4l»'s>4l»'5> employment of (IV)-5 — — - ­ Salvage organization, beach : - (X)-6 SCR Radar deck loaded on LST ' (XX)-8 Surf and Breaker conditions, qualified— aerographers— mate vdth BM'to make reports on . < (VIl)-2(VII;-2 —' ' Swellrell in deep water, means of measurement of (VII)-2

* - Talkers, Indian - (IX)-7. "Task Force Communication Digest", distribution of (IX)-6 - — -— — ­ Visual communications (lX)-8 VHF multi-channel push button radio equipment, # installation of^— (lX)-7 radio teletype equipment, furnish to Transßon and VHF *— TransDiv Commanders (IX;~7 VHF RATT frequency, not interfere with SK radar— • (IX)-6 Voice radio calls for small craft (IX)~7

Weather reporting code, simplified (VII)-2

"' ' : ¦ s •¦¦¦ . *\ ,¦ (?) ; « . ¦ ¦¦':' ..rf 'A* 'i!< '¦'•'^•' G AX*y!RFf) Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - BVO JBIA PART (I) LIST OF DIRECTIVES

1. Operation Plan Cincpoa No* 11-44, serial 0001027, dated 25 November 1944 • 2. ComFIFTHFIeet (CTF 50) ­ Operation Plan CoraFlFTHFleet No* 13-44, serial 00040, dated 31 December 1944. - 3. ComPhibsPac (CTF 51) Operation Plan ComPhibsPac No* A25-44, « serial 000280, dated 20 December­ 1944. 4. ComPhibsPac (CTF 51) Training Order ComPhibsPac No. A29-44, serial 000287, dated 21 December 1944.

5» ComPhibsPac (CTF 51) - Training Movement Order ComPhibsPac No. A3O-44, serial 000288, dated 21 December 1944. 6. ComPhibsPac (CTF 51) +> Training Order ComPhibsPac Uo. A33-44, serial 000311, dated 31 December 19A4 # 7. ComPhibsPac (CTF 51) - Letter of Instructions for SOPA, IWO J2MA, after Departure of CTF 51 Estimated about 7 March 1945, serial 000149, dated 4 March 1945. - 8. ComPhibGrp 2 (CTG 51«21) Operation Order ComPhibGrp 2 No. A20­ 2-45, serial 00030, dated 8 March 1945. #

ifiii1!H^^'^M! LAST PAGE t k Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - :ITO JIMA PART (II)

COMPOSITION OF FORCES SECTION (A) COMPOSITION OF TRANSPORT- GROUP ABLE (TG 51.12 51*12 Transport Group ABLE (Transßon 16) - Rear Admiral;HILL ~ AUBURN (F) Captain-MYERS 1 AGC 51,»12 »1 TransDiv J^.6 Commodore MfcGOVERN

CECIL (SF), DEUEL, DARKE, HOCKBIG' 4 APA « TOLLAND, ,ATHME • . 2 AKA - < 51.12.2 TransDiv 47 Captain WOTHERSPOON. ' RUTLAND (P), HIGHLANDS, SANDOVAL, HANSFORD 4 APA IHITLET 1 AKA 51*12.3 TransDiv 43 - Captain ANDREWS TALLADEGA (F), MISSOULA, LUBBOCK, DICKMS 4 APA STOKES 1 AKA GUNSTON HALL 1LSD Temp, 51? 12.4 TransDiv 2 LENAWEE (F), WHTTESIDE, CARTERET 3 APA THURSTON 1AP YANCEI 1 AKA # GEAR 1 ARS Screen - Captain CHANDLER

VAN VALKMBURG (CDS 58) (SF), FUILAM (CDS 45), GUEST BMNETT (FD), HUDSON (FD), IRWIN, PRINGLE (CDD 90), STANIJ, HOWORTH, MULLANY, BRADFORD, TERRY, ANTHONY 33 DD RIDDLE 1 DE DEVASTATOR, DEFENSE 2 AM NOTES:

1. On 29 January (17, Long*) BRULE due engineering casualty- returned Pearl screened by GAMBLE. BRULE replaced by CARTERET who joined at SAIPAN, GAMBLE did not rejoin. 2, TERRY joined screen 29 January (W. Long.) and was de­ tached at SAIPAN. I * Action Report • ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (II)- Composition of Forces; ." Section (A) - Composition of Transport Group Able (TG 51.12))

Following ships were detached at SAIPAN: MULLANY, BRADFORD, 3. " ANTHONY, DEVASTATOR, DEFENSE. 4. Following ships joined at SAIPAN: HOVJORTH, IRWIN, STANLY, PRINGLE, RIDDLE, GUNS.TON HALL, GEAR. 5. HALFORD scheduled join at SAIPAN, but due collision did not participate. . . •

t « N.

• .r^» v. -. (ii)- 2 <

i 4 !Wl*f4lH*iorr? allttiMOolnrr Action Report — ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (II) Composition /of Faroes)

SECTION (B) COMPOSITION OF TASK FORCE FIFTY THREE

53 Attack Force - Rear Admiral HILL Force Flagship - AUBURN - Captain MYERS 1 AGC 53.10 Air Support Control Unit - Crvnmander Osborne

Troops - m 56.2 Assault MajfG-en. H. SCHMIDT, USMC Corps Troops, FIFTH Amphibious Corps, plus attached units FOURTH Marine Division, plus attached units FIFTH Marine Division, plus attached units 53 •!Transport Group ABIE - (transßon 16) - Commodore McGOVERN 53.1*1 TransDiv 46 less SUFFOLK, plus TOHAND ­ Commodore . McGOVTOJ CECIL (SF), DEUEL, DARKE, HOCKING, THURSTON 5 APA TOIIAND, IBITESIDE 2 AKA - 53..1.2 TransDiv 47 l^ss MARATHdN> KENTON, OBERON/ p^lus RUTUND, HANSFCED, YANCET ­ Captain V/otherspoon » RUTIAND (F), HIGHLANDS, SANDOVAL HANSFCED, CARTERET 5 APA WHITLEY, YANCEST 2 AKA 53.1.3 "TransDiv 43 - less LAGRANGE, TAZEVffiLL, KITTSON, BURLESON, ;WANDOT, TORRANCE, plus* TALUDBGA/ MISSOUU/ LUBBOCK, LENAWEE, STOKES, GUNSTON HAIL (F), MISSOUIA,, LUBBOCK, DICKENS, TALLADEGA " LEMAVffi 5 APA ATHENE, STOKES 2 AKA GUNSTON HALL 1LSD 56 •2.1 ABLE Landing Group - Maj.Gen. Rockey, USMC FIFTH Marine Division, plus attached units Corps and Garrison Force Troops, assigned » for transportation (ii)-p!*ipj: .4 CONFIDEMTIAL

Action Report ConiPhibGrp 2 - I'.VO JLIA (Part (Ij)-Composition of Forces) Section (B) ­ Composition of Task Force Fifty Three) - - 53.2 Transport Group BAKER (Transßon 15) Commodore FMAGAN 53.2.1 TransDiv 43 less FREMONT, V/ARRICK, plus BAYFIELD, ARTEMIS, OZARK - Commodore "FLANAGAN BAYFIELD (SF), MELLETTE, HENDRY, SIBLEY, BERRIEN 5 APA SHOSHONE, ARTEMIS 2 AKA OZARK 1 LSV - 53.2.2 TransDiv 44 plus BELLE GROVE Captain SEYFRIft) • HINSDALE (F), PICKENS, SANBCRNJ NAPA, BLADEN 5 APA SOUTHAMPTON, STARR 2 AKA BELLE GROVE 1 LSD 53.2.3 TransDiv 4^ less PONDERA, BRAKEN, STOKESj plus XOVMDES BARRO.W, LEO, ASHLAND - Captain SABALOT LOCAN (F), NKJBERRY, MIFFLK, LOvJNDES, BARROtt 5 APA LEO, MULIPHS! 2 AKA ASHIAJID 1 LSD

56.2.2 BAKER Landing Group - Maj.Gen. CATES, USMC FOURTH I;arine Di.vision, plus attached Units Corps and Garrison Force Troops, assigned for transportation # 53.3 Tractor Flotilla - Captain BRERETON - Flotilla Flagships GREGORY (FD), LCI(L) 994 (OF) 1DD, 1LCI(L) 53.3.1 Tractor Group ABLE - Commander NEIKUM - Group Flagships LITTLE, LCI(L) 995 (OF) 1DD, 1LCI(L) - 53*3.2 IST Unit ONE Commander GULLETT LST 241, 354, 568, 643, 715, 756(GF), 929(H) 7 LST 53»3»3 LST Unit TWO - Lieut.Coradr. LEA. LST 70, 390, 449 (UF), 481, 634, 758, IQ33(H) 7 LST - (ID 4 i CONFIDENTIAL Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - BTC) JIMA (Part (II)--.^Composition"' of Forces) Section (B) - Composition of Task Force Fifty Three) 53.3*4 Tractor Group BAKER -'Captain' BR3EETON 53.3*5 LST Unit THREE - Commander MacKINNOJJ

LST 587(GF), 642(Radar),- 716 ' 723(Radar), 761/ 812/ 930(H) 7 IST 53.3.6 LST Unit FOUR - Commander LIEF LST 684> 713 (UF), 731, 787, 789, + 928, 931(H) ; X- 7 IST 53.3.7 Tractor Group CHARLIE Captain PETJRSON, USCG Group Flagships - ROOKS, LCI(L) 998(OF) 1DD, l.l£I(L) 53.3.8 IST Unit FIVE - Commander SANDS, USC£ IST 726, 76O(GF), 763, 764, 779, 792(Radar), 784, 648, 1032 9 LST 53 .3,9 LST Unit SIX - Commander MIU.INGTCN, USCG

LST 42, 121, 224, 399>, 782(UF),' 735, V 795, 607, 940 9 IST 53.4 ISM Flotilla - Commander CARPENTER + Flotilla Flagship - LCI(L) 628 1LCI(L) 53.4*1 ISM Unit ABLE - Lieut,Comdr. GRISWOLD LSM 43,*V46, 47> w' 49 > 92 > 242> 261, 264(GF), 266 : 12 LSM - 53.4.2 ISM Unit BAKER Lieut.Comdr. LIND LSM 43, 59, 60(GF>, 145/ 201/ 202> 206, 207, 238, 239, 241, 260, 70, 74, 126, 211, 323, 216 18 ISM 53.5 Control Group - Captain Adell 53.5.1 Central Control Unit, - Captain Adell

PCB 377 1PCE ¦ PC(S)-14Q3*'U2i i '2 PC(S) - (II) 5 I

Action Report - *^t,f ComPhibGrp.2 IT*O JIliA (Part (llh*'Compos ition of Forces j ; , Section (B) - Composition of Task Force Force Fifty Three) Three)

53*5.2 Control Unit ABIE - Lieut.Comdr. DAMES

PC(S) 1460, 34613A61 2 PC(S) SC 3.298, 133413 3 A 2 SC 53.5.3 Control GREEN - - Lieut. SEXTON

PC 463 ' 1PC SC 1315 :1 SC 53.5.4 53.5.4 Control RED - Lieut. BILLS

PC 469 1! PC + SC 1316 1316 • :1 SC 53*5.5 Control Unit BAKER - LieuLieutiComdr.UComdr. WHEELER FC(S) 1452/ 1455 :2 PC(S) SC 1066, 1272, 3360 • • ;3 SC ' 53.5.6 Control YELLOW - Lieut. Comdr. HENDERSON

PC 578 . ¦ :1 PC - 53-5*7 Control BLUE Lieut. WHEATLEJC PC 1081 :1 PC SC 1374 1374 :1 SC - ' ' 53.6 53.6 Beach Party Group Captain ANDERSON # Group Flagship - SC 724 ' - 5353.6.1 •6.1 Beach Party Unit AgLE AgLE Commander TRAPNELL Transßon 16 Beach Party Party 53.6^3 GREEN Beach Party ~ Lieut *Condr, McDEVITT TransDiv 48 Beach Party - 53.6,4 RED Beach Party Lieut.Comdr. SQUIRES TransDiv 47 Beach Party - ¦.:' 53 .6.2 Beach Party Unit BAKER Lieut,Comdr. L3PPENCOTT ; :V r7 A" ;v r-^,^.

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I Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JTMA (Part (II)- Compos itioa/of Forces $ Section (B) •*. Composition of Task Force Fifty Three)

T* Transßon 15 Beach Party - 53.6.5 tELLOW Beach Party Lieut.Comdr. LOOMIS TransDiv 45 Beach Party- 53.6,6 BLUE Beach Party Lieut.Corodr. BBD TransDiv 44 Beach Party - 53.7 Pontoon Barge, Causeway and LCT Group Lieut # Comdr« Ryan

« * - Group Flagship LCI(L) 772 \ 1LCI(L) 53.7.1 Pontoon Barge Unit ABLE - Lieut, ELMIGER 16 - 3x12 barges (SP) when launched from LST's 760, 779, 930, 931 53.7.2 Pontoon Barge, Unit BAKER ­ Lieut.(jg) KNOLL 12 - 3x12 barges (SP) when launched from LST

Report Action - - i ComPhibGrp 2 IVD JBIA (Part (II) Composition of Forces* Section (B) - Composition of Task Force Fifty Three) - 53.7.7 LCT Unit BAKER Ens. DQRTON LCT 1030 loaded .on LST 782 LCT 1031 loaded 'on LST 1032' LCT 1404 loaded on LST 648 LCT 1055 loaded on LST 634 LCT 1269 loaded in -GDNSTON HALL LCT 1154 loaded on LST 716 6 LCT 53.S Small Craft Group - Lieut.Comdr. NELSON LCI(L) 1029(F) (Until arrival of LST(M)'s 1LCI(L) + LCI(G) 438, 441 (From TG 52.5) 2 LCI(G) IST(M) 676(P), 678 (on arrival of TG 51.5) 2 LST(M)

t 53.5.1 Small Boat Unit - Lieut. MANLE? Small boats assigned

52.4 Underwater Demolition Group - Captain HANLON

GIIMER (F), WATERS, EULL, BARR, .BLESSIIAN, BATES 6 APD UDT #13, Lieut.Comdr. MCRANZ embarked in BARR UDT #12, Lieut.Comdr. HOCHUp embarked in BATES UDT .#l4, Lieut.(jg) ONDERDONK embarked in BULL UDT #15, Lieut*. BROOKS embarked in BLESSMAN 52.5 Gunboat Support Group - Captain AYLWARD - # Group Flagship LCI(L) 988 I'LCI(L) 52-5.1 Gunboat Support Unit ONE- Comdr. MALANAPHY - LCI(L) 627 (F) 1ICI(L) LCI(G) 450, 466, 469 (press), 471 (press), 473, 474 6 LCI(G) - 52.5 »2 Gunboat Support Unit TWO Lieut.Comdr • NASH 1CI(G) 346, 348, 438, 441, 449 (press) 457 (F) 6 LCI(G) 52.5.3 Gunboat Support Unit THREE ­ CapU.. AYLWARD LCS(L) 51, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 6 LCS(L)

(II)- 8 I

I t "¦ vt r *jE ff # » Action Report - OomPhibGrp 2 IWO JIMA (Part (II)—Composition/ of Forces' Section (B) - Composition of Task Force Fifty Three)

52,5.4 Gunboat Support Unit FOUR - Lieut.Comdr. STONE ICS(L) 3l(F), 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 6 tCS(L) 51*1 Joint Expeditionary Reserve (when assigned) - Commodore LOOMIS - 51.1.1 Transßon 11 Commodore LOOMIS

51,1.2 TransDiv 31 less LEONARD IVOOD, ARTEMIS, plus FREMONT, ITARRICK - Commodore LOOMIS + FREMONT (SF), FAYETTE, KNOX, LEEDSTOM. HARRY LEE 5 APA ALMAAGK, V/ARRICK 2 AKA 51*1«3 TransDiv 32 less PRESIDENT HAVES,- ATHENE, plus CAPE JOHNSON, JUPITER Captain POPHAM FRES. JACKSON (F), PRES, ADAMS, DOYHM, BOLIVAR 4 APA CAPE JOHNSON 1AP LIBRA 1 AKA JUPITER 1AX 51*1.4 TransDiv 33 less V/INDSOR, VIRGO, AURELIA, plus ALHENA, HERCULES - Captain HAIGHT CALLAViTAY (F), FREDERICK FUNSTON, JAMES O»HARA. FELAND 4 APA ALHMA 1 AKA # HERCULES 1 AX - 56,3 Landing Force Reserve Maj.Gen. Erskine, USMC THIRD Marine Division, plus attached units

- (ID 9 i LAST PAGE «

Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JBSA PART (III)

i. OPERATIONS SECTION (A)

IjOADING 1* Assault forces of the 4th and sth Marine Divisions plus Corps and Garrison Units were loaded in the HAWAIIAN Islands.

2, A survey of port facilities in MAUI and HAWAII was made early in December by representatives of interested commands and a twelve day load­ * ing schedule was decided on. This period of time proving to be ample. 3. Fifty-four hundred rounds of Naval 8" ammunition was distributed among nine ships and three hundred and sixty depth charges were loaded on two ships for resupply. 4. Transßon ELEVEN, one LSV, and three LSD were loaded in- the MARIANAS. The LSV was loaded with fifty amphibious trailers, filled with rations, ammunition and water. 5. Sixty LST's and thirty-one LSM's were available for the operation* Of the IST!s three were loaded in ULITHI, four in GUAM and the balance in the HAWAIIAN area. Six IST's carried causeway sets and fourteen LST's each carried four pontoon barges. Thirty-eight LST's were preloaded with troop supplies and twenty-four LST's preloaded with Navy ammunition.

6* Four LST's were designated as medical supply and evacuation control #> units, and three LST's as radar LST's, 7. Realizing that unloading at target from larger ships to small craft was likely to prove difficult and to reduce the unloading time of the transports it "was decided to load pallets on one side of the tank deck of IST carrying LVT*s. However, this decision was not reached until after loading had commenced on the larger ships and as a result »B" rations were the primary load of the pallets so loaded. During the unloading phase this proved to be the wrong type of supplies to be loaded in LST's as the beach could not handle them e?.rly in the operation. This caused the LST's to retract with cargo still aboard and it was not until four to six days later that they were able to beach and complete discharging.

8, Of the total LSM's available for loading, sixteen carried medium tanks, ten carried 4th and sth Marine Divisions Shore Party equipment, one carried Signal equipment, one carried 75mm 1 s of Special Weapons Co. and one carried Corps Engr. equipment, the latter being loaded in GUAM* Based on tests in OAHU prior to loading, a tonnage of 260 short tons was authorized, and to use this tonnage some ISM's stowed drums of gas** oline in the stern, others under sto§ffi|M¥famumi^n.^ations or 5 gal» tl|yJjj— • lii_\\fl»fi ) w"^t»%f iiiiillif ft/ i isiiHi.S^.p^rt ConPhiborp 2 - i7£) JEiA (Part (III)- Operations) Section (A) - Loading)

water cans. This type of cargo proved highly satisfactory during unload­ ing and most LSM's unloaded completely once on the beach.

9. On arrival at SAIPAN many readjustments in the loadings had to be effected due to many LVT's being in SAIPAN. An officer of this staff flew to SAIPAN and -arranged for all transfers, readjustments of loading and transfer of troops, and this operation was smoothly and efficiently accomplished.

#

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(III) - 2 iiMiiMTVi/ t

Action Report I ComPhibGrp 2 - BVO JIMA (Part (XII) - Operations) SECTION (B> GENERA NARRATIVE'

1. The approach (a) The Approach Plan became effective at 0910K February 18, and was executed without incident* No change 'in disposition of for­ ces was involved,- Pictures of.the objective, taken on DOG minus THREE were delivered tsr plane, drop about noon, and at 1500K the formation was stopped ,to permit transfer of Underwater Demoli­ tion Team personnel and charts to designated vessels. •» 2. The DOG Day assault * (a) Allunits arrived on schedule and it was apparent a's early as 0700K that HOW Hour would be met. The only departure found necessary from prearranged, -plans was the deletion of LCI(G)fs from participation in assault as a result of heavy damage suffered on DOG minus WO Day, The remaining 12 LCS(L) fs re­ arranged their formation so as to bring all beaches" under fire. .Allpreliminary landing preparations proceeded exactly as sched­ i uled. Tbe GUNSTON HALL/-,carrying Z£T's with tanks embarked, completed launching of her 3 LfcT's at 0740K. By 0810K all IST's carrying assault troop.s had been launched. (b) Allair support units arrived on stations promptly. At F OBOSK naval gunfire was lifted to permit bombing^ rocket, and Napalm attacks on landing beaches and beach flanks, and re­ * sumed again at 0825K. .(c) No gunfire was receiv.ed in or near transport or IST areas * during this period, and .transport' squadrons were directed to move in 3000 yards at their discretion. (d) Assault waves were;dispatched on schedule, and landed on all beaches at 0906K,' the prearranged HOW Hour. Only a small a­ mount of gunfire was received- in the boat lanes during the approach to the beaches. . (c) The evacuation control LSTIs. launched one pontooa barge each during the mornings These were the' only barges launched until DOG plus TWO Day; 1ST 1s .carrying I£Tf s had previously been or­

dered to prepare* * to launch as soon as LVT's were dis­ LCT's4 charged, and to report readiness. Six of these completed

launching "prior to' sunset, making a total of nine I£T's in the 1 • water night. mm* _._ DOG / »m m W^«^ &

• a !W^[ f? . l^.nfe^f U£UmLA ?Cfrim % Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (ill)- Operations; Section (B) - General Narrative)

(f) LCT's and LSM's carrying tanks were called in to the beach commencing about 0920K, and all.beached and discharged success­ fully in spite of enemy gunfire. The.tanks, however, encountered great difficulty in moving inland from the beaches. Four LSMfs ¦were hit by shellfire while beached, but were able to retract under their own power.

(g) TransDiv 32 with one RCT of the THIRD Marine Division embark­ ed, arrived in the area at 1000K. Reembarkation of LVT's in par­ ent LST*s commenced at about the same time* Reembarkation contin­ ued until early afternoon, at which time all were aboard with the exception of those being used for emergency supply. Loose sand on beaches and heavy enemy fire combined to make unloading of equip­ ment very difficult. Only emergency supplies were landed on DOG « Day. Transports moved in to Area ZEBRA in early afternoon. (h) During the first day all BLT's of the FOURTH and FIFTH Marine Divisions, together with half of the division artillery, were landed against increasingly heavy opposition. Initiallosses in amphibious vehicles were moderate. No. air attacks took place, although unidentified planes caused a-n alert in the early evening.

(i) Night retirement was conducted in general accordance with pre­ vious plans and directives. A total of eleven fire support ships, seven transport types, and twenty-one LST's remained at the ob­ jective overnight. AllLSK's and control craft remained. at the objective overnight throughout the operation. No unloading took place during the night, except into I_SH f s alongside heavy ships remaining at the objective. 3. Subsequent operations * (a) February 20 (DCG plus ONE)-. Beach operations during the day were greatly hindered by soft sand and heavy enemy fire, further complicated by broached boats. Only DUKW's and LVT T s were capable of moving supplies inland and only emergency supplies were landed, UDT personnel were used in an attempt to clear beaches. One LST beached on Beach RED during the afternoon to debark Corps artil­ lery. Three additional LCT T s were launched.

(b) Defense Group, consisting primarily of LST's, arrived during the forenoon, as did the SAMARITAN. Coirmenced evacuation of casualties to SAIiARITAN on arrival. Defense Group, less repair ships and certain LST's required by troops, was ordered to' re­ tired area toswait call, i (c) Night retirement was conducted generally as scheduled, with a total of fourteen fire support ships, twelve transport types, and ¦>MMm"mv i f i * t' I-,«W |* Action Report- - ComPhibGrp 2 IWO JIMA (Part (III) - Operations; Section (B.) General Narrative) fifty LST's remaining at the objective. The large number of LST's

was retained to permit unloading of "hot" supplies embarked' there­ ' in by DUKWs and LVT's. ¦'/'.'

% (d) Troop operations during the day proceeded slowly against heavy resistance. Prior nightfall all units of division artillery, plus one battalion of Corps artillery, were ashore* RCT 21, in TransDiv 32, was boated but not landed during the day. No air attack developed, although unidentified aircraft again caused a temporary RED Alert in the early evening. Some enemy gunfire fell in the transport area during the day, but no hits were received. (c) February 21 (DOG plus TOO). LOGAN and NAPA were in collision # during night retirement. ,Damage to LOGAN was light, but NAPA suffered extensive damage aft. Both able to proceed under own power. (f) During th« day fire continued heavy on all beaches. Pontoon causeway was launched during the day for use on Beach RED but could not be installed satisfactorily because of surf conditions, which also prevented the unloading of LCVP and LCMf s. Pontoon barges were ordered launched and a total of seventeen were placed in the water during the day. This proved to be an unfortunate de­ cision, as weather conditions prevented their use and made them unmanageable; LCS(L)rs were used during day an t Twelve the. in effort to clear broached landing craft from the beaches, but these attempts were only partially successful*. Beached two LST's and numerous LSM's for unloading during the day. * (g) The SAMARITAN completed loading casualties and sailed during the afternoon. Twelve fire support ships, sixteen transport except types, and all six LST's remained at the' ' objective over­ night and continued unloading operations. :

(h) Troops advanced very slowly against bitter opposition through - out the day. RGT 21, which had been anbarked in TransDiv 32, wat landed during the afternoon* RCT 9, anbarked in TransDiv 31, was in the area as floating reserve. Commanding General . FIFTH Marine Division and ADC FOURTH..Marine Division set up ashore. A suicide air attack in force developed during the late afternoon in which several ships, among them the KEOKUK and LST 477,. were hit by suicide planes, Both of the latter were operating in a retired area. They were able t.o proceed to IWO under their own power. No ships at the objective were damaged although several planes were shot down in'the vicinity. (i)February 22 (DOG plus THREE), Unfavorable weather conditions for sniall craft, particularly LVT's, BUKfo's, and pontoon barges, '<$&$ /jV'x 1 f>ir*irr4 lIM**§MmJm^*%z! r l *f i Action ,F-?P:2±Lti - jIWO - ComPhibGrp 2 JB/1A (Part (ill) Operations; a Section (B)1 -. General Narrative)

Caused wide dispersion of these types and kept spare control vessels, gunboats and salvage vessels occupied in locating and rescuing drifters. Line of Departure, was moved in to lf>oo yards £I*olll the beach during the morning. An inspection of western - beaches was made by the Force Beachnaster, who reported heavy sniper fire encountered. LCT's and LSM's were used to good ad­ vantage in unloading on the beaches, ;which were stillbadly blocked by broached boats and wrecked vehicles* Corps Shore Party was- set up ashore. Access from beaches inland was being improved rapidly.

