Special forces from Gulf Cooperation Council nation attempt to hook boarding ladder onto U.S. Army vessel “Corinth” during visit, board, search, and seizure training in Arabian Gulf during exercise Eagle Resolve, March 17, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Kathryn L. Lozier)
The Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine
By John A. Pelleriti, Michael Maloney, David C. Cox, Heather J. Sullivan, J. Eric Piskura, and Montigo J. Hawkins
s the United States enters a new to disrupt and degrade the Nation mation, cyber, drug, economic, and era of near-peer competition, over time. China and Russia, Iran and unconventional warfare, to avoid and A current irregular warfare (IW) North Korea, and violent extremist offset U.S. conventional military advan- doctrine is insufficient to counter organizations (VEOs) have been using tages. While aware of threats, U.S. adversary irregular strategies intended irregular methods, including infor- strategists struggle to define them, as evidenced by the frequent use of non- doctrinal, poorly defined terms such as hybrid, gray zone, nontraditional, Colonel John A. Pelleriti, ARNG, is G3 Deputy Chief of Staff Operations for the Florida National Guard. unconstrained, and asymmetric warfare. Colonel Michael Maloney, USAF, is Commander of the 932 Operations Group at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Lieutenant Colonel David C. Cox, USMC, is Commanding Officer of Intelligence Support The doctrinal terms irregular warfare Battalion, Marine Corps Support Facility, in New Orleans, Louisiana. Lieutenant Colonel Heather J. and unconventional warfare (UW) Sullivan, USAF, is Commander of the 349th Force Support Squadron at Travis Air Force Base, California. provide a common point of departure Lieutenant Commander J. Eric Piskura, USN, is Assistant Operations Officer, Naval Supply Systems Command Fleet Logistics Center, in Norfolk, Virginia. Major Montigo J. Hawkins, USA, is a Logistics for the discussion, but are incomplete, Officer at U.S. Transportation Command. generally not well understood, and
104 Joint Doctrine / Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 often misused. To be successful in this area.”4 UW is currently only conducted of armed conflict by expanding coercion new era of irregular competition, U.S. by SOF, primarily Army Special Forces, to new fronts, violating principles of planners must reassess and update IW- who are specially organized, trained, and sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and related terms, concepts, and authorities equipped to conduct UW by U.S. Special deliberately blurring the lines between required to counter irregular threat Operations Command.5 While UW is civil and military goals.”9 The NDS also strategies. focused on coercing, disrupting, or over- acknowledges adversarial use of threat Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the throwing hostile governments, it adds the strategies, short of open warfare, to Armed Forces of the United States, defines complex requirement of working with achieve its goals that include informa- IW as “a violent struggle among state and or through an insurgency or resistance tion warfare, ambiguous or denied nonstate actors for legitimacy and influ- movement to achieve UW objectives. proxy operations, and subversion.10 ence over the relevant population(s).”1 Recent UW examples include U.S. SOF Both documents make a clear case that This definition evolved largely out of support to the Northern Alliance in the most senior U.S. leaders understand post-9/11 counterinsurgency (COIN) Afghanistan and anti–Islamic State forces the irregular nature of the threats the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and in Syria. Adversary definitions of UW Nation is facing. is focused on influencing the relevant often differ from the U.S. definition and Threatened use of unrestricted war- population to defeat insurgencies. While include a much broader scope of non- fare, not to be confused with IW or UW, appropriate for COIN environments, traditional warfare activities. These are is not new. For years, U.S. military and current IW doctrine is not focused on discussed in more detail later, but, suffice professional debate has examined and countering strategic irregular threats it to say, the current U.S. definition is incorporated elements of unrestricted intended to undermine the United States too narrow to counter the broad range war, albeit under a variety of models and over time. Traditional, or conventional, of irregular strategies being employed by names. Recognition of recent success- warfare also falls short. Traditional America’s adversaries. ful employment of unrestricted warfare warfare consists of major force-on-force against the United States is starting to operations and is characterized as “a The Use of Unrestricted emerge in military and political dialogue violent struggle for domination between Warfare and the national