Dyer, William John
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The Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2Nd December 1917
Centre for First World War Studies A Moonlight Massacre: The Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2nd December 1917 by Michael Stephen LoCicero Thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts & Law June 2011 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract The Third Battle of Ypres was officially terminated by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig with the opening of the Battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917. Nevertheless, a comparatively unknown set-piece attack – the only large-scale night operation carried out on the Flanders front during the campaign – was launched twelve days later on 2 December. This thesis, a necessary corrective to published campaign narratives of what has become popularly known as „Passchendaele‟, examines the course of events from the mid-November decision to sanction further offensive activity in the vicinity of Passchendaele village to the barren operational outcome that forced British GHQ to halt the attack within ten hours of Zero. A litany of unfortunate decisions and circumstances contributed to the profitless result. -
The Original BAOR Divisions Closed Down
The Original British Army of the Rhine Richard A. Rinaldi © 2006 The first British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) was created in March 1919 to control troops in the British occupation zone along the Rhine. The Armistice that went into effect on 11 November 1918 provided for British, French and American troops to occupy bridgeheads across the Rhine River. The new army had five corps, each of two divisions, and a cavalry division. Regular units (other than cavalry) were largely withdrawn from BAOR divisions as they formed, with few remaining even to May 1919. While some New Armies and TF battalions survived as part of BAOR, the divisions were reinforced or continued with a large number of former training battalions. See Note 1 at the end for a discussion of the sources and conventions adopted for this material. It is quite likely that details of artillery in particular are incomplete. Where a division retained its former brigade numbers, it may be presumed that the wartime battalions were gone in or before March 1919, and they appear only where they remained at least to April 1919. See Note 2 for a discussion of the ‘50-series’ battalions. BAOR began organized as follows: II Corps Light Division (formed from 2nd Division) Southern Division (formed from 29th Division) IV Corps Lowland Division (formed from 9th Division) Highland Division (formed from 62nd Division) VI Corps Northern Division (formed from 3rd Division) London Division (formed from 41st Division) IX Corps Western Division (formed from 1st Division) Midland Division (formed from 6th Division) X Corps Lancashire Division (formed from 32nd Division) Eastern Division (formed from 34th Division) Cavalry Division (formed from 1st Cavalry Division) This force began to contract only five months later, with four divisions (Highland, Western, Midland and Eastern) and three corps (IV, VI and IX) closing down by the end of August. -
1 Armoured Division (1940)]
7 September 2020 [1 ARMOURED DIVISION (1940)] st 1 Armoured Division (1) Headquarters, 1st Armoured Division 2nd Armoured Brigade (2) Headquarters, 2nd Armoured Brigade & Signal Section The Queen’s Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards) 9th Queen’s Royal Lancers 10th Royal Hussars (Prince of Wales’s Own) 3rd Armoured Brigade (3) Headquarters, 3rd Armoured Brigade & Signal Section 2nd Royal Tank Regiment 3rd Royal Tank Regiment (4) 5th Royal Tank Regiment 1st Support Group (5) Headquarters, 1st Support Group & Signal Section 2nd Bn. The King’s Royal Rifles Corps 1st Bn. The Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort’s Own) 1st Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (H.Q., A/E & B/O Batteries, Royal Horse Artillery) 2nd Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (H.Q., L/N & H/I Batteries, Royal Horse Artillery) Divisional Troops 1st Field Squadron, Royal Engineers 1st Field Park Troop, Royal Engineers 1st Armoured Divisional Signals, (1st County of London Yeomanry (Middlesex, Duke of Cambridge’s Hussars)), Royal Corps of Signals ©www.BritishMilitaryH istory.co.uk Page 1 7 September 2020 [1 ARMOURED DIVISION (1940)] NOTES: 1. A pre-war Regular Army formation formerly known as The Mobile Division. The divisional headquarters were based at Priory Lodge near Andover, within Southern Command. This was the only armoured division in the British Army at the outbreak of the Second World War. The division remained in the U.K. training and equipping until leaving for France on 14 May 1940. Initial elements of the 1st Armoured Division began landing at Le Havre on 15 May, being sent to a location south of Rouen to concentrate and prepare for action. -
