DOCSLIB.ORG

Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiatives in Afghanistan. Actors

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiatives in Afghanistan. Actors Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m SWP Co 501962–2012 Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiatives in Afghanistan WP S Actors, Demands, Germany’s Role as Mediator Nils Wörmer It is widely held that NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan can only succeed if progress is made in the country’s internal peace process. But none of the initiatives to date have been able to initiate meaningful negotiations, nor has it been possible to reach lasting agreements on representatives, mediators, topics and procedures. Numerous actors have already been involved in exploratory talks involving both independent and inter- connected threads. It would represent an important step forward if existing initiatives could be channelled into an orderly negotiating process. Germany can play an impor- tant mediating role here. Talks about a political resolution of the Afghanistan conflict will be protracted and complex, their outcome open. Forward strategic thinking must also consider the possibility of the Afghan peace process failing. In July 2012 Afghanistan’s President Hamid gorically excluded top-level (strategic) talks Karzai again asked the German government of any kind with Afghan insurgents. But for help in mediating peace talks. In 2010 contacts have always existed at district and 2011 Germany had arranged secret and provincial level. talks between representatives of the Taliban Since 2002 the Afghan government has and the United States. By early 2012 these maintained communication of varying had led to the temporary establishment of a quality and intensity with the three main Taliban liaison office in Qatar. While many currents of the insurgency: Taliban, Islamic observers regard the “Qatar process” as the Party (Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) and most promising initiative to date, it has Haqqani network. President Karzai’s posi- been on ice since March 2012. It is not yet tion on talks has sometimes appeared con- clear whether the German efforts will move tradictory, inviting insurgent leaders to forward or whether this mediation initia- talks in Kabul and guaranteeing them safe tive will fail too. passage while excluding such talks (appar- During the initial years of the ISAF ently at U.S. behest) in official pronounce- mission the United States and NATO cate- ments. At the latest since 2008, however, Nils Wörmer is a Senior Associate inSWP’s Asia Division SWP Comments 44 December 2012 1 Kabul appears to be earnestly interested in political committee of the Taliban leader- talks at the highest level, above all with the ship council, the rahbari shura. Taliban and the HIG. In both rounds the Saudi government The various past initiatives reveal which apparently offered Mulla Omar and Gul- actors wish to be involved in future nego- buddin Hekmatyar permanent or tempo- tiations, which representatives are accept- rary sanctuary in Saudi Arabia if a political able, and who comes into question as resolution of the conflict could be reached. mediator. They also supply insights into British diplomats were involved in prepar- the core demands of the parties, the inter- ing the second round, which also discussed ests of external actors and ultimately the the possibility of power-sharing with the room available for compromise. Taliban. The international community explicitly welcomed the Saudi initiative, with only Initiatives to Date the Iranian government expressing strong Saudi activities. At Kabul’s request the criticism and thereby staking its claim to Saudi government organised in 2008 and a role in any Afghan peace deal. The Saudi 2009 the first initiative leading to direct role is also controversial in Afghanistan, high-level contacts between the Afghan meeting rejection by Shiite groups and government, the Taliban and the HIG. After individual leaders of the former Northern troublesome experiences with the Taliban Alliance. Although repeatedly mentioned in the 1990s, Riyadh was initially cautious by President Karzai over the past three and made its core concern – that the Tali- years, the Saudi initiative remains in ban openly distance itself from al-Qaeda – abeyance. a precondition for future engagement in Talks on the Maldives. Three inofficial the Afghan peace process. meetings between representatives of the The first of two rounds of talks came Afghan government, the Taliban, the HIG about in September 2008, in the guise of and the non-militant opposition took an invitation from King Abdullah to break place on the Maldives in January, May and fast together at the end of Ramadan. The November 2010. While the initiative had Afghan government was indirectly repre- little influence on the substance of the sented at both meetings by the President’s peace process, Afghan observers nonethe- older brother Qayum Karzai, who holds no less regard it as significant for its contribu- government office. Apparently no official tion to confidence-building and establish- representatives of the HIG and Taliban ing contacts. leaderships participated in the first round, The initiative was proposed by Homay- with only former functionaries attending oun Jarir, another of Hekmatyar’s sons-in- the meeting in Mecca. The latter included law. The Afghan government was not in- the last foreign minister of the Taliban gov- cluded in the preparations for the talks, ernment, Mulla Ahmad Wakil Mutawakil, which were funded privately by Afghan and the Taliban’s former ambassador to businessmen, and repeatedly indicated that Pakistan, Mulla Abdul Salam Zaeef. Partici- it did not expect them to advance the peace pation in the second round in February process. Although President Karzai rejected 2009, chaired by the head of the Saudi intel- the initiative, he sent close personal ad- ligence service, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul- visers as observers to all three rounds of Aziz, was higher-ranking: the HIG