DOCSLIB.ORG

British Strategy and Oil, 1914-1923

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
British Strategy and Oil, 1914-1923 Gibson, Martin William (2012) British strategy and oil, 1914-1923. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3160/ Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Glasgow Theses Service http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] British Strategy and Oil, 1914-1923. Martin William Gibson. Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. College of Arts. School of Humanities. University of Glasgow. 17 January 2012 Martin William Gibson 2012 2 Abstract This thesis analyses the significance of oil to British strategy during 1914-1923. It shows that by 1923 Britain had a coherent oil policy, which affected naval strategy, diplomatic relations, policy towards the oil industry and post-war aims in the Middle East. Previous works have looked at only part of the picture and have not appreciated the extent to which oil affected all these areas. This work brings all these different facets together into a single study. The most important British user of oil was the Royal Navy, which was replacing coal with oil as its principal fuel even before the First World War, which saw great growth in the use of oil. Aircraft and land vehicles powered by oil fuelled internal combustion engines transformed both warfare and civilian life, but their overall usage of oil was much less than that of the RN. British industry was slower than the RN to adopt oil because coal was cheaper; the RN put the technical advantages of oil ahead of cost. Britain's power and prestige was based on its naval supremacy; British dominance of naval fuel bunkering was a key factor in this. Britain had substantial reserves of coal, including Welsh steam coal, the best in the world for naval use, but little oil. Britain's oil strategy in 1914 was to build up reserves cheaply in peacetime and to buy on the market in wartime. An oil crisis in 1917 showed that this was flawed and that secure British controlled supplies were needed. The war created an opportunity for Britain to secure substantial oil reserves in the Middle East. Attempts to obtain control of these affected the peace treaties and Britain's post-war relations with its Allies. The USA was then the world's largest producer and was the main supplier to the Allies during the war. It believed, wrongly, that its output would decline in the 1920s and feared that Britain was trying to exclude it from the rest of the world. France also realised that it needed access to safe and reliable supplies of oil. The largest available potential oilfield was in the Mosul vilayet, part of the Ottoman Empire in 1914, and now part of Iraq. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement allocated about half of Mosul to France, which in 1918 agreed to include all of it in the British mandate territory of Iraq in return for a share of the oil and British support elsewhere. Other disagreements delayed an Anglo-French oil agreement, 3 but one was finally signed at San Remo in 1920. It was followed by the Treaty of Sèvres with the Ottoman Empire, which appeared to give Britain all that it wanted in the Middle East. The resurgence of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal meant that a new treaty had to be negotiated at Lausanne in 1923. Sèvres angered the USA, since it appeared to exclude US oil companies from Iraq. For a period Britain focused on the need to have a large British controlled oil company, but it was eventually realised that control of oil bearing territory was more important than the nationality of companies. This allowed US oil companies to be given a stake in Iraqi oil, improving Anglo-American relations. Britain's need for oil meant that it had to ensure that the Treaty of Lausanne left Mosul as part of the British mandate territory of Iraq. Turkey objected, but the League of Nations ruled in Britain's favour. Britain had other interests in the region, but most of them did not require control over Mosul. Mosul's oil gave Britain secure supplies and revenue that made Iraq viable without British subsidies. By 1923 Britain had devised a coherent strategy of ensuring secure supplies of oil by controlling oil bearing territory. 4 Table of Contents Abstract ...................................................................................... 2 List of Tables ................................................................................ 7 List of Figures ............................................................................... 8 Acknowledgement .......................................................................... 9 Author's declaration ....................................................................... 10 Definitions .................................................................................. 11 Abbreviations .............................................................................. 11 Oil Companies .............................................................................. 12 Glossary of Oil Industry Terms ........................................................... 14 Introduction ................................................................................ 16 1 British Strategy and Oil, 1914-16 .................................................. 32 1.1 British Oil Strategy in 1914 ..................................................... 32 1.1.1 The Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines ............................ 