(j) A total of thirteen fire support ships, twenty transport types, and all LST's not completely unloaded remained at the ob­ jective overnight. Ships of TransDiv 32 were retained to unload # 81mm ammunition badly needed ashore. . '..."¦•' (k) Troops progressed very slowly during the day against heavy * opposition. Air attacks by single Jap planes caused short alerts in the early morning and again in mid-afternoon. No damage re­ sulted. (1) February 23 (DOG plus FOUR).- Transport Squadron Commanders were authorized to move heavy ships to anchorages off" assigned beaches at daylight. Evacuation control LST's and LST(M) fs had been previosuly directed to inshore anchorage. Unloading condi­ tions were much improved with beaches able to take all craft of LCM size and larger. General unloading was commenced on Beaches GREEN and RED. Permission was received to launch six additional LCT f s, but only one was launched Airing the day. * (m) SOLACE arrived in the morning and commenced receiving casual­ ties. Cfo SI.! reported for duty to CTF 53 with remainder of his task group. The remainder of the Defense Group also arrived and reported for duty. Twelve fire support ships, twenty trans­ port types, and all LST's not completely unloaded remained in the area overnight.

(n) Troops made good advances during the day against continuing heavy opposition. Swimmers landed behind the lines on the west coast during the previous night and required extensive mop-up. Elements of. the 28th RCT raised the- colors on the peak of Mount ' SURIBACHI at 1035K, providing what may well be one of the most dramatic pictures of the war. Commanding General FOURTH Marine "Division set up ashore. A temporary "FLASH RED" was sounded in the afternoon but the contact proved to be a friendly B-24« Commencing at 1900K, a series of attacks by enemy planes contin­ uing for two hours was received. During the alert one LSM beach­ ed on Beach RED, received a hit forward from a 75iEm gun and (Ill)-6 4 X !KC*orr " Action Report - v x ComPhibGrp 2 IWO JIMA (Part (III)~ Operations; Section (B) - General Narrative)

¦to another on the same beach received shrapnel, damage. BERRIEN re­ ceived /fOnim hit which wounded 17. No other damage resulted. (o) February 24 (DOG plus FIVE). Unloading conditions on all beaches were improving steadily despite surf conditions which made handling of LCM!s difficult. Ten LST's were assigned to assist in unloading heavy ships.

(p) The PINKNEY arrived to evacuate casualties* The SOLACE com­ pleted loading and sailed, as did eighteen LSTfs. Twelve fire support ships, twenty-four transport types, and all LST's reraain­ • ed at the objective overnight. (q) Troop progress ashore was very slow against characteristic bitter resistance, despite an intense preliminary preparation by air, gunfire, and artillery. The Commanding General Landing Force established headquarters ashore. A special beach, consist­ ing of a portion of beaches already in operation, was organized for use by the THIRD Marine Division, and the control organiza­ tion was modified accordingly. RCT 9> embarked in TransDiv 3lj was landed. The Commanding General THIRD Marine Division set up headquarters ashore, and the THIRD Marine Division took over the center of the lines. An enemy air attack took place during the evening with AUBURN receiving a bomb straddle by anall bombs without injury.

(r) February 25 (DOG plus SIX). Unloading continued despite easterly winds and unfavorable unloading conditions. Commenced offshore survey operations off Beaches PURPLE and BROWN Tv

(s) COLUMBIA VICTORY, troop ammunition resupply ship, arrived in the afternoon. Nine unloaded transports departed. A total of ten fire support ships, twenty-eight transport types, and all LST's remained at the objective overnight.

(t) Troops nade little or no progress against what appeared to ho the nain enemy defensive installations . Anti-aircraft artillery landed during day. There were no enemy air attacks during the period •

(v) February 26 (DCG plus SEVEN). Beach conditions continued to improve as additional Shore Party personnel and equipment became available. General unloading was comasnced on Beaches YELLOW and BLUE in the morning, and the restriction previously placed on use of LCVP f s was cancelled. The temporary Fleet Post Office was (HIM t Action. Report - - ComPhibGrp 2 IWO JB/iA (Part (III) -Operations; * Section (b) General. Narrative) ­ established in IST 809, later shif-ted to LST 642-, Senior LSM and LCT Commanders with staffs, set up headquarters in AUBURN.

(v) PINKNSI completed loading and departed during the afternoon. Seven LST's also departed. A total of twelve fire support ships, twenty-four transport types, arid all 1ST 1 s remained - at the objec­ tive overnight, •

(w) Troops progressed slowly against the main enemy defensive in­ stallations. 01 aircraft commenced using airfield number one. Un­ loading of troop resupply ammunition commenced.

(x) February 27 (DOG plus SIGHT). Heavy breakers on east beaches prevented use of LCM's and LCVP's and made operations of LCT's difficult.First detachment of PBM search squadron arrived to be # based at the' newly established seaplane base. Senior LST Command­ er, with staff, set up headquarters in AUBURN. Fourteen unloaded transports departed during the afternoon. Eleven fire support ships ;thirty-two transport types, and all LST's remained at ob­ jective overnight. Troops made good progress during the day a­ gainst the main enemy defensive positions.

.(y) February 28 (DOG plus -NINE). Surf conditions remained un­ favorable en eastern beaches, preventing unloading of LCM's and LCVP's. GroPac 11 assumed control of. Beach GRKEN during the morning, Operation of evacuation control LST's was terminated and all f:;rther evacuation was handled direct to transports. In­ spection of western beaches showed them usable as soon as snipers were cD.eared. Underwater Demolition Team personnel and ships were released from further duty. Number one airfield was reported ready for emergency landings by carrier types. *

- (z) SAMARITAN and SOLACE arrived to receive casualties. Nine empty tr^r.sports and six LST's departed during the afternoon. A total of ten fire support ships, twenty-one transport types, and all LST's remained at the objective overnight.

(aa) Troop progress ashore was good against heavy opposition. Island Comirander set up his command- post ashore during the day. Air delivery o.f critical items was, inaugarated.

(bb) March 1 (DOG plus TEN). Two additional beaches were taken over b~rG"rcPac lie Surf conditions still prohibited landing of LCM's * on ea.jv-ern beaches* , ,-.

(cc) SMARITAN completed loading and sailed. Four unloaded trans­ ports cvlso departed,. Ten fire support ship.s, nineteen transport types, and all LST*s remained at the objective overnight. -.(in)'ra i

C t.

Action Report GomPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (III)- Operations ; Section (B) ~ General Narrative) (dd) Troop progress during, the day was slow. Enemy planes appeared in the area in the early morning ,but caused no damage. Enemy shore battery in northern portion. of island opened up at daylight on the TERRY., and scored numerous hits. COLHOUN repeived one shell hit and STEMBEL; was straddled., COLUMBIA VICTORY, with a load of ammu­ nition, received several near misses.

(cc) March 2 (DOG plus ELEVEN), Opened beach on west coast to use by LCT fs and DUKW!s. LCT 1029 broached on RED Beach. ZERO Garrison Echelon arrived for unloading, .HERCULES grounded in the early afternoon, but -was cleared by tugs without apparent damage. SOLACE completed loading and sailed as did four .unloaded transports. All but seven of remaining transports, all LST's.and ."ten fire support # ships remained at the, objectiv e, overnight. First emergency landing was made on the airfield during the morning. Troop progress was good against continuing opposition. (ff) March 3 (DOG plus TWELVE). Commenced using western beaches for all LCT unloading. Shifted ships working cargo to western anchorages to. take advantage of lee. Screen was modified to provide adequate cover. BOLIVAR and CAUXMAY. while at anchor off eastern beaches received small caliber shell hits with only minor damages resulting. Nine fire support ships, and all IST f s remained at the objective overnight. Five LST's sailed. Troops made satis­ factory progress but opposition was stilldetermined. (gg) March 4 (DOG plus THIRTEEN). Used both anchorage areas for heavy ships; western for unloading ships and eastern for ships not so engaged. A B-29 made a successful emergency landing on airi'-eld • one r LSM reported that she was completely disabled by number 59 flooding. received while beached. CTF 51 ordered first garrison echelon brought forward* . . (hh) SUMNER arrived and reported to ComSeron 12 representative I'or hydrographic work. DesDiv 99 arrived. Transferred pontoon barge and causeway personnel to BERRIEN> who departed with MXLIPHEN in the afternoon.. Eight fire support ships, all LST's, and thirty- one transport types remained at the objective overnight. Troops progress slight against fierce opposition.

(ii)March 5 (DOG, plus FOURTEEN) > Surf conditions on western beaches made unloading'by LCM and LCT difficult, JOLIET VICTORY, ammunition resupply ship, arrived. Six transports, with RCT 3 embarked, departed for GUAM, Eight fire'support ships, and all transport and LST's, remained at the objective overnight. Troops utilized the day in reorganizing and readjusting front lines.

(III)-9 J

_— Ts~_ ' "* ActionA^J-J Report», U '"*•« - (III)- ComPhibGrp 2 IWO JB'IA (Part Operations; » Section (B) - General Narrative)

(jj)March 6 (DOG plus FIFTEEN). Unloading conducted on both eastern and western beaches with surf interfering on western side. Conducted survey of IST approaches to western beaches. Access for IST discovered rtff Beach WHITE TOO. Eleven transport types departed, These ships were the last remaining of' those bringing in the three assault divisions, except for five ships designated for reembarkation of troops. COLUMBIA VICTORY sailed. Nine fire support ships, all LST's, and all transport types, remained at the objective overnight •

(kk) Troops were able to make only very slight gains despite very heavy preparation fires. Twenty-eight P-51's and twelve P-6l's arrived. DOYEN, in eastern anchorage, was straddled by fire from shore with no damage. - • (11) March 7 (DOG plus SIXTEEN). Unloading conditions on western beaches became increasingly worse because of heavy surf and oper­ ations were suspended after sunset. Unloading continued on east beaches. IST 761 beached successfully on western beach during morning, using previously marked channel* CAPE STEPHENS reported serious propeller damage, which prevented her proposed participation in forthcoming operations. LCT 1029 was hauled clear of the eastern beaches, but could not be salvaged because of unexpected flooding. She was towed to deep water and sunk. GroPac IIPort Director set up headquarters -in AUBURN preparatory to assuming control of un­ loading. Garrison Group ONE arrived. SAMARITAN arrived. No night retirements were made on this and succeeding days. Eight fire support ships were available inside screen.

(mm) Troops made better progress against apparently decreasing opposition. Early morning RED Alert was caused by an . unidentified contact which was soon lost. Three DUMBG PB^YA's arrived to base # ashore. Shore based aircraft assumed duties as day, and night CAP.

(nn) March 8 (DOG plus SEVENTEEN) ? Surf conditions remained bad on western beaches and all ships involved in loading or,unloading operations were shifted to eastern anchorages. Crew. of crashed B-29 rescued by HUDSON and crew of crashed VT picked up by screen vessel. SUMNER received minor caliber shell hit with one killed. SAMARITAN completed loading and departed. SOLACE arrived. HAMLIN departed after securing seaplane base. Facilities previously provided by base transferred ashore. Three transport types not immediately required were sent to a waiting area about 100 miles southeast of the objective. Nine fire support ships were available during the- day and night. Troops progressed slowly during the day ' against many pillboxes. .

(Ill)-10

*' V5V5 %!;«'¦ %. Action Report » ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (III)- Operations; Section (B) ­ General Narrative)

*» (oo) (DCG ) Itetcfri 9 pX\isj Continued unloading over eastern ; EIGHTEEN . beaches with surf preventing operations on western side, CTF 51 departed and CTF 53 assumed duties of SOPA IfifD JIMA. with designation CTG 51*21»- Commander Expeditionary Troops transferred his head* 'quarters to AUBURN, Three transport trypes of the ZERO Garrison Group completed- unloading and departed* Two task groups of eleven transport types- each, with escorts, were directed to operate at sea in a retired area until called forward. These were the ships designated for reembarkation of the FOURTH and FIFTH Marine Div­ isions'* • VTB.ma.de successful wheels up landing on airfield after dark. Six fire support ships were available during the day and • night. (pp) Troop progress was encouraging against decreasing resistance* Patrols reached the water at the northern end of the. Island during the afternoon* An early morning air attack by several enemy planes resulted in no damages to. own shipping or shore installations* Night fighter from shore made contact and forced his target to jettison bombs.

(qq) March 1Q (DOG plus NINETEEN)» Continued unloading on eastern beaches only« Several B-?29 fs made emergency landings. Two un­ loaded ships of the ZERO Garrison Group sailed, completing the departure of that group except for one ship remaining to evacuate troops, SOLACE departed. Disabled LSM 59 departed under tow, GREGORY reported destroying two mines bearing 025 degrees, distance 50 miles from SURIBACHI. Six fire support ships were available day and night. Shore based aircraft assumed anti-submarine patrol duties. Troops progress was good with troops at waters edge in • several places. Heaviest resistance was centered along the left ' j side of the line* * (rr) March 11 (DOG plus TWENTY). CTG.S3U2I turned over to the Port Director the responsibility' for unloading garrison shipping. Four­ teen LSM ' s and sixteen I£T s were assigned him for this function, the remainder, plus LST*s, being reserved for troops reembarkation. DICKERSON (APD) departed for GUAM with fifty-eight POMe embarked. Remainder of the escort carrier group ceased providing support missions and departed. Six fire support ships were available for day and night support. Organized resistance, except for numerous pockets, ceased in the THIRD and FOURTH MarDiv sector, but strong opposition was still encountered by the FIFTH MarDiv* (ss) March 12 (DOG plus JfifflTY-QNE), Continued unloading on east­ ern beaches. Established boat pool in LST(M) 676 under command of GroPac 11. Commenced netlaying operations off east coast, BOUNTIFUL arrived. Seven B-29's landed. Anti-submarine plane »

1 ¦?' * Action/l«-k+- nAn Reportr^wAwl n>- ",< •¦ I* £7 CoinPhibGrp 2 - IWO JBift. (Part (III)- Operations; r Section (B) - General Narrative)

made visual submarine contact to. southeast and DEEDE (DE) was sent to conduct Hunter-Killer operations, Results were negative, al­ though search was continued until sunset .of the next day. Two hfavy cruisers departed, -leaving only destroyers for fire support requirements. One or two destroyers, plus an LCI on occasion, were available for fire support duty, primarily 'illumination, . throughout the remainder of the 1 operations. Troops conducted mopping up operations in THIRD and FOURTH MarDiv area. FIFTH Division continued- to me>et- bitter -opposition in its Zone of Action.

' (tt) March 13. !(DOG plus TWENTY-TWO ). Returning B-29 f s, several of which at IWO, -landed caused a BLUE Alert in the early t morning, The . second Garrison Group arrived, including a troop ammunition • resupply ship. Three LST's, two with troop ammunition loads, arrived. Two maintenance and resupply ships were .released and i. sailed. KAMA arid' KANGOKU ROCKS, off west coast of island, were secured by troops without opposition. CHINA VICTORY reported cracked rudder post,' but investigation proved', that defect was not serious r FIFTH MarDiv was still in 'meeting heavy opposition •its sector. * , . (Ul*) March 14 (DOG plus TWENTY-THREE). Surf conditions made un­ loading on eastern beaches difficult and swell; interfered with loading alongside. Eleven transport and cargo types arrived , from. retired area and commenced reembarkation of the FOURTH Marine Division under -the direction of their own task unit commander. . -Ships were initially anchored off eastern beaches but were moved ..to, western anchorages later in the day. Troops and equipment . continued to reembark into landing craft from eastern beaches for. discharge into ships of f western beaches. BCONTIFUL com­ • pleted loading casualties and departed. Four LST's, two .carrying crippled LVTfs and two ammunition, departed. Ten B-29's landed. Special anti-submarine search to southeast was established in view of the possibility of an enemy sub in that. area.

,(w) At' the American Flag " of ficially over IWO O93OK was ' ' raised JIMA.' : . : • ­ (ww) FIFTH Marine Division made good progress against very heavy opposition. THIRD Division and part of FOURTH Division not yet embarked continued mopping- up operations. ' ComGen Expeditionary Troops, departed. . ... ' (xx) March 15 (DOG plus TWMTt-FOtffi). Reembarkation of FOURTH Marine Division and. unloading of garrison proceeded from eastern .beaches* LSM fouled in'the:net -off-'the- eastern ed.astT during the early mprning, and was riot' freed, until the next day* Two trans­ ports of the second Garrison Group, one carrying POW's, departed. WsASSfFffp" lp: '* Action Report - V i ComPhibGrp 2 IWO JIMA (Part (III)- Operations ; Section (B) - General Narrative)

(yy) March 16. (DOG plus TWENTY-FIVE). Submarine contact was made by anti-submarine ptene thirty miles northeast and ELDEN was sent to assist. Results were negative.

(zz) IWO JIMA. was reported officially secured at ISOOK. FOURTH Marine Division continued reenbarkation and all other units con­ tinued wiping out pockets of resistance * (aaa) March 17 (DOG plus TWENTY-SIX). Surf conditions on eastern beaches became worse during the day, but not sufficiently so to stop reembarkation. Numerous contacts were made by anti-submarine planes during the day, but all proved negative. Destroyer of outer • screen made contact evaluated as positive submarine by her, but was unable to develop it. DE and plane sent to assist also failed. A total of sixteen B-29 J s landed. Commander Minesweeping Unit completed sweeping previously unswept area to westward of island, with negative results. Fighter pilot on CAP reported missing. Resultant search had negative results, Tanker moor­ ings for gasoline pipe line were found to be out of position, and relocation was commenced. O&SANUS (ARB) departed. Troops continued mopping up operations. (bbb) March 18 (DOG plus ThtENTy~SEVEN ). Surf conditions on western beaches became ,1/vor se during the day. Three LST f s and one LSM beached there during 'the afternoon, and all retracted successfully although LST's" encountered difficulty in high wind and swell. Operations on western beaches were secured at sunset and all ships were directed to be prepared to shift to eastern anchorages at sunrise. Ships conducting loading or unloading • operations had previously been so directed. Twelve transport or cargo type assigned to reembark the FIFTH MarDiv arrived and began reembarkation, initially from western beaches. COSSATOT (AO) arrived to act as station oiler. Four ships of the first and second Garrison Group departed. LST 642, without engine, drifted into the anti-submarine net, with no damage. An anti­ submarine plane was forced down during the afternoon, and a search by'DUMßO.and three screening vessels had negative re­ sults. Units, of FIFTH MarDiv commenced reembarkation, but clean-up of heavy* pocket of resistance in northern coiner of the island continued.

(ccc) March 19 (DOG plus TfaWY-B&HT), Surf conditions on western beaches remained bad. All ships loading or unloading anchored off the east coast, and those which had completed loading shifted to west coast anchorage. Tug cleared LST 642 from anti-submarine net. A B-29 was ditched to northward, and a destroyer was sent out to conduct search in conjunction with a DUMBO plane. The search was initially netative. Further search 111)13 HNniASSfFIFfi Action Report - *- i ComPhibGrp 2 IWO JIM (Part (III)-Operations; t Section (B) - General Narrative)

for downed ASP plane was conducted, with negative results. Com Desßon U inDUNLAP, with two destroyers, •arrived and reported to Screen Commander, Commanding General FOURTH Marine Division em­ barked in the PRESIDENT POLK. Clean-up of pockets of resistance continued ashore.

(ddd) March 20 (DOG plus TWENTY-NINE). Surf conditions on western beaches permitted unloading operations, while those on eastern beaches became worse as a result of a heavy swell. Operations con­ tinued temporarily from both beaches. An LCT, while at anchor, was, rammed by an LST, and damaged so severely that emergency dock­ ing was required. Destroyer was recalled from search for B-29 and for ASP plane, but DUMBO plane sighted B-29 survivors in the • afternoon and GATIING (DD) was dispatched and accomplished their rescue. Net laying operations off eastern beaches were suspend­ ed until the weather improved, since the heavy swell made opera­ tions hazardous. All ships reembarking the FOURTH Marine Division completed loading and departed. Four transport types arrived with the Army Garrison HOT embarked. A YOG with badly needed bulk aviation gasoline arrived and .commenced pumping to shore stowage. The FIFTH Marine Division continued feeinbarkation of selected units. Clean-up operations were stillin progress ashore.

(ccc) March 21 (DOG plus THIRTY). Continued embarkation and un­ loading operations on both beaches and commenced debarking the garrison RCT on we stern beaches. Reembarkation of FIFTH MarDiv proceeded very slowly because of combat requirements. (fff.) March 22 (DOG plus THIRTY-ONE). Unloading conditions on • western beaches were excellent. Eastern beaches were ordered closed during the morning because of heavy surf, IST 727 broached in the early morning when an LSM coming off the beach fouled her anchor. Two tugs and an LCI were sent to assist, but efforts to bring her off during the day were hampered by heavy surf and parting lines, and she was not gotten clear until March 25. An LSM broached later in the morning, but cleared without damage with the assistance of an LCI, Conducted a sur­ vey for additional beaches on western coast suitable for LSM's and above, but with negative results. RATHBURNE (APD) depart­ ed with POW's embarked.

(ggg) March 23 (DOG plus THIRTY-TWO). Allunloading and embarka­ tion continued over western beaches. 2UNI (ATP) fouled tow wire in propeller while engaged in salvage of L3T 727 and broached on eastern beach south of the LST. Salvage operations on the latter temporarily suspended, and remaining tug and two net f

Action Report b - ComPhibGrp 2 IWO JIMA,{-Eart,(III);-. tOper^tions; Section (B) - General Narrative)

tenders sent to ZUNI's assistance. CTG 51.21 requested the ser­ vices of a salvage of|ipor "and -an additional tug from CTF 94. LST 642, which was disabled, "reported she was dragging on to beach, and was taken in tow by LST 3# and shifted to -western an­ chorage. Net unit commenced installation of"net off-west coast as a combined protective and net stowage measure, until permanent installation off east coast could be completed,. Heavy weather 'carried away several? net moorings, off eastern coast.

(hhh) March 24 (DOG plus THIRrf-THREE). Unloading conditions con­ tinued good on western beaches, Land surf moderated on the eastern beaches, ZUNI was fulled clear of beach by. tttg and net tender. • Damage was considerable but she expected to be able to proceed .• under her asm power- after emergency repairs. ResumeoT salvage work «n IST 727, utilizing two net tenders to tpw. . Authorized re-ppening of cast-crn beaches as surf continued to moderate. Dis­ pensed with dawn and dusk general quarters at discretion of officers, Division continued embarkation commanding FlFtH*Marine - as rapidly as troops could be spared. (iii)March 25 (DOG plus 'KiIRTY>FQUR). Surf conditions* oh western • beaches became unfavorable for LCT!s and operation of these craft was suspended. 'Conditions on eastern beaches. were good. LST 727 was pulled clear by two net tenders and anchored off'shore. Numerous salvage and Submersible pumps were, necessary" to control flooding." Six transport and cargo types carrying garrison per­ sonnel and equipment arrived, as did four LST's. eT& 51.?l;was authorized to retain IST's in area after unloaded. An evening RED Alert was caused by five raids, totalling approximately ten • planes. None, of the planes closed below, forty^fivemiles. Two sure arid one possible kills were reported by night fighters, .four of which were airborne. Troops completed wiping out all pockets of resistance. . •

(jjj)March 26 (DOG pIus ,THIRTY-FIVE)^ At CBCOK Commanding General landing Force turned over cocraahd to the Island Command­ er • The capture and occupation phase of I^G JIMA was declared completed and CTG/ 51•& reported to Cpmicander- Forward Area for temporary duty as SCPA IM) JB£A. • .­

: itt"*.:i'A&£&k!'; ' I " ' .-'¦ M i~ 9*- •,M, Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 ~ TVO JIMA (Fart (ill)- Operations) SECTION (C) UNLOADING OPERATIONS ly Assault Unloadin

Unloading of assault shipping on DOG Day and DOG plus ONE Day was confined to LST's and LSM's, except for a floating reserve of LCVF's and LCM's maintained at each control vessel, loaded with ammunition, water, rations and medical supplies. Surf conditions soon proved it useless to try landing supplies by small boats and by DOG plus ONE Afternoon all unloading of transports was- confined to LCT's and LSM's. APA'sand AKA's were restricted to unloading "On Call« from DOG plus ONE to DOG plus FIVE. When shipping availability permits, APA's should carry ammu­ nition, emergency rations, water, medical supplies, and vehicles only. # Allorganizational gear should be loaded on the AXAfs. Ordinarily the beach is never ready to receive on DOG Day anything but this type of cargo-. AAPrs loaded in this manner" could completely unload immediately and retire from the area. As other types of supplies are. needed and "wanted on the beach the AKA's .can supply.it faster than the beach parties can ha.odle. . ¦ .

