Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m SWP Co 501962–2012 Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiatives in Afghanistan WP S Actors, Demands, Germany’s Role as Mediator Nils Wörmer It is widely held that NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan can only succeed if progress is made in the country’s internal peace process. But none of the initiatives to date have been able to initiate meaningful negotiations, nor has it been possible to reach lasting agreements on representatives, mediators, topics and procedures. Numerous actors have already been involved in exploratory talks involving both independent and inter- connected threads. It would represent an important step forward if existing initiatives could be channelled into an orderly negotiating process. Germany can play an impor- tant mediating role here. Talks about a political resolution of the Afghanistan conflict will be protracted and complex, their outcome open. Forward strategic thinking must also consider the possibility of the Afghan peace process failing. In July 2012 Afghanistan’s President Hamid gorically excluded top-level (strategic) talks Karzai again asked the German government of any kind with Afghan insurgents. But for help in mediating peace talks. In 2010 contacts have always existed at district and 2011 Germany had arranged secret and provincial level. talks between representatives of the Taliban Since 2002 the Afghan government has and the United States. By early 2012 these maintained communication of varying had led to the temporary establishment of a quality and intensity with the three main Taliban liaison office in Qatar. While many currents of the insurgency: Taliban, Islamic observers regard the “Qatar process” as the Party (Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) and most promising initiative to date, it has Haqqani network. President Karzai’s posi- been on ice since March 2012. It is not yet tion on talks has sometimes appeared con- clear whether the German efforts will move tradictory, inviting insurgent leaders to forward or whether this mediation initia- talks in Kabul and guaranteeing them safe tive will fail too. passage while excluding such talks (appar- During the initial years of the ISAF ently at U.S. behest) in official pronounce- mission the United States and NATO cate- ments. At the latest since 2008, however, Nils Wörmer is a Senior Associate inSWP’s Asia Division SWP Comments 44 December 2012 1 Kabul appears to be earnestly interested in political committee of the Taliban leader- talks at the highest level, above all with the ship council, the rahbari shura. Taliban and the HIG. In both rounds the Saudi government The various past initiatives reveal which apparently offered Mulla Omar and Gul- actors wish to be involved in future nego- buddin Hekmatyar permanent or tempo- tiations, which representatives are accept- rary sanctuary in Saudi Arabia if a political able, and who comes into question as resolution of the conflict could be reached. mediator. They also supply insights into British diplomats were involved in prepar- the core demands of the parties, the inter- ing the second round, which also discussed ests of external actors and ultimately the the possibility of power-sharing with the room available for compromise. Taliban. The international community explicitly welcomed the Saudi initiative, with only Initiatives to Date the Iranian government expressing strong Saudi activities. At Kabul’s request the criticism and thereby staking its claim to Saudi government organised in 2008 and a role in any Afghan peace deal. The Saudi 2009 the first initiative leading to direct role is also controversial in Afghanistan, high-level contacts between the Afghan meeting rejection by Shiite groups and government, the Taliban and the HIG. After individual leaders of the former Northern troublesome experiences with the Taliban Alliance. Although repeatedly mentioned in the 1990s, Riyadh was initially cautious by President Karzai over the past three and made its core concern – that the Tali- years, the Saudi initiative remains in ban openly distance itself from al-Qaeda – abeyance. a precondition for future engagement in Talks on the Maldives. Three inofficial the Afghan peace process. meetings between representatives of the The first of two rounds of talks came Afghan government, the Taliban, the HIG about in September 2008, in the guise of and the non-militant opposition took an invitation from King Abdullah to break place on the Maldives in January, May and fast together at the end of Ramadan. The November 2010. While the initiative had Afghan government was indirectly repre- little influence on the substance of the sented at both meetings by the President’s peace process, Afghan observers nonethe- older brother Qayum Karzai, who holds no less regard it as significant for its contribu- government office. Apparently no official tion to confidence-building and establish- representatives of the HIG and Taliban ing contacts. leaderships participated in the first round, The initiative was proposed