MASTER'S THESIS M-734
ESPOSITO, Bruce John. THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE.
The American University, M. A ., 1965 Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE
A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the School of International Service
American University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in International Relations
and Organization Signatureff^of C Cha irmani L A//, L & ^ /
Dean_oy the School by ^ AMERICAN . . LRS1ÏY Bruce Esposito LIBRARY
1964 WASHINGTON. B. C, # oô^O TABLE OP CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION ...... 1
CHAPTER II.
THE PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE PERIOD
(1954-1958) ...... 35
CHAPTER III.
THE MILITANT PERIOD
(1959-1961)...... 55
CHAPTER IV.
CONCLUSIONS ... 87
EPILOGUE (1962)...... 95
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 104 MAPS
PAGE
FIGURE 1.
POLITICAL MAP OF INDIA ...... 115
FIGURE 2.
NORTHERN FRONTIER OF INDIA...... 116 HISTORIGAL INTRODUCTION
The major problem of this thesis is to present
an account of Communist China's foreign policy in
the Sino-Indian border dispute. The supporting
problems will be to trace the historical development
of Chinese and Indian policies toward the border
areas. Mo attempt will be made to Judge the validity
of the Chinese claims^ nor to establish a "just"
boundary between the two nations. This thesis will
trace the events of the Sino-Indian dispute up to
and including December 1961, A brief epilogue will describe developments in 1962.
This study is based exclusively on primary and secondary sources in the English language. The
Tibetan sources translated into English were not exceedingly rewarding as they chiefly dealt with
^See Margaret Fisher, Leo Rose and Robert Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (New York: Frederick A. Fraeger, 1963), Chapter 11, for an analysis of the Chinese claims. religious events and they lacked historical per spective. On the other hand, the Chinese sources which have been translated into English show the remarkable Chinese historical sense and were extremely useful. The major part of the primary documentation used in this thesis was released by the Government of India. These documents usually contaih the Indian note and the Chinese reply.
The Indian versions of the Chinese notes have been compared with the English translations released by the Chinese government wherever possible. The differences in translation can all be attributed to the individual styles of the translator.
A study of the border dispute is important for two reasons. The first is the dispute is between the two "giant" powers of Asia. Both states, which follow different patterns of industrialization and different forms of government, are contending for the lead of the people of other Asian and African states. The ramifications of this dispute have great significance for the Afro-Aslan nations as well as for the United States and its allies. The second reason is that no detailed analysis of Commu nist China's foreign policy toward the border dispute exists.
Before discussing the Sino-Indian border dispute it is wise to sketch a brief outline of Chinese and
Indian policies toward the border regions and how the frontier evolved into its present alignment. The border area comprises the states of India, Nepal,
Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet. Tibet, because of its geo graphic position, has played a crucial role in the early development of the boundary between India and
China.
Tibet was an independent state until it was conquered by the Mongols in 1247 and incorporated by
China during the Yuan Dynasty (1280-1368). With the decline and overthrow of the Yuan, the Chinese ties with Tibet for three hundred years were practically o non-existent. Chinese sources mention that after
the Yuan, Tibet still paid tribute to China,^ but
Tibetan sources do not mention this tribute.^
With the coming of the Ifanchus to power in
China a struggle developed with several Central
Asian tribes. One of these tribes, the Dzungars,
invaded Tibet, at a time of the selection of a
Dalai Lama, and installed their own candidate as
the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan Government called for
Chinese assistance. In 1720 the Chinese defeated
the Dzungars in Tibet and installed two Ambans
(Resident Ministers) and a Chinese expeditionary
force at Lhasa.^ China's claim to suzerainty
Prithwis Chandra Chakravarti, India's China Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 13-14.
^Shen Tsung-lien and Liu Shen-Chi, Tibet and the Tibetans (Stanford University Press, 1953), p. 40.
^Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 14.
^Ibid. , p. 15. See L. Petech, China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1950), Chapters 3-8, for a detailed account of the Dzungar Occupation, the Chinese conquest and establishment of a protectorate in Tibet. appears to date from this time.^ (see note)
George N. Patterson, Tibet in Revolt (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), p. 24. Note: "The questions of suzerainty and sover eignty are a matter of degree of dependency. Suze rainty, a difficult word to give a precise juristic meaning, was defined in 1923 by the Permanent Court in the following terms: 'The extent of the powers of a protecting state in the territory of a protected state depends, first upon the treaties between the protecting state and the protected state establishing the protectorate, and, secondly, upon the conditions under which the pro tectorate has been recognized by third powers as against whom there is an intention to rely on the provisions of these treaties. In spite of common features possessed by pro tectorates under international law, they have individual legal characteristics resulting from the special conditions under which they were created, and the stage of the development.' On the other hand, sovereignty has been described as the situation when a state occupies a definite part of the surface of the earth, within which it normally exercises, subject to the limitations imposed by international law, jurisdiction over persons and things to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of other states. When a state exercises an authority of this kind over a certain territory, it is popularly said to have sovereignty over the territory." J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), pp. 12 - 12, 150. 6
By the beginning of the nineteenth century
Chinese power had begun to deteriorate in Tibet.
This was due to the internal weaknesses of the
Chinese throne and to the successive encroachments by the foreign imperialistic powers. In 1841 the
Tibetans alone had been able to repulse an invasion of the Dogras. In 1842 the authorized representa tives of the Kashmir State Government, the Dalai
Lama of Tibet signed a treaty which affirmed the O traditional boundary between Ladakh and Tibet. In
1856 however the Chinese failed to protect Tibet from Nepali invaders who were then able to extract from the Tibetans extraterritorial rights and annual Q sums. In 1860 the Lhasa Government, although able to suppress an internal rebellion, requested Chinese
7 Chanakya Sen, Tibet Disappears (Sew York: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. 6. 8 Fisher, et. al., op. cit., pp. 55-56. In 1847 the Chinese Government informed the British Govern ment that there was no need for additional measures for fixing this boundary as it had been sufficiently and distinctly fixed. Chinese Betrayal of India (New Delhi Hind Gyan Mala, 1962), pp. 12-13. Q Shen and Liu, o£. cit., p. 47. assistance but none was forthcoming.In 1876 Great
Britain entered into a treaty with China providing, thereby, that a British mission of exploration be sent to Tibet. The Tibetans refused to allow the mission to enter.In 1890 under British insistence
Sikkim and China demarcated their mutual border.
In 1899 Lord Curzon became Viceroy of India.
He believed that if peace and security were to be had on the northern frontiers of India the British Govern ment must deal directly with the Tibetans, and not with the Chinese who had shown impotence in previous agreements concerning Tibet. Lord Curzon in the same year received permission from the British Government in London to open up direct negotiations with Tibet.
The letters that Curzon sent to the Thirteenth Dalai
^®Patterson, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
^^Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 16.
^^Pradyumna P. Karan and William M. Jenkins, Jr., The Himalaya Kingdoms Bhutan. Sikkim, and Nepal (Princeton: Van Nostrand Company, 1963), p. 77. 8
Lana were all returned unopened.At this time it
was rumored that the Dalai Lama was negotiating with
the Czar of Russia.Britain was currently engaged
with Russia in power rivalries in Central Asia and
the Near East. Curzon felt the situation in Tibet
endangered Indian security ünd as a result the Young-
husband Expedition was formed. The expedition
invaded Tibet through the Chumbi Valley and finally
stopped at Lhasa.A result of the expedition was
the Lhasa Convention of September 1904. The Conven
tion provided, inter alia: the acknowledgement of
Sikkim as a protectorate of Great Britain by the
Tibetan Government ; no portion of Tibet should be ceded, sold or leased to any foreign power; and no
^^Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 16.
^^Sir Charles Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 63-64.
l^Li Tieh-tseng, Tibet Today and Yesterday (New York: Bookman Associates, 1960), pp. 87-92. See Sir Peter Fleming, Bayonets to Lhasa (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), chapters VIII-XX for a detailed description of the British 1904 invasion of Tibet. 9
power should intervene in Tibetan affairs.The
Lhasa Convention was not signed by the Dalai Lena who fled before the coming of the British, but it was signed by high Tibetan officials who had the
Dalai Lama's seal.
The 1904 Convention opened Tibet to British
trade, eliminated the Russian danger, and secured
for Britain an influence over Tibet's external policy. The British were careful to affirm that
"the British Government fully recognized the suze rainty of the Chinese Government," and that the
British "had not the least desire to supplant China
in the suzerainty of Tibet. The Chinese did not protest the treaty and in fact the Chinese Amban in
^®Bell, op. cit., pp. 284-286 (Appendix VII Convention Between Great Britain and Tibet).
17Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 18. 18 Patterson, op. cit., p. 29. 10
Tibet gave the British much assistance.The
British tried to secure Chinese acceptance of the
1904 Lhasa Convention and finally succeeded in 1906 with a Convention between Great Britain and China.
The Chinese position was strengthened by the 1904
Lhasa Convention and the 1906 Agreement with the
British because the Chinese received reaffirmation of their suzerainty in Tibet. In 1907 Great Britain secured an agreement with Russia which set Tibet up as a buffer zone between India and the Russian
Asiatic Empire. Great Britain and Russia agreed to respect "the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in the internal administration." Britain obtained from Russia recognition of a "special interest in the mainte nance of the status quo in the external relations
^^Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 18.
^®Bell, op. cit., pp. 287-289 (Appendix VIII Convention between Great Britain and China). 11 of Tibet
The Chinese revolution of 1911 gradually had its effects in Tibet. By mid-1912 most of the
Chinese troops in Tibet were no longer under military discipline. The Tibetans forced them to surrender and they returned to China via India. By the end of
1912 Chinese authority had almost ceased to exist in
Tibet.In April of 1912 Yuan Shih-kai issued a proclamation stating that Tibet would be treated on the same basis as a province of China and would be considered an integral part of the Republic.By late 1912, when the revolution in China had quieted down. Yuan Shih-kai, Ibresident of China, sent a force to retake Tibet. The Chinese advances in
Tibet were stopped by the Tibetan army.^^
^^Ibld., pp. 289-291. 22 Patterson, op. cit., p. 39.
