DOCSLIB.ORG

China – Australia – Pro-Democracy Groups – Falun Gong – Monitoring of Activist Groups

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
China – Australia – Pro-Democracy Groups – Falun Gong – Monitoring of Activist Groups Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: CHN32643 Country: China Date: 21 November 2007 Keywords: China – Australia – Pro-democracy groups – Falun Gong – Monitoring of activist groups This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. Please provide a succinct update regarding the PRC authorities’ known/suspected monitoring of pro-democracy and Falun Gong protest activities in Sydney. 2. Sources suggest that the PRC expects most to have economic motives, but that they may pursue those that they (actually) believe to be dissidents or similar. Do any reports suggest that attendance at protests, etc, is sufficient to arouse adverse attention? RESPONSE 1. Please provide a succinct update regarding the PRC authorities’ known/suspected monitoring of pro-democracy and Falun Gong protest activities in Sydney. DFAT have consistently noted that it is likely that activists who have participated in protest activities against the Chinese government, including members of pro-democracy, Falun Gong and Uighur nationalist organisations, will be monitored and questioned or detained on their return to China. This view is supported by Amnesty International, Chinese government defectors and some Australian academics. In DFAT’s opinion such a person’s treatment on return to China will depend upon their profile and their attitude on return. In 2000, DFAT advised that “it is very likely that Chinese authorities would be seeking to obtain information on prominent Falungong practitioners / leaders abroad.” (DIMIA Country Information Service 2000, Country Information Report No. 58/00 – Update Information on Falun Gong, (sourced from DFAT advice of 4 February 2000), 7 February – Attachment 1). Similarly in May 2006, DFAT advised it is likely that Uighur activists are monitored and that “The more involved the individual had been in a Uighur organisation outside of China, the more likely that China became aware of the individual’s activities” (DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/18 – China: Return of Australian Uighur Association Members, (sourced from DFAT advice of 26 May 2006), 26 May – Attachment 2). Here is the text of the DFAT assessment: A.1. It is not possible to say definitively how Chinese authorities would treat a particular individual who returned to China after being involved in a Uighur group in Australia. It is likely that the Chinese authorities seek to monitor Uighur groups in Australia and obtain information on their membership and supporters. On return to China, it is likely that the authorities would at least put such people under surveillance and might detain them for interview. Whether the person would face more serious consequences could be influenced by whether China perceived the person’s activities outside of China as amounting to criminal activities. China regards separatist activities (eg calling for Xingjian’s independence from China) as criminal, regardless of whether the person was in China or in another country when he or she carried out such activities. In determining what constitutes separatist activity, China does not make a significant distinction between non- violent political calls for Xinjiang independence and advocacy of violence (although the latter would likely attract more severe punishment). … A.2. As noted above, the consequences for the individual on return to China would be related to his or her level of involvement with the organisation outside of China, as well as the individual’s behaviour on return to China. The more involved the individual had been in a Uighur organisation outside of China, the more likely that China became aware of the individual’s activities (with repercussions as outlined above) (DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/18 – China: Return of Australian Uighur Association Members, (sourced from DFAT advice of 26 May 2006), 26 May – Attachment 2). In addition, there are a number of DFAT opinions which note that the activities of an activist overseas could affect their treatment on return, and these carry the clear implication that the Chinese authorities monitor and are aware of the activities of activists in Australia: • In November 1999 DFAT noted that: It is likely that any member of a pro-democracy group who returned to China and engaged in political activity would come to the attention of the authorities, but would be unlikely to be arrested and charged unless the individual ignored warnings from the authorities and continued to engage in political activity. If this occurred, any previous political activities of the individual abroad would probably be included in the authorities’ case against that individual. (note, this sentence differs from our past assessment, (CX38530) as the threshold for government action against China Democracy Party activists seems to have been lowered during the course of 1999. (DIMIA Country Information Service 1999, Country Information Report No. No.3956/99 Pro-democracy group in Australia (sourced from DFAT advice of 20 October 1999), 9 November – Attachment 3). • In March 2002 DFAT advised that: As far as we are aware, the likely treatment of Tiananmen-era returnees would depend to a large degree on their behaviour on return, as well as on the nature and extent of their involvement in protest activities