This Copy of the Thesis Has Been Supplied on Condition That Anyone Who
University of Plymouth PEARL https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk 04 University of Plymouth Research Theses 01 Research Theses Main Collection 2014 The British Way of War in North West Europe 1944-45: A Study of Two Infantry Divisions Devine, Louis Paul http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/3014 Plymouth University All content in PEARL is protected by copyright law. Author manuscripts are made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the details provided on the item record or document. In the absence of an open licence (e.g. Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher or author. This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the author's prior consent. 1 THE BRITISH WAY OF WAR IN NORTH WEST EUROPE 1944-45: A STUDY OF TWO INFANTRY DIVISIONS By LOUIS PAUL DEVINE A thesis Submitted to Plymouth University in partial fulfilment for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of Humanities May 2013 2 Louis Paul Devine The British Way of War in North West Europe 1944-45: A Study of two infantry divisions Abstract This thesis will examine the British way of war as experienced by two British Infantry Divisions - the 43rd ‘Wessex’ and 53rd ‘Welsh’ - during the Overlord campaign in North West Europe in 1944 and 1945. The main locus of research centres on the fighting components of those divisions; the infantry battalions and their supporting regiments. -
INFORMATION to USERS the Most Advanced Technology Has Been Used to Photo Graph and Reproduce This Manuscript from the Microfilm Master
. INFORMATION TO USERS The most advanced technology has been used to photo graph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the original text directly from the copy submitted. Thus, some dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from a computer printer. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyrighted material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are re produced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is available as one exposure on a standard 35 mm slide or as a 17" x 23" black and white photographic print for an additional charge. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. 35 mm slides or 6"X 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. Accessing theUMI World’s Information since 1938 300 North Z eeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA Order Number 8820321 Operational art and the German command system in World War I Meyer, Bradley John, Ph.D. The Ohio State University, 1988 Copyright ©1088 by Meyer, Bradley John. All rights reserved. UMI 300 N. ZeebRd. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 OPERATIONAL ART AND THE GERMAN COMMAND SYSTEM IN WORLD WAR I DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Bradley J. -
Canada and the BATTLE of VIMY RIDGE 9-12 April 1917 Bataille De Vimy-E.Qxp 1/2/07 11:37 AM Page 4
BRERETON GREENHOUS STEPHEN J. HARRIS JEAN MARTIN Bataille de Vimy-E.qxp 1/2/07 11:37 AM Page 2 Bataille de Vimy-E.qxp 1/2/07 11:37 AM Page 1 Bataille de Vimy-E.qxp 1/2/07 11:37 AM Page 3 BRERETON GREENHOUS STEPHEN J. HARRIS JEAN MARTIN Canada and the BATTLE OF VIMY RIDGE 9-12 April 1917 Bataille de Vimy-E.qxp 1/2/07 11:37 AM Page 4 Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Greenhous, Brereton, 1929- Stephen J. Harris, 1948- Canada and the Battle of Vimy Ridge, 9-12 April 1917 Issued also in French under title: Le Canada et la Bataille de Vimy 9-12 avril 1917. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-660-16883-9 DSS cat. no. D2-90/1992E-1 2nd ed. 2007 1.Vimy Ridge, Battle of, 1917. 2.World War, 1914-1918 — Campaigns — France. 3. Canada. Canadian Army — History — World War, 1914-1918. 4.World War, 1914-1918 — Canada. I. Harris, Stephen John. II. Canada. Dept. of National Defence. Directorate of History. III. Title. IV.Title: Canada and the Battle of Vimy Ridge, 9-12 April 1917. D545.V5G73 1997 940.4’31 C97-980068-4 Cet ouvrage a été publié simultanément en français sous le titre de : Le Canada et la Bataille de Vimy, 9-12 avril 1917 ISBN 0-660-93654-2 Project Coordinator: Serge Bernier Reproduced by Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters Jacket: Drawing by Stéphane Geoffrion from a painting by Kenneth Forbes, 1892-1980 Canadian Artillery in Action Original Design and Production Art Global 384 Laurier Ave.West Montréal, Québec Canada H2V 2K7 Printed and bound in Canada All rights reserved. -
The Evolution of British Tactical and Operational Tank Doctrine and Training in the First World War