E. Richardson, A Short History of Tibet (New York: £. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1962), p. 103. 12
The British, anxious for the maintenance of peace on their northern boundary, invited the
Chinese and Tibetan representatives to a Tripartite
Conference at Simla in October of 1913. On April
27, 1914, a convention declaration, though of an essentially compromise position, was put forward by the British representative and initialled by all the delegates. The treaty, inter alia, fixed the frontier between Tibet and the Northeast area of
India. The frontier from east of Bhutan to the borders of Burma, a distance of 850 miles, had never been delimited. The British representative to the
Simla Conference, Sir Henry Mac Mahon, and the other delegates agreed to delimit the boundary according to the watershed principle so often invoked by international law.25 (see note)
^®Sen, op. cit.. p. 11. Note: "In the normal parlance of international relations, delimitation refers to the general description of a boundary which can be defined in various ways — by watersheds, rivers, mountain ranges, or other natural or artificial features. Demarcation is the on the spot marking of a boundary in conformity with principles established in delimitation. Fisher, et. al., op. cit., p. 93. 13
Within two days the Chinese Government tele graphed its refusal to ratify the Convention.26
Nevertheless the British and Tibetan Governments ratified it and declared the Convention valid 27 between themselves. The Chinese Government refused to ratify the treaty because it would not accept the boundary between inner and outer Tibet as indicated in the treaty. The Chinese made no mention of disagreement with the Tibet-Indian oo boundary clause of the treaty.
The Simla Convention has gained new importance in the light of the recent border dispute. The
Indian Government argues that the Mac Mahon line indicated in the Simla Convention is valid because
Tibet was under Chinese suzerainty and thus had certain treaty making powers. The Chinese Govern-
26patterson, op. cit,, p. 46.
^^Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 22,
26Richardson, op. cit., p. 117. 14
ment maintains the Tibetans were under Chinese
sovereignty and the treaty is null and void because
the Chinese did not ratify it. A noted Indian
international law expert, K. Krishna Rao, maintains
the position, as other international law experts do,
that Tibet at this time had treaty making power s. 29
The Chinese Nationalist Government since it
came to power in 1928 has maintained that:
The so-called Mac Mahon Line Is a line unilaterally claimed by the British during their rule over India. The Government of the Republic of China has never accepted this line of demarcation and is strongly opposed to the British claim. Since the armed conflict has drawn world attention and touched upon the question of demarcation between China and India, the Government of the Republic of China is constrained to reiterate its position on this matter.
29g. Krishna Rao, "The Sino-Indian Boundary Question and International Law, ** International and Comparative Law Quarterly, April 1962, 400.
2Qchlnese News Service, October 30, 1962, 1. 15
The 1931 Provisional Constitutions of the Republic of China for the Period of Political Tutelage, claimed that "The territory of the Republic of China consists of the various Provinces and Mongolia and
Tibet."31
The Chinese Communists before seizing power in
China in 1949 made some reference to the Sino-Indian boundary. In 1939, when Mao Tse-tung was waging war against the Nationalist Government it was reported that he said: "In defeating China in war, imperi alist powers have taken away many Chinese dependent states and parts of her territory England seized
^Ipaul Linebarger, Djang Chu, and Ardath Burks, Far Eastern Governments and Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956), p. 551. 16
Burma, Bhutan, Nepal ..."32
In the years after the Chinese Revolution of
1911 the Tibetans remained quasi-independent and totally free from Chinese political domination, but remained isolated from the rest of the world. They foiled any Chinese encroachments against their
32]fao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," (December 1939) quoted in Department of State, Chinese Communist World Outlook (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 29. Note: "In the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, New York: International Publisher, 1954, Vol. 3, p. 82, this passage has been altered to read as follows: 'The process of the transformation of China into a semi-colony and colony by imperialism allying with Chinese feudalism, is at the same time the process of the struggle of the Chinese people against imperialism and its lackeys. The Opium War, the Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-French War, the Sino- Japanese War, the coup d'etat of 1898, the Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4 Movement, the May 30 Movement, the Northern Expe dition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the present Anti-Japanese War all testify to the stubborn resistence of the Chinese people, who refuse to submit to imperialism and its lackeys. ' " Department of State, Chinese Communist World Outlook, Ibid. 17 boundaries from 1911 to 1949. The Tibetan Govern ment saw no need to seek political recognition until the late 1940*s. At this time recognition was not possible because of: (1) Great Britain's with drawal from South Asia after 1945, (2) Tibet's previous history of isolation, and (3) the confused
Asian political scene after World War II.
This part of the historical introduction has traced Sino-Indian policies toward the border areas.
The evolution of the border alignment was also discussed as well as the validity of certain treaties affecting the boundary. The remainder of the intro duction will discuss Chinese Communist foreign policy objectives and outline China's relations with India until 1954. 18
A MILITANT PERIOD
By mid 1949 the Kuomintang dominated National
Government had been defeated by the Chinese communists on the mainland of China. In October with the formal establishment of the Central Peoples Government at
Peking we can begin to trace Communist China's foreign policy. The First Plenary Session of the
Chinese Peoples Political Consulative Conference
(CPPCC), a sort of 'ad hoc' constituent assembly, begun in September, 1949, adopted inter alia, the
Common Program. In this document the Chinese Govern ment announced the following intentions in foreign policy:
"(a) protect China's independence, freedom and security (b) work for lasting international peace and friendly co-operation between all countries (c) establish cordial relations with foreign governments whose attitudes were friendly (d) unite with the Soviet Union and other Communist states and movements in the struggle against the 'imperialists' and in particular the U. S. A. 19
(e) protect the rights and interests of the Overseas C h i n e s e , "33
Seldom are the professed aims of a state not the actual ones; China in this case was not different.
One leading specialist on Communist China stated the most important foreign policy objective of China is the preservation of China's national security. This objective imposes certain limits on what China can do to expand such as the avoidance of the risks of a major war with a major state.34
A second objective of Chinese foreign policy is the extension of Chinese communist influence in
Asia. This desire for extension of influence in
Asia has been characteristic of China throughout its history. When China was strong in the past she traditionally sought to expand territorially and to spread her culture. This was particularly true
33%ichard G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 20,
3^Ibid.. p. 85. 20
O e during the T'ang Dynasty.
The third major Chinese communist policy objective has been the strengthening of China's military, ideological and economic position vis a vis the Soviet Union since 1956. Because of the early independent development of the Chinese
Communist Party and the paucity of Soviet aid during the conquest of China they have shown independence of thought in ideological matters and a strong desire to be self sufficient from the Soviet Union in the economic and military spheres. This third objective of Chinese policy is largely responsible for the strains existing between the Soviet Union and China today.
The fourth major Chinese Communist policy objective is that China wishes to be, in addition to an Asian power, a great world power. ^China has
33ibid., p. 87.
36Ibid., p. 89. 21
repeatedly stated that on any major issue in
international relations China's opinion must be 37 considered.
Communist China's foreign policy since 1949 with India has gone through several broad dis
tinguishable stages. The first stage of relations which lasted from 1949 to 1954 will be discussed in this chapter. These relations were underlain by a Chinese "hard line" policy. In 1949 Mao Tse-
tung proclaimed Peking's determination to "lean to" the Soviet side in world affairs. And in 1950 the
Chinese and the Soviet leaders signed the "Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Mutual Friendship, Alliance and
Mutual Assistance." In the first two or three years of this stage the Chinese espoused violent revolutionary means in order to establish other 38 communist states in Asia. Liu Shao-chi, at a
37 A, Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 65-66.
36Barnett, op. cit., pp. 87-89. 22
Trade Union Conference in November 1949 declared;
The war of national Liberation in Vietnam has liberated 90 percent of her territory; the war of national liberation in Burma and Indonesia is now developing; the partisan warfare against imperialism and its lackeys in Malaya and the Phillipines has been carried on over a long period, and armed struggles for emancipation have also taken place in India. In Japan, the progressive people's movement against the immersion of Japan into a colony by American imperialism are developing. The movement of the Korean people against Syngman Rhee, puppet of American imperialism and for the establishment of a unified people's democratic republic of Korea cannot be halted. The labor movements and national liberation movements in Siam and the Near East countries as well as in Africa are also growing.^®
The Chinese Government in September 1949 declared that it would "abolish all prerogatives of imperialist countries in China" and to "undertake to wage the peoples war of liberation to the end, liberate all the territory of China, and accomplish the cause of
^^Ibid., p. 90. 23 unifying the country.With the establishment of the Central Government at Peking the Chinese started to build roads leading to Tibet and to build up supplies and reinforcements for an expe dition to Lhasa. Months before October 1949 the
Chinese declared their determination to conquer
Tibet and safeguard her frontiers.
As the Chinese military build up proceeded the Indian Government grew anxious as to the fate of Tibet. K. M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to
China, met Chou En-lai for a general discussion on August 22, 1950. Ambassador Panikkar, at this time, took the opportunity to express the Govern ment of India's attitude on Tibet which was that the Indian Government would follow a peaceful policy in settling its relations with Tibet. At the meeting, Panikkar wrote, that Chou En-lai felt it was the "sacred duty" of his government to
40lbid., p. 91. 41 Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 25, 24
"liberate" Tibet by either military or pacific means; however, the Chinese Government did favor 42 the method of peaceful negotiation.
Meanwhile the Lhasa Government sent a mission to try to negotiate with the Chinese representative,
These conversations proved futile and upon Indian advice and fresh instructions from Lhasa the mission proceeded to Peking. While they were enroute the Chinese Government announced on October
25 that:
Units of the Chinese Peoples Army have been ordered to cross over into Tibet in order to free three million Tibetans from Western Imperialist oppression and to consolidate national defenses on China's western borders.
The Indian Government sent a note the following day to Peking. It expressed "great regret" about the invasion of Tibet by China and it deplored the
42 K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas (London: Gray Allen and Unin Ltd., 1955), p. 105.
^^Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 29, 25 use of force in this situation.**
On October 30 Peking replied to the Indian note of October 26 stating that:
Tibet is an integral part of the Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China.*"*
The note also contained a warning that "no foreign interference shall be tolerated" with regard to
Tibet and that "the viewpoint of the government of
India must be considered as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China.
