STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT:
SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE
Editor Derek J. Mitchell
June 2004 About CSIS
Since 1962, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has been dedicated to providing world leaders with strategic insights on – and policy solutions to – current and emerging global issues.
CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, formerly U.S. deputy secretary of defense. It is guided by a board of trustees chaired by former U.S. senator Sam Nunn and consisting of prominent individuals from both the public and private sectors.
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Cover photo: South Korean Protesters Chant Slogans by Candlelight during an Anti-U.S. Rally in Seoul. Cover photo credit: © Reuters/CORBIS.
Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K St. N.W., Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.csis.org Contents
Acknowledgments iv Introduction 1 I. Does Popular Sentiment Matter? / What’s At Stake? 5 Derek Mitchell II. A History of U.S.-ROK Relations to 2002 11 David Kang and Paul Chamberlin III. Yankee Go Home? A Historical View of South Korean Sentiment toward the United 24 States, 2001-2004 Kim Seung-hwan IV: South Korean Self-identity and Evolving Views of the United States 36 Bak Sang-mee V: Generational Change in South Korea: Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance 43 Lee Sook-jong VI: South Korean Civil Society and Alliance Politics 50 Katharine H.S. Moon VII: The Emergence of “New Elites” in South Korea and its Implications for Popular 59 Sentiment Toward the United States Lee Jung-hoon VIII: Friendship in Need of Substance: Perspectives of South Korean Business toward the 67 United States Kim Byoung-joo IX: The Role of the Media and the U.S.-ROK Relationship 73 Scott Snyder X: U.S. Popular Views toward South Korea 82 William Watts XI: Analysis of the September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND Polls 92 Eric Larson XII: Findings 107 XIII: Recommendations 114 Appendix A: Summary of September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND Polls 122 Appendix B: September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND Polls, Survey 1 131 Appendix C: September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND Polls, Survey 2 147 Appendix D: About the Contributors 165 Acknowledgments
This project is the product of cooperation between the International Security Program (ISP) of CSIS and Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea. Derek Mitchell, ISP senior fellow, chaired the task force and edited this report. Professor Lee Jung-Hoon of Yonsei University’s Graduate School of International Studies (GIIS) also provided intellectual and financial support for the project.
A select task force of senior practitioners and specialists in U.S.-Korean affairs provided essential guidance to the organization and implementation of the project from its inception, and substantive inputs to authors concerning their papers. The consistent commitment of task force members over several months was critical to the completion and quality of the study. The task force included:
Bak Sangmee, Hankuk University of International Affairs Paul Chamberlin, Korea-U.S. Consulting, Inc. William Drennan, U.S. Institute of Peace Gordon Flake, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation David Kang, Dartmouth College Byoung-Joo Kim, Kim, Lee, & Partners, Inc. Seung-Hwan Kim, Myongji University Eric Larson, RAND Corporation Sook-Jong Lee, The Sejong Institute Norman Levin, RAND Corporation Michael McDevitt, CNA Corporation Katharine Moon, Wellesley College Don Oberdorfer, Johns Hopkins University Scott Snyder, The Asia Foundation William Watts, Potomac Associates
The project benefited greatly from the administrative assistance of several CSIS staff members, including ISP research associate Kazuyo Kato, who took over at mid-course and ably shepherded the report to its conclusion, and ISP research assistant Alice Brennan, who guided the project during its early stages. ISP intern Janet Kang also assisted Mr. Mitchell and Ms. Kato with the editorial process. We would also like to extend appreciation to Eunice Chung and ISP research assistant Kristine Schenck for their artistic contribution to this publication.
CSIS and Yonsei University are also deeply grateful for the institutional and financial support of the project from the Korea Foundation. Without the Korea Foundation’s vision and assistance, this study could not have been conducted. We are likewise grateful for the co-sponsorship of the South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo for the public survey conducted in September 2003 in support of this project. We would further like to thank the Korea office of the Asia Foundation for its financial support. The statements made and views expressed in this report, however, are solely the responsibility of the authors.
iv Introduction
Americans, in professing support for democracy around the world, sometimes overlook the fact that new democracies can create as many complications as benefits for U.S. bilateral relationships. On the one hand, dealing with autocracies is simple: convince the autocrat to side with you, and you can count—generally—on a stable relationship. Democracies, on the other hand, are moving targets. Leaders are constantly looking over their shoulders at political opponents and keeping an eye on popular opinion, which is often driven not only by considerations of national interest but also by miscellany such as culture, emotion, and historical memory.
The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) provides a case study in this regard. As 2003 approached, the United States and South Korea seemed to have ample reason to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of their historic alliance. Established in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War, in which millions of Koreans and tens of thousands of Americans died, the alliance successfully contained and deterred potential aggression by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) and fostered a secure environment in which both the United States and South Korea could prosper. South Korea rose from the devastation of war to become a strong, stable, confident, and ultimately free and democratic society.
