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The Hinges of History: State-Making and Revolt in Early Modern France Author(s): Edgar Kiser and April Linton Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 67, No. 6 (Dec., 2002), pp. 889-910 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088975 Accessed: 27/05/2010 08:05 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asa. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Sociological Review. http://www.jstor.org THE HINGES OF HISTORY: STATEoMAKING AND REVOLT IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE EDGAR KISER APRIL LINTON University of Washington Princeton University The formation of early modern states-combining increases in taxation, warfare, and administrative centralization-was often violently opposed by subjects. A game theoretic model of strategic interactions between rulers and subjects is developed to more fully specify the relationship between state-making and revolt in France be- tween 1515 and 1789. Quantitative analyses of revolts throughout France are com- bined with a brief case study of revolts in Guyenne (the most quarrelsome French province) to test propositions derived from the model. Offensive war (but not war in general) and administrative centralization increased the likelihood of revolt, while the presence of the Estates General (the national legislative assembly) decreased it. The effect of taxation on revolt depended on the historical context-high taxes and offensive wars tended to incite revolts prior to the Fronde (a cluster of revolts in 1648-1653), but had no effect afterwards. It is argued that the outcomes of signifi- cant revolts, like the Fronde, often serve as important turning points in the history of state-making. Potentially similar events in medieval England and early modern Spain are also discussed. HE PROCESS of early modem state- to explore the causal relationship between Imaking was often quite unpopular; it various aspects of state-making and tax re- was marked by frequent wars, increasing volts.' Both state-making and revolt are the taxation, and the growth and centralization result of choices, and these choices are al- of administrative institutions. As several ways made in light of the anticipated reac- scholars have shown, these factors often tions of other actors. Rulers consider the triggered revolts in early modern states possibility of revolt when they think about (Barkey 1991; Berce 1987; Bonney raising taxes or pursuing unpopularpolicies. 1978:214; Brustein and Levi 1987; Clark In deciding whether to revolt, subjects con- 1978; Goldstone 1991; Hopcroft 1999; sider both the likelihood of rulers using re- Kiser, Drass, and Brustein 1993; Major pression and their other options for decreas- 1960:127; Markoff 1996:12, 42; Mousnier ing their tax burden, such as tax evasion. The 1970, 1979:741-42; Tilly 1975, 1986:7, determinants of the costs of tax evasion, in 1993:17, 156-58; Zagorin 1982). part a function of rulers' decisions about ad- We use a model of the strategic interac- ministrative techniques, must thus also be tions between rulers and taxpaying subjects part of a model of revolt. To provide a rough heuristic model of the Direct correspondence to Edgar Kiser, Depart- relationship between state-making and re- ment of Sociology, Box 353340, University of volt, we use a game theoretic decision tree. Washington, Seattle WA 98195 (kiser@u. washington.edu). We thank Julia Adams, Terry 1 Revolts were caused by many factors other Boswell, Julie Brines, Cai Yong, Jerry Herting, than taxation, including religious conflicts, popu- Peter Hoff, Hyojoung Kim, James Kitts, Becky lation growth, price increases, elite conflicts, and Pettit, Kevin Quinn, Ron Schoenberg, Katherine the rise of capitalism (Barkey 1991; Goldstone Stovel, and several anonymous ASR reviewers 1991; Lachmann 1989, 2000). We focus only on for helpful comments. revolts against state taxation. AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2002, VOL. 67 (DECEMBER:889-9 10) 889 890 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW The extensive form of game theory high- province in which revolt occurred most fre- lights the sequential nature of interaction, quently in early modem France-almost one- and thus precisely specifies the relationships third of the revolts in France occurred there. between various aspects of state-making Guyenne is also a useful case because it al- (war, taxation, and administrativecentraliza- lows us to explore in more detail the impor- tion) and revolt. We use the model in a lim- tant fiscal and administrative changes in the ited way: We look at the state-making pro- Pays d'Etat (provinces retaining provincial cess from the point of view of subjects. Ex- legislative assemblies in the sixteenth cen- plaining the actions of rulers (such as tax in- tury) in southern France in the early seven- creases and war-making) that initiate the teenth century. Because it is not possible to process is beyond the scope of this paper.2 get quantitative data at the provincial level We test the relationship between aspects for our entire period (especially for tax rates, of state-making and revolt mainly via quan- prices, and population), we do not reproduce titative analyses of revolts in France be- our statistical analysis for Guyenne. How- tween 1515 and 1789. Early modern France ever, we do have sufficient data to roughly is a useful case in which to explore these re- test whether the same causal dynamics oper- lationships for several reasons. First, many ate at national and provincial levels. of the classic historical studies of state-mak- ing and revolt cited above focus on this case, STATE-MAKING AND REVOLT AS allowing us to draw on their insights in con- STRATEGIC INTERACTION structing our models and to compare their qualitative findings with our more quantita- We begin with two simple assumptions about tive results. Second, early modern France the interests of actors.5The rulers (i.e., chief contains ample variation in the main aspects executives) of states want to maximize tax of state-making (levels of taxation, war, ad- revenue while maintaining security of rule ministrative centralization) and tax revolts, (Kiser 1994; Levi 1988; North 1981). Tax- facilitating the testing of our arguments. payers collectively want public goods like Because tax rates and rates of revolt security and social order that require taxa- (among other things) varied substantially tion, but individually they want to minimize across provinces (Brustein and Levi 1987; their tax burden.6 Using these assumptions, Collins 1994:20; Major 1994:xviii; Markoff and information and argumentsfrom the his- 1996:37; Mousnier 1979:641),3 it is impor- torical literatureto specify the structuralcon- tant to supplement our analysis with an ex- ditions within which these actors were em- amination of these relationships at the pro- bedded, we first outline propositions about vincial level.4 We focus on Guyenne, the how taxes, war, and centralization affected revolt in France, and then we construct a 2An adequate test of the game-theoretic model model showing how these factors are interre- as a whole would require both endogenizing the lated. choices of rulers by explaining both tax rates and policy choices, and using comparative cases to show the conditions under which state-making TAXATION AND REVOLT goes down paths not followed in the French case. Several scholars have that there is a 3Although aggregated data on French taxation argued have been used as a measure of the tax burden in relationship between levels of taxation and several exemplary historical analyses (Braudel 1972:684; Goldstone 1991:196-212; Mann 5 The following discussion, based on these as- 1993:358-400; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1986:61-63; sumptions, outlines a stylized model of strategic Wallerstein 1989), all of these scholars recognize interaction, and should not be taken as a histori- that provincial variations across early modern cal description. France make incomplete any test that aggregates 6 It is, of course, a simplification to group all across them. taxpayers together, but the fact that most early 4 Our intent is not to reproduce Brustein and modern tax revolts, in France and elsewhere, Levi's (1987) masterful analysis of the geogra- were class collaboration revolts involving a phy of revolt-an analysis of one province would broad cross-section of subjects (Barkey 1991; not allow us to do that. We supplement their Brustein 1985; Mousnier 1970:42) makes it a work by focusing on the timing of revolt. reasonable simplification. STATE-MAKING AND REVOLT IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 891 revolt frequency in early modern France but they realize that doing so can sometimes (Barkey 1991; Berce 1987; Hopcroft 1999; increase the likelihood of revolt. The lower Mousnier 1979; Tilly 1986; Zagorin 1982). the benefits to subjects provided by the cur- Our model suggests that this relationship is rent policy pursued by rulers (such as an un- produced by two micro-level causal mecha- popular war), the greater the potential ben- nisms.

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