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The London Gazette of FRIDAY, the 2Ist of MAY, 1948 By IRumb. 38296 3103 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of FRIDAY, the 2ist of MAY, 1948 by Registered as a newspaper •MONDAY, 24 MAY, 1948 THE BATTLE OF CRETE The following Despatch was submitted to the So, without air support of any sort, the fleet Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on had to be exposed to a scale of air attack which 4th August, 1941, by Admiral Sir Andrew B. is believed to have exceeded anything of the Cunningham, G.C.B., D.S.O., Cymmander- kind yet experienced afloat.* > in-Chief, Mediterranean. 4. The air attack on Crete started on the 2oth May, 1941. The sweeps of the Light Forces on Mediterranean, the night 20th/2ist and during daylight 2ist were uneventful except for heavy air attacks qth August, 1941. and the unlucky loss of H.M.S. JUNO (see paragraphs 14 to 20). f As far as the Navy was Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships, concerned, the real Battle of Crete began on the attached reports of naval operations in the night of 2ist/22nd May, with the success- defence of Crete between I5th May and 27th ful encounter of Force D with an enemy convoy May, 1941. Reports on the evacuation of troops (see paragraph 23). This encounter was. skil- from Crete will be forwarded later. fully and thoroughly exploited, was a heavy 2. The object of the operations was the pre- blow to the Germans and an encouragement for vention of enemy seaborne landings on the our hard pressed troops in Crete. coast of Crete.' It was known that airborne * Footnote : Air Ministry comment: The R.A.F. invasion of the island was impending; but it in the Middle East had suffered severe losses during appeared almost inconceivable that airborne the Greek campaign and in Cyrenaica, and fighter strength was so reduced as to be barely sufficient for invasion alone could succeed against forewarned the defence of the Middle East base itself. The troops, that seaborne support was inevitable strength of the bomber force was scarcely better. In and that the destruction of troop convoys would the face of pressing commitments it had only been win the day. possible to spare resources for the construction of two airfields in Crete and these were but moderately equipped. From these airfields, before the loss of 3. The Navy succeeded in its object but paid Greece, it had been possible to operate a handful of a heavy price for this achievement. The fleet R.A.F. and F.A.A. fighters for the occasional pro- was operating within easy range of enemy air tection of shipping, but now confronted with the bases and beyond the reach of any protection German Air Force operating in overwhelming num- bers from ample bases in Greece and the adjoining from our own air force. The fleet fighters of islands, and. in view of the dangerous depletion of H.M.S. FORMIDABLE were reduced to only Middle East air forces as a whole, decision reluctantly four as a result of casualties and unservice- had to be taken that the maintenance of fighter forces in Crete merely invited destruction and could ability arising from the recent operation not be justified. With this view, the Commanders- " Tiger."* It was, therefore, useless to send in-Chief in the Middle East were in agreement. H.M.S. FORMIDABLE to assist. Though every possible effort was made by aircraft 'based in Africa and in Malta to attack enemy air- * Footnote : Operation " Tiger " was the passage fields they could make little impression on the over- of naval reinforcements and a convoy containing whelming strength of the G.A.F. Shore based fighter urgent military stores through the Mediterranean, cover to our ships operating to the north of Crete covered by Force H as far as the Sicilian Narrows •was clearly out of the question. and thence by the Mediterranean Fleet to Alexandria. t Footnote: References are to paragraphs in the It took place between the 4th and gth May, 1941. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's narrative. 