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Composition of the Tuidang Movement

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Tradition and Dissent in China: The Tuidang Movement and its Challenge to the Communist Party By Caylan Ford BA (Hon.) in History, 2008, University of Calgary A thesis submitted to The faculty of The Elliott School of International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree of Master of Arts May 15 2011 Thesis directed by Bruce J. Dickson Professor of Political Science and International Affairs © Copyright 2011 by Caylan Ford All rights reserved ii Abstract Tradition and Dissent in China: The Tuidang Movement and its Challenge to the Communist Party In the fall of 2004, a series of editorials appeared in a Chinese dissident newspaper run by Falun Gong adherents in the United States. The editorials served as the catalyst for what may be the largest dissident movement in China in over two decades. The movement, known as Tuidang (“withdraw from the party”), has seen as many as tens of millions of Chinese citizens publicly denounce the Communist Party. Unlike the student movement of 1989 or the more recent Charter 08—both of which embraced the language of western democracy—the Tuidang movement employs distinctly Chinese language and meaning that is more Confucian than humanist. The movement calls to revive traditional moral virtues and to cast off the ‘foreign’ ideology of Communism, which is portrayed as antithetical to true Chinese values, human nature, and universal laws. The Tuidang movement offers an alternative ideology that is at once compelling and accessible, and levels a potent challenge to the Communist Party’s claim over Chinese nationalism. This study seeks to answer four basic questions about the Tuidang movement. First, it analyzes the ideological origins behind the movement, and seeks to discover what it has to say about issues like governance, morality, and nationalism. Second, it endeavors to shed light on the inner workings of the Tuidang movement, and illuminates the methods and motivations of its activists. Third, it makes use of a sample of Tuidang statements to assess who the movement’s participants are, the nature of their grievances with the party, and the personal significance the movement has for them. Finally, I examine the direct and indirect responses to the Tuidang movement from Chinese officialdom in an effort to determine what, if any, impact the movement has had on contemporary Chinese politics. The study finds that the Tuidang movement, driven by the efforts of Falun Gong adherents, has become a formidable challenge to both the Communist Party’s legitimacy and what remains of its official ideology. The party appears to agree with this conclusion, describing the struggle to suppress the movement as a matter of its very survival and responding accordingly. The war now being waged between Falun Gong practitioners and the Communist Party is a battle to control the critical symbols of morality, tradition, and nationalism. It is a struggle for the very heart of China. iii Table of Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... iii List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ v List of Tables ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. vi CHAPTER ONE: Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Protest and Dissent in 21st Century China ......................................................................................................................................................................... 6 The Logic of Legitimacy ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 13 Research Challenges ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 19 Approach and Key Findings ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 24 CHAPTER TWO: From Tiananmen to Tuidang .............................................................................................................................. 31 The Qigong Boom ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 31 The Rise of Falun Gong .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 33 End of the Qigong Era ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 38 Challenges to Communist Party Legitimacy .................................................................................................................................................................. 39 Escalation of Tensions: 1996 - 1999 ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 43 Suppression and Response ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 48 Analyzing Jiuping ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 56 CHAPTER THREE: Evolution and Organization of the Tuidang Movement ............................................. 64 Digital Tools of Dissemination ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 67 The Tuidang Activists ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 69 International Network ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 74 Inside China ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 75 Assessment ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 79 CHAPTER FOUR: Composition of the Tuidang Movement ............................................................................................ 82 Statements from China ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 90 Demographics ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 92 Geographic Distribution ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 94 Party Affiliations ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 95 Grievances with the Party .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 96 Ideological Orientation ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................
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