33 1.1.2 The Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company................. 35 1.2 Mesopotamian Oil ................................................................ 37 1.3 Britain and the Ottoman Empire in 1914 ..................................... 38 1.4 Development of British War Aims in the Middle East ....................... 38 1.4.1 Alexandretta and Mesopotamia ........................................... 39 1.4.2 The De Bunsen Committee ................................................ 41 1.4.3 The Sykes-Picot Agreement ............................................... 45 1.5 Oil and the Mesopotamian Campaign ......................................... 48 1.5.1 The Despatch of IEF D ...................................................... 48 1.5.2 Early Manoeuvres by IEF D................................................. 50 1.5.3 The 1915-16 Offensive ..................................................... 53 1.5.4 The Capture of Baghdad ................................................... 55 1.6 The National Oil Company...................................................... 57 1.6.1 The 1916 Oil Company Merger Proposals ................................ 57 1.6.2 Royal Dutch Shell and the British Government ......................... 62 1.7 Chapter Summary ................................................................ 63 2 Wartime Oil Supplies ................................................................ 64 2.1 Oil and Land and Air Warfare .................................................. 65 2.2 U-Boats and Oil .................................................................. 67 2.3 Efforts to Deny Oil to the Enemy .............................................. 70 2.4 Oil and Diversions into Sideshows ............................................. 72 2.5 The 1917 Oil Crisis ............................................................... 73 2.6 Early Administrative Arrangements ........................................... 74 2.7 Walter Long and the Petroleum Committee ................................. 76 2.7.1 Stocks and Demand ......................................................... 78 2.7.2 Tanker Construction ........................................................ 82 2.7.3 Bread or Oil? ................................................................. 83 2.7.4 Re-consideration of Coal Fired Warships ................................ 87 2.7.5 Home Production ........................................................... 88 2.8 Chapter Summary ................................................................ 92 3 Oil and Inter-Allied Relations, 1917-18 ........................................... 94 3.1 Oil and Anglo-American Relations ............................................. 94 3.1.1 The US Oil Industry ......................................................... 95 3.1.2 Mexico ........................................................................ 98 3.1.3 Tanker Shortages ........................................................... 99 3.1.4 Anglo-American Shipbuilding and the Post-War World. .............. 103 5 3.2 The Inter Allied Petroleum Conference ..................................... 109 3.2.1 France and Oil.............................................................. 109 3.2.2 Italy and Oil ................................................................ 111 3.2.3 Allied Oil Requirements .................................................. 112 3.3 Chapter Summary ............................................................... 113 4 Oil and British War Aims ........................................................... 115 4.1 The Oil of Mosul................................................................. 115 4.1.1 The Seizure of Mosul. ....................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Russian Oil and Gas Challenges
    Order Code RL33212 Russian Oil and Gas Challenges Updated June 20, 2007 Robert Pirog Specialist in Energy Economics and Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division Russian Oil and Gas Challenges Summary Russia is a major player in world energy markets. It has more proven natural gas reserves than any other country, is among the top ten in proven oil reserves, is the largest exporter of natural gas, the second largest oil exporter, and the third largest energy consumer. Energy exports have been a major driver of Russia’s economic growth over the last five years, as Russian oil production has risen strongly and world oil prices have been very high. This type of growth has made the Russian economy dependent on oil and natural gas exports and vulnerable to fluctuations in oil prices. The Russian government has moved to take control of the country’s energy supplies. It broke up the previously large energy company Yukos and acquired its main oil production subsidiary. The Duma voted to give Gazprom, the state- controlled natural gas monopoly the exclusive right to export natural gas; Russia moved to limit participation by foreign companies in oil and gas production and Gazprom gained majority control of the Sakhalin energy projects. Russia has agreed with Germany to supply Germany and, eventually, the UK by building a natural gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine and Poland. In late 2006 and early 2007, Russia cut off and/or threatened to cut off gas or oil supplies going to and/or through Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Belarus in the context of price and/or transit negotiations — actions that damaged its reputation as a reliable energy supplier.
