DOCSLIB.ORG

Assessment of the On-Ground Risk During Re-Entries

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Assessment of the On-Ground Risk During Re-Entries ASSESSMENT OF THE ON-GROUND RISK DURING RE-ENTRIES H. Klinkrad Mission Analysis Section, ESA/ESOC, D-64293 Darmstadt, Germany ABSTRACT they produce a significant mass percentage of break-up fragments which can withstand the aerothermal heat flux and structural loads during re-entry, and which can gen- The present paper outlines methods which allow to quan- erate ground impacts with significant risk levels to the tify and monitor the on-ground population risk in the population within the debris swath. Historic examples course of a hazardous re-entry event. The risk poten- of this category were the re-entries of Skylab (on 11-Jul- tial will be derived from an object related casualty cross- 1979, with a mass of 74 t), and Salyut-7 (on 07-Feb-1991, section, the endangered ground swath, and the underlying with a mass of 40 t). The latest, most massive object in population density. Means will be described to perform a space history to re-enter was Mir (on 23-Mar-2001, with long-term risk assessment for a given latitude band, and a a mass of 135 t). The re-entry of Skylab was analysed in short-term risk assessment for a given nodal longitude of detail by Dreher [2] et al., while the Salyut-7 event was the final re-entry orbit. In case of residual manoeuvring well documented in the proceedings of an ESOC work- capabilities strategies will be outlined to manage and re- shop [5]. Results of re-entry simulations with satellite duce the risk potential by controlling the nodal longitude break-up models were compiled by Fritsche [3] et al., of the final orbit, and the impact footprint. The usefulness and by Bouslog [1] et al. In context with launch events, of these concepts will be demonstrated for the historic re- Kompaniets [8] et al., and Smith [11] investigated possi- entries of Skylab and Salyut-7, and for the recent re-entry ble debris sources, and derived related on ground risks. of the Mir space station. Based on available technical information, NASA [10], ESA [6], and NASDA compiled debris mitigation hand- books, which also address risk assessment and mitigation 1. INTRODUCTION procedures for uncontrolled re-entries. Of the 26,500 Earth orbiting objects which USSPACE- In the present paper the risk associated with the re-entry COM has tracked since 1957 more that 18,000 have re- of a risk object will be analysed, based on empirically entered into the atmosphere by the year 2001. Most of justified and computationally verified assumptions on the these objects disintegrated and burnt up, posing only a break-up altitude, and on the cross track and along track minor risk on ground. In the year 2001 the number of un- extension of an impact probability distribution. The most classified, correlated objects in the USSPACECOM cat- prominent historic re-entries of massive objects, i.e. the alog was on the order of 8,500. Due to the limited sen- decays of Skylab, Salyut-7, and Mir, will be used to dis- sor sensitivities, all of these objects have diameters larger cuss results of the risk analysis methods which are devel- than 10 to 30 cm. Out of the catalog population, about oped in this paper. 1 object re-enters each day, and 1 to 2 objects with a radar cross-section (RCS) larger than 1 m2 re-enter each week. The latter ones, which have a radius of about 1 m, 2. RE-ENTRY GROUND SWATH have an increased survival potential, and they are gener- ally followed more closely by USSPACECOM until their Some 80% of the currently catalog space object popula- final entry. A NASA [4] analysis of several months of tion have near-circular orbits of e 0 ¡ 05. This is partly such re-entry monitoring and prediction exercises indi- due to operational practices, and partly due to the natural cated that the global distribution of entry locations, for circularisation of orbits under the effect of airdrag, con- the given inclination distribution of the catalog orbits, is centrated around perigee passes. Those orbits which due rather uniform, with no evident clustering on the North- not fall under this category are mostly highly eccentric ern or Southern hemisphere. throughout their orbital lifetime, with their decays driven by luni-solar