ANGLO-FRENCH TRADE RELATIONS UNDER CHARLES 11.

C~IARLES11’s Francophile policy, so slavishly followed by his immediate successor, was one ofthe leading causes of the “ Glorious Revolution’’ of 1688. The late Sir John Seeley, indeed, in his brilliant essay on the Growth of British Policy, maintained that the Revolution as a movement began as early as 1670, when Charles I1 and Louis XIV were signatories to the notorious Secret Treaty of Dover. That the French alliance was more than distasteful to a large section of the nation became increasingly evident in the second decade of Charles’s reign. In the seething cauldron of Anglo-French antagonism during this period Popish Plots were but the scum which boiled up to the surface ; the more important causes of mistrust were not religious. Englishmen had begun to realise that France was consciously aiming not merely at ascendancy in European politics, but at domination in the newly developing markets of the world. Urged on by the vigorous and comprehensive measures of Colbert, France was making a deter- mined onslaught upon both Dutch and English trade in the East and West Indies, the Baltic and on the West African coast. Hatred and fear of the French colony in Canada made England’s North American colonists yield a reluctant allegiance to their mother country. In the Newfoundland fisheries, too, a bitter conflict was raging between fishermen of both nations, while Colbert’s naval policy, which alone involved Louis XIV’s Government in an annual expenditure of thirteen million francs, and resulted in the growth of a fleet in point of numbers superior to that of England, gavc rise in the latter country to a I‘ scare ” in many respects similar to that which in recent years grceted the advent of Germany to the front rank of maritime nations. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that as the reign proceeded, Charles 11’s relations with Louis XIV became increasingly unpopu- lar with the majority of his subjects. Indeed an investigation of the above-summarisecl causes of hostility between England and France will at once reveal not only the important part they played in the drama which reached its climax in 1688, but also the fact t,hat the economic conditions so largely operative in bringing about NO.25.-VOL. VII. U 18 HISTORY [APRIL the second Hundred Years’ War had their origin during the reign of Charles 11. The economic aspect of this rivalry, in so far as the reign of Charles I1 is concerned, has received scant attention at the hands of historians, and it is the purpose of this paper to show how between 1660 and 1686, owing to the operation of the “ Mercantile System ” in both countries, a bitter tariff war grew up between England and France resulting in the virtual prohibition of all trade between them save that of the smuggler. One of the great underlying causes of this development lay in the enormous stimulus given by Colbert to French native production. In his internal economic policy the great minister organised an industrial movement in France by means of State aid to home manufactures. To this end he created and fostered the growth of what he judged to be French national industries. He granted “ immunities, indulgences, premiums, pensions, protections, etc., to foreign artists, artificers, manufacturers, etc., from all parts,” to settle with their families and workmen in France.1 He stimulated the French woollen, silk and tapestry manufactures. Workers in gold, silver, ivory and brass were procured from abroad to teach their handicrafts to French artisans. In every way measures were taken which strove on the one hand to improve the existing French manufactures, and on the other to introduce fresh ones and new branches of commerce. As a complement to this internal policy, Colbert devised the most rigid Protectionist system that Europe had up to that time witnessed. “Tout le commerce,” he once said, “ consiste B decharger les entrkes des marchandises qui servent aux manu- factures du dedans du royaume, et 8. charger celles qui sont manufactur8es.”a Fouquet, indeed, had led the way by the imposition of a duty of sfty sous a ton upon all foreign ships entering French harbours. Colbert not only maintained this tax, but, we are told, would have gone to the length of entirely pro- hibiting all foreign imports into France, had he been able effec- tively so to do.* In 1664 he prepared the way for future develop- ments by the institution of a moderate tariff upon imports from foreign countries. Three years later a much stricter system was introduced. The climax came in 1672, when Colbert’s regulations became so stringent that they were one of the leading causes of the war between France and Holland which commenced in that year. France’s greatest commercial rivals during Colbert’s term of