    [Show full text]
  • Case #2 United States of America (Respondent)
    Model International Court of Justice (MICJ) Case #2 United States of America (Respondent) Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. United States of America) Arkansas Model United Nations (AMUN) November 20-21, 2020 Teeter 1 Historical Context For years, there has been a consistent struggle between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 2018, United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. embassy located in Tel Aviv would be moving to the city of Jerusalem.1 Palestine, angered by the embassy moving, filed a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2018.2 The history of this case, U.S. relations with Israel and Palestine, current events, and why the ICJ should side with the United States will be covered in this research paper. Israel and Palestine have an interesting relationship between war and competition. In 1948, Israel captured the west side of Jerusalem, and the Palestinians captured the east side during the Arab-Israeli War. Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948. In 1949, the Lausanne Conference took place, and the UN came to the decision for “corpus separatum” which split Jerusalem into a Jewish zone and an Arab zone.3 At this time, the State of Israel decided that Jerusalem was its “eternal capital.”4 “Corpus separatum,” is a Latin term meaning “a city or region which is given a special legal and political status different from its environment, but which falls short of being sovereign, or an independent city-state.”5 1 Office of the President, 82 Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel and Relocating the United States Embassy to Israel to Jerusalem § (2017).
    [Show full text]
  • Enquest Announces the Appointment of Neil Mcculloch As Head of Its North Sea Business
    ENQUEST ANNOUNCES THE APPOINTMENT OF NEIL MCCULLOCH AS HEAD OF ITS NORTH SEA BUSINESS EnQuest PLC is pleased to announce the appointment of Neil McCulloch as President, North Sea, with effect from 1 April 2014. Neil has held a number of senior positions in the oil and gas sector, and joins EnQuest from international oil and gas company OMV AG, where he held the global role of Senior Vice President Production & Engineering. Prior to this, Neil spent 11 years with BG Group in a range of senior UK and international roles, most recently as Vice President & Asset General Manager, UK Upstream, with accountability for the delivery of BG’s UK North Sea business. Neil will succeed David Heslop, who retires from his role as Managing Director UKCS on 1 April 2014. Thereafter David will continue to support EnQuest in an advisory capacity or on special projects. Amjad Bseisu, Chief Executive of EnQuest said: “I am delighted to welcome Neil as head of our North Sea business. With his wealth of technical and management experience in the oil and gas industry and in the UK North Sea in particular, I am confident that Neil will be an excellent member of EnQuest’s senior management team and will make a valuable contribution to the growth and development of EnQuest over the coming years. “The Board and I would also like to express our sincere gratitude to David for his contribution to EnQuest in our formative years; his leadership, knowledge and experience have been key to many of EnQuest’s successes and achievements, and have helped us to build a world class organisation in Aberdeen.
    [Show full text]
  • Offshore Wind Operations & Maintenance a £9 Billion Per
    OFFSHORE WIND OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE A £9 BILLION PER YEAR OPPORTUNITY BY 2O3O FOR THE UK TO SEIZE OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE SUMMARY New data compiled by the Offshore Renewable Energy (ORE) Catapult reveals the UK offshore wind operations & maintenance (O&M) market will grow faster in relative terms than any other offshore wind sub sector market over the next decade. By 2O3O, it will be the UK’s second largest sub sector market after turbine supply: a projected £1.3 billion per year opportunity. The Rest of the World (excluding UK) offshore wind O&M market opportunity is even greater. We project it will be valued at £7.6 billion per year by 2030. To discuss commercial dynamics in offshore wind O&M, we conducted an interview with energy industry leader Sir Ian Wood, which is summarised below. His comments highlight that offshore wind O&M is an area that plays to the UK’s existing strengths in offshore oil and gas services and associated technologies. O&M already has the highest level of UK content of any part of the offshore wind supply chain. In short, there is a sizable opportunity for the UK to create internationally significant service businesses in offshore wind O&M, learning from experience from the North Sea oil and gas industry. We already have the vital elements to capture this opportunity but investment in infrastructure to create the environment for collaborative development and demonstration of the enabling technologies and services is required. DEFINING OFFSHORE WIND O&M A clear definition of offshore wind O&M comes from a report published by GL Garrad Hassan: Offshore wind O&M is the activity that follows commissioning to ensure the safe and economic running of the project.