repre- talks. HIG and Taliban were represented by sented by Ghairat Bahir, son-in-law of its associated parliamentarians and provincial leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the Taliban governors. Hekmatyar’s son Feroz also par- by Mulla Agha Jan Mutassim, a son-in-law ticipated as his personal envoy. Emissaries of Mulla Omar and former chair of the of the Haqqani network are reported to have attended the third meeting. SWP Comments 44 December 2012 2 In the concluding declaration of the ment in response to the signing of the Stra- third round in November 2010 the par- tegic Partnership Agreement between ticipants proposed establishing a “high Afghanistan and the United States. Shortly national security council” to serve until a beforehand, important representatives of cease-fire could be concluded. The Council the non-militant opposition had welcomed would have to confirm all government more unequivocally than ever before the decisions by two-thirds majority before prospect of a reconciliation between the implementation. The meeting declared the Afghan government and Hekmatyar’s party. withdrawal of all foreign forces and the EU and UN exploratory talks with Tali- cessation of all external attempts to inter- ban leaders. Since 2007 various actors have vene in the peace process to be precondi- endeavoured to arrange talks with top Tali- tions for a cease-fire. As the next step the ban commanders or confidants of Mulla results of the conference were to be dis- Omar. cussed with representatives of Pakistan In 2007 Michael Semple, the deputy to and Iran. the European Union special representative HIG initiatives. As well as participating for Afghanistan, held talks with high-rank- in the talks in Saudi Arabia and the Mal- ing Taliban that gave rise to much specula- dives, and countless smaller exploratory tion. When the Afghan government got meetings within and outside Afghanistan, wind of Semple’s diplomatic activities it the HIG also opened up a separate, bilateral expelled him, plainly wishing to underline channel with the Afghan government. that there was to be no contact with leaders The first decisive move came in spring of the insurgency without its participation 2008, after the release of Hekmatyar’s im- or at least knowledge. prisoned son-in-law Ghairat Bahir. Numer- Since spring 2009 Kai Eide, the head of ous secret meetings between Gulbuddin the UN mission in Afghanistan, has met Hekmatyar and various emissaries of the with high-ranking Taliban leaders several Karzai government followed, leading to times at various locations. The last of these the first direct talks between the Afghan meetings, in early January 2010 in Dubai, President and a five-member HIG delega- discussed possible venues and conditions tion led by Qutbuddin Helal in mid-March for future exploratory talks. According to 2010. Helal, former deputy prime minister Eide, this channel broke off in February and Hekmatyar’s long-serving second-in- 2010 when the Pakistani intelligence ser- command, presented the Afghan govern- vice arrested Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar ment with a fifteen-point HIG peace plan, in Karachi. Mulla Baradar was one of Mulla which has been thoroughly discussed since Omar’s deputies, chief military strategist then. The HIG’s most important demands and operative leader of the Taliban move- include full and complete withdrawal of ment. He is reported to have authorised NATO forces, an electoral law reform, new the exploratory talks with the UN, and via elections, and the preparation of a new emissaries opened up his own contacts to constitution by the newly elected parlia- the Afghan government and probably also ment. According to statements made by to the Iranians. high-ranking Afghan government officials In autumn 2010 it became known that and HIG representatives in spring 2012, the British intelligence service had, with they had agreed in principle on many the knowledge of the Afghan government points of controversy, but the talks were and NATO, been in contact for several deadlocked over the question of the pres- months with a man identifying himself as ence of Western forces after 2014 and the Mulla Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, mili- status of the constitution.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban
    Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban A thesis submitted to the Miami University Honors Program in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for University Honors with Distinction by, Brandon Smith May 2005 Oxford, OH ABSTRACT AFGHANISTAN, 1989-1996: BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE TALIBAN by, BRANDON SMITH This paper examines why the Afghan resistance fighters from the war against the Soviets, the mujahideen, were unable to establish a government in the time period between the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989 and the consolidation of power by the Taliban in 1996. A number of conflicting explanations exist regarding Afghanistan’s instability during this time period. This paper argues that the developments in Afghanistan from 1989 to 1996 can be linked to the influence of actors outside Afghanistan, but not to the extent that the choices and actions of individual actors can be overlooked or ignored. Further, the choices and actions of individual actors need not be explained in terms of ancient animosities or historic tendencies, but rather were calculated moves to secure power. In support of this argument, international, national, and individual level factors are examined. ii Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban by, Brandon Smith Approved by: _________________________, Advisor Karen L. Dawisha _________________________, Reader John M. Rothgeb, Jr. _________________________, Reader Homayun Sidky Accepted by: ________________________, Director, University Honors Program iii Thanks to Karen Dawisha for her guidance and willingness to help on her year off, and to John Rothgeb and Homayun Sidky for taking the time to read the final draft and offer their feedback.