abroad. Individuals who took a leading role in protests overseas would likely be monitored by local public security authorities on return (provided, of course, that they were aware of the individual’s return). Official interest would be ongoing if those authorities assessed that an individual was likely to continue political agitation while in China (DIMIA Country Information Service 2002, Country Information Report No. No. 61/02 Treatment on return of demonstrator (sourced from DFAT advice of 12 March 2002), 12 March – Attachment 4). • In September 2006, DFAT advised that “If practitioners have played an active role in Falun Gong organisations overseas, the Chinese authorities are more likely to take an interest in their cases.” (DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/53 – China: Return of failed asylum seekers, (sourced from DFAT advice of 14 September 2006), 15 September – Attachment 5). • In March 2007, DFAT advised that: Authorities could, however, treat the person more severely if he or she was quoted publicly as criticising China’s regime or senior leadership in the media. If, for example, the person had been an active, outspoken member of one of these groups and had publicly called for the end of Communist Party rule in China, he or she would be more likely to be put under surveillance and possibly detained on return to China. At the extreme, the person could be criminally prosecuted, for example under Article 105 of China’s Criminal Law, which prohibits “incit[ing] others by spreading rumours or slander or any other means to subvert State power or overthrow the socialist system.” (DIAC Country Information Service 2007, Country Information Report No. CHN8990 – CIS Request CHN8980: China: Publication of client details, (sourced from DFAT advice of 20 March 2007), 22 March – Attachment 6). On the monitoring of political dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners overseas, Amnesty International in Canada reported in June 2005 that: The China research team at our international secretariat has informed us that while they do not have verifiable evidence that the Chinese authorities monitor the activities of Chinese activists overseas; including Uighur and Tibetan nationalists, political dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners; it is their view that it is highly likely that monitoring takes place. The China Coordinator for Amnesty International Canada maintains close ties to the Chinese community in exile in Canada. She has been informed numerous times by a variety of diaspora/dissident groups in Canada; Falun Gong, Han Democracy groups, Tibetans, Uighurs; that any public activity they hold is monitored by PRC Embassy officials, with photographs taken of participants. While Amnesty International is not able to verify the surveillance claims, the reports we receive of surveillance activities are frequent, from reliable sources and consistent. (Amnesty International Canada 2005, Amnesty International concerns on Uighur asylum seekers and refugees, June, p.4 – Attachment 7). In 2005, two Chinese officials, Chen Yonglin and Hao Fengjun, defected in Australia. They both claimed that China had an extensive network to monitor Falun Gong and other anti- Chinese activists in Australia. Chen Yonglin was a Consul for Political Affairs of the Consulate-General of China in Sydney, who worked in the Chinese Consulate-General in Sydney from 2001 to 26 May 2005. In his testimony to the United States Congress Committee on International Relations, Chen noted the various measures the Consulate took to contain the Falun Gong in Sydney (Chen, Yonglin 2005, ‘Testimony of Chen Yonglin at the United States Congress Committee on
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Local Church – Reform Through Labour – Police – Black Lists – Medical Bail and Parole 8 January 2010
    Country Advice China China – CHN35881 – Fujian – Christians – Local Church – Reform through Labour – Police – Black lists – Medical bail and parole 8 January 2010 Questions 1 Please advise on the current treatment of Local Church members (Shouters) in Fujian province. Contrasting information was found in the sources consulted regarding the treatment of Local Church members in Fujian province. The following reports indicate improvements in the treatment of the Local Church within some parts of Fujian province: In February 2009 an elder of the Local Church in Melbourne advised that while the Local Church is viewed as illegal in Fujian province, the arrest of members has decreased. The Elder provided the following advice on the treatment of the Local Church in Fujian province: As we understand it, the local churches in China are viewed differently in each province. Certain provinces allow the local churches to register with the authorities and once they have done so, they are allowed to worship. However, in other provinces, including Fujian province, the local churches are regarded as illegal gatherings, however as we understand from some members who come from this province, there is not much arrests as before. There is now more dialogue between members of the local church and the authorities.1 A November 2008 report by the Country Research Section of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), China’s Protestants and Catholics, also reports on the increased tolerance of the Local Church by government authorities in some areas of Fujian. The report states that some Local Churches now operate legally in Fuzhou and several rural counties in Fujian.
