Refugee Review Tribunal

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: CHN32643 Country: Date: 21 November 2007

Keywords: China – Australia – Pro-democracy groups – – Monitoring of activist groups

This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.

Questions

1. Please provide a succinct update regarding the PRC authorities’ known/suspected monitoring of pro-democracy and Falun Gong protest activities in . 2. Sources suggest that the PRC expects most to have economic motives, but that they may pursue those that they (actually) believe to be dissidents or similar. Do any reports suggest that attendance at protests, etc, is sufficient to arouse adverse attention?

RESPONSE

1. Please provide a succinct update regarding the PRC authorities’ known/suspected monitoring of pro-democracy and Falun Gong protest activities in Sydney.

DFAT have consistently noted that it is likely that activists who have participated in protest activities against the Chinese government, including members of pro-democracy, Falun Gong and Uighur nationalist organisations, will be monitored and questioned or detained on their return to China. This view is supported by Amnesty International, Chinese government defectors and some Australian academics. In DFAT’s opinion such a person’s treatment on return to China will depend upon their profile and their attitude on return.

In 2000, DFAT advised that “it is very likely that Chinese authorities would be seeking to obtain information on prominent Falungong practitioners / leaders abroad.” (DIMIA Country Information Service 2000, Country Information Report No. 58/00 – Update Information on Falun Gong, (sourced from DFAT advice of 4 February 2000), 7 February – Attachment 1). Similarly in May 2006, DFAT advised it is likely that Uighur activists are monitored and that “The more involved the individual had been in a Uighur organisation outside of China, the more likely that China became aware of the individual’s activities” (DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/18 – China: Return of Australian Uighur Association Members, (sourced from DFAT advice of 26 May 2006), 26 May – Attachment 2). Here is the text of the DFAT assessment:

A.1. It is not possible to say definitively how Chinese authorities would treat a particular individual who returned to China after being involved in a Uighur group in Australia. It is likely that the Chinese authorities seek to monitor Uighur groups in Australia and obtain information on their membership and supporters. On return to China, it is likely that the authorities would at least put such people under surveillance and might detain them for interview.

Whether the person would face more serious consequences could be influenced by whether China perceived the person’s activities outside of China as amounting to criminal activities. China regards separatist activities (eg calling for Xingjian’s independence from China) as criminal, regardless of whether the person was in China or in another country when he or she carried out such activities. In determining what constitutes separatist activity, China does not make a significant distinction between non- violent political calls for Xinjiang independence and advocacy of violence (although the latter would likely attract more severe punishment).

…

A.2. As noted above, the consequences for the individual on return to China would be related to his or her level of involvement with the organisation outside of China, as well as the individual’s behaviour on return to China. The more involved the individual had been in a Uighur organisation outside of China, the more likely that China became aware of the individual’s activities (with repercussions as outlined above) (DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/18 – China: Return of Australian Uighur Association Members, (sourced from DFAT advice of 26 May 2006), 26 May – Attachment 2).

In addition, there are a number of DFAT opinions which note that the activities of an activist overseas could affect their treatment on return, and these carry the clear implication that the Chinese authorities monitor and are aware of the activities of activists in Australia:

• In November 1999 DFAT noted that:

It is likely that any member of a pro-democracy group who returned to China and engaged in political activity would come to the attention of the authorities, but would be unlikely to be arrested and charged unless the individual ignored warnings from the authorities and continued to engage in political activity. If this occurred, any previous political activities of the individual abroad would probably be included in the authorities’ case against that individual. (note, this sentence differs from our past assessment, (CX38530) as the threshold for government action against China Democracy Party activists seems to have been lowered during the course of 1999. (DIMIA Country Information Service 1999, Country Information Report No. No.3956/99 Pro-democracy group in Australia (sourced from DFAT advice of 20 October 1999), 9 November – Attachment 3).