perturbations acting on the perigee altitude. Occasionally, at rates of one in several years orbital struc- Such re-entries can be forecast with good precision, and tures re-enter, which have geometric cross-sections of they will not be dealt with in this paper. The dominant 100 m2 or more, and masses of several 10 tons. Such class of near-circular orbits shows clusters at certain in- spacecraft can be classified as high-risk objects, since clination bands. The orbital inclinations are very stable Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Space Debris, ESOC, Darmstadt, Germany, 19 - 21 March 2001 (ESA SP-473, August 2001) during the entire orbital phase, and they can be used for Tab.2 summarises related results for the Mir ground- a coarse risk analysis, focused on the constrained latitude track drift (inclination 51.6 , with decay to an altitude φ §©¨ band of ¢¤£¦¥ i i . of 200 km at the end of the propagation). In all anal- ysed cases the application of the groundtrack correction impact probability 1σ 2σ 3σ scheme to previously predicted COIW locations led to an adjusted cross-track position well within 5 km of the elliptic corridor 0.39347 0.86466 0.98889 most recent prediction. rectangular corridor 0.46606 0.91107 0.99987 Tab. 1: Integrated impact probability for elliptic and rect- 3. CASUALTY CROSS-SECTION angular fragment dispersion areas of 1σ, 2σ, and 3σ ex- tensions along track and cross track. One of the key issues in re-entry risk analyses is the iden- The prediction of the orbital decay of a spacecraft, and of tification of components of a spacecraft which are likely its final re-entry, aerothermal break-up, and ground dis- to survive the deceleration and heating peaks following a persion of fragments is affected by uncertainties of the break-up event at altitudes of typically 75 to 80 km. Stud- initial orbit and attitude state, of the ambient atmosphere, ies sponsored by NASA [1] and ESA [3] have addressed of the aerodynamic characteristics, of the structural and this challenging task, which involves a simultaneous so- thermal response of the materials, and of the resulting lution of 6 degrees-of-freedom (DoF) flight dynamics break-up altitude and fragment spread. Depending on equations, with aerodynamic, aerothermodynamic, ther- the entry angle and break-up altitude, the ground disper- mal, and structural loads acting on a complicated geom- sion of fragments can extend over more than 1500 km etry, composed of many different materials. Computa- along track and 80 km cross track, assuming a sus- tions predict that certain materials (e.g. stainless steel), tained lift-to-drag ratio of up to L D 1, and a mean and certain shapes (e.g. tanks) have a particularly good break-up altitude of 80 km. During the orbital decay potential of re-entry survival, particularly if high melting phase, the final re-entry location can only be predicted temperatures are combined with low area-to-mass ratios. with considerable uncertainties, which can be cumulated The retrieval of such objects at several re-entry sites has into an impact probability density function (PDF). This supported these assumptions [2, 4]. PDF can be formally produced by propagating the overall error covariance matrix from the last available orbit de- In order to assess the on-ground risk due to surviving termination to the most probable re-entry location, which debris of a single re-entry event, the NASA safety stan- shall be denoted as the centre of impact window (COIW). dard [10] NSS 1740.14 introduces an equivalent casualty Based on the analysis of 15 historic re-entry events, we cross-section Ac, which is composed of the cross-sections shall assume that the 2σ extension of the fragment dis- Ai of individual fragments, augmented by a projected hu- 2 ¡ persion area on ground is an ellipse, which is symmetric man risk cross-section of Ah 0 36m (corresponding to ¡ to the predicted COIW location, both in the along and Ah 0 6m, as used by NASA). cross track direction. We shall further assume that the n 2 along track extension corresponds to a 20% error in the ¨ Ac ∑ Ah Ai (1) COIW time, and that the cross track extension is 80 km, relative to a drift corrected ground track. For implemen- i 1 tation purposes, we shall analyse a rectangular fragment This quantity Ac is a simple, yet very