On the day (October 31) following the receipt of the Chinese note the Indian Government sent another note to Peking. The Government of India denied that any foreign influences affected its foreign policy, and stated the Indian Government had "no political or territorial ambitions in Tibet"
44 Sen, op. cit., p. 71.
*5Ibid., p. 72. 26
but the Indian Government pointed out that "certain
rights have grown out of usage and agreements ...
among neighbors ..." and these rights the Indian ^ ' Government was anxious to maintain as they were to
the mutual interest of India and Tibet.*®
On November 16 the Chinese replied to the
Indian note and reaffirmed their belief that Tibet
was an integral part of China, and admonished India
for interfering with a domestic problem. The
Chinese at the end of the note hoped that any dis
pute between India and China would be settled by
normal diplomatic channels.*?
While the aforementioned exchange of notes was
taking place Tibet appealed to the United Nations
for assistance on November 7, 1950.^^ Previous to
this appeal the Lhasa Government asked India to
plead Tibet's case. India refused to do so, how
*^Ibid.. p. 74. *?Ibid., pp. 75-77.
*®Ibid., pp. 94-97. 27 ever she suggested Lhasa make a direct appeal to the United Nations and that India would support her appeal to the extent of condemning China for using force in the dispute. On November 17 the delegate from El Salvador requested the Tibetan appeal to be placed on the agenda of the General
Assembly. The United States and Great Britain made it known that they would follow India's position with regard to this dispute. On November
25 when the request to condemn China and to study appropriate measures to be taken by the United
Nations was brought before the steering Committee of the General Assembly, India had reversed its understanding with Tibet, and agreed to Great
Britain's motion to postpone the matter. Perhaps, upon consideration, the Indian Government felt that to support the Tibetan appeal would only further worsen the situation. The Steering Com mittee "unanimously decided to adjourn consider ation .... of the item ..."49
4®Ibid., p. 106. 28
. With the postponement of discussion on the
Tibetan complaint in the United Nations, the
Tibetan Government had no other recourse left
but to deal directly with Peking. In late April
a six man Tibetan delegation arrived at Peking
and on May 23 they signed "the Agreement of the
Central Peoples Government and the Local Govern ment of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful
Liberation of Tibet."®® Article Three of this
Agreement stated that "the Tibetan people have
the right of exercising national regional
autonomy under the unified leadership of the
Central Peoples Government."®! With the signing
of this treaty Tibet lost any claim to an inde pendent existence. Peking controlled her
external affairs and had the right to maintain
an army anywhere in Tibet. In theory Tibet was
an autonomous region of China but it is now known
®®Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 33.
®!sen, op. cit., p. 78. 29 from a recent statement of the Dalai Lama that the
Chinese immediately started to violate the few rights the Tibetan Government gained from the treaty.52
China's relations with India from 1949 to 1954 on the international scene were not too cordial.
In 1950 and 1951 China cancelled India's trade position in Central Asia and Tibet. In the
Kuomintang period India had maintained a Consulate
General at Kashgar in Sinkiang. The Chinese
Government declared Sinkiang a "closed area" and refused permission to maintain the Consulate.
This act stopped almost all trade with Central
Asia. In Tibet by late 1951 Indian traders and visitors were increasingly subject to scrutiny and hardship. In September (1951), the Government of
52 Dalai Lama, My Land and My People (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), p. 220. 53 Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 51. 30
India turned over its political Agency in Lhasa to a Consulate General at Chinese insistence. It became obvious that India had to revise her treaty rights in Tibet.®*
Negotiations were begun for treaty revision with China concerning the Tibet region in late
1953. Negotiations were stalemated by the Chinese insistence on matching trade agency for trade agency. India had three trade agencies and the
Chinese wanted to establish new trade agencies at
Almore and Simla in the Northeast Frontier Agency region. These two towns were in the hill regions on the border. The Indian newspapers felt, as many Indian officials did that these Chinese centers would be used for espionage in the already politically disturbed hill territories.®® The
5*Ibid.. p. 52.
^^Lowell Thomas, Out%:of this World (New York: Greystone Press, 1950), p. 213. 31
Chinese Government finally agreed to drop the proposals for these hill trade agencies and an
Agreement was signed on April 29, 1954 between the Republic of India and the Peoples Republic of China on trade and intercourse between the
Tibet region of China. In the Agreement the preamble contained principles which were thought to guide Sino-Indian relations. These principles, commonly called Panch Shila, are:
(1) mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence.
The agreement also provided for establishment of trade agencies in both countries and stipulated the privileges and restrictions of traders when 32 they cross the border.®® In the course of negoti ations, the issue of the Indo-Tibetan border did
indirectly arise with reference to the pass areas
in the middle sector of the boundary. In the original Chinese draft of the Agreement, the wording was: "The Chinese Government agrees to open the following passes." The Indian repre sentative objected to this wording because it
implied the passes were Tibetan whereas the Indian
Government claimed these passes. After some ♦ discussion, both sides agreed to adopt the follow ing wording: "Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes....
(1) Shipki La Pass, (2) Mana Pass, (3) Niti Pass,
(4) Kungribingri Pass, (5) Darma Pass, (6) Lipu
Pass." This indirect recognition that the passes
Ministry of External Affairs, Notes, Memo randa, and Letters Exchanged and Agreements signed Between the Governments of India and China 1954- 1959 (White Paper I), 1959, pp. 98-101, 33 were in fact border passes drew from the Chinese representative the comment that "this was the fifth concession on our part,"®?
The 1954 Agreement is significant for several reasons; firstly India condemned and relinquished the "relics of British Imperialism" which in 1950 she considered as rights having grown out of usage and agreements which is natural among close 58 neighbors; secondly the Agreement described
Tibet as the "Tibet region of China." This in effect was a recognition of Chinese sovereignty in the area; thirdly, the 1954 Agreement is a turning point in Sino-Indian relations. After this
Agreement cordial relations existed at the inter national level between these countries. However in relations on the diplomatic level, which were kept secret from the public until September 1959,
57 Fisher, et. al., op. cit.. pp. 84-85.
®®Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 54. 34
there existed several disputes between the two nations — the most serious the dispute over the exact alignment of their common boundary.
This last section of the historical intro
duction discussed briefly the goals of Communist
China's foreign policy and then traced and ana
lyzed the events between the two countries from
1949 to 1954. This period of relations was
initially underlain by a Chinese "hard line;" however, with the signing of the Panch Shila
Agreement relations between the two countries grew apparently friendlier. In the next chapter there will be discussions of the Chinese "peace ful coexistence" policy and the border dispute from 1954 to 1958 with India. II.
PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE PERIOD (1954-1958)
A new period of relations beg^in 1954 between
Communist China and India. The pillar of this relationship was the 1954 Agreement on Tibet.
The cordial policy which existed on the international level was part of a new line in Communist China's foreign policy. This new line was foreshadowed by the Korean Truce of 1953, the Geneva Conference of
1954, the Indo-China Accord of 1954, and highlighted by the Nehru-Chou Conference in New Delhi in 1954 and finally the Bandung Conference of 1955. The
Chinese foreign policy theme during this period was the "five principles of peaceful co-existence" and
"Asian solidarity," Peking now de-emphasized the use of force and revolutionary insurrection, Peking at the Geneva Conference was instrumental in negoti ating an acceptable formula for the Indo-China
Armistice and during an interlude at this Conference
Chou En-lai stopped in India and issued a joint 36 communique reiterating the Five Principles,^® The
Bandung Conference was called by several of the
Colombo nations - Burma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan
and Ceylon^® and symbolized the increasing
importance of non-western nations in world affairs.
The conference was dominated by Nehru and Chou.
Chou En-lai was highly successful in making friends
for China as well as creating an image of a peaceful,
powerful and conciliatory China.
The reasons for the change in Chinese policy
probably revolve around the realization that her militant policy was no longer as effective as before
(e. g., the Huk movement in the Philippines was
defeated as was the guerilla movement in Malaya);
Peking also hoped to corrode the United States sup
ported anti-communist organizations and alignments
in Asia (e. g., Seato) which had developed in reaction
59 Barnett, op. cit., pp. 97-105.
®®George Me Turnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 4. 37 to China's hard policies; also China was about to begin her First Five Year Plan and wanted a conducive atmosphere for the successful completion of it.
During this new stage of international friend ship, Chou visited India several times. Nehru paid one visit to China from October 18 to 28, 1954 and was received with enthusiasm and Panch Shila was again affirmed. 61
Supplementing these intergovernmental contacts, various contacts of an unofficial nature were exchanged. Delegations to Peking and New Delhi came and went throughout this period. Early in 1955
Peking sent cultural missions to India, Pakistan,
Burma, and I n d o n e s i a . ®2 in late December of 1955 and early 1956, Madame Soong Ching-ling, wife of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen, visited India, Burma and
6l Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 59.
G^Ibid., p. 63. 38
Pakistan.®®
In addition to political and cultural collabo ration, the Sino-Indian friendship was made closer by the trade agreement of October 14, 1954 which was valid for two years and was renewed in 1956 and
1958.®*
On the confidential diplomatic level only a few months after the signing of the 1954 Panch Shila
Agreement in mid 1954, the Chinese intruded into the Bara Hoti Plains area. This intrusion began what has since been called the Sino-Indian border dispute. The adumbration of this dispute was the
Chinese policy of "cartographic intrusion," begun in 1950 and this policy should be looked at briefly.
In 1950 the Chinese published maps of China showing large portions of India as part of Chinese
Soong Ching-ling, Good Neighbors Meet. (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1956). This book contains speeches made during the tour. 64 White Paper I., op. cit., pp. 108-110, 39 territory. When in November 1950 Nehru's attention was drawn to the Chinese maps which showed parts of
Ladakh and Assam as belonging to China, Prime
Minister Nehru said that "the Mac Mahon Line is our boundary, map or no map. We will not allow anybody to come across that boundary."®®
However year after year Peking continued to publish maps showing large portions of the frontier within the territorial limits of China. The disputed territories thus shown were (1) four of the five division of the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA),
(2) some areas north of the State of Uttar Pradesh,
(3) large areas of Ladakh, (4) the Tashi-gang Area of eastern Bhutan and (5) a slice of territory in northeastern Bhutan.®® When Nehru went to China in
October 1954, he raised the question of these maps
65 Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 67.
®®The Sino-Indian Boundary Question (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1962), map 2. 40 with Prime Minister Chou En-lai. Chou replied that "these maps were really reproductions of old pre-libérâtion maps and that you (China) had had no time to revise them."®?