Yet, as 2003 dawned, the South Korean people made international headlines when they flooded the streets of Seoul by the thousands to angrily denounce the United States. Their immediate grievance was frustration and resentment over perceived U.S. arrogance in the deaths of two South Korean schoolgirls who were accidentally run over by a U.S. military vehicle and the subsequent acquittal of the involved soldiers by a U.S. military tribunal. Demonstrators burned American flags; chanted “Yankee, Go Home”; held aloft placards denouncing the United States as imperialist; and, in late 2002, elected a new president whose rhetoric and platform, inter alia, called for a Korea that stood up to the United States. Public opinion polls taken in early 2003 showed South Korean views of the United States to be at a historic low, with a large majority deeming the bilateral relationship in poor shape.
Viewing all these developments without context, the United States predictably reacted with surprise and anger at the apparent bitterness of its long-time ally. “How could the Koreans be so ungrateful?” “Why should we continue to put our forces in harm’s way, often separated from their families, for a society that not only does not want us there, but also deems us imperialists and burns our flag?” Members of Congress, newspaper columnists, cable television pundits, and even some U.S. officials began to talk about potentially withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea. Combined with ongoing frictions about policies toward North Korea and continuing tensions in general alliance management, a vicious downward spiral of action and reactionンand perhaps over- reactionンdeveloped that seemed to put the overall relationship in jeopardy. Far from celebrating the alliance’s golden anniversary, some commentators in 2003 were pronouncing the alliance “defunct.”1
1 Robyn Lim, “Japan as the ‘New South Korea?” ICAS (Institute for Corean-American Studies, Inc.) Special Contribution no. 2003-0305-RxL (2003): 1.
1 2 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Conservatives within the South Korean elite mobilized to reassure U.S. counterparts that the demonstrations did not represent true popular sentiment. They noted that “anti-American” demonstrations in South Korea are not new, that participants represented a small vocal minority of South Korean opinion, and that polls demonstrating otherwise were unsound.
Although the entreaties of South Korean conservatives were not entirely inaccurate, the depth and breadth of South Korean resentment that was displayed toward the United States in late 2002 and 2003 seemed to signal something more complex and troublesome. What was at work just beneath the surface of South Korean society transcended any individual precipitating event. Observers began to note that changes within the society itselfンthe growth of democratic values, development of civil society, economic development, generational change, and an overall growing sense of national confidence and prideンmight be changing the orientation of South Korean society and affecting its view of its long-time protector and ally, with potential detriment to the long-term health of the relationship. Indeed, the April 2004 National Assembly elections, which led to a sweeping win for the more liberal opposition party and the ascension to power of a younger generation of legislators, only reinforced the sense of change in South Korean politics and society.
It is thus important that policymakers and other elites in both the United States and South Korea understand better the dynamics and evolution of South Korean society, and, in turn, of development of popular sentiment toward the United States, if they seek to control the course of the U.S.–ROK relationship in the years ahead. Misunderstanding or ignoring such dynamics, whether overestimating or underplaying them, threatens to put the historic alliance at risk, just as unaddressed corrosion undermines any structure’s sound foundation.
This study attempts to assess and analyze developments in South Korean society, as well as various themes, sources, and trends in popular sentiment toward the United States that are connected to those developments. Examination of such a subject is by nature inexact and impressionistic. Recognizing this inherent limitation, the project’s methodology seeks to approach the issue of South Korean views of the United States from a variety of angles and perspectives, the sum of which, it is hoped, may provide a composite picture and a foundation from which both governments may address the issue. Indeed, the study is conducted with an eye toward the policymaker; it concludes with a series of policy recommendations to both countries on the basis of the study’s findings.
This report benefits from the combined input of South Korean and U.S. specialists from universities, government, business, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who have prepared chapters on selected topics related to the issue of Korean sentiment toward the United States. In chapter I, Derek Mitchell addresses the questions of why popular sentiment matters in the bilateral relationship and what is at stake in safeguarding the bilateral alliance for respective national and international interests.
The following two chapters place the issue of South Korean sentiment toward the United States into a historical context. In chapter II, David Kang and Paul Chamberlin analyze the bilateral relationship from the late nineteenth century until 2000, and they assess the enduring effects that U.S. policies and cultural, economic, and political interaction with the United States during this period have had on South Korean views of the United States today. In chapter III, Kim Seung-hwan picks up the trail by tracing key developments in the relationship from 2001 to 2004. Kim examines A WORKING GROUP REPORT 3 how several different events, large and small, during this period created a kind of “perfect storm” in 2002–2003 that continues to resonate in the relationship.
In chapter IV, sociologist Bak Sang-mee examines how the evolution of South Korea as a democratic and developed society has affected the way South Koreans perceive themselves and, in turn, how this evolving self-identity is affecting how they perceive others, particularly the United States. Bak, in fact, notes a diversity in modern South Korean self-identity according to generation, gender, and class, and she connects those South Korean trends to the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea.
The six chapters that follow offer insights into the perspectives of various influential elements of South Korean society on national sentiment toward the United States. In chapter V, Lee Sook-jong discusses why South Korean views of the United States differ significantly along generational lines and examines how the emergence of a more assertive younger age group is affecting South Korean sentiment. Katharine Moon, in chapter VI, adds a further component to understanding the transformation of Korean public opinion with an examination of how the rise of social groups and other NGOs, plus their interaction in a democratizing South Korea, have shaped and facilitated the growth and expression of anti-American sentiment.