strategic documents nation-states or coalitions and alliances of National strategic documents clearly outlined. At a time when many aspects of nation-states.”2 While traditional warfare outline the irregular threats posed the conventional U.S. military are at their covers nation-state level competition, by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, peak, primary competitors are freely em- it is insufficient to counter most state- and VEOs. U.S. strategists previ- ploying unrestricted warfare to counter sponsored irregular threats. The risk of ously referred to this group as “4+1” U.S. strength. escalation with China, Russia, Iran, or and more recently as “2+2+1.” The As early as the 1980s, the Chinese North Korea—all current or potential nu- National Security Strategy makes a began the process of modernizing their clear powers—is too high for traditional clear case that the 2+2+1 are actively conventional force structure, power warfare to be a viable strategic option in competing against the United States, projection capability, and doctrine. The most cases. This is why the indirect ap- its allies, and partners.6 The document unprecedented success of the U.S.-led proach is so attractive to U.S. adversaries states, “many actors have become coalition in the Gulf War provided the and why they have become highly skilled skilled at operating below the thresh- Chinese with a template for future war at operating below the level of traditional old of military conflict—challenging through recognition that technological conflict and are careful not to provoke the United States, our allies, and our dominance gave the United States and its one.3 While conventional capabilities may partners with hostile actions cloaked allies unparalleled information that could certainly be leveraged in nontraditional in deniability.”7 It further details how exploit an opposing force.11 Recognizing warfare, major combat operations against adversaries are disrupting and degrading the difficulty and expense of trying to near-peer competitors is seldom a feasible sources of American strength utilizing match the U.S. conventional military in strategic option. transnational criminal organizations, the near term, the Chinese focused on UW, a related concept to IW, is cyberspace, and economic warfare.8 The overcoming the conventional advantages often misused and generally not well key takeaway is not that they are com- that contributed to military dominance. understood outside of the special opera- peting with the United States, but how Unrestricted warfare doctrine was a tions forces (SOF) community. UW is they are competing. U.S. adversaries are by-product of this quest, ultimately not merely the opposite of conventional not interested in a conventional fight, introduced to the public in February warfare, but is defined as “activities to but prefer to attack indirectly so as not 1999 when two Chinese PLA Air Force enable a resistance movement or insur- to provoke conventional conflict. The colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, gency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow National Defense Strategy adds, “Both published the book Unrestricted a government or occupying power revisionist powers and rogue regimes Warfare.12 by operating with an underground, are competing across all dimensions of Unrestricted Warfare hypothesized auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied power. They have increased efforts short that modern warfare would no longer
JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Pelleriti et al. 105 Soldiers assigned to 7th Special Forces Group conduct urban warfare training during Emerald Warrior 17 at Hurlburt Field, Florida, March 7, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Barry Loo) conform to the Clausewitzian principles would be a mixture of covert and overt, military means. Because Iran lacks the of using armed forces “to compel [the] licit and illicit activities. “Combatants” size, influence, and resources of China, enemy to do our will,”13 but had instead would be representative of the popula- their application of unrestricted warfare transformed into a layered and inter- tion: civilians, businessmen, politicians, may be more aggressive. Lacking the minable campaign “using all means, servicemembers, entrepreneurs, criminals, same options as China, and operating including armed force or non-armed and terrorists, all constantly shifting in a vastly different regional environ- force, military and non-military, and le- between roles. Conventional military ment, Iran’s employment of unrestricted thal and non-lethal means to compel the battles would be secondary in nature and warfare comes in the form of support for enemy to accept one’s interests.”14 Such complementary to other efforts, if they terrorism and subversion through surro- campaigns would integrate information occurred at all.17 The ultimate goal would gates. Through its Islamic