.In 1954 India also undertook some cartographic revision of its own maps. Prior to 1954 the boundary between China and India west of Nepal was marked undefined. However, starting in 1954 this same boundary was marked delimited.®® These re visions might have been undertaken to present the
Indian concept of the boundary as well as to use as a bargaining device.
The map issue was discussed again when Chou En- lai visited India toward the end of 1956. Prime
Minister Nehru later revealed in a letter that Chou told him that he:
®?White Paper I, op. cit., p. 49.
®®The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, op. cit., reference maps 3 & 4. 41
had accepted this MacMahon Line border with Burma and whatever might have happened long ago, in view of the friendly relations which existed be tween China and India, you (Chou En- lai) proposed to recognize this border with India also. You (Chou En-lai) added that you would like to consult the authorities of the Tibetan region of China and you proposed to do so.®9
Mr. Nehru further states in his letter to Prime
Minister Chou that they discussed the border issue at considerable length and Mr. Nehru mentioned that:
there were no disputes between us about our frontier, but that there were certain very minor border problems which were pending settlement. We decided that these petty issues should be settled amicably by representatives of the two governments, meeting together on the basis of established practice and ' custom as well as water sheds. There was a long delay in this meeting taking place, but ultimately a representative of the Chinese Government came to Delhi and discussed one of these petty issues for some time. Unfortunately no settle ment about this matter was arrived at then and it was decided to continue the talks later. I was sorry that these
69 White Paper I, op. cit., p. 49, 42
talks had not resulted in a satisfactory agreement so far. The issue is a minor one and I wanted to remove by friendly settlement all matters that affected our two Governments and countries. I had thought then of writing you on this subject, but I decided not to trouble you over such a petty matter.?®
Nevertheless the manufacture of "pre-liberation' maps continued. In the July 1958 issue of "China
Pictorial" a map was shown that had "clear inaccu racies" in it insofar as China's border with
India was concerned. 71
The Indian Government, in a note dated 21
August, 1958 stated that:
the present Government of the People's Republic of China has now been in office for so many years and now maps are being repeatedly printed and published in China. The Government of India would suggest that necessary corrections in the Chinese maps should not be delayed further.?2
70 White Paper I, op. cit., p. 50,
?llbid., p. 46.
?2lbid., p. 46. 43
In a memorandum from the Foreign Office of
China concerning this Indian note, the Chinese
Government stated that maps produced in China at the present time are based on preliberation maps as Prime Minister Chou En-lai has stated. And further, China "has not yet undertaken a survey of China's boundary, nor consulted with countries concerned and that it will not make changes in the boundary on its own," Further "the Chinese
Government believes that with the elapse of time, and after consultation with the various neighbour ing countries and a survey of the border regions, a new way of drawing the boundary of China will be decided on in accordance with the results of the consultations and the survey,"?®
This was a reversal of past Chinese policy.
Previous to this November 3, 1959 memorandum, the
Chinese had always insisted their maps were based
73 ^Ibid., p. 49. 44 on pre-liberation maps, but now the Chinese
Communist Government felt the whole boundary was not formally delimited and it felt the need for it to be formally delimited. In other words,
Peking reserved the right to declare at a future time what areas of the frontier it felt needed revision. Nehru retorted that he "did not know what kind of surveys can affect these well-known and fixed boundaries."?*
The previous section of this chapter discussed one aspect of a duality in Peking's foreign policy during 1954-1958. On the international level apparent friendly relations were maintained while on the confidential diplomatic level the carto graphic problem foreshadowed the second aspect of the duality in Peking's policy. Peking, first with cartographic intrusions and then with actual border icidents militantly claimed large areas of
Indian territory. The next and last part of this
?*Ibid.. p. 51. 45 chapter will deal with the actual border disputes of the period (1954-1958).
(PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE LEVEL - II)
While the official relations between the two countries were apparently friendly there erupted a series of disputes on their mutual boundary.
The dispute grew in seriousness as the years pro gressed. It should be remembered the dispute was carried on in confidential correspondence until it was released in 1959. This part of the chapter will discuss the middle sector of the border first because it was there that the dispute began and 75 then discuss the other sectors.
The first reported border incident took place
7SThe Sino-Indian border may be divided into three sectors: the Western, Middle, and Eastern sectors. The Western sector stretches from the Karakorum Pass to a few hundred miles east of Parigas. From this point east to the Nepal border is the middle or central sector. The Eastern sector covers the boundary line from Bhutan to the Burma border. 46 in mid 1954, less than three months after the sign ing of the Sino-Indian Panch Shila Agreement on
Tibet, On July 17, 1954 the Indian Government received the first of what was to be many diplo matic notes, protesting the presence of "Indian troops armed with rifles" who had "crossed the
Niti Pass and intruded into the Wu-je of the Ali area of the Tibet region of China." The Chinese further noted that this was not in conformity with principles of non-aggression and friendly 7R co-existence..." The Indian Government replied that the Chinese allegation was incorrect and that a party of Border Security Force was encamped on the Hoti which is southeast of the Niti border 77 pass and is in Indian territory.
The Bara Hoti (Wu-je) question of intrusion was not solved in 1954 and in June of the following
?®White Paper I, op. cit., p. 1.
??Ibid.. p. 3. 47 year the Indian Government informed the Chinese
Government that a party of Chinese troops had encamped in the Hoti Plain and that they had entered Indian territory without documents and requested their withdrawal.^® The Chinese
Government in response alleged that Indian 79 soldiers crossed into Wu-je of Tibet. The
Indians also informed the Chinese that they were unaware of the exact location of Wu-je, though the Counselor at the Chinese Embassy mentioned it was twelve kilometers north of the Tunjun La
Pass.®®
The dispute over Bara Hoti had Somehow leaked to the newspapers in India and the dispute caused much publicity and concern in India. With a move to allay public suspicion the Indian Government on November 11, 1955 stated Bara Hoti was not of
?®Ibid., p. 4.
?®Ibid., p. 5.
80Ibid., p. 6. 48 strategic or military importance and that it was uninhabitable. The news release stated the crux of the matter as the Indian Government saw it:
The Indo-Tibetan border is well defined. The question is merely one of fact, namely whether this small area of Bara Hoti lies north or south of the border pass. It is admitted by both sides that if the area is north of the border pass, it would lie in Tibet; and if it is south it would lie in India.
In the summer of 1956 the dispute over Bara
Hoti continued. In June the Indian Government stated a party of Chinese troops were preparing to cross the Tungjun la and go into India and the
Indian government instructed its personnel not to permit this party to trespass. 82 The Chinese in reply stated the roads were now passable and thus if the Governments of China and India sent troops into Wu-je as they did in 1955, they would confront
81 Chakravarti, op. cit., pp. 67-68, 82 Ibid., p. 12. 49 each other and a conflict might arise. The
Chinese government suggested a "joint investigation' and that both governments should avoid sending troops into the area.83 The Indian government accepted the joint investigation on Wu-je (Bara
Hoti) but according to a Chinese source still sent their troops into Bara Hoti.®^ In the latter part of the summer conversations were held which first revealed an apparent shift in the Chinese viewpoint on Bara Hoti. The Chinese government now viewed Bara Hoti as Chinese — whether it is in the north or south of the Tunjun la Pass.®®
The events of 1957 if any, at Bara Hoti are not known because no documents were released by either government for 1957. However the dispute continued in the summer of 1958. This time the
Indian government protested the Chinese policy of
^^Ibid., pp. 15-16.
Qe Ibid., pp. 30-32. 50 establishing outposts at Lapthal and Sangcha Malla
(both near Bara Hoti) in Indian territory. The establishment of outposts in Indian territory was a presage of a more militant position which would follow.
In 1956 when the Chinese government showed a conciliatory attitude toward the Bara Hoti question by suggesting the establishment of a joint investi gation, the Chinese crossed the Shipki La Pass some one hundred miles west of Bara Hoti.®® The diplomatic correspondence available refer to two incidents which took place at Hupsang Khad, a short distance south of Shipki La Pass, however the documents relating directly to these incidents have not yet been released.®?
In an area still further west <150 miles) from
Shipki La Pass lies the towm of Khurnak Port near
GGlbid., p. 17.
®?Ibid., pp. 18-19. 51
Pangong Tso Lake (which is in the western sector
of the border.) In July of 1958 the Indian govern ment protested the trespassing of Chinese troops
into this part of Indian territory. The trespass
ing in this area was part of a more militant
policy the Chinese were beginning. The militant
line became even more evident in 1959. 88
Still further west from Kharnak Fort in the western sector of the border is the region the
Chinese and Indians call Aksai Chin. In Aksai
Chin the Chinese surveyed the route of a road in
1956 and road construction commenced shortly after.
Peking announced completion of the road on October
5, 1957, although the exact alignment of the route was not specified. Reports of Chinese activity
had reached New Delhi in late 1957, but the rainy
season from May to August delayed the dispatch of
reconnaissance parties to the area until the spring
88 Ibid., p. 22. 52 of 1958. The question arises why the Indians were so late in learning of this road. This question can be explained by pointing out that the area is uninhabited and until 1958, the Indian authorities only sent up occasional reconnaissance parties.
With the closing of the Indian Consulate at Yarkand in 1951, trading parties stopped going into the area and also the Indian trading agency located in
Western Tibet and permitted under the 1954 Sino-
Indian Agreement, was allowed to operate only a
QQ few weeks of the year.
In the spring of 1958 the Indian government drew to the attention of the Chinese government the fact that :
a mortar road had been constructed across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the Jamma and Kashmir State...
®®Leo E. Rose, "Conflict in the Himalayas," Military Review, Feb. 1963, p. 6. 53
The Indian government requested information on the disappearance of an Indian patrol near Shinglung in Indian territory.The Chinese replied that on September 8th and 12th, Chinese frontier guards discovered and detained armed Indian personnel at
Tahungliutan and Kerzrekirekan on the "Sinkiang-
Tibet road in Chinese territory.
The extreme militant measures which were only taken in the Aksai Chin by the Chinese were an indication of the importance they attached to this area. The reason for this importance is the road through Aksai Chin is an important all-weather easily defended military supply line to Tibet.
The other Chinese military supply roads to Tibet are through mountaineous area which Invite ambush.
In this chapter the duality in Communist China's
®®Ibid., pp. 26-27.
®^Ibid.. p. 28. 54 foreign policy could be seen - friendly relations on the international level; severly strained relations on the confidential diplomatic level.