Lee Jung-hoon follows in chapter VII with a focus on the perspectives of South Korea’s traditional elites, i.e., government, academia, and the like. He notes significant changes in the makeup of elites in South Korean society, including the development of “new elites” in recent years and the effect of the evolution in views of the traditional and new elites on the bilateral relationship. The business community has served as a particularly important elite element in South Korea, the perspectives of which Kim Byoung-Joo writes about in chapter VIII. Despite some diversity within the community toward the United States, Kim notes the critical ballast that South Korean business has provided to South Korea’s relationship with the United States, particularly during periods of bilateral tension or dispute.
In chapter IX, Scott Snyder examines the role of South Korean media in alternately reflecting and shaping national views of the United States. He observes that this powerful institution has become increasingly diverse, autonomous, and competitive in recent years as South Korean society has democratized, affecting both the way South Koreans receive their information and the quality of the information they receive.
To provide further context for assessing emerging dynamics in the bilateral relationship, the report turns the discussion around in chapter X as William Watts examines U.S. popular views of South Korea. Through analysis of various public opinion surveys, Watts observes both positive and negative trends in U.S. public perspectives, including the potential implications of the relatively shallow nature of U.S. public knowledge and understanding of its ally.
Eric Larson follows in chapter XI with a systematic analysis of the public opinion polls conducted in 2003 by CSIS and JoongAng Ilbo and developed in cooperation with the RAND cooperation in support of this project (the results of which are included in the appendices). He places those results in the context of trends in South Korean sentiment toward the United States since 1990. This analysis suggests that there has been only a partial recovery in favorable sentiment toward the United States since the decline in 2002. It also suggests that, although beliefs about the importance of U.S. forces to South Korea’s security are helping to buoy favorable sentiment, 4 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE continued concerns about the health of the bilateral relationship and differences over North Korea are creating drag and may be stalling a full recovery.
The report concludes with an overview of the project findings in chapter XII and a final chapter of policy recommendations for both countries to consider to help mitigate both negative trends in South Korean sentiment toward the United States and their potential effects on the overall relationship over time. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 5
Chapter I Does Popular Sentiment Matter? / What’s at Stake? Derek Mitchell
Two fundamental questions immediately arise as one begins to consider the issue of South Korean popular sentiment towards the United States.
Does Popular Sentiment Matter?
The first question goes to the heart of this study: does popular sentiment really matter in international affairs or do realists have it rightンthat is, will national interest ultimately win out as the final arbiter of a nation’s foreign and security policies? In other words, are expressions of popular sentiment cheap, or might they have real costs to a bilateral relationship over time?
There is indeed a profound difference between expressing frustration and resentment toward the United States in public opinion polls, over the Internet, or even on one’s streets, and taking the dramatic step of severing an alliance and driving out U.S. troops traditionally considered essential to one’s sense of security. South Koreans have continued to recognize the value of the U.S. deterrent against North Korea, as well as the practical benefits of peace and stability that the relationship engenders for the country’s economic and other interests. Even during the worst period of outrage against the United States in late 2002ヱ2003, polls noted that large majorities in South Korea remained in favor of U.S. military presence and of the alliance in general.
Nonetheless, complacency in this regard is dangerous. In fact, it is not merely a matter of whether the two countries maintain the alliance, troop presence, and so forth, in form. However, one must remain concerned about the effect of South Korean popular sentiment toward the United States on the ability of the two countries to fulfill the functions required to keep the relationship vital and useful. For instance, are growing resentments affecting the ability of U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) troops to train, operate, and inter-operate effectively? Are the changing political dynamics constraining the ability of the two countries to cooperate politically on important international strategic issues? Further deterioration of popular sentiment could threaten the quality of a continuing alliance.
In democratic societies, waves of popular emotion can drive policy in directions that even political leaders may find difficult to control. Those kinds of forces are particularly evident in new democracies, as citizens begin to understand and feel more confident in their new civic rights and to seek to flex their new muscles on behalf of causes long suppressed under former regimes. Amplified by an equally eager and newly empowered media culture, popular emotions may coalesce into political causes, determine electoral outcomes, and alternately shape and constrain the choices of elected officials by raising the costs of a preferred policy course.1
1 One might simply look to the results of the 2002 ROK presidential elections or the 2004 Spanish general elections for electoral outcomes that arguably resulted from short-term emotionalism, or look to Indonesia’s current spotty d 6 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
South Koreans themselves will acknowledge that they are a highly emotional and collectivist people (see Bak Sang-mee, chapter IV). Korean society puts great pressure on the individual to conform to the prevailing opinion of one’s peer group. Although this dynamic certainly exists elsewhere, in Korea this culture is particularly prevalent and intense, thereby enabling a prevailing sentiment to spread widely and deeply, to gain momentum, and to cascade in a prevailing direction in a fashion that may be swift and difficult to control.
