Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

SWP Co m ments 501962–2012

Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiatives in Afghanistan WP S Actors, Demands, Germany’s Role as Mediator Nils Wörmer

It is widely held that NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan can only succeed if progress is made in the country’s internal peace process. But none of the initiatives to date have been able to initiate meaningful negotiations, nor has it been possible to reach lasting agreements on representatives, mediators, topics and procedures. Numerous actors have already been involved in exploratory talks involving both independent and inter- connected threads. It would represent an important step forward if existing initiatives could be channelled into an orderly negotiating process. Germany can play an impor- tant mediating role here. Talks about a political resolution of the Afghanistan conflict will be protracted and complex, their outcome open. Forward strategic thinking must also consider the possibility of the Afghan peace process failing.

In July 2012 Afghanistan’s President Hamid gorically excluded top-level (strategic) talks Karzai again asked the German government of any kind with Afghan insurgents. But for help in mediating peace talks. In 2010 contacts have always existed at district and 2011 Germany had arranged secret and provincial level. talks between representatives of the Taliban Since 2002 the Afghan government has and the United States. By early 2012 these maintained communication of varying had led to the temporary establishment of a quality and intensity with the three main Taliban liaison office in Qatar. While many currents of the insurgency: Taliban, Islamic observers regard the “Qatar process” as the Party (Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) and most promising initiative to date, it has Haqqani network. President Karzai’s posi- been on ice since March 2012. It is not yet tion on talks has sometimes appeared con- clear whether the German efforts will move tradictory, inviting insurgent leaders to forward or whether this mediation initia- talks in Kabul and guaranteeing them safe tive will fail too. passage while excluding such talks (appar- During the initial years of the ISAF ently at U.S. behest) in official pronounce- mission the United States and NATO cate- ments. At the latest since 2008, however,

Nils Wörmer is a Senior Associate inSWP’s Asia Division SWP Comments 44 December 2012

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Kabul appears to be earnestly interested in political committee of the Taliban leader- talks at the highest level, above all with the ship council, the rahbari shura. Taliban and the HIG. In both rounds the Saudi government The various past initiatives reveal which apparently offered Mulla Omar and Gul- actors wish to be involved in future nego- buddin Hekmatyar permanent or tempo- tiations, which representatives are accept- rary sanctuary in Saudi Arabia if a political able, and who comes into question as resolution of the conflict could be reached. mediator. They also supply insights into British diplomats were involved in prepar- the core demands of the parties, the inter- ing the second round, which also discussed ests of external actors and ultimately the the possibility of power-sharing with the room available for compromise. Taliban. The international community explicitly welcomed the Saudi initiative, with only Initiatives to Date the Iranian government expressing strong Saudi activities. At Kabul’s request the criticism and thereby staking its claim to Saudi government organised in 2008 and a role in any Afghan peace deal. The Saudi 2009 the first initiative leading to direct role is also controversial in Afghanistan, high-level contacts between the Afghan meeting rejection by Shiite groups and government, the Taliban and the HIG. After individual leaders of the former Northern troublesome experiences with the Taliban Alliance. Although repeatedly mentioned in the 1990s, Riyadh was initially cautious by President Karzai over the past three and made its core concern – that the Tali- years, the Saudi initiative remains in ban openly distance itself from al-Qaeda – abeyance. a precondition for future engagement in Talks on the Maldives. Three inofficial the Afghan peace process. meetings between representatives of the The first of two rounds of talks came Afghan government, the Taliban, the HIG about in September 2008, in the guise of and the non-militant opposition took an invitation from King Abdullah to break place on the Maldives in January, May and fast together at the end of Ramadan. The November 2010. While the initiative had Afghan government was indirectly repre- little influence on the substance of the sented at both meetings by the President’s peace process, Afghan observers nonethe- older brother Qayum Karzai, who holds no less regard it as significant for its contribu- government office. Apparently no official tion to confidence-building and establish- representatives of the HIG and Taliban ing contacts. leaderships participated in the first round, The initiative was proposed by Homay- with only former functionaries attending oun Jarir, another of Hekmatyar’s sons-in- the meeting in Mecca. The latter included law. The Afghan government was not in- the last foreign minister of the Taliban gov- cluded in the preparations for the talks, ernment, Mulla Ahmad Wakil Mutawakil, which were funded privately by Afghan and the Taliban’s former ambassador to businessmen, and repeatedly indicated that Pakistan, Mulla Abdul Salam Zaeef. Partici- it did not expect them to advance the peace pation in the second round in February process. Although President Karzai rejected 2009, chaired by the head of the Saudi intel- the initiative, he sent close personal ad- ligence service, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul- visers as observers to all three rounds of Aziz, was higher-ranking: the HIG repre- talks. HIG and Taliban were represented by sented by Ghairat Bahir, son-in-law of its associated parliamentarians and provincial leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the Taliban governors. Hekmatyar’s son Feroz also par- by Mulla Agha Jan Mutassim, a son-in-law ticipated as his personal envoy. Emissaries of Mulla Omar and former chair of the of the Haqqani network are reported to have attended the third meeting.