• In March 2002 DFAT advised that:

As far as we are aware, the likely treatment of Tiananmen-era returnees would depend to a large degree on their behaviour on return, as well as on the nature and extent of their involvement in protest activities abroad. Individuals who took a leading role in protests overseas would likely be monitored by local public security authorities on return (provided, of course, that they were aware of the individual’s return). Official interest would be ongoing if those authorities assessed that an individual was likely to continue political agitation while in China (DIMIA Country Information Service 2002, Country Information Report No. No. 61/02 Treatment on return of demonstrator (sourced from DFAT advice of 12 March 2002), 12 March – Attachment 4).

• In September 2006, DFAT advised that “If practitioners have played an active role in Falun Gong organisations overseas, the Chinese authorities are more likely to take an interest in their cases.” (DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/53 – China: Return of failed asylum seekers, (sourced from DFAT advice of 14 September 2006), 15 September – Attachment 5).

• In March 2007, DFAT advised that:

Authorities could, however, treat the person more severely if he or she was quoted publicly as criticising China’s regime or senior leadership in the media. If, for example, the person had been an active, outspoken member of one of these groups and had publicly called for the end of Communist Party rule in China, he or she would be more likely to be put under surveillance and possibly detained on return to China. At the extreme, the person could be criminally prosecuted, for example under Article 105 of China’s Criminal Law, which prohibits “incit[ing] others by spreading rumours or slander or any other means to subvert State power or overthrow the socialist system.” (DIAC Country Information Service 2007, Country Information Report No. CHN8990 – CIS Request CHN8980: China: Publication of client details, (sourced from DFAT advice of 20 March 2007), 22 March – Attachment 6).

On the monitoring of political dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners overseas, Amnesty International in Canada reported in June 2005 that:

The China research team at our international secretariat has informed us that while they do not have verifiable evidence that the Chinese authorities monitor the activities of Chinese activists overseas; including Uighur and Tibetan nationalists, political dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners; it is their view that it is highly likely that monitoring takes place.

The China Coordinator for Amnesty International Canada maintains close ties to the Chinese community in exile in Canada. She has been informed numerous times by a variety of diaspora/dissident groups in Canada; Falun Gong, Han Democracy groups, Tibetans, Uighurs; that any public activity they hold is monitored by PRC Embassy officials, with photographs taken of participants. While Amnesty International is not able to verify the surveillance claims, the reports we receive of surveillance activities are frequent, from reliable sources and consistent. (Amnesty International Canada 2005, Amnesty International concerns on Uighur asylum seekers and refugees, June, p.4 – Attachment 7).

In 2005, two Chinese officials, Chen Yonglin and Hao Fengjun, defected in Australia. They both claimed that China had an extensive network to monitor Falun Gong and other anti- Chinese activists in Australia.

Chen Yonglin was a Consul for Political Affairs of the Consulate-General of China in Sydney, who worked in the Chinese Consulate-General in Sydney from 2001 to 26 May 2005. In his testimony to the United States Congress Committee on International Relations, Chen noted the various measures the Consulate took to contain the Falun Gong in Sydney (Chen, Yonglin 2005, ‘Testimony of Chen Yonglin at the United States Congress Committee on International Relations hearing “Falun Gong And China’s Continuing War On Human Rights”‘, 21 July, pp.34-43 http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/22579.pdf – Attachment 8). These included monitoring Falun Gong activities:

Strictly controlling and monitoring the Falun Gong activities. The Consulate has informed the Russian Consulate-General in Sydney twice about the main list of the Falun Gong practitioners, and the latter helped to intercept a number of the Falun Gong practitioners who wanted to enter Russia in the period while Jiang Zemin were visiting Russia. … Each year, there are over 20 Falun Gong practitioners intercepted by the Chinese Consulate, who want their visas or Chinese passports to be renewed. For those Chinese nationals who want to extend their passports, the Consulate normally confiscates their passports. There are some local Chinese and Chinese students encouraged to mix with the Falun Gong practitioners for the purpose of collecting information, and the award will be some cultural performance tickets, dinners, gifts and cash. (p.38)

Chen, in an earlier interview claimed that “my job in the consulate actually is to monitor the activities of pro-democracy activities, and Falun Gong practitioners while they have public assembly, and I sometimes take photo of them and they also can see I was there and they take photo of me, too.” (‘Chinese defector details spy claims’ 2005, Australian Broadcasting Corporation Lateline Programme, 20 June http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2005/s1396471.htm – Accessed 20 November 2007 – Attachment 9). He also makes the claim in this interview that there are 1,000 secret agents and informants working with the Chinese Consulate in Australia.