Indeed, emotionalism may have special resonance and effect if connected to deep veins of national pride or historical memory, to which South Korea is also hardly immune. The Korean people are proudly nationalistic and have a keen sense of grievance over a history of perceived victimization as a pawn in the strategic machinations of great powersンalternately China, Japan, Russia (Soviet Union), and the United States. As South Koreans have become more confident in the success of their political, economic, and social development, they have remained mindful of this history and have demanded to be accorded respect consistent with their achievements (see Bak Sang-mee, chapter IV). They also have become increasingly sensitive over the effect of and jurisdiction over foreign troops on their sovereign territory, even if such forces are present to safeguard their security. Events or actions that tap into this national well of resentment and insecurity thus may prove to have a profound effect on relations with today’s South Korea.
Triggering events could include anything from the disqualification of a beloved Olympic speed skater to the acquittal of U.S. servicemen in the traffic deaths of two Korean schoolgirls (see Kim Seung-hwan, chapter III). However, the U.S.–ROK relationship is centered on North Korea, and thus it is in this context that the greatest sensitivities in and damage to the bilateral relationship may result.
In fact, growing differences in perspective and policy toward North Korea not only strike at the heart of the alliance but also feed and reinforce mutual resentments. Many South Koreans particularly take issue with the manner in which the United States has approached peninsular affairs in recent years. As tensions on the peninsula mount, South Koreans have openly bristled at perceived U.S. “arrogance,” “unilateralism,” heavy-handedness, and lack of concern for the national interests and sensitivities of South Korea, ンfrom terming the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) a member of an “axis of evil,” to embarrassing President Kim Dae-jung with a frosty reception in Washington in early 2001, to apparently failing to engage seriously with the North to solve the nuclear crisis,
Indeed, after 50 years (most of them under authoritarian rulers closely allied with the United States), South Koreans no longer accept the notion of a “big brother/little brother” relationship, and chafe at the inherent disrespect that the U.S. government seems to convey in its continued approach to North Korea and the alliance. Even South Korean conservatives who welcomed a U.S.- led harder line toward the North in recent years expressed resentment in 2003ヱ2004 over the manner in which the United States considered and pursued revisions in its military presence on the peninsula. The U.S. initiative to move forces in stages to a base south of Seoul, potentially so the troops could be deployed on occasion off the peninsula for other contingencies, came up for allied
cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts. That lack of cooperation is due, in part, to concern over popular opinion as elections approach in 2004. d A WORKING GROUP REPORT 7
discussion only once a decision had been madeンand leakedンin Washington. The incident angered many conservatives who had loyally defended the principles behind the U.S. forward-deployed military presence on the peninsula. The U.S. decisions to abruptly change the strategic outlines of the relationship, without consultation, seemed to undermine those conservatives’ position and created a different type of anger and resentment in this traditionally and solidly pro-U.S. camp.
At a strategic level, the divide is also widening. The United States focuses not only on the peninsular but also on the global implications of the North Korean threat, including that country’s potential to become a leading international proliferator of nuclear weapons-grade material. South Korea seems to focus primarily on peninsular stability, particularly whether peninsular tensions are increasing because of U.S. policies over the nuclear issue. While the United States talks of regime change, condemns human rights abuses in the North, and grows ever more angry at South Korea’s reluctance to reverse its engagement policy toward the North in favor of a more hard-line approach, the South seems content to maintain the political status quo on the peninsula as long as stability reigns.
At the same time, polls in South Korea have revealed a broader distaste for U.S. strategic engagement worldwide. A majority of South Koreans opposed the second Iraq war, and according to one high-profile 2002 survey, the South Koreans were one of only two non-Islamic peoples of which a majority opposed the U.S.-led war on terrorism.2 In 2004, a poll showed that more South Koreans feared the United States than feared the possibility that North Korea might start a war on the peninsula.
Such divergences are not ignored in Washington and, in turn, have created a backlash in official U.S. sentiments concerning the credibility, usefulness, and future viability of the alliance. In this way, the expression of Korean popular sentiment toward the United States may help escalate frustration and resentment between the two countries in a steadily tightening spiral. It takes little imagination to recognize that any continuation of this trend threatens to undermine the critical sense of trust and partnership that the alliance must maintain to remain viable in the long term.
Meanwhile, even as traditional pillars of the alliance are becoming weaker, other strategic trends may also magnify the effect of popular opinion on the alliance over time. As succeeding generations of South Koreans become less concerned about North Korea as a security threatンexcept insofar as reunification might create economic and social burdens on the Southンthe United States may, at best, come to be viewed as irrelevant and, at worst, as an obstacle to reconciliation or reduction of tensions on the peninsula. (Some in South Korea may already argue the latter viewpoint.) Under such conditions, negative views of the United States may affect South Korean commitment to the strategic relationship.
In addition, the value of South Korea’s economic relations with East Asia, particularly China, is beginning to exceed the value of its relations with the United States, offering an important alternative center of interest that may reduce U.S. leverage and importance in South Korean strategic calculations. President Roh Moo-hyun’s call for a more independent military posture from the United States, while potentially helpful to the alliance because it allows the United States to focus its
2 Pew Global Attitudes Project, What the World Thinks in 2002 (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2002), 60.
d 8 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
highly stretched forces elsewhere, might also make South Korea sufficiently confident in its self- defense capability to weaken the traditionally compelling need for U.S. partnership. Negative popular sentiment toward the United States could induce the less-desirable outcome in both cases.