\ >The' loading into LCT's and LSM's must be irore carefully super­ vised by the Commanding Officers of Transports, Many Transports over­ loaded the smaller craft, or dumped the supplies into them giving no thought to.the difficulties of unloading on the beach* In some cases large heavy boxes were loaded on top of an already overloaded LCT causing hours of delay on the beach in unloading. The preloading of LST's again proved highly satisfactory, the only- error being in loading of "B" rations. The preloaded supplies must be confined to supplies needed on the beach early in the operation. # LSM's should be preloaded' with supplies in a like manner as LST' s to take advantage of the tonnage they can carry.

The loading of Garrison, Assault Units in Assault Troop shipping should be discontinued if practicable. Garrison Assault Units should be loaded in their own- ships so they can be unloaded when needed without having to retain several partially loaded assault ships in the area.

2* Garrison Unloadin

On 3 March the ZERO Echelon arrived. It arrived with fenders, lines and canelccrepared on each vessel. Special slings, nets and Stevedore gear hra been prepared aboard each vessel to handle each type of cargo. They completed unloading on 11 March, and great credit*orrctASMß)-*iraLttgl *to and to the Convoy Commodore, < Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (ill) - Operations; Section (C) - Unloading Operations)

Capt. MacGOWAN, for their readiness and smart performance.

The first echelon ships arrived at target with loading plans that proved useless, as these plans showed what had been loaded on them on the West Coast. Much,of this cargo was unloaded inOAHU an

Garrison Echelons coming into hostile areas prior to the securing of the areas, must be prepared to start unloading immediately. on arrival They must be equipped Jo take care of themselves, Messing of unloading crews must be arranged for prior to departure* Rear echelons should see that ships of this class are properly prepared and fitted out before they sail. This is .especially true when they are part of the' assault shipping . Two re supply ammunition ships -had to be called into" the" area early in the operation. The first ship, COLUMBIA VICTORY, arriving DOG plus SIX. The ammunition needed was primarily mortar and artil­ lery. The 3,55mm .ammunition was all stowed in one hatcH and tne 105mm stowed in two hatches, one of these being the same hatch as the 155mm. • The needed by ammunition primarily the troops being 3Lssmni and losmm, it meant working only two hatches. This *did not allow the ship to be worked at the required rate as ifthe different types of ammunition had been spread throughout the five hatches. The loading of the JOLIET VICTORY was the same as the COLUMBIA VIC2OHY, with all artil­ lery ammunition in two hatches.

For future .operations where the beaching' of L'ST's is possible, it is recommended that LST s be loaded with about 1000 tons of high priority ammunition. Experience has taught that only three or £our . types of ammunition is required by the troops in addition to the initial supply. Ifthe LST's are not capable of beaching or unloading at a causeway, larger ships must be loaded so that all priority types of ammunition are available from all hatches.

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(III) ­ 18 r Action Report * - /¦ ComPhibGrp 2 MO JIMA (Fart (III) Operations) Section (C) ­ Unloading Operations)

' k* Logistics During Unloading ftiase s (a) logistics during the unloading phase was supervised by CTF 51 from DOG Day (l9February, 1945), until the date of his departure on 9 March, 1945* when it was turned over to CTF 53, (b) The logistic situation was as follows * (1) The CACHE (AO-67) was the only Fleet Tanker present. Her cargo consisted of 58,000 barrels black fuel, 5,000 barrels diesel oil, 323,000 gallons Avgas, and the standard load of • lube oilin drums. (2) (AOG-*10) The NEMASKET* was present with 8,005 barrels diesel oil and 1185 gallons of 9370 lube oil. (3) The WABdSH(AOGH) was also present with 14,150 barrels diesel oiland 444 barrels of 9370 bulk lube oil, plus 50 drums of 9250 and 114 drums of 9370 lube oil. This drummed lube oil was transferred to the LsT 642 for later issue to small craft remaining at the objective. (4) %c TOMBIGBJSE (ACG-ll) was present 'with 114,700 gallons of fresh water on hand.

(5) The CALAMUS (ACG-25), was standing by at GUAM loaded with water awaiting orders to sail to IWO JIMA if needed. This AOG was released to ComServßon TEN on 21 March, 1945> since her services were not required.

# (c) Due to adverse weather conditions during the unloading phass a critical shortage of mooring lines and fenders, developed very rapidly. All transports leaving the objective were directed to transfer all available six and eight inch manila line and fenders to LST 646, which had previously been designated as a "smoke supply ship,"

(d) Ihe fueling of the screen vessels was supervised and handled by the Screen Commander and worked out very satisfactorily. All fueling of these vessels was carried out in the Inner Screen Area. (c) The LST(M) 676 furnished supplies to an average of about five ships per day. This service included fuel,, water, lube oil, fresh and dry provisions. The fresh and dry provisions stocks were aug­ mented by the transfer of excess provisions from the transports arriving at B'JO J334A.

(Ill)-UflljLitMf^f*Ui *i Action ReAr""Refert^*^9 '? ?MJ - Co,i::j.Ur;> I- 1.70 JBIA (Part (ill) Operations; Section (C) - Unloading Operations)

(C) In order to maintain adequate water supply for small craft remaining in the area, ComServßon TEN was requested to fillall LST's sailed to IKO JBflA. to their capacity with potable water. (g) Allaviation .gasoline remaining in the COSSATOT (AO-77) (223,000 'gallons) was transferred to the YOG-72 for delivery to the Island Comma ndqr. / •

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ff ™v*,if r ¦¦ *%.ij \ Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - UNO JB& (Part (III)- Operations)

SECTION (D) MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1* Commencing prior to the initial rehearsal and continuing through the movement to the objective, the Tractor Flotilla Commander (ComLST Flot21) was responsible for coordinating movement, logistics, and re­ pair of over one hundred and fifty miscellaneous craft ranging in size from SC's to LST's, This is a tremendous burden to place upon the or­ ganization of an LST Flotilla Staff. Although the assignment was well handled, itis believed that a more satisfactory solution can be reached. • Consideration should be given to assigning an Amphibious Group Commander to command of the Tractor Flotilla until sortie from final staging point, at which time he willbe available for such other duty as desired* This willenable the- multitude of details in organization, loading, maintenance, movement^ and repair to be handled by a large staff with adequate facilities. This assignment could be combined with that of Commander of the Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve, or of the Demonstration Group, since the need for these commands commences when the need for a Tractor Flotilla Commander ends.

2. Small craft, such as SCI.s, PC fs, and PCS's, required extensive voyage repairs after completion of the long movement from PEARL to SAIPAN. Repair facilities were incapable of fulfillingall requests prior departure.

Necessary availability for small craft should be scheduled after their arrival in forward staging areas. This may require earlier de­ * parture of these ships from rear areas, and make them unavailable for screening duties with Tractor Groups. This availability is"particular­ ly necessary for vessels stationed on the Line of Departure. Itis further recommended that an administrative organization be established to handle the numerous requirements of this type of craft. 3. Night retirement of ships not required at the objective was pre­ arranged. Routes were laid out and retiring groups and escorts were assigned insofar as practicable. This reduced to an appreciable extent the amount of traffic necessary in order to initiate retirement.

mmirrn mlhsssb Action Report i ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JEiA PART (IV)

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT ' SECTION (A) . . NARRATIVE OF FIRS SUPPORT. BY LCI TYPES

1» 4"5 rocket fire for beach preparation and close support of the landing was scheduled for delivery by the Gunboat Support Group con­ sisting of. two 6-ship LCI(G) units and two 6-ship LCS(L) units. The plan provided for initial rocket salvos to be delivered by these ships during the period HOJ minus NINETY to HOW minus FORTY-FIVE for the pur­ • pose of detonating possible beach inflamables well in advance of the time troops would land. The plan also provided for two fullrocket salvos to be delivered in close support of the leading wave. The first of these was to be delivered on the beach at HOvi minus TEN minutes af­ ter which launchers were to be reloaded and the second salvo fired t 300 to 500 yards inland from the beach. Strafing by aircraft, sched­ uled to commence at HOU minus FIVE minutes, required the second 4"5 rocket salvo to be fired prior to this time.

2. To prevent early blanketing of supporting fire of two. destroyers and a battleship stationed in the boat lanes, the plan prescribed that the four 6-ship gunboat units proceed toward shore in unit columns a­ - head of the leading LVT assault wave. After passing the battleship destroyer line, the gunboat units were to deploy into line for firing rockets.

3» Of the original 12 LCl(G)'s of Gunbaet Support Units #1 and ft2t only three were in condition to deliver the scheduled support on DOG # Day, the others having been lost or damaged by enemy fire on previous days. Units #3 and fik consisting of 6 LCS(L)'s each were directed to increase their spacing on final deployment in order to cover the por­ tions of the beach assigned by plan to the absent LCl(G)'s, 4. On completion of their rocket salvos at HOIT minus FIVE minutes, . 4 LCS(L)'s of each of the two gunboat support units took position ac­ cording to plan, opposite the flanks of the landing area and supported, with 40mm fire, battalions to which initially assigned. This fire was directed on the slopes of 3URIBACHI YA&Aand the high flanking ground on the right of the beach. Until communications were established with assigned spotters ashore, fire was directed by replacement spotters previously embarked in one LCS(L) of each unit for this purpose* 5» Mortar Support Units #1, #2, and #5> consisting of six mortar LCl's, were assigned to provide scheduled flanking and deep support­ ing mortar fire as follows: Units v2and #5, using Plan v^n, fired from HOW minme THIRTY-FIVE to HCXY minusJMMssra SEVEN minutes on the eastern slopes CONFIDENTIAL

Action Report CcmPfribGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (IV) - Naval Gunfire Support; Section \k) - Narrative of Fire Support by LGI Types) «• and approaches to SURIBACHI YAMA while Unit #1, using the same fire de­ livery plan, delivered fire on the eastern flank high ground during the same period. At HOW Hour Units #2- and '^s in column, entered and crossed the boat lanes from the west, turned shoreward into line and followed the SIXTH assault wave toward shore. At about HOT plus TWENTY minutes, when 2000 yards from shore all ships of these two units opened fire using Plan "B" with mortar range set for 3200 yards and swept a rectangular area 2200 yards long by 1000 yards deep as they moved in. Stopping- and lying to 1000 yards from shore, fire was then maintained 1800 yards in­ land and parallel to the beach until HCftf plus SIXTY minutes. At HOW minus SEVEN, -Mortar Support Unit #1 shifted its line of fire farther to the east for safety to troops and resumed fire at HOW pIus. TEN minutes firing at a reduced rate for neutralization until 1300. 17,400 rounds • of 4V-2 mortar were scheduled for delivery in support .of the landing by ' ' ' these three units. .. .

of SSR- Rocket 6. RCM and Rocket Support Unit #1 consisting nine 5"0 t LCl's, delivered scheduled neutralization fire on the MOTOYAMA' area from 0645 to 1309. Allrockets on board these ships (a total of approx­ imately 9500) were delivered during this period, using standard Plan I!RA" from a reference point to northeast of the island. On completion of this fire, all fire support duties of this unit terminated for the remainder of the operation. 7. The 8 LCS(L)'s assigned to flank- battalions continued their close fire support missions throughout the day, replacement 40mm ammunition being obtained for them from heavy cruisers. For night support, 4 LCS(L)'s of Unit w2> were assigned'' to support battalions designated by Headquarters. ¦ Division ? • 8. On completion of their scheduled fire, Mortar Support Units #1, tf2, and #5 replenished mortar ammunition and joined Units f?3 and #4 in area ROG£R awaiting assignment. Night harassing mortar fire requests from Headquarters Landing Force were fulfilled by assignment of Units #2 and #5 to cover prescribed areas throughout the night using stand­ ard plan "A" and varying the line of fire between. specified limits. A total of 24,000 rounds. of which 20% was W, were delivered by these two units from reference points 1000 yards off the northwest and south­ enemy was east coast s4s 4 of the island. Large caliber counter fire re­ ceived by the northern unit, but was not intense or accurate enough to - • require the withdrawal of this unit. DOG plus ONE - 20 February 1945

• - 9. At 0920, CTF 51 gave control of fire support by LCI types to CTF 53 for the remainder of the.operation. At this time, four LCS(L) f s each of Gunboat Units fr3 and 7f4 were assigned to furnish 4Ctam fire in ¦* (lV)-2 CONFIDENTIAL Action Report - - ComPhibGrp 2 D7© -JIMA (?hrt (IV) -Naval Gunfire Support; Section (A) Narrative of Pire Support by LCI Types) 4— direct support of battalions on the right ,and lett flanks of our lines. 10 •From 1242 to 1400* Mortar Support Unit w3w3 delivered 6000 rounds of mortar fire into the southeastern coastal areas of the island using standard plan "C«l, This special mission was delivered in ah attempt- to stop the heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire on the landing beaches believed to be emanating from the area taken under fire. 11. Night direct support requests for gunboats were fulfilledby assigning four LCS(L)'s of Unit #3 to battalions as requested. 12. Mortar Units•#!• and r2, using Plan "a.11, provided harassing fire 9 throughout the night into the same areas as were covered* on 'DOG Night, 12,000 4'J2 mortar shells were scheduled for delivery by • these units during the night. Shortly after commencing its fire, Unit #1, position­ ed to the north, r was driven off by heavy and accurate enemy artillery fire. The GUEST was then assigned to cover this unit with counter batt­ ery fire. On resumption of fire, Unit #1 was again forced to withdraw' in spite of the GUEST !s supporting fire. ¦ DOG plus'TWO -* 21 February 194? 13. During the morning, one :3SC$(L) delivered 40mm fire in support of assigned battalion.' Allother LCS(L) were released from fire support status and assigned to provide urgent" salvage work on the beaches. 14 • From 1750 to 1800 Mortar Support Unit *#, using Plan "CM deliver­ ed 540 rounds of mortar fire into the southeastern coastal area for neu­ # tralization. 15. *Mortar Units til and j# delivered the night harassing fires request­ ed by Headquarters Landing Force. The area covered was essentially the same as on previous nights, as before, the northern unit (Unit #5) re­ ceived enemy counter fire during the night but counter battery fire by the HALL, assigned for support, permitted this unit ' to remain in position throughout the night. .

DOG plus THREE-- 23 February I1I1

16, Gunboat Unit #3 was assigned permanently to salvage duties this date. Unit #4 was retained for fire support duties only. Four LCS(L) rs of Unit ffU were assigned to direct support missions with battalions in flank positions throughout the day and that night.

17* Mortar Unit wZ, supported by SHANNON, delivered night harassing fire using Plan "A" from a reference point off the northeast coast of the island.

PERIOD after DOG plus THREE 18. LCS(L)'s of Unit #4 and LCl(G)'s available from RCM Unit #2' were assigned daily to support battalions designated by Headquarters Landing Force, Division intelligence officers, specially trained observers, and naval gunfire liaison officers were frequently embarked in ships for reconnaissance and. specific fire missions along the shorelines in advance of troop movement. On March 8 all LCS(L)'s departed the area. On March 12, in anticipation of possible attempt by the enemy to effect evacuation of high ranking Japanese by submarine, an LCI(G) was ordered to patrol the coast line beyond our lines to observe for and prevent any such attempt. This patrol was continued nightly thereafter until the island was secure. 9 19* One Mortar Unit continued to be assigned each night to deliver harassing fire. Enemy counter fire continued to require the assign­ ment of a destroyer or cruiser to provide support for the harassing 7 unit. On departure of Units frl} frZ, and #5, from, the area on February 26, Units #3 and #k were reorganized into"5-ship divisions. Due to the reduced size of the remaining units and their inexperience. in Flan "A" fire delivery, night harassing fires were here &ftor delivered using Plan "CM. On February 28, two more mortar LCl's departed the area, leaving two 4-ship units available for mortar fire. On February 27 and for several days thereafter individual mortar LCl's were assigned dur­ ing daylight to provide direct support to battalions designated by Head­ quarters Landing Force.

20. The remaining area int6 which night harassing fire could safely be delivered, required the employment of only one mortar LCI on the night • of March I. Thereafter harassing fires at night by these ships was dis­ continued. On March 3 all remaining mortar LCl's departed the area. 21. .Ammunition expenditures by LCI types exclusive of pre-«-DOG Day ex­ penditures, were as follows;

60,000 4.2 Mortar 8,000> 4.5 BR Rockets 116,000 40mm 9,500 SVO SSR Rockets

'}\"!J%7: * HUBWOTIED Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (IV) - Naval Gunfire Support) SECTION (B) COaMSNTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON FIBS SUPPORT EMPLOY­ MMOF GUNBOAT, MORTAR* AND 5-HCH ROCKST LCl*s 1. Gunboats, (LCl^'s and LCS(L)(3)'s)

(a) Heretofore in Central Pacific operations the ship to shore move** ment support by LCI gunboats has consisted of one fullrocket salvo delivered on the beach at about HOW minus Ti2N minutes. At IWO JIMA the gunboat group made an early run toward shore between HOW minus • NINETY and HOW minus FORTY-FIVE and delivered initial rocket salvos in an attempt to detonate possible inflamables on the beach well in advance of the time of landing* Another innovation at IWO JIMA was the loading and firing of a second rocket salvo during the ship to shore movement of the leading wave; The gunboats fired their first past operations, reloaded t salvo at HOW Minus TEN minutes as in then rocket racks as they moved in to a range of 600-7PO yards from the beach and fired a second salvo at HOW minus FIVE minutes placing 4 this salvo 300 to 500 yards inland. Since "4.5 racket f^re is more neutralizing than destructive and since its sho^t range prevents its use for neutralization of inland areas, its use has rarely been • requested after a landing* The best employment of 4"5 rockets there­ fore is beach neutralization just prior to the landing and, their em­ ployment for and additional' -salvos at JIMA is recommend­ initial - • IWO ed for future landing support, • , (b) Prearranged fire schedules provided for the initial assignment of one gunboat unit to support each of the two flank battalions on the beach. Replacement naval gunfire liaison officers and spotters # were embarked in the gunboat unit flagship to direct the fire until cofumunications were established with the spotter ashore* Tuis plan provided an excellent neutralizing fire on the flanks of the land­ ing beach and was found to be so effective that the Landing Force requested continuous assignment of one or more gunboats to the bat­ talion on the flanks of the front line for the remainder of the oper­ " ation.

2-, Mortar LCI*

' ''" (a) the operation mounting This Was first" in which LCl's mortars ' ' have been employed by the Fifth Amphibious Force. Their primary ; mission, 'as conceived in the initial planning, was the delivery of""' heavy harassing fire at nigjit to prevent the initiation of organised counter attacks. Their support with this fire was most gratifying and materially reduced the demands for harassing fire by destroyers and cruisers. " "((*»". .T Jt jj J* W "*¦> Action Report - - ComPhibUrp" 2 IWO JIMA (Part (IV) -Naval Gunfire Support; Section, (B) Comments and Recommendations on Fire Support Employment of Gunboat,. Mor­ tar, and 5-inch Rocket LCl's) — ' i­

(b) Two methods of delivering' harassing mortar fire at night were employed at IV/0 JB1A: (l) Plan (A) of the .standard mortar fire plans, in which 5 LCl's steam on an eliptical track around an LCI acting as reference ship. Ships fire singly in succession during the two minutes run on the leg on which they are pointed toward the targe^ area. (2) Plan (C) in which the 6 LCl's of a division lie to on a line, 200 yards between ships, and fire when the ships head is between prescribed limiting lines of fire. Both plans have many advantages and disadvantages. Since itis next to impossible to hold an LCI on an accurate heading for a long period when dead in the water, plan (C) is unsuitable for interdiction fire where • continuous and fairly accurate fire along a definite line is re­ quired. Harassing fire, which requires irregular volume and rate of fire with an unsystematic pattern and coverage of the area har­ assed, is especially typical of the fire to be expected of six LCl's, dead in the water all on different headings between pres­ i cribed limits. Plan (a), on the other hand> has all the fire de­ livery characteristics most suited for interdiction fire and least > euited for harassing fire, , (c) The 3200 yard range limit of LCI mortar fire requires these ships to approach as close to shore as safe navigation permits in order to place their fire, as far inland ac> possible. On a well de­ fended island such as DfO JIMA, this close approach to shore drew considerable enemy fire even at night. LCI mortar ships found good use for their bow 40ram in delivery of counter-battery fire in self protection, but this was found insufficient and it became necessary to assign one of the general support destroyers or cruisers to cov­ er the nightly harassing mortar LCI unit. In making plans for de­ # livery of night (or day; harassing fire by mortar LCl's, the plans should incorporate the employment of a destroyer,, for counter-batt­ ery protection of the harassing unit. This ship should work with the Mortar Unit .Commander on a couimon frequency.

(d) On request, individual mortar LCl's were assigned to battalions for direct support, generally to those battalions whose flanks were along the case of gunboat support, Preliminary the shoreline as in ( reports indicate that this support was more in the form of harassing or neutralization fire for the battalion supported. In rough water, the accuracy of LCI mortar fire in deflection is greatly decreased by rolling and can not be safely called for in areas close to own troops. , LCI mortar fire for direct support should therefore only be expected to accomplish harassing or preparation neutralizing fire for an advance into areas within range of the LCI mounted mor­ tar. '••..'.¦¦" :^Jlv:v :' (IV)'6 t f

\ Action Report - ComPhibGrp 2 IWO JIMA (Part (iV) Naval Gunfire Support; Section (B) Comments and Recommendations on Fire Support Employment of Gunboat, Mor­ tar, and $-inch Rocket LCl's) (c) While the accuracy In deflection of mortar fire from LCI/s is greatly effected by rolling and variations- in ship head, its accuracy in range is quite* dependable and relatively unaffected by motion of the ship. 1 Itis" therefore very suitable for neutralizing fire over the heads' of ttfoops when the line of fire is perpendicular to. the line of troops. Its high trajectory makes it ideal for use when ships troops target ships preclude and located between the and firing t the use of high velocity fiat trajectory fire. At Ih'o JIMA, the neutralization of large areas inland from the beaches was efl'ectiv- Ely delivered by mortar fire from LCI'-s on a line parallel tq;and * < 1000 yards from shore. ? This f^re Was hot provided however, until HOW plus TWENTY minutes. Using- Plan 1 I(B U with desired Modifications, mortar JjQl's 1 should be. employed^ in the boat lanes to provide beach neutralization just prior to the time the first wave leaves the line i of departure and during its run to the beach. They shoulcl precede the first wave by any desired distance, stop and lie' iq not 'less than 600 yards (minimum firing range) from shore, and continue mor­ « tar •fire on the beach until the first wsve is about 200. yards from shore. At this time the fire, should be lifted about 200" to' 500 yards inlanti and lifted in predetermined steps thereafter accord­ ing to a prearranged time schedule based on anticipated troop. ad­ vance. This t,ype of moving. close support was provided at'lWO *JBIA M using SM/38'AA5 /38'AA Common fire with 1200 foot second charges,'." : 3. SVO SSR Rocket LCl's (h0lU)(3)(R)(RQi) ls) (a) This was the first amphibious operation in t'jfe ;Pacif ic in which T • spin stabilized havq seen action. ine" rocket LCl's, ;. s'.'o rockets were employed at IV/0 JIMA to deliver harassing rocket fire' on the MOTOYi\MA area from dawn until 1300 on DCG pay at which time all\ rockets were expended. . These new typ>e .rocket's have: a maximum rari£>? of 5250 yards but when fired at this range from a rolling LCI the inaccuracy of the fire makes it unsuitable for anything- but harass­ ment on areas well removed from own*troops.

(iv)*7 ' Action Report**"*- 't. f ComPhibGrp 2 IWO JIMA (Part (IV) -Naval Gunfire Support)

SECTION (C)

NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIBE SUPPORT AFTER DEPARTURE CTF 51

I.;. Control of Naval Gunfire Support was turnad dvar to CTF 53 at 0800, March 1945 when CTF .51 departed from the area. The voice radio calls of CTF 51 and CTF 52 were taken over and employed by CTF 53 on all naval gunfire circuits in order not to disclose to the enemy the knowledge that CTF 51 had departed. 2. .Fire support requirements on March- 9 consisted of four destroyers and one heavy cruiser furnishing call-fires for battalions designated by Headquarters Landing Force. These requirements rapidly diminished as occupation of the island continued. On March 12 TUSCALOOSA and SALT LAKE * CITY were released and departed from the area. "After March IC, VOF spot­ ting services were not required and on March 12 the WAKE ISLaNB and its VOF squadron departed from the area.

3» By March 13 > fire support requirements had been reduced to two des­ i troyers, for day and night support. When situations permitted, division naval gunfire officers were embarked in destroyers to aid in identifying » targets and to supervise the fire for special missions.

4« IWO JIMA was officially declared Secure at 1800, March 16, 1945. Night illumination by destroyers was required for several days there­ after until a difficult pocket of enemy resistence on the north tip of the island was eliminated and mopping up completed. 5. As surf conditions and availability of ships permitted,, parties of interested officers from fire support ships were sent ashore for tours of inspection of enemy defensive installations and results of naval bom­ • • bardment.