efficient way to con- dispersion area which is tangent to the 2σ dispersion el- centrate the entire knowledge on the break-up process of lipse. The resulting probabilities of an impact within a a re-entering spacecraft into a single figure. It would al- 1σ, 2σ, and 3σ ellipse and rectangle are listed in Tab.1. low a spacecraft manufacturer to provide means for a reli- For the adopted conditions, the total impact probability able re-entry risk assessment without disclosing sensitive within a 2σ rectangular ground swath is 91.1% (as com- information on construction details. As such, the casualty pared to 86.5% for the elliptic integration limits). cross-section could become a common international stan- dard of data exchange in the course of re-entry prediction ∆ n ∆ n ∆λ n ∆ campaigns (e.g. in the frame of the Inter-Agency Space ∑ ∑ ∑ t d t sec s km pred i N i N i u Debris Coordination Committee, IADC).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous & [Locking Missions
    / tv -t_ ---Fi>{ NASA-TM-II2692 • _7, w- -_ ° ;: Fourth Report of the Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous & [locking Missions March 1, 1995 A Task Force of the NASA Advisory Council THOMAS P. STAFFORD 1006 Cameron Street Alexandria, VA 22314 March 1, 1995 Dr. Bradford Paxkinson Chairman, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Advisory Council National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, DC 20546-0001 Dear Dr. Parkinson: Enclosed is the fourth report of the NAC Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions. This report is the culmination of a two and one-half month review of preparations in Russia for the Phase 1A missions (Soyuz TM-21, Mir 18 Main Expedition, and STS-71). Once again the Task Force received tremendous support from many individuals and organizations at NASA. The same applied to our site visits in Russia where we were met with an openness and candor which served to reinforce our confidence in the ultimate success of the upcoming missions. Over the next two months, the Task Force will be focusing its efforts in two areas. The first are the preparations for STS-71, including the status of the Orbiter Docking System and the analysis of data produced by the STS-63 mission. The second area is the NASA and NASA contractor presence in Russia, including the interaction of Phase 1 and Phase 2 personnel, NASA and contractor functions, and the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2. Sincerely, Thomas P. Stafford CC: NASA/HQ/Code A/Mr. Goldin NASA/HQ/Code A/Gen. Dailey NASA/HQ/Code A/Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Detecting, Tracking and Imaging Space Debris
    r bulletin 109 — february 2002 Detecting, Tracking and Imaging Space Debris D. Mehrholz, L. Leushacke FGAN Research Institute for High-Frequency Physics and Radar Techniques, Wachtberg, Germany W. Flury, R. Jehn, H. Klinkrad, M. Landgraf European Space Operations Centre (ESOC), Darmstadt, Germany Earth’s space-debris environment tracked, with estimates for the number of Today’s man-made space-debris environment objects larger than 1 cm ranging from 100 000 has been created by the space activities to 200 000. that have taken place since Sputnik’s launch in 1957. There have been more than 4000 The sources of this debris are normal launch rocket launches since then, as well as many operations (Fig. 2), certain operations in space, other related debris-generating occurrences fragmentations as a result of explosions and such as more than 150 in-orbit fragmentation collisions in space, firings of satellite solid- events. rocket motors, material ageing effects, and leaking thermal-control systems. Solid-rocket Among the more than 8700 objects larger than 10 cm in Earth orbits, motors use aluminium as a catalyst (about 15% only about 6% are operational satellites and the remainder is space by mass) and when burning they emit debris. Europe currently has no operational space surveillance aluminium-oxide particles typically 1 to 10 system, but a powerful radar facility for the detection and tracking of microns in size. In addition, centimetre-sized space debris and the imaging of space objects is available in the form objects are formed by metallic aluminium melts, of the 34 m dish radar at the Research Establishment for Applied called ‘slag’.