Revolutionary and resources across multiple domains be to diminish the United States and its Guard Corps, Iran supports numerous simultaneously, creating a “battlefield of allies, creating conflict without crossing regional terrorist and militia groups, battlefields” in order to reduce an op- thresholds that would result in open, including Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian ponent’s superiority on one battlefield by conventional combat. Islamic Jihad, the Taliban, and Iraqi forcing the opponent to deal with many Iran employs unrestricted warfare Shia groups.19 The success of Iranian battlefields concurrently.15 The result for many of the same historical and unrestricted warfare strategy can be seen would be the fading distinction between practical reasons as China. As outlined in the current conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq, soldiers and civilians because war would in his paper, “Unrestricted Warfare in Syria, and Yemen, all battlefields where be everywhere—battlefields would be Chinese and Iranian Foreign Policies,” conventional forces support the layered “virtually infinite.”16 Traditional operat- Canadian Lieutenant Colonel M.R. and simultaneous application of influence ing domains (land, sea, air, space, cyber) Perreault outlines the similarities in how by other means. would expand in every direction, includ- both nations see themselves and the Russia also subscribes to unre- ing politics, economics, trade, culture, world—threatened by the West and driv- stricted warfare strategy, dubbed “New legal, information, infrastructure, and ing toward regional supremacy.18 As a Generation Warfare” by Russian general even the national psyche. result, China and Iran both seek to offset Valery Gerasimov in February 2013.20 Qiao and Wang suggest that most un- U.S. power and influence, but neither are Gerasimov described the evolution of restricted warfare activities would occur capable of achieving their desired results Russian hybrid warfare whereby future prior to any formal declaration of war and through application of conventional conflict will be defined by the “tendency
106 Joint Doctrine / Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 toward blurring the lines between the North Korea is the most recent coun- “There is a remarkable correlation states of war and peace.”21 Conflict try to adopt and employ unrestricted to [China’s] historical experience of will focus on a series of “asymmetrical warfare. Through media manipulation, the opium wars in the mid-1800s, in operations using a host of [strategic] intelligence infiltration, sabotage, espio- which foreign nations fostered Chinese capabilities to ‘nullification of an enemy’s nage, cyber hacking, and military threats, addiction, leading to the takeover of advantages in armed conflict.’”22 Like North Korea has been able to protect their assets. This episode was led by the Chinese unrestricted warfare model, its ruling regime while simultaneously the British, with German, French, the Russian version simultaneously links developing its nuclear and conventional Dutch, American, Russian and Japanese limited, targeted military operations to warfighting capabilities. Its application of support—just the nations where the layers of “information operations, cyber unrestricted warfare has successfully frus- new wave of synthetics has struck.”31 warfare, legal warfare, economic war, and trated U.S.-led sanctions and U.S.–South U.S. adversaries understand that drug any other activities that are directly linked Korean military might. Although their addicts cannot serve in the military. to the designated strategic outcome.”23 capabilities are more limited than China, They also pay fewer taxes and eventually These layers are constantly evaluated and Russia, or Iran, all of these regimes sup- become an economic drain on society. modified to achieve the desired effect of port North Korean efforts as part of their China is not alone in using drugs as a “shifting stable and thriving state[s] into a own unrestricted warfare campaigns. The weapon. Joseph Douglass stated, “While web of chaos, humanitarian upheaval and political tension and chaos caused by the the dubious distinction of initiating large- outright civil war, making it susceptible North Korean strategy increases U.S. scale political war with drugs goes to the to foreign intervention.”24 In his article, costs in national treasure and political Chinese, it is the Soviets who have made “Conventional and Unconventional in attention. Similar to support to North trafficking the effective political warfare Military Actions,” Romanian lieutenant Korea, several specific irregular tactics are and intelligence weapon it has become.”32 general Teodor Frunzeti characterizes un- utilized by multiple adversaries and wor- Douglass further outlined how both the conventional war as a “political struggle thy of further analysis. Chinese and Russians effectively utilized with non-political