6. Total ammunition expenditures from March 9* to 0800, March 17 were as follows: 8" HC 300 rounds" 8" AP 50. 5"/38 AaC 4904 "» SM/385 M/38 WP 77

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COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FIRS SUPPORT - !• The assignment of an Amphibious Group Commander to conduct and coordinate the pre-DOG Day bombardment of IWO JIMA was highly success­ ful in ensuring accurate damage evaluation, systematic destruction, coordination of effort and reliable intelligence information. It is recommended that the officer assigned this mission >ih>:fiiture. operations. continue with this systematic destruction of specific targets clear of the close support areas and coordinate target Jintelligenc^throughout : - the assault and occupation of the objective musing ships and aircraft • assigned to him daily for this purpose. 2. The rapid expansion of available types of fire support imposes a control problem of such complexity and magnitude that a division of con­ trol appears desirable for effective employment of all types. Itis recommended that in future ao' at IWO JIMA, the control of gunboat rocket and mortar support craft be placed under the attack force I commander. Since LCI types not immediately occupied in fire support are * assigned other duties such as salvage, patrol, smoke protection, mail trips, press, etc, it is particularly desirable that the attack force commander control all LCI types whether for fire support or for the other duties for which he is normally responsible. 3. The amount of starshell illumination requested continues to be excessive and appeared to be greater than necessary considering the amount of front to be illuminated at IWO JIMA. Frequently as many as eight stars were observed burning at one time when no emergency existed. Unlike SAIPAN and TBJIAN where starshells were fired at irregular inter­ • vals with the purpose of catching the enemy in the open by surprise, their use at IWO JIMA appeared to attempt continuous illumine tion for each, or nearly each, battalion in assault. Illumination by one ship is considered ample for each regiment in assault unless more than three battalions are attached or the terrain is such that one ship could not possibly deliver adequate illumination. The failure to use starshell illumination economically and judiciously necessitated establishing max­ imum expenditure allowances early in the operation to prevent exhaustion of ths supply. The present initialload of 50 pounds of starshells per gun for destroyers is considered adequate; to increase this willrequire an undesirable reduction of Aa Common. 4. Confusion and misunderstandings at SAIPAN and IVfO JIMA demonstrat­ ed the unde sirability of having the officer controlling gunfire support and the Commanding General of the landing force in different ships al­ though this was necessary for other considerations. Problems which arise during the critical period of establishing a definite beachhead can be more easily and more quickly solved if these two officers are able to discuss a problem and agree on its solttti^n-^persjanally rattier over \

''^Jw'Jt 91 Action Report - ComPhibGrp 2 IWO JIMA (Part (IV).-Naval Gunfire Support; Section (D) - Comments and Recommendations for Fire Support) the radio. Ifit is necessary to hcve the Headquarters of the Landing Force on a ship other than the one controlling naval gunfire, it is strongly recommended that troop naval gunfire officer be Ipca'ted witti. the officer controlling gunfire "support and have the authority to make all but major decisionsv

Note: Ail"times- throughout Part (IV) are KING (minus 10 zone) time. m

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¦ - >¦: • (iv)-io i*,* ''¦ *-" Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA PART (V

* AIR SUPPORT

!? General (a) The Air Support Control Unit functioned as a relief and re­ laying station for the unit on the USS ELDORADO 'from DOG Day until 0800K, 9 March, at which time control was transferred to the USS AUBURN. At this time control of the Combat Air Patrol and Anti- Submarine Patrol became a function of this unit. Control of close troop support missions was delegated to the Landing Force Air • Support Control Unit. A summary of daily air operations for 9 March through 26 March is included in paragraph 4. Operations >

2. Comments (a) For the first time in an amphibious operation in this theatre an Air Support Control Unit was landed and set up ashore with the intention of actively controlling close troop support missions. This unit was composed of Marine and Naval officers (with the former predominating) and Marine enlisted technicians and oper­ ators. The liaison that this unit was able to accomplish by virtue of the proximity (75 £t«) to the Landing Force Command Post far surpassed anything that has ever gone before in Air Sup­ port operations and as a result, troop requests for air support were run much more expeditiously than ever before. It is con­ sidered that a Landing Force Air Support Control Unit is an ab­ solute necessity for the control of troop support missions. How­ • ever, it is felt that the Landing Force Air Support Control Unit tried to assume the control of close support missions before they had monitored all the nets long enough to get the routine and to pick up control without any lost motion, Sou Ac equipment dif­ ficulties entered into the picture since this was the first ser­ vice use of the radios. Itis felt that in future operations when the LFASCU is preparing to assume control of troop support mis­ sions, they should monitor all nets which they expect to operate for a minimum of 12 hours. At quiet periods, radio checks should be made. Net control officers expecting to join the LFASCU for the operation of tl;e major strike nets (SAD-1, SAD-2, SAD-S, SAR, or SAO) should be embarked on the controlling AGC and the relief AGC. They should .disembark after the close of operations one day and be ready to assume control on a thoroughly tested shore-based set-up early the following morning. Lost motion was noted par­ ticularly during the IWO JIMA Operation in that when the LFASCU attempted to assume control of troop support missions that they did not have the complete current lists of Air Liaison Parties 1 requests. After this hiatus wa#|Clased, however, the LFASCU did Action Report - - ComPhibGrp 2 I7X) JIMA (Part (V) Air Support) •P* an excellent piece of work and in many cases gave the troops much more nearly what they wanted than was. ever possible before the » inception of this system.

(b) A new method of coordinating artillery fire and air strikes was used successfully for the first time during this operation. A brief of each air strike was broadcast over the Corps Artillery £lre Direction Control net. Each air strike was given a number and the following information was given: time bracket, target area, direction of approach and retirement, number and type of aircraft, minimum altitude and any other pertinent information. Each bat­ tery of artillery was able to control its fire so as not to inter­ fere with strikes, but a complete shut-down of artillery was only necessary once or twice to run a treetop level Napalm attack. Whenever two or more battalions of artillery were firing on the • same target, that information was Passed to CASCU with the max­ imum ordinate and aircraft were warned to keep clear. This prov­ ed a very satisfactory method of coordination from the Air Sup*­ port view-point and itis believed to be satisfactory from the artillery view-point.

(c) Coordination with naval gunfire still can only be obtained (after fire support has been turned over to the Shore Fire Control Parties) by placing "Plan Victor" (limit of maximum ordinate at 1200 ft.) in effect, thus imposing a minimum, altitude limitation on the air strike. Fortunately naval gunfire ordinates at the ranges most commonly used are below 1200 ft. and "Plan Victor" does not impose a serious limitation. But the minimum altitude restriction on the air strike places a considerable limitation on the aircraft since bombing and strafing accuracy is greatly in­ creased with decrease in dropping and firing altitude. • (d) In general, communications were excellent on all Air Support nets on the flagship of TF 53 • This ASCII played an important role in maintaining, by relay, communications between other Air Sup­ port participants. On several occasions this unit assumed com­ plete control of various nets during periods of materiel failure in other units. At night considerable CW interference reduced the efficiency of the high frequency circuits. Numerous instances still exist of aircraft and other stations using the improper net, and of not maintaining good radio discipline on the correct net. Air Liaison Parties showed evidence on numerous occasions of not being familiar enough with their radio equipment. Both Carrier and Target Anti-Submarine Patrol being on the same frequency was the causfe of considerable interference.

3» Re commend at ions

(a) This -ASCU was composed of 15 officers and acted as a relief team during the iViO JIMA Operation.' Considerable difficulty was UNCUSSiFIFD (V)-22 Action Report * ComPhibGrp2 - IWO Jlllik (Part (V) - Air Support)

experienced in adequately monitoring all nets, and stillhaving t officers available to relieve others for meals etc. From this experience, it is felt strongly, that the minimum number of officers that a complete operating Air Support Control Unit can function with is nineteen* Seventeen of these are reouired for the oper­ ating team, including net control officers, coimiunications offi­ cers and intelligence officers. Once trained, this team is an intra-dependent, cooperating unit which cannot afford to have any member on call to any outside source. Allplanning and overall jurisdiction of 'operations must be done by officers who are not a part of the operating team itself. The organization of new strikes, formation of plans for the following day, changes in existing plans and other strategic problems must be worked out by officers who are intimately familiar with, but not involved in, m the working" of the operating team itself. The planning staff is composed of the ComASCU and the planning officer and is required in the ASCU on the flagship having control of an amphibious oper­ ation. No planning staff is reouired on relief flagships unless it is contemplated that they assume control without being able to transfer any officers from the controlling ASCUt

(b) A recommended organization chart follows. •

- 4 9 ii Ji «te Action Report - CojjiftiibGrp 2 MO JBIA (Part (v) - Air Support) *

RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATION

¦¦ AIR SUPPORT CONTROL UNIT for FLAGSHIP CONTROLLING AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

¦y • Planning Officer

* NET CONTROLLERS Communication Support Air Air Officer H* Direction Direction

2 C W. 0. I Support Air t I Request — .j Support i Air • i -F Observation *I 1 , Intelligence | -, Local Air Air Officer j Warning Warning t Filter Officeri L Fighter j & Ass *t«Intel!.] Director Offer.

U U General Warning Air-Sea Rescue

Status Board 1 Air Support Support [_ Keeper Hi * i Command t t Available to relieve net controllers 'or meals etc. etc.

! Jiffif *¦ i((. ?VwF *V> |W iH ji. Report Action \ ComPhibGrp % r IWO JIMA. (Part; (V).- Air Support)

T" (c) i The advantages of having former. Air Liaison Officers.as Sup­ port Air Reouest Net Controllers are too numerous to mention. The assignment of officers to ASCU's and LFASCU's should be made to include at least one such officer. On account of the* numerous re­ cent developments and specialization in the technique of aerial anti-submarine warfare, brie'meniber of every ASCU should have the complete three-weeks course in Anti-Submarine Warfare as given at NAS, Kaneohe, T,H. The superficial three-nday course is suffic­ ient for other net controllers . Another member of every ASCU should have previous Air-Sea Rescue training or experience,.

(d) The possibility of consolidating the Support Carrier Area ASP and the Target ASP should be investigated. If this could be done • a ,great saving in VTB aircraft would effected, _ .• be .. (c) The assignment of a secondary Support Air Reouest Net would have a definite value* The present net is always so busy that it would be hazardous, to conduct two simultaneous close support strikes. T?ith a secondary net available, this could be done by having the ALP fs involved change to secondary for the duration of the strike, .Allrequests for new strikes must be made on primary. The Local Air Warning Secondary was not used at. DUO JIMA despite numerous Hunter-killer operations. Its use as SAR-Secondary is suggested.

(f) Communications: Omit the assignment of frequencies between 30 and 40 megacycles in future communication plans for air support, except for Inter-Fighter Director net." During the briefing period for future operations, stress even more the fact that all stations must use the proper net and not come up on a net which has been • assigned for another purpose. r. . 4. Operations

(a) Prior to DOG Day, Air Support Operations were controlled by ASCU, TF 52. From DOG Day until 0800K, 9 March 1945, ASCU,. TF 51 assumed control. At' 0800K, 9 March 1945, control of Air Support was turned over to the ASCU, TF 53 which, at 1000K, became TG 51.21, Control of troop support missions remained delegated ' to the Landing Force, Air Support Control Unit, At this time, day and night CAP was being flown by land-based fighters. All other support aircraft were CVE-based. On 9 March 1945, land-based . fighters furnished call strike groups in addition to 'the CVE groups , On 10 March 1945,. all call strike groups were, made up of land-based fighters and at 1430K this date a shore-based VMTB squadron especi­ ally trained in Anti-Submarine Warfare assumed the ASP, On 11 March 1945, the CVE's furnished no aircraft whatsoever for the sup­ port of operations in this area. Close troop support missions were flown by shore-based Army aircraft through HOOK, 14 March 1945, (V)<-5 UNCUSSIFIHi UNGMSSfFfffIAction Report ComPhibGrp 2- ITO JIM (Part (V) - Air Support)

when the last strike was completed. Strategic strikes on the BONINS were flown daily by these aircraft commencing 11 March 1945 i and continuing through the time that IWO JIMA was turned over to CTF 94.

AH SUPPORT' SUMMARY DOG plus EIGHTEEN 9 March 194

CVE planes furnished close support missions. These were aug­ mented by X-CAP P-51»s which gave some excellent close strikes. Very close support missions were run today due to shrinking enemy territory. One B-29 with engine trouble made safe emergency landing at IVJO Field and willremain until engine replaced. Plane found and guided in by ASCU PhibGrp 2. A ground looped on • P-51 landing and crashed into two parked P-51's. One plane burned. Pilot of plane injured. The USS ENTERPRISE is leaving tonight and all night CAP willbe flown by Army P-6l's. Enemy planes came into area last night but did not attack. Night fighter made contact but no kill,due to pronounced evasive action of enemy plane. A dispatch came out this evening from Landing Force Headouarters that Carrier planes willno longer be needed for close support. It doesn't seem likely that much more air support for strikes will be needed in this operation. B-29's are making 300 plane strike tonight on TOKYO Planes Used in Strikes •

Bombing and strafing including rockets - 18,

* tcijaMfefrtiJit f\fF fl^lj¦, Action Report - - ComPhibGrp 2 3WO J2MA (Part (V) Air Support) .«*.

«, / Source of Plants Vp.. VT T0. 51*26 104 29 SARGENT BAY TULAGI WAKE ISLAND SAGINAW BAY BTO- J3MA P-51's J&- , Total 150 29 • AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY DOG plus NINETEEN 10 March 194: Last night a night ASP plane from CVE, USS TULAGI could not get wheels down to land at base and made a safe wheels up emergency landing at 810 JIMA Airfield #1. -AGATE BASE reported slight dam­ age to this plane and all her- crew safe.. Nine depth charges and a few flares and depth charge markers were delivered at the airfield by X-ASP planes at 0900K this morn­ ing. This delivery was continued during the morning by Carrier based ASP planes to help supply the shore-based ASP* At 1430K, VMTB shore-based TBM's took over target Anti-Submarine Patrol and relieved carrier from this duty. Today's air support has been confined to the ' extreme northern tip of the Island, target areas 250 and 251. More air support to­ day furnished by land-based P-51's. Five B-29's on trip back from TOKYO raid, made emergency land­ ings at IWO Airfield today. One was damaged oh landing. Three were lost, and CASCU'FhibGrp 2 found them on radar screen and # guided them in to field for landing. Only seven support missions flown today. Planes Used in Strike VF 31 VT 0 Total 31 Total Sorties 74 Bombs Used in Strikes Total Weight 500#- 38 19,000# Napalm 10 Total 19,000# Total Tons 9.5 Missions * "" Bombing and strafing 7 -vhm i'**¦?' it if Napalm «i 1 (included in above) 3 * * (v)-7 ¦ ­ Action Report - 9 *">• r - ComPhibGrp 2 IW JIMA (Part (V) Air Support)

Source of Planes VF VT a Land-based P-51's 45 TU 51.26 (CVE's) 23 2 Total zs "2 AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY DOG plus TWENTY 11 March 194 Very little close support today with only 3 missions run. These three missions were bombing and strafing in target areas 250 and 251 against blockhouses and personnel. In mission number two, a bomb ricocheted and exploded close to friendly troops but no casualties resulted. Seventeen P-51!s, with a 2xsCO# bomb load each, took off for • CHICHI JIMA at Q9OSK and returned safely at 1115K. Landing Force ASCU operated today from radio eouipped jeeps and some personnel have left the Island. Results of today's P-51 bombing and strafing strike on CHICHI JIMA: the seventeen planes. were from the Fighter Squadron 47 of the 15th Fighter Group AAF; scored 22 hits on Susaki Field on run­ way and among planes • One direct hit two probables and five near misses on smaller ships in harbor. Strafed Susaki Field and Kita­ mura tcwn and Okimura town on HAHA JIMA. Set fire to radio weath­ er station on Okimura, 13,442 rounds of .50 cal. ammunition ex­ pended.. 32x500# bombs expended on mission. Excellent mission. Planes Used in Strikes

P-5.1 1 s 15 Bombs .Used in Strikes Total Weight • 500# 30 15,000#

Total Tons 7.5

Missions Bombing and strafing 3

Source of Planes

Land-based P-51's 17

AIR SUPPORT SIMMY DOG plus TWENTY-ONE 12 March 1945

CVE's, SARGENT BAY, TUIAGI, WAKE ISLAND, and SAGINAW BAY left the area last night after weeks of excellent performance in air support missions,.

'•* ¦ ¦. **. . .¦¦ 1 (V)-8 \

4 Action Report j ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIWA (Part (V) ~ Air Support)

\ A total of seven B-29's returning from NAGOYA strike made emer­ gency landings at IWO JIMA field this morning. One came in with only two engines operating and some had one engine out. Two were found and vectored into field and #thers were led in by planes of their own group. Ihree planes departed IW the same day. Two B*-24's on CHICHI JIMA strike ran low on gasoline and made safe landings at Airfield #1 last night. Later took off for base. A submarine was sighted by an Antii-Submarine Patrol Plane at 1145* Submarine submerged and plane dropped Sono-buoy and depth charges. USS DEEDE (DD 263) was assigned as Hunter-killer ship and operations were continued through the night* • Planes Used in Strikes VF 16 P~51 f s

Bombs Used in Strikes Total Weight 50Q# 32 16,000# Total Tons .a Missions: Bombing and Strafing 2 Source of Plane 15th Fighter Group AAF 16 P~51 f s AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY. DOG plus TWENTY-TWO 13 March 1945

N» close air support today because enemy area too restricted. • OY plane carrying MarDiv Air Observer reported crashed in sth target area 235 H. Crash itself was not observed as plane went down behind ridge. One B-24 and one B-29 made safe emergency landings at IWO, South ­ Field. B*-24 had one engine out and B-29 was leaking gas from two engines. Both planes took. off for base* Sixteen P-51's from Fighter Group 15, AAF, carrying 2x500# bombs each, took off for CHICHI JIMA and dive bombed and strafed instal­ lations. Targets were Radar Station, Susaki Airfield and wharves and docks. Direct hits were scored. Intense and accurate light flak. Hunter-killer operations concluded at 1900 today. Results were negative.

AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY DOG plus TWENTY-THREE 14 .March 19 One close support mission was run today with very good results* AirLiaison parties said that troeps made gains after strike. Nine 8~29's made safe 1 emergency landings at IWO JIMA. Eight of ftjwv/yv-.J ;t !^X*Tf..''i\ •• %

Action Report - - ComP&LbGrp 2 rVO JIMA (Part (V) Air Support) c these planes took off during the day and returned to base. This makes a total of twenty-four B-29's that have made emergency land­ i ings here since the operation began. \ Two ASP planes attacked disappearing radar contacts with nega­ tive results. Combat Air Patrol investigated a reported ship at MENAMI "with negative results. Sixteen P-51 f s with 2x500# bombs each went to CHICHI- JIMA this afternoon. Four planes hit gun pos­ itions North of Susaki Airdrome and weather station. One made safe landing although, damaged while on strike. AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY DOG plus TWENTY-FOUR 15 March 1945

I No close support strikes today. An ASP plane reported an oil slick and dye marker near KITA 10 JIMA. On further investigation, it was reported that the sighting # was a sulphur spring. sth MarDiv Air Observer was wounded in foot and leg by AA and returned to base. Six B-24 search planes and six PV search planes staged at P7O Airfield #1 en route to base. A life raft and dye marker was reported. On further investiga­ tion, results were reported negative. Another ASP reported two dye markers. Both investigated carefully, results negative. Sixteen Mustangs, 2x500# bombs each, dive bombed and strafed ' targets in CHICHI JIM and HAHA JIMA. Targets were Susaki Air­ field, CHICHI, gun emplacements, OKDIURA THV7N and military instal­ lations, and KITA MURA TOIN, HAHA JIM. No flak was encountered. Results difficult to observe due to weather. All returned safely to base. . • AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY DOG plus TWENTY-FIV3 16 March 1945 • Sixteen Mustangs with 500# bombs, dive-bombed and strafed enemy installations on CHICHI JIMA.- Targets were radio station, Sea­ plane Base, gun positions and sotrage areas. No flak encountered. One flight reconnoitered HAHA JIMA on return and spotted two small cargo vessels at KITAMURA. No attack due to shortage of ammo. Allorganized resistance on IWO JIM ceased at 1800K today. At 1030K an ASP plane reported a definite sonar contact about fifteen miles north of the north tip of the Island. A Destroyer Escort was dispatched to conduct Hunter-Killer operations and arrived about 1245K. Radio contact between the plane and the DE was established. At 1825K the ASP had good sonar indications, so the DE stood off while the ASP dropped special ASW weapon. No detonation occurred. After a safe period the DS again closed the area and obtained its first sonar contact, but did not attack. Hunter-Killer Operations continued throughout the night.

(V)-10 !It«iIi • iIt « « S it. m '¦

Action Report. •/%'•¦-..- •'; GpmPHWy* ggr "s IWO JIMA (Fart (V) Air Support)

as m SB ¦¦ * AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY DOG plus TWENTY-SIX 17 March 19. One P-51 disappeared . from his division while flying through overcast on CAP* Plane last seen in vertical dive at 2000 ft. Searches sent out have reported. negative results. Sixteen B-29 !s landed at TVO Airfield #2 on way '"back from Japan Empire raid. Ten took off and six remained on field for servicing. Hunter-Killer operations from yesterday were discontinued at .. since 1924, 16 1055 K. No sonar contact March -1945. At 1100 the USS COTTSN (DD 669) picked up a sonar contact eight miles from HOT ROCKS. Hunter-Killer operations were begun; at 'H42K and continued throughout the afternoon ancf night* Results negative. The ASP dropped sono-buoys on two oil slicks during the after­ • noon. One was negative, the other reported hearing propellor noises. No attacks were made, A tactical air observer reported a periscope wake close to shore near the north end of. the Island. Investigation by ASP showed course of reported wake was .parallel to that of a minesweeper. Evaluated as a paravane,- :

' AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY DOG plus rJENTY-SUffSN 18 March 1945 Hunter-Killer operations with USS GOTTEN secured at 164-OK, Nega­ tive results. The Air Defense Control Center assumed operational control of ASP for indoctrination training in control. Sixteen Mustangs with 24x500# bombs strafed and dive-bombed tar­ gets on CHICHI JIM. One flight hit radar station, one flight hit radio direction finder and one hit barges in FUTAMI KO. Bomb­ ing results excellent. No flak. One ASP plane reported Mmself lost at 1430, Allradars looked • for plane to give him a steer for base* Allattempts to locate plane by radar and- other methods failed and plane made a water- landing in an unknown location at 1647 K. Searches by two Dumbo Rescue planes and two flights of P-51's were to no avail. Four ASP planes made sono-buoy drops on suspected targets. All results were found negative. The USS McCALL (DD 400) reported that he had seen many whales in the vicinity of IW& during the day.

AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY DOG plus IWENTY-hIIGHT . 19 tferch 1945 Sixteen Mustangs, 2x500# bombs, dive-bombed and strafed ./targets on CHICHI JIMA. One flight bombed and strafed Susaki Airfield. Secondary explosion following bomb bursts indicated having hit ammunition and storage area, Susaki. Three flights hit radio sta­ tion and other military installations. Observation difficult due to clouds. Searches continued for lost ASP who made water landing yesterday. Results negative. flMUOTII) Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - TO JIMA (Part (V) - Air Support)

Three B-29's landed at r?0 Field #2 today on way back from NAGOYA strike. One reported at 0625K that he was ditching at 80 4 miles, bearing 350 degrees from HOT ROCKS. Searches by 2 B-29 Dumbos, one surface craft and one PBY were negative.

AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY DOG plus TWENTY NINE 20 March 1945 Two PBT Dumbos continued search for B-29 crew and lost TBM pilot. Results negative on the latter. At 1600K, Dumbo 3 report­ ed sighting two rafts with 10 men at 331 degrees, 115 miles. The USS GATLING (DD 671) recovered ten survivors at 2035K, all in good condition. P-51 strike to BONINS was cancelled on account of weather. AIR SUPPORT SUMCRY DOG plus THIRTY 21 March • 1945 Sixteen Mustangs each with 2x500# bombs, dive-bombed and strafed enemy installations on CHIGHI JIMA, Targets were barracks and radio stations. Fires were set by bombs and strafing. No flak. No other air activity, except routine CAP, ASP and air evacua­ tion planes.

AIR SUPPORT "SUMMARY DOG plus THIRTY-ONE 22 March 1945.

Fifty-three' Mustangs from the second garrison fighter group arrived today. . Sixteen- Mustangs with 2x500 pounders each, struck BONINS. Tar­ gets weather station, fuel storage tanks, RDF installations and reservoir. Meager heavy flak, accurate in altitude but trailing. No -Activity observed on HAHA JIMA. AIR SUPPORT STOSARY DOG plus THIRTY-ThO 23 March 1945 • Fifteen Mustangs dive-bombed and strafed TAKINOURA TOIN, reservoir area, OKIMURA TO7N and gun laying radar. Flak meager and inac­ curate. A four-plane Anti-Sub Patrol plan was made effective today on account of low availability of TBF aircraft. This plan willbe flown continuously until changed. Thirty additional Mustangs arrived from the MAPIANNAS, thus completing the second garrison fighter group.

AIR SUPPORT STOMARY . DOG plus THIP.TY-TKRES 24 March 1945 Two Mustang strikes against the BONINS were flown today. The morning strike skip-bombed and strafed naval installations and Susaki Airfield under a 1000 ft solid overcast. Flak was moderate, inaccurate. One flight of the afternoon strike hit the radar sta­ tion. The other 3 flights were weathered out of CHICHI and HAHA, so hit targets on KITA IWO SHIM en route to base. iirtawftiHi** Action Report - ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (V) Air Support) i •^ AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY DOG plus THIRTY-FOUR 25 March 1945 Four "Dreamboats" made emergency landings on Airfield #2 on returning from NAGOYA strike, Allwere reported as having taken off for Marianas bases. Both Mistang strikes to the BONINS were cancelled on account of weather. Only other air activity was routine CAP, ASP and transports.