    [Show full text]
  • The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle: a Strategic and Historical Analysis
    ICNC MONOGRAPH SERIES The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle: A Strategic and Historical Analysis Tenzin Dorjee ICNC MONOGRAPH SERIES Cover photos: (l) John Ackerly, 1987, (r) Invisible Tibet Blog SERIES EDITOR: Maciej Bartkowski John Ackerly’s photo of the first major demonstration in Lhasa in 1987 CONTACT: [email protected] became an emblem for the Tibet movement. The monk Jampa Tenzin, who is being lifted by fellow protesters, had just rushed into a burning VOLUME EDITORS: Hardy Merriman, Amber French, police station to rescue Tibetan detainees. With his arms charred by the Cassandra Balfour flames, he falls in and out of consciousness even as he leads the crowd CONTACT: [email protected] in chanting pro-independence slogans. The photographer John Ackerly Other volumes in this series: became a Tibet advocate and eventually President of the International Campaign for Tibet (1999 to 2009). To read more about John Ackerly’s The Power of Staying Put: Nonviolent Resistance experience in Tibet, see his book co-authored by Blake Kerr, Sky Burial: against Armed Groups in Colombia, Juan Masullo An Eyewitness Account of China’s Brutal Crackdown in Tibet. (2015) Invisible Tibet Blog’s photo was taken during the 2008 Tibetan uprising, The Maldives Democracy Experience (2008-13): when Tibetans across the three historical provinces of Tibet rose up From Authoritarianism to Democracy and Back, to protest Chinese rule. The protests began on March 10, 2008, a few Velezinee Aishath (2015) months ahead of the Beijing Olympic Games, and quickly became the largest, most sustained nonviolent movement Tibet has witnessed. Published by the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict The designations used and material presented in this publication do P.O.
    [Show full text]
  • The Falun Gong Factor
    CompassionISSUE 6 The Falun Gong Factor Why unsung acts of courage, from banners to broadcasts, are so important to understanding today’s China ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: Olympics unworthy? China’s Gestapo Chinese courts A defector’s confessions About This Editon For several years now, participants in one of the largest grassroots campaigns of civil disobedience the world has known have quietly informed fellow Chinese citizens about the brutal persecution unfolding in their own backyards. They are the practitioners of Falun Gong (or “Falun Dafa”), and at great personal risk have labored to right a tremendous wrong. Part of the Falun Gong’s effort has been to provide the outside world, on a daily basis, with priceless eyewitness accounts from inside China. These accounts tell of a suppression that permeates every facet of Chinese society. What emerges is a uniquely candid look at how the suppression of Falun Gong, as with the group’s determined resistance, impacts the Chinese people and nation, if not larger world. This edition of Compassion tells a tale at once sobering and hopeful. As the distinguished historian Ar- thur Waldron points out in his introductory essay, the campaign, for all its brutality, is failing to crush the Falun Gong. The campaign has seen new, horrific twists in recent times, however, as argued in unsettling detail by David Matas; chief among them is organ harvesting from living Falun Gong adherents. Sarah Cook sheds much-needed light, meanwhile, on the little-known entity charged with executing the nation- wide suppression—the 6-10 Office. Yet we have occasion for optimism, in spite of all this, in the movement of astounding size and vigor that has emerged in China among the Falun Gong, as described in “Righteous Resistance.” And this, de- spite enormous, yet seldom described, legal challenges set before the Falun Gong; Clive Ansley unravels for us the dubious system that is China’s courts.
    [Show full text]
  • IB # 366-New Text
    JUNE 2020 ISSUE NO. 366 Australia-China Relations: The Great Unravelling NAVDEEP SURI ABSTRACT Over the last three decades, Australia and China have established mutually beneficial economic ties. However, Australia’s decision to ask for an independent enquiry into the origins of SARS-CoV-2, which causes COVID-19, has led to a backlash from China. This brief examines the more important developments since 2015 that persuaded Australia to take measures aimed at protecting both its open economy and its democratic polity against China’s systematic campaign to expand its influence. The brief describes various case studies including the attempts by the Chinese Communist Party to use Australia’s large Chinese community to support its foreign policy objectives, its attempts to secure strategic economic assets in Australia, and its efforts to use corrupt practices for recruiting politicians who would support its agenda. Attribution: Navdeep Suri, “Australia-China Relations: The Great Unravelling,” ORF Issue Brief No. 366, June 2020, Observer Research Foundation. Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a public policy think tank that aims to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed analyses and in-depth research, and organising events that serve as platforms for stimulating and productive discussions. ISBN 978-93-90159-20-8 © 2020 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. Australia-China Relations: The Great Unravelling INTRODUCTION reaction from China. Australia has held firm in its response to threats of economic coercion, Over the last three decades, China and causing concern in business circles about the Australia have developed a mutually new dynamics of the relationship.