    [Show full text]
  • The Civilian Impact of Drone Strikes
    THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS Acknowledgements This report is the product of a collaboration between the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict. At the Columbia Human Rights Clinic, research and authorship includes: Naureen Shah, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, Rashmi Chopra, J.D. ‘13, Janine Morna, J.D. ‘12, Chantal Grut, L.L.M. ‘12, Emily Howie, L.L.M. ‘12, Daniel Mule, J.D. ‘13, Zoe Hutchinson, L.L.M. ‘12, Max Abbott, J.D. ‘12. Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of Center for Civilians in Conflict, led staff from the Center in conceptualization of the report, and additional research and writing, including with Golzar Kheiltash, Erin Osterhaus and Lara Berlin. The report was designed by Marla Keenan of Center for Civilians in Conflict. Liz Lucas of Center for Civilians in Conflict led media outreach with Greta Moseson, pro- gram coordinator at the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School. The Columbia Human Rights Clinic and the Columbia Human Rights Institute are grateful to the Open Society Foundations and Bullitt Foundation for their financial support of the Institute’s Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, and to Columbia Law School for its ongoing support. Copyright © 2012 Center for Civilians in Conflict (formerly CIVIC) and Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America. Copies of this report are available for download at: www.civiliansinconflict.org Cover: Shakeel Khan lost his home and members of his family to a drone missile in 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, and FUTURE by Andrew Watkins
    PEACEWORKS Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, AND FUTURE By Andrew Watkins NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 Making Peace Possible NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 ABOUT THE REPORT This report examines the phenomenon of insurgent fragmentation within Afghanistan’s Tali- ban and implications for the Afghan peace process. This study, which the author undertook PEACE PROCESSES as an independent researcher supported by the Asia Center at the US Institute of Peace, is based on a survey of the academic literature on insurgency, civil war, and negotiated peace, as well as on interviews the author conducted in Afghanistan in 2019 and 2020. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Andrew Watkins has worked in more than ten provinces of Afghanistan, most recently as a political affairs officer with the United Nations. He has also worked as an indepen- dent researcher, a conflict analyst and adviser to the humanitarian community, and a liaison based with Afghan security forces. Cover photo: A soldier walks among a group of alleged Taliban fighters at a National Directorate of Security facility in Faizabad in September 2019. The status of prisoners will be a critical issue in future negotiations with the Taliban. (Photo by Jim Huylebroek/New York Times) The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject. © 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No.