1 Anderson, Hietorical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce (1764), ii. 480. * Ltlvisse, Hiatoire de France, VII. Part I. p. 236. a Ibid.. p. 230. 19221 ANQLO-FRENCH TRADE RELATIONS 19 office were Holland and England. The tariff regulations were aimed chiefly at the former, but the latter soon began keenly to resent the restriction of her export trade to France, especially her exports of woollen manufactures, which were entirely forbidden from entering the French market. In 1669 Colbert induced Van Robais, a Dutch merchant, to settle at Abbeville with five hundred workmen, there to set on foot the manufacture of woollen broad- cloth. France was indeed to be independent of England for her supplies of woollen goods. For her supplies of raw wool, however, her own sheep flocks were entirely insufficient, and she looked chiefly to England to make up for this deficiency. England, on the other hand, was as anxious as France to stimulate her own woollen manufacture. In 1661, therefore, the export of raw wool was forbidden by “ An Act for prohibiting the exportation of Wooll, Woollfells, Fullers Earth or any kinde of Scouring Earth,” 1 and the legisla- tion against the export of wool was several times reinforced by further statutes and royal proclamations throughout the reign. An extensive smuggling system naturally grew up between the Channel ports of both countries, which caused the Government much trouble and was not effectively checked.a The prohibition of the import of English manufactured goods into France combined with the influx of French manufactured goods into the English market to cause an outcry in England against the French trade. As early as 1660 a numerously signed petition had been presented by the shopkeepers and artisans of London and district to Charles 11, wherein they showed the damage to trade by import of woollen cloths, laces, ribbons, silks, etc., much increased since the peace made by Cromwell with the French.s The petitioners advised the king that the

12 Car. 11. c. 32. See also Cal. of State Papers, Domcdc, passim. a In 1664 Captain John Strode wrote to William Prynno, chairman of a Committee of the House of Commons, “ Vast quantities of wool aro transported at night along the coast from Sandwich to Newhaven, and the persons so strong, that none dare meddle with them without five files of soldiers. Nobody before looked into it, for more wool has been seized this year than in many years before; now they have spies about the castle, so that if the gate be opened, they take the alarm, and return their wool to the houses, and, pretending to be wool-combers and weavers, it cannot be seized there, though they hardly make a piece a year. They have threatened and beaten most of the officere of the Customs, and go disguised on dark nights so that no one can swear to them ; 200,000 pistoles’ worth of wool have been this year landed at French ports, bcsides what has gono to Flanders and Holland. The Walloons of Canterbury are great traders in it, and dl this side of England.” Cal. S.P.D. 1664, March 27. See also Cal. S.P.D. 1669, Oct. 28. Cal. S.P.D. 1600, Nov. 44. 03 20 HISTORY [APRIL wearing of English manufactures should be encouraged, and that of foreign goods discountenanced. In the following year it was complained that the cheaper French tapestry was driving the English manufacture from the market.’ The early methods of the English government to cope with this new problem were haphazard and tentative. In October 1665 Charles I1 announced to the Lord Mayor of London that owing to the vast sums yearly exported for foreign manufactures, while in both Holland and France vigorous methods were employed to prevent the import of English manufactures, he had resolved thenceforth to wear only clothes made of English-wrought materials. The Lord Mayor was to proclaim this resolution to the London shopkeepers, in order that they might not send abroad for laces, silks, and other imported clothing stuffs.2 The attention of Parliament was drawn to the question, and on September 22, 1666, the Commons appointed a Committee “to consider of Proposals to be tendered to the House, for Advance of the Manufactures of this Nation, and to provcnt Excess In using Foreign Manufactures.” The report of the Committee was laid before them on October 8, by Sir George Downing, and at the Committee’s suggestion the following resolutions were passed by the House : (a) “ That the Committee have liberty to draw up and tender a Bill to the House, for the prohibiting the Importation of all Sorts of Manufactures and Commodities whatsoever, of the Growth, Production, or Manufacture of France, and of all other Lands and Places in the Possession of the French King, into any Port or Place of this Kingdom, or Town of Berwicke upon Tweed. (b) “That his Majesty be humbly moved to issue out his Proclamation, prohibiting strictly the Importation of all Sorts of Manufactnres and Commodities whatsoever, of the Growth, Production or Manufacture of France,” etc.4 Downing was then appointed by the Commons to make known the above resolutions to the Lords, and a conference between the two Houses was arranged.5 The Lords, however, objected to thc resolutions on the grounds that such a proceeding would destroy a great part of the Duke of York’s revenue from wine licences, while the Royal Proclamation would be rendered in- effectual unless its scope included both Scotland and Ireland, since England might be stocked from these kingdoms.6 The