Also seen was the cartographic revision extensively practiced by the Chinese was also practiced in a more limited manner by the Indians. Also seen was that the border incidents which began in 1954 grew in intensity and number by 1958. The increased militancy of the Chinese in 1958 was to dominate the next period (1959-1961) of Sino-
Indian relations. III.
THE MILITANT PERIOD (1959-1961)
In 1958 there was a general hardening of the line in Chinese foreign policy and concurrent with this general hardening was a more militant attitude toward India. The beginning of this attitude toward India can be seen in the arrest and detention of Indian personnel in the Aksai Chin area in the spring of 1958. The formerly friendly official relations were rather quickly destroyed.
The Tibetan Uprising in March of 1959, The Kongka
La Incident, and the Indian government offer of political asylum to the Dalai Lama resulted in an abusive and extensive propaganda attack by China
(toward India). By the summer of 1959 relations were at a nadir and tension was high. Beginning with the Nehru-Chou Conference of April 1960, and the resulting establishment of an investigating -, border commission the tension somewhat eased.
As stated previously, Peking in 1958 adopted 56 a more militant line toward India, as well as with several other states. Two questions often asked were why did China change her general policy line, and then, specifically, change her policy towards
India.
An explanation of the first question lies in several events. The first is that at the 20th
Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956 Krushchev denounced Stalin. The Chinese were annoyed at this, and later allegedly charged Krushchev had undertaken the assault on Stalin without informing the Chinese and other bloc parties beforehand.
The delegate to the Congress, Chu Teh, spoke favor ably of Stalin — an indication that Peking did not know of the impending attack, or was seeking to head them off. Peking immediately sought to limit the attack on Stalin and to qualify the allegations against him, probably to protect Mao from possible charges that he was following in Stalin's mistakes and also to discourage any revisionist tendencies 57 within the bloc. Here lies the origin of the Sino-
Soviet dispute and the pursuit of a more independent 92 foreign policy by Communist China.
In 1957 it seems the Chinese made a reassessment of the world balance of power which was stimulated by Soviet advances in science and missiles. The
Chinese shift was apparent when in Moscow for the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution
Mao Tse-Tung stated:
There are now two winds in the world: the east wind and the west wind. There is a saying in China: "If the east wind does not prevail over the west wind, then the west wind will prevail over the east wind.* I think the characteristic of the current situ ation is that the east wind prevails over the west wind, that is, the strength of socialism exceeds the strength of imperialism.®®
®^Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962) pp. 42-46. QO Barnett, op. cit., p. 110. 58
The change in Chinese policy was probably also
prompted by some internal factors, Pentony argues
that the Fall of 1958 may be regarded as the turning
point in Chinese military preparations. Prior to
this time there were two contending military powers,
each with its own view on tactics and strategy.
One, centered around the General Staff of the
Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army wanted the creation
of a professional modern army, with all the latest
technical equipment. This group placed organization
and equipment as a first priority. The second, a more politically oriented military group, found its
supporters in the headquarters of the Army and had
Mao himself as a leader. The second group adhered
firmly to Mao's military doctrine, stressing the
importance of ideological and political factors.
The conflict ended in August and September of 1959 with a victory of the supporters of Mao which found
expression in changes in the headquarters and General
Staff of the People's Liberation Army. Defense 59
Minister P'eng Teh-huai had to relinquish his post
in favor of Lin PiaO and former Minister of State
Security Lo Jui-ch'ing was appointed Chief of the Q4 General Staff.
Also in late 1957 the CCP it seems assumed a more leftist and radical policy. The CCP moved from a relatively cautious economic policy based
on the Soviet model, to a frenzied one based on maximum exploitation of human labor power. The reason for this change was an attempt to industri
alize China at an even quicker pace than previously. 95
Thus, it may be argued that because of the tensions
created by the 20th Congress, the Soviet military
advance and domestic Chinese factors the Chinese
decided that a more militant foreign policy would
be successful at this time.
94 D, E, Pentony, ed., China, The Emerging Red Giant: Communist Foreign Policies (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), p. 157. 95_ Zagoria, op. cit., p. 150. 60
The answer to the second question of why the change in Chinese policy toward India lies in the nature of the Indian response to the Tibetan up rising against the Chinese in Tibet. Since 1956 there were scattered local rebellions of Tibetans in Kham and Amdo. The basic causes of the up rising in 1959 were: the Chinese practiced
"forced labor and compulsory exactions" on the
Tibetans and enforced a "systematic persecution of the people, plunder and confiscation of property belonging to individuals and monastaries and execution of certain leading men in^Tibet;"®® in addition there was a large influx of Chinese into Tibet which placed a burden on the Tibetan economy. It is reported that by mid-1959 food prices shot up as much as thirty times the previous q»7 prices. Still another basic cause of the
96 Chakravarti, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
®?Patterson, op. cit., p. 131, 61 rebellion was the chauvinism of the Chinese in
Tibet. In October, 1957, Fan Ming, a member of the Chinese Communist Tibetan Work Committee reported:
Great-Han chauvinism in Tibet is manifested in the feeling of superiority of the Han race, re pugnance at the backwardness of Tibet, discrimination against Tibet, distortion of Tibet, failure to respect the freedom of religious belief and traditional customs of the Tibetan people,.,®®
And the final cause was the Chinese disrespectful attitude toward the Buddhist Church and Dalai Lama.
It was Chinese policy to secularizethe personality 99 of the Dalai Lama as much as possible.
However, the immediate cause for the rebellion in Lhasa was the Chinese insistence that the Dalai
Lama attend a theatrical performance in the
98 Raj a Hutheesing, ed., Tibet Fights for Freedom (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1960), p. 22. 99 Ibid., pp. 19-33. 62
Chinese headquarters at Lhasa without his usual bodyguard.There was a rumor in Lhasa that the Chinese planned to kidnap the Dalai Lama at this performance.On March 10, the date of this performance, thousands of Tibetan people in front of the Norbulinka, the summer palace, prevented the Dalai Lama from going. The demonstrations in Lhasa on this date were anti-
Chinese in tone. On the fourteenth of March fighting broke out in the city, and the Dalai
Lama fled to India on the seventeenth. 102 The
Dalai Lama arrived in India on March 31 and accepted the Indian offer of political asylum.^®®
The Chinese immediately conducted propaganda campaigns against India. The New China News
^®®Hutheasing, op. cit., p. 37.
lOllbid., p. 41.
Ibid., p. 43.
10®Noel Barber, The Flight of the Dalai Lama (London: Hodder and Staughton, 1960), pp. 113-114. 63
Agency (Hsinhua) Issued a communique that the rebellion was "engineered by the Imperialists, the Chiang Kai-shek bandits, and foreign reaction aries; the command center of the rebellion was in
Kalimpong (a town in India)." The communique referred to the discussion of Tibetan affairs with the Indian Parliament as "impolite and improper" and interfering with the "internal affairs of a friendly c o u n t r y , when the Dalai Lama arrived in India Hsinhua reported that the Dalai Lama had entered India "under duress.
Warnings and threats to India were also not wanting. On April 24 the People's Daily proclaimed that the"Deputies (of the Second National People's
lO^Concerning the Question of Tibet (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1959), pp. 4-13.
•^^^Ibid., pp. 67-74. 64
Congress) of various nationalities give solemn
warnings to Indian expansionists." On April 25
the Peking radio solemnly warned: "British
imperialists and Indian expansionists had better
clarify their minds or they will suffer a tragic
end." On April 30 the People's Daily held out
the threat; "We give solemn warning to imperi
alists and Indian expansionists. You must stop
at once, otherwise you will be crushed to pieces
under the iron fist of 650 million Chinese people. "106
The Tibetan uprising and the subsequent Indian
offer of political asylum to the Dalai Lama were
the main causes for a worsening of Sino-Indian
relations. The military situation in Tibet
increased the importance of the Aksai Chin road to
the Chinese. The increased importance of this road
led the Chinese to a more militant position about
it and later, in October of 1959, led to an incident
10®Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 92, 65 at Kongka La (in Aksai Chin) which further worsened relations between the two countries.
Before discussing Sino-Indian relations over the boundary question during 1959-1961, a brief survey of the border incidents will be related.
In the summer of 1959 the Indian government protested, on July 30, "the presence of a Chinese armed detachment in Indian territory in the region of Western Pangong Lake in Ladakh area of the Jammu and Kashmir states," and also the Indian Government demanded the release of a reconnaisance party arrested in that same area.^®? The Chinese claimed the area the Indian personnel were found in was the
"Western part of the Tibet region of China.
In the summer of 1959 the border incidents con tinued in the middle section of Bara Hoti (Wu-je).
The Chinese protested Indian incursions in September.1®®
10?White Paper I, p. 38.
lOSibid., pp. 39-40.
lO^White Paper II. p. 7. 66
The problem of Bara Hoti continued in 1960 and
1961 with both nations claiming the other had
intruded into its territory.
In the summer of 1959 the border dispute
spread to a previously unaffected part of India
— the extreme eastern part from the top of Sikkim
to the tri-junction of India, Ohina, and Burma.
During the summer the Indian Government requested
the withdrawal of intruding Chinese troops from
Khinzemane^^^ and later the Chinese protested the repeated incursions into Chinese territory around
Shatze and Khinzemane. 112 In June a border
incident occurred at Migyitun with the Chinese protesting Indian incursion into the town of Migyitun,
The Indian Government immediately denied this 114 incursion. In August 1959 there was Chinese firing on an Indian post at Long j u — a few miles
^^®White Paper V , pp. 7, 9. ^^^White Paper I, p. 41,
ll^White Paper II, pp. 1-2. ^^®White Paper I, p. 34.
^^^Ibid.. pp. 35-36. 67
south of Migyitun. The Chinese claimed that the
Indians fired first^l® and the Indians claimed
the Chinese fired first.
The most serious incident of 1959 was the so-
called Kongka La Incident of October, which further worsened Sino-Indian relations. The Chinese
government reported that Indian troops intruded
into Chinese territory south of Kongka La Pass
(in the western sector) on two successive days,
(October 20 and 21) and on the latter day the
"Chinese reluctantly fired back after Indian troops
attacked their position.The Indian Government
denied that its troops attacked the Chinese
position but stated that the Indian police party
had "been subjected to sudden and aggressive
firing by Chinese forces.As a result of the
^^®Ibid.. p. 43. ll®Ibid., pp. 44-45
ll?White Paper II, p. 13.
ll®Ibid., pp. 14-15. 68 incident, several Indian personnel were killed.