    [Show full text]
  • Commission Internationale De Juristes Mission
    Commission internationale de juristes Mission La Commission internationale de juristes est consacree a la primaute, a la coherence et a l'application du droit international et des principes qui font progresser les droits de l'Homme. La Commission internationale de juristes (CIJ) se distingue par l'impartialite, l'objectivite et l'approche juridique faisant autorite qu'elle applique a la protec­ tion et a la promotion des droits de l'Homme par le biais du respect de la preeminence du droit. La CIJ fournit des services d'experts juridiques aux niveaux national et interna­ tional afin de garantir que le developpement du droit international reste fidele aux principes des droits de l'Homme et que les normes internationales soient mises en oeuvre au plan national. La Commission, creee a Berlin en 1952, est composee de 60 juristes eminents qui representent les divers systemes juridiques du monde. II incombe au Secretariat international, base a Geneve, de realiser les buts et objectifs de la Commission. Pour s'acquitter de cette tache, le Secretariat international beneficie d'un reseau de sections nationales autonomes et d'organisations affiliees implantees sur tous les continents. Parmi les distinctions decernees a la CIJ en hommage aux contributions qu'elle a apportees a la promotion et a la protection des droits de l'Homme figurent le premier Prix europeen des droits de l'Homme attribue par le Conseil de l'Europe, le Prix Wateler pour la paix, le Prix Erasme et le Prix des Nations Unies pour les droits de l'Homme. Commission internationale de juristes Case postale 216 - 81 A, avenue de Chatelaine CH - 1219 Chatelaine / Geneve - Suisse Tel: (+41 22) 979 38 00 Fax: (+41 22) 979 38 01 E-Mail: [email protected] Site web: www.icj.org ELEMENTS FOR A GENERAL RECOMMENDATION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TABLE OF CONTENTS I ntroduction.................................................................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Jirga: Justice and Conflict Transformation
    REPORT Security in South Asia CAMP (Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme) and Saferworld The Jirga: justice and conflict transformation March 2012 The Jirga: justice and conflict transformation COMMUNITY APPRAISAL AND MOTIVATION PROGRAMME and SAFERWORLD MARCH 2012 Acknowledgements This report represents an analysis of primary research commissioned by Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP) and Saferworld in Pakistan during 2011. This report was co-authored by Christian Dennys and Marjana. This publication was designed by Jane Stevenson, and prepared under the People’s Peacemaking Perspectives Project. Particular thanks for their inputs into the research process go to Aezaz Ur Rehman, Neha Gauhar, Riaz-ul-Haq, Habibullah Baig, Naveed Shinwari and Fareeha Sultan from CAMP and Rosy Cave, Chamila Hemmathagama, Paul Murphy and Evelyn Vancollie from Saferworld. CAMP and Saferworld would like to thank officials from Government of Pakistan, members of civil society and all those people living in Lower Dir and Swat who shared their views and opinions despite the sensitive nature of the topic. We are grateful to the European Union (EU) for its financial support for this project. The People’s Peacemaking Perspectives project The People’s Peacemaking Perspectives project is a joint initiative implemented by Conciliation Resources and Saferworld and financed under the European Commission’s Instrument for Stability. The project provides European Union institutions with analysis and recommendations based on the opinions and experiences of local people in a range of countries and regions affected by fragility and violent conflict. © Saferworld March 2012. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution.
    [Show full text]
  • My Life with the Taliban
    MY LIFE WITH THE TALIBAN Courtesy of www.pdfbooksfree.pk ABDUL SALAM ZAEEF My Life with the Taliban Edited by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn Courtesy of www.pdfbooksfree.pk Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright © Abdul Salam Zaeef 2010 Editors’ introduction and translation Copyright © Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, 2010 Foreword Copyright © Barnett R. Rubin, 2010 All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Za’if, ‘Abd al-Salam, 1967 or 8– My life with the Taliban / Abdul Salam Zaeef. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-231-70148-8 (alk. paper) 1. Za’if, ‘Abd al-Salam, 1967 or 8– 2. Taliban—Biography. 3. Afghan War, 2001—Biography. 4. Prisoners of war—Afghanistan—Biography. 5. Prisoners of war—United States—Biography. 6. Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp—Biography. I. Title. DS371.33.Z34A3 2010 958.104'7—dc22 [B] 2009040865 ∞ Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. This book is printed on paper with recycled content. Printed in USA c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared. Courtesy of www.pdfbooksfree.pk CONTENTS Kandahar: Portrait of a City ix Editors’ Acknowledgements xxv Editors’ Notes xxvii Character List xxix Foreword by Barnett R. Rubin xxxvii Preface by Abdul Salam Zaeef xli Maps xlviii–xlix 1.