1 Gal. S.P.D. 1GG1, Oct. 12. Petition of Sir Sackvillo Crow, Bart. Ibid., 1665, Oct. 2G. 3 Commona’ Journals, viii. 626. 4 Ibid., viii. 632. Ibid., viii. 632, 037, 038, 639. 6 Cnl. S.P.D. 1866, Oct 20. 19221 ANQLO-FRENCH TRADE RELATIONS 21 project, therefore, was dropped for the time, and Parliament contented itself with passing the ‘‘ Act for Burying in Woollen onely,” while two years later the duties on French wines were raised to El6 a tun.2 Thus before the end of the fist decade of Charles 11’s reign there were vigorous and loud complaints against the influx of French commodities into the English marlret, the French pro- hibition of the import of English manufactures, and the “ mis- chievous practice of wooling, as it is vulgarly termed, that is, the running of our English and Irish wool into France.” In the second decade the complaints increased in volume and bitterness, the mercantilist theory of the “ Bdancc of Trade ” being appealed to in support of the abolition of French trade. The Whigs, therefore, who first attained colicsion as a party in order to combat the French influence at the English Court, were at this period ardent protectionists, and advocated a tarifi war with France, with whom the balance of trade was, according to their statistics, unfavourable to England. At the same time they urged a rapprochement with the Dutch on the grounds that the balance of trade with Holland was in England’s fa~our.~ The Tories, on the othcr liaiid, advocaied a more generous economic policy based on Free Trade principles. As supporters of the king’s friendship with Louis XIV they refused to accept the balance of trade theory, and argued that prohibition of the English trade with France would be dctrimental to the king’s customs’ revenue. Their views were exprcssed by a remarkable coterie of economic writers, including Dudlcy North, for twenty years a merchant at Smyrna and Constantinople ; Charles Dsvcnant, a son of the poet, and a commissioner of cxcisc ; Josiah Child, “ the soul of the East India Company,” and Nicolss Barb~n.~ The idea of a “ balance of trade ” developed from the Bullionist theory, which had its birth in Spain during the sixteenth century, when her discoveries in the New World made her the proprietor of the principal mines which supplied Europe with precious metals. The English mercantilists, with Misselden and Thomas Mun in their van, adopted the Bullionist idea chiefly for reasons

1 18 and 19 Car. 11. c. 4. 19 and 20 Car. 11. c. G; Cul. S.P.D. 1668, July 11. 3 Anderaon, Hist. and Chron. Dedudion, ii. 480. 4 Blok, Hietory of the People of the Nelhedaiad8, iv. 517, states that by the end of the century, whereas Dutch exports to England wore roughly about six million pounds sterling in value, those of England to Holland amounted to about eighteen millions. For an account of their writings see Ashley, “The Tory Origin of Free Trade in Surveys, Hiatoric and Economic. 22 HISTORY [APRIL of national safety. To meet any sudden emergency, especially in the case of war, a good supply of bullion was an urgent necessity for raising and equipping an army and fleet, and a government amply supplied with treasure in the form of specie was thus powerfully fortified for or against foreign aggression. England, not owning any gold or silver mines, after vainly attempting to prohibit the export of the precious metals, developed the theory of the “ Balance of Trade,” which Mun admirably stated in the opening pages of his work entitled England’s Treasure by Foreign lrade, published in 1664. “ The ordinary means to increase our wealth and treasure is by foreign trade,” he wrote ; “ to sell more to strangers yearly than we consume of theirs in value. For that part of our stock which is not returned to us in wares must necessarily be brought homo in treasure.” From the days of Cromwell it had been noted by many English merchants that the balance of trade with France was growing increasingly unfavourable to England, and this combined with the agitation about the import of French manufactured goods to create no little disturbance in influential trading circles. In 1667, as a result of Colbert’s measures to prohibit the import of English cloth into France, Houblon, Papillon and other important London merchants laid before Parliament certain statistics showing that English exports to France were less than those of France to England by no less a sum than E965,128 17s. 4d. a year.l The Whig party in Parliament at once raised the issue of prohibition, which became their economic rallying-ground against France for over a century. At first, however, their efforts met with scant success, but between 1672 and 1677 negotiations were set on foot to bring about a commercial treaty between England and France wherein some measure for equalising the balance might be provided. In this connection, therefore, “ a scheme of trade as it is at present carried on between England and France in the commodities of the native product and manufacture of each country, calculated as exactly as possible,” was in 1674 drawn up “ in obedience to the command of the Lords Commissioners for the Treaty of Com- merce with France.” a Houblon and Papillon’s table of statistics was again quoted, and it was asserted that whereas English annual exports to France were only of the value of €171,021 69. 8d., English imports from France were valued at the sum of $1,136,150 4s. oa.