    [Show full text]
  • Australia: Background and U.S
    Order Code RL33010 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Australia: Background and U.S. Relations Updated April 20, 2006 Bruce Vaughn Analyst in Southeast and South Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Australia: Background and U.S. Interests Summary The Commonwealth of Australia and the United States are close allies under the ANZUS treaty. Australia evoked the treaty to offer assistance to the United States after the attacks of September 11, 2001, in which 22 Australians were among the dead. Australia was one of the first countries to commit troops to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In October 2002, a terrorist attack on Western tourists in Bali, Indonesia, killed more than 200, including 88 Australians and seven Americans. A second terrorist bombing, which killed 23, including four Australians, was carried out in Bali in October 2005. The Australian Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, was also bombed by members of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) in September 2004. The Howard Government’s strong commitment to the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq and the recently negotiated bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Australia and the United States have strengthened what were already close ties between the two long-term allies. Despite the strong strategic ties between the United States and Australia, there have been some signs that the growing economic importance of China to Australia may influence Australia’s external posture on issues such as Taiwan. Australia plays a key role in promoting regional stability in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.
    [Show full text]
  • Australia Sidelines Taiwan, 2001–2007 the Australian Government
    CHAPTER FIVE AUSTRALIA SIDELINES TAIWAN, 2001–2007 The Australian government received some respite from the demands of the US-China-Taiwan triangle due to the “post 9/11 détente” between the United States and China following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US.1 In addition, as Stuart Harris earlier noted, Australia could “more easily pay the alliance price in distant areas than within the region.”2 Australian support for the US in Iraq and Afghanistan assisted Canberra in re-orientating Australian policy towards a strong compre- hensive alliance with the US, while simultaneously resisting the adoption of a common approach with Washington towards Beijing over Taiwan.3 The Australian government also had more space to maintain its silence during Sino-American standoffs.4 With the US more accommodating of such Australian “defections” over issues with China and Chinese demands vis-à-vis Taiwan, Australia found itself extraordinarily free to oblige Beijing in sidelining Taiwan. This was particularly important to the Chinese gov- ernment with President Chen Shui-bian challenging China’s goal of uni- fication during this period. As a result—for a brief period at least—the Australian government was able to move simultaneously closer to both the US and to China.5 Australia Has its Cake and Eats it Too Unlike the profound shift of the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War, post-9/11 cooperation merely moderated strategic competition between the US and China. Beijing had earlier launched a “diplomatic 1 From: Ibid., p. 7. 2 Harris, Will China Divide Australia and the US?, p.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Annotated Bibliography of Liu Xiaobo's Texts in Chronological Order
    1 Annotated Bibliography of Liu Xiaobo’s Texts in Chronological Order Year Chinese Title English Title Category 04/1984 艺术直觉 On Artistic Intuition 关系学院 学 1 1984 庄子 On Zhuangzi 社科学战线 05/1985 和冲突 – 中西美意的差别 Harmony and Conflicts – Differences between Chinese 京师范大学 and Western Aesthetics 学 07/1985 味觉说 Theory of Taste 科知 Early 1986 种的美思潮 – 徐星陈村索拉的 A New Aesthetic Trend – Remarks Inspired by the Works 文学 2 部作谈起 of Xu Xing, Chen Cun and Liu Suola (1986:3) 04/1986 无法回避的思 – 几部关知子的小说 Unavoidable Reflection – Contemplating Stories on 中 / MA 谈起 Intellectuals (EN 94) Thesis 03/10/1986 机，时期文学面临机 Crisis! New Era’s Literature is Facing a Crisis (FR) 深圳青 10/1986 李厚对 – Dialogue with Li Zehou (1) 中 1986 On Solitude (EN) 家 1988:2 1 th Zhuangzi was a Chinese Daoist thinker who lived around the 4 century BC during the Warring States period, when the Hundred Schools of Thought flourished. 2 Shanghai writer Chen Cun (1954-) and Beijing writers Liu Suola (1955-) and Xu Xing (1956-) who expressed contempt for the formal education of the mid-1980s and its pretention. Liu Xiaobo responded to a conservative attack on 'superfluous people' by defending these three writers who were popular in 1985 and who would be also attacked in 1990 as “rebellious aristocrats” whose works displayed a “liumang mentality.” He wrote a positive interpretation of their way of “ridiculing the sacred, the lofty and commonly valued standards and traditional attitude.” He also drew a connection between traditional “individualists” such as Zhuangzi, the poet Tao Yuanming (365-427 CE) and the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove (竹林七) as related to this modem trend of irreverence.