    [Show full text]
  • “TELLING the STORY” Sources of Tension in Afghanistan & Pakistan: a Regional Perspective (2011-2016)
    “TELLING THE STORY” Sources of Tension in Afghanistan & Pakistan: A Regional Perspective (2011-2016) Emma Hooper (ed.) This monograph has been produced with the financial assistance of the Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Ministry. © 2016 CIDOB This monograph has been produced with the financial assistance of the Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Ministry. CIDOB edicions Elisabets, 12 08001 Barcelona Tel.: 933 026 495 www.cidob.org [email protected] D.L.: B 17561 - 2016 Barcelona, September 2016 CONTENTS CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES 5 FOREWORD 11 Tine Mørch Smith INTRODUCTION 13 Emma Hooper CHAPTER ONE: MAPPING THE SOURCES OF TENSION WITH REGIONAL DIMENSIONS 17 Sources of Tension in Afghanistan & Pakistan: A Regional Perspective .......... 19 Zahid Hussain Mapping the Sources of Tension and the Interests of Regional Powers in Afghanistan and Pakistan ............................................................................................. 35 Emma Hooper & Juan Garrigues CHAPTER TWO: KEY PHENOMENA: THE TALIBAN, REFUGEES , & THE BRAIN DRAIN, GOVERNANCE 57 THE TALIBAN Preamble: Third Party Roles and Insurgencies in South Asia ............................... 61 Moeed Yusuf The Pakistan Taliban Movement: An Appraisal ......................................................... 65 Michael Semple The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan .......................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan's Future Policy Towards Afghanistan. a Look At
    DIIS REPORT 2011:08 DIIS REPORT PAKISTAN’S FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN A LOOK AT STRATEGIC DEPTH, MILITANT MOVEMENTS AND THE ROLE OF INDIA AND THE US Qandeel Siddique DIIS REPORT 2011:08 DIIS REPORT DIIS . DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 1 DIIS REPORT 2011:08 © Copenhagen 2011, Qandeel Siddique and DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark Ph: +45 32 69 87 87 Fax: +45 32 69 87 00 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.diis.dk Cover photo: The Khyber Pass linking Pakistan and Afghanistan. © Luca Tettoni/Robert Harding World Imagery/Corbis Layout: Allan Lind Jørgensen Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS ISBN 978-87-7605-455-7 Price: DKK 50.00 (VAT included) DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk Hardcopies can be ordered at www.diis.dk This publication is part of DIIS’s Defence and Security Studies project which is funded by a grant from the Danish Ministry of Defence. Qandeel Siddique, MSc, Research Assistant, DIIS [email protected] 2 DIIS REPORT 2011:08 Contents Abstract 6 1. Introduction 7 2. Pakistan–Afghanistan relations 12 3. Strategic depth and the ISI 18 4. Shift of jihad theatre from Kashmir to Afghanistan 22 5. The role of India 41 6. The role of the United States 52 7. Conclusion 58 Defence and Security Studies at DIIS 70 3 DIIS REPORT 2011:08 Acronyms AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir ANP Awani National Party FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FDI Foreign Direct Investment FI Fidayeen Islam GHQ General Headquarters GoP Government
    [Show full text]
  • Death-Penalty-Pakistan
    Report Mission of Investigation Slow march to the gallows Death penalty in Pakistan Executive Summary. 5 Foreword: Why mobilise against the death penalty . 8 Introduction and Background . 16 I. The legal framework . 21 II. A deeply flawed and discriminatory process, from arrest to trial to execution. 44 Conclusion and recommendations . 60 Annex: List of persons met by the delegation . 62 n° 464/2 - January 2007 Slow march to the gallows. Death penalty in Pakistan Table of contents Executive Summary. 5 Foreword: Why mobilise against the death penalty . 8 1. The absence of deterrence . 8 2. Arguments founded on human dignity and liberty. 8 3. Arguments from international human rights law . 10 Introduction and Background . 16 1. Introduction . 16 2. Overview of death penalty in Pakistan: expanding its scope, reducing the safeguards. 16 3. A widespread public support of death penalty . 19 I. The legal framework . 21 1. The international legal framework. 21 2. Crimes carrying the death penalty in Pakistan . 21 3. Facts and figures on death penalty in Pakistan. 26 3.1. Figures on executions . 26 3.2. Figures on condemned prisoners . 27 3.2.1. Punjab . 27 3.2.2. NWFP. 27 3.2.3. Balochistan . 28 3.2.4. Sindh . 29 4. The Pakistani legal system and procedure. 30 4.1. The intermingling of common law and Islamic Law . 30 4.2. A defendant's itinerary through the courts . 31 4.2.1. The trial . 31 4.2.2. Appeals . 31 4.2.3. Mercy petition . 31 4.2.4. Stays of execution . 33 4.3. The case law: gradually expanding the scope of death penalty .