and non-military the drug trade throughout the Cold means, putting into practice . . . political, Drug Warfare War to undermine the United States economic, psychological, propaganda, A growing body of scholarly work economically, socially, and militarily to military measures against a state to desta- points to the deliberate use of illicit great effect. Qiao and Wang define drug bilize its political power.”25 narcotics by 2+2+1 as both a chemical warfare as “obtaining sudden and huge Russia’s successful operations in weapon and funding strategy. Utiliza- profits by spreading disaster in other Ukraine and Georgia are representative of tion of illicit narcotics in this manner is countries.”33 This distinction highlights the new model. Russia succeeded in dele- not a new concept. The Western powers that the illicit drug trade is more than just gitimizing the Ukraine government and leveraged the opium trade extensively a profit-making business but also a form its North Atlantic Treaty Organization during the 19th-century Opium Wars of warfare used to threaten the security of supporters, while also seizing large areas both to exploit China economically and other nations. The USASOC white paper of Ukrainian territory by employing a to degrade its population and military asserts that drug warfare is one piece blend of SOF, proxy forces, corporate power.28 As early as the 1940s, Mao of a wide spectrum of warfare tied to a entities, civilians, intelligence agents, po- Zedong realized the potential of using broader Chinese military strategy meant litical agitators, media, and transnational drugs as a weapon and mounted a coor- to destabilize an adversary.34 criminal elements. As stated in the U.S. dinated drug warfare campaign against Jihadists have also adopted the tactic Army Special Operations Command the West, officially targeting “Japan, the to target American and Western youth (USASOC) white paper “Counter- United States military forces in the Far and use the immense profits to finance Unconventional Warfare,” “Funded by East, neighboring countries throughout terrorist activities.35 Both Hizballah and the Kremlin and operating with differing the Far East, and the United States al Qaeda have issued fatwas encourag- degrees of deniability or even acknowl- mainland.”29 Currently, the Drug ing the use of drug warfare as part of edgement, the Russian government uses Enforcement Administration assesses their overall strategies against the West.36 ‘little green men’ for classic [unconven- that the vast majority of the most This tactic is literally a “two for one” for tional warfare] objectives . . . causing dangerous illicit drugs (for example, VEOs as they use drugs to undermine chaos and disrupting civil order.”26 The fentanyl and other synthetic opioids) are target populations while simultaneously speed and effectiveness of employing imported from China through direct reaping enormous illicit profits to fund multiple “battlefields” simultaneously mail or smuggled through Canada and other nefarious activities. In 2016 alone, took the United States and its allies by Mexico.30 Long-time analysts Ralph over 63,000 Americans were killed by surprise.27 Russia’s conventional forces Little and Paul Pilliod describe how drug overdose37 at a cost of over $500 played a supporting, nondecisive role, Islamic extremists and China are delib- billion to the U.S. economy.38 The num- demonstrating Russia’s commitment to erately using drug warfare to weaken bers are staggering, and when viewed unrestricted warfare as a strategic tool. Western target populations. They state, through an irregular strategic lens, a
JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Pelleriti et al. 107 brilliant strategy—intended to poison no strings attached. Unlike the United paigns in history and serve as a prelude a target population while degrading States, China does not demand free and of future battles. military capabilities and bankrupting the fair elections, human rights vetting, or Open source media reports are replete economy—comes into focus. anti-corruption measures in return for with examples of the nefarious use of the economic aid. Lack of quid pro quo cyber domain by adversaries other than Economic Warfare is enticing for developing nations that Russia. These include China’s theft of The economy is arguably the most merely wish to gain new infrastructure F-35 Joint Strike Fighter plans to create important of the four instruments of or aid with no expectation of repayment. its J-31 aircraft, Iranian hackers charged national power and a key target of China’s Belt and Road Initiative—a with attacks on U.S. banks and infra- near-peer adversaries’ indirect attacks. massive infrastructure effort to develop structure, and a North Korean release of As mentioned, both China and Russia a Eurasian land bridge from China to damaging emails from the Sony enter- include the concept of economic Russia, Central Asia, Indochina, and tainment