by Homay- with only former functionaries attending oun Jarir, another of Hekmatyar’s sons-in- the meeting in Mecca. The latter included law. The Afghan government was not in- the last foreign minister of the Taliban gov- cluded in the preparations for the talks, ernment, Mulla Ahmad Wakil Mutawakil, which were funded privately by Afghan and the Taliban’s former ambassador to businessmen, and repeatedly indicated that Pakistan, Mulla Abdul Salam Zaeef. Partici- it did not expect them to advance the peace pation in the second round in February process. Although President Karzai rejected 2009, chaired by the head of the Saudi intel- the initiative, he sent close personal ad- ligence service, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul- visers as observers to all three rounds of Aziz, was higher-ranking: the HIG repre- talks. HIG and Taliban were represented by sented by Ghairat Bahir, son-in-law of its associated parliamentarians and provincial leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the Taliban governors. Hekmatyar’s son Feroz also par- by Mulla Agha Jan Mutassim, a son-in-law ticipated as his personal envoy. Emissaries of Mulla Omar and former chair of the of the Haqqani network are reported to have attended the third meeting. SWP Comments 44 December 2012 2 In the concluding declaration of the ment in response to the signing of the Stra- third round in November 2010 the par- tegic Partnership Agreement between ticipants proposed establishing a “high Afghanistan and the United States. Shortly national security council” to serve until a beforehand, important representatives of cease-fire could be concluded. The Council the non-militant opposition had welcomed would have to confirm all government more unequivocally than ever before the decisions by two-thirds majority before prospect of a reconciliation between the implementation. The meeting declared the Afghan government and Hekmatyar’s party. withdrawal of all foreign forces and the EU and UN exploratory talks with Tali- cessation of all external attempts to inter- ban leaders. Since 2007 various actors have vene in the peace process to be precondi- endeavoured to arrange talks with top Tali- tions for a cease-fire. As the next step the ban commanders or confidants of Mulla results of the conference were to be dis- Omar. cussed with representatives of Pakistan In 2007 Michael Semple, the deputy to and Iran. the European Union special representative HIG initiatives. As well as participating for Afghanistan, held talks with high-rank- in the talks in Saudi Arabia and the Mal- ing Taliban that gave rise to much specula- dives, and countless smaller exploratory tion. When the Afghan government got meetings within and outside Afghanistan, wind of Semple’s diplomatic activities it the HIG also opened up a separate, bilateral expelled him, plainly wishing to underline channel with the Afghan government. that there was to be no contact with leaders The first decisive move came in spring of the insurgency without its participation 2008, after the release of Hekmatyar’s im- or at least knowledge. prisoned son-in-law Ghairat Bahir. Numer- Since spring 2009 Kai Eide, the head of ous secret meetings between Gulbuddin the UN mission in Afghanistan, has met Hekmatyar and various emissaries of the with high-ranking Taliban leaders several Karzai government followed, leading to times at various locations. The last of these the first direct talks between the Afghan meetings, in early January 2010 in Dubai, President and a five-member HIG delega- discussed possible venues and conditions tion led by Qutbuddin Helal in mid-March for future exploratory talks. According to 2010. Helal, former deputy prime minister Eide, this channel broke off in February and Hekmatyar’s long-serving second-in- 2010 when the Pakistani intelligence ser- command, presented the Afghan govern- vice arrested Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar ment with a fifteen-point HIG peace plan, in Karachi. Mulla Baradar was one of Mulla which has been thoroughly discussed since Omar’s deputies, chief military strategist then. The HIG’s most important demands and operative leader of the Taliban move- include full and complete withdrawal of ment. He is reported to have authorised NATO forces, an electoral law reform, new the exploratory talks with the UN, and via elections, and the preparation of a new emissaries opened up his own contacts to constitution by the newly elected parlia- the Afghan government and probably also ment. According to statements made by to the Iranians. high-ranking Afghan government officials In autumn 2010 it became known that and HIG representatives in spring 2012, the British intelligence service had, with they had agreed in principle on many the knowledge of the Afghan government points of controversy, but the talks were and NATO, been in contact for several deadlocked over the question of the pres- months with a man identifying himself as ence of Western forces after 2014 and the Mulla Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, mili- status of the constitution.