Australia Sidelines Taiwan, 2001–2007 the Australian Government
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CHAPTER FIVE AUSTRALIA SIDELINES TAIWAN, 2001–2007 The Australian government received some respite from the demands of the US-China-Taiwan triangle due to the “post 9/11 détente” between the United States and China following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US.1 In addition, as Stuart Harris earlier noted, Australia could “more easily pay the alliance price in distant areas than within the region.”2 Australian support for the US in Iraq and Afghanistan assisted Canberra in re-orientating Australian policy towards a strong compre- hensive alliance with the US, while simultaneously resisting the adoption of a common approach with Washington towards Beijing over Taiwan.3 The Australian government also had more space to maintain its silence during Sino-American standoffs.4 With the US more accommodating of such Australian “defections” over issues with China and Chinese demands vis-à-vis Taiwan, Australia found itself extraordinarily free to oblige Beijing in sidelining Taiwan. This was particularly important to the Chinese gov- ernment with President Chen Shui-bian challenging China’s goal of uni- fication during this period. As a result—for a brief period at least—the Australian government was able to move simultaneously closer to both the US and to China.5 Australia Has its Cake and Eats it Too Unlike the profound shift of the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War, post-9/11 cooperation merely moderated strategic competition between the US and China. Beijing had earlier launched a “diplomatic 1 From: Ibid., p. 7. 2 Harris, Will China Divide Australia and the US?, p. 50. 3 Blumenthal, “Strengthening the U.S.-Australian Alliance: Progress and Pitfalls,” pp. 1, 5. 4 Wesley, “Australia-China,” p. 77. 5 White, The US, Taiwan and the PRC: Managing China’s Rise: Policy Options for Australia, p. 7. 78 chapter five counter-offensive to compete with the US in the Asia-Pacific region,”6 “using its economic influence and great power potential to try to weaken U.S. leadership in Asia,” with Australia a target of that strategy.7 Beijing appears to have misinterpreted Australia’s attempts to move closer to Beijing as being a direct result of this strategy, and hence at the expense of the US. According to a former Chinese diplomat posted in Australia, Chen Yonglin, the Chinese government was using economic means to com- pel Australia to give ground on security issues, and turn Australia into “a country like France, that can implement a policy to say no to the United States.”8 To effect its policy “China has aggressively wooed Australia, send- ing its finest diplomats, building up cultural exchanges, offering a stra- tegic partnership, and aggressively promoting the importance of China’s demand for natural resources to the Australian economy.”9 An element of this “charm offensive” was the prospect of an Australia- China free trade agreement (FTA). In October 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Australia and signed an agreement commencing work by both sides on studying the potential for a free trade agreement.10 During that visit, in what The Australian’s Paul Kelly grandly labeled a “symbolic turning point in our history,” Hu became the first non-American leader to address a joint sitting of the Australian federal parliament. Adding to the symbolic significance for Kelly, this occurred a day after President Bush had also addressed a joint sitting.11 In his address, Hu urged Australia to play “a constructive role” in the peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan, stressing that the threat to regional peace came from pro-independence elements on the island.12 As noted by Blumenthal, Australia’s reliance on mineral exports provided a 6 Tow and Hay, “Australia, the United States and a ‘China Growing Strong’: Managing conflict avoidance,” p. 45. 7 Blumenthal, “Strengthening the U.S.-Australian Alliance: Progress and Pitfalls,” p. 5. 8 Chen Yonglin managed to “defect” to Australia in May 2005 despite the Australian government’s reluctance. Quote from: Sheridan, “Chinese Human Rights Abuse a No-Go Zone.” 9 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press (2007), p. 214. 10 Diplomacy Monitor, “China, Australia near FTA Talks,” 22 March 2005, http://www .diplomacymonitor.com/stu/dm.nsf/dn/dn071DEB728AE2D35C85256FCC0058C63D. 11 Paul Kelly, “Poised Between Giants,” The Australian, 23 July 2005, http://www.the australian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,16015221%255E12250,00.html. 12 Patrick Goodenough, “China’s Taiwan Law Places Australia in Awkward Position,” Cybercast News Service, 15 March 2005, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp ?Page=%5CForeignBureaus%5Carchive%5C200503%5CFOR20050315a.html..