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In the concluding declaration of the ment in response to the signing of the Stra- third round in November 2010 the par- tegic Partnership Agreement between ticipants proposed establishing a “high Afghanistan and the United States. Shortly national security council” to serve until a beforehand, important representatives of cease-fire could be concluded. The Council the non-militant opposition had welcomed would have to confirm all government more unequivocally than ever before the decisions by two-thirds majority before prospect of a reconciliation between the implementation. The meeting declared the Afghan government and Hekmatyar’s party. withdrawal of all foreign forces and the EU and UN exploratory talks with Tali- cessation of all external attempts to inter- ban leaders. Since 2007 various actors have vene in the peace process to be precondi- endeavoured to arrange talks with top Tali- tions for a cease-fire. As the next step the ban commanders or confidants of Mulla results of the conference were to be dis- Omar. cussed with representatives of Pakistan In 2007 Michael Semple, the deputy to and Iran. the European Union special representative HIG initiatives. As well as participating for Afghanistan, held talks with high-rank- in the talks in Saudi Arabia and the Mal- ing Taliban that gave rise to much specula- dives, and countless smaller exploratory tion. When the Afghan government got meetings within and outside Afghanistan, wind of Semple’s diplomatic activities it the HIG also opened up a separate, bilateral expelled him, plainly wishing to underline channel with the Afghan government. that there was to be no contact with leaders The first decisive move came in spring of the insurgency without its participation 2008, after the release of Hekmatyar’s im- or at least knowledge. prisoned son-in-law Ghairat Bahir. Numer- Since spring 2009 Kai Eide, the head of ous secret meetings between Gulbuddin the UN mission in Afghanistan, has met Hekmatyar and various emissaries of the with high-ranking Taliban leaders several Karzai government followed, leading to times at various locations. The last of these the first direct talks between the Afghan meetings, in early January 2010 in Dubai, President and a five-member HIG delega- discussed possible venues and conditions tion led by Qutbuddin Helal in mid-March for future exploratory talks. According to 2010. Helal, former deputy prime minister Eide, this channel broke off in February and Hekmatyar’s long-serving second-in- 2010 when the Pakistani intelligence ser- command, presented the Afghan govern- vice arrested Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar ment with a fifteen-point HIG peace plan, in Karachi. Mulla Baradar was one of Mulla which has been thoroughly discussed since Omar’s deputies, chief military strategist then. The HIG’s most important demands and operative leader of the Taliban move- include full and complete withdrawal of ment. He is reported to have authorised NATO forces, an electoral law reform, new the exploratory talks with the UN, and via elections, and the preparation of a new emissaries opened up his own contacts to constitution by the newly elected parlia- the Afghan government and probably also ment. According to statements made by to the Iranians. high-ranking Afghan government officials In autumn 2010 it became known that and HIG representatives in spring 2012, the British intelligence service had, with they had agreed in principle on many the knowledge of the Afghan government points of controversy, but the talks were and NATO, been in contact for several deadlocked over the question of the pres- months with a man identifying himself as ence of Western forces after 2014 and the Mulla Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, mili- status of the constitution. tary leader of the Taliban and deputy of In May 2012 the HIG indefinitely sus- Mulla Omar. Only after several meetings, pended direct talks with the Afghan govern- including one with President Karzai, did it