The Indians who were captured by the Chinese were subject to very poor treatment. The Indian press severely criticized the Chinese for their action.1^®
Meanwhile, the Chinese press hardly mentioned the incident and tried to glance over it.^®®
In the summer of 1960 a new area of the eastern sector came into dispute. On July 29, the Indian
Government protested the intrusion of Chinese soldiers into "Indian territory in the Kameng
Frontier Division of NEFA."^®^ In September the
Government of India protested the incursion by
Chinese troops in the vicinity of Jelepla.Pass.^®®
In November and December the Chinese charged the
/ / ? C/if) , , V -i, • . o;. r iil 120 Survey of the China Mainland Press (Hong Kong: American Consulate General) October and November, 1959.
l®lwhite Paper IV, p. 6. 122 Ibid., p. 4. 69
Indians with incursions into Chinese territory around Kailu Pass (near Jelepla Pass in
Sikkim).The dispute continued in 1961 and in April the Indians protested Chinese intrusions in this area.^^^
Another new area of the eastern sector* which became subject to the dispute was the tri-junction of India, China, and Burma. On October 1, 1960, the Indian Government remarked that the new
Burmese-Chinese Boundary treated the exact location of the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary was not specified. The Indian Government stated that the "traditional boundary of India west of the Sino-Burmese boundary follows the watershed between D-chu in India and Lat-te in the Tibet region of China; and the Tri-Junction of India,
Burma, and China is five miles north of the Diphuk
IOC ^ ^White Paper V. p. 6.
124 Ibid., p. 11. 70
La Pass,,,"^®® The Chinese Government replied that the "traditional customary Sino-Indian boundary east of Bhiltan follows in the main the southern part of the Himalayas..."^®® The
Chinese later stated the boundary is not exactly marked because, "it involves the boundaries of
three states, it must and can only be formally
defined through agreement of all three govern ments. "127 jjj 1 9 6 1 both countries consistently maintained their previous positions.1®®
Now let us trace the relations of India and
China toward the border during the period from
1959 to 1961. In the last chapter Nehru was quoted as saying that he did not know what kind of surveys could effect these well-known boundaries,
On January 23, 1959 Chou En-lai answered Nehru's
statement in the first full statement of the
l®5lbid., p. 20. !®®Ibid., pp. 21-22.
l®?Ibid., pp. 25-26. ^^®Ibid., pp. 34-35, 37. 71
Chinese position on the border issue. Prime
Minister Chou first pointed to the fact that
"the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formerly delimited," He added that "historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been concluded between the Chinese
Central Government and the Indian Government."
Chou further added that:
because the boundary between the two countries is not yet formally delimited and some differences exist, it is un avoidable that there should be discrepancies between the boundaries drawn in the respective maps of both sides. On the maps currently published in our country, the Chinese boundaries are drawn in the way consistently followed in Chinese maps for the past several decades if not longer. We do not hold that every portion of this boundary line is drawn on sufficient grounds. But it would be inappropriate for us to make changes without having made surveys and without having con sulted the countries concerned."^®®
Chou elaborated on the Chinese position in a
!®®White Paper I. pp. 52-54. 72 later communication and stated, "...that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question." Chou felt that "Britain conducted extensive territorial expansion into China's Tibet region..." and as a result the Chinese Government cannot give "formal recognition to the situation created by the application of the British policy of aggression against China's Tibet region as the foundation for the settlement of the Sino»Indian boundary question.
In October of 1959 the incident at Kongka La occurred. The relations between the two countries became worse. The Chinese Government immediately made several propositions to improve the situation.
The Chinese Government proposed that;
In order to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two countries, to insure the
ISOpocuments on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), pp. 1-13. 73
tranquility of the border regions, and to create a favorable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question, the Chinese Govern ment proposes that the armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 kilometers at once from the so-called Mac Mahon line in the East, and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the West, and that the two sides undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their forces, but still maintain civil administrative personnel and unarmed police there for the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of order.
And also;
The Chinese government proposes that in order to discuss further the boundary question and other boundary questions in relations between the two countries, the Prime Ministers of the two countries hold taks in the immediate future.131
The Indian Government refused to accept the
Chinese proposal of withdrawing troops evenly, but instead suggested:
ISllbid., pp. 14-17. 74
that in the Ladakh area...the Govern ment of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government has shown as the international boundary to their 1956 maps.., Similarly, the Chinese Government should withdraw their personnel to the east of the International boundary which has been described by the Government of India in their earlier rules and correspondences and shown in their official maps. Since the two lines are separated by long distances, there should not be the slightest risk of border clashes between the forces on either side. The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area...132
Acceptance of the Chinese proposal would have seriously jeopardized Indian defense positions in
NEFA and would have given the Chinese control over
Aksai Chin. The Indian counterproposals pointed out that in the latter, there were no Chinese south of the Indian border except at Longj u and
132lbid., pp. 129-141. 75 that if the Chinese withdrew from there, no clashes could take place. Nehru's proposals about Ladakh would have surrendered Chinese control of the Aksai Chin Road. The Chinese
Government considered the Indian proposals unfair and thus not acceptable. 133
In Chou's letter of November 7, 1959, the
Chinese suggested that talks be held between
Chou and Nehru over the border dispute. Nehru felt that before any. meeting between the two men should take place it would be necessary that some preliminary steps be taken to insure a successful meeting. "Unless this is done, there is danger of the meeting not leading to a successful result, which we so much desire, and disappointing the hopes of millions of ,134 people in our two countries. Nehru
IS^Ibid., pp. 18-28.
^34ibid., pp. 129-141. 76 suddenly reversed this decision. What led to this decision to meet Chou is not known. It is possible that Nehru was unnerved about the Com munist propaganda capital which was being made about his refusal to meet Chou. It is more probable that Nehru changed his mind upon Soviet advice. Shortly before the shift in Nehru's policy President Element Voreshilov of the USSR,
Mr. F. R. Koslev, Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, and Madame Ye, a Deputy of the Supreme
Soviet came to India.
On April 19 Chou En-lai arrived in New Delhi with Marshal Chen Yi, Vice Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Chang Han-fu, Vice Foreign
Minister, and Mr. Chang Yen, Deputy Director of
Foreign Affairs in the State Council. Nehru and
Chou consulted for six days, and both refused to move from their fixed positions. After the talks
^^^Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 119. 77 had ended, the Chinese Prime Minister held a press conference in New Delhi at which he stated that he had sought unsuccessfully to obtain
Indian agreement to the following six points as a basis for further negotiations:
1. There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides. 2. There exists between the two countries a line of actual control up to which each side exercises administrative jurisdiction. 3. In determining the boundary between the two countries, certain geographi cal principles, such as watersheds, river valleys, and mountain passes, should be equally applicable to all sectors of the boundary. 4. A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples toward the Himalayas and the Karakoram Mountains. 5. Pending a settlement of the boundary question between the two countries through discussions, both sides should keep to lines of actual control and should not put forward territorial claims as pre-conditions, but indi vidual adjustments may be made. 6. In order to insure tranquility on the border so as to facilitate the discussions, both sides should continue to refrain from patroling along all 78
1 sectors of the boundary.
A joint communique issued on April 25 admitted
that the talks did not succeed in resolving the
differences between the two parties. However, the
two Ministers agreed to set up a commission of
officials of the two governments who should "meet
and examine, check and study all historical docu ments, records, maps, and other materials relevant
to the boundary question.. .and draw up a report
for submission to the two governments."^37
The two official teams met first at Peking in
June and July of 1960, and then at New Delhi during
August and September, and finally at Rangoon during
November and December 1960. Reaching an agreement
on the agenda was the first task facing the con
ference and proved to be a difficult one. The
136pigher, et. al., op. cit., pp. 89, 90.
137Ministry of External Affairs, Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question, p. 1. 79
Chinese and Indians disagreed both on objectives and procedure. The Chinese representative proposed three points as the basis for the agenda :
1. Whether the Sino-Indian boundary had been formally delimited; 2. the location and terrain features of the traditional boundary and its basis; and 3. the line of present actual control between the two c o u n t r i e s . ^38
The Indians considered the first and third points beyond the competence of the conference and they argued that:
The core of thfe problem for the officials was to ascertain the location of the alignments claimed by the two govern ments and then for both sides to bring forward evidence to sustain the claims where it overlapped with the alignment of the other to vindicate that it was of actual Indian or Chinese territory — as the case may be. The question of actual control was unconnected with the task of deciding as to which country had legitimate title to the area claimed by the o t h e r . ^39
138ibid., p. 5.
139ibid., p. 6. 80
The Indians then offered a counterproposal, suggesting that the agenda comprise the following topics for each of the three sectors of the boundary:
Location and natural features of the Sino-Indian boundary; basis in treaties and agreements. Basis in tradition and custom. Basis in administration and jurisdiction. Miscellaneous.140
This Indian proposal was later accepted.
Another question which presented a problem was the exact extent of the borders to be discussed.
The Indians argued for a discussion of Sikkim's and
Bhutan's boundaries with China. The Chinese success fully refused to discuss these boundaries,
Also, the Chinese persisted in their efforts to introduce their basic tenets — namely that the Sino-
Indian border in its entirety had never been formally delimited and that there was only a "traditional customary line" between the two countries which still
140ibid., p. 7.
14libid., p. 11. 81 required delimitation. The Indian representatives refused to discuss this question, and considered it beyond the purview of the conference. Nevertheless the Indian Government did have to take into account several treaties and thus the question of delimitation.
One tactic which annoyed the Indians was the
Chinese tendency to confuse delimitation and demarca tion as two interchangeable t e r m s . ^^3 Also, the significance of natural features in the formation of boundaries was another point the Indians and Chinese representatives could not agree on. The Indians relied heavily on the watershed principle while the
Chinese argued that:
Geographical features have a certain bearing upon the formation of a traditional customary line, but they are by no means the only or decisive factor.. .Therefore, as a rule, the natural features of a traditional
^^^Fisher, et. al., op. cit., p. 93,
^43ibid., p. 93. 82
customary line follow different natural features in different sectors in accordance with the actual situation throughout the years of administrative jurisdiction and activities of the inhabitants of a country, and there is no reason why it should precisely run along the single feature of water sheds.