Hao Fengjun, a 32-year-old Chinese police intelligence analyst who defected shortly after Chen in 2005, has claimed that a Chinese spy organisation called “Special Force” operated in Australia:

While the Secret Force’s main job was to gather political and military information, it also closely monitored Falun Gong and other religious or Chinese democracy groups. Mr Hao knows all this because he worked for the “” in the National Security Bureau in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin. His job, he said, was to collate and analyse intelligence reports sent back from Australia, the US, Canada and New Zealand about Falun Gong and other groups. (Hughes, G. and Allard, T. 2005, ‘Fresh from the Secret Force, a spy reports on China’, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 June http://www.smh.com.au/news/National/Fresh-from-the- Secret-Force-a-spy-reports-on-China/2005/06/08/1118123901298.html – Accessed 17 November 2006 – Attachment 10).

Dr John Fitzgerald, professor in Asia-Pacific Studies at the Australian National University, has supported Mr Chen’s claims that Chinese activists are monitored in Australia (Fitzgerald, John 2005, ‘A lesson in diplomacy’, Australian Policy Online, 21 June http://www.apo.org.au/webboard/print-version.chtml?filename_num=12165 – Accessed 21 November 2007 – Attachment 11). He gives the following information on China’s informant network in Australia:

The size and impact of the Chinese informant network in Australia reaches far beyond the small cohort of cloak and dagger intelligence operatives who are based in embassies, consulates, information bureaus, travel agencies and other legitimate businesses. Like the old East German Stasi informant system, China’s informant network is built on the benign principles of neighbourhood watch under the less benign supervision of paid operatives. These operatives gather and file information from a large number of formally recruited informers and informal volunteers in Australia, who report on their fellow students and working colleagues, before passing it on to higher authorities in the intelligence system back in China. It is estimated that one in 50 East Germans was an unpaid Stasi informant. With 40,000 to 50,000 visitors from China in Australia at any one time, one thousand informers in Australia is well within the range of plausibility. And given the flexible scalability of the operation, Chen Yonglin’s estimate of 1000 informants in Australia as likely underestimates as overstates the extent of the informant network at any point in time.

The system has been functioning since diplomatic relations were first established in 1972, a time when Australian intelligence agencies were equally active in recruiting spies and informants to keep an eye on Australians in China. The scale was modest. This changed exponentially after the massacre of 1989. The Chinese informant network in Australia expanded to the point of recruiting a significant proportion of Chinese visitors to the country. These recruits informed embassy and consular officials about people the security services placed under surveillance, and occasionally carrying message back from officials to harass Chinese-Australian citizens.

The system soon came to embrace the principle of plausible deniability. Throughout the 1990s, Chinese-Australian democracy activists were warned that their families in China would suffer if they attended public rallies in this country. Non-Chinese academics were pointedly advised that their universities’ educational programs in China would suffer if they spoke at the same rallies. In some cases warnings were issued directly by consular officials. So a professor at Monash University, Bruce Jacobs, was warned that his access to China could be restricted if he spoke out. But in many cases warnings were conveyed through intermediaries whose roles could plausibly be denied by officials carrying diplomatic passports even though the intermediaries claimed unequivocally to speak on their behalf. These messages conveyed the impression that Chinese officials in this country would not hesitate to threaten Chinese-Australians if they stepped out of line. At no point however could Chinese officials be charged with exercising undue influence in conveying this message to Australian citizens and residents.

The rate of informal surveillance picked up apace after the Falun Gong crackdown in 1999. Colleagues at universities in Australia advise that many of their academic visitors from China were summoned to meetings with local security forces on the eve of their departures from China and told who to contact and who to avoid among Chinese-Australians they might run across in the street. Under the circumstances this was sensible advice given that the visitors would fall under surveillance themselves if they happened to meet up with a suspect person who was already under surveillance. The same visitors were invited to report back on their return to China about any suspicious activities they observed among Chinese-Australians.