3104 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24 MAY, 1948 5. It was on the morning of the 22nd. May, May for all forces to'withdraw to1 the eastward. that things commenced to go awry. The enemy .Had this error not occurred the battleships convoy sighted by For.ce C was almost, cer- would not have been ordered back to tainly a large one (see paragraph 27). The Alexandria and would have been available as Rear Admiral Commanding, .fifteenth Cruiser a support and rallying point for the 5th Squadron was presented with a unique oppor-. Destroyer Flotilla on the morning of the 23rd tuniry of effecting its destruction but unfor- May, so that the loss of KELLY .and KASHMIR^ tunately, in the face of heavy air attacks, and might well have been avoided (see .paragraph w^th H.A. ammunition stocks beginning to run 46). low, he decided that he would not have been 10. that the fleet suffered disastrously justified in pressing on to the northward and this encounter with' the unhampered Germ| gave the order to withdraw. The situation Air Force is evident but it has- to be reme was undoubtedly a difficult one for him, as this bered on the credit side that the Navy's diity , attack was certainly on a majestic .scale but it was achieved and no enemy ship whether \^ar- appears that no diminution of risk could have, ship or transport succeeded in reaching Qrete been achieved by retirement and that, in fact, or intervening in the battle during these the safest place for the squadrpn would have critical days. Nor should the losses sustained been among the enemy ships. The brief action blind one to the magnificent courage' and did, however, have the effect of turning back' endurance .that was displayed throughout. I the convoy, and the troops, if they ever did have never -felt .prouder of .the Mediterranean reach Crete, were not in time to influence the iFleet than at the close of these particular .battle. operations, except perhaps, at the fashion in . 6. In the meantime; a further unlucky deci- which it faced up to the • even greater strain sion had been taken (see paragraphs 25 and which was so soon to1 be imposed upon it. 26). DIDO, wearing the flag of the Rear 11. Where so much that was meritorious Admiral (D), Mediterranean; had expended was performed it is almost invidious to1 particu- 70 per cent, of her A.A. ammunition. The larise, (but I feel that I must draw" the attention destroyers were also running low; but AJAX of Their Lordships to two outstanding and ORION had 42 and 38 per cent, respec- .examples. These are • the conduct of tively remaining. The Rear Admiral (D), KANDAHAR (Commander W. G. A. Robson, Mediterranean, correctly decided that DIDO Royal Navy) and KINGSTON (Lieutenant must withdraw from the Aegean; ibut, from Commander P. Somerville, D.S.O., Royal yery natural reluctance td leave other ships of Navy) during, the whole period of the opera- his squadron to face the music after -he himself tion and, in particular, the rescue of the crews had retired, he took AJAX and ORION with of GREYHOUND-and FIJI (see paragraphs 34 him. This decision, .although such results to 39). KANDAHAR has recorded that be- could hardly have been foreseen, deprived the tween 1445 and 1930 she was subjected to 22 hard pressed Force. C.of their assistance at a separate air attacks and''all the,rescue, work time 'when the weight of their A.A., fire would during daylight, was carried''Out .in face of have been an invaluable support. heavy bombing and machine gunning. The 7. The junction of Forces A and C on the other story is that of the gallantry and devotion afternoon of the 22nd May, -left the Rear of Commander W. R. Marshall A'Deane, Royal Admiral Commanding, Fifteenth Cruiser Navy, of GREYHOUND, whose self sacrifice Squadron, after a gruelling two days, in com- stands out'even amongst this record of fine mand of the combined force. Before he had deeds. <, - really'time to grasp the situation of his force, After the loss of his own ship he was picked a series of disasters occurred, the loss of up by KANDAHAR. Whilst . KANDAHAR GREYHOUND, GLOUCESTER and finally was engaged in rescuing the crew of the FIJI, FIJI. , . \ • Commander Marshall A'Deane dived overboard, 8. Past experience had gone to1 show that in the darkness, to the assistance of a man some when under -heavy scale of air attack it is way .from 'the. ship. He was not seen again. 'essential" to keep ships together for mutual,sup-, 12. Rear Admiral H. B. Rawlihgs, O.B.E.; port. The decision to send KANDAHAR and in the WARSPITE, had a particularly anxious KINGSTON to the rescue of GREYHOUND'S time. He handled a series of difficult situations people cannot 'be cayilled at but in the light of in a determined and skilful manner and by his subsequent events it would probably have been timely support undoubtedly did air possible to better had the whole force closed' to their sup- extricate Forces C and D from their awkward port. The Rear Admiral Commanding, i5th situation on the evening of the 22nd May. Cruiser Squadron-was however not aware of the shortage of A.A. ammunition in 13. The skilful"operation of the forces under .GLOUCESTER and FIJI. As a final mis- the Rear Admiral (D), Mediterranean, which fortune, when rejoining after the loss of led to the destruction of the first enemy convoy GLOUCESTER, FIJI steered a course diverg- has already been mentioned.
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