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AFRICAN ELECTIONS IN 2015: A SNAPSHOT FOR CÔTE D’IVOIRE, TANZANIA, BURKINA FASO AND SUDAN John Mukum Mbaku, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative INTRODUCTION democratic constitution making to provide each country with institutional arrangements In 2015, many countries in Africa—including that guarantee the rule of law—where the the Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Egypt, latter exists, the law is supreme; a majority of Ethiopia, Guinea, Libya, Mauritius, Niger, the citizens voluntarily accept and respect the South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo and law; there is judicial independence; the law is Zambia—will conduct presidential and/or not administered arbitrarily or capriciously but legislative elections. Most of these countries citizens are able to expect predictable results; have struggled with transition to democracy at there is protection of human rights, including least since the mid-1980s, and some of them those of minority ethnic and religious groups; much more recently. The 2015 elections, then, and governments operate in an open and for some, could be turning points for embrac- transparent manner. ing democracy more closely, and, for others, for significantly deepening and institutional- Openness and transparency are very important izing democracy and emerging as democratic for governance in Africa. Making certain that strongholds on the continent. public policies are designed and implemented in an open and transparent manner not only re- The failure to manage ethnic and religious di- duces corruption but also improves the chanc- versity and provide institutional structures that es that these policies will reflect the values, enhance peaceful coexistence, national inte- interests and aspirations of the country’s rele- gration and nation-building, remains one of vant stakeholders. If discontented groups have the continent’s most intractable governance either had the opportunity to participate fully problems. This failure has produced political and effectively in policy design and implemen- economies that are pervaded by violence, most tation, or were quite aware of how these poli- of it attributable to destructive mobilization cies were chosen and why, they are less likely to by ethnic and/or religious groups that consid- resort to destructive mobilization. er themselves marginalized by public policies, pushed to the economic and political periph- A major challenge for all countries that will ery, and prevented from participating gainfully conduct elections in 2015 will be to ensure that in economic growth. Minimizing violent mobi- the majority of their citizens see these elections lization requires state reconstruction through as free, fair and credible. These governments FORESIGHT AFRICA: TOP PRIORITIES FOR THE CONTINENT IN 2015 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION | AFRICA GROWTH INITIATIVE 50 must (1) provide the security necessary to en- Côte d’Ivoire sure that no one participating in the elections is threatened, molested or denied access to the Historical Context process; (2) make certain that the opposition is provided with adequate access to the media, in- After independence cluding government-owned and operated out- in 1960, Côte d’Ivo- lets, so that it can fully and effectively explain ire was led by the its platform to prospective voters; (3) create an authoritarian leader open dialogue with all constituencies to prevent Félix Houphouët-Boi- feelings of marginalization; (4) minimize polit- gny until his death in 1993. His successor, Hen- ical corruption and avoid any activities (e.g., ri Konan Bédié, who was overthrown in 1999, vote-rigging) that can place the opposition at disastrously emphasized ethnicity in public ser- a competitive disadvantage and enhance the vice, effectively excluding individuals who were ability of the incumbent government to win not considered indigenes of Côte d’Ivoire from the elections; (5) make sure that the national serving in administrative positions. In fact, for- election commission is independent enough to mer International Monetary Fund executive and function effectively in carrying out the election; current president of Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane and (6) provide facilities for domestic and in- Ouattara, was disqualified from participating in ternational monitors so that they can perform the 2000 presidential elections because of his their jobs well and ensure that the elections are ethnicity. Then, President Bédié and many oth- fair, free and credible. ers, claimed that Ouattara was a Burkinabè from neighboring Burkina Faso, and the country’s Importantly, the policy priority for the post-elec- new constitution, approved in 2000, mandated tion governments should be participatory con- that a presidential candidate’s parents must both stitution making to