company.46 As acknowledged warfare as part of their unconstrained India, coupled with a maritime Silk Road by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of warfare doctrines. Historically, eco- from China through Singapore to the Staff General Martin Dempsey in 2015, nomic warfare encompassed sanctions, Mediterranean—is a prime example. The cyber is “the only major field of warfare trade embargoes, blockades, and United States has little influence and less in which the United States doesn’t quarantines, as well as competition for control over these geographic areas that have an advantage over its foes.”47 markets and raw materials.39 The pos- have significant economic impact in the Commanders of every U.S. combatant session or denial of natural resources, United States and globally. The competi- command have echoed this sentiment. sources of production, and wealth tion for raw materials and markets will Information and cyber are not only key have served as root causes of warfare provide enormous potential for conflict in enablers for conventional forces and throughout history. A prime example the years to come.42 operations but also important weapons in is Japan’s reaction to U.S. trade and the unconstrained warfare arsenal. oil embargoes in the late 1930s, which Cyber Warfare Japan perceived as an act of war and Information and cyber also represent Reassessing Doctrine precipitated the attack on Pearl Harbor. significant irregular challenges, as the The United States is clearly engaged in Modern economic warfare, however, world has grown increasingly dependent a nontraditional conflict but possesses is not merely about trade embargoes, on information and communication limited irregular doctrine and strategies sanctions, and commerce. The modern technology. Regimes have adapted to compete and win. Reassessing current economic warfare environment includes their information and cyber doctrine to doctrine presents several options. First, cyber theft of trade secrets, currency overcome historical U.S. technological we must expand the current definition and market manipulation, globalization, advantages. The Russian cyber attack on of IW to include all nontraditional forms and interconnectivity on a scale not seen Estonia in 2007, for instance, served as a of warfare. While the current defini- to date. Economic warfare is merging significant warning regarding adversary tion focuses narrowly on influencing a with cyber war to make the notion of intent and capabilities. It was the “first relevant population in a COIN environ- embargoes enforced by ships of the line cyber-attack in history that affected a ment, an expanded IW definition should seem quaint. Regarding China, Harold country nation-wide,” according to include identifying and countering near- Furchtgott-Roth stated, “competition Helen Popp, counselor for cyber issues peer competitors’ irregular tactics, which and property rights are blurred and at the Estonian embassy in Washington, are characterized by a conventionally diminished.”40 He also references the DC.43 During what came to be known weaker opponent using irregular means coming fight over 5G cellular technology as a distributed denial-of-service attack, to degrade, disrupt, and eventually and the U.S. response to Chinese at- Estonians could not access online defeat a conventionally stronger foe—a tempts at dominance in 5G highlighting media, government Web sites, or bank fundamental premise of irregular warfare property rights and intellectual property accounts.44 The coordinated hybrid going back to the beginning of warfare theft as key components of economic attack on Georgia just a year after the itself.48 U.S. IW doctrine must evolve warfare.41 New economic flashpoints are Estonia attack was another example of from its current post-9/11, COIN focus also emerging in Africa, as China seeks Russia’s threat to U.S. allies.45 Even to one that encompasses a broader spec- control over raw materials and rare earth more concerning, the jury is literally still trum of irregular threats. elements (REEs). In 2010, China con- out on claims that Russian state-backed A second option is to broaden the trolled over 90 percent of African REE hackers leveraged information and cyber definition of UW with an expanded mining, forming, manufacturing, and warfare to influence the U.S. Presiden- emphasis on near-peer competition. refining, essentially creating a monopoly tial election in 2016. If true, a state’s As mentioned, the current definition on these key resources. China is also ability to directly influence the outcome requires working with or through an expanding its influence in developing re- of a U.S. election could represent one of insurgency, resistance movement, under- gions through economic investment with the most effective irregular warfare cam- ground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force, all