… Chinese Foreign Affairs officers are hauled over the coals on their return to China if they have not fulfilled their quota of dossiers on Falun Gong practitioners and dissidents …

In 2003, Br Benamin Penny, author of a number of articles on the Falun Gong, gave this opinion on whether Falun Gong protesters were being photographed by the Chinese Consulate in Sydney:

Practitioners believe they are being photographed. … It would surprise me if Chinese government employees in Australia had not indeed photographed the demonstrations taking place outside their missions. I would be reasonably confident that members of the Chinese community in Australia would be able, and some might be willing, to identify the people in the photos. Practitioners certainly believe that not only are they identified but that the mission has information on (at least) their places of residence and home phone numbers – some have apparently received phone calls from unidentified Chinese people warning them off taking part in anti-government activities. (Penny, Benjamin 2003, Questions and Answers on the Falun Gong movement, 22 September, Q.7 – Attachment 12). 2. Sources suggest that the PRC expect most to have economic motives, but that they may pursue those that they (actually) believe to be dissidents or similar. Do any reports suggest that attendance at protests, etc. is sufficient to arouse adverse attention?

The reports cited in Question 1 indicate that attendance at protests, etc. is likely to arouse adverse attention. No other information was located on this question.

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Government Information & Reports Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada http://www.irb.gc.ca/ UK Home Office http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk US Department of State http://www.state.gov/ Investigation into Mr Chen Yonglin’s claims http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/fadt_ctte/asylum/report01/index.htm. United Nations (UN) UNHCR http://www.unhchr.ch/ Non-Government Organisations Amnesty International website http://www.amnesty.org/ Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/ International News & Politics BBC News website http://news.bbc.co.uk/ Search Engines Google search engine http://www.google.com.au/

Databases: FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIMA Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. DIMIA Country Information Service 2000, Country Information Report No. 58/00 – Update Information on Falun Gong, (sourced from DFAT advice of 4 February 2000), 7 February. (CISNET China CX39773)

2. DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/18 – China: Return of Australian Uighur Association Members (sourced from DFAT advice of 26 May 2006), 26 May. (CISNET China CX154325)

3. DIMIA Country Information Service 1999, Country Information Report No. No.3956/99 Pro-democracy group in Australia (sourced from DFAT advice of 20 October 1999), 9 November. (CISNET China CX38758) 4. DIMIA Country Information Service 2002, Country Information Report No. No. 61/02 Treatment on return of demonstrator (sourced from DFAT advice of 12 March 2002), 12 March. (CISNET China CX62843)

5. DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/53 – China: Return of failed asylum seekers, (sourced from DFAT advice of 14 September 2006), 15 September. (CISNET China CX161676)

6. DIAC Country Information Service 2007, Country Information Report No. CHN8990 – CIS Request CHN8980: China: Publication of client details, (sourced from DFAT advice of 20 March 2007), 22 March. (CISNET China CX174138)

7. Amnesty International Canada 2005, Amnesty International concerns on Uighur asylum seekers and refugees, June.

8. Chen, Yonglin 2005, ‘Testimony of Chen Yonglin at the United States Congress Committee on International Relations hearing “Falun Gong And China’s Continuing War On Human Rights”‘, 21 July, pp.34-43 http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/22579.pdf

9. ‘Chinese defector details spy claims’ 2005, Australian Broadcasting Corporation Lateline Programme, 20 June http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2005/s1396471.htm – Accessed 20 November 2007.

10. Hughes, G. and Allard, T. 2005, ‘Fresh from the Secret Force, a spy reports on China’, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 June http://www.smh.com.au/news/National/Fresh-from-the- Secret-Force-a-spy-reports-on-China/2005/06/08/1118123901298.html – Accessed 17 November 2006.

11. Fitzgerald, John 2005, ‘A lesson in diplomacy’, Australian Policy Online, 21 June http://www.apo.org.au/webboard/print-version.chtml?filename_num=12165 – Accessed 21 November 2007.

12. Penny, Benjamin 2003, Questions and Answers on the Falun Gong movement, 22 September, Q.7.