In short, the collective effect of ROK popular sentiment and broader trends in the strategic relationship may create deep fault lines in the U.S.–ROK relationship over time if not addressed. As long as the North Korean threat remains, the alliance will maintain a degree of ballast. However, in the long run particularly, should the threat from the North disappear, the corrosive effect on the relationship of continued negative popular sentiment will likely be substantial. The worst-case scenario, which began to develop in late 2002 and early 2003, would involve a mutually reinforcing dynamic of action and reaction to perceived slights that could develop a self-sustaining momentum within the two societies and polities. The result would be a deterioration in relations that would not necessarily be rational or controlled, nor would it be consistent with the best interests of the two countries. Rather, it would answer to an emotional logic that operates regardless of the best intentions of both countries’ strategists and leaders. Such an outcome must be avoided.
What’s at Stake?
The second question is broader and more fundamental: what is at stake should negative popular sentiment toward the United States drive the two countries to attenuate or sever the alliance? Why does the alliance matter, and what are the costs to both the United States and South Korea in the event the alliance deteriorates?
In this regard, one must examine the issue both in the immediate and long term. Most critically, in the short term, problems in the alliance will give aid and comfort to the common enemy, North Korea. A core goal of the North for 50 years has been to maintain its sovereign existence, to sever the U.S.–ROK alliance, to expel the United States from the peninsula, (at least in the past) to use the leverage of its military threat and political and ideological muscles so it can undermine confidence and stability in the South, and to force its will on the South Korean people. Growing negative South Korean sentiment toward the United States offers the North some encouragement that time may be on its side and that its current tactics of “divide and conquer” may be working. Thus it provides the North with little incentive to engage constructively or to change its ways both on the peninsula and in its international activities. Indeed, although the North is hardly in a position to initiate a full-scale attack on the South with any success, limited actions to create confusion and turmoil in the South remain credible tactics.
For 50 years, the U.S.–ROK alliance has helped deter aggression from the North and has provided the Southンand its business and investment partnersンwith sufficient reassurance against provocation to promote national stability and development. Indeed, the two countries have much at stake in their economic relationship. Bilateral trade between the United States and South Korea in 2002 totaled more than US$55 billion.3 The United States accounted for 49.5 percent of total foreign direct investment into South Korea that year, accounting for thousands of jobs and ranking first among South Korea’s investment partners. Perhaps most critically, South Korea imports all of its
3 Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States, Korea-US Economic Trade Issues in 2003, 2004,
Weakening of the alliance relationship would create psychological uncertainty within the South and thus would work to the detriment of the economic and national security interests of both South Korea and the United States. Over the longer term, a steady dissolution of the relationship to the point where the alliance is undermined may have even more dire implications. One might consider the cautionary example of the severance of the U.S.–Philippines alliance in 1992, which resulted in a decade of profound bitterness and lasting resentment between the two countries. Like the worst divorces, the emotional results of dissolving the alliance could be worse than the situation that led to the break in the first place. The United States and South Korea can hardly afford such a result, not only because of the many mutual interests on which they should work together, but also because a crack in the U.S.–ROK relationship would be much more profound strategically for East Asia than was the end of the U.S.–Philippine alliance—following the Cold War.
Indeed, U.S. regional alliances have served as the foundation of East Asian security for decades. Should the U.S.–ROK alliance falter, questions may arise concerning the continued viability and relevance of this security structure. This questioning, in turn, may lead to perceptions at best of fluidity and at worst of an emerging strategic vacuum in Northeast Asia. A perception that the strategic orientation of South Korea is in play would induce a competitive balance-of-power game in which traditional regional rivalries might re-emerge. Such perceptions have a self-fulfilling element to them that could undermine overall stability and mutual trust in the region.
The end of the U.S.–ROK alliance would also put enormous pressure on U.S. relations with Japan, because Japan would need to shoulder a greater net strategic burden in support of the United States. Particularly if that end occurred under great popular pressure rather than through a mutually agreed separation, Japan’s leaders might face increased domestic ferment of their own to reconsider the nation’s strategic posture, thereby creating additional fluidity and nervousness within the region—given Japan’s history—and further threatening the atmosphere of mutual reassurance.
The result may be the creation of competing power centers in East Asia that divide the United States and South Korea from each other rather than unite them according to common values and interests. This result serves the interests of neither the United States nor South Koreaンnor the region.
In fact, the stability engendered by U.S. alliance relationships in East Asia has benefited the United States in a full range of its political, military, economic, and strategic interests, all of which would be placed in some jeopardy by an end to its alliance with South Korea. The United States would lose special relationships that have promoted its regional economic ties and have offered both training and basing rights to its forces, rights that have helped facilitate America’s international power projection, both politically and militarily, over many decades.