    [Show full text]
  • The Forgotten Fronts the First World War Battlefield Guide: World War Battlefield First the the Forgotten Fronts Forgotten The
    Ed 1 Nov 2016 1 Nov Ed The First World War Battlefield Guide: Volume 2 The Forgotten Fronts The First Battlefield War World Guide: The Forgotten Fronts Creative Media Design ADR005472 Edition 1 November 2016 THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS | i The First World War Battlefield Guide: Volume 2 The British Army Campaign Guide to the Forgotten Fronts of the First World War 1st Edition November 2016 Acknowledgement The publisher wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the following organisations in providing text, images, multimedia links and sketch maps for this volume: Defence Geographic Centre, Imperial War Museum, Army Historical Branch, Air Historical Branch, Army Records Society,National Portrait Gallery, Tank Museum, National Army Museum, Royal Green Jackets Museum,Shepard Trust, Royal Australian Navy, Australian Defence, Royal Artillery Historical Trust, National Archive, Canadian War Museum, National Archives of Canada, The Times, RAF Museum, Wikimedia Commons, USAF, US Library of Congress. The Cover Images Front Cover: (1) Wounded soldier of the 10th Battalion, Black Watch being carried out of a communication trench on the ‘Birdcage’ Line near Salonika, February 1916 © IWM; (2) The advance through Palestine and the Battle of Megiddo: A sergeant directs orders whilst standing on one of the wooden saddles of the Camel Transport Corps © IWM (3) Soldiers of the Royal Army Service Corps outside a Field Ambulance Station. © IWM Inside Front Cover: Helles Memorial, Gallipoli © Barbara Taylor Back Cover: ‘Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red’ at the Tower of London © Julia Gavin ii | THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS | iii ISBN: 978-1-874346-46-3 First published in November 2016 by Creative Media Designs, Army Headquarters, Andover.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 7. Remembering Them
    University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository University of Calgary Press University of Calgary Press Open Access Books 2017-02 Understanding Atrocities: Remembering, Representing and Teaching Genocide Murray, Scott W. University of Calgary Press http://hdl.handle.net/1880/51806 book http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives 4.0 International Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNDERSTANDING ATROCITIES: REMEMBERING, REPRESENTING, AND TEACHING GENOCIDE Edited by Scott W. Murray ISBN 978-1-55238-886-0 THIS BOOK IS AN OPEN ACCESS E-BOOK. It is an electronic version of a book that can be purchased in physical form through any bookseller or on-line retailer, or from our distributors. Please support this open access publication by requesting that your university purchase a print copy of this book, or by purchasing a copy yourself. If you have any questions, please contact us at [email protected] Cover Art: The artwork on the cover of this book is not open access and falls under traditional copyright provisions; it cannot be reproduced in any way without written permission of the artists and their agents. The cover can be displayed as a complete cover image for the purposes of publicizing this work, but the artwork cannot be extracted from the context of the cover of this specific work without breaching the artist’s copyright. COPYRIGHT NOTICE: This open-access work is published under a Creative Commons licence. This means that you are free to copy, distribute, display or perform the work as long as you clearly attribute the work to its authors and publisher, that you do not use this work for any commercial gain in any form, and that you in no way alter, transform, or build on the work outside of its use in normal academic scholarship without our express permission.
    [Show full text]
  • Red Sand: Canadians in Persia & Transcaucasia, 1918 Tom
    RED SAND: CANADIANS IN PERSIA & TRANSCAUCASIA, 1918 TOM SUTTON, MA THESIS ROUGH DRAFT, 20 JANUARY 2012 CONTENTS Introduction Chapter 1 Stopgap 2 Volunteers 3 The Mad Dash 4 Orphans 5 Relief 6 The Push 7 Bijar 8 Baku 9 Evacuation 10 Historiography Conclusion Introduction NOTES IN BOLD ARE EITHER TOPICS LEFT UNFINISHED OR GENERAL TOPIC/THESIS SENTENCES. REFERECNCE MAP IS ON LAST PAGE. Goals, Scope, Thesis Brief assessment of literature on Canada in the Russian Civil War. Brief assessment of literature on Canadians in Dunsterforce. 1 Stopgap: British Imperial Intentions and Policy in the Caucasus & Persia Before 1917, the Eastern Front was held almost entirely by the Russian Imperial Army. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, through the western Caucasus and south to the Persian Gulf, the Russians bolstered themselves against the Central Empires. The Russians and Turks traded Kurdistan, Assyria, and western Persia back and forth until the spring of 1917, when the British captured Baghdad, buttressing the south-eastern front. Meanwhile, the Russian army withered in unrest and desertion. Russian troops migrated north through Tabriz, Batum, Tiflis, and Baku, leaving dwindling numbers to defend an increasingly tenable front, and as the year wore on the fighting spirit of the Russian army evaporated. In the autumn of 1917, the three primary nationalities of the Caucasus – Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis – called an emergency meeting in Tiflis in reaction to the Bolshevik coup d'etat in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. In attendance were representatives from trade unions, civil employees, regional soviets, political parties, the army, and lastly Entente military agents.
