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AFRICAN ELECTIONS IN 2015: A SNAPSHOT FOR CÔTE D’IVOIRE, , AND

John Mukum Mbaku, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Growth Initiative

INTRODUCTION democratic making to provide each country with institutional arrangements In 2015, many countries in Africa—including that guarantee the rule of law—where the the Burkina Faso, , , , latter exists, the law is supreme; a majority of , , , , , the citizens voluntarily accept and respect the , Sudan, Tanzania, and law; there is judicial ; the law is —will conduct presidential and/or not administered arbitrarily or capriciously but legislative elections. Most of these countries citizens are able to expect predictable results; have struggled with transition to democracy at there is protection of rights, including least since the mid-1980s, and some of them those of minority ethnic and religious groups; much more recently. The 2015 elections, then, and governments operate in an open and for some, could be turning points for embrac- transparent manner. ing democracy more closely, and, for others, for significantly deepening and institutional- Openness and transparency are very important izing democracy and emerging as democratic for governance in Africa. Making certain that strongholds on the . public policies are designed and implemented in an open and transparent manner not only re- The failure to manage ethnic and religious di- duces corruption but also improves the chanc- versity and provide institutional structures that es that these policies will reflect the values, enhance peaceful coexistence, national inte- interests and aspirations of the country’s rele- gration and nation-building, remains one of vant stakeholders. If discontented groups have the continent’s most intractable governance either had the opportunity to participate fully problems. This failure has produced political and effectively in policy design and implemen- economies that are pervaded by violence, most tation, or were quite aware of how these poli- of it attributable to destructive mobilization cies were chosen and why, they are less likely to by ethnic and/or religious groups that consid- resort to destructive mobilization. er themselves marginalized by public policies, pushed to the economic and political periph- A major challenge for all countries that will ery, and prevented from participating gainfully conduct elections in 2015 will be to ensure that in economic growth. Minimizing violent mobi- the majority of their citizens see these elections lization requires state reconstruction through as free, fair and credible. These governments

foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 50 must (1) provide the security necessary to en- Côte d’Ivoire sure that no one participating in the elections is threatened, molested or denied access to the Historical Context process; (2) make certain that the opposition is provided with adequate access to the media, in- After independence cluding government-owned and operated out- in 1960, Côte d’Ivo- lets, so that it can fully and effectively explain ire was led by the its platform to prospective voters; (3) create an authoritarian leader open dialogue with all constituencies to prevent Félix Houphouët-Boi- feelings of marginalization; (4) minimize polit- gny until his death in 1993. His successor, Hen- ical corruption and avoid any activities (e.g., ri Konan Bédié, who was overthrown in 1999, vote-rigging) that can place the opposition at disastrously emphasized ethnicity in public ser- a competitive disadvantage and enhance the vice, effectively excluding individuals who were ability of the incumbent government to win not considered indigenes of Côte d’Ivoire from the elections; (5) make sure that the national serving in administrative positions. In fact, for- election commission is independent enough to mer International Monetary Fund executive and function effectively in carrying out the election; current president of Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane and (6) provide facilities for domestic and in- Ouattara, was disqualified from participating in ternational monitors so that they can perform the 2000 presidential elections because of his their jobs well and ensure that the elections are ethnicity. Then, President Bédié and many oth- fair, free and credible. ers, claimed that Ouattara was a Burkinabè from neighboring Burkina Faso, and the country’s Importantly, the policy priority for the post-elec- new constitution, approved in 2000, mandated tion governments should be participatory con- that a presidential candidate’s parents must both stitution making to reconstruct the state and be Ivorian. The citizenship issue partly spurred provide institutional arrangements that guar- Côte d’Ivoire’s 2002-2007 . antee the rule of law. However, even if the 2015 elections are successfully carried out and However, in 2007, , president are considered fair, free, and credible, many of since the 2000 elections, declared that Ouat- these countries will still continue to suffer from tara was qualified to run in the 2010 presiden- high levels of corruption, violence, inequality, tial elections. In the second round of elections, and low economic growth and development an independent electoral commission declared unless they are provided with institutional ar- Ouattara the winner with 54 percent of the rangements that guarantee the rule of law. vote. However, Gbagbo’s supporters argued that there had been fraud and sought to annul Below, we present an overview of some upcom- votes from several . The Constitutional ing African elections in 2015. (For an in-depth Council then annulled the electoral commis- look at ’s elections, see “The 2015 Pres- sion’s declaration and concluded that Gbagbo idential Elections in Nigeria: The Issues and had won 51 percent of the vote. Ouattara and Challenges.”) Over 15 African countries are Gbagbo took parallel oaths of office—though planning elections in 2015; however, due to the international community, including the Af- space limitations, this brief only discusses elec- rican Union, recognized Ouattara as the legiti- tions in Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, mate president. These events resulted in a sec- and the of Sudan. ond civil war and, subsequently, Gbagbo was arrested by the International Criminal Court in

foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 51 2011 for . Ouattara re- politically connected have access to food (See, mains the president of Côte d’Ivoire. e.g., Aljazeera 2013; BBC Service n.d.; IRIN 2008). Election 2015 Thus, Ivorians face many challenges in the years Côte d’Ivoire has set presidential elections for to come: They must deal with issues such as 2015. The major players in these elec- citizenship; government impunity; entrepre- tions are (1) incumbent Allasane Ouattara and neurship and the full participation of all groups his Rassemblement des républicains (RDR); and in wealth creation; and peaceful coexistence— (2) the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI). The FPI, all issues that have contributed to past violent previously led by the now-indicted Gbagbo, is conflicts. Whoever wins the elections (and the currently led by Pascal Affi N’Guessan who will endorsement of Ouattara’s candidacy by Bédié, likely participate in the 2015 elections. The FPI one of the country’s political heavyweights, boycotted the 2011 parliamentary elections, makes Ouattara a likely winner of the 2015 citing bias by the electoral commission for in- presidential contest) should form a government cumbent Ouattara, intimidation of FPI support- that reflects the country’s ethnic and religious ers by the national army, and the government diversity so that it can effectively lead a credi- banning of the pro-FPI newspaper . ble reconstruction effort. The Ouattara govern- In fall 2014, the FPI withdrew from, but later ment must work with its international benefac- returned to, the electoral commission, raising tors to make certain that the 2015 elections are fears that the party might boycott the elec- fair, free and credible. More importantly, given tions. Such a boycott by the FPI would have un- the distrust that Gbagbo supporters currently dermined both the credibility of the elections have in the incumbent government, it is neces- and the country’s efforts to usher in a period of sary that the latter create conditions that would peace and national reconstruction. significantly improve the chances that the FPI and other opposition groups will accept the re- Henri Konan Bédié and the Parti démocratique sults of the 2015 elections and abide by them. de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) were expected to be strong contenders in the 2015 elections. How- Of course, the post-election government must ever, in mid-September 2014, Bédié endorsed engage all of the country’s relevant stakehold- Ouattara for re-election in 2015, effectively rul- er groups in robust dialogue about issues that ing himself out as a candidate for the presiden- are critical to peaceful coexistence, national cy of the republic in 2015. integration, nation-building, and human devel- opment. These include, inter alia, citizenship, The current Ouattara-led coalition government youth , and poverty, especially of the RDR and PDCI was supposed to engage among vulnerable groups (e.g., women, rural Ivorians in a process of state reconstruction, but inhabitants, and the urban poor). the institutional structures and governing pro- cess that have failed Ivorians in the past remain United Republic in place. For one thing, the question of citi- of Tanzania zenship, a major contributor to the civil wars, has not been resolved. In addition, the FPI and Historical Context Gbagbo followers believe that they have been pushed to the political and economic periph- On April 26, 1964, ery, and restless urban youth cry that only the merged with Zanzibar to

foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 52 form the United Republic of Tanzania—within are throwing their hats into the ring. Presently, the latter, Zanzibar remains a semi-autonomous the most important political parties in Tanza- with its own government. Throughout nia and their leaders are the incumbent CCM most of its existence as an independent and (Mizengo Pinda—presently the prime minister, sovereign nation, Tanzania has functioned ex- but is battling an internal challenge to his nom- clusively as a one-party state. ination); Chadema (Freeman Mbowe); and CUF (Mohamed Mnyaa). However, since 1992, there have been four credible competitive elections—in 1995, 2000, Since 1992, when multiparty political competi- 2005 and 2010—all won by the Chama Cha tion was reintroduced into Tanzania, opposition Mapinduzi (CCM) (Party of the Revolution). parties have significantly improved their ability Though the CCM has been the winner, its mar- to challenge the CCM. In fact, as noted above, gin of victory has not been overwhelming, and in the 2010 presidential elections, candidates most Tanzanians and international observers representing CHADEMA and CUF jointly cap- have considered these elections free, fair and tured 35 percent of the vote against the incum- credible. In the general elections held in 2010, bent CCM’s 63 percent. This year, the growing incumbent President received strength of opposition parties could force the 63 percent of the vote while the party captured winning candidate to seek the help of the op- 78 percent of the seats in the National Assem- position in forming a government capable of bly. In the semi-autonomous region of Zanzibar, effectively governing the country. Such a “uni- Ali Mohamed Shein of the CCM won 50 per- ty” government would be one that includes cent of the vote in the presidential election and individuals from not just the winning political the CCM won 50 percent of the seats in the party, but from others. assembly—against the opposition Civic United Front’s (CUF) 47 percent. It is expected that the 2015 elections will pro- vide the opportunity for further deepening and So, while the CMM has remained dominant, institutionalization of democracy in Tanzania. other parties, especially the Chadema (Party for Perhaps, the opposition could capture the gov- Democracy and Progress), a center-right move- ernment and bring about new and fresh ap- ment whose popularity continues to increase, proaches to dealing with what have become in- have provided effective and growing chal- tractable problems—rising poverty; high levels lenges. In the elections of 2010, for example, of unemployment, especially among the youth Chadema captured 27 percent (presidential) and other vulnerable groups (e.g., women and and 24 percent (parliamentary) of the vote. The rural inhabitants); high prices, especially for Civic United Front, another opposition party, food and fuel; and bureaucratic corruption. captured 8 percent (presidential) and 24 per- cent (parliamentary) of the vote. These results Notably, Tanzania is also currently going show a significant deepening of political com- through a constitutional review process. It is petition. expected that the new constitution will be ad- opted before the October 2015 elections. Ma- Election 2015 jor amendments might include the removal of gender discrimination from the law (such an Tanzania’s fifth general elections will take place amendment to the constitution would allow a in October 2015. Notably, President Kikwete is woman to transmit her to her hus- constitutionally barred from contesting for a band); ending the ban on dual nationality; re- third term, and a large number of candidates moving the rights to citizenship based on birth

foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 53 in Tanzania; and creating a federal union com- In 2000, the country’s post-Cold War 1991 prising three governments—a Tanganyika gov- constitution was amended to impose a limit of ernment, a union government, and a Zanzibar two five-year consecutive terms on the presi- Isles government. This constitutional process dency. However, in 2010, Compaoré’s support- is not without controversy: The CCM-domi- ers argued that because he was in office when nated parliament has approved the country’s the amendments went into effect, they did not draft constitution, despite the fact that oppo- apply to him and, hence, he was qualified to sition parties have refused to participate in the run for re-election a third time. He did—and process on the grounds that their suggestions captured 80 percent of the vote. In the run-up have been ignored. The next step is for the con- to the 2015 elections, Compaoré’s stitutional draft to be presented to the public supporters, especially members of his party, for approval by referendum. the Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP), campaigned to change the constitution Although elections in Tanzania since 1992 have so that Campaoré could run for a fourth term. generally been adjudged fair and free by both Tanzanians and foreign observers, the CCM- Just before and in response to the scheduled led government should continue to ensure that vote on the controversial amendment, on Octo- the process remains so, especially in light of le- ber 28, 2014, thousands of protesters gathered gitimate and serious challenges to its political in , the capital, and Bobo Diou- power. lasso, the country’s second-biggest city. In re- sponse to the mass demonstrations, legislators Burkina Faso postponed and eventually cancelled the vote. Just a few days later, Compaoré, who had ruled Historical Context Burkina Faso since 1987, resigned and fled.