The Final report submitted by the representatives to their respective countries were actually two reports — a Chinese and an Indian report. The reports contained a plethora of geographic and historical information. It is beyond the purview of this theme to discuss the validity of the material presented. However, the most striking contrasts were the differences in approach — the Indians presented a thorough and careful case supported by
630 documents, whereas the Chinese seemed careless in the presentation and sustance of their case and
^^^Ibid., p. 94. 83 produced only 245 documents to support their case,
(see Note) If the Chinese made such a careless presentation, why did they insist on holding border talks? The most plausible reason is that the
Chinese felt a need to counter the unfavorable publicity throughout Asia that had accompanied their brutal suppression of the revolt in Tibet, and their border problem with India. By advocating border talks, they could play a role of a psrty seeking peaceful means to settling a dispute, while at the same time the approach used by the Chinese to the
Indians precluded any actual settlement. The Chinese probably expected to use the report as a basis for a
145j|inistry of External Affairs, Concluding Chapter of the Report of the Indian Officials on the Boundary Question (New Delhi: Government of India, 1961), p. 7. Note: See Fisher, op. cit.. Chapter XI, for a discussion of the documents submitted at these meetings. 84 propaganda campaign which would make it appear that
China had a well documented case and India only relied on a legacy from British imperialism. The
Indians immediately published the reports which tended to lessen the impact of the Chinese propa ganda campaign. Nonetheless, China's willingness to hold border talks did relieve some of the acute tension in South Asia.
Relations between China and India remained tense in 1961, The border dispute spread to new areas of the Indian frontier. In July of 1961
R. K. Nehru, Secretary General of the External
Affairs Ministry visited Peking. Prime Minister
Nehru explained the purpose of the trip as to "find out the trend of Chinese thinking on the official report on the border dispute." Nehru emphasized that he was not entrusted to carry out any negotiations. While in Peking, Secretary Nehru
l^Gpisher, et, al., op. cit., p. 127, 85 % spoke to Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-chi, and Chen Yi.
In general, Indian observers thought that India
had gained nothing by Nehru's stopover in C h i n a . ^^7
On December 2 the deadline for requesting any
extension of the Sino-Indian trade agreement of
1954 passed without either party requesting an
extension. Without an extension, the agreement was due to expire in June 1962, eight years after
the ratification. On December 3, the Chinese
suggested the countries conclude a new trade treaty.148
The Chinese wished to separate the trade treaty from
the border events; however the Indians refused to 140 disassociate the two items.
This chapter has tried to explain the reasons
for changes in Chinese foreign policy in 1958/59 and
then briefly survey the various border disputes from
^^"^Ibid,, p, 133.
148white Paper VI. p. 188.
et. al., op. cit., p. 145. 86
1959 to 1961, In this period we see the areas in dispute increasing in number as well as in severity.
For example, the whole NEFA region came into dispute at this time. The final section of this chapter — an outline of Sino-Indian relations — revealed a rapid and vast deterioration in relations, primarily due to the Tibetan Uprising, the Indian offer of asylum to the Dalai Lama, and the Kongka
La Incident. The Chinese and Indian proposals for less tensions on the border were almost total failures. The Nehru-Chou conference of 1959 and the border talks of 1960 seemed to lessen tension along the border only minutely. The Chinese main tained a strong militency force during this period.
The epilogue of these will relate how the Chinese militency increased and finally erupted in a full- scale war for a short time in 1962. IV.
CONCLUSIONS
To date there is no settlement in sight between
China and India over their common frontier. It is probable that there will be no settlement in the near future unless one of the parties offers some major concessions and this seems unlikely.
A question often asked is why did China abandon her former policy of apparent friendship with India and adopt a hostile policy toward her.
The following viewpoints are not meant to be mutually exclusive (with the exception of the first), but mutually supporting.
One of the many answers to this question, by far the least likely, is that the shift in Chinese foreign policy was laid to the Indian sympathy and assistance to the Tibetans and the Indian Govern ment's offer of political asylum to the Dalai Lama during the 1959 Tibetan Uprising. This point of view is disproved by the various notes exchanged 88 between China and India preceding which showed that the location of the boundary was previously in disagreement.
Another widely held view, more sophisticated than the previous, was that the adoption of an aggressive attitude by China (in Indian eyes) was to cover up the failures of the commune and the other failures in China's domestic economy. With the adoption of the "aggressive" policy the
Chinese people's attention would be diverted to an external matter. Also the proponents of this view claimed that the Chinese Communist leaders thought that a side effect of a more militant
Chinese policy toward India would be a subverting of India's economic development by diverting funds 150 to the military establishment.
Still another viewpoint of the boundary dispute is that China is following her traditional policy of expansion. Whenever there was a strong Dynasty
Indian Express, December 16, 1961. 89
(Tang, Yuan, early Manchu) there were persistent attempts by the Chinese to expand territorially and to spread Chinese culture. The Chinese
Communists represent a strong, "dynasty" in China which has greater territorial ambitions than any previous dynasty. This is because China is seized with a revolutionary zeal. The Chinese Communists feel they must reshape the world in the Communist image. As good Communists the Chinese believe in the inevitability of the world revolution and the ultimate triumph of Communism in the world. Coupled with Communistic revolutionary zeal is the great
Han chauvinism. The Han chauvinism is reflected in the independent position China assumes vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, in the ideological dispute with the Soviet Union and the superior attitude felt by the Chinese people toward the barbarians (non-Han in a cultural sense) and also the sense of pride in
China's historical past. 90
Still another viewpoint is that Peiping wants to prove to the world it is not a satellite of
Moscow. Communist China was annoyed at Premier
Krushchev's friendly Indian policy and the promotion of peace with the U. S., a country that steadfastly refuses to recognize and trade with Communist China. 151
Another plausible explanation of why the boundary dispute took place lies in the fact that the Chinese wish to intimidate the nations of
Southeast Asia such as Burma, Malaya, Thailand, and the Indo-China States, long considered prime Com munist targets. The Chinese believe that by exposing the military weakness of India the nations of South and Southeast Asia will be more amenable to Chinese designs. Coupled with the above explanation is the desire of the Chinese to show the world that they are the strongest Asian country as well as a great world power.
^^^Editorial, New York Times, October 31, 1959, 91
A second question which many people ask is what is China driving for in this border controversy?
Some believe that the Chinese have as a long term goal the subjugation of the border peoples and eventually the proponents of this viewpoint believe that with the border areas in China's possession, with their strategic approach to India, a revolution could be fermented in India in a manner similar to the events in South Viet Nam and Laos. The proponents further cite that West Bengal, contigious with part of the border region is>a "hotspot" of
Communist influence and could easily be turned into an Indian Yenan with the border region in Chinese . 152 possession.
A more critical analysis of this question will reveal varying aims for various time periods. The border dispute can be divided into three phases.
The first phase began in 1949 and can be called the exploratory phase. In this phase the Chinese first.
152^jitorial, Daily News, September 6, 1959. 92 saw the strategic (military) and mineral (mainly gold) potential of the western portion of Tibet,
The second phase began in 1956 with the revolt of the Khams in Tibet where the main Chinese supply roads were located. These roads were in mountainous areas and thps liable to ambush. The Aksai Chin
Road surveyed in 1956 and construction started in
1957, was an easily defended, all weather road to
Tibet, The importance of this road was indicated by one, the militancy of the Chinese in that area in 1958, and second, in 1959 it was rumored the
Chinese offered to swap their claims for the NEFA for Aksai Chin. The Indian Government was unwilling to accept this type of settlement.
The third phase of the dispute began in 1959 after the Chinese realized that the Aksai Chin could not be obtained through peaceful negotiations, the Chinese evolved a more militant policy. This phase of the dispute can be called the expanding phase. The border incidents in 1959 and later 93
Increased in intensity and number. Also the
Chinese claims to Indian territory increased in 153 1960, In June 1960 the Chinese produced a new map incorporating an additional 3000 miles of
Ladakh. This new map altered the boundary previously shown between Ladakh and Sinkiang in the important Karakoram Pass area, and the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet in the vicinity of Pangong and Spanggur lakes. Also during the 1960 joint investigation boundary discussions, the Chinese refused to discuss with India the boundaries of the two Indian protectorates, Sikkim and Bhutan, hinting they did not recognize Indian claim to these areas.
However, the future phases of the disputes may find
Chinese narrowing or expanding their claims on disputed territory depending on international con ditions and Chihese domestic conditions.
The long term goal of China on the border dispute
lG3pisher, et. al., op. cit., pp. 129-130. 94 is tied up with the general Chinese aim to dominate
South and Southeat Asia. The refusal of the Chinese to discuss the boundaries, Sikkim and Bhutan with
India, the increase of Chinese influence and economic aid to Nepal, as well as the steady in filtration of the former Indo-Chinese states are indicators of this long term aim. EPILOGUE
The following is a survey of the events of
the Sino-Indian border dispute during 1962. During
that year the Chinese made incursions into the
Western and Eastern Sectors of the border. The overall Indian military situation improved as com munications were improved. In 1962 the Indians set up new military posts which "leap-frogged" Chinese posts in an effort to block potential Chinese lines of advance and hinder supply and communication
lines. As a result of these tactics Nehru reported
in August, 1962, control had been regained over nearly 2500 square miles of the 12,000 square miles previously lost to the Chinese. 154
Early in January the Chinese intruded into the
Longju area. In April and May there were numerous
Chinese incursions into the Chip Chap area of 155 Ladakh. In May India tried to relieve the tensions
^^^Fisher, et. al., op. cit., p. 131.
135india News, January 26, 1963, p. 11, 96 on the border by urging the Chinese to consider
Nehru's proposal of November, 1959, for the with drawal of Indians in Ladakh to west of the boundary line shown on the Chinese maps of 1956 and of the
Chinese forces withdrawal east of the boundary as shown on official Indian maps. The Indian Govern ment stated in a note that it would permit "pending negotiations and settlement of the boundary question, the continued use of the Aksai Chin road for
Chinese civilian traffic." This note could hardly have been given serious consideration by the
Chinese because the Aksai Chin road is primarly a military road and surrendering it in return for a guarantee of only civilian use was definitely not acceptable to the Chinese. In June it was reported that the Chinese were building branch roads south of the Aksai Chin road in Ladakh.As border activities were more widely extended into the
^36Ibid., p. 11. 'à \ 97 disputed areas, tbe livelihood of resort to violence increased. W July Indian outposts in the Galwan
Valley of Ladakh were encircled by Chinese troops.