reconstruct the state and be Ivorian. The citizenship issue partly spurred provide institutional arrangements that guar- Côte d’Ivoire’s 2002-2007 civil war. antee the rule of law. However, even if the 2015 elections are successfully carried out and However, in 2007, Laurent Gbagbo, president are considered fair, free, and credible, many of since the 2000 elections, declared that Ouat- these countries will still continue to suffer from tara was qualified to run in the 2010 presiden- high levels of corruption, violence, inequality, tial elections. In the second round of elections, and low economic growth and development an independent electoral commission declared unless they are provided with institutional ar- Ouattara the winner with 54 percent of the rangements that guarantee the rule of law. vote. However, Gbagbo’s supporters argued that there had been fraud and sought to annul Below, we present an overview of some upcom- votes from several regions. The Constitutional ing African elections in 2015. (For an in-depth Council then annulled the electoral commis- look at Nigeria’s elections, see “The 2015 Pres- sion’s declaration and concluded that Gbagbo idential Elections in Nigeria: The Issues and had won 51 percent of the vote. Ouattara and Challenges.”) Over 15 African countries are Gbagbo took parallel oaths of office—though planning elections in 2015; however, due to the international community, including the Af- space limitations, this brief only discusses elec- rican Union, recognized Ouattara as the legiti- tions in Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, mate president. These events resulted in a sec- and the Republic of Sudan. ond civil war and, subsequently, Gbagbo was arrested by the International Criminal Court in FORESIGHT AFRICA: TOP PRIORITIES FOR THE CONTINENT IN 2015 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION | AFRICA GROWTH INITIATIVE 51 2011 for crimes against humanity. Ouattara re- politically connected have access to food (See, mains the president of Côte d’Ivoire. e.g., Aljazeera 2013; BBC World Service n.d.; IRIN 2008). Election 2015 Thus, Ivorians face many challenges in the years Côte d’Ivoire has set presidential elections for to come: They must deal with issues such as October 2015. The major players in these elec- citizenship; government impunity; entrepre- tions are (1) incumbent Allasane Ouattara and neurship and the full participation of all groups his Rassemblement des républicains (RDR); and in wealth creation; and peaceful coexistence— (2) the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI). The FPI, all issues that have contributed to past violent previously led by the now-indicted Gbagbo, is conflicts. Whoever wins the elections (and the currently led by Pascal Affi N’Guessan who will endorsement of Ouattara’s candidacy by Bédié, likely participate in the 2015 elections. The FPI one of the country’s political heavyweights, boycotted the 2011 parliamentary elections, makes Ouattara a likely winner of the 2015 citing bias by the electoral commission for in- presidential contest) should form a government cumbent Ouattara, intimidation of FPI support- that reflects the country’s ethnic and religious ers by the national army, and the government diversity so that it can effectively lead a credi- banning of the pro-FPI newspaper Notre Voie. ble reconstruction effort. The Ouattara govern- In fall 2014, the FPI withdrew from, but later ment must work with its international benefac- returned to, the electoral commission, raising tors to make certain that the 2015 elections are fears that the party might boycott the elec- fair, free and credible. More importantly, given tions. Such a boycott by the FPI would have un- the distrust that Gbagbo supporters currently dermined both the credibility of the elections have in the incumbent government, it is neces- and the country’s efforts to usher in a period of sary that the latter create conditions that would peace and national reconstruction. significantly improve the chances that the FPI and other opposition groups will accept the re- Henri Konan Bédié and the Parti démocratique sults of the 2015 elections and abide by them. de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) were expected to be strong contenders in the 2015 elections. How- Of course, the post-election government must ever, in mid-September 2014, Bédié endorsed engage all of the country’s relevant stakehold- Ouattara for re-election in 2015, effectively rul- er groups in robust dialogue about issues that ing himself out as a candidate for the presiden- are critical to peaceful coexistence, national cy of the republic in 2015. integration, nation-building, and human devel- opment. These include, inter alia, citizenship, The current Ouattara-led coalition government youth unemployment, and poverty, especially of the RDR and PDCI was supposed to

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