For Universal Jurisdiction: Against Fletcher's Antagonism
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Tulsa Law Review Volume 39 Issue 4 Twenty-Five Years of George P. Fletcher's Rethinking Criminal Law Summer 2004 For Universal Jurisdiction: Against Fletcher's Antagonism Albin Eser Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Albin Eser, For Universal Jurisdiction: Against Fletcher's Antagonism, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 955 (2013). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss4/13 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Eser: For Universal Jurisdiction: Against Fletcher's Antagonism FOR UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: AGAINST FLETCHER'S ANTAGONISM Albin Eser* Of course, it appears unfriendly to make a contribution "against" the person who is to be honored. But when George P. Fletcher wrote his editorial comment "Against Universal Jurisdiction,"1 he expressed the hope that someone would carry forth the dialogue by responding. Here is a response in terms of a plea "for universal jurisdiction" to show that most of his antagonism is to be rejected. My criticism of his anti-universality position will not be completely new to him, however, since we already had some discussion on our contrary views when jointly giving a course on international criminal law at Columbia Law School in 2003. Therefore, I am confident that our mutual respect and long-lasting friendship will be strengthened rather than weakened by this controversy. I. SETFING THE TUNE If one is a sensitive person, one may already feel affected by Fletcher's opening characterization of those who "favour universal jurisdiction for serious crimes of cruelty and violence",2 as "compassionate 'right-thinking' lawyers of the world"a-as if these people are led more by sentiment than by reason, as if in their self-righteous conviction of knowing what is good for mankind and the world, they seem to relate with outer space more than with earthly realities. As a supporter of universal jurisdiction, I must confess not to feel amused by finding myself put in the corner of passionate but brainless "good people." Nevertheless I could live with this prejudice if Fletcher recognized that universal jurisdiction-at least at its true core-is thought of as a way to secure the prosecution of crimes against universally recognized values even in cases in which states with primary jurisdictions (such as the state of the territory where the crime 4 was committed or the state the accused is a national of) do not function properly. * Dr. iur., Dr. h. c. mult., M.C.J., Professor Emeritus of Albert Ludwigs University Freiburg, former Director of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign International and Criminal Law. For constructive criticism and assistance, particularly for collecting material on "double jeopardy," I am greatly indebted to Christoph Burchard, research fellow at the Max Planck Institute. 1. George P. Fletcher, Against UniversalJurisdiction, 1 J. Intl. Crim. Just. 580, 580 (2003). 2. Id. 3. Id. 4. There are, of course, more facets of "universal jurisdiction" than can be briefly described in this analysis. For the variety of approaches, see A. Hays Butler, The Doctrine of UniversalJurisdiction: A Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003 1 Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 13 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:955 Calling supporters of this proposition "compassionate 'right-thinking' lawyers" would come close to an insult, however, if it were to imply that a person committed to universal jurisdiction would readily disregard sacred principles and standards of ordinary criminal justice. Now, whatever Fletcher wanted to hint at with his dubious comment, he leaves no doubt that in his eyes "universal jurisdiction is both unwise and unjust."5 When turning to the reasons he propounds for his position, it might appear proper to follow his line of arguments. Although this will be done to a certain extent, some variations seem appropriate, partly because Fletcher himself takes up similar arguments at different stages (as he does, for instance, with questions of double jeopardy), arguments will here rather be addressed at one place, and partly because he evaluates the interests of the defendant and the victim (as well as other parties involved in the criminal justice system) from a perspectivedifferent from that preferred here. Another difficulty of following his reasoning lies in the fact that it is not always clear whether he speaks of universal jurisdiction in terms of a general principle (with possible variations in one way or another) or of universal jurisdiction as it is regulated on the national level (in domestic penal codes) and/or on a supranational level (as, in particular, by the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court6). Nevertheless, I shall try my best to do justice to his propositions, be it in this or in that context. II. AMBIVALENT CONCEPTIONS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION No doubt, the opening of Fletcher's plea against universal jurisdiction may impress some by recalling that "many are outraged by Belgian, Canadian, German and other claims to have the right to judge crimes no matter where they are committed"7 and by reminding us of "some unseemly threats of retaliation, 8 by officials in the Bush administration "if Belgium refuses to draw in its net of asserted jurisdiction."9 Before coming to the propositions and implications of this statement, I must first express astonishment about the timing of such excitement. Universal jurisdiction has been recognized, if not as an international mandate, then at least in terms of being empowered to proscribe, for many decades, as Review of the Literature,11 Crim. L. Forum 353 (2000). As to my own view on universal jurisdiction so far, see Albin Eser, Harmonisierte Universalitat nationaler Strafgewalt: ein Desiderat internationaler Komplementaritat bei Verfolgung von Volkerrechtsverbrechen, in Strafrecht, Strafprozessrecht und Menschenrechte: Festschrift fPr Stefan Trechsel zum 65. Geburtstag 219 (Andreas Donatsch, Marc Forster & Christian Schwarzenegger eds., Schulthess 2002) [hereinafter Eser, Harmonisierte Universalitit]; Albin Eser, National Jurisdiction over ExtraterritorialCrimes within the Framework of International Complementarity: A Comparative Survey on Transnational Prosecution of Genocide According to the Principle of Universality, in Man's Inhumanity to Man: Essays on InternationalLaw in Honour of Antonio Cassese 279 (Lal Chand Vohrah et al. eds., Kluwer L. Intl. 2003) [hereinafter Eser, NationalJurisdiction]. 5. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 580. 6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 7. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 580. 8. Id. 9. Id. https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss4/13 2 Eser: For Universal Jurisdiction: Against Fletcher's Antagonism 2004] UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION evidenced by the famous Lotus'° case of 1927. Even more remarkably, many infamous criminals would not have been tried and convicted if not-at least in an auxiliary way-for the principle of universal jurisdiction. Consider two examples: the trial of German war criminals after World War II by the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg 8 and the trial of Adolf Eichmann by the Israeli Supreme Court.9 In both instances it is very doubtful that Germany, the jurisdiction where the relevant crimes had been committed, would have been willing to put the criminals on trial and to punish them in a way which would have been considered just worldwide. That means, without taking resort to the principle of universality these crimes might have remained unpunished. This basic fact seems to be overlooked by Fletcher when, in connection with the Eichmann case, he argues against universal jurisdiction using the example of Argentina." Even if he is right in assuming that Argentina (as the long term domicile of Eichmann) could have claimed universal jurisdiction and ended up with an acquittal, this is not an apt argument against universal jurisdiction as such; rather this only points to a general pitfall of international or transnational criminal law, that of concurrent (national and/or international) jurisdictions. When the state of the commission of the crime claims territorial jurisdiction and the state the defendant is a citizen of asserts jurisdiction based on the nationality principle, it can easily come to pass that one is driving at a conviction and the other at an acquittal. Although these are certainly serious inter-jurisdictional conflicts which deserve to be dealt with separately, and in particular with regard to "ne bis in idem ,12 concurrencies of this sort are not peculiar to universal jurisdiction. Rather, they are common for all combinations of different principles for applying national criminal law to extraterritorial crimes.13 And this, by the way, would be true even if all jurisdictions of the world restricted themselves to the principle of territoriality; for even within such a seemingly clear-cut territorial demarcation it may happen that a criminal act was started in one country, continued in a second, and finally effected in a third, and that-on the basis of "ubiquity" (as this principle is called in European continental tradition), 4 or the common law terms of "objective" and "subjective" territoriality, or the new American paradigm of "defensive territoriality"'"- each state concerned claims jurisdiction, though perhaps for different ends. 10. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20 (Judgment No. 9 of Sept. 7); see generally Christopher L. Blakesley, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, in International Criminal Law vol. 2, 33, 45-47 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed., Transnatl. Publishers 1999). 11. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 583. 12. See infra pts. V & VIII. 13. Eser, NationalJurisdiction, supra n. 4, at 280-84.