For its part, South Korea could try to align with another major regional power, such as China, to replace the sense of security and reassurance provide by the United States. However, South Korea has some history with such an arrangement and may be rather unlikely to trust the goodwill of its
d 10 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
powerful and willful neighbor.4 Alternatively, South Korea may try to maintain strategic neutrality and political independence in the new strategic environment with competing major powers on its doorstep. However, South Koreans also remember their troubled history in this regard. Success would be achieved, at best, only through extraordinary vigilance and constant resolve—and at enormous financial and economic cost. The ROK would need to fill the void of U.S. military power and endure the psychological transition that domestic and foreign investors would need to undergo before they would feel comfortable again that South Korea was a sufficiently secure and fiscally sound base for operations. South Korea thus could not be sure of the political, economic, and other results of such a strategic transition.
Perhaps the most profound cost that would be incurred by the steady deterioration of relations between South Korea and the United States would be that those two strong and proud societies, which have stood together as blood brothers through hot and cold wars for more than half a century, would sacrifice their relationship just at the point when the mutual benefits, combined capabilities, and common interests might be at their apex. A proud, strong, confident, and democratic South Korea is an extraordinarily important partner for the United States in addressing the many critical common security challenges (besides North Korea) faced in the region and elsewhere: energy security, safety of sea lanes for trade and shipping, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational terrorism, humanitarian assistance, and so forth. To allow resentments to build to the point that the two partners focus attention more on problems with each other than on common problems of the global community would be a net loss both for their societies and for the world as a whole.
4 One might note the recent controversy over the “war of history” between South Korea and China in early 2004, which centered around the historical status of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo. A Beijing academic institution placed the kingdom within Chinese sovereignty, infuriating Koreans in the North and the South, who called Koguryo “the root of the Korean nation” and backed a massive petition drive to condemn “China’s distortion of history.” “S Korea, China in dispute on history.” Associated Press report published in Taipei Times. February 2, 2004, 5. Indeed, longstanding border disputes and other unresolved legacies of history remain extant between South Korea and China, disputes that, although dormant, may arise upon Korean unification or in the face of increased instability along the common border. d A WORKING GROUP REPORT 11
Chapter II A History of U.S.–ROK Relations to 2002 David Kang and Paul Chamberlin
South Korea is a stellar example of successful economic and political development and of successful U.S. foreign policy. Most South Koreans recognize, and admit, that the Republic of Korea (ROK) could not be what it is today without the close relationship that it has had with the United States. Indeed, the United States had a formative effect on South Korea far beyond the three-year conflict of 1950–1953. North Korea has been successfully deterred from attacking South Korea for more than half a century. The U.S.–ROK mutual defense treaty, forward basing of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and significant security and economic assistance have helped empower South Korea’s impressive development and have facilitated U.S. success at the strategic crossroads of Northeast Asia.
However, it is precisely this success—and South Korea’s dramatic transformation—that has led to inevitable strains in South Korea’s relationship with the United States. After 50 years, the U.S.– ROK alliance has begun to show signs of age. For starters, South Koreans want to be respected for their impressive accomplishments in rapidly developing one of the world’s top economies and arguably becoming the leading democracy in continental Asia. No longer do they accept being taken for granted as a subservient junior partner and no longer will they unquestioningly follow U.S. policies in the region.
To the contrary, they seek—if not expect—U.S. assistance in their efforts to ameliorate tensions on the Korean Peninsula by improving relations with North Korea—a necessary step toward peaceful reunification, which some envision as functionally occurring on a step-by-step basis in the next one or two generations. Any assessment of the current alliance or prescriptions for the future must be made with an understanding of how the United States and South Korea have changed over the past 50 years. The causes of the tensions run deeper and arise from an alliance that has been taken for granted by both countries for too long. The material and psychological situation of South Korea is dramatically different from what it was five decades ago. The decline of North Korea and the impressive rise of South Korea as an economically successful, vibrant democracy have significantly changed South Korea’s perception of itself and of the United States.
The dynamics of the peninsula are generally triangular: relations between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea have a mutual effect on each other. When relations between North and South Korea have been relatively tense, relations between the United States and South Korea have been closer. In the past decade, as the South has perceived North Korea to be increasingly less of a threat, and as interaction and cooperation between North Korea and South Korea have increased, relations between Seoul and Washington have grown more strained. Although this chapter will not focus on those triangular dynamics in particular, it is important to note that they form a backdrop to any discussion of the U.S.–ROK relationship.
There is much that is positive in the relationship between South Korea and the United States, and this fact should not be overlooked when focusing on the problems in the relationship. There is 12 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
still a deep reservoir of goodwill on the part of many South Koreans toward the United States for its help during the Korean War. Many South Koreans experienced firsthand U.S. aid, as well as U.S. help in promoting economic development. Furthermore, the United States has been a culturally positive influence on South Korea, although some South Koreans worry that their traditional culture is becoming too “Americanized” through pop culture, the Internet, and other information-age tools. Through extensive emigration to the United States, many South Koreans have a positive and increasingly rich perspective on the United States and its influence on the peninsula.
A central element of the relationship has been the military alliance that has been in effect since 1950. More than 33,000 U.S. troops died in the Korean War, and after the armistice, the military alliance came into formal existence with the signing of the 1953 bilateral defense treaty. The core of the alliance has always been U.S. military deployments in South Korea, which at their height comprised 100,000 troops as well as nuclear-capable Lance missiles. Even today, the nuclear-capable forces comprise 38,000 troops, sophisticated air bases, and naval facilities that guarantee U.S. involvement in any conflict on the peninsula. The military alliance provides operational control of selected ROK armed forces to the U.S. commander of the U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) during wartime.