Shortly after Up- Also, over the years, both Compaoré and Burki- per Volta (which na Faso became important players in the polit- changed its name ical economy of both the and the Saha- to Burkina Faso in ra, especially in the fight against transnational 1984) gained in- terrorism. As 2015 neared, there was fear that dependence from in 1960, it was led if the president forced a change in the consti- by Maurice Yaméogo, who quickly banned tution and extended his stay in power, there all political opposition, forcing mass riots and could arise the type of political instability that demonstrations that only came to an end after might force military intervention. Even if the the military intervened in 1966. Military coups president left office as mandated by the con- in 1980, 1982 and 1983 continued to usher stitution, there was still fear that he might try in authoritarian leaders. Although the leader to hand over power to his powerful friends and of the 1983 coup, Captain , family members, especially his brother, François introduced many institutional reforms that ef- Compaoré. In fact, many observers were con- fectively aligned the country with Marxist ide- vinced that any attempts by the president to als, he was overthrown in 1987 by Captain either manipulate the 2015 elections to keep Blaise Compaoré, who subsequently reversed either the CDP and himself in power or to el- all of Sankara’s progressive policies and led the evate his brother to the position, would most country until he resigned under pressure in late likely not be received well by an increasingly 2014. restless and inquisitive opposition. These fears, it turns out, were quite prophetic.

foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 54 Immediately after the president resigned, army unusual formula to achieve relative stability in chief, General Honoré Traoré, Compaoré’s aide Burkina— mixed with traces de camp, announced to the nation that he had of democracy. The complex governance system assumed the powers of president and head of relied primarily on Compaoré’s dominant and state—a move not sanctioned by the consti- charismatic political power and failed to build tution, which states that the president of the sustainable institutions—specifically those ca- temporarily assumes those duties in a pable of maintaining the rule of law and en- case like this. hancing peaceful coexistence in his absence. He acted opportunistically and sought to ex- In any case, the opposition, which had con- ploit his public position for personal gain, en- tributed significantly to the ouster of the dangering the country’s democracy and paving president, rejected Traoré, arguing that as a the way for the military to intervene in national close and trusted advisor of the ousted pres- politics. Now, the foundations for democracy— ident, his leadership would not represent the especially political pluralism and stakeholder type of complete break that they wanted with engagement—have eroded. the painful past, as embodied in Compaoré’s 27 years in power. The Burkinabè military must unambiguously hand over power to a civilian government and So, on November 1, 2014, Colonel Isaac Yacou- fully retreat to the barracks, allowing a fully ba Zida, told the people of Burkina Faso that empowered civilian interim president to orga- the military had intervened to prevent further nize and carry out the 2015 elections. violence and he had assumed the powers of the president and . He went on to In terms of the elections: Before Compaoré was say that he would lead a “peaceful transition” forced out of office, he was expected to be one and one that would guarantee the “continuity of the principal players in the presidential elec- of the [Burkinabè] state.” At the time, howev- tions planned for 2015 (if he had succeeded er, Zida did not provide any details about how in amending the constitution). Even before the he and the military planned to proceed with opposition turned against Compaoré’s candida- the transition. However, perhaps bowing to in- cy, many important and close associates in the ternational pressure, Zida later stepped down CDP, aware of maneuvers by Compaoré and in this role, with former diplomat and foreign his supporters to keep him in office indefinitely, minister Michel Kafando assuming power as had already left the party and joined the op- the country’s interim president. This move was position—which is composed of several distinct largely seen as a positive development for de- opposition groups. And so, besides the former- mocracy and civilian rule, though enthusiasm ly incumbent CDP, other major political parties was quickly tempered when, days later, the mil- in Burkina Faso include the Party for Democ- itary announced that Zida would serve as inter- racy and Socialism (Parti pour la démocratie et im prime minister while the country prepared le socialism); and Union for Rebirth/Sankarist for elections. Movement (Union pour la renaissance/Mouve- ment Sankariste). As of December 2014, none Election 2015 of them has picked a candidate to lead them in the 2015 presidential election. So, what happens next? Over more than a quarter century in power, Compaoré used an

foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 55 Sudan significantly, primarily as a result of the indepen- dence of South Sudan in 2011; reconciliation Historical Context with the exiled opposition group the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), allowing it to par- From 1956 until ticipate in governance; and a peace agreement 1989, the govern- with the main rebel group in (though ment in the Repub- fighting has not ceased since some rebels have lic of Sudan was rejected it). characterized by instability, violence and coups d’état. After a In 2010, Sudan held both presidential and leg- 1989 bloodless coup, Colonel Omar al-Bashir, islative elections. Al-Bashir captured 68 percent supported by a military council, rose to pow- of the vote. However, both domestic and in- er, suspended political parties, extended the ternational observers argued that the election Islamic legal code to the entire country, and was neither free, nor fair nor credible, citing suppressed and/or banned organizations that intimidation and harassment of the opposi- opposed his regime. In 1993, al-Bashir declared tion, corruption, fraud, and interference with himself president and dissolved the military the campaigns of opposition politicians (Carter council. Center 2010).

As a pro-democracy movement swept the con- Election 2015 tinent in the early , Sudan also attempted to engage in “democratic” elections, holding The elections in 2015 could be a major turning presidential and legislative elections in 1996. point for Sudan: In October 2013, various mem- The attempt did not go well. There were no bers of al-Bashir’s ruling National Congress Par- legal political parties so candidates ran as in- ty (NCP), dissatisfied with the president’s lead- dependents. As a result of the civil war that ership, announced plans to form a new party, was raging throughout most of the southern one that is expected to appeal to secularists and provinces, voting did not take place in that leftists. This move, should it take place, would part of the country. The opposition called for represent the most important challenge to party a boycott, arguing that the process was unfair cohesion since the decision by Hassan al-Turabi to them, especially given the fact that govern- to leave the NCP and form the opposition NDA. ment organs (including public media houses) However, senior members of the government favored al-Bashir and made it very difficult for do not believe that there would be such a split. opposition candidates to effectively and fully They have strongly criticized these suggestions, inform the voters of their political positions. In especially those that would weaken the NCP and the end, Omar al-Bashir captured 75 percent of threaten its hegemonic control of the country. the votes cast, while the 39 other candidates collectively received 22 percent. Regarding the 2015 elections, tentatively scheduled for April 2, 2015, senior govern- Al-Bashir’s regime has been characterized by ment officials have accused the opposition of significantly high levels of internal violence. In refusing to engage in a national dialogue, one fact, in July 2008, the International Criminal which would include all of the country’s politi- Court called for the arrest of al-Bashir for geno- cal constituencies in examining (1) ending civil cide, war crimes and crimes against humani- conflict; (2) dealing more effectively with pov- ty in Darfur. However, over the last 10 years, erty; (3) strengthening national identity; and the violence within Sudan’s has fallen (4) improving political freedoms. The important

foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 56 political alliance called the National Consensus stakeholder groups, including rebel groups, to Forces (NCF) has boycotted these supposed seek out a solution to intractable problems, par- efforts, arguing that the government is acting ticularly the conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan opportunistically, is only seeking to maximize and the Blue states. Finally, there are other al-Bashir’s chances of remaining president, and opposition parties, including those belonging is not interested in genuine dialogue. to rebel groups, such as the Sudan Revolution- ary Front (SRF), which argue that the elections So, who is likely to participate in the 2015 elec- should be postponed until comprehensive peace tions? First, al-Bashir (who has been in office has been achieved in the country. They maintain since 1989) and the ruling NCP will run and— that, under existing conditions, free, fair and should they win—will continue the same failed credible elections are not likely to happen, and policies that have alienated Sudan from the in- that al-Bashir and the NCP will manipulate the ternational community, severely limited foreign process to ensure they are victorious. investment, significantly increased bureaucratic and political impunity, and retarded the coun- While a free and fair election in 2015 could cre- try’s transition to democratic governance and ate the opportunity to engage the peoples of integrated development. Second, Al-Sadiq Sudan in the type of state reconstruction and al-Mahdi of the National Umma Party (NUP), reconstitution that they failed to undertake at the country’s largest opposition, will likely run. independence in 1956, given the current re- Like other opposition leaders, he favors the gional violence and the absence of governmen- formation of a transitional government, which tal openness and transparency, it is unlikely that would provide the wherewithal for the holding the elections will be fully participatory and in- of a national sovereign conference whose partic- clusive, nor would they be fair and free. Hence, ipation would include all the country’s relevant the results are likely to confirm the status quo.

foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 57 References IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2012. “Analysis: Burundi’s Bumpy Road to Aljazeera. 2013. “ Coast targets Gbagbo the 2015 Polls.” November 12. http://www. followers in .” December 2. http:// irinnews.org/report/96689/analysis-burundi-s- www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/12/ bumpy-road-to-the-2015-polls. ivory-coast-targets-gbagbo-followers- IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks). ghana-201312252716257571.html. 2012. “Togo: Simmering Discontent Ahead of BBC World Service. N.d. “Case Study: The Issue Polls.” October 24. http://www.irinnews.org/ of Nationality in .” http://www. printreport.aspx?reportid=96625. .co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks). ihavearightto/four_b/casestudy_art15.shtml. 2008. “Côte d’Ivoire: Poverty getting worse— Bøås, M. 2014. “The : study.” December 3. http://www.irinnews.org/ Violence in a ‘Phantom’ State.” -Atlantic report/81804/cote-d-ivoire-poverty-getting- Quarterly, Vol. 1, p. 12-13. worse-study.

Carter Center. 2010. “Observing Sudan’s 2010 Kimenyi, M. S. and Mbaku, J. M. 2011. “Elections National Elections, April 11–18, 2010.” April. and Violence in Nigeria: The Question of Atlanta: Carter Center. http://www. Citizenship in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Brookings cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/ Institution, April 28. http://www.brookings. peace_publications/election_reports/ edu/research/opinions/2011/04/28-nigeria- FinalReportSudan-Apr2010.pdf. elections-kimenyi-mbaku.

Chemouni, B. 2014. “The 2015 Elections in Kimenyi, M. S. and Mbaku, J. M. 2011. “What Burundi: Towards Authoritarianism or Next for Côte d’Ivoire?” Brookings Institution, Democratic Consolidation?” Democracy in April 8. http://www.brookings.edu/research/ Africa: A Resource for the Study of Democracy opinions/2011/04/08-ivory-coast-kimenyi-mbaku. in Africa, February 3. http://democracyinafrica. Mbaku, J. M. 2013. “Providing a Foundation for org/2015-elections-burundi-towards- Wealth Creation and Development in Africa: The authoritarianism-democratic-consolidation/. Role of the Rule of Law.” Brooklyn Journal of International Crisis Group. 2013. “Burkina , Vol. 38, No. 3, p. 959-1051. Faso: With or Without Campaoré, Times of Mbaku, J. M. 2013. “What Should Africans Expect Uncertainty.” Africa Report, No. 205, July from their ?” Denver Journal of 22. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/ International Law and Policy, Vol. 41, No. 2, p. africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/205-burkina- 149-183. faso-avec-ou-sans-compaore-le-temps-des- incertitudes.aspx.

foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 58 Presidential and Legislative Elections in Africa in 2015

Libya Egypt DATE TBD MARCH

Niger Sudan DATE TBD Chad DATE TBD APRIL

Nigeria Guinea Côte Ethiopia DATE TBD FEBRUARY South d’Ivoire Sudan MAY OCTOBER JULY Togo Burkina Faso MARCH NOVEMBER

Tanzania Burundi OCTOBER* MID-2015** General Parliamentary Presidential Zambia Mauritius *Tanzania will also hold a constitutional JANUARY MAY*** referendum in April 2015. **Burundi will hold its parliamentary elections in May and presidential elections in June. ***The Agalega Islands, Cargados Carajos Shoals (Saint Brandon) and Rodrigues are not shown.

Note: This map reflects all confirmed elections as of December 22, 2014 according to the National Democratic Institute, https://www.ndi.org/electionscalendar.