    [Show full text]
  • Prospective Decommissioning Activity and Infrastructure Availability in the UKCS
    NORTH SEA STUDY OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 122 Prospective Decommissioning Activity and Infrastructure Availability in the UKCS Professor Alexander G. Kemp and Linda Stephen October, 2011 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS ISSN 0143-022X NORTH SEA ECONOMICS Research in North Sea Economics has been conducted in the Economics Department since 1973. The present and likely future effects of oil and gas developments on the Scottish economy formed the subject of a long term study undertaken for the Scottish Office. The final report of this study, The Economic Impact of North Sea Oil on Scotland, was published by HMSO in 1978. In more recent years further work has been done on the impact of oil on local economies and on the barriers to entry and characteristics of the supply companies in the offshore oil industry. The second and longer lasting theme of research has been an analysis of licensing and fiscal regimes applied to petroleum exploitation. Work in this field was initially financed by a major firm of accountants, by British Petroleum, and subsequently by the Shell Grants Committee. Much of this work has involved analysis of fiscal systems in other oil producing countries including Australia, Canada, the United States, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria and Malaysia. Because of the continuing interest in the UK fiscal system many papers have been produced on the effects of this regime. From 1985 to 1987 the Economic and Social Science Research Council financed research on the relationship between oil companies and Governments in the UK, Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands. A main part of this work involved the construction of Monte Carlo simulation models which have been employed to measure the extents to which fiscal systems share in exploration and development risks.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Mobility and Logistics Issues
    BACKGROUND PAPER U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Mobility and Logistics Issues March 1978 Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office Washington, D.C. U.S. AIR AND GROUND CONVENTIONAL FORCES FOR NATO: MOBILITY AND LOGISTICS ISSUES The Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Qovernment Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 FT II PREFACE The defense budget that the Congress will be considering in fiscal year 1979 places a strong emphasis on improving U.S. conventional forces for NATO. U.S. decisions concerning air and ground conventional forces for NATO are, however, tied closely to, and must be assessed in terms of, the capabilities of our NATO allies. This paper outlines the increasing importance of mobility and logistics in NATO defense. It compares U.S. and allied capabilities in those areas and presents options regarding U.S. decisions on logistics and mobility. The paper is part of a CBO series on the U.S. military role in NATO. Other papers in this series are U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Overview (January 1978),Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance"" (December 1977), and two forthcoming, background papers, Air Defense Issues and Firepower Issues. This series was under- taken at the request of the Senate Budget Committee. In accord- ance with CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, the study offers no recommendations. This paper was prepared by Peggy L. Weeks and Alice C. Maroni of the National Security and International Affairs Division of the Congressional Budget Office, under the supervision of John E.