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space
    SALYUT: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space December 1983 NTIS order #PB84-181437 Recommended Citation: SALYUT: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space–A Technical Mere- orandum (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA- TM-STI-14, December 1983). Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 83-600624 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 Foreword As the other major spacefaring nation, the Soviet Union is a subject of interest to the American people and Congress in their deliberations concerning the future of U.S. space activities. In the course of an assessment of Civilian Space Stations, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) has undertaken a study of the presence of Soviets in space and their Salyut space stations, in order to provide Congress with an informed view of Soviet capabilities and intentions. The major element in this technical memorandum was a workshop held at OTA in December 1982: it was the first occasion when a significant number of experts in this area of Soviet space activities had met for extended unclassified discussion. As a result of the workshop, OTA prepared this technical memorandum, “Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space. ” It has been reviewed extensively by workshop participants and others familiar with Soviet space activities. Also in December 1982, OTA wrote to the U. S. S. R.’s Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin, requesting any information concerning present and future Soviet space activities that the Soviet Union judged could be of value to the OTA assess- ment of civilian space stations.
    [Show full text]
  • Orbiting Debris: a Space Environmental Problem (Part 4 Of
    Orbiting Debris: A Since Environmential Problem ● 3 Table 2--of Hazardous Interference by environment. Yet, orbital debris is part of a Orbital Debris larger problem of pollution in space that in- cludes radio-frequency interference and inter- 1. Loss or damage to space assets through collision; ference to scientific observations in all parts of 2. Accidental re-entry of space hardware; the spectrum. For example, emissions at ra- 3. Contamination by nuclear material of manned or unmanned spacecraft, both in space and on Earth; dio frequencies often interfere with radio as- 4. Interference with astronomical observations, both from the tronomy observations. For several years, ground and in space; gamma-ray astronomy data have been cor- 5. Interference with scientific and military experiments in space; rupted by Soviet intelligence satellites that 14 6. Potential military use. are powered by unshielded nuclear reactors. The indirect emissions from these satellites SOURCE: Space Debris, European Space Agency, and Office of Technology As- sessment. spread along the Earth’s magnetic field and are virtually impossible for other satellites to Earth. The largest have attracted worldwide escape. The Japanese Ginga satellite, attention. 10 Although the risk to individuals is launched in 1987 to study gamma-ray extremely small, the probability of striking bursters, has been triggered so often by the populated areas still finite.11 For example: 1) Soviet reactors that over 40 percent of its available observing time has been spent trans- the U.S.S.R. Kosmos 954, which contained a 15 nuclear power source,12 reentered the atmos- mitting unintelligible “data.” All of these phere over northwest Canada in 1978, scatter- problem areas will require attention and posi- ing debris over an area the size of Austria; 2) a tive steps to guarantee access to space by all Japanese ship was hit in 1969 by pieces of countries in the future.
    [Show full text]
  • Learning from Fukushima: Nuclear Power in East Asia
    LEARNING FROM FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR POWER IN EAST ASIA LEARNING FROM FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR POWER IN EAST ASIA EDITED BY PETER VAN NESS AND MEL GURTOV WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ANDREW BLAKERS, MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY, GLORIA KUANG-JUNG HSU, AMY KING, DOUG KOPLOW, ANDERS P. MØLLER, TIMOTHY A. MOUSSEAU, M. V. RAMANA, LAUREN RICHARDSON, KALMAN A. ROBERTSON, TILMAN A. RUFF, CHRISTINA STUART, TATSUJIRO SUZUKI, AND JULIUS CESAR I. TRAJANO Published by ANU Press The Australian National University Acton ACT 2601, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at press.anu.edu.au National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Title: Learning from Fukushima : nuclear power in East Asia / Peter Van Ness, Mel Gurtov, editors. ISBN: 9781760461393 (paperback) 9781760461409 (ebook) Subjects: Nuclear power plants--East Asia. Nuclear power plants--Risk assessment--East Asia. Nuclear power plants--Health aspects--East Asia. Nuclear power plants--East Asia--Evaluation. Other Creators/Contributors: Van Ness, Peter, editor. Gurtov, Melvin, editor. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover design and layout by ANU Press. Cover image: ‘Fukushima apple tree’ by Kristian Laemmle-Ruff. Near Fukushima City, 60 km from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, February 2014. The number in the artwork is the radioactivity level measured in the orchard—2.166 microsieverts per hour, around 20 times normal background radiation. This edition © 2017 ANU Press Contents Figures . vii Tables . ix Acronyms and abbreviations .