The evolution of British tactical and operational tank doctrine and training in the First World War PHILIP RICHARD VENTHAM TD BA (Hons.) MA. Thesis submitted for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy by the University of Wolverhampton October 2016 ©Copyright P R Ventham 1 ABSTRACT Tanks were first used in action in September 1916. There had been no previous combat experience on which to base tactical and operational doctrine for the employment of this novel weapon of war. Training of crews and commanders was hampered by lack of vehicles and weapons. Time was short in which to train novice crews. Training facilities were limited. Despite mechanical limitations of the early machines and their vulnerability to adverse ground conditions, the tanks achieved moderate success in their initial actions. Advocates of the tanks, such as Fuller and Elles, worked hard to convince the sceptical of the value of the tank. Two years later, tanks had gained the support of most senior commanders. Doctrine, based on practical combat experience, had evolved both within the Tank Corps and at GHQ and higher command. Despite dramatic improvements in the design, functionality and reliability of the later marks of heavy and medium tanks, they still remained slow and vulnerable to ground conditions and enemy counter-measures. Competing demands for materiel meant there were never enough tanks to replace casualties and meet the demands of formation commanders. This thesis will argue that the somewhat patchy performance of the armoured vehicles in the final months of the war was less a product of poor doctrinal guidance and inadequate training than of an insufficiency of tanks and the difficulties of providing enough tanks in the right locations at the right time to meet the requirements of the manoeuvre battles of the ‘Hundred Days’. -
The German Army, Vimy Ridge and the Elastic Defence in Depth in 1917
Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 18, ISSUE 2 Studies “Lessons learned” in WWI: The German Army, Vimy Ridge and the Elastic Defence in Depth in 1917 Christian Stachelbeck The Battle of Arras in the spring of 1917 marked the beginning of the major allied offensives on the western front. The attack by the British 1st Army (Horne) and 3rd Army (Allenby) was intended to divert attention from the French main offensive under General Robert Nivelle at the Chemin des Dames (Nivelle Offensive). 1 The French commander-in-chief wanted to force the decisive breakthrough in the west. Between 9 and 12 April, the British had succeeded in penetrating the front across a width of 18 kilometres and advancing around six kilometres, while the Canadian corps (Byng), deployed for the first time in closed formation, seized the ridge near Vimy, which had been fiercely contested since late 1914.2 The success was paid for with the bloody loss of 1 On the German side, the battles at Arras between 2 April and 20 May 1917 were officially referred to as Schlacht bei Arras (Battle of Arras). In Canada, the term Battle of Vimy Ridge is commonly used for the initial phase of the battle. The seizure of Vimy ridge was a central objective of the offensive and was intended to secure the protection of the northern flank of the 3rd Army. 2 For detailed information on this, see: Jack Sheldon, The German Army on Vimy Ridge 1914-1917 (Barnsley: Pen&Sword Military, 2008), p. 8. Sheldon's book, however, is basically a largely indiscriminate succession of extensive quotes from regimental histories, diaries and force files from the Bavarian War Archive (Kriegsarchiv) in Munich. -
TRANSFORMING the BRITISH ARMY an Update
TRANSFORMING THE BRITISH ARMY An Update © Crown copyright July 2013 Images Army Picture Desk, Army Headquarters Designed by Design Studio ADR002930 | TRANSFORMING THE BRITISH ARMY 2013 TRANSFORMING THE BRITISH ARMY 2013 | 1 Contents Foreword 1 Army 2020 Background 2 The Army 2020 Design 3 Formation Basing and Names 4 The Reaction Force 6 The Adaptable Force 8 Force Troops Command 10 Transition to new Structures 14 Training 15 Personnel 18 Defence Engagement 21 Firm Base 22 Support to Homeland Resilience 23 Equipment 24 Reserves 26 Army Communication Strategic Themes 28 | TRANSFORMING THE BRITISH ARMY 2013 TRANSFORMING THE BRITISH ARMY 2013 | 1 Foreword General Sir Peter Wall GCB CBE ADC Gen Chief of the General Staff We have made significant progress in refining the detail of Army 2020 since it was announced in July 2012. It is worth taking stock of what has been achieved so far, and ensuring that our direction of travel continues to be understood by the Army. This comprehensive update achieves this purpose well and should be read widely. I wish to highlight four particular points: • Our success in establishing Defence Engagement as a core Defence output. Not only will this enable us to make a crucial contribution to conflict prevention, but it will enhance our contingent capability by developing our understanding. It will also give the Adaptable Force a challenging focus in addition to enduring operations and homeland resilience. • We must be clear that our capacity to influence overseas is founded upon our credibility as a war-fighting Army, capable of projecting force anywhere in the world. -
CHAPTER X IT Is Now Time to Lift the Veil That Hid from the Arriving