108 Joint Doctrine / Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 SEALs conduct military field operations during exercise Trident 18-4 at Hurlburt Field, Florida, July 11, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Corban Lundborg)
of which do not always apply to near-peer A third option is to leave the current In addition to doctrine, the authori- irregular conflict. UW has not always definitions of IW and UW intact and ties required to operationalize doctrine been as narrowly focused as it is today. develop an entirely new doctrinal concept are a critical component in developing an UW definitions from the Cold War era to cover near-peer sponsored irregular operational approach. Homeland defense emphasized guerrilla warfare and resis- threats (for example, hybrid, asymmetric, and homeland security authorities are tance movements, but also included the unconstrained, or nontraditional warfare). especially relevant to the discussion of concepts of political, psychological, and The new concept should be inclusive of all irregular attacks employed against the economic warfare, as well as sabotage and irregular methods, as well as conventional homeland. Homeland defense is focused subversion supported and directed by an force and interagency capabilities to be on defending against state-sponsored at- external force.49 The Army UW definition fully effective. Counter-Unconventional tacks, while homeland security is focused from 1969 states, “UW consists of mili- Warfare states, “To prove successful, on preventing criminal and terrorist tary, political, psychological, or economic counter-UW must be strategic in con- acts.53 Without question, interagency co- actions of covert, clandestine, or overt ception and scope. It therefore must operation is important for both; DOD is nature within areas under the actual or encompass the whole-of-government the lead for homeland defense, while the potential control or influence of a force while employing the full range of syn- Department of Homeland Security is the or state whose interests and objectives are chronized IW functions in order to defeat lead for homeland security. Historically, inimical to those of the United States.”50 an adversary’s unconventional warfare homeland defense has focused on defend- UW doctrine continued to include the activities.”52 None of the current doctrinal ing the air and maritime approaches from concepts of sabotage and subversion into options, traditional warfare, IW, or UW air and missile attack, as these were the the 1990s, and did not lose doctrinal ties fully addresses state-sponsored irregular primary military threats to the homeland. to political, psychological, and economic threats and strategies. Whichever doctrinal Under the new paradigm, however, warfare until well into the COIN era in route is chosen, the key is to understand enemies use indirect tactics to easily Iraq and Afghanistan.51 Expanded UW that the United States is engaged in a dif- bypass conventional air and maritime doctrine should be less tied to working ferent type of war, probably not the one defenses. Policymakers have a difficult with and through insurgencies and resis- the Department of Defense (DOD) is time discerning what constitutes a state- tance movements and more focused on best prepared to fight. Updated doctrine sponsored irregular attack, possibly using the broader aspects of state-versus-state and authorities are required to compete transnational criminal organizations, irregular conflict. and win. cyber hackers, or other third parties as
JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Pelleriti et al. 109 33 surrogates versus a criminal or terrorist American Military’s Competitive Edge (Wash- Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, ington, DC: Department of Defense, January 55. act. The distinction is extremely signifi- 2018), 2. 34 USASOC, Counter-Unconventional War- cant, however, when discussing homeland 10 Ibid., 3. fare White Paper, 3. defense versus homeland security au- 11 Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from 35 Little and Pilliod, Drug Warfare, 2. thorities. Under a new homeland defense the Gulf Wars” in Chinese Lessons from Other 36 Ibid., 5. framework, DOD could become the Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, 37 Holly Hedegaard, Margaret Warner, and and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Arialdi M. Miniño, Drug Overdose Deaths in the supported instead of supporting agency Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 159. United States, 1999–2016, NCHS Data Brief to counter state- or VEO-sponsored ir- 12 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unre- No. 294 (Washington, DC: Department of regular attacks. Almost without saying, stricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy Health and Human Services, December 2017), interagency cooperation and coordina- America (Venice, CA: Shadow Lawn Press, available at
110 Joint Doctrine / Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019