AIR SUPPORT SIBiMRY DOG plus THIRTY-FIVS 26 March 1945

Due to presence of enemy aircraft in the area last night, 21 P-51 Mustangs left for a special dawn strike on the BONINS this morning with Susaki Airfield and enemy aircraft as the primary target. The O runway was cratered and the area thoroughly strafed* One new Betty was observed and probably destroyed* Moderate accurate light flak. Allplanes returned at 080QK. At 0800K responsibility for all defenses, including air, at ITO JIMA passed to Commander Forward Area*

•

¦MEDICAL

SECTION (A)

> NARRATIVE­

1,- Preparation in Hawaiian Area (a) Two months prior to rehearsal exercises inMA^AIAEABAY and KAHOOLAvffi ISLAND area 11-18 January 1945, conferences were conducted • periodically with allmedical personnel involved in,the operation. Included in these conferences were the beach party medical officers, shore party medical officers, SMO's of APAfs,. LST(H) medical officers, and staff medical officers of Transßons, Allmedical groups were briefed in their roles pertaining to medical matters and evacuation. The Medical Plan was analyzed in detail and problems of coordination and general questions were freely discussed to the mutual benefit of

¦ allparticipants # * (b) LST(H) 929 was designated to carry the VJhole-Blood Bank for dis­ tribution of whole blood to forces afloat and ashore. Prior to leaving v HONOLULU, the follovdng equipment and personnel were embarked for the care and maintenance of whole blood; - 2 150 cv. ft, reefer boxes {one on - 2^-ton truck and one on deck) 2 - 350 cv. ft,reefer boxes • / 2 - Ice flake machines 1 - Jeep 1- 14 x 14 tent 1 - Chief Pharmacists Mate 2 - Hospital Corpsmen 1 2j-ton truck . Reefers and ice flake machines were self-contained units operated, by gasoline engines. At the objective, when""opportunity was presented, one ice flake machine, 2 reefers, 2^-ton truck, jeep, and maintenance personnel were to be larded and establish' blood, bank ashore under Landing Force supervision.

2, Chain of evacuati on

(a) Four LST(H)Ts, or casualty evacuation control LST!s, were especially equipped with medical personnel and supplies^ and their function was to screen casualties and distribute them equably among available trans­ ports and hospital ships. One LST(H) was available to each of the UWife'nFn y*sMs.wn Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IrfO JIMA (Part (VI) - Medical; Section (A) ~ "Narrative)

colored beaches, or two for each Marine Division, The planned method of evacuation was as follows: Allboats, LVT's, or DUXWrs which evacuated wounded from beaches were to proceed to their respective evacuation control LST(.H) f s'. Those casualties who were unable to stand the boat trip to transports or hospital ships were to be trans­ ferred to the JLST(H) for treatment until such time as their condition warranted further transfer, Thqse were to be lifted by cranes in Mills-Harris slings and lowered into the tank deck where first aid and shock treatment were to be acjministered. Allothers were to remain in LCVFls and be sent to transports or hospital ships designated by the Evacuation Control officer. Those casualties arriving at LST(H) !s in LVT's or DUKW's were to be unloaded onto the pontoon barge alongside the LST(H) .and retransf erred into LCVP!s and then directed to awaiting transports or hospital ships. This procedure relieved the LVT's and • DUKW's for further military duty and also placed the casualties in faster and more comfortable boats. (l) Each LST(H) had 4. surgeons and 27 corpsmen as permanent medical complement. This number was increased by the transfer of one Beach Party Medical Section (1medical officer and & corpsmen) from APA's at the objective, giving each LST(H) 5 surgeons and 35 corpsmen. These beach party medical sections were on call by their Transßon i commanders if needed. Besides the above complement the 4th MarDiv sent one medical officer and two corpsmen to the two L3T(H) fs i serving their beaches for recording purposes. This was a very satisfactory arrangement and is recommended for future operations.

3. Whole Blood

(a) At SAIPAN, pxior to departure for objective, all ships were ordered to receive whole blood in quantities shown below: • Each APA 16 flasks" LSV OZARK - st)o LST(H) 929 1100 « Each AH - Bi2 m LST(H) 930, 931, 1033 16 « Additional whole blood was to be furnished by incoming AH's or to be flown up from GUAM when air facilities were organized. 4. DOG Day (19 February) (a) On DOG Day, 19 February, 30 APA!s, 12 AKA*s, one LSV (OZARK) and four LST(H) !s were available for evacuation of casualties. The LSV OZARK was available for casualty evacuation when APA!s were not avail­ able. Her medical personnel of two medical officers, nine corpsmen, 'one Pharmacist, and one dental officer was reinforced by Medical

i3 (Vl)~2 Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (VI) - Medical; Section (A) - Narrative)

Company A of the 3rd MarDiy. and..six beach party medical sections from six APA*s, giving a total of 13 medical officers, 103 corpsmen, 2 dental officers, and 2 Pharmacists, Personnel of Medical Company A of 3rd MarDiv remained aboard until patients were removed at rear area. (b) On DOG Day, HOW Hour (0900), beach parties had extreme difficulty in establishing and equipping their evacuation stations due to soft volcanic sand terrain and constant mortar and artillery barrage, to­ gether with machine gun fire, A heavy surf contributed to difficulties in beaching LCVP fs for evacuation of casualties, Many of .these small craft broached upon beaching. At 1300 one APA was ordered to close in to each LST(H) to receive casualties in order to eliminate the long ride to the transport area. This procedure vas carried out throughout • the operation in order to get casualties aboard as quickly as possible.

c •

.*-.**» , "'%&*&» < ytwfj.YNFrit0 Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JB.IA (Part (VI) - Medical)

SECTION (B)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Shore-to-ship evacuation was very satisfactory. The LSTCHj's did an invaluable job both in treating casualties and screening and distributing casualties equably among the ships.

2. Approximately 6136 casualties were screened through the LST(H)'s in a period of 9| days. This large number overtaxed all the medical personnel.

(a) it is recommended that four additional medical officers and ten corpsmen be added to these ships for a total of 8 medical officers # and 37 corpsmen* This would eliminate the transfer of beach party medical sections for temporary duty.

(b) Or, recommend that personnel of landing Force field hospitals and personnel of garrison force hospitals pc temporarily detailed to L3T(H)'s until such time as their services are required ashore.

) 3#3 # One operating room with one operating table is inadequate aboard LST(H)!s.

(a) Itis recommended that two operating rooms be installed in troop compartments and a portable one on tank deck. An area on tank deck can be enclosed with tarpaulin for this purpose after vehicles are launched. 4. A more expeditious and satisfactory method of transferring casualties from the barge to the tank deck should be sought. The present procedure of picking up the stretcher patient by crane situated on top LST deck and then • lowering him down through the hatch to the tank deck is unwieldly and slow.

(a) It is recommend ed that a study be made of this situation by BuShips with a view to installing cargo ports through hull of the ship in the area abreast of the barge. This port would lead to a passageway direct into the tank deck. 5» The pontoon barges used to receive the casualties alongside were im­ properly designed for the purpose. They punctured the LST's, were damaged by LVT's, etc., coming alongside, and provided no protection for the operators or for the casualties.

(a) It is recommended that the barge used for this purpose be specially prepared with adequate fenders to protect the LST(H) and be protected from damage by the LVT!s, DOKW 1 s and other landing craft coming along­ side. Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - BO J3HA. (Part (VI) - Medical; Section (B) - Comments and Recommendations)

(b) Recommend that soon after launching of the pontoon barge, some form of overhead protection be installed on one-half the barge. 6. There were a few instances reported of transports refusing to receive casualties from LCVP fs after these craft were given orders by evacuation control officers of LST(H) f s %o unload their casualties to these ships. Reasons given were that the transports were overtaxed or were not the ships designated as casualty receivers. This condition must not occur; it adds to the detriment of the casualties. 7. The boats returning from the beach during the early stages of the • assault were found to be inadequate for the evacuation of casualties from the LSTOO's to the transports, and it was necessary for"the Transßon commanders to detail more boats to each LST(H) for this service. (a) Itis recommended that TransDiv commanders maintain close liaison with their assigned LST(H) Ts and assign additional LCVPfs as circum­ stances require.

» &. LSV OZARK, serving as an emergency hospital ship during the night and when transports left the objective, rendered invaluable service, and a greater number could well be used in future operations. . t (a) Recommend that medical personnel of landing force hospitals and garrison hospitals be temporarily detailed to this type of ship to aug­ ment their medical complement until such time as their services are required ashore. • 9. Movies and pictures of the various medical facilities in the chain of evacuation during operations should be taken to be used in the instruction of future groups for coming operations.

10. AH's should have a larger loading platform at base of ladder to facilitate faster and easier handling of casualties from small craft. * 11. Landing Force should make greater effort to establish sufficient bed space for casualties as soon after the assault phase as possible. This is essential to take care of casualties when weather conditions prevent normal shore-to-ship evacuation, and also to eliminate night evacuation, which, under the most favorable weather conditions, is difficult in blacked-out areas. Fortunately during this operation, evacuation by craft larger than LCM was possible during rough weather, although carried out under most unfavorable conditions of transfer.

(a) Continuous day-and-night evacuation was necessary from DOG Day (19 February) to DOG plus TWELVE (3 March), From DOG plus TV-JELVE to DOG plus TiWFI day evacuation continued, but there was no night tJt l Action Report *i it! ComPhibGrp 2 - LO JBIA (Part (VI) - Medical; Section (B) - Comments and Recommendations)

evacuation. On DOG plus TWENTY (11 March) there was no shore-to-ship evacuation.

12. There was no problem of caring for wounded civilians on this operation because all civilians had been removed prior to June of last year.

13. A list of reported casualties to naval units of Commander Task Force 53 is appended. This list is not considered to be complete as submitted reports were incomplete. 14. The list of total casualties evacuated by ships during the IWO JBIA. operation is appended. 15. No unusual dieases were reported among the troops or ships' personnel # of the force. Few cases of gas gangrene "were encountered, but exact reports as to numbers are not available at this time. Three cases of dysentery among reembarked troops was reported by CTU 12.6.1, and all units were directed to adhere to strict sanitary precautions to avoid an epidemic.

16. Medical supplies, as a whole, were adequate, but transfer of certain items from ship to ship and ship to shore was necessary. Quantities of i medical supplies, not needed by ships retiring from the objective, were transferred to flagships or landing force for use in the area. AH's trans­ ferred their excess whole blood to medical authorities afloat prior to de­ parture from objective.

17. Air evacuation from IWO JBiA to GUAM was established on 3 March (DOG plus TWELVE Day). A list of casualties evacuated by.air is appended. 18. In general, casualty reports from lower echelons to Attack Force • Commander were irregular, late, or not made. This was especially true in the first four days.

(a) Recommend that casualty reports from TransDiv Commanders be sub­ mitted at 0900 and 1500 instead of 0900 and 1700 as heretofore. 19. The retention of #iite casualties at the objective was an ever-present problem to forces afloat. In accordance with the Medical Plan, all white casualties were to be retained aboard ships until such time as facilities ashore could receive them. This opportunity never materialized, and on 5 March (DOG plus FOURTEEN) Landing Force requested that all white casualties be evacuated to rear areas. In order to comply with the Medical Plan, fre­ quent transfers of white casualties from ships departing to ships remaining was necessary. This procedure loaded the beds in ships remaining which could have been used for current casualties*

(Vl)-6

«_ OcffliltffllAlfl\ VifIif- Action Report ComPhibGrp £ XO JIMA (Parii '(Vi)'^ Medical; Section (B)" -'Comments and Recdmiiienciatidns ) •* ••

(a) Recommend that- speciMeshipsy '-preferably- -those AX's remaining at objective longest, be designated to take only these casualties, or send all types. of casualties back to rear areas. • >

\

« • - ComPhlbGrp 2 IJO JIMA (Part (VI) - Medical; Section (B) - Comments and Recommendations)

SUMMARY OF NAVAL BATTLE CASUALTIES •

* •

NOTE: Figures based upon reports 'made to CTF 51 supplemented by reports received by CTF 53.. - MCIASSIFP* 0 X tiiif1!itcoirirrt Action Report - ComPhibGrp 2- MO JE.CA (Part (VI) - Medical; Section (B) Comments and Recommendations)

LANDING FORCB CASUALTIES

(Figuresires from V PhibCorps reports) 4 CUMULATIVECUM DAILY DAY DATE KIA WIA MIA TOTAL I)fAL D Day 19 Feb.' 76 1080 5 1161 1161 D plus 1 20 «" 264 1562 481 3055 1894 D plus 2 21 426 2116 355 3969 919 D plus 3&4 22,23" 870 4711 670 6251 2282 • D plus 5 24 " 1021.021 5284 537 6845 594 D plus 6 25 1195.195 6006 549 7750 905 D plus 7 26 "« 1347.347 6791 :¦ 484 8622 872 D plus a 27 1556.556 7984 586 :10126 1504 D plus 9 28 » 1616.616 8418 575 10661 535 D plus 10 1Mar. 1845.845 9150 599 11595 934 D plus 11 2 tt 2005#05 9780 545 12333 738 D plus 12 3 ti 2278>278 10632 541 13451 1118 « D plus 13 4 it 2468>468 10556 631 13655 204 D plus 14 5 H 2620>620 10753 546 :13919 264 D plus 15 6 tt 2715>715 11054 452 14221 302 D plus 16 7 II 2569>869 11505 430 14804 583 D.plus 17 8 It 3Q55*Q55 12251 435 15741 937 D plus IB 9 It 31915191 12723 445 16359 618 D plus 19 10 ft 3315J315 13203 421 16940 581 D plus 20 11 tt 3488$488 13785 419 17692 752 D plus 21 12 II 36531653 14130 421 18204: 512 D plus 22 22 13 tl 3765>765 14403 434 18602 393 • It D plus 23 14 3#78}878 14750 434 19062 460 D plus 24 15 It ai2+112 15102 437 19653 591 D plus 25 16 tt 4206+206 15290 423 19928 275 D plus 26 17 If 4305+305 15474 417 20196 263 D plus 27 18 tl 4357[,357 155U 397 20265 69 D plus 28 19 It 4403+403 15598 391 20392 127 D plus 29 29 20 tt 4457 \USI 15677 359 20493 101 D plus 30 21 tt 4503 15732 353 20588 95 D plus 31 22 It 4540 15820 336 ;20696 108 D plus 32 23 tt 4590 15954 301 ;20845 149 tt ; D plus 33 33 24 4590f590 15954 301 20845 0 D plus 34 25 Tl 4590,590 15954 301 : 20845 0 D plus 35 26 It 4590(.590 15969 301 ;20860 15

4 ' '- M Tj^l? v iI 'i' Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - T.70 JBIA (Part (Vl)'- Medical; Section (B) - Comments and Recommendations)

CASUALTIES SCREENED BY LST(H)'s

LST(H) LST(H) LST(H) LST(H) DAILY DAY DATE 929 930 931 1033 TOTAL D Day 19 Feb. 281 398 B8 213 985 " D plus 1 20 168 248 249 151 816 " D plus 2 21 31 230 220 223 704 D plus 3 . 22 » 26 40 37 118 221 • D plus 4 23 » 200 279 46 96 621 D plus 5 24 » 93 309 96 209 707 D plus 6 25 « 26 132 225 56 439 » D plus 7 26 46 574 226 30 876 t " D plus 8 27 45 324 136 87 592 D plus 9 28 » 0 inr 0 0 JZL. 916 2709 1323 1188 613 6 • RECAPITULATION: LST(H)*s operated from 19 February to 28 February inclusive, a total of ten days. According to avail­ able reports, they screened 613 6 casualties from the beach. Figures were taken from incomplete Form A»s supplied to CTF 53 by LST(K)'s and from LANFOR Casualty Reports.

¦-<.¦¦ > :(vi)-io t V\,.; v? turn *$%iif 11,1/ Action Report - - ComPhibGrp 2 "BfO JIMA (Part (VI) Medical; Section (B> -'Coments and Recommendations)

REVISED SUMMARI OF CASUALTIES -EVACUATED FROM BEACHES TO SHIPS

DAY DATE WOUNDED DEAD D Day 19 Feb. 1214 11 D plus 1 20 Feb. 2140 76 D plus 2 21 Feb. 3392 109 D plus 3 22 Feb. 3959 144 • D plus 4 23 Feb. 4948 176 D plus 5 24 Feb. 5573 226 D plus 6 25 Feb. 5992 268 D plus 7 26 Feb. 6402 307 D plus 8 27 Feb. 7597 34^ D plus 9 28 Feb. 8059 364 D plus 10 1Mar. 8537 379 D plus 11 2 Mar. 9435 401 » D plus 12 3 Mar. 10018 408 D plus 13 4 Mar. 10573 '437 D plus 14 5 Mar. 11439 449 D plus 15 6 Mar. 11618 451 D plus 16 7 Mar. 11969 451 D plus 17 8 Mar. 12248 456 D plus 18 9 Mar. 12612 459 D plus 19 10 Mar. 12815 461 D plus 20 11 Mar. No shore- to-ship evacuation D plus 21 12 Mar. 13Q37 461 • D plus " 22 13 Mar: 13182 467 D plus 23 14 Mar. 13370 470 D plus 24 thru ) D plus 28 ) No shore-to— ship evacuation D plus 29 20 Mar. 13434 470 D plus 30 21 Mar* 13461 470 D plus 31 22 Mar. 13507 470 D plus 32 23 Mar, 13536 470 D plus 33 24 Mar. 13559 470 13 plus 34 25 Mar. 13589 471 D plus 35 26 Mar. 13620 471 D plus 36 27 Mar* 13737 472 NOTE: Figures based upon incomplete reports received by CTF 53. Totals are cumulative. . NtfftsSffJWl \

Action Report - - ­ ComfhibGrp 2 IWO JE£A (Part (VI) Medical; Section (B) Comments and- Recoutoendations')

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES EVACUATED * " BY SHIPS FROM TARGET AREA

DATE TOTAL OMJLATIVE DEPARTED SHI^S DAILY TOTAL D plus 2 21 Feb. SAMARITAN 623 623 D plus 5 24 » NAPA and ;SOLACE 863 1491 D plus 6 Nine transports 1469 2960 D plus 7 PINKNEY 622 3 s&> D plus 8 Twelve transports ani • 1703 5285 OZARK

EVACUATIOM OF CASUALTIES BY AIR

(Figures from V FhibCorps Reports)

DAY DATS DAILY TOTAL CUMULATIVE TOTAL D plus 12 3 March" 8 8 D plus 13 4 " 42 50 D plus 14 5 75 125 D plus 15 6 « 171 296 D plus 16 7 « 131 427 D plus 17 8 »" 225 652 • D plus 18 9 216 868 D plus 19 10 » 48 916 D plus 20 11 "w 244 1160 D plus 21 12 " 211 1371 D plus 22 13 " 56 1427 D plus 23 14 59 1486 D plus 24 15 » 165 1651 D plus 25 16 "« 213 1864 > D plus 26 17 129 1993 D plus 27 18 » 138 2131 D plus 28 19 « 97 2225 i D plus 29 20 « 92 2320 D plus 30 21 "« 57 2377 D plus 31 22 " 19 2396 D plus 32 23 15 2411 D plus 33 24 "« 19 2430 D plus 34 25 7 2437 • D plus 35 26 n 12 2U9 ? jiaAssra Action Report - * ComFhibGrp 2 B«0 JDIA PART (VII) AEROLOGY

1. A cold front which had passed over BD JEIA two days prior to DOG Day was followed by a small high pressure cell. On the morning of the day of the assault landing the skies were partly cloudy with light easterly surface wind. This hisi was soon displaced by the passage of a frontal system, the warm- front passage occurring about 0630K with the winds veering to southwest, and the cold front passage occurring about 15OOK, 20 February. Surface winds veered to the north and the surface velocity increased to an average of twenty knots. Intermittent rain occurred during the day. Ihis system was followed by another weak high pressure cell with surface winds averaging twenty knots from the NNE. # A low pressure center then moved into the area, with a track that passed south' of IWO JIMA. Surface winds backed around the compass as the center moved from the southwest to the northeast. Precipitation occurred intermittently throughout the day of February 22 with the pre- rain ' dominating form. A strong high pressure cell moved in behind the low center and the winds were northeasterly with velocities gradually de­ creasing from 25 knots to an average of 15 knots by February 26th. A weak cold front passage, with light precipitation, occurred about 1200K on the 26th with wind velocities increasing to 20 knots and winds veering from northwest to northeast. Pressures again rose and winds remained easterly with velocities varying from 14 to 20 knots until the next cold front passage. This occurred on the fourth of March, a weak cold front passing over the island at about O4OOK with intermittent rain throughout the remainder of the day* Kind velocities increased slightly following the frontal passage but by night the winds had leveled off at about ten knots. Pressures moved upward and the surface wind becanre northerly after veering completely around the compass. # Surface winds slowly veered toward the south during the fifth and sixth of March with velocities gradually moving up to an average of 14 knots prior to the next weak cold front passage, 1 about O3OOK on the seventh of March. Light rain occurred intermittent ly throughout the seventh with wind velocities averaging northwest fourteen knots. Winds remained northerly with high pressure until the tenth of March, when v.dnds backed to northwest and velocities increased to an average of 18 knots. Pres­ sures gradually rose as a high pressure cell moved into the area with wind velocity decreasing to ten knots and winds veering to northeast by the fourteenth of March. The barometric pressure then started to decline, the wind velocities continued to decrease, and surface winds veered to the east. Winds veered to north at 0600K, 16 March, in advance of a weak cold front passage which occurred at 0200K, 17 March. Following the frontal passage barometric pressures started a slow rise, surface winds veered to northwest, wind velocities increased to 30 knots by 19 March* Intermittent precipitation occurred on 17 March. Winds continued to veer, with a high pressure cell moving into the area, to the east. Precipita­ tion occurred on the 20th of inarch and again on the 22nd of March. As "'IINCIOTO f ~ " Action Report - ComPhibGrp 2 - 2WO JIMA (Part frlJ) Aerology) •» / the high moved out of the area, wind velocities decreased reaching a velocity of 4 knots on the 24th of March, Winds veered to the north­ west fifteen hours prior to the' cold-front passage, withIclear skies and unrestricted visibility, which occurred at 1500K on 24 March, Following the cold front passage, overcast skies and light showers were observed throughout the night. Pressures moved upward as a high displaced the cold front, wind velocities increased to eighteen knots. The cloudiness began to break the night of 25 March and wind moved up­ ward to about 20 knots on the morning of "26 March. 2# It is recommended that the use of a qualified aerographers mate with the Beachmaster to make reports on surf and breaker conditions on the landing beaches be continued. Such information is not only valu­ • able 'for planning and safeguarding the unloading but also provides in­ formation regarding weather features from distant areas which may not be covered by an adequate weather reporting network. 3. Since the empirical relationship between the swell observed in deep water and the surf observed on the beaches has not been well de­ fined it is further recommended that some means of measuring swell accurately in deep water bo provided. This could consist of a light bamboo pole of sufficient length equipped with some sort of a damping disk, to nullify any tendency the pole might have to rise and fall with the swell, suitably painted to make height of swell easily determined. One such unit to be provided at least one ship to be used during the assault phase. 4. On the night of March 6 and the morning of March 7, much valuable data was received from picket destroyers relative to a previously unre­ ported cold front as it moved southward across JEWO JIMu Itin recom­ mended that a simplified weather reporting code be supplied these ships # to facilitate transmission of this information in such a situation with due regard for security measures.