CHAPTER X “THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ‘FIFTH’ ARMY”1 IT is now time to lift the veil that hid from the arriving reinforcements the chain of events that had produced the situations into which they were flung. It may be taken as an axiom that, when an army is in the grip of a desperate struggle, any one moving in its rear tends to be unduly impressed with the disorganisation, the straggling, the anxiety of the staffs, and other inevitable incidents of such a battle; he sees the exhausted and also the less stubborn fragments of the force, and is impressed with their statements, while the more virile and faithful element, mainly fighting out in front, ignorant or heedless of all such weakness in rear, is largely beyond his view. It is undeniable that during and after their race to the Aniiens front the Australian divisions were witnesses of many incidents that impressed them with a lack of virility in a certain proportion of the British troops. Rumours depre- ciating the resistance offered by parts of the Fifth Army were widespread not only throughout the remainder of the British Army, but among the French population, and were even current in England. The Australian troops were the ctief reinforcement sent to that army by the British command in the later stage of the retirement, and eventually occupied the whole of its remaining front as well as part of the Third Army’s. The Australian soldier was not an unfair critic. If the Performance of a neighbouring unit excited his admiration, no one was so enthusiastic and outspoken in his praise; but, where performance fell short of its expectations, it was quite useless to attempt to gloss over to him such failure. -
The Birth of Airpower, 1916 the Character of the German Offensive
The Birth of Airpower, 1916 359 the character of the German offensive became clear, and losses reached staggering levels, Joffre urgently demanded as early a start as possible to the allied offensive. In May he and Haig agreed to mount an assault on I July 'athwart the Somme.' Long before the starting date of the offensive had been fixed the British had been preparing for it by building up, behind their lines, the communications and logistical support the 'big push' demanded. Masses of materiel were accumulated close to the trenches, including nearly three million rounds of artillery ammuni tion. War on this scale was a major industrial undertaking.• Military aviation, of necessity, made a proportionate leap as well. The RFC had to expand to meet the demands of the new mass armies, and during the first six months of 1916 Trenchard, with Haig's strong support, strove to create an air weapon that could meet the challenge of the offensive. Beginning in January the RFC had been reorganized into brigades, one to each army, a process completed on 1 April when IV Brigade was formed to support the Fourth Army. Each brigade consisted of a headquarters, an aircraft park, a balloon wing, an army wing of two to four squadrons, and a corps wing of three to five squadrons (one squadron for each corps). At RFC Headquarters there was an additional wing to provide reconnais sance for GHQ, and, as time went on, to carry out additional fighting and bombing duties.3 Artillery observation was now the chief function of the RFC , with subsidiary efforts concentrated on close reconnaissance and photography. -
Symbols Book
Activity Book for Schools 1 Symbols of Ireland A symbol is something that represents another thing – for example, a shamrock stands for Ireland. If you see a shamrock in the exhibition, it will mean that the people who use the symbol have an attachment to Ireland. Such symbols help people to feel that they belong to a group or to a country. My Name: 1 Be a History Detective Search the Soldiers and Chiefs galleries to discover how armies have used Irish symbols since the 17th century. Examine the evidence in the objects and pictures on display for examples of symbols used for different reasons. You will find symbols on uniforms and flags, but also in some unexpected places. Enter the first room after the introduction space. 2 Symbols in 'The British Garrison in Ireland' & Searching the Stokes Tapestry - Stop at the large display in the middle of the room. ;^cYVcYYgVli]ZhZY^[[ZgZcihnbWdahd[>gZaVcY# Lda[]djcY H]VbgdX` >g^h]ig^Xdadjg =Vge =^WZgc^V º>gZaVcY»gZegZhZciZYVhVldbVc]daY^c\V[aV\VcYh]^ZaY <jZhhl]Vii]ZXdadjghd[i]Zig^Xdadjg[aV\hnbWda^hZ4 <gZZc L]^iZ DgVc\Z 3 Enter the next room. Symbols in 'Warfare in Ireland' ' Smashed to Pieces - Stop at the first display on the wall after ‘Warfare in Ireland’ at the doorway. Look closely at the full-sized model of the Tullyhogue chair after it had been smashed. >cid]dlbVcne^ZXZhlVh^iWgd`Zc4 Find the chair in the picture of the landscape to see how it looked before it was smashed. GZVYi]ZaVWZaid[^cYdji/ L]djhZYi]^hX]V^gVhVi]gdcZ4 L]nY^Yi]Z:c\a^h]WgZV`i]ZX]V^g4 Leave through the doorway, walk past the row of helmets and enter the next room.