    [Show full text]
  • ATLAS SUPPORTED: Strengthening U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation
    ATLAS SUPPORTED: Strengthening U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation JINSA’s Gemunder Center U.S.-Israel Security Task Force Chairman Admiral James Stavridis, USN (ret.) May 2018 DISCLAIMER The findings and recommendations contained in this publication are solely those of the authors. Task Force and Staff Chairman Admiral James Stavridis, USN (ret.) Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander and former Commander of U.S. European Command Members General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.) Former Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command LTG John Gardner, USA (ret.) Former Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command Lt Gen Henry Obering, USAF (ret.) Former Director of U.S. Missile Defense Agency JINSA Gemunder Center Staff Michael Makovsky, PhD President & CEO Harry Hoshovsky Policy Analyst Jonathan Ruhe Associate Director Table of Contents Executive Summary 7 Strategic Overview 17 Growing Iranian threat to the Middle East 18 Israel’s vital role in defending mutual interests 19 New opportunities for U.S.-led regional defense 20 Recommendations 21 Elevate Israel’s official standing as an ally to that of Australia 21 Frontload the MoU to ensure Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) 26 Replenish and regionalize prepositioned munitions stockpiles in Israel 28 Drive Israeli-Arab regional security cooperation 29 Support Israel’s legitimate security needs against the Iranian threat in Syria 33 Develop new frontiers for bilateral military cooperation and R&D 35 Endnotes 37 I. Executive Summary “Beautiful,” is how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently described the relationship between the United States and Israel, two liberal democratic countries which acutely share many values and security interests. The United States recognized the State of Israel minutes after the Jewish state was established 70 years ago this month, but a bilateral strategic partnership only began several decades later during the height of the Cold War.
    [Show full text]
  • Paris Peace Conference 1919-1920: Results Key Words: Treaty Of
    Paris Peace Conference 1919-1920: Results Key words: Treaty of Versailles, Treaty of Saint-Germain, Treaty of Neuilly, Treaty of Trianon, Treaty of Sèvres, Treaty of Lausanne Paris Peace Settlement Country Name of the Treaty Year when the treaty was signed Germany Treaty of Versailles 28 June 1919 Austria Treaty of Saint-Germain 10 September 1919 Bulgaria Treaty of Neuilly 27 November 1919 Hungary Treaty of Trianon 4 June 1920 Ottoman Empire Treaty of Sèvres, subsequetly Sèvres: 10 August 1920 revised by the Treaty of Lausanne Lausanne: 24 July 1923 Work for you to do: Get divided into three delegations: American, British and French. Each delegation should use the ideas from the class before to work out their proposed decision on each of the ideas and questions below. Remember to argue from the point of view of each country. Once each delegation has worked out its proposals, the whole class should discuss each issue and then vote on it. Important issues and types of questions to do: Will you make Germany guilty of starting the war? Will you limit German armed forces? Should Germany pay for the war? If so, how much? Should Germany lose some of its territories in Europe? What would you do with the German colonies? Would you promote establishing the League of Nations? Would you promote “self- determination policy” ask for dissolution of Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire? 1. The Treaty of Versailles: ended the state of war between Germany and the Allied Powers. It was signed on 28 June 1919, exactly five years after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
    [Show full text]
  • Treaty of Lausanne Pdf in Urdu
    Treaty of lausanne pdf in urdu Continue A peace treaty between the Republic of Turkey and the Allied powers at the end of the Turkish War of Independence, replacing the Treaty of Sevres for other purposes, see the Treaty of Lausanne (disambiguation). Treaty of Lausanne Long name: Treaty on peace and exchange of prisoners of war with Turkey, signed in LausanneAccord relatif a la restitution r'ciproque de intern's civil and l'change de prisonniers de guerre, To sign the Lausanne borders of Turkey established by the Treaty of Lausanne24 July 1923PostationLausanne, SwitzerlandEffected6 August 19241924After ratification by Turkey and any three of the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan, the treaty would come into force for those high contracting parties and in the future for each additional signatory to the ratification fieldIntinor France Italy Turkey DepositaryFrenchricte Treaty of Lausanne on Wikisource Treaty Lausanne (French: Tribe de Lausanne) was a peace treaty agreed during the Lausanne Conference 1922-23 Lausanne, Switzerland, July 24, 1923. It officially settled the conflict that originally existed between the Ottoman Empire and the Federal French Republic, the British Empire, the Kingdom of Italy, the Japanese Empire, the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Romania since the outbreak of World War I. This was the result of the second attempt of peace after the failed Sevres Treaty. The previous treaty was signed in 1920, but was later rejected by the Turkish national movement, which fought against its conditions. The Treaty of Lausanne put an end to the conflict and defined the borders of the modern Turkish Republic.
    [Show full text]