Here the Indians stood their ground and finally 157 after several tense days the Chinese retired.
Professor Fisher in her new book believes that this event marks a critical point in the Ladakh border controversy. The Chinese were put on notice that a mere display of superior force would not of itself permit them to consolidate control of the
Aksai Chin. The Incident suggested that not only were future significant Chinese moves in Ladakh unlikely to succeed without resort to force, but the maintenance of the Chinese position would soon
require armed a c t i o n .
157 Ibid., p. .3.
^^^Fisher, et. al., op. cit.. p. 132. 98
This author does not believe that this incident
was as crucial as Professor krcontends. The
Chinese saw the continued build-up of communications,
supplies, and troops all through late 1961 and 1962.
The new residency of the Indian military was
exemplified by the leap-frog technique and the
rescinding of the order in early 1962 that Indian
troops must be fired on first before they could re
turn the fire. Thus this incident in the Galwan
Valley was only another manifestation of this new
Indian resiliency.
In September the Chinese concluded aggressive patrolling in the Thagla region of NEFA. In
October a Chinese detachment was sent across the
Mac Mahon line and established a post, close to
an Indian post at Dhola, two miles south of the
frontier. The Indian government order to eject the intruders was then called by the Chinese "an attack upon China." Professor Fisher and others feel that if no firing had occurred at Dhola, the 99
159 Chinese would have sought provocation elsewhere.
On October 20, the Chinese started full scale military activities in Ladakh and in the NEFA.
Within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities the Chinese had launched a three pronged attack on
Indian positions in Ladakh. One column crossed the harder in the vicinity of Daulat Beg Oldi; another came across 100 miles east of Pangong
Lake; the third crossed still another 100 miles southeast at Demchok. The Chinese invasion followed the pattern of a week of attack, three weeks lull in the fighting and then another week of attack.^®®
In the NEFA area the Chinese also launched a three pronged attack. One column attacked Thaga
159 Fisher, et. al., op. cit., p. 135.
^®®Maharaj K. Chopra, "The Himalayan Border War An Indian Military View.y Military Review, May 1963, pp. 11-13. 100
La in the Western portion of NEFA; another attacked
Langju in the center of the NEFA; and the third attacked Kibito in the eastern part of NEFA.
In the NEFA Indian forces were forced to with draw. The character of the invasion followed the pattern of Ladakh — a week of attack; a three week lull; and then a week of attack.
On November 21 the Chinese suddenly and uni laterally issued a self-imposed condition of cease fire. The cease fire stated that Chinese troops in the Ladakh and the NEFA would withdraw 20 kilo meters to the north and east of what was termed
"the line of actual control" as of November 7,
1959. India was warned to withdraw its forces an equal distance to the south and west of the 1959 line under threat of renewal of hostilities. The
Indians on December 1, suggested a return to the
^^^Ibid., pp. 13-14. 101
line of September 8, 1962.^®^ Why this difference
in dates? At first glance, it might appear that the Chinese were offering to give up the fruits of
three years penetration into territory claimed by
India. Actually the Indian military position had
improved considerably from what it had been in
1959.
Meanwhile the Indians under the pressure of a
Chinese attack urgently requested military supplies
from the Western powers. The response to India's
need was immediate and large amounts of supplies were sent by the Western states, particularly the
United States and Great Britain.
On December 10, after the Chinese ceasefire was
in effect, six non-aligned Colombo nations (Burma,
Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia, and the United
Arab Republic) met at Colombo, Ceylon to discuss
169 India News, January 26, 1963, p. 1.
India News, January 4, 1963, p. 8. 102 the Chinese-Indian border dispute. Thi5 group worked out a compromise solution and Mrs. Ban- daranarke of Ceylon, as a representative of the six nations, in the beginning of 1963 discussed these proposals first with Chou En-lai and then with Nehru,
New York Times, January 25, 1963. Note: These proposals called for the withdrawal of Chinese troops behind the frontiers in Northeastern India and 20 kilometers behind the maximum line of advance in Ladakh province of Kashmir. Chou En-lai stated that the Chinese Government would accept the Colombo proposals with two interpretations: (1) Indian troops should keep their ex isting military position along the entire Slno-Indian border and not to the western sector alone and (2) that after the 20 kilometers with drawal from the line of actual control of November 7, 1959 certain areas in dispute i. e., the Che Dong area, Longju, Wuje, and the western sector the Chinese would refrain from sending civilian authorities if the Indians did the same. Peking Review, February 1, 1963, p. 5. The Indians accepted the proposals 'in toto*. These proposals would have allowed Indian troops to reoccupy evacuated areas in both NEFA and Ladakh. New York Times, January 1963, 103
Concurrently with fighting on the frontier the
Pakistan Government quietly came to an agreement 165 with China on its common frontier on December 27.
These negotiations were begun in 1959 but the
Chinese at that time were not primarily interested in these talks and wished to wait and see how the
Indian border talks progressed. However, by the spring of 1962 the Chinese were pressing for talks with Pakistan — a sign which reflected the Ififi deterioration on the Sino-Indian frontier. A
Sino-Pakistan boundary treaty was concluded in
February of 1963.
The events of 1962 on the Sino-Indian border point in only one direction — it will be a long time before peace and tranquility reign on the boundary between China and India.
India News, January 1963.
IGGpisher, et. al., op. cit., pp. 139-142. 104
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Sanghvi, Ramesh. India's Northern Frontier andChina. Bombay: Contemporary Publishers, 1962.
Sen, Chanakya. Tibet Disappears. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960.
Shen, Tsung-lien and Liu, Shen-chi. Tibet and the Tibetans. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953. Ill
Sherrlng, Charles A, Western Tibet and the British Borderlands. London: Edward Arnold, 1906.
Steiner, H, A. "India Looks to her Northern Frontier.” Far Eastern Survey, 1959.
Tang, Peter S. H, Communist China Today. Vol. I. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957.
Thomas, Lowell Jr. The Silent War in Tibet. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959.
Thomas, Lowell Jr. Out of th±s World. New York: Greystone Press, 1950.
Tuker, Frances. Gorkha, Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal. London: Constable and Company, Inc., 1957.
Waddell, L, A. Buddhism of Tibet. Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd., 1958.
Walker, R. L, China Under Communism. New Haven: Yale University, Press, 1955.
Walker, R. L, The Continuing Struggle. New York; Athene Press, 1958.
Wang, Chun-hing. A Simple Geography of China. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1958.
Williams, E, T. Tibet and Her Neighbors. Berkeley: University of California Publications, 1937,
Younghusband, Sir Francis. India and Tibet. London: John Murray, 1910.
Zagoria, Donalds. The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. 112
PERIODICALS
Ber reman, Gerald. "Peoples and Cultures of the Himalayas," Aslan Survey, June, 1963, pp. 289- 304.
Clubb, O. E. "China's Drive Toward Empire,V Progressives. Oct., 1959, pp. 21-24.
Clubb, O. E. "Soviet vs. Chinese Communism," Military Review, Nov., 1961, pp.
Field, Alvin. "Bhutan, Kham, and the Upper Assam Line," Military Review. Jan., 1960, pp. 92-100.
Frazer, John E, "Struggle for the Himalayas," Reader's Digest. Jan. 1962, pp. 170-176.
"Himalayas-Struggle for the Roof of the World, " Time, April 6, 1962, pp. 28-37.
Johnson, Ray G. "Exploring a Siaso Wonderland of Wild West China, " National Geographic Magazine, June, 1944, pp. 713-742.
"Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute," China Quarterly, July/Sept., 1960; Jan./March., 1961; April/June, 1961.
Leng, Shao-chuan. "India and China, " Far Eastern Survey, May 21, 1952, pp. 73-78.
I*%yner, Norman D. "Trans-Himalayan Confrontation, " Orbis. Winter, 1963.
Patterson, George. "Recent Chinese Policies on Tibet and Toward the Himalayan Border States, " China Quarterly, 12 (Oct. - Dec. 1962), pp. 191-202. 113
"Paying the Price of Befriending Red China," U« S, News and World Report, Nov, 16, 1959, pp. 68^70.
Rao, K. Krishna. "The Sino-Indian Border Question and International Law," International and Comparative Law Quarterly. April, 1962, pp. 375- 415.
"Red China's Game in India - Grab First, Then Talk," Ü. S. News and World Report. Nov. 23, 1959, pp. 46-47.
Rose, Leo E. "Conflict in the Himalayas," Military /" Review, Feb. 1963, pp. 3-15.
Rose, Leo E. "Himalayan Border States: Buffers in Transition," Asian Survey Feb. 1963.
Rose, Leo E. "Sino-Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan Border States," Orbis, 2 (July 1961), pp. 198-215.
Thompson, Donald. "China and Tibet," Royal Central Asian Journal, XLIX (July-Oct. 1962) pp. 66-
Tolstoy, Ilia. "Across Tibet from India to China," National Geographic Magazine, Aug. 1946, pp. 169- 222.
Varma, S. N. "Trends in India's Foreign Policy," Aspects of India's Foreign Relations, New Delhi: Indian Council on World Affairs, 1957.
Whittam, Daphne E. "Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty," Pacific Affairs, Summer, 1961, pp. 174-183.
NEWSPAPERS
"China Denounces Nehru on Border," New York Times^ Dec. 7, 1961. 114
Grimes, Paul. "China's Acts Anger and Bewilder India," New York Times. Oct. 31, 1959.
Grimes, Paul. "Nehru Border Dilemma Grows," New York Times. Nov. 14, 1959.
Hamilton, Thomas J. "Peiping Actions Spears India- Pakistan Amity, " New York Times. Jan. 16, 1960.
Lindsay, Michael. "Chinese Puzzle: Mao's Foreign Policy," New York Times Magazine. Oct. 12, 1958.
New York Times. Dec. 2, 1950.
Trumbull, Robert, "India vs China in Southeast Asia," New York Times, Nov. 16, 1961. 115
POLITICAL MAP OF INDIA
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