>v it. mxfsm—~* t

Action Report ComfhibGrp 2 -'BK> JIMA (Part (VIS Aerology)

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(Vll)-5 « .-* Col^Ftip|^f4AL COMPHIBGRF»2*IWO j|MA (fA^T^VIt-AEROLCXSYj

LAST PAGE uUL <: Action Report- ComPhibGrp 2 WO JBIA PART (VIII)

SMOKE

1* Smoke again proved to be invaluable as protective cover for ships in the transport area against detection by enemy planes during night air raids. Enemy planes flew over the smoke -hidden ships apparently un­ able to take any effective action. Smoke was used sixteen (16) times for a total of nine (9) hours and forty-seven (47) minutes. During these raids no ships in the smoke screen were hit by bombs. The U.S.S. AUBURN (AGC-1O), completely covered with smoke, was straddled by five bombs with the closest one landing approximately 300 yards • away. Smoke was not used in the daytime to cover transports. 2, Very little difficulty was encountered with the operation of the portable oilfog generators. Their performance throughout the operation was most satisfying. These generators are capable of emitting large volumes of non-toxic smoke that persists for long distances downwind. No trouble was encountered by Floating Smoke Pots M4A2 and Mk3 pots igniting spontaneously. The floating smoke pots are invaluable for establishing a quick screen and maintaining it at the source. •

LAST PAGE c

Action ms&mReport ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA PART (IX) COMMUNICATIONS 1.. General

(a) Throughout the course of the IWO JIMA operation communications generally, were very satisfactory, as witnessed by the ability of command to execute its directives in an expeditious manner* Cir­ cuit discipline was good during the entire operation, and in this respect a marked improvement over previous amphibious actions was readily discernible. Thus were demonstrated the benefits to be derived from constant training and adequate supervision throughout * all echelons of command*. . (b) Existing publications and directives regarding the handling of communications during this assault were found to be fully ade­ quate * The Communication Plan to Operation Plan ComPhibsPac No.. A25-44, plus the schematic diagram of frequency assignments, fur* nished an excellent key to communications for this particular, opera-, tion. CentComTWO and PACCALL, with a few exceptions, stood the test of use well*

(c) Planning for the communications of the operation was simpli­ fied by the presence of most of the interested planning staffs in the same locality. The fitting out of ships ..with equipment was handled efficiently by Navy Yard assistance and under the direc­ tion of Commander, Administrative Command, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet. • (d) Shortly before leaving PEARL, a VHF Radio Teletype installa­ tion was installed in the AUBURN, After considerable testing prior to departure and enroute to the objective this equipment was functioning fairly well. Some interference was noted with the SK radar, caused by the harmonic relationship of the RATT trans­ mitter carrier and the SK radar. This interference was periodic and not continuous. (c) A Joint Communication Center was established in the AUBURN and served all commands embarked. The Flag, -Flagship and Landing Force personnel were pooled and served the communication center under one joint internal organization. This system proved valua­ ble and aided in a close harmony and liaison with the Landing Force Staff, 2% Count ermea sure s (a) In preparation for assuming J3CM control responsibilities, an installation- of interim ROM receiver, analyzer and direction finder equipment was located 'in RalJfcAjl^^hajAyHJßNy Control Action fieporir*T**» lt*|# ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO Jim (Part (IX) - Communications)

was stationed in CIC with direct sound powered communication to

¦ the installation. \ ¦

(b) Rehearsal exercises indicated the value of employing -radar' count ermeasures against enemy air search radars while own sur­ face units are underway* The location of .the surface units by airborne radar was' impossible When airborne radar was' jammed. For an island objective the value of employing a screen to jam • air-search radar while at anchor in the transport area is questionable. Evidence obtained is not conclusive due to the fact that the location of the island objective is .known to the enemy;and there is no real necessity for him to use his radar. He can usually locate the objective by ordinary navigational means or by sighting the usual display of starshells being fired ' # over enemy lines. . 3« "Visual communication enroute to objective ' \ (a) From PEARL KARBCE to ENKETOK a continuous NAN communication watch was maintained from sunset to sunrise by all ships of the task group. At ENPSTOK a periodic watch was substituted for the continuous watch and MM procedure was modified slightly in ac­ cordance with certain recommendations from ships and unit com­ manders of the group. The twelve-inch signal searchlight fitted with a type "H" hood, and the "G" or "AM" type receiver made a good signalling combination for a range, not exceeding 630006 3000 yards. NAN communications, on the whole,. were fair, but not entirely satisfactory due to the following: (1) Lack of an established, uniform procedure. • (2) Eye strain* Severe cases were reported by numerous ships of the group. •

(3) Failure of receivers, and inadecuacy of spares.

(4) High rate of consumption of flashlight batteries for "C" type receivers. (5) Interference from rigging arid booms. (6) Difficultyin keeping lights and receivers trained while zigzagging. . • ¦

V (7) Inadequacjr equipment for sending ail-ships of existing * messages expeditiously. All-ships messages were never cleared completely. The X-2A beacon is unsatisfactory because signals appear Relaying by the use of slurred and indistinct.' direc­ • tional light was too slow.­ SM -W& •jj kw im at Action Report CoraFhibGrp 2 - IWO J3MA (Part (IX) - Communications) «p -b

4» Assault and unloading (a) At #3*OK, DOG Day, the various Task Group Commanders began t» establish functional circuits in the VHF band. Transmissions were held to a minimum*¦ At 0600K radio silence was broken and all cir­ cuits were manned. Equipment was in all respects ready for, •pera­ tion according to plan* (b) Graphs showing the daily volume of traffic on radio. circuits are attached* ; .

(c) On DOG plus EIGHT Day the following Commanders were embarked • on the tUS.S. AUBURN and were assigned radio equipment in Flag Bridge Badio to control their groups and carry out their duties: (1) LST Flotilla Commander, (2) ISM Flotilla Commander. (3) LCT Group Commander.

(4) Pont«on and Causeway Commander •

(5) Control Group Commander ?

This brought together the commands interested in the phase. However, from a communication standpoint, the effect was to use the SCR 608 channels from the flagship more extensive­ ly. Previously all outgoings were handled on a limited number • / tf circuits. It was necessary for the above commanders to com*­ munieate with their units and in so doing SCR channels on which only a listening watch had previously been kept, became active. During the early part of the unloading phase. order and discipline declined somewhat on the SCR circuits. For the most part this was due to the shifting of traffic from the functional to the gener­ al and the necessity of the higher commands to coirjnunicate with individual units thereby overloading the more widely guarded cir­ cuits.

(d) On DOG plus FIVE Day the portable radio teletype was set up ashore. This means of communication with Headquarters Landing Force was reliable and expeditious. Traffic was handled both ways at once under normal conditions with an alternate means of a simplex circuit in case of failure of one machine. j (c) Marine Corps Navajo Indian voice talkers were employed on Landing Force circuits throughout the assault and unloading. This provided a rapid and reliable means of transmitting clas­ sified messages from the headquarters ship to the Landing iirif!ilipfi-11 ' KflUST'cn Action Report - ComPhibGrp 2 L/0JT+jl (Part (IX) - Communications)

Force Headquarters and Marine Division Command Posts ashore.

5. High frequency radio teletvDe 4

(a) On DOG plus SEVENTEEN Day the high- -frequency radio teletype equipment furnished by Commander Forward Area and used by CTF 51 was 'transferred from the SIDORaDO to the AUBURN. This equipment was installed by technicians in the AUEURK, assisted initially by technicians from the SLDORaDO* The installation was made temporary with the primary purpose of getting the EPS circuit to GUAivi effective as early as possible. (b) Although the equipment worked satisfactorily in the EIDOttADO, • several electrical defects developed either in transit to or in setting up the equipment in the AUBURK and were discovered upon installation. Considerable trouble v^as experienced in elimina­ ting all the difficulties, both mechanical and electrical.

(c) On the morning of DOG plus Ti'J&OT Day, the third day after transfer of the equipment, tests were, conducted with Radio GUAL. Vie received transmissions satisfactorily but Radio GUAL could not receive our transmissions. On DOG plus TtfiftTYGLpS Day another test was made and R^dio I!;-.O JILiA also conducted tests on the same circuit* At 2300K en this day, Badio GUAk co;Tu:i.enced copying AUBURN radio tdlet3Tpe signals, "readability 5", and gave the order to go ahead v;ith traffic, -Fror:; this .tine on, the radio teletype circuit EPS to GUAII, carried a considerable volume of traffic in the form of ;.:ress releases arid encrypted messages. A totai of over 32,400 words of press were sent from the AU3URIC of which about two thirds were sent by HF radio teletype. : 't • 6. Visual communication at objective

(a) Semaphore was employed. with good success, by ships in the anchorage area at the objective. The two sets of luminous sharkskin semaphore flags used by the flagship proved visible to a much higher degree and greater range than ordinary flags, especially during twilight.

(b) Directional flashing light was the fastest and most relia­ ble means of visual communication at. the objective. The flag­ ship's twelve-inch signal searchlights were in almost continuous use during daylight hours from pOG plus OKii Day to DOG plus ELEVEN Day, Several times during this period all ten of the twelve- inch v;ere searchlights on the signal bridge in use simultaneously. i Difficulties experienced in directional flashing light communica­ tions were attributable to:

(1) Improper headings, especially task force organization " c inn* JJUfIL/t If;,? * f .nf Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 * IWO JIMA (Part (IX) - Communications) • ?

call signs.

(2) Carelessly transmitted numerals, especially in the texts of routine reports. ¦ .

(3) Signalmen not alert to visual calls. This was especially true of certain salvage- vessels and other small craft, who were sometimes called for fifteen minutes without answer.

U) Use of voice calls in headings of visual despatches ? (c) The .large hull numbers recently painted on the bow and stern # of transport types and on some landing craft and small vessels were most helpful in identifying ships quickly. The identifica­ tion flags flown'by the ships of Transport Group BAKSR were also of great assistance. 7. Comments on RCM at objective­ (a) On 24 February, a DB picket reported enemy airborne radar signal intercepted which lasted for only a short time. Itis believed that this was a good indication that radar transmis­ sion was probably only being usod to check bearings and naviga­ tion and was not being employed for the entire approach and at­ , tack. It is possible that the enemy was D/Fing our VHF transmis­ sions.

(b) During the entire operation the intercept, receivers indicated that interrogators were left on constantly for periods up to three • or four hours. Not only did this condition prove to troublesome RCM operators but it is an abuse of the interrogator equipment and dootrine.

(c) On^yone enemy shore-based radar signal was detected during the assault phase. This occurred early on DOG Day at 0625K and its characteristics of 100/700/&5 approximated those of a previously reported signal. This signal was no' longer observed after this time. Except for a high PRF tone heard behind the jamming on 23 February no indications of these signals werer received on the AUBURN equipment . It is believed that the primary cause for the non- detection of distant and weak signals is the very long antenna leads necessitated by the location of the RCM equipment in Radio I. Only occasional monitoring was possible on 23 February since, the jamming indications appeared but intermittently on the panoramic 1 adaptor scopes. Positive control would not have been possible from the AUBURN. On '24 February no enemy radar signals or jamming, in-» * dications were observed at any time. Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - EVO JB/rA '(Part (IX) - Communications) •-?

(d) Radio counter-measures

(l) As far as this command is concerned, radio counter-measures were not used against the enemy. Plans were made to check and identify enemy jamming or interference on our frequencies if such were used during the assault, but there were no indica­ tions of enemy jamming on our assault circuits. From the valua> ble information received on the enemy circuits by the Landing Force R.I. section on the flagship, it is believed it would not 'have been advisable to attempt counter-measures or interference with enemy radio in any way after the assault had started. Had jamming or interference been attempted on enemy circuits, they would not have been so free with information that was inter­ # cepted in full concerning their forces. The information re­ ceived was more valuable than effects would have been if enemy circuits had been jammed. High frequency direction finders would have been very valuable in locating the approximate position of the many enemy radio stations on the island, (about 10). The throe DE!s having this equipment on board reported none of them operative or calibrated* Had this fact been reported sufficiently in advance of departure from SAIPAN, they could have been made operative and calibrated. HF/DF's in this operation could have played a great part in the loca­ tion and ultimate destruction of t^my radio stations.

8. Recommendations (general (a) Registered publications issuing offices issue monthly a com­ pilation of all the numerous changes, numbered and unnumbered publications • dispatch corrections to the basic communication such as CentComTWO and PACCALL.

(b) Include in PACCALL or CentComTWO a selected list of phone­ tic and easily remembered code words for types of ammunition, important medical supplies, food and water, for use on voice circuits. Voice circuits from a security point of view, are in great need of a simple code, capable of quick encode and decode, to screen tactical information from the enemy. This code could be used in combination with plain language, the vital words and phrases being encoded and the remainder left plain. The employ­ ment of a simple code in this manner, plus judicious use of the shackle cipher would reduce information leaks to the enemy, es­ pecially on medium frequency voice transmissions.

i (c) Speed up the distribution of the "Task Force Communication Digest" by effecting distribution with OpPlans. Distribution must be complete and actually accomplished so that -those who re­ • quire the Di^>»fjyfjf^f^^V^^iP^^J^ • " """ " "*<"¦• A-4.4 n W Action ReportI ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JiMA (Part (IX) - Qonaminications )

(d)' Choose frequencies for '¦VHF RATT and test to insure no inter­ ference is caused to SK.radar,. .

(c) Bring iJoint Assault, Code up to date for both afloat and ashore use by including commonly used phrases from actual operations.

(f) Continue to use Indian Talkers between the headquarters ship and Landing Force CP ashore. (g) Furnish VHF radio teletype equipment to Transßon and TransDiv • Commanders for use in their flagships. (h) Use Radio Intelligence Platoons during early bombardment phase of the operation in order to obtain early information on number and location of enemy radio stations operating in. enemy held territory. This information might lead to obtaining inter­ cepted information of great Intelligence value. (i) Increase allowance of AGC radio equipment as follows: (1) Two additional TCZ transmitters,, (2) Four additional TCS transmitters. (3) Two additional SCR 608, (j) Increase tender spares as follows • (1) SCR 536 to 30. (2) Vibrators (12 volt) for SCR 610 to 12. (3) Dynamotors for each SCR 508, 608, 808, to 24' for 6088 and 8 for 808s # , Demands for these exceeded the supply. (k) Hhen new VHF multi-channel push button radio equipment is available in limited quantities install such equipment initial­ ly in AGCs, TransDiv flagships, landing craft flotilla and group flagships, RCK equipped ships and ships employed in the screen, in that .order of precedence.

(l) Assign type voice radio calls to landing craft and small ves­ sels and append hull number or part of hull number for positive identification,, Sacrificed security willbe compensated by in­ creased speed of communications. UNP4 ARMnrfl Wnr .< ***&$iLll Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JB/IA (Part (IX) - Communications) »•

(m) Embark IST, 101 and ISM flotilla commanders in DD's or DE's or provide their flagships with.ECM. and special means for its destruction. This willfurnish a, rapid and reliable means :of. sending classified information to these important commanders and .their commands. No satisfactory 'method now. exists for handling

(h) RCM

(l) Each vessel with RCM equipment designate an RCM officer in charge of training^and operation.: This officer .preferably to have an understanding of CIC functions. • (2.) When practicable assign RCM vessels to the screen of night retirement groups. . •

(3) When practicable assign vessels equipped with RCM inter­ cept receivers to radar picket stations.

(A) Arrange assignment of RCM intercept guards so that all bands will be continuously searched by vessels both on picket duty and around the transport area.

(5) Revise and expand present control and reporting signals along the lines of code words now in effect for the fast car­ rier task forces.

(6) Prior to each operation, provide each RCM equipped vessel with a list of all ship, she.shpre, re, and airborne radars which may • be employed by friend or enemy.

(o) Radar

(1) Continue use of LSTs for deck Leading SCR 527 shore-based radars when time permits calibration and when only.one SP radar is available on^ships present at the objective.

(p) Visual communications

,(l)List all special uses of signal flags, for,a particular' for, quick communicati,on- annex, operation, reference, in the ' or in a special communication seption of the appropriate annex of the operation plan. (2) Require, that, $ue to "the -inherent difficulties of NAN i communication and. consequent- eye strain, MAN communication

be reserved for messages whi

(3) Develop and provide an external unit for energising "C" type NAN receivers, (Commander Transport Division FORTYEIGHT reports having constructed and used such a unit with much success).

(4) Provide an all-around light visible through 10,000 yards having a range sufficient to give satisfactory communication to all units of the screen from the vicinity of the fleet • center. The X-2A type transmitter is not satisfactory.

•

i OMPHIB! SGRP2' IW9 JIKA W^gT|)d fcajfcujiuNieAfioNS) , - -200 -200 j j

¦ ¦rrr ! i >' i l : pi'! ENCRYPTED TRAFFIC j/s ' \ j/ !\' /^ I I X : j i_ ! i X i t^ j i /i V \ J~ !!Ii i HANDLEDBY JCC • ' ' y: " 160 ¦-j /! ¦;¦; !¦h I; v\ \ >.s - f¦ 'i SUM TOTAL- 3253 \n ' ; 1t V !I ' ";: 1 f ;'< i ': ': :: VV : ¦ ! iL I DAILYAVERAGE 17.800 CODE GROUPS i ¦\\ ! :/ : .I I I !1 I ! y: ; ! ! ! ! i • 120 , i ¦ ' |-' : > / \/ \ \/ ' l\ iAIl(Ju IM' ' ' / IAUBUHNIBK.IIN', /' V' \ 1//it1I \ AUBURN IN, , IRATTIRAT T T LANDED , 'A ' ' |COMTRANS«RpdICOMTRANS2RPS|COMTRANS«RfH 11-H WESTERN I AMD / : i\ : J £BAtjCRI | _^-^iI\H!\-- \ IAN^HOPAGqANipHOPAGq COMMENCED :\\ \ /A ABLE BAHttP. I^4^^!\ ; SERVINGsi;EP^ING LA-NFOR LA-NFOR / \ / IVEPfK&JtD/^^^IdEPARTEQ£_U-- I\\ !— ! _.- - ; ; ASHORE,ASHORE) ..¦ ¦ / \< . ! » 'V) : -A.\^ •/' I j ": i s Hd^par I >'TT s \r \ \ I I !' \ /I i[. 40 • _^--f" A T-j-¦ RADIO TELETYPE -VHF ' i i•:M M I ¦ ¦ I i i*K!¦ \--'\^J/:¦ ¦¦ ¦ : : / / i : i' t1i\K!; I \i !; TOTAL ¦ i ¦ j : J i ¦ ¦ OUTGOING : — '¦ i i v r--.J__ _i- r"\' ! I i: : ! ,j ! i i i AVERAGE MESSAGE LENGTH , Mi: I ! ! I \"-\ \ ! ¦ i ; , i ABOUT 37 GROUPS Fi 1 i : | I I i i I j i | illI i V-l1 i i 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 36 27 28 I I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 FEBUARY— L... MARCH ! ! ' "¦ ¦ 1 ¦ '"\"\'T~} • 2375 ! ! M : I ! ! \'\ 2200

2025

1850 ' '' ' i \ 'A GROUP ABOARIb 1 1 ¦ / / COMMANDERi \/ \/ \ /ELIMINATINGINTERCEPT r 1675 : : \ / ONFOUR.CfiCUITS j j. _.. _|

1500 ;. .: ....!! ¦...: |.. :..!._.j VOICE MESSAGES \/. \/. ¦ ; i i : | i i NOT INCLUDING-NGF \ ! 1325 1325 \ ...... |. | j CSA-CIC : SUM TOTAL-26580 ' \ A : ; ' ¦¦ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 1150 '. "¦ : : \ ' !"' ' total / / \\ \ ; j I OUTGOING , , \ / , 975 ; . . \y V: .—j ...^' v v ¦ fiOO fiOO / k

625

300 : i i : i : • 200

' ¦ ;' j , ; 100 . i ! i i i ! I ~T~ 1 I 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 , I I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ._ ' ¦¦- i ... FEBUARY-- ¦ MARCH J 250 250 ' ' ' * "— i : : /C~P~~" • J LIW^AT^ER CAUSED . / \ \ :~^FLUCTUATIONS INTRAFFIC * ' ' ¦ / \ ¦ • , i 200

'j ANCHOjRED ' '"' 150 / \ / \ IAUBUR^ "*! j V/TWESTERN ANCHORAGE VISUALMESSAGES \J ¦ \ \ ' SUM /^ I A '\ A~— I TOTAL-2784 ____/ / \ A \ \ / I AVERAGE DAILYOUTGOING-60 / ¦ \ <\ /\\.- - \--,­\--,- / i i TOTAL 100 100 /;\ A ¦¦¦/ \¦• ~~_/ -h ---! OUTGOING .: /; ¦ \ / / \ \ ¦ / y v v x¦ Vj : I ¦ "" ¦¦¦- :.-¦¦-: ; ;;:>-^ :>-^ : | \ , I x ": i N^ . i ! /^f , I —— ——— ——— — -J .—. . I 1 : I i i J* J * L-.L 1 ! i i I i 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I I 12f Jtt I011ai 6 7 AA,ft - FEBUARY FEBUARYBUARY 1 1I|%J IN^gH ft f»| it" *«•"' £-. f**>*M LAST PAG: «WMsra Action Report - ComPhibGrp 2 'IWO J3&A PART (X) % FORCE BEACHMASTER REPORT SECTION (A) ASSAULT UNLOADING

1, By 1100 DOG Day communication had been established with nearly­ all advanced elements of beach parties on the individual beaches and by 1300 communication had been established with most of the TransDiv • Beachmasters and two Transßon Beachmasters. 2. A serious problem from the very first hour was the salvaging and clearing of broached and wrecked boats, plus LVT's and DUKVPs, from the beaches so that supplies could be landed and general unloading expedited. These had accumulated because of the surf, soft sand, and enemy gunfire. 3. During the first four days in addition to handling essential supplies for the troops, all efforts on the beaches were devoted to beach clearance, preparation of exits and the construction of lateral and in­ land roads. This work was interrupted many times especially on the beaches on the right flank, by enemy mortar and artillery fire. 4. The Underwater Demolition Teams working with LCS(L)'s, LCl's and small salvage boats were responsible for most of the salvage work and wreck clearance, Division Shore Party engineers later aided by Corps Shore Party worked continuously on the building and improvement of exits and roads. The steel, accordion type matting proved invaluable and made • it possible to move wheeled vehicles over the beaches. 5« Casualty evacuation during the early phase of this operation was accomplished satisfactorily by utilizing DUKW's, LVT's and any type of landing craft, including LSLi's on several occasions. 6. On DOG plus FIVE Day the north half of Beach RED WO and the south half of Beach YELLOV7 ONE was redesignated as Beach BLACK and assigned for the use of Third Marine Division. This beach was placed under the control of the Transßon ELEVEN Eeachmaeter,

7* Pontoon causeways and pontoon barges could not be used because of the heavy surf. Several attempts were made to place causeways with no success. Barges were loaded with supplies but these could not be handled on the beach and most of the supplies were lost and barges ended up adrift* 8. The assault beach parties of Transßon SIXTEEN were relieved on DOG plus NINE Day by GroPac ELEVEN on Beach GREEN and by a Beach party from parties / Transßon ELEVEN on Beaches RED. The assault beach of Transßon FIFTEEN were relieved .on • DOG \p\vts EBEVSN Day •by the Force Beachmaster " ' Actj.on Report"- ¦ --.r. r - Com% ibGrp 2 IWD J3MA (Part (x) Force- Beachraaster RePortj Section (A) Assault Unloading) aided by personnel from GroPac ELEVEN. < 9. On DOG plus ELEVEN Day Beach PURFLE TV/O was established for the handling of LCT's and small boats because the surf on the eastern beaches became too rough. It operated until DOG plus SEVENTEEN Day. This beach also was used for the evacuation of casualties. 10. At 0800 on DOG plus EIGHTEEN the Force Bea'chmaster was secured by CTF 53 and the Garrison Beachmaster took over the beaches. •

•

* .;.- 1-f^g if /f.f s*" ' "-'(x)-2 Action Report -*¦***•*I*U wwwssraComPhibGrp 2 IWO JBU (Part (X) Force Beachmaster Report) SECTION (B) I COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Beach Partiest Beach Operations and Equipment < (a) There were several factors that contributed to the accumulation of wreckage on the beaches. The steepness of the beach combined with a rough surf with short high breakers resulted in the broaching and swamping of many small landing craft. (b) LST's and LSM's proved to be good beaching ships because they extended seaward beyond the breaking point of the surf. Ihe LCT's and LCM's on the other hand, proved many times to be too short # under conditions and were very to keep on the beach« these ' difficult At no time, however, was it possible to safely keep LCVP ? s on the beach and unload them.

(c) The soft volcanic sand was the cause for breakdown and abandon­ ment of many LVTf s, tanks, and vehicles at the water line. Tracked vehicles sunk deeply in the sand and in attempting to turn some broke their tracks.

(d) Beach clearance was impeded by the quick accumulation of sand in and around the wrecked craft and vehicles.

(c) The beachmaster s did splendid work, but it is to be noted that on beaches where outstanding performance was achieved the beach- master was an experienced officer• Beaches were fairly well • organized under difficult operating conditions. (f) On this operation ComPhibGroup TWO had equipment that could be made available to any unit when needed. This equipment included seven armored Bulldozers, seven cranes and one LeTourneau Crane with Euclid treads. (g) Bulldozers (armored)

(l) Seven TD-18 bulldozers were obtained through the Force Supply Officer and the armor assembly was designed and con­ structed by the 70th Naval Construction Battalion. The plating used was 20# STS and all welded. These were made available on the beaches for assault unloading and were, also employed by the troops in offensive warfare when they found their own armored TD-16 too light. 30 caliber fire and mortar fire did not affect their operation. These bulldozers should be made standard equipment for Assault shore parties. IMGUSSTO Action ITeTx?*-** *** &.f. J[Jf , . -Wrnft ComPhibGrp > 810 JIMA (Part (x) Force- Beachmaster Report; Section (B) Comments and Recommendations) (h) Cranes \ For the first time the assault forces had more than enough cranes on the beaches. Four main, types are to be noted: - a. Track son Swing Crane, CT9 Used for working in confined space especially well suited for use on an L&U - b, Austin Western Badger For use on LST's and on pontoon barges. - - £. Northwest 7g ton capacity For use on the beaches to transfer cargo from small landing craft to trucks or sleds. - • d. LeTourneau 20-ton Crane with Euclid treads Proved in­ valuable on the beach for the moving of heavy loads and in clearing heavy wreckage.,

1. For transporting this crane the boom and the tongue can be separated by burning off several bolts and shipped knocked-down. The lifting blocks can be brought together and the cable coiled.

The repair kits on each crane proved to be adequate.

(i) Steel Matting (a) Marston matting, prefabricated with hinge pins in 50 foot section proved invaluable in this operation. The pre-hinged matting was bound in sections and a total of seven sections were placed on a. steel sled. The sled was pulled by a tractor • and the matting laid behind the sled (see Pictorial Record page 13). A total, of 420,000 sq. ft. (8j miles) of this matting was prefabricated at Pearl Harbor Navy prior to departure; of this, 150,000 sq. ft, was made available to both the Fourth and Fifth Marine Divisions by Corps Shore in pre-assault loading.

