CHAPTER 1 REINFORCEMENT OF AUSTRALIA Y early March 1942, the Japanese thrust had struck deep into th e B Pacific to the south and wide to the south-west . Along its southern axis the Filipino and American forces in the Philippines were isolate d and wasting fast; after the fall of Rabaul on 23rd January the Japanes e were on the move through the Australian Mandated Territory of Ne w Guinea ; Port Moresby was under aerial bombardment from 3rd February onwards ; Japanese aircraft were questing southward over the Solomo n Islands. Along the south-west axis the British had surrendered Singapor e on 15th February and, by 7th March, had begun the retreat from Rangoo n which was to carry them right out of Burma ; a threat to India was develop- ing; the Netherlands East Indies were rapidly being overrun ; on the Aus- tralian mainland Darwin, Broome and Wyndham had been heavily raided from the air. The Japanese armies thus controlled the area within an arc whic h embraced the Western Pacific, passed through the Solomons and New Guinea and south of the Indies to Burma . This arc pressed down almost upon Australia whose nearest friendly neighbours on either side were now disadvantageously placed : the United States, separated by some 3,00 0 miles of ocean, was weaker than Japan on sea, on land and in the air; India, which had sent its best formations to the Middle East and Iraq, ha d lost some in Malaya, and had others fighting in Burma, was now garrisone d mainly by raw divisions. In Australia itself some military leaders had long foreseen this ver y situation. But now, of four experienced divisions of volunteers of the Aus- tralian Imperial Force (A .I.F.), one had been lost in Malaya and in th e islands north of Australia and the other three, which had been serving i n the Middle East, were still overseas . The absence of these elite troops at a critical time in Australia had also been foreseen and the "calculate d risk" accepted, because it was by no means certain when they went abroad that, if Australia itself were threatened with invasion, the situation i n other theatres would permit of their recall . Even if it would, the return of such an army could not be accomplished for some months after th e necessity first became apparent. Consequently preparations for the local defence of Australia had had to be based substantially on plans for th e use of the home army. By the end of June 1940 (when, with France falling, enlistments in th e A.I.F. vastly increased) the militia, a force comparable with the British Territorial Army or the American National Guard, had dwindled in num- bers to 60,500, although its authorised strength was 75,000 to 80,000 — a decline in which the greatest single factor had been enlistments for over - sea service. The Government then decided to increase the militia's strength by calling up more men as defined in Class 1 of the Defence Act—un- 2 REINFORCEMENT OF AUSTRALIA 1939-41 married men and widowers without children, between the ages of 18 an d 35. By July 1941, virtually all men in Class 1 had become liable for service and by the end of August the militia numbered 173,000 . Of these, however, only 45,000 were serving full time . As the call-ups continue d it became clear that, apart from voluntary enlistment for oversea service , the two most important factors reducing the numbers available to th e militia were the system of exempting men engaged in "essential" industry or giving them seasonal leave (which affected nearly 30 per cent of all men liable for service in Class 1), and medical unfitness, either temporary or permanent, which debarred nearly 14 per cent of the class from service . But lack of continuity in the training of such forces as could be gathere d together was also a handicap. When war with Germany began, first on e month's, then three months' additional training had been ordered . Later the 1940-41 policy provided that serving and potential officers and non - commissioned officers should be intensively trained for 18 to 24 days a s a preliminary to a camp period of 70 days, that militiamen (other than these) who had completed 90 days' training in 1939-40 should undergo 12 days' special collective training, and that the rest of the militia shoul d carry out 70 days' training. A further complication was added in Jul y 1941, when "trained soldiers " (those who had already undergone 90 days ' training) and recruits became liable for three months' and six months ' training respectively in each year. The fragmentary nature of the trainin g was thus an important factor in preventing a high general standard o f efficiency being achieved . Each unit, however, had a nucleus of key men serving full time and, when the War Cabinet approved the six months' recruit training system, it also approved proposals for the enlargement and more intensive training of these groups—that officers, warrant and non - commissioned officers, specialists and essential administrative personnel , not exceeding 25 per cent of the strength of each unit, should form a train- ing and administrative cadre and, when the unit itself was not in camp , should undergo special training. There were other impediments to efficiency . The most energetic an d capable of the younger officers had gone to the A .I.F. The senior appoint- ments were filled by officers who had seen hard service in the war o f 1914-18 and there were many such veterans in the middle ranks . These strove to maintain efficiency and keenness, but suffered many handicaps , including a serious shortage of equipment of all kinds—even rifles, o f which large numbers had been sent to England in 1940. While it was the largest and most important part of the army in Aus- tralia, the militia did not, however, constitute the whole of it . At the end of August 1941, the Permanent Military Forces in Australia numbere d 5,025 ; there were 12,915 in garrison battalions, and 43,720 in the Volun- teer Defence Corps (V .D.C.) . The formation of an Australian Women's Army Service (A.W.A.S.) had been approved on 13th August. The garrison battalions, filled mostly by old soldiers of the previous war , had their origin in the "War Book"' plans for mobilisation, which ha d See G . Long, To Benghazi (1952), p . 34, in this series. 1937-41 VOLUNTEER DEFENCE CORPS 3 provided for the raising of battalions for the local protection of the coas t defences—"ten garrison battalions to relieve ten battalions of the fiel d army allotted to the local protection of the forts". A further impuls e toward this end had come from the Returned Soldiers ' League throug h a resolution passed at its Twenty-Second Annual Congress at Hobart i n November 1937 . It stated that "Congress deems it necessary that a nationa l volunteer force be raised from ex-servicemen and others between the age s of 41 and 60 years for local defence and to relieve existing forces fro m certain necessary duties in the event of a national emergency ".2 During the crisis in France the Federal Executive of the League, o n 31st May 1940, followed this resolution with a declaration "that a Com- monwealth-wide organisation of ex-servicemen for home defence purposes be established and that a scheme with that object be framed forthwith" .3 The Government agreed and decided to form an Australian Army Reserve on the general lines which the League had envisaged . Class "A" was to include volunteers up to 48 years of age, medically "fit for active service" and not in reserved occupations, who would be prepared to be posted t o militia units and undergo the normal training prescribed for those units . Class "B" was to include volunteers not eligible for Class "A" and to be divided into two groups—Garrison Battalions' Reserve and the R .S.L. Volunteer Defence Corps. The garrison reserve would enlist for the dura- tion of the war while the V .D .C. was "to be organised by the R .S.S. & A.I.L.A. on flexible establishments approved by Army Headquarters an d should carry out such voluntary training as can be mutually arrange d between G.O.Cs and State branches of the League in association with th e existing area organisation" .4 So the formation of the V .D.C. began on 15th July 1940.5 But at first the V.D.C. had little more to sustain it than the enthusias m of its own members since the army was preoccupied with training an d equipping the A.I.F. and the militia, and little material could be spare d for the new corps . By the end of 1940 the V .D.C. numbered 13,120 and two considerations were becoming obvious : first that the Government would have to revise in some measure its stated intention of not acceptin g any financial responsibility for this voluntary, part-time, unpaid organisa- tion (except that involved in arming, and later, clothing it) ; and second that it must be brought more directly under the control of the army . In February 1941, therefore, the War Cabinet approved the expenditure of £157,000 on uniforms for the corps, following that in May with a vot e of a further £25,000 for general administrative expenses. In May also the Military Board assumed control, foreseeing that roles of the V .D.C.