1 Pad. History, Appendix CXV. Cunningham, English Indually and Com- mewe, Modern Times, p. 468. 3 Cal. S.P.D. 1674, Nov. 20. 19221 ANGLO-FRENCII TRADE RELATIONS 23

From the evidence contained in the Domestic State Papers it would seem that the wool merchants and manufacturers of England hoped that the much-discussed treaty would contain something after the nature of a reciprocity agreement over the question of impositions. In 1674, therefore, a petition was lodged with the king stating “ that the wool manufacture has been esteemed the staple commodity of thb kingdom, that no treaty of commerce with France having been settled since 1606, when it was declared that the very considerable impositions previously laid on our manufactures should remain as they were till they could be mitigated by a further treaty then intended, the King of France during the late unhappy troubles and his Majesty’s absence took occasion to advance the customs on the said manufactures to a very unequal rate, beyond the proportion of French manufactures imported into England, and since the Restoration he has twice doubled 1 what was during those troubles so unequally laid, so that the manufactures of this kingdom are, as it were, prohibited, very little being capable of being exported to balance what is imported, but merchants are forced to remit bib of exchange to pay for what they buy in France, to the extreme detriment of the revenues, the fall of rents, and the ruin of many families, though no occasion has been given to his Majesty by advance of imposi- tions on French merchandises except wines, which has been no ways injurious to France.” The result of this petition was the issue of an Order in Council instructing the Earl of Arlington to bring pressure to bear upon Ruvigny, the French ambassador, for the more speedy conclusion of the pending treaty. Should, however, Ruvigny be unable to procure the necessary powers in this matter from Louis XIV, Arlington was ordered to instruct Sir William Lockhart to proceed to France, there to conclude the treaty “ in the most advantageous possible manner for balancing the trade between both kingdoms.” At the same time the committee appointed to “ prepare the pro- ject of the said treaty ” was to continue to “ meet and review it in order to the perfecting thereof.”J The wool manufacturers placed great hopes upon the treaty, and in a letter written to Sir Joseph Williamson it was represented that whereas at the be@- ning of the reign six or eight thousand pieces of cloth went annually to London from Kendal to be shipped for France, in 1674 less than three hundred were sent, while the number of kerseys exported to

1 This refers to Colbert’e tariff regulations of 1664 and 1867 mentioned above. * CaZ. S.P.D. 1674 (July ?), p. 314. 8 Ibid., 1674, July 24. 24 HISTORY [APRIL

France yearly from tho West of Yorkshire had fallen from ten thousand to less than five hundred.' Meanwhile the Weavers Company of London had also petitioned the king and Privy Council against the " frequent importation of foreign wrought silks, ribbons, laces," etc. They asserted that owing to the increased consumption of these commodities many thousands of weavers had been forced to forsake their calling, and they begged that the old statutes of Edward IV and Henry VII against the importation of such goods should be revived by royal proclamation, and that the king should again declare his intention of wearing only English manufactures.2 On this point, however, the Government remained passive. Either it considered such a policy incompatible with its scheme for a reciprocity treaty with France, or Charles I1 was committed too far with Louis XIV to admit of his adopting such an attitude. But thc French Government was in no hurry to conclude the treaty, and the English merchants began to complain that France was deliberately delaying matters in order to enjoy her trading advantages at the expense of England.3 In the following year, indeed, the London weavers caused a riot in the City by falling npon thc French weavers there, destroying their materials and wrecking their house^.^ So serious was the outbreak that the Government was forced to inter~ene.~ In 1674, with the ascendancy of Danby in the counsels of the king, it would seein that Charles I1 was attempting to break loose from his dependence upon Louis XIV, and although in the tangled events and contradictory policies of the next four years it is well- nigh impossible to get at the real motives of Charles, his most modern critic, Dr. W. A. Shaw, is of opinion that he was genuinely aiming at independence of France in his foreign policy.6 In the light of the new material which Dr. Shsw has unearthed this view is certainly feasible, and it is possible that, had Charles possessed the confidence of Parliament and people in a greater measure, the bribes of Louis XIV would have been powerless to prevent the English king from following a national policy in 1675 by joining the coalition of hostile powers against France. As it was, Charles's attitude towards France began to stiffen from 1674, and although the year 1675 saw another secret treaty between him and Louis XIV, publicly the negotiations for the