RECOMMENDATION I That similar matting, be made available to each assault division in all future amphibious operations, particularly when soft sand is liable to be encountered on the beaches. (j)Fire Pumps

Seven 500 gal/mm fire pumps were provided by the shore party. Each pump had 1000 ft. of hose with it. However, no necessity developed for its use. In addition, one LCS(L) was provided for each Transßon beach, specially equipped with fire fighting wciAmw^ "~ Action Report - **«*JI/ - GomPhibGrp 2 WO JIM (Part (X) Force Beachmaster Report; Section (B) - Comments and Recommendations) t apparatus* RECOMMENDATION : Ihat a trained crew be' assigned to these pumps, and that when LVT's become available* each pump be placed in one to make them mobile fire-fisiting units exclusively. This would prevent damage to 'the equipment particularly to the hose which is quite vulnerable. In addition it would prevent clogging of suction strainer in heavy surf. (k) Smoke Generators (a) Beach and Shore Party Personnel had received previous in­ • structions and training in the use of the smoke, generators. The generators were mounted on pallets together with one drum of fog oil, but were not landed for th%s purpose. (l) Beacfr Signal ing gystem (a) The beach markers brought along on this operation were too heavy and bulky. The lights for use at night were too small and not readily distinguishable. On the beaches at ¦ IWO the standard system of beach markers could not be used* Cargo of all types had to come in to available beaching points, and be dis­ tributed from thorv... .Under similar conditions the most effective marker would have been several solid colored flags spaced at various intervals on each beach. Beaching craft would then be instructed by the Control vessel to beach at a definite color flag on designated beach. At night the same system could be used with beach parties showing colored lights. 3h addition, • mobile range markers should be provided for LsT's and LSM's, with lights for night beaching. W. Pontoon Causewa^ Several unsuccessful attempts were made to install pontoon causeways. If an experienced crew had been in charge of this work there is no doubt that the causeway could have been in­ stalled and that it would have been of considerable help in unloading supplies from smaller boats ard pontoon barges. However, in the planning of future operations at least two 1500 Ib, anchors, one shot of 15 fathoms and one shot of 30 fathoms of 1$" chain should be made a part of each causeway in­ stead of 6" manilla line or 1" wire which is not strong enough. In addition, two pieces of 30 fathoms each of l|" galvanized wire with an eye splice on each end, should be taken along to hold shore end of causeway to deadman on the beach. ays as a direct result of enemy fire and surf condi­ tions. A substantial number of the boats lost in this period could have been saved if the crews of the salvage boats had more training and experience in this type of work, and had the proper type salvage boat been available. During this period there was also an insuffi­ cient number of salvage boats to handle all of the beaches* After • the first two days a greater number of salvage boats were made avail­ able and these together with the experience gained the first two days helped in reducing the number of wrecked craft. The LCPR's used as salvage boats, are not, as now constructed, suited for -this work because they are too light, do not have enough power, and are not maneuver able enough. ' ¦ Fouled propellers were a serious problem throughout the opera­ tion, mostly from loose lines, cargo nets and debris from wrecked landing, craft. Effort was "made to sweep the approaches by salvage boats properly equipped with grapnel' hooks, but this proved diffi­ cult because of surf and also the large number of operating craft unloading in the restricted areas concerned. RECOM/lEMDATION: That a beach salvage organization be established as an integral part of the Attack Force organization. This salvage command would administer and train personnel, and coordinate all • salvage work. The nucleus of this command should consist of officers and men trained and experienced in this type of work, who would .make a study of overall selvage work in an effort to improve methods and equipment. To this command should be made available specially designed shallow draft tugs that could come in and do heavy close shore work thus replacing vessels now being used which are not con­ structed nor equipped to do this work*

(b) The Shore Party should detail a special group who would func­ tion immediately upon landing, to salvage and gather lifebelts, cargo nets, slings, and ail unloading gear to be found on the beaches.

(§) Two new types of salvage boats which are modifications of the present LCPR and LCM are recommended and covered in separate correspondence . "WyAW/Firn (x)6 Action Report - ComfhibGrp 2 - MO JJMA (Part (X) Forcg Beachmaster Report; Section (B) - Comments and. Recommendations) E 3« Communications (a) The medium frequency channel assigned to the Control and Beachmaster units should be guarded continuously by all Force* Transßon and TransDiv Beachmaster Commands. Failure to comply with this channel assignment makes it impossible to contact the violator except by relay, this non-compliance increases traffic on other channels and slows down communication. (b) Extensive use of flashing light for ship to shore communica­ tions should be made by all beach parties during the day and at night when security permits. The minimum amount it was used was • found very satisfactory. Semaphore should be employed when possible for intra and inter beach messages. (c) Operators aboard ships should be cautioned to transmit at a slow speed to stations on the beach to avoid unnecessary repetitions. The unfavorable conditions under which messages are received ashore necessitates a slow transmission. This is especially true at night. (d) Breaches of security were quite common. Operators should have a thorough training in the use of the shackle code, code words and procedure before reaching the objective. The use of the correct channel for the different types of transmissions plus some common sense should be stessed in all voice trainirg.

(c) In order to obtain efficient performance of radios on shore they should be properly spaced. It was found that if they were • placed twenty to twenty- five feet apart there was no interference. Signal lights should be placed at the highest available loca­ tion but at the same time at a place protected from enemy observation and direct fire. (f) Allradio gear should be kept dry. Beachmasters must take steps to see that waterproof coverings available are used when transporting equipment to the beach. Radiomen and signalmen should be trained to make minor adjustments - such as replace­ ment of tubes, fuses and cleaning carbon from generators.

(g) An accurate log of all visual and voice transmissions should be maintained. It will prove a valuable reference and record for future use.

1 f'.| /I *(X)V7, >f '{hfiSi^AGS) i - ComftiibGrp 2 IWO J3MA I PART (X) FORCE BEACHMASTER REPORT SECTION (A) ASSAULT OTJOABING

1. By 1100 DOG Day communication had been established with nearly all advanced elements of beach parties on the individual beaches and by 1300 communication had been established with most of the TransDiv Beachmasters and two Transßon Beachmasters. % 2. A serious problem from the very first hour was the salvaging and 1 clearing of broached and wrecked boats, plus LVT's and DUKWPs, from the beaches so that supplies could be landed and general " unloading expedited. These had accumulated because of the surf, soft sand, and enemy gunfire.

3. During the first four days in addition to handling essential supplies for the troops, all efforts on the beaches were devoted to beach clearance, preparation of exits and the construction of lateral arc* in­ land roads. This work was interrupted many times especially on the beaches on the right flank, by enemy mortar and artillery fire. 4* The Underwater Demolition Teams working with LCS(L)'s, LCl's and small salvage boats were responsible for most of the salvage work and wreck clearance. Division Shore engineers later aided by Corps Shore Party worked continuously on the building and improvement of- exits and roads. The steel, accordion type matting proved invaluable and made • it possible to move wheeled vehicles over the beaches. 5. Casualty evacuation during the early phase of this operation was accomplished satisfactorily by utilizing DUKW's, LVT's and any type of landing craft, including LSLl's on several occasions. 6. On DOG plus FIVE Day the north half of Beach RED TWO and the south half of Beach YELLOW ONE was redesignated as Beach BLACK and assigned, for the use of Third Marine Division. This beach was placed under the control of the Transßon ELEVEN Beachmaster. 7. Pontoon causeways and pontoon barges could not be used because of the heavy surf • Several attempts were made to place causeways with no success. Barges were loaded with supplies but these could not be handled on the beach and most of the supplies were lost and barges ended up adrift. 8. The assault beach parties of Transßon SIXTEEN were relieved on DOG plus NINE Day by GroPac ELEVEN on Beach GREEN and by a Beach party from Transßon ELEVEN on Beaches RED. The assault beach parties of Transßon FIFTEEN were relieved on DOG plus ELEVEN Day by the Force Beachmaster tiityi&'Ksf"-Wl} A i¦ 1 1 i * f Action Report - - CornelibGrp 2 HO JIMA (Part (x) Force- Beachmaster Report; Section (A) Assault Unloading) aided by personnel from GroPac ELEVEN. 4 9. On DOG plus ELEVEN Day Beach PURPLE WO was established for the handling of LCT's and small boats because the surf on the eastern beaches became too rough. It operated until DOG plus. SEVENTEEN Day. This beach also was used for the evacuation of casualties* 10. At 0800 on DOG plus EIGHTEEN the Force Beachmaster was secured by CTF 53 and the Garrison Beachmaster took over the beaches* •

•

(JO-2 •ActionrfssiFe Report - ComPhibGrp 2 IWO' J3MA (Part (X) Force Beachmaster Report) i SECTION (B) COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Beach Parties, Beach Operations and Equipment (a) There were several factors that contributed to the accumulation of wreckage on the beaches. The steepness of the beach combined with a rough surf with short high breakers resulted in t-he broaching and swamping of many small landing craft.

(b) LST's and LSM's proved to be good" beaching ships because they 'extended seaward beyond the breaking point of the surf. Ihe LCT's • and LCM's on the other hand, proved many times to be too short under these conditions and were very difficult to keep on the beach. At no time, however, was it possible to safely keep LCVP's on the beach and unload them.

(c) The soft, volcanic sand Was the cause for breakdown and abandon­ ment of many LVT's, tanks, and vehicles at the water line. Tracked vehicles sunk deeply in the sand and in attempting to turn some broke their tracks. (d) Beach clearance was impeded by the quick accumulation of sand in and around the wrecked craft and vehicles. (c) The beachmasters did splendid work, but it is to be noted that on beaches where outstanding performance was achieved the beach- master was an experienced officer. Beaches were fairly well • organized under difficult operating conditions. (f) On this operation ComfhibGroup TWO had equipment that could be made available to any unit when needed. This equipment included seven armored Bulldozers, seven cranes and one LeTourneau Crane with Euclid treads. (g) Bulldozers (armored)

(l) Seven TD-18 bulldozers were obtained through the Force Supply Officer and the armor assembly was designed and con­ structed by the 70th Naval Construction Battalion. The plating used was 20# STS and all welded. These were made 'available on the beaches for assault unloading and were also employed by the troops in offensive warfare when they found their own armored TD-16 too light. 30 caliber fire and mortar fire did not affect their operation. These bulldozers should be made standard "equipment 'for assault shore parties.

.'! /< (x)-3 h W fit jrfNL

- - ComPhibGrp" 2 BO JKA (Part (x) Force- Beachmaster Report; Section (B) Comments and Recommendations) (h> Crane s 4 For the first time- the assault forces had more than enough cranes on the beaches." Four 'main types are to be noted: a. Trackson Swing Crane, CT9 - Used for working in confined space especially well suited for use on an ZsM. - tu Austin Yiestern Badger For use on LST's and on pontoon barges. - - £. Northwest 7j ton capacity For use on the beaches to transfer cargo from small landing craft to trucks or sleds* - • d. LeTourneaii; 2o-ton Crane with Euclid treads Proved in­ valuable on the beach for the moving of heavy loads and in clearing heavy wreckage. 1. For transporting this crane the boom and the tongue can be separated by burning off several bolts and «, shipped knocked-down. The lifting blocks can be brought together and the cable coiled*

The repair kits on each crane proved to be adequate.

(i) Steel Matting

(a) Marston matting, prefabricated with hinge pins in 50 foot section proved invaluable in this operation. The pre-hinged matting was bound in sections and a total of seven sections were placed on a. steel sled. The sled was pulled by a tractor • and the matting laid behind the sled (see Pictorial Record page 13). A total of 420,000 sq. ft. (8g miles) of this matting was .prefabricated at Pearl Harbor Navy Yard prior to departure; of this, 150,000 sq. ft. was made available to both the Fourth and Fifth Marine Divisions by Corps Shore in pre-assault loading.

RECOMMENDATION : That similar matting be made available to each assault division in all future amphibious operations, particularly when soft sand is liable to be encountered on the beaches. (o) Fire Pumps

Seven 500 gal/mm fire pumps were provided by the shore party. Each pump had 1000 ft. of hose with it. However, no necessity developed for its use." ,In addition, one LCS(L) was provided for each Transßon beach, specially equipped with fire fighting

¦ a XMv ;:f;K.' (x)-4 - C6mPhibGrp 2 - BftfO JIMA (Part (x) -Force Beachmaster Report; Section (B) - Comments and Recommendations) * «^ apparatus.

RECOMMENDATION t That- a' trained crew be assigned to these pumps, and that when LVT's .become available, each pump be placed in one to make them mobile fire-fisiting units exclusively. This "would prevent damage to -the equipment particularly to the hose which is quite vulnerable. In addition it would prevent clogging of suction strainer in heavy surf. (k) Smoke Generators (a) Beach and Shore Party Personnel had received previous in­ • structions and. training in the use » of the smoke generators. The generators were mounted on pallets together with one drum of fog oil, but were not landed for this purpose* ; a) Beach Signaling System (a) The beach markers brought along on this operation were too heavy and bulky. The lights for use at night were too small and not readily distinguishable. On the beaches at. IWO the standard system of beach markers could not be used. --Cargo of all types had to come in to available beaching points, and be dis­ tributed fromt^orv.,. Under similar conditions the most effective marker would have. been several solid colored flags spaced at various intervals on each beach. Beaching craft would then be instructed by the Control vessel to beach at a definite color flag on designated beach. At night the same system could be used with beach parties showing colored lights. In addition, mobile range markers be provided for LST r s and LSM'.s, • should ' with lights for night beaching. . : . (m) Pontoon Causeways

. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to install pontoon causeways. If an experienced crew had been in charge of this work there is no doubt that the causeway could have been in* stalled and that it would have been of considerable help in unloading supplies from smaller boats and pontoon barges. However, in the planning of future operations at least two 1500 lb, anchors, one shot of 15 fathoms and one shot of 30 fathoms of 15" chain should be made a part of each causeway in~ stead of 6" manilla line or 1" wire which is not strong enough. In addition, tw pieces of 30 fathoms each of lj» galvanized wire with an eye splice on each end, should be taken along to hold shore end of causeway to deadman on the beach. Action Re po rt ComPhibGrp 2 - 810 JIM (Part (X) - Force Beachmaster -Report; Section (b) - Comments and Recommendations) 2. Salvage Operations 4 (a) The largest single problem which confronted all beach and shore parties during the operation was the accumulation of wrecked landing craft and other equipment on the beach approaches, at the waters edge, and on the beaches. Most of the wreckage occurred on DOG and DOG plus ONE' Days, as a direct result of enemy fire and surf condi­ tions, :•¦

A substantial number of the boats lost in this period could have been saved if the crews of the salvage boats had more training and experience in this type of work, and had the proper type salvage boat been available. During this period there was also an insuffi­ cient number of salvage boats to handle all of the beaches* After • the first two days a greater number of salvage boats were made avail­ able and these together with the experience gained the first two days helped in reducing the number of wrecked craft. The LCPR rs used as salvage boats, are not, as now constructed, suited for this work because they are too light, do not have enough power, and are not maneuver able enough.

Fouled propellers were a serious problem throughout the opera­ tion, mostly from loose lines, cargo nets and debris from wrecked landing craft. Effort was made to sweep the approaches by salvage boats properly equipped with grapnel hooks, but this proved diffi­ cult because of surf and also the large number of operating craft unloading in the restricted areas concerned. ' RECOMMENDATION That a beach salvage organization be established as an integral part of the Attack Force organization. This salvage command would administer and train personnel, and coordinate all • salxrage work. The nucleus of this command should consist of officers and men trained and experienced in this type of work, who would make a study of overall salvage work in an effort to improve methods and equipment. To this command should be made available specially designed shallow draft tugs that could come in and do heavy close shore work thus replacing vessels now being used which are not con­ structed nor equipped to do this work. (b) The Shore Party should detail a special group who would func­ tion immediately upon landing, to salvage and gather lifebelts, cargo nets, slings, and all unloading gear to be found on the beaches.

($) Two new types of salvage boats which are modifications of the present LCPR and LCM are recommended and covered in separate correspondence.

• * ¦* ¦ '*,*?'.-: r *:¦- ¦ (X)-6( X)-6 IMSSfFIEOAction Report - - ComfhibGrp 2 JWO JIMA (Part (X) Forcg Beachmaster Report; Section (B) ­ Comments and Recommendations) I «* o» 3. Communications (a) The medium frequency channel assigned to the Control and Beachmaster units should be guarded continuously by all Force* Transßon and TransDiv Beachmaster Commands . Failure to comply with this channel assignment makes it impossible to contact the violator except by relay, this non-compliance increases traffic on other channels and slows down communication,. (b) Extensive use of flashing light for ship to shore communica­ tions should be made by all beach parties during the.day and at night when security permits# The minimum amount it was used was • found very satisfactory. Semaphore should be employed when possible for intra and inter beach messages. (c) Operators aboard ships should be cautioned to transmit at a slow speed to stations on the beach to avoid unnecessary repetitions. The unfavorable conditions under which messages , are received ashore necessitates a slow transmission. This is especially true at night. (d) Breaches of security were qMite common. Operators should have a thorough training in the use of the shackle code, code words and procedure before reaching the objective. The use of the correct channel for the different types of transmissions plus some common sense should be stessed in all voice training.

(c) In Order to obtain efficient performance of radios on shore they should be properly spaced. It was found that if they were • placed twenty to twenty-five feet apart there was no interference. Signal lights should be placed at the highest available loca­ tion but at the same time at a place protected from enemy observation and direct fire. (f) All radio gear should be kept dry. Beachmasters must take steps to see that waterproof coverings available are used when transporting equipment to the beach. Radiomen- and signalmen should be trained to make minor adjustments such as replace­ ment of tubes, fuses and cleaning carbon from generators. (g) An accurate log of all visual and voice transmissions should be maintained. It willprove a valuable reference and record for future use.

v'i*;i ¦¦;;¦ ¦¦;.'ici)-7 ¦ • ''iSisy PAOE) Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA

PART (XI)

DAMAGE * SECTION (A) v OPERATIONAL DAMAGE TO LANDING CRAFT 1. Operational damage to landing craft was considerable. Damage to LCVP»s was caused mostly by the surf and 'beach conditions. The beach was littered with partially submerged LVT s, tanks, LCM's and broken up LCVP's. The loose sand quickly washed into and around the wrecks, making it impossible to tow them clear. The total number of small craft lost * by battle damage, broaching and a few cases of drifting to sea was approximately 209.

2. The operational damage to the LCT's, LSM's and LST's other than on the beaches was caused alongside vessels while unloading with heavy swells running. The action of the swells damaged their sides by rolling and being thrown against the ships side, splitting the seams along the bottom and deck edges and denting the shell plating and frame work. The cane and rope fenders used by the transports reduced the damage to craft considerably. But these fenders were soon ruined and flattened' by the continuous pounding. Wooden fenders are of little protection under these conditions due to the fact that they lack flexibility and apply the im­ pact over a smaller area* Holes and dents were knocked in the sides of the SS SEA STURGEON, CHINA VICTORY, and BRITAIN VICTORY by the bow ramp of the LCT's and LSM!s while coming alongside or while riding under the bow of number 1hatch or the counter of number 5 hatch.

• to cargo 3. While some of the damage inflicted small craft and vessels is caused by carelessness, improper ship handling, inadequate fenders, and securing the craft alongside improperly, most of it is unavoidable when heavy swells are running. Also craft of all sort up to LST's were continually getting their screws fouled in pieces of cable, line and cargo nets in and near the beach edge. Due to the fairly steep beaches, loose volcanic ash and strong undertow anything near the beach water line became a potential hazard to the screws of beaching craft. Approximately 75% of the craft under repair were from fouled and bent screws. Some fouling of screws resulted from beaching LCT's, LSM's and LST's too close together and fouling the stern cable of adjacent craft. 4« The stern anchor windlass machinery of the LCT's suffered con­ siderable damage while alongside cargo vessels due to their exposed location. The housing and radiator knocked against the side of the ship or up against the side under the bow and counter, throwing the machinery out of line and crushing the radiator. j^^iittSs4U\\ Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IT'JO JIMA. (Part (XI) - Damage; Section (A) - Operational Damage to Landing Craft)

?— 5. The pad eyes welded on the LCT's for securing them to the deck of the LST's for transportation /were a source of damage. Many times the decks of LST*s are loaded with ammunition and the pad eyes cannot be burned pff. It is recommended t.hai: these pad eyes be set flush with ? the hull or made by bolting. be portable \ *

•

i

(XI)-2 Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (XI) - Damage)

SECTION (B), REPAIRS TO DAMAGED LANDING CRAFT

1. Plans provided that the senior LSD Commander function as the coordinating agency for repairs to small craft, utilizing the facil­ f ities of the 3 LSDrs plus other vessels of the Service and Salvage Group which were made available to him. After arrival in the area the AGENOR and OCEANUS were made available to assist, and excellent results were accomplished in repairing the constant stream of damaged craft. It soon became apparent that tank deck spaces of the LSD's would be constantly in demand for docking LCT's and LSM's, and weather conditions made repairs on LCM's alongside extremely difficult. This « restricted the amount of repairs that could be accomplished on LCM's and, whenever practicable, damaged LCM's were exchanged with ones in operating condition from ships present. During the period from 19 February to 27 March the following work was accomplished on landing craft:

,SMfs, docked *- 28 CT's, docked -» 26 CM's, repaired, approx.-. 468 2. The spare parts carried forward in the assault shipping, including spares carried by the individual craft, proved to be adequate. However, it is felt that still more could be accomplished by LSD's iftheir repair parties were increased* The present allowance is 1BMLc, 1CMlc, 1 CM2c, 2 CJOc, 1 CSF, 2 SFlc, 3 SF2c, 5 SF3c, 1M2c. This should be increased to 1BMlc, 1Cl&c, 1CM2c, 2 CM3c, 1 CSF, 4 SFlc, 6 SF2c, 10 SF3c, 1 CMoMM, 2 MoMMlc, 3 MoMM2c, and 4 MoMM3c # 8 of the SF rates should be • qualified arc The of arc welding be welders. allowance machines should increased from 2 to 4. 3. The work on many craft which are dry docked or taken alongside for repairs could be done on the scene, such as clearing fouled screws, engine trouble, bow ramp mechanisms and minor hull damage near the water line. This could be accomplished by having a boat such as an LCM, equipped with a welding machine, oxy^acetylene cutting outfit, shallow water diving outfit, towing rig and a 500 G.P.K. fire and drainage pump and the bow of the LCM cut down and fitted with a good bow fender for pushing. These repair crews and equipment should be available on each APA. 4. In order to reduce damage while unloading in heavy swells adequate fenders or camels must be provided* The fenders should be about 3 feet in diameter, flexible, have positive buoyancy and rugged enough to take the pounding and absorb shock. On such craft as an LSM with a fairly high freeboard, lower and upper fenders should be hung. The lower, row of fenders should be floated and provided by the cargo vessel, the other row should be carried by the LSM and secured just below the upper deck level, ifnff^i/IC*C*4tf*'if*"ii\ * " •-''** Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IVO JIMA PART (XI) DAMAGE I SECTION (A) i OPERATIONAL DAMAGE TO LANDING CRAFT 1, Operational damage to landing craft was considerable.. Damage to LCVP's was caused mostly by the surf and beach conditions. The beach was littered with partially submerged LVT's, tanks, LCMls and broken up LCVP's. The loose sand quickly washed into and around the wrecks, making it impossible to tow them clear. The total number of small craft lost • by battle damage, broaching and a few cases of drifting to sea was approximately 209.

2- The operational damage to the, LCT's, LSM's and LST's other than on the beaches was caused alongside vessels while unloading with heavy swells running. The action of the swells damaged their sides by rolling and being thrown against the ships side, splitting the seams along the bottom and deck edges and denting the shell plating and frame work. The cane and rope fenders used by the transports reduced the damage to craft considerably. But these fenders were soon ruined and flattened' by the continuous pounding. Wooden fenders are of littleprotection under these conditions due to the fact that they lack flexibility and apply the im­ pact over a smaller area. Holes and dents were knocked in the sides of the SS SEA STURGEON, CHINA VICTORY, and BRITAIN VICTORY by the bow ramp of the LCT's and LSM's while coming alongside or while riding under the bow of number 1hatch or the counter of number 5 hatch, • 3. While some of the damage inflicted to small craft and cargo vessels is caused by carelessness, improper ship handling, inadequate fenders, and securing the craft alongside improperly, most of itis unavoidable when heavy swells are running. Also craft of all sort up to LST's were continually getting their screws fouled in pieces of cable, line and cargo nets in and near the beach edge. Due to the fairly steep beaches, loose volcanic ash and strong undertow anything near the beach water line became a potential hazard to the screws of beaching craft. Approximately 75$ of the craft under repair were from fouled and bent screws. Some fouling of screws resulted from beaching LCT's, LSM's and LST's too close together and fouling the stern cable of adjacent craft.