However, the military alliance is embedded within a much broader U.S.–ROK relationship. This larger relationship has grown dramatically in the past half century. With bilateral trade totaling more than $55 billion in 2002, South Korea is a major trading partner of the United States. U.S. firms invested more than $5 billion in South Korea in 2002.1 As other chapters in this study discuss, there are real differences between and real changes in the perceptions of the U.S. and South Korean populations regarding the U.S. role in South Korea, the policy toward North Korea, and the U.S. and South Korean roles in East Asia. Understanding the history of the U.S.–ROK alliance, and more broadly the interaction between the United States and South Korea over the past century and more, will help shed light on the context of how South Koreans view the United States and how the bilateral relationship reached the point it had in 2001.
There are two enduring strands in the historical U.S.–ROK relationship. The first strand involves the interaction of U.S. policy and Korean reaction. The second strand has been the deep formative effect that the United States has had directly and indirectly on the evolution of South Korea’s modern culture, including that country’s major social institutions: family, religion, education, economics, and politics. Those twin strands have occasionally led to strains in what has basically been a sound alliance in both countries’ interests.
Mistrust of U.S. Intentions
South Korean views of the United States do not exist in a vacuum but have been formed within a context of interaction over several decades. Although U.S. policy decisions are often downplayed on in the United States, many South Koreans are aware of numerous decisions that were less than favorable to South Korea. Although this historical mistrust of the United States is often dismissed in the United States as inconsequential, the underlying current of mistrust in South Korea regarding actual U.S. intentions is palpable and serious.
1 Korea Economic Institute of America, “Basic Economic Data on Korea (2002–2004),”
A. Colonization, Liberation, and Alliance From the beginning of U.S. involvement in Korea, the peninsula was never a high priority to the United States, and this basic fact has been one of the root causes of South Korean perceptions and concerns regarding the United States. This mistrust of U.S. intentions began as far back as the nineteenth century. The United States was the first Western nation to conclude a treaty that opened Korea to trade in 1882. This result followed two small—and abortive—missions whereby the United States attempted to open Korea by force in 1866 and 1871.2 Although his intervention was virtually unknown in the United States, Teddy Roosevelt brokered the peace treaty (The Treaty of Portsmouth) in 1905 that ended the Russo-Japanese War.
That treaty—part of the negotiations known as the Taft-Katsura agreement—essentially acknowledged Japanese primacy in Northeast Asia, including dominance over Korea, in a de facto exchange for Japanese acceptance of U.S. domination over the Philippines. The U.S. position allowed Japan to make Korea its colony in 1910 without any hindrance or threat to Japan’s dominant power position on the peninsula, although Washington’s actual ability to thwart Japanese expansion at the time was somewhat questionable. The net effect was to usher in a period of brutal occupation and colonization that ended more than 1,200 years of Korean history as a relatively sovereign and independent nation-state. Liberation from Japan in 1945 was followed immediately by national division, which prevented the Koreans from re-establishing Korea as an independent sovereign country. Peacefully reunifying Korea as a democratic state remains an important South Korean national objective.
Koreans in the late nineteenth century worried about their national security in light of the decline of China, their traditional protector, and the rise of imperial Japan, their traditional enemy. Seeking a security hedge, Korea welcomed the 1882 Korea-U.S. Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation as something of a security alliance, in that Article I states, “If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable agreement, thus showing their friendly feelings.” Regardless of whether presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft could have prevented Japan from annexing Korea, the U.S. refusal to honor the 1882 Korea–U.S. treaty remains in Korean historical memory and raises questions among some Koreans as to U.S. trustworthiness in the future.
B. Liberation The U.S. role in dividing Korea in 1945 is another source of concern to some Koreans, who note that the Franklin Roosevelt administration in 1943 took the position that Korea should be free and independent “in due course” after liberation from Japan. As a practical matter, however, the United States could not prevent the Soviet Red Army from occupying the Korean Peninsula in August 1945. The nearest U.S. military forces were in Okinawa and were preparing to invade the main Japanese islands when Red Army forces entered the peninsula. To stop the Soviets from occupying the entire Korean peninsula, Washington proposed a temporary demarcation line along the thirty- eighth parallel, ostensibly to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces on the peninsula. Washington attempted various diplomatic solutions to end national division in the next few years, but Moscow was determined to maintain influence on the Korean Peninsula, reflecting Russian strategic goals at
2 The General Sherman was destroyed by Koreans in 1866 near Pyongyang, and a force of 651 Americans captured a few Korean forts near Kanghwa in 1871, but ultimately withdrew. 14 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE the turn of the twentieth century. Although the United States could not achieve its goal of a free and independent unified Korea, it did succeed in providing an environment for Koreans to taste the benefits of freedom south of the 38th parallel.