1 Cal. S.P.D. 1074, July 27. a Ibid., 1073, May 28. 1 Ibid., 1074, Nov. 20. Ibid., 1076, Aug. 10. Ibid., 1076, Aug. 11. 6 Introductions to Cale. of Treaaury Papers of the reign, completed in 1917. 19221 ANGLO-FRENCH TRADE RELATIONS 26

marriage of William of Orange and Mary of York proceeded until the marriage took place in 1677. In 1675 too, when it became cvident that there would be no reciprocity treaty with France, Charles reiterated his intention of not wearing foreign manufac- tured apparel, and issued an Order in Council prohibiting his subjects from wearing “ foreign points or laces.” 1 This half-hearted policy failed to satisfy the growing tide of opinion in Parliament and the country against French trade. Parliament ordered an examination into the general balance of trade between England and France. It wm discovered that while English imports from France for the year were of the value of f1,500,000, English exports to France were valued at only f 170,000, the adverse balance being f 1,330,000. From this time the Opposition in Parliament made war with France the chief item in its political programme and the sole condition upon which supplies would be granted to the Crown. This opposition, in spite of the bribes of the king, was very powerful indeed, and maintained so tight a hold upon its financial weapon that in all its money grants to the king it not only stipulated, but took active steps to ensure, that the money when collected should be used only for the specified purpose.2 Petitions and complaints poured in upon Parliament.s Multitudes of poor, it was said in the Commons, were on the verge of starvation for want of employment, which was chiefly caused by the “ intolerable impositions laid on English manufactures by the French king and others.” Early in the year 1676 Downing and Williamson set themselves to synthesise the various complaints and endeavour to formulate some definite policy for recommendation to the Crown. In this connection Williamson noted the foUowing statistics :

I. English exports lo Prance : Woollen manufactures . . €63,000 Other manufactured commodities . . 84,000 Total manufactured commodities exported to France . . 147,000 Total English exports to France . . 171,000

1 Cal. S.P.D. 1075, July 14. On thia point me Scott, Hielory of Joint Stock Companiee to 1720, i. 296,296. * Cal. S.P.D. 1076, October paaeim. Joud of the Home of Comwwna, ix. 365. 4 Joudof the Home .of Cornmom, ix. 301. 6 Cal. S.P.D. 1076, March 9. 26 HISTORY [APRIL

11. English imports from Trance : Linen . . 2507,000 Silks . . 300,000 Wine and Brandy . . 200,000 Total manufactured commodites imported from France . . 21,007,000. [N.B .-The total English imports from France he does not give.]

Williamson further noted t-he English dependence upon France for fashions, a fact which the French took advantage of by con- tinually changing fashions. Thus when fine cloth was generally worn in England, the French brought droguettes into fashion. When equally good imitations of these were produced in England, the French let them drop. English stuffs also were bought from the weavers and sold as French at a higher price.1 The proposals of Williamson and Downing to remedy this evil condition of affairs were threefold, and reflect a sad lack of constructive ability in those two assiduous officials. They recommended : (a) That the law for burying in woollen should be strictly enforced. (b) That the king should declare his intcntion of wearing only English manufactures; that ladies should wear only silk of English manufacture; and that English patterns of stuff and silk should be chosen just contrary to the prevalent fashion in France. (c) That no warrants for importing prohibited goo& from France should be granted, and that the king’s moiety of such goods should be burnt.2 That these recommendations were not acted upon seems pretty certain, since the agitation continued to grow in intensity, and various contemporary pamphlets, such as Verbum Sapienti 3 and Britannia Languens,4 called attention to the increasing danger from France. The anonymous author of the latter, which was first published in 1680, stated that from 1638 to 1676 the English coinage had annually decreased. This fact, he maintained, was caused by English trade being decadent and overbalanced, bullion being exported to make good the balance. Throughout 1676 petitions continued to be sent in, chiefly by the citizens of London against “the great importation of