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become apparent that the man was a fraud. nounced his wish to reopen the Saudi chan- Rather than a Taliban leader he was a shop- nel. Important leaders of the Afghan politi- keeper in the Pakistani city of Quetta. cal opposition have expressed reservations Qatar process. At the end of 2009 the and stiff criticism of the Qatar process. They German foreign intelligence service (BND) believe there should only be talks with the succeeded in establishing contact with Taliban if all Afghan groups are included, Tayeb Agha, Mulla Omar’s former personal especially those who fought against the secretary. The first meeting was arranged Taliban before 2001. in spring 2010 in Doha. In November 2010 and again in May 2011 the BND brought Tayeb Agha to Munich, where he became NATO Strategy and the Peace Process the first emissary of the Taliban leadership At the strategic level the United States com- to conduct direct talks with an American pleted a change of course with the new delegation from the State Department and Afghanistan strategy unveiled by President intelligence services, conducted under the Obama in March 2009, now declaring their auspices of the German foreign ministry. fundamental willingness to conduct talks The outcome of these talks was a series with “moderate Taliban”. NATO adopted of confidence-building measures (though central aspects of the new US strategy a some also speak of a political deal that has month later at its summit in Strasbourg/ yet to be implemented). The first part of the Kehl. Since then the topics of negotiation, agreement was the opening of a Taliban reconciliation and reintegration of in- liaison office in Qatar, which could serve surgent fighters have gradually shifted to as a forum for future talks between Mulla the centre of NATO’s internal strategy Omar’s emissaries and representatives of debate. the international community. The United In 2009 and 2010 the newly elected States and the Afghan government made President Obama’s administration deployed the opening of the liaison office conditional tens of thousands of additional troops for a on the Afghan Taliban distancing itself pub- limited period (the “surge”), with the objec- licly from international terrorism. tive of militarily weakening the three most The second part of the agreement related important Afghan insurgent groups – Tali- to an exchange of prisoners. The United ban, HIG and Haqqani network – to a point States raised the prospect of transferring where they had no alternative but to nego- five high-ranking Taliban leaders from tiate. However, this strategy has largely Guantánamo to Qatar, where they would failed. be reunited with their families and placed At the London Afghanistan conference in under house arrest. In return the Taliban January 2010 the ISAF participants and was willing to release three U.S. citizens, the Afghan government laid out the coordi- including Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl who nates for a process that came to be known they have held since June 2009. as “the transition”, during which ISAF In mid-March 2012 the Taliban sus- would hand over responsibility for Afghan- pended the liaison office and prisoner swap istan’s security to the Afghan security talks on the grounds that the United States forces. The transition began in July 2011 was always adding new demands. But they and is due to be completed by the end of indicated via various channels that this did 2014. In London Karzai also announced not mean the end of the Qatar process. that his government would hold a Peace Not being involved in the talks, the Af- Jirga in early summer 2010 to set in motion ghan government was extremely reserved a national peace and reconciliation process about this initiative. When it first heard and establish a reintegration programme of the talks, this caused a diplomatic upset for insurgent fighters, to be funded by the with Qatar, and Karzai pointedly an- international community.

