In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware
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EFiled: Aug 09 2013 03:34PM EDT Filing ID 53567139 Case Number 334,2013 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE ALAN KAHN, SAMUEL PILL, IRWIN PILL, RACHEL PILL and CHARLOTTE No. 334,2013 MARTIN, PlaintiffsBelow, Appellants, Court Below: Court of Chancery of v. The State of Delaware C.A. No. 6566CS M&F WORLDWIDE CORP., RONALD O. (Consolidated) PERELMAN, BARRY F. SCHWARTZ, WILLIAM C. BEVINS, BRUCE SLOVIN, CHARLES T. DAWSON, STEPHEN G. TAUB, JOHN M. KEANE, THEO W. FOLZ, PHILIP E. BEEKMAN, MARTHA L. BYORUM, VIET D. DINH, PAUL M. MEISTER, CARL B. WEBB and MacANDREWS & FORBES HOLDINGS INC., DefendantsBelow, Appellees. APPELLANTS’ OPENING BRIEF ROSENTHAL, MONHAIT & GODDESS, P.A. Carmella P. Keener (Bar No. 2810) 919 North Market Street, Suite 1401 Wilmington, DE 19801 (302) 6564433 FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP Peter B. Andrews (Del. Bar No. 4623) 20 Montchanin Road, Suite 145 Wilmington, DE 19807 (302) 4823182 Counsel for August 9, 2013 Plaintiffs BelowAppellants OF COUNSEL: WOLF POPPER LLP Carl L. Stine Matthew InsleyPruitt 845 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 (212) 7594600 FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP Nadeem Faruqi Beth A. Keller 369 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017 (212) 9839330 GARDY & NOTIS, LLP James S. Notis Kira German 501 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10017 (212) 9050509 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................iii NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING .......................................................................1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................................................................3 STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................4 A. Perelman and MacAndrews & Forbes Controlled MFW...................4 B. The Buyout.........................................................................................6 1. The Special Committee Was Not Fully Empowered...............7 2. The Special Committee Was Not Independent........................9 3. The Special Committee Obtains a $1 Price Increase And Approves the Buyout .......................................................9 C. Procedural History.............................................................................10 D. The Decision Below..........................................................................11 ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................13 I. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT BUSINESS JUDGMENT APPLIES TO CONTROLLER FREEZE OUT MERGERS WHERE THE CONTROLLER’S PROPOSAL IS CONDITIONED ON SPECIAL COMMITTEE APPROVAL AND A MAJORITYOFTHE MINORITY VOTE.................................................13 A. Question Presented............................................................................13 B. Scope of Review................................................................................13 C. Merits of the Argument.....................................................................14 1. This Court Has Reaffirmed the Continuing Viability of Kahn v. Lynch’s Dictate that Entire Fairness Applies in All Going Private FreezeOut Mergers...................................14 2. Entire Fairness Should Continue to Be the Standard of Review in Controller FreezeOut Merger Cases ................17 II. THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT REGARDING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND WHETHER THE MAJORITYOFTHEMINORITY PROVISION WAS EFFECTIVE IN THIS CASE......................................................................25 A. Question Presented............................................................................25 B. Standard and Scope of Review..........................................................25 C. Merits of Argument...........................................................................25 1. The Special Committee Was Not Independent.......................26 2. The Special Committee Was Not Fully Empowered..............31 3. The Issue of Efficacy of the MajorityoftheMinority Provision Here Is Highly Factual and the Subject of Expert Testimony....................................................................33 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................34 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011) ...........................................................................22 Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Brown, 941 A.2d 1011 (Del. 2007)......................................................................13, 25 Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012)..................................................................15, 16, 20 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)........................................................................26, 27 In re Atlas Energy Resources, LLC, Unitholder Litig., 2010 WL 4273122 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010)...........................................17, 18 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004)................................................................26, 28, 29 Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990) .......................................................................15 In re Cox Commc’ns S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005) ......................................... 1011, 16, 20, 23, 24 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999)............................................................................15 In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) ............................................31, 32 Kahn v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 1996 WL 159628 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 1996) ......................................29, 31, 32 Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).................................................................... passim Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997)..................................................................15, 16, 31 iii Mercier v. InterTel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 814 (Del. Ch. 2007) ...............................................................22 In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013) ................................................................. passim New Castle County Dep’t of Land Use v. Univ. of Del., 842 A.2d 1201 (Del. 2004)............................................................................16 In re Oracle Corp. Deriv. Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) .................................................................28, 30 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993)..............................................................................26 In re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 990 A.2d 940 (Del. Ch. 2010) ................................................................. 2324 In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)..................................................29 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)........................................................................14, 15 Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996)......................................................................13, 25 OTHER AUTHORITIES Matthew Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form Over Substance? The Value of Corporate Process and Management Buyouts, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1653492 (5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, 2010 ..................................................18, 21 Guham Subramanian, PostSiliconix FreezeOuts: Theory, Evidence and Policy, http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/472 (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center of Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series, Paper 472, 2004) ...........19 iv Faith Stevelman, Going Private at the Intersection of the Market and the Law, 62 Bus. Law 775 (May 2007) .......................................................................................18 Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested Transactions, 36 Del. J. Corp. L. 903 (2011)............................................................................................................20 Nicola Faith Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corp. Boards, 34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1435 (2011)......................................................................................................20 Steven Davidoff, The Management Buyout Path of Less Resistance, N.Y. Times, June 12, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/themanagementbuyout pathoflessresistance/.............................................................................................19 STATUTES AND RULES Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 .............................................................................28, 29 Del. Prof. Cond. R. 1.7.............................................................................................29 New York Stock Exchange Rule 303A.02(a)..........................................................27 v NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING Stockholders of M & F Worldwide Corp. (“MFW”) brought this class action against the Company’s Board of Directors (the “Board”), its controlling stockholder, defendant Ronald O. Perelman (“Perelman”), and his wholly owned holding company, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc. (“MacAndrews & Forbes” and collectively, the “Defendants”), arising out of Perelman’s acquisition of the 57% of MFW’s common stock