The next three years saw a relatively clumsy U.S. military occupation. The occupation authority alienated many South Koreans because of politically and culturally inept policies emanating from Washington and the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). For example, the United States proposed a five-year international trusteeship that was utterly unacceptable to South Koreans, who yearned for immediate self-rule after 40 years of oppressive foreign rule. U.S. Army Major General John R. Hodges, a highly decorated combat commander who became head of USAMGIK, saw little difference between Koreans and Japanese, calling them “breeds of the same cat,” and he planned to treat Koreans as “conquered enemies.” After receiving the Japanese surrender, for example, he approved the Japanese commander’s request to “keep Japanese police armed to protect his troops and the 600,000 Japanese civilians in Korea from reprisals.” Washington immediately ordered Hodges to rescind his decision but not before Koreans formed their own opinions about USAMGIK and U.S. intentions.3
USAMGIK also disbanded local self-governing bodies and installed as governors at various levels numbers of U.S. military personnel who were ignorant of Korean customs and language. Most Koreans properly saw themselves as impoverished victims of imperial Japanese aggression, but USAMGIK tended to seek advice from propertied persons and conservatives who had obviously prospered during colonization, undoubtedly at the expense at times of fellow Koreans.
Nevertheless, before the dissolution of USAMGIK in 1948, the United States did assist South Koreans in the transition to a free democracy—providing a stark contrast to developments in North Korea. By 1950, the United States had withdrawn all troops but a 500-man Korean Military Advisory Group and, regrettably, put the ROK outside an East Asia defense perimeter that included Japan and the Philippines. Those actions implied that the United States did not regard South Korea as a significant international partner.
C. Liberation and Alliance In the late 1940s, U.S. decisionmakers, who were coping with the realities of a military force reduction that demobilized roughly 11 million military personnel from a force of 12 million, argued that the United States had “little strategic interest in Korea, or maintaining troops or bases in Korea ... and the Soviet threat is not immediately serious.”4 Not until North Korea’s invasion on June 25, 1950, did the U.S. national command authority acknowledge the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula as President Harry Truman and his advisers pondered the implications of a Communist victory for Japan and other Asian states. Thus, U.S. national security planners finally came to join their counterparts in Tokyo, Moscow, and Beijing in considering the Korean Peninsula as the strategic center of Northeast Asia.
Although there is considerable scholarly debate about the events of late 1949 and 1950, many believe that part of the reason the North attacked was its confidence that the United States would not fight. This North Korean miscalculation rested on Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s famous
3 Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1983), 20. 4 U.S. Department of State, RG 59, box #7394, 895.01/2-2547, Memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War Section III-A (cited in Yeonmi Ahn, 66). A WORKING GROUP REPORT 15 statement in January 1950 that put South Korea outside the U.S. defense perimeter.5 Commanding less attention was Acheson’s comment implying that the United Nations would reinforce countries outside of the defense perimeter in defending against attacks.
Koreans fought a North-South war to resolve the postliberation question of which Korean government would govern unified Korea. The United States, however, had to decide whether or not to fight what was then considered a “monolithic Communist menace.” Indeed, the United States ultimately became involved in defending South Korea as part of a broader ideological conception of strategic interests befitting its status as an emerging superpower. Korea became the proving ground for the new U.S. policy to resist Communist expansion. Within 65 days of concluding the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the United States and the ROK signed a bilateral security alliance to “strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area”; interestingly, the treaty does not specifically mention North Korea. U.S. policy sought more than the creation of a military alliance. It also called for building up the ROK as a political and economic bulwark against Communist expansion in Northeast Asia.
D. Vietnam South Korean involvement in the Vietnam War deepened the U.S.–ROK relationship for several years in the 1960s. Approximately 300,000 South Korean troops served in Vietnam, in the White Horse and Tiger divisions. The arrangement served both countries well. The United States could point to an ally that supported its war, while South Korea deepened its security relationship with the United States and received economic benefits.6 For example, the United States promised that in return for sending troops to Vietnam, USAID (the U.S. Agency for International Development) would provide $150 million specifically for Korean economic development, while the United States would pay for the cost of basing South Korean troops in Vietnam. 7 The United States also paid shipping costs for South Korean goods sent to Vietnam in support of the troops. According to Kim Suk-joon, between 1965 and 1969, South Korean earnings from its involvement in Vietnam totaled $546 million, or 16 percent of its total foreign receipts for that period. It totaled $1 billion if extended to 1973.8 Such gains were crucial in helping South Korea meet its economic goals during this period.
However, in the late 1960s and 1970s, first President Richard Nixon and then President Jimmy Carter, respectively, either withdrew U.S. troops from South Korea or announced intentions to do so during a time when the ROK remained highly vulnerable to the North. Nixon’s “Asia for Asians” speech—aimed at providing a rationale for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam—had significant political, economic, and geopolitical repercussions for South Korea, especially in light of North Korean commando attacks in 1968 against the Blue House in Seoul and the Ulchin-Samchok region in the east. Those raids killed a number of South Koreans. Because the United States defended South Korea for broad geopolitical reasons, ROK leaders were always acutely aware that the U.S. commitment to South Korean defense could change at any time. President Park Chung-hee never
5 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A contemporary history (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 9. 6 Woo Jung-en, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 119. (Woo writes, “In the days of the Vietnam War, when Korean soldiers substituted for Americans