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The Bonn Afghanistan conference in work rejected the Jirga, as did the Taliban, December 2011 and the NATO summit in the latter moreover succeeding in staging Chicago in May 2012 were already making a highly symbolic attack on the venue. A decisions about the time after 2014, for number of important opposition figures which a NATO-led training mission is demonstratively stayed away. planned. The Afghanistan conferences and At the end of July 2010, in response to NATO summits since 2010 have defined a the demands of the Peace Jirga and the im- series of areas in which progress needs mediately ensuing Kabul conference, the be made if it is to be possible to withdraw UN Security Council partly fulfilled a fighting forces by the end of 2014 and request that the Karzai government had stabilise Afghanistan in the long term. submitted years earlier, and removed According to this, creating functioning individual names from the sanctions list. Afghan security forces, strengthening the While this initially affected five former involvement and cooperation of neighbour- Taliban leaders, another fourteen were ing states (especially Pakistan and Iran), removed in July 2011, leaving just 124 improving governance and anti-corruption, names on the list. In June 2011 the list, and above all making progress in the in- which originally contained Taliban and ternal Afghan peace process are precondi- al-Qaeda affiliates without distinction, had tions for the success of the NATO strategy been divided into two separate documents. in Afghanistan. This step is regarded as an important pre- condition for reintegration measures, and for the negotiating process itself. The Afghan Government and the From the outset the manner in which Peace Process the peace process was initiated came in for Initiation of the process. As announced at stiff criticism in Afghan domestic politics. the London conference in January 2010, the The same applies to the instruments Afghan government organised a national, created to implement the process. advisory Peace Jirga at the beginning of High Peace Council. At the end of Sep- June 2010 in Kabul. In the resolution tember 2010 President Karzai announced adopted at the conclusion of the three-day the establishment of the High Peace Coun- gathering chaired by former President Bur- cil, which the Peace Jirga can count as its hanuddin Rabbani, the participants called most important achievement. The Council, for the appointment of a High Peace Coun- again chaired by Burhanuddin Rabbani, cil, as a permanent institution to advance comprises seventy members, which accord- drive the government’s reconciliation pol- ing to a study by Afghanistan Analysts Net- icies and the peace process. The Jirga also work (AAN) included fifty-three former or drew up a comprehensive catalogue of active members of the political-military recommendations to the Afghan govern- organisations that fought in the Afghan ment, the leaders of the insurgency and the civil wars of the 1980s and 1990s. The Coun- international community, proposing for cil includes ten women who, together with example confidence-building measures two men, are regarded as the representa- such as the release of prisoners and the tives of Afghan civil society. According to removal of the names of Afghan citizens the study thirteen council members have from the United Nations sanctions list ties to the HIG, while twelve held govern- based on Security Council Resolution 1267 ment posts during the time of Taliban rule of 15 October 1999. (1996–2001). Afghan civil society organisa- The Afghan government’s choice of chair tions believe that the government could at and the sixteen hundred delegates to the least have avoided appointing individuals Peace Jirga was highly controversial within accused of war crimes and crimes against the country. The HIG and the Haqqani net- humanity.

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The High Peace Council has made but Core Demands of the Parties very slow progress, and has already suffered Afghan government. Kabul demands several severe setbacks. In September 2011 that insurgent groups recognise the Afghan Burhanuddin Rabbani was killed in his own constitution, end the armed struggle and home by suicide bombers posing as repre- unconditionally cease cooperation with sentatives of the rahbari shura, the Tali- transnational terrorist organisations. It also ban’s highest leadership body. About half asserts its right to the lead role in all nego- a year after the killing, President Karzai tiating initiatives and wishes to be involved named Rabbani’s son Salahuddin as the at an early stage in support measures by new chair of the High Peace Council. A few other governments, or at least kept fully weeks later Arsala Rahmani, a high-ranking informed. President Karzai has repeatedly member of the Council, was shot dead in invited both the HIG and the Taliban to his car in Kabul. Rahmani, who belonged to participate in the upcoming 2014 elections the “Taliban group” in the Peace Council, after laying down their arms. It is unclear had been the figure regarded as most likely to what extent the current Afghan govern- to be able to open direct communication ment would be willing to negotiate serious- channels to Taliban leadership circles. ly about power-sharing with the Taliban. The High Peace Council, which is slated Political opposition. The most influen- to play a central role in future negotiations tial figures in Afghanistan’s highly hetero- between the Afghan government and the geneous non-militant opposition demand leaders of the insurgency, has for some recognition of the constitution and the time been facing accusations of ineffective- preservation of the country’s territorial ness, corruption and nepotism. Nonethe- integrity. Many opposition figures reject less, since taking over the chair Salahuddin power-sharing with the Taliban. While Rabbani has succeeded in launching new some are willing to allow the Taliban to initiatives. In summer 2012, in consultation participate in elections, others wish to see with the Pakistani government, representa- the organisation dissolved and its leaders tives of the Council met with Mulla Abdul prosecuted. Leading politicians from the Ghani Baradar, a former deputy of Mulla former Northern Alliance demand partici- Omar captured in Pakistan in February pation in all negotiation initiatives. 2010. It is speculated that he could mediate Taliban. The Taliban do not recognise as an intermediary between the Afghan and the Afghan constitution or government Pakistani governments and the Taliban. and demand the withdrawal of all foreign In the scope of a new initiative to initiate forces as a precondition for participation in peace talks, a High Peace Council delega- peace talks. They see NATO and the United tion led by Rabbani travelled to Pakistan States as their main enemy and are willing in November 2012, where both countries to discuss only isolated issues with them, called on the Taliban to distance itself fully such as the establishment of a liaison office and publicly from al-Qaeda. Both also or prisoner exchanges. Otherwise, there underscored their intention to continue appears to be scant room for compromise. doing everything in their power to support In the case of the Haqqani network, a par- the Afghan-led peace and reconciliation tially autonomous group within the Tali- process. As a gesture of goodwill the Pakis- ban movement, no clear stance on nego- tani government released at least twelve tiations is currently discernible. Many imprisoned Afghan functionaries and Tali- observers regard it as unwilling to nego- ban commanders and raised the prospect tiate. of also freeing Mulla Baradar. Hezb-e Islami. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s organisation demands the withdrawal of all foreign troops and fundamental reforms of the electoral law and the constitution.