    [Show full text]
  • Tragic Tangle: Soyuz-1
    National Aeronautics and Space Administration Tragic Tangle: Soyuz-1 Leadership ViTS Meeting June 2010 Bryan O’Connor Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance Wilson B. Harkins Deputy Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance This and previous presentations are archived at: sma.nasa.gov/safety-messages THE MISHAP On April 23,1967, the Soviet Union launched the Soyuz-1 spacecraft to achieve a new and elaborate docking capability. Multiple malfunctions on orbit forced ground crews to abort the mission. In a crippled spacecraft with rapidly draining power reserves, Cosmonaut Colonel Vladimir Komarov heroically maneuvered the craft for re-entry to Earth. Upon re-entry, the vehicle’s drag and backup parachutes entangled. With no means of braking, Soyuz-1 struck the ground at 90 miles per hour, and the USSR’s most experienced cosmonaut was killed. The Space Race Begins •1961-1963: The USSR flies six successful Vostok crewed missions. •1964-1966: No Soviet manned flights •1961-1966: The U.S. flies six crewed Mercury and ten crewed Gemini missions, pioneering techniques for use en route to the moon. Under immense pressure to overtake the Americans, the Soviets planned a 1967 mission involving two Soyuz spacecraft to rendezvous, dock, transfer cosmonauts, and commemorate May Day. Soyuz and Apollo Test Failures •November 1966: Kosmos-133 unmanned Soyuz suffers maneuvering problems upon re-entry and automatically self-destructs over the Pacific. • December 1966: Second unmanned Soyuz’ booster explodes on pad •January 1967: Apollo 204 fire kills three astronauts. • February 1967: Kosmos-140 unmanned Soyuz heat shield experiences 30mm burn-through during entry. •April 1967: Despite failures, as May Day approaches, Design Bureau Cosmonaut Colonel gives order for dual Soyuz mission.
    [Show full text]
  • Uncontrolled Re-Entries of Spacecraft and Rocket Bodies: a Statistical Overview Over the Last Decade
    Uncontrolled Re-Entries of Spacecraft and Rocket Bodies: A Statistical Overview over the Last Decade Carmen Pardinia1*, Luciano Anselmoa2 a Space Flight Dynamics Laboratory, Institute of Information Science and Technologies (ISTI), National Research Council (CNR), Via G. Moruzzi 1, 56124 Pisa, Italy 1 [email protected]; 2 [email protected] * Corresponding Author Abstract More than 24,400 catalogued orbiting objects have re-entered so far into the Earth’s atmosphere since the beginning of the space age. The associated returning mass, close to 30,000 metric tons, was mainly concentrated in intact objects, i.e. payloads and spent upper stages, accounting for nearly 29% of the re- entered objects. During the 10 years from 2008 to 2017, almost 450 large intact objects have re-entered without control, with a total returning mass of approximately 900 metric tons. Since the beginning of 2018 until mid-November, nearly 86 metric tons of returned materials were associated with almost 65 uncontrolled re-entries of large intact objects, three of which with a mass exceeding 5 metric tons: the Zenit-3F second stage 2017-086D, the C-25 cryogenic upper stage 2017-031B, and the Chinese space station Tiangong-1. After an overview of the most critical historic re-entry events, the attention will be focused on the re- entries of massive objects occurred without control from 2008 to 2017, by categorizing them in terms of relevance, re-entry frequency, returned mass, distribution in inclination, overflown latitude bands, eccentricity and perigee/apogee altitudes before re-entry. Cases in which spacecraft and rocket bodies components were retrieved, and eyewitnesses sightings were reported, will be presented as well.
