Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater- Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel
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Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater- Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel U.S. House of Representatives • Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations April 2010 Committee Print 111-4 (National Defense University) (Military Academy) (Command & General Staff College) (Army War College) (Naval Academy) (Marine Corps University) (Naval War College) (Air Force Academy) (Air University) ANOTHER CROSSROADS? PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION TWO DECADES AFTER THE GOLDWATER- NICHOLS ACT AND THE SKELTON PANEL U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES • COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS APRIL 2010 Committee Print 111-4 ii Nothing to see here iv HASC OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS STAFF O&I STAFF LEAD: LORRY M. FENNER, PH.D. O&I STAFF ASSISTANT: LEE F. HOWARD III JOHN E. KRUSE WILLIAM S. JOHNSON THOMAS E. HAWLEY RYAN P. CRUMPLER With assistance from Sean McDonald, Drew Walter, Peter Kavanewsky, Ashley Alley, Anne Daugherty Miles, Nate Allen, and Abraham Kanter. v vi PREFACE “The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.” Thucydides This report examines officer in-residence professional military education (PME) as a critical investment in the most important element of our military – people. The primary purpose of PME is to develop military officers, throughout their careers, for the rigorous intellectual demands of complex contingencies and major conflicts. The United States cannot afford to be complacent when it comes to producing leaders capable of meeting significant challenges, whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels of warfare. Military officers must think critically, communicate well, conduct themselves with integrity, and lead others to perform strenuous tasks in difficult and often dangerous situations. As a matter of national security, the country’s continuing investment in the PME system must be wisely made. In supporting the military, the Congress is responsible for providing funds, setting associated policy, and providing oversight to ensure that all military and Department of Defense civilian personnel are properly prepared to perform their missions. The House Armed Services Committee has long supported the members of the armed forces by providing oversight, guidance, and resources with respect to PME. The most notable effort was the landmark review conducted by Chairman Ike Skelton’s panel twenty years ago, which recommended comprehensive reform of the PME system.1 That Panel’s report stated: “Although many of its individual courses, programs, and faculties are excellent, the existing PME system must be improved to meet the needs of the modern profession at arms.” While this Subcommittee will not propose revolutionary changes as the Skelton Panel did, the current PME system should be improved to meet the country’s needs of today and tomorrow. Twenty years ago, the U.S. military was educating officers to engage Cold War adversaries. Clearly, much about our military and our world has changed since then, and we know that much will continue to change as we look to the future. PME, therefore, must remain dynamic. It must respond to present needs and consistently anticipate those of the future. It must continuously evolve in order to imbue service members with the intellectual agility to assume expanded roles and to perform new missions in an ever dynamic and increasingly complicated security environment. Other requirements are enduring and must be preserved. With respect to PME, Congress should regularly pose and assess these questions: How well is the nation educating its officers presently? And, what should be done to educate them more effectively in the future? 1 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, No. 4, (The Skelton Report). vii viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We want to thank our fellow Subcommittee Members and the Subcommittee staff. We would also like to thank all of the Members of the House Armed Services Committee, particularly Chairman Ike Skelton and Ranking Member Buck McKeon. Congressman Steve Israel of the Appropriations Committee deserves special mention for his interest in this important subject. We wish to express our gratitude to current and former HASC staff including Erin Conaton, Paul Arcangeli, Robert Simmons, Paul Oostburg Sanz, Paul Lewis, Debra Wada, Suzanne McKenna, Vickie Plunkett, Craig Greene, John Chapla, Lara Battles, Jennifer Kohl, Mary Kate Cunningham, Joshua Holly, Mary Goldstein, M. Cathy Devinney, Nancy Warner, Rebecca Ross, Cyndi Howard, Everett Coleman, Derek Scott, and J.J. Johnson for their support. Finally, we want to thank our own military legislative assistants (MLAs), fellows, and schedulers: Julie Zelnick, Shannon Green, Hector Soto-Rodriguez, Toby Watkins, Melissa Tuttle, David Bann, Sean Welch, Damon Loveless, and Whitney Stockett, as well as the rest of the Subcommittee MLAs for their assistance. We also appreciate the hard work of those outside the committee who assisted in this effort, including those with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, the Combatant Commanders, and the leaders, faculty, staff, and students of the PME institutions we visited. In particular, we thank the Joint Chiefs of Staff/DJ-7 staff and service staffs, who responded to our many requests for hearing witnesses, briefings, and documents, as we examined this issue. We would also like to thank the U.S. Southern Command, Central Command, Special Operations Command, Africa Command, Northern Command, Transportation Command, Strategic Command, Joint Forces Command, Joint Task Force-Bravo, Army Training and Doctrine Command, National Defense University, National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Joint Forces Staff College, Army War College, Naval War College, Air University, Marine Corps University, Army Command and General Staff College, United States Naval Academy, United States Military Academy, and United States Air Force Academy for hosting our visits. In addition, we would like to recognize the Congressional Research Service for their invaluable assistance. We are particularly indebted to the men and women in the legislative affairs and legislative liaison offices in all of these organizations, whose work with us is greatly appreciated. We also need to acknowledge many experts, including those from several nongovernmental organizations. We thank the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, the Inter- University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and the Institute for Defense Analyses for their support of our hearings. We would also like to thank the government witnesses who participated in our efforts. We especially thank the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and the Service Chiefs of Staff who met with Subcommittee Members to discuss their views on professional military education. Our greatest expression of thanks goes to the students and educators, both military and civilian professors, who take part in this ongoing effort to develop officers so that they possess the knowledge and intellectual agility to confront the challenges that lie ahead. Their efforts are essential if our military officers are to be known for both their strategic thinking abilities and the skill with which they operate in the national security environment. VIC SNYDER ROB WITTMAN ix x EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (the Subcommittee) reviewed the state of the officer in-residence professional military education (PME) system to determine what can, and should, be done to improve PME amid complex and evolving national security challenges. Military officers of every grade are expected to demonstrate intellectual agility, think critically, communicate well, conduct themselves with integrity, and lead others to perform strenuous tasks in difficult and often dangerous situations. The principal purpose of PME is to educate officers throughout their careers in preparation for this unique public trust. The Subcommittee endeavored to: evaluate PME’s effectiveness relative to its purpose; assess whether it is sufficiently responsive to military needs; and appraise its component schools in their pursuits of well-resourced and qualitatively- rigorous programs. As a result, the Subcommittee identified specific areas for departmental action and further congressional oversight to promote continuing improvement of the system. In 1987, the year following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act2 (Goldwater-Nichols), the House Armed Services Committee (the Committee) established a panel on PME led by Representative Ike Skelton (the Skelton Panel). The Skelton Panel undertook the last comprehensive congressional review of PME. The Skelton Panel assessed the PME system’s ability to develop officers in both strategy and joint matters and the overall quality of PME, as well as the Department of Defense’s (the Department’s) plans to implement the joint PME requirements created by Goldwater-Nichols. The Panel published its findings and recommendations in a report, dated April 21, 1989 (the Skelton Report). This Subcommittee did not attempt to reproduce either the scope or the depth of the Skelton Panel’s