    [Show full text]
  • MA Roche (Chairperson) RPG Haines QC
    REFUGEE STATUS APPEALS AUTHORITY NEW ZEALAND REFUGEE APPEAL NO 76536 AT AUCKLAND Before: M A Roche (Chairperson) R P G Haines QC (Member) Counsel for the Appellant: K Gore Appearing for the Department of Labour: No Appearance Date of Hearing: 16 & 17 August 2010 Date of Decision: 15 November 2010 REASONS FOR DECISION [1] This is an appeal against the decision of a refugee status officer of the Refugee Status Branch (“RSB”) of the Department of Labour (“DOL”) declining the grant of refugee status to the appellant, a national of China. INTRODUCTION [2] The appellant first arrived in New Zealand in December 2000 on a student permit. Between December 2000 and October 2009 the appellant completed a course of study in New Zealand and worked in accordance with the terms of work permits she was issued. She returned to China for visits to her family in 2003 and 2005. Following the decline of her application for permanent residence in New Zealand she claimed refugee status on 2 October 2009 on the basis that she was at risk of being persecuted in China because of her involvement with the Falun Gong movement. Following an interview on 6 November 2009 her refugee status claim was declined in a decision dated 6 May 2010 leading to her present appeal. [3] The appellant is a Falun Gong practitioner and for several years was the co- 2 ordinator for Falun Gong in Rotorua. She claims that the combination of her activities on behalf of Falun Gong (including her participation in public protests during the visit of the Deputy Premier to New Zealand in June 2010), her involvement with the Epoch Times newspaper, and her involvement with the Shen Yun Performing Arts Group will have made her a person of interest to the Chinese authorities.
    [Show full text]
  • Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa
    Responses to Information Requests - Immigration and Refugee Board of C... http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/ResRec/RirRdi/Pages/index.aspx?doc=454185 Home > Research Program > Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests (RIR) respond to focused Requests for Information that are submitted to the Research Directorate in the course of the refugee protection determination process. The database contains a seven-year archive of English and French RIRs. Earlier RIRs may be found on the UNHCR's Refworld website. 2 October 2012 CHN104187.E CHN104187.E China: Monitoring of Chinese citizens who practice Falun Gong (Falun Dafa) outside of China; consequences upon return to China (2008-2012) Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa 1. Monitoring of Chinese Falun Gong Practitioners in Canada Two representatives of the Falun Dafa Association of Canada (FDAC) stated that the Chinese authorities monitor practitioners of Falun Gong in Canada (FDAC 12 Sept. 2012; ibid. 18 Sept. 2012). In 21 September 2012 correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Vice-President of the FDAC in Toronto stated that the Chinese Embassy and Consulates in Canada keep "blacklists" of all known Falun Gong practitioners. Additionally, in a telephone interview with the Research Directorate on 12 September 2012, an Ottawa-based representative of the FDAC explained that the authorities send people to observe, take photos of, and "attempt to intimidate" practitioners with their presence at public Falun Gong activities (FDAC 12 Sept. 2012). In correspondence sent to the Research Directorate on 18 September 2012, the Toronto FDAC Vice-President wrote that Chinese agents taking photos at Falun Gong events "run away" when approached (FDAC 18 Sept.