4. The stern anchor windlass machinery of the LCT's suffered con­ siderable damage while alongside cargo vessels due to their exposed location. The housing and radiator knocked against the side of the ship or up against the side under the bow and counter, throwing the machinery out of line and crushing the radiator. liWJ

«* 5. The pad. eyes welded on the LCT's for securing them to the deck of the LST's for transportation were a source of damage. Many times the decks of LST's are loaded m,X>h ammunition and the pad eyes cannot i be burned pff. Itis recommended that these pad eyes be set flush with the hull or be made portable by bolting. ) •

•

>mit\mni (XI)-2 Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (XI) - Damage) SECTION (B)

REPAIRS TO DAMAGED LkM)IM> CRAFT

1. Plans provided that the senior LSD Commander function as the coordinating agency for repairs to small craft, utilizing the facil­ ities of the 3 LSD's plus other vessels of the Service and Salvage Group which were made available to him. After arrival in the area the AGENOR and OCEANUS were made available to assist, and excellent results were accomplished in repairing the constant stream of damaged craft. It soon became apparent that tank deck spaces of the LSD's would be constantly in demand for docking LCT's and LSM's, and weather conditions made repairs on LCM's alongside extremely difficult. This restricted the anount of repairs that could be accomplished on LCMf s and, whenever practicable, damaged LCM's were exchanged with ones in operating condition from ships present. During the period from 19 February to 27 March the following work was accomplished on landing craft:

,SM's, docked - - - - — CT»s, docked 2< CM's, repaired, approx*- 46)

2. The spare parts carried forward in the assault shipping, including spares carried by the individual craft, proved to be adequate. However, it is felt that stillmore could be accomplished by LSD's iftheir repair parties were increased. The present allowance is 1 BMLc, 1CKLc, 1 CM2c, 2 CM3c, 1 CSF, 2 SFlc, 3 SF2c, 5 SF3c, 1M2c. This should be increased to 1BMlc, 1 CIO.C, 1 CM2c, 2 CK3c, 1 CSF,' U SFlc, 6 SF2c, 10 SF3c, 1 CMoMM, 2 MoMMlc, 3 MoMM2c, and k MoMfiOc, 8 of the SF rates should be # qualified arc welders. The allowance of arc welding machines should be increased from 2 to 4. 3. The work on many craft which are dry docked or taken alongside for repairs could be done on the scene, such as clearing fouled screws, engine trouble, bow ramp mechanisms am minor hull damage near the water line. This could be accomplished by having a boat such as an LCM, equipped with a welding machine, oxy-acetylene cutting outfit, shallow water diving outfit, towing rig and a 500 G.P.K* fire and drainage pump and the bow of the LCM cut down and fitted with a good bow fender for pushing. These repair crews and equipment should be available on each APA. 4. In order to reduce damage while unloading in heavy swells adequate fenders or camels must be provided. The fenders should be about 3 feet in diameter, flexible, have positive buoyancy and rugged enough to take the pounding and absorb shock. On such craft as an LSM with a fairly high freeboard, lower and upper fenders should be hung. The lower row of fenders should be floated and provided by the cargo vessel, the other row should be carried by the LSM and secured just below the upper deck * • . , i}; ,_ _, level. iwir'wjsyicu.t. i. ? ? '>«. yMfiyssinfT; i Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA PART (XII) CHRONOLOGY OF SHIPS PRESENT IWO JIMA

DURING. PERIOD' COMPHIBGRP 2 SOPA' ITO JIMA 9-28 MARCH, 1945 EAST LONG. DATES

9 March 1?45 SHIPS PRESENT at IWO JIMA and in operating and retirement areas at O9OOK on departure of ComPhibsPac (CTF 51) in ELDORADd (AGC 11). Note? At # I'OOOK ComPhibGrp 2. ceased to be CTF 53 and became CTG 51.21. AGC 's - AUBURN (AGC 10) (ComPhibGrp 2 - SOPA; ComLSTFlot 13; ComLSMGrp 13; ComLSMGrp 14; ComLCTGrp 48). ISP 'a - ASHLAND (LSD 1), BELLE GROVE (LSD 2), XAP and XAK - CAFE GEORGIA, CAPE ISABEL, CAFE SAN MARTIN, CAPE STEPHENS, DASHING WAVE (Captain Macgovran - ComGarrisonGroup ZERO), SEA RUNNER, SEA STURGEON (Captain Lustie - ComGarrisonGroup ONE), CAPE FEAR, CHINA VICTORY, BRITAIN VICTORY. LST's - 84, 247, 634, 642, 646, 676(M), 731, 761, 764/ 784, 928, LCl's - 80, 345, 346, 348, 437, 471. LSM's - 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 59, 60, 92, 140, IU,143, 145, 201, 206, 207, 238, 239, 241, 242, 260, 261, 264, 266, SC's - 1054, 1270. PC's - 779, 800, 1588. VMS's - 193, 235, 288, 345, 351T407, 426, 475, 478. LCT's - 630, 631, 6327^92, 860, 866, 1028, 1029, 1030, 1031, 1055, 1061, 1154, 1269, 1300, 1318,1245, 1393, 1404.. CHINCOTEAGUE .(AVP 24), AGENOR (ARL 3), OCEANUS (ABB 2), SHACKLE (ARS 9), ZEBRA (AKN 5), JOLIET VICTORY (XAE), J.D. SLOAT (XAE), SOLACE (AH 5), CACHE (AO 67), NEMASKET (AOG 10), TOMBIGBEE (AOG 11), WABASH (AOG 4), TAWAKONI (ATF 114), ZUNI (ATF 95), ATR 52, YP 42, # BITTERBUSH (AN 39), CANOTIA (AN 47), LANCEWOOD (AN 48), SILVERLEAF (AN 68), SUMNER (AGS 5) (Captain Reppy - ComServßon 10 Rep.), SALT LAKE CITY (CA 25) (ComCruDiv 5), TUSCALOOSA (CA 37), M.L. ABELE (DD 733), BENNION (DD 662), BRONSON (DD 668) (ComDesßon 50), BRYANT (DD 665), CAPPS (DD 550) (Com- Desßon 46), GOTTEN (DD 669), DCETCH (DD 670), GREGORY (DD 802), GATLING (DD 671), HULL (DD 586), HEALY (DD 672), HOWORTH (DD 592), IZARD (DD 589), LEUTZE (DD 481), LITTLE (DD 803), MC CAIX (DD 400), PUTNAM (DD-757), STANLY (DD 478), TWIGGS (DD 591), yAN VALKENBURGH (DD 656) (ComDesßon 58), DEEDE (DE 263), ELDEN (DE 264), DIONNE (DE 261), OVERTON '(APD 23), HUMPHREYS (APD 12), DICKERSON (APD 21), HERBERT (APD 22), R.H. SMITH (DM 23), H.A. V.ILEY (DM- 29), HOWARD (DMS 7), HAMILTON (DUS 18), Area VARNISH t (TU 52.2.3) SAGINAW BAY (CVE 82) (CTU 52.2.3 - ComCarDiv 25), SARGENT BAY (CVE 83), WAKE ISLAND (CVE 65), TULAGI (CVE 72), PATTERSON (DD 392), CAMPBELL (DD 443), HALLIGAN (DD 484), BAGLEY (DD 386), ROWELL (DE 403), SEIVERLING (DE 441), MOCRE (DE 442), 6'FLAHERTY (DE 340). Area VARNISH (TU 52.2.5) - ENTERPRISE (CV 6) (pTU 52.2.5 - C«inCarDiv 7),*EaSKA (CB 1), FLINT (CL 97), MONSSEN (DD 798), LAWS (DD 558), PRITCHETT (DD 561), LONGSHAW (DD 559),MERTZ (DD 691), REMEY (DD 668), NORM.'IN SCOTT (DD 690). Area PORCH (TU 12.6.2) (Point EQUITY 0100K daily) - ROCKBRIDGE (APA 228) ¦ I ?, . .. . I, (Xll)-lM«*/?ii*"h ,':VS\ \v^r^^ \ i (

Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IViD JIMA (Part (XII) - Chronology of ships present ItfO JIMA during period ComPhibGrp 2 SOPA IWO JIMA) - (CTU 12.6.2 ComTransDiv 59), KINGSBURRY (APA 177), GRIMES (APA 172), BOLLINGER (APA 234), BECKHAM (APA 133), SEVIER (APA 233), LANDER (APA 178), PICKAWAY (APA 222), HERCULES (AX 41),, JUPITER (AX 43), CAPE JOHNSON (AP 172), W.C. MILLER (DE 259) (ComCortDiv 16), T. PARKER (DE 369), CABANA (DE 260), YJYMAN (DE 38), LOVERING (DE 39), SEDERSTROM (DE 31), CANFIELD (DE 262} •

ARRIVALS:

1500K - TU 12.6.1 at Point ALIMONY to operate area CELLAR - ZEILEN (APA 3) (CTU 12.6.1 - CoiriTransßon 20), GOLDEN CITY (AP 169), G.F. ELIOTT (AP 105), PRES. PC&K (AP 103), WINGED ARROW (AP 170), HERAID OF THE MORNING (AP 173), JOHN LAND (AP 167), PRES. MONROE (AP 104), STORM # KING (AP 171), ELECTRA (AKA 4), THUBAN (AKA 19), COOLBAUGH (DE 217) (ComCortDiv 36), HARMON (DE 678), GREENWOOD (DE 679), DARBY (DE 218), J.D. BLACKWOOD (DE 219), LOESER (DE 680). DEPARTURES: - - 0900K ELDORADO (AGC 11) (CTF 51 ComPhibsPac), PUTNAM (DD 757). ETA GUAM 3/11/45. - - - 1500K TU 51.29.16 VAN VALKEN3URGH (DD 656) (CTU 51.29.16 ComDesßon 58), NEMASKET (AOG 10), TOMBIGBEE (AOG 11), DASHING WAVE (XAP) (Captain Macgowan), CAPE ISABEL (XAK), CAPE SAN MARTIN (XAK), BRYANT (DD 665), SMITH (DM 23), WILEY (DM 29). ETA SAIPAN 3/11/45. - - - 1800K TU 51.26.2 ENTERPRISE (CV 6) (CTU 51.26.2 ComCarDiv 7), FLINT (CL 97), ALASKA (CB 1), MONSSEN (DD 798), LAWS (DD 558), PRITCHETT (DD 561), LCMSHAW (DD 559), MERTZ (DD 691), REMEY (DD 668), NORMAN SCOTT (DD 690), ETA ULITHI3/12/45. # 10 March 194 ARRIVALS: 0800K - CASE (DD 370), FS 207. DEPARTURES: - - .0800K TU 51.29<17 - CAPPS (DD 550) (CTU 51.29.17 ComDesßon 46), HALL (DD 583) (ComDesßon 51)/TKIGGS (DD 591), BENNION (DD 662), LEUTZE (DD 481), M.L. ABELE (DD 733). ETA ULITHI3/12/45. - 0800K OVERTON (APD 23) (OTC), CAPE GEORGIA (XAK). ETA LEYTE 3/14/^5. ' - " 1000K HAMILTON (DD 590). ETA ENIWBIOK 3/13/45. ni'Vfii^ Ip|iM!fWV. (xii)-2 V >¦ I Action Report CornPhlbGrp 2.- IWO JIMA (Part (XJI)" - Chronology rf ships present IT'IO JIMA - during period ComPhibGrp 2 SOPA TO JIMA) 1200K - SHACKLE (ARS 9^ ETA ULITHI 3/12/45. 180QK SOLACE (AH 5). ETA' GUAM" 3/12/45. 1830K - TU 51*29.18 - CASE (DD 370) (CTU 51.29.18), CAPE STEPHENS (XAK), LSM 59, TAWAKONI (ATF 114). ETA SAIPAN 3/14/45. 11 March 1945 ARRIVALS: - • 1200K ROTfiELL (DE 403) from TU 51.26.1. 2016K - SEDERSTROM (DE 3D from TU 12.6.2. DEPARTURES: 11C0K .-¦ DICKERSON (APD 21). ETA GUAM 3/13/45. 1900K - TU 51.26.1 - SAGINAW BAY (CVE 82) (CTU 51.26.1 - ComCarDiv 25), SARGENT BaY (CVE 83), TULAGI (CVE 72), WAKE ISUI© (CVE 65), escorted by PATTERSON (DD 392), HALLIGAN (DD 584), SEIV3RLBJG ¦ (DE 441), MOORE (DE 442), CAMPBELL (DE 443), O1O 1FLAHERTY (DE 340). ETA ULITHI 3/14/45. 12 March 194 ARRIVALS: • * 080CK BOUNTIFUL (AH 9). 1600K - RATHBURNE (APD 25). DEPARTURES: 1300K - TU 51.29.20 - LITTLE (DD 803) (CTU 51.29.20), WABASH (AOG 4), ETA SAIPAN 3/14/45. 1900K - TU 51.29.19 - SALT UKE CITY (CA 25) (CTU 51.29.19 ­ C:mCraDs.v 5), TUSCALOOSA (CA 37), BAGLEY (DD 386), SEDERSTROM (DE 31), ROWHL (DE 403). ETA ULITHI3/15/45. 13 March 19^ ARRIVALS:- 1300K TU 96.3.17 - HYDE (APA 173) (CTU 96,3.17), ATTaLA (APA 130), SANTA ISABEL (XAP), (?AK), KINGSPORT VICTCRY (XAK). mmtm JIQWIf T/vILIIAMB. LEEDS (XAK),'•Wi±^iai- -dX'W^SpiP' '(XiSK),. STADTEELD (DE 29), (Xli)-3 1

4 Action Report i ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIMA (Part (XII) - Chronology of ships present IWO JIMA during period ComPhibGrp 2 SOPA IWD JIMA) EMERY (DE 28), CLIMAX (AM161). 1400K - CURRIER (DE 700) (OTC), LST 768, 816, 886, VMS 412. DEPARTURES; - 1100K - TU 51.29.21 STAMLY (DD 478) (CTU 51.29.21), JOHET VICTORY (XAK). ETA SAIPAN 3/15/45. 1600K - TU 51.29.23 - CURRIER (DE 700) (CTU 51.29.23), J.D. SLOAT (XAK). ETA SAIPAN 3/16/45. 14 March 1945 # ARRIVALS: - 0600K TU 12,6.2 - RDCKBRIDGE (APA 228) (CTU 12.6.2 - ComTransDiv 59), KINGSBURY" (APA 177), GRIMES (APA 172), BOLLINGER (APA 234), SEVIER (APA 233), LANDER (APA 178), PICKAWAY (APA 222) BECKHAM (APA 133), PHES. POLK (AP 103), CAPE JOHNSON (AP 172), HERCULES (AX 41), JUPITER (AX 43), escorts W.C. MILLER (DE 259) (ComCort- Div 16), T. PARKER (DS 369), CABANA (DE 260), CANFIELD (DE 262). DEPARTURES: 0800K - TU 51.29.24 * HUMPHREYS (APD 12) (CTU 51.29.24), HERBERT (APD 22). - ETA LEYTE 3/17/45­- 1100K TU 51.29.26 HOI.ORTH (DD 592) (CTU 51.29.26), LST 886, 816. ETA SAIPAN 3/17/45. • - 1200K - TU 51.29.25 LST 84 (CTU 51.29.25), 784, ISM 242, VMS 412, SC 1054. •ETA SAIPAN 3/19/45. 1800K - BOUNTIFUL (AH 9). ETA GUAM 3/16/45. 15 March 1945 ARRIVALS: (NONE)

DEPARTURES : - 0800K - TU 51.29.22 to operate area CELLAR SEA STURGEON (XAP) (CTU 51.29.22 - Captain Lustie), SEA RUNNER (XAP), CAPE FEAR (XAK), EMERY (DE 28), CLIMAX (AM161). - 1600K - TU 51.29.27 HYDE (APA 173) (CTU 51.29.27), ATTALA (APA 130), 'GREGORY (DD 802), STADTFELD (DE 29). ETA SAIPAN 3A7/45. (XII)-4 < t Action Report - - ComPhibCxrp 2 IWO JIMA (Part (XII) Chronology of ships present IWO JIMA during period ComPhibGrp 2 SOPA B7Q JIMA) 16 March 1945 ARRIVALS: - 0700K SEA RUNNER (XAP), escorted by GREENWOOD (DE 679) from area CELLAR* GREENWOOD (DE 679) returned. - 0700K LEGION VICTORY (XAK), PC 590. DEPARTURES:

1200K - TU 51.29.28 - CACHE (AO 67) (CTU 51.29.28), T. PARKER (DE 369) # to TG 50,8. 17 March 1945 ARRIVALS: (NONE)

DEPARTURES: - - 0900K TU 51.29.29 OCEANUS (ARB 2) (CTU 51-29.29), PC 590. ETA SAIPAN 3/20/45. 18 March I1I1 ARRIVALS: - 0630K - TU 12.6.1 from area CELLAR ZEILIN (APA 3) (CTU 12,6.1— ComTrans- • Ron 20), GOLDEN CITY (AP 169), GEORGE, F* ELLIOT (AP 105), WINGED ARROW (AP 170), HERALD OF THE MORNING* (AP 173), JOHN LAND (AP 167), PRES. MONROE (AP 104), STORM KING (AP 171), ELECTRA- (AKA'4). THUBAN (AKA 19), with escorts COOLBAUGH (DE 217) (ComCortDiv 36), DARBY (DE 218), J.D. BLACKWOOD (DE 219), LOESER (DE 680), HARMON (DE 678), GREENWOOD (DE 679). 0630K - TU 51.29.22 from area CELLAR - SEA STURGEON (XAP) (CTU 51.29-22 Captain Lustie), CAPE FEAR (XAK), escorts EMERY (DE 28), CLIMAX (AM161). - 0630K COSSATOT (AO 77), T. PARKER (DE. 369). DEPARTURES: - - 1000K TU 51.29.1 EMERY (DE 28) (CTU 51.29.1), SEA RUNNER fXA?), SANTA ISABEL (XAP), RUTLAND VICTORY (XAK), CLIMAX (AM 3.61), ETA SAIPAN 3/20/45.

t (XII)~5 »

UjiffWut?!^;«yrr ,p :;» "^ * ...» ;.O* 111! Action Report - ComPhibGrp 2 ItoO JIMA (Fart (XII) ­ Chronology of ships present TUG -JIMA during period CpmPhibGrp 2 SOPA IKO JIMA) 19 March 1945* ARRIVALS: 1530K - DUNLAP (DD 384.) (ComDesßorv 4), CUfcMNGS (DD 365), CASE (DD 370). 1730K - RICHARD O'BRIEN (ARU 4), CASSIN (DD 372). DEPARTURES; (NOME)

20 March 1( ARRIVAIS; • 1100K - YOG 72, LST 727, IMS 151, 267, HOLLY (AN 19). - 1330K TU 96.6.5 - ZAURAK (AX 117) (CTU 96.6.5), ALKAID (AX 114), ALDERAMIN (AX 116), CELENO (AX 76), WILLIAMSON (DE 370), FRENCH (DE 367). DEPARTURES; - 0800K - TU 51.29.2 - ROCKBRIDGE (APA 228) (CTU 51.29.2 ComTransDiv 59), KINGSBURY (APA 177), GUIDES (APA 172), BOLLINGER (APA 234), SEVIER (APA 233), UNDER (APA 173), PICKAVJAY (AFA 222), BECKHAJi (APA 133), BELLE GROVE (LSD 2), CHINA VICTORY (XAK), HERCULES (AX 41), PRES. POLK (AP 103), escorts fi.C. MILLER (DE 259) (ComCortDiv 16), CABiJ^A (DE 260), DIONNE (DE 261), CANFIELD • "¦¦ (DE 262); DEEDE (DE 263), ELDEN (DE 264), HOWARD (DMS 7). ETA GUAM 3/22/45. « - # XBOOK -TU 51.29.3 IST 768 (CTU 51.29.3), VMS 151, 267. ETA'SAIPAN 3/24/45. 1830K - TU 51.29.4 ­ JUPITER (AX 43) (CTU 51.29.4), T. PARKER (DE 369). ETA HHIEKTOK 3/25/45. 21 March

ARRIVALS; (NONE)

DEPiiRTURESi (NONE) 22 March 194; ARRIVALS: 1230K - LST 38, CURRIER (DE 700) • (XII)-6 f 4 I Action Report ComPhibGrp 2 - IWO JIM (Part (XII) - Chronology of ships present IWO JIMA during period ComPhibGrp 2 SOPA BVO JIMA)

DEPARTURES: - 1800K RATHBURNE (APD 25). ETA GUAM 3/24/45. - 1820K - TU 51.29.5 CURRIER (DE 700) (CTU 51.29.5), LST 928, 634. ETA GUM 3/28/45. 23 March 194:

ARRIVALS: (NONE) • DEPARTURES : (NONE) 24 March 1945 ARRIVALS: (NONE)

< DEPARTURES : - 1500K -TU 51.29.7 FRENCH (DE 367) (CTU 51.29.7), WILLIAMSON (DE 370), ETA ENIWETOK 3/29/45. 25 March 1945 ARRIVALS: - 0830K - MARSHFIELD VICTORY (XAK),SWANSON (DD 443). 1130K - LST 648, s^, 300, 275, FANNING (DD 385). 1230K TU 96.6,6 - RANDALL (APA 224) (CTU 9,6.6.6 - ComTransDiv 69), # QUEENS (APA 103), MASSILLON VICTORY (XAK), Vv.M. HAYS (XAK), CHRISTOPHER G~LE (XAK), with escorts COUNSEL (AM 165), CHANGE (AM159).

DEPARTURES:

1600K -TU 51.29.8 - SWANSON (DD 443) (CTU 51.29.8), LST 731, 247. ETA GUAM 3/29/45.

ARRIVALS:

HOOK - SAFEGUARD (ARS 25).

DEPARTURES: (NONE)

(XII)-7 k. wW W Wtehmi *j4j4 ill**-**Ih111 1 Action Report- - I ComPhibGrp 2 IK) JIMA (Part (XII) Chronology of ships present IWO JIMA during: period ComPhibGrp 2 SOPA IWO JIMA): 27 March 1945 ARRIVALS;

Q93OK - (2nd Echelon Harbor Development) - ATR 58 (OTC), ATR 16, YTB 66, OT 3t6', VMS 291', CONCRETE 12, CONCRETE 7, PONTOON S4RGE. 1300K - LCI 449, SC 1373. DEPARTURES: - 1000K - TU 51.29.9 HEALY (DD 672) (CTU 51.29.9), THUBAN (AKA 19), ETA GUAM 3/29/45. • - - 1800K TU 51.29.6 ZEILIN (APA 3) (CTU 51;29.6 ­ ComTransßon 20), GOLDEN CITI (AP 169), GEORGE F. ELUOT (AP 105), WINGED ARROW (AP 370), HERALD OF THE MORNING (AP 173), JOHN LAND (AP 167), < FRES.. MONROE (AP 104), STORM KING (AP 171), CAPE JOHNSON (AP 172), ELECTRA (AKA 4), CAPE FEAR (XAK), SEA STURGEON (XAP) (Captain Lustle), * dJHIAND (LSD 1), COOLBAUQH (DE 217) (ComCortDiv 36), D/i^BY (DE 218)^ IBLACKWOOD(DE 219"), HAHMDN (DE 678), GPJEEN;-JOOQ (DE.67?"), ' IZARD (DD 589), MC CALL (DD 4CO). ETA ENIWETOK 4/2/45. " 26 March 1945-'­ • No arrivals or departures prior 0800K. . At 08Q0K TGS-1-.21 dissolved and SOPA functions JCWO JIMA transferred to CbmDesßon 4 in DUNLAP (DD 364); ComPhibGrp 2 departed on temporary duty for GUAM by,air, ComPhibGrp 2 Adniiaistration remained in AUBURN (AGC 10). At 1039K TU 51.29.12 underway for PEARL. via Ei^IWETOK. TU 51.29.12 (G,O. AUBURN- OTC): AUBURN (AGC 10), LEGION VICTORY (XAK), BRITAIN VICTORY (XAK), # GOTTEN (DD 669), LOESKI (DE 680).

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DOG Day Bombardment. SURIBACHI Hitby White Phosphorous. •

DOG Day Bombardment. UNCLASSIFIED fc w w H 58? >W

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DOG Day Afternoon— Note Broached LCVP's blocking beach Tanks moving up over rough sand. Supplies beginning to congest beach due to steep terrace HDLJSWI ' '' " \mtr -^Bfc gm ft aL *-.*> <%mwi f^»

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Wrecked LCVP's, LVT's and trucks obstruct the beach.

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Lookingnorth from YELLOW TWO-_>jnte steep bank at high water UWLttSWEP

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DUKW's and LVT'sunable to climb the steep terrace.

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Broached LCVP's and bogged dowr, truck block the beach.

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Damaged LVT(A)and Jap Lugger obstruct the beach. •

Eight days \*+&r *hp T.VTCA^ Vms nrnptirnllv disannearerJ in the hifting sands 'IMCLASSIFIFP a CO C

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Lack of exits caused congestion of supplies on beaches.

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LST's and LSM's are forced to land close together due to wreckage f^issinrn 111 1All1

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Unimproved roads impeded the movement of supplies.

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~~~ Bulldozers reduced the terraces making exits to the lateral ffl&ASSff*' UNCLASSIFIED

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Preassembled Marston matting on runner sleds was laid on roads and beach exits. •

A general view of RED Beach showing matting on roads. (MMSSW-um CONFIDENT!AI

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The steep beach gradient, the surf and the volcanic sand caused numerous small craft to broach —Note flooding from backwash over ramp. •

Though broached, prompt action saved the supplies. UNCLASSIFIED 9EW UNCLASSIFIEL

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Delivering cargo on runner sleds —Note casualty evacuation station in background.

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iandling palletized 105mm ammunition. JNCLASSIFIED \>

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Unloading of pontoon barge with an LVT.

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Beach and surf conditions wrecked numerous barges. "Uncollected- " cargo nets on the beach went ndrif* r issini

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Shifting sands made it necessary to demolish wrecks and remove them piecemeal. •

The LeTourneau crane was an invaluable piece of equipment. UNCLASSW& *

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The armored bulldozer rendered outstanding service both on the beach and in the front lines.

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DOG Day plus ELEVEN. Opposites with the same fate.

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LSD renders assistance to a pontoon barge. CONFIDEN TF 41

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The Marston matting showed the effects of heavy traffic but the supplies were cleared from the beaches. •

LCT 1029 broached on DOG Day plus ELEVEN and eventually had to be sunk at sea. CONFIDENTIAL

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12 inch 750 lb rocket. Range 5000 yards. Explosive charge 310 lbs. •

Beached Jan LSM on RpspVi rtttf:two

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Effects of NGF on 5inch CD gun emplacement atop cliffoverlooking Eastern Beaches. •

* Field of fire > inch gr~ flrvshown above. •

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Rugged terrain in the northern part of the island made progress difficult and casualties high. irassintp

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Example of damage to LCT's while alongside APA's and AKA's— Note ruptured seams between deck and sides. JWCIASSIFIEr

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