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council ISIL (Da’Esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds One Entry to Its Sanctions List
    Security Council 1518 Sanctions Committee Removes One Entry from Its Sanctions List On 30 June 2021, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003) removed the following entry from its Sanctions List of individuals and entities: B. Entities and other groups IQe.116 Name: STATE CONTRACTING WATER AND SEWAGE PROJECTS COMPANY A.k.a.: a) STATE ORGANIZATION FOR WATER AND SEWAGE b) GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR WATER AND SEWAGE PROJECTS c) GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING WATER AND SEWERAGE PROJECTS d) GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR OPERATION WATER AND SEWERAGE PROJECTS F.k.a.: na Address: a) Street no. 52, Alwiya, Al-Nahtha, near P.O. Box 5738, Baghdad, Iraq b) P.O. Box 1011, Basil Square, Baghdad, Iraq c) P.O. Box 1011, Al Wathba Square, Baghdad, Iraq Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information: Press releases concerning changes to the Committee’s Sanctions List may be found in the “Press Releases” section on the Committee’s website at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1518/press-releases. The updated version of the Committee’s Sanctions List, available in HTML, PDF and XML format, may be found at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1518/materials. The United Nations Security Council Consolidated List is also updated following all changes made to the Committee’s Sanctions List and is accessible at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list. Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds One Entry to Its Sanctions List On 17 June 2021, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities approved the addition of the entry specified below to its ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List of individuals and entities subject to the assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo set out in paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2368 (2017), and adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
    [Show full text]
  • Leveraging the Taliban's Quest for International Recognition
    Leveraging the Taliban’s Quest for International Recognition Afghan Peace Process Issues Paper March 2021 By Barnett R. Rubin Summary: As the United States tries to orchestrate a political settlement in conjunction with its eventual military withdrawal from Afghanistan, it has overestimated the role of military pressure or presence and underestimated the leverage that the Taliban’s quest for sanctions relief, recognition and international assistance provides. As the U.S. government decides on how and when to withdraw its troops, it and other international powers retain control over some of the Taliban’s main objectives — the removal of both bilateral and United Nations Security Council sanctions and, eventually, recognition of and assistance to an Afghan government that includes the Taliban. Making the most of this leverage will require coordination with the Security Council and with Afghanistan’s key neighbors, including Security Council members China, Russia and India, as well as Pakistan and Iran. In April 2017, in a meeting with an interagency team on board a military aircraft en route to Afghanistan, U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s new national security advisor, retired Army Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, dismissed the ongoing effort to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban: “The first step, the national security adviser said, was to turn around the trajectory of the conflict. The United States had to stop the Taliban’s advance on the battlefield and force them to agree to concessions in the process .... US talks with the Taliban would only succeed when the United States returned to a position of strength on the battlefield and was ‘winning’ against the insurgency.”1 1 Donati, Jessica.
    [Show full text]
  • Individuals and Organisations
    Designated individuals and organisations Listed below are all individuals and organisations currently designated in New Zealand as terrorist entities under the provisions of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. It includes those listed with the United Nations (UN), pursuant to relevant Security Council Resolutions, at the time of the enactment of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 and which were automatically designated as terrorist entities within New Zealand by virtue of the Acts transitional provisions, and those subsequently added by virtue of Section 22 of the Act. The list currently comprises 7 parts: 1. A list of individuals belonging to or associated with the Taliban By family name: • A • B,C,D,E • F, G, H, I, J • K, L • M • N, O, P, Q • R, S • T, U, V • W, X, Y, Z 2. A list of organisations belonging to or associated with the Taliban 3. A list of individuals belonging to or associated with ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida By family name: • A • B • C, D, E • F, G, H • I, J, K, L • M, N, O, P • Q, R, S, T • U, V, W, X, Y, Z 4. A list of organisations belonging to or associated with ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida 5. A list of entities where the designations have been deleted or consolidated • Individuals • Entities 6. A list of entities where the designation is pursuant to UNSCR 1373 1 7. A list of entities where the designation was pursuant to UNSCR 1373 but has since expired or been revoked Several identifiers are used throughout to categorise the information provided.
    [Show full text]