    [Show full text]
  • Australia's Second China Challenge
    ISSUE: 2018 No. 20 ISSN 2335-6677 RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS Singapore | 10 April 2018 Australia’s Second China Challenge Malcolm Cook* EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • Over the last quarter-century, the challenge posed by Australia’s deepening economic ties with China for Australian strategic interests and policies has dominated security-related discussion of the bilateral relationship. • In the last year, for the first time in the post-Cold War era, domestic security concerns about alleged Chinese state and proxies’ efforts to influence inappropriately Australian society and politics have become a major media and political focus. • These domestic security concerns are more nebulous, politically sensitive and prone to domestic partisanship than the strategic ones. • Australia’s strategic concerns with China motivated greater Australian security engagement with Southeast Asian states and ASEAN. These recent domestic security concerns may enhance Australian engagement with some Southeast Asian states * Malcolm Cook is Senior Fellow at ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. 1 ISSUE: 2018 No. 20 ISSN 2335-6677 “The Government is concerned about growing attempts by foreign governments or their proxies to exert inappropriate influence on and to undermine Australia’s sovereign institutions and decision-making.” 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Australian Government, page 75. ECONOMIC ORIGINS1 Economically, Australia has benefitted significantly from China’s post-Cold War rise. Australian trade statistics underline how deep this commercial relationship has become. In 2016-17, China accounted for over a quarter of total Australian merchandise trade, close to a third of total merchandise exports, and over four-fifths of Australian exports of iron ore.
    [Show full text]
  • Report Title - P
    Report Title - p. 1 of 410 Report Title A guide to Oriental classics. Prepared by the staff of the Oriental studies program, Columbia College and ed. by Wm. Theodore de Bary and Ainslie T. Embree. (New York, N.Y. : Columbia University Press, 1964). A plan for the prince : the Ming-i tai-fang lu of Huang Tsung-hsi. Translated and explained by William Theodore de Bary. (New York, N.Y. : Columbia University, 1953). Diss. Columbia Univ., 1953. [Huang, Zongxi. Ming yi dai fang lu]. A select list of books on the civilizations of the Orient. Ed. by W.A.C.H. Dobson. (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1955). [WC] A source book in Chinese philosophy. Transl. and compiled by Wing-tsit Chan. (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1963). A, Xiu. Pfauenprinzessin und Prinz : nach einem Volksepos des Tai-Volkes. [Übersetzt von Eva Müller]. (Peking : Verlag für fremdsprachige Literatur, 1961). [Zhao shu tun he nan ruo na]. [Mul] A, Ying. Eluosi he Sulian wen xue zai Zhongguo. (1956). In : A Ying quan ji ; vol. 2. [Russian and Soviet literature in China]. [Gam2] A, Ying. Yibusheng di zuo pin zai Zhongguo. In : Wen xue cong bao ; no 17 (1956). [Ibsens Werke in China]. [Ibs115] Abegg, Lily. China und Vietnam. (Einsiedeln : Benziger, 1967). (Offene Wege ; 6). [WC] Abegg, Lily. Im neuen China. (Zürich ; Freiburg i.B. : Atlantis Verlag, 1957). [Reise unter der Organisation von Intourist von Hong Kong nach Guangzhou, Beijing, Xian, Chongqing, Wuhan, Mandschurei, Lanzhou bis Tianjin]. [Cla] Abegg, Lily. Vom Reich der Mitte zu Mao Tse-tung. (Luzern ; Frankfurt a.M. : Bucher, 1966).
    [Show full text]
  • Submissions That I Might Not Otherwise Have Been Able to Safely Venture
    SUBMISSION TO THE SENATE INQUIRY INTO ASYLUM AND PROTECTION VISAS FOR CONSULAR OFFICIALS Introduction 1. I thank the Committee for the invitation extended to make a submission in relation to the following terms of reference: (a) The response of Department of Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Attorney-General's Department and their respective Ministers to Mr. Chen Yonglin's approaches or requests to the Australian Government for asylum and/or a protection visa; (b) The application of the Migration Act 1958, its regulations and guidelines concerning the maintenance of confidentiality for any consular officials or staff (including Mr. Chen Yonglin, and any other former consular officials or staff) who were applicants for territorial asylum and/or protection visas by Department of Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and their respective Ministers; (c) The involvement of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Minister in the deportation, search and discovery of Vivian Solon, and; (d) any related matters 2. This submission addresses paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) of the Committee’s Terms of Reference. 3. All clients quoted in this submission have, with the exception of now un- contactable West Papuan clients, expressly allowed me to quote or cite their experiences. In every case, except for Mr Chen Yong Lin and Ms Chen Hong, those persons were, or are, my clients and, as such, any waiver of legal professional privilege with respect to their statements is limited only to that divulged in this submission. Chen Yong Lin who is providing testimony in support of related Falun Gong legal proceedings has approved of my references to him, likewise Chen Hong.
    [Show full text]