1 CaZ. S.P.D. 1G7G-7, pp. 18, 19, and Introduction (Daniell). a Ibid., 1676-7, p. 19. Ibid. 4 Anderson, Hiat. and Chron. Deduction, ii, 633, who disputes his reasoning. 19221 ANOLO-FRENCH TRADE RELATIONS 27

foreign manufactures,” representing the distress occasioned by “ the unparalleled impositions ” laid by Louis XIV upon English rnanufactures.l The matter was even taken up by Alderman Thomas Beckford as Lord Mayor of London, and a representation upon the subject of the French “ indignities ” was made to the king by the Common Council.* In February 1677, therefore, a treaty of commerce was concluded between Charles I1 and Louis XIV, which defined the law of the sea, laid down rules to be observed by merchants in war-time, and deter- mined points regarding contraband and prizes. The disputed trade question, however, was not mentioned, nor was any scheme of reciprocity of customs duties even hinted at.3 But Charles and Louis, by a secret agreement arrived at in 1676, and copied out in his own hand by Charles in order to obviate the risk of publicity at a time when he was openly offering his mediation between the French and the Dutch, pledged themselves to give no aid to each other’s enemie~.~ Meanwhile opinion in the country began to turn in favour of a war with France and total prohibition of French manufactured commodities.6 Alarmed at Louis XIV’s conquests in the and his progress against the Dutch, Parliament granted Charles the sum of f884,OOO for building thirty ships of war, and in repeated addresses he was urged to join the coalition against France. Charles replied that intervention was impossible without adequate funds for raising and equipping an armament. But the Opposition was afraid lest if this course were pursued, the king would utilise the supplies and army thus raised to force a Catholic and French policy upon England at the point of the sword. They therefore refused to grant money until Charles should actually have allied with the Dutch against Louis XIV, The king thereupon administered a sharp rebuke to Parliament, claiming that tho “fundamental power of making peace and war ” rested in the sovereign alone, and concluded by adjourning Parliament until March 1678. Charles was thus thrown again into the arms of Louis XIV, and negotiations were opened between Courtin, the French ambassador, and Charles for a sum of money which would render him independent of Parliament. At the same time Danby was labouring to bring about an alliance between England and Holland. Charles was not un-

1 Cd S.P.D. 1878, October, paaeim. * Zbid., 1878, Oct. (27) and Oct. 28. Anderson, op. cit. ii. 838, 639. Lodge, Polil. Htktory of England, 1880-1702, pp. 137-8. 6 Cal. S.P.D. 1877, Marah and May 27. 28 HISTORY [APRIL

favourable towards the project, hoping thereby to secure the trust of his Parliament. M7illiam of Orange, too, was con- vinced by his ill-success against France that his only safety lay in winning the English alliance. In October 1677, therefore, he came to England and was betrothed to the Princess Mary, whom he married on November 4 of the same year. The condi- tions of peace agreed upon by Charles and William were sub- mitted to Louis XIV, who haughtily rejected them. Charles and William then agreed to force these conditions upon France, and the English fleet was put in readiness for war. England also was to send 12,000 troops to the assistance of the allies. To convince France that he was in earnest, Charles summoned Parliament to meet on January 28, 1678, and its hostile temper towards France was at once strikingly evinced. The Commons voted an address to the king for an immediate declaration of war upon France.1 “The question of trade has been so beaten already,” wrote a pamphleteer, “that there remains little to be added to it. Nor, in truth, needs it, since it is agreed on all hands that the French set up for an universal commerce, as well as for an universal monarchy; and, in eflect, the one is but a necessary consequent upon the other. Nor is it enough, it seems, for us to be designed upon by them, without lending them our own hands towards the cutting of our own throats ; for, upon a sober and judicious estimate, we are losers by our trade with France, at least, a million and a half per annum.” Parliament, indeed, represented the opinion of the country generally when early in the session (which lasted until July 15) it followed up its address by passing “ An Act for raising money by a Poll and otherwise to enable His Majesty to enter into an actual Warr against the French King and for prohibiting several French commodities.” By clause 70 of this Act French goods were not to be imported for three years from March 20, 1678, and it was further enacted that “ all and every Importation and Importations or vending or selling or uttering or retailing of any French Wines, Brandy, Linnen, Silks, Salt or Paper or other Commodities imported contrary to this Act or any of them shall be and is hereby declared and adjudged to be a common Nusance to this Kingdome in general1 and to all His Majestyes subjects thereof.”

1 CaZ. S.P.D. 1678, March 16. The Present State of Christendom, in Harteian Miac. i. 248. 30 Car. 11. c. 1. Statutes of the Realm, vi. 862. See also Commons’ Journala, 1607. Feb. 26 and 28 and March 1, 2, 4, 6, 6, 7, 8 ; Illemoira of Sir John Rereaby (ed. J. J. Cartwright, 1875), pp. 125-144, and Marvell’s Work8 (ed. A. B. Groaart, 1868), ii. 670-042. 19221 ANGLO-FRENCH TRADE RELATIONS 29

The supply granted was expected to yield the sum of over two millions, and it was expressly stipulated that the money voted was to be used for no other purpose than hostilities against France. The Treasury was forbidden to sign warrants, etc., for money except for the French war, while it was ‘‘ further enacted by the authoritie aforesaid, that all Loans upon the Credit of this Act be and are hereby appropriated to the use and service of a Warr against the French King nor shall they be issued out of the Exchequer to any other Interest or Purpose whatsoever nor by any other Warrant or Order but wherein it is expressed that the same is for the use and service of a Warr against the French King.”’ In apportioning the money voted, Parliament estimated for the sum of f1,414,920 to be spent on the navy and f637,OOO on the army, thus making a total of €2,051,920.2 Herein we may note the significance of the coming struggle : England’s main concern was with the naval aspect. The menacing growth of the French fleet and overseas trade touched England in a particularly sore spot, and just as the navy was the pivot upon which the whole of

her “ mercantile system ” revolved, so a war which arose out of the application of that system would be fought mainly at sea. Louis XIV seems to have been thoroughly alarmed at this new development of affairs, Economically France was growing exhausted in the struggle with William of Orange ; Louis must at any cost prevent an Anglo-Dutch union. The Dutch, therefore, were given surprisingly favourable terms at the Treaty of Nimwegen concluded on August 10, 1678, much against the wishes of William. At thc same time the Grand Monarque, who had hitherto supported Charles I1 against the Whigs, set out to break up the temporary union between the English king and the Opposition. Notwithstanding his change of front, Charles inspired the Whigs with no confidence. Barillon and the younger Ruvigny, therefore, were despatched post-haste to England with a lavish supply of money for bribing not only the king against the Opposition, but also the Opposition against the king. At the same time Barillon showed himself at Newmarket races and elsewhere publicly with the king. The game was well managed, and in the ensuing Popish Plot scare and Exclusion Bill crisis a situation was created eminently satisfactory to Louis XIV. If Charles would not fight for him he certainly should not fight against him. It needed all the tact and political ability of Charles to prevent the civil war

Articles 60 and G1, Statutes of the Reah, vi. 861. a Journals of the House of Commons, ix. 438. 30 HISTORY [~RIL,1922 directly fomented by French intrigue, but his duller-witted brother reaped the whirlwind.1 Charles, embittered by the duplicity of Parliament, relapsed once more into the arms of France. By1679 also he was financially practically independent of Parliament, since his settled revenue under the stimulus of the increase of trade yielded annually a large surplus over expenditure, and he was thus by 1681 not only able to pay off much of the Crown debt, which in 1679 had stood at El,600,000, but also to refrain from summoning further Parlia- ments.2 The import of French manufactures, on the other hand, received a temporary check, but since the operation of the Act of 1678 forbidding their import endured only for a period of three years, the policy initiated by it was not finally and defkitely adhered to until the reign of William and Mary. In 1692 an imposition of 26 per cent. was laid upon all French goods entering the country. Four years later this was doubled, while later additions raised it in the middle of the eighteenth century to 75 per cente8 “ The French in their turn,” wrote Adam Smith, “have, I believe, treated our goods and manufactures just as hardly. . . . Those mutual restraints have put an end to almost all fair commerce between the two nations ; and smugglers are now the principal importers, either of British goods into France, or of French goods into Great Britain.” The balance of trade question was only one among many causes which contributed to bring about war between England and France and the downfall of the Stuart dynasty in England. Alone it would not have been a sufficient cause of war, but it wove itself into the complicated tissue of causes operating in that direction during the latter half of the seventeenth century, and so played no unimportant part in shaping history. The Anglo- French rivalry, political, economic, naval, military and religious , was the natural resultant of the national development of the two states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; but it was stimulated and fostered by the fallacious economic doctrines of the mercantilists, based upon the assumption that one nation’s prosperity meant another’s poverty. D. G. E. HALL. For the political evente of the year 1658 compare Lodge, op. cit. pp, 143-68, and W. A. Shaw. Introduction to the laat volume of the Calenda~of Treaaury Papera of the reign of Charles 11. Scott, op. cil. i. 296-97. * JFealth ofNation8 (ed. J. S. Nicholson, 1884), p. 192.