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Unlike the Taliban, it at least recognises will have to be accompanied by separate the Afghan government as a negotiating agreements on confidence-building mea- partner. sures of the kind discussed in the Qatar United States and NATO. For the United process or in the scope of the most recent States and NATO, acceptance of the Afghan Afghan-Pakistani initiative. Such talks constitution and recognition of the serving plainly only have a prospect of success if government are non-negotiable. Those are they are kept secret as long as possible. the core concerns to which the ambitious Here too, Germany can continue to play an objectives of the early years of Western important mediating role and provide the involvement have now been reduced. They required forum. also demand that the Afghan insurgents All political and societal groups must be fully and unconditionally cease all cooper- included in future negotiations between ation with transnational terrorist groups. the Afghan parties, which should ideally It is unclear whether the United States be as transparent as possible. Pakistan and requires the Taliban to publicly distance Iran should not be excluded, and at least © Stiftung Wissenschaft und itself from al-Qaeda and recognise the Kar- kept informed about planned initiatives. Politik, 2012 zai government as a negotiating partner as In assessing the Qatar process it must be All rights reserved a precondition for establishing the liaison remembered that the central actor of the These Comments reflect office or exchanging prisoners. peace process – also according to the NATO solely the author’s views.

strategy – was not involved. When the SWP Afghan government tried to enter the pro- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Conclusions and Recommendations cess, the Taliban objected, talks came to a German Institute for To this day it has not been possible to ini- halt and the initiative was regarded as hav- International and Security Affairs tiate substantive talks between the conflict ing failed for the time being. parties in Afghanistan. The peace process The positions of the serving Kabul gov- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 remains largely unstructured. The Afghan 10719 Berlin ernment and the militant opposition cur- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 government’s talks with a fraudster and rently appear to be mutually incompatible, Fax +49 30 880 07-100 the murder of Burhanuddin Rabbani by especially where the status of the Afghan www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] an emissary underline the inadequacy of constitution is concerned. To that extent NATO’s and even the Afghan security the goal often discussed in Western capi- ISSN 1861-1761 forces’ knowledge about the Taliban’s in- tals, of clearly advancing the peace process Translation by Meredith Dale tentions, structures and decision-making in the sense of substantive negotiations (English version of processes. before the conclusion of the transitional SWP-Aktuell 70/2012) Neither in Afghan society as a whole phase in 2014, is also overambitious and nor among the main non-militant political unrealistic. NATO and the Afghan govern- groups is there any consensus about how ment must also be prepared for the even- the peace process should proceed. It is ques- tuality of the transition ending without a tionable whether the Karzai government political solution in sight. and the High Peace Council can succeed in clearly defining the timeframe, partici- pants, issues and venues before the 2014 presidential elections. Germany’s great acceptance among all relevant actors, and not least the relevant experience already gathered in the Qatar process, would allow it to play a supportive role in the inevitable preparatory talks. It is becoming apparent that the nego- tiations between the Afghan parties de- manded by the international community

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