Special forces from Gulf Cooperation Council nation attempt to hook boarding ladder onto U.S. Army vessel “Corinth” during visit, board, search, and seizure training in Arabian Gulf during exercise Eagle Resolve, March 17, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Kathryn L. Lozier) The Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine By John A. Pelleriti, Michael Maloney, David C. Cox, Heather J. Sullivan, J. Eric Piskura, and Montigo J. Hawkins s the United States enters a new to disrupt and degrade the Nation mation, cyber, drug, economic, and era of near-peer competition, over time. China and Russia, Iran and unconventional warfare, to avoid and A current irregular warfare (IW) North Korea, and violent extremist offset U.S. conventional military advan- doctrine is insufficient to counter organizations (VEOs) have been using tages. While aware of threats, U.S. adversary irregular strategies intended irregular methods, including infor- strategists struggle to define them, as evidenced by the frequent use of non- doctrinal, poorly defined terms such as hybrid, gray zone, nontraditional, Colonel John A. Pelleriti, ARNG, is G3 Deputy Chief of Staff Operations for the Florida National Guard. unconstrained, and asymmetric warfare. Colonel Michael Maloney, USAF, is Commander of the 932 Operations Group at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Lieutenant Colonel David C. Cox, USMC, is Commanding Officer of Intelligence Support The doctrinal terms irregular warfare Battalion, Marine Corps Support Facility, in New Orleans, Louisiana. Lieutenant Colonel Heather J. and unconventional warfare (UW) Sullivan, USAF, is Commander of the 349th Force Support Squadron at Travis Air Force Base, California. provide a common point of departure Lieutenant Commander J. Eric Piskura, USN, is Assistant Operations Officer, Naval Supply Systems Command Fleet Logistics Center, in Norfolk, Virginia. Major Montigo J. Hawkins, USA, is a Logistics for the discussion, but are incomplete, Officer at U.S. Transportation Command. generally not well understood, and 104 Joint Doctrine / Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 often misused. To be successful in this area.”4 UW is currently only conducted of armed conflict by expanding coercion new era of irregular competition, U.S. by SOF, primarily Army Special Forces, to new fronts, violating principles of planners must reassess and update IW- who are specially organized, trained, and sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and related terms, concepts, and authorities equipped to conduct UW by U.S. Special deliberately blurring the lines between required to counter irregular threat Operations Command.5 While UW is civil and military goals.”9 The NDS also strategies. focused on coercing, disrupting, or over- acknowledges adversarial use of threat Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the throwing hostile governments, it adds the strategies, short of open warfare, to Armed Forces of the United States, defines complex requirement of working with achieve its goals that include informa- IW as “a violent struggle among state and or through an insurgency or resistance tion warfare, ambiguous or denied nonstate actors for legitimacy and influ- movement to achieve UW objectives. proxy operations, and subversion.10 ence over the relevant population(s).”1 Recent UW examples include U.S. SOF Both documents make a clear case that This definition evolved largely out of support to the Northern Alliance in the most senior U.S. leaders understand post-9/11 counterinsurgency (COIN) Afghanistan and anti–Islamic State forces the irregular nature of the threats the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and in Syria. Adversary definitions of UW Nation is facing. is focused on influencing the relevant often differ from the U.S. definition and Threatened use of unrestricted war- population to defeat insurgencies. While include a much broader scope of non- fare, not to be confused with IW or UW, appropriate for COIN environments, traditional warfare activities. These are is not new. For years, U.S. military and current IW doctrine is not focused on discussed in more detail later, but, suffice professional debate has examined and countering strategic irregular threats it to say, the current U.S. definition is incorporated elements of unrestricted intended to undermine the United States too narrow to counter the broad range war, albeit under a variety of models and over time. Traditional, or conventional, of irregular strategies being employed by names. Recognition of recent success- warfare also falls short. Traditional America’s adversaries. ful employment of unrestricted warfare warfare consists of major force-on-force against the United States is starting to operations and is characterized as “a The Use of Unrestricted emerge in military and political dialogue violent struggle for domination between Warfare and the national strategic documents nation-states or coalitions and alliances of National strategic documents clearly outlined. At a time when many aspects of nation-states.”2 While traditional warfare outline the irregular threats posed the conventional U.S. military are at their covers nation-state level competition, by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, peak, primary competitors are freely em- it is insufficient to counter most state- and VEOs. U.S. strategists previ- ploying unrestricted warfare to counter sponsored irregular threats. The risk of ously referred to this group as “4+1” U.S. strength. escalation with China, Russia, Iran, or and more recently as “2+2+1.” The As early as the 1980s, the Chinese North Korea—all current or potential nu- National Security Strategy makes a began the process of modernizing their clear powers—is too high for traditional clear case that the 2+2+1 are actively conventional force structure, power warfare to be a viable strategic option in competing against the United States, projection capability, and doctrine. The most cases. This is why the indirect ap- its allies, and partners.6 The document unprecedented success of the U.S.-led proach is so attractive to U.S. adversaries states, “many actors have become coalition in the Gulf War provided the and why they have become highly skilled skilled at operating below the thresh- Chinese with a template for future war at operating below the level of traditional old of military conflict—challenging through recognition that technological conflict and are careful not to provoke the United States, our allies, and our dominance gave the United States and its one.3 While conventional capabilities may partners with hostile actions cloaked allies unparalleled information that could certainly be leveraged in nontraditional in deniability.”7 It further details how exploit an opposing force.11 Recognizing warfare, major combat operations against adversaries are disrupting and degrading the difficulty and expense of trying to near-peer competitors is seldom a feasible sources of American strength utilizing match the U.S. conventional military in strategic option. transnational criminal organizations, the near term, the Chinese focused on UW, a related concept to IW, is cyberspace, and economic warfare.8 The overcoming the conventional advantages often misused and generally not well key takeaway is not that they are com- that contributed to military dominance. understood outside of the special opera- peting with the United States, but how Unrestricted warfare doctrine was a tions forces (SOF) community. UW is they are competing. U.S. adversaries are by-product of this quest, ultimately not merely the opposite of conventional not interested in a conventional fight, introduced to the public in February warfare, but is defined as “activities to but prefer to attack indirectly so as not 1999 when two Chinese PLA Air Force enable a resistance movement or insur- to provoke conventional conflict. The colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, gency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow National Defense Strategy adds, “Both published the book Unrestricted a government or occupying power revisionist powers and rogue regimes Warfare.12 by operating with an underground, are competing across all dimensions of Unrestricted Warfare hypothesized auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied power. They have increased efforts short that modern warfare would no longer JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Pelleriti et al. 105 Soldiers assigned to 7th Special Forces Group conduct urban warfare training during Emerald Warrior 17 at Hurlburt Field, Florida, March 7, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Barry Loo) conform to the Clausewitzian principles would be a mixture of covert and overt, military means. Because Iran lacks the of using armed forces “to compel [the] licit and illicit activities. “Combatants” size, influence, and resources of China, enemy to do our will,”13 but had instead would be representative of the popula- their application of unrestricted warfare transformed into a layered and inter- tion: civilians, businessmen, politicians, may be more aggressive. Lacking the minable campaign “using all means, servicemembers, entrepreneurs, criminals, same options as China, and operating including armed force or non-armed and terrorists, all constantly shifting in a vastly different regional environ- force, military and non-military, and le- between roles. Conventional military ment, Iran’s employment of unrestricted thal and non-lethal means to compel the battles would be secondary in nature and warfare comes in the form of support for enemy to accept one’s interests.”14 Such complementary to other efforts,