    [Show full text]
  • Launch Vehicle Classification for Decision-Making of Small
    Trans. Japan Soc. Aero. Space Sci. Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 234–241, 2021 DOI: 10.2322/tjsass.64.234 Launch Vehicle Classification for Decision-Making of Small Satellite Launch Options* Mengying ZHANG,1) Qin XU,2)† and Qingbin ZHANG1) 1)College of Aerospace Science and Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, Hunan 410073, China 2)Center for Assessment and Demonstration Research, Academy of Military Science, Beijing 100091, China In recent years, there has been a steady increase in the small satellite launch market. With the rapid development of novel launchers, for small satellite owners and operators, how to effectively and efficiently choose appropriate launch ve- hicles has become a major concern. Based on updated launch records, a reliable launch data source for multi-attribute eval- uation and reclassification is established. Using a statistical classification process, active launch vehicles are classified into five representative-in-class launchers on the basis of their capabilities and performance. Unlike the previous categorisation based on payload ability, this method captures launch cost, technology maturity, reliability and availability of each cat- egory within the current launch vehicles in service. Moreover, representatives are selected as the baseline types for the high-level planning and designing of complex small satellite launch missions. The analysis indicates that this study pro- vides a valid statistical classification and selection strategy of representative-in-class launch vehicles to support decision- making for rapid assessment on a large number of small satellite launch missions. Key Words: Small Satellite, Launcher Selection, Reliability, Launch Cost 1. Introduction 350 Small satellites (<=1000kg) 300 The past decade has witnessed a boom in the small satellite Large satellites (>1000kg) market.
    [Show full text]
  • Cleaning up Cosmos: Satellite Debris, Radioactive Risk, and the Politics of Knowledge in Operation Morning Light
    hƩ ps://doi.org/10.22584/nr48.2018.004 Cleaning up Cosmos: Satellite Debris, Radioactive Risk, and the Politics of Knowledge in Operation Morning Light Ellen Power University of Toronto Arn Keeling Memorial University Abstract In the early morning of January 24, 1978, the nuclear-powered Soviet satellite Cosmos 954 crashed on the barrens of the Northwest Territories, Canada. The crash dispersed radioactive debris across the region, including over multiple communities. A close reading of the archival record of the military-led clean up operation that followed, known as Operation Morning Light, shows how the debris recovery effort was shaped by government understandings of the northern environment as mediated through authoritative science and technology. This authority was to be challenged from the very beginning of Operation Morning Light. Constant technological failures under northern environmental conditions only increased the uncertainty already inherent in determining radioactive risk. Communication of this risk to concerned northerners was further complicated by language barriers in the predominantly Indigenous communities affected. For many northern residents, the uncertainties surrounding radiation detection and mistrust of government communication efforts fueled concerns about contamination and the effectiveness of debris recovery. Though an obscure episode for many Canadians today, the Cosmos crash and recovery intersects with important themes in northern history, including the politics of knowledge and authority in the Cold War North. The Northern Review 48 (2018): 81–109 Published by Yukon College, Whitehorse, Canada 81 On January 28, 1978, amateur explorer John Mordhurst was overwintering in a cabin near Warden’s Grove, a small copse of trees on the Th elon River in the Northwest Territories.
    [Show full text]
  • SOYUZ THROUGH the AGES the R-7 Rocket That Led to the Family of Soyuz Vehicles Launching Today Lifted Off for the First Time Onfeb
    RUSSIAN SPACE SOYUZ THROUGH THE AGES The R-7 rocket that led to the family of Soyuz vehicles launching today lifted off for the first time onFeb. 17, 1959. The last launch, on Dec. 27, 2018, was number 1,898. Irene Klotz and Maxim Pyadushkin Vostochny Cosmodrome anufactured by the Progress Rocket Space Center in Sama- Evolution of Soyuz-Family Launch Vehicles ra, Russia, the medium-lift expendable booster originally was used for Soviet-era human space missions and later became the R-7 Soyuz Soyuz-L workhorse for the country’s civilian and military space programs. M 1957 First launch of the ICBM (SS-6 1966-76 (32 launches, 1970-71 (three launches, Sapwood) that served as a basis for including 30 successful, all successful, The first rocket officially named Soyuz was launched in Soviet/Russian launch vehicles from Baikonur) from Baikonur) 1966 and has since flown 1,050 times, of which 1,023 were including the Soyuz family successful. Production of Soyuz rockets peaked in the early Soyuz 1980s at about 60 vehicles per year. Medium-Class Launch Vehicle Russia began offering Soyuz launch services internationally in the mid-1980s through Glavkosmos, a commercial entity set up to sell Soviet rocket and space technologies. Manufacturer: Progress Rocket Space Soyuz-U/-U2 Soyuz-M Center, Samara, Russia In 1996, Russia created Starsem, a joint venture (35% ArianeGroup, 25% Roscosmos, 25% RKTs Progress, 15% 1991 Breakup of the 1973-2017 1971-76 (eight launches, Soviet Union, (859 launches, including all successful, from Plesetsk) Dimensions Arianespace) that had exclusive rights to provide commercial launch services on Soyuz launch vehicles.
    [Show full text]
  • Space Station” IMAX Film
    “Space Station” IMAX Film Theme: Learning to Work, and Live, in Space The educational value of NASM Theater programming is that the stunning visual images displayed engage the interest and desire to learn in students of all ages. The programs do not substitute for an in-depth learning experience, but they do facilitate learning and provide a framework for additional study elaborations, both as part of the Museum visit and afterward. See the “Alignment with Standards” table for details regarding how “Space Station!” and its associated classroom extensions, meet specific national standards of learning. What you will see in the “Space Station” program: • How astronauts train • What it is like to live and work in Space aboard the International Space Station (ISS) Things to look for when watching “Space Station”: • Notice how quickly astronauts adapt to free fall conditions and life on the ISS • Reasons humans go to the cost, risk, and effort to work in Space • The importance of “the little things” in keeping astronauts productive so far from home Learning Elaboration While Visiting the National Air and Space Museum Perhaps the first stop to expand on your “Space Station” experience should be the Skylab Orbiting Laboratory, entered from the second floor overlooking the Space Race Gallery. Skylab was America’s first space station, launched in 1973 and visited by three different three-man crews. It fell back to Earth in 1979. The Skylab on display was the back-up for the Skylab that was launched; the Skylab program was cancelled before it was
    [Show full text]
  • U S E R M a N U
    •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 1 SOYUZ USER’ S MANUAL ST-GTD-SUM-01 - ISSUE 3 - REVISION 0 - APRIL 2001 © Starsem 2001. All rights reserved. •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 2 •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 3 SOYUZ USER’S MANUAL ST-GTD-SUM-01 ISSUE 3, REVISION 0 APRIL 2001 FOREWORD Starsem is a Russian-European joint venture founded in 1996 that is charged with the commercialization of launch services using the Soyuz launch vehicle, the most frequently launched rocket in the world and the only manned vehicle offered for commercial space launches. Starsem headquarters are located in Paris, France and the Soyuz is launched from the Baikonour Cosmodrome in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Starsem is a partnership with 50% European and 50% Russian ownership. Its shareholders are the European Aeronautic, Defence, and Space Company, EADS (35%), Arianespace (15%), the Russian Aeronautics and Space Agency, Rosaviacosmos (25%), and the Samara Space Center, TsSKB-Progress (25%). Starsem is the sole organization entrusted to finance, market, and conduct the commercial sale of the Soyuz launch vehicle family, including future upgrades such as the Soyuz/ST. Page3 •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 4 SOYUZ USER’S MANUAL ST-GTD-SUM-01 ISSUE 3, REVISION 0 APRIL 2001 REVISION CONTROL SHEET Revision Date Revision No. Change Description 1996 Issue 1, Revision 0 New issue June 1997 Issue 2, Revision 0 Complete update April 2001 Issue 3, Revision 0 Complete update ST-GTD-SUM-01 General modifications that reflect successful flights in 1999-2000 and Starsem’s future development plans.
    [Show full text]