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Avoiding the New Cold War: Environmental Conflict Resolution and the Need for an International Legal Regime in the High Arctic

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Avoiding the New Cold War: Environmental Conflict Resolution and the Need for an International Legal Regime in the High Arctic Avoiding the New Cold War: Environmental Conflict Resolution and the Need for an International Legal Regime in the High Arctic By Sam Mulopulos Grinnell Peace Studies Conference 2012 It is an indisputable axiom of science that the planet is warming.1 And while experts can debate the radix of such increase in earthly temperatures, this paper believes the origins of the coming planetary catastrophe irrelevant. Rather it is the results of such climatic change, particularly in the Arctic, that this paper finds to be of unique interest. While global warming will engender a variety of environmental misfortunes, nowhere in the world will the effects of a modified climate be as acute and amplified as in the Arctic. Already the region is experiencing the effects of global warming.2 Thus the High Arctic is the frontline in the fight for the planet, and how nations respond to the concomitant results of climate change there will dictate the global response to future situations. Currently two unique predicaments face the five Arctic coastal states.3 Both problems are consequences of melting sea ice resulting from the escalation of global temperatures. The deliquescence of sea ice has precipitated greater resource exploration of the Arctic Ocean basin and the subsequent discovery of a potential 400 billion barrels of oil beneath the sea floor.4 The unearthing of vast reserves of subsea hydrocarbons has transformed the perception of the Arctic from an inhospitable wasteland to a cornucopia of mineral wealth. Already Russia, Canada, and Denmark have begun to maneuver to secure a piece of the potential windfall. Such behavior has contributed to a host of sovereignty debates, and as with any contention in which valuable resources are involved, tensions are high. 1 Hansen, James. "Global Temperature Chane." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103.39 (2006): 14288-14293. Print. 2 Gunitskiy, Vsevolod. "On Thin Ice: Water Rights and Resource Disputes in the Arctic Ocean." Journal of International Affairs 61.2 (2008): 261. 3 These states are the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark. Denmark is considered an Arctic state because of its authority over semi-autonomous Greenland. 4 Norwegian company Statoil suggests that there might be up to one quarter of the worlds oil beneath the ocean. Ibid., 263. But chemical resources are not the only instigators of Arctic environmental conflict. Melting sea ice is creating new physical resources as well, such as the Northwest Passage, thus enhancing Arctic navigation. The Northwest Passage, that elusive strait which so befuddled early explorers, has become a reality. In the coming decades, the passage will be entirely devoid of summer sea ice and instead be filled with cumbersome cargo ships desiring to reduce the voyage from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean by a potential 7,000 kilometers.5 Figure 1: The Northwest Passage. The red line shows the potential transit route. The islands, which the route circumvents, are indisputably Canadian.6 The dynamics of this dispute are different because the debate involves just the United States and Canada. Canada asserts that the Northwest Passage is internal Canadian waters, meaning that foreign vessels entering the Passage would be forced to pay a tariff, and the Canadian government could deny access to the strait to any yearning navigators.7 Conversely the United States asserts that the Passage is an international 5 Cotter, James. "Developing a Coherent Plan to Deal with Canada's Conundrum in the Northwest Passage." Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 11.3 (2009): 1. 6 Zorzetto, Alicia. "The Dispute over the Northwest Passage." The Inventory of Conflict and Environment. N.p., n.d. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/northwest-passage.htm Lopez, Barry. Arctic Dreams. New York: Scribner, 1986, 46. 7 Kraska, James. "The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage." The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 22.2 (2007): 257. strait, which would permit watercraft of any nation to use it, without having to pay duties to any overseeing government.8 The established framework for resolving these resource claims and territorial disputes rests with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a 1982 document outlining international maritime law.9 In regards to the exploitation of subsea hydrocarbons, UNCLOS explains that coastal states possess an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extends 230 miles out to sea along the nation’s continental shelf. However, countries can petition the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) for an additional 350 mile expansion of their EEZ. Eligibility for an EEZ augmentation must be reinforced with credible geologic evidence that “the area in question is connected to their [a state’s] own continental shelf.”10 This is currently the procedure by which Russia has attempted to claim much of the Arctic Ocean and the accompanying oil. This paper will cover some techniques and policies, which will serve to mitigate these conflicts. The above has served to establish a secure background in the conundrums of a changing Arctic climate. The core purpose of this paper is to identify and outline solutions to these problems. At the heart of Arctic environmental conflict resolution is the need for a strengthened international legal regime. An enforceable treaty among Arctic states will set an enduring course for alleviation of regional quarrels and will persist as an exemplar for climate change management. To this end I have selected five strategies for Arctic conflict resolution. The strategies are: 8 Ibid., 263. 9 United Nations. “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Signed 10 December 1982. 25-26. 10 Gunitskiy, Vsevolod. "On Thin Ice: Water Rights and Resource Disputes in the Arctic Ocean." Journal of International Affairs 61.2 (2008): 262. Ratification of UNCLOS by the United States While deeply comprehensive, UNCLOS remains a weak document because the United States has never ratified the treaty. Since the Senate voted against ratification in 1983 the US has been effectively excluded from much of the Arctic sovereignty debate. And while the Bush administration tried to resurrect the document, no significant progress has been made towards ratification in almost 30 years.11 An expeditious formalization of the UNCLOS treaty would benefit the United States in two ways. First, the treaty would allow the US to lay claim to any resources that may exist off Alaska’s northern coast. Since 2007, the US Coast Guard Cutter Healy has been operating in Northern waters mapping the Chukchi Cap, a mysterious and ice covered undersea formation, which may contain potentially valuable resources.12 Figure 2: The Chukchi Cap. US scientific expeditions may not only discover new resources, but also prove that the Cap is an extension of Alaska’s continental shelf.13 11 Reynolds, Paul. "Russia Ahead in Arctic 'Gold Rush'." BBC News. British Broadcasting Company, n.d. Web. 7 Feb. 2012. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6925853.stm. 12 "United States Explores the Seabed of the Arctic Ocean to Bolster its Claims to the North's Strategic Resources." Canadian American Strategic Review. N.p., n.d. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. http://www.casr.ca/id- arctic-empires-3.htm. 13 Ibid. Furthermore, the Chukchi Cap may be a geologic extension of Alaska’s continental shelf. Under the current UNCLOS language, the US could submit their geological evidence to the UNCLCS, which would decide whether the claim was valid. A positive ruling from the UNCLCS would allow the US to extend their current EEZ another 350 kilometers to gain access to whatever resources might exist beneath the Chukchi Cap. But one can only speculate because the research is still on going and currently there is no conclusive corroboration that the Chukchi Cap either contains natural resources or is connected to Alaska’s continental shelf. However, one thing is certain. The United States is currently not party to UNCLOS and thus cannot petition for an extension of Alaska’s continental shelf or claim any potential subsea resources. If the US wants to participate in the Arctic ‘gold-rush’, as some analysts refer to it, the next administration will need to elevate the ratification of UNCLOS to the forefront of its agenda. The second reason for US acceptation of UNCLOS is purely diplomatic. Because UNCLOS forms the foundation of Arctic resource dispute resolution, any state not party to UNCLOS is effectively not involved in any international deliberations. Republican Senator Richard Lugar supports ratification of the document citing Russia’s claims to Arctic hydrocarbons. In a 2007 statement Lugar said “Unless the United States ratifies the treaty, Moscow will be able to press its claims without an American at the table.”14 The paramount motivation for ratification is, therefore, to ensure a US presence in future Arctic negotiations. 14 Lugar, Richard G.. "Lugar: We Need Law of the Sea." The Washington Note. N.p., n.d. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2007/05/lugar_we_need_l/. Ultra-nationalist critics of the treaty inquire, “if the U.S. ratifies the treaty and UNCLCS rules that Arctic riches belong to Russia, what does the U.S. do then?”15 The answer is simple. The US would do what would it currently does as a non-party to the treaty: nothing. If the United States ratifies UNCLOS, then at the very least the US can have voice at any negotiations and more effectively communicate its Arctic interests. Non- ratification means that the US will have to stand idly by as other states lay claim to the Arctic, effectively depriving the United States of the opportunity to have a role in the North. With Russia gearing up for a future Arctic power play, the consequences of an uninvolved United States could prove dire.16 US ratification of UNCLOS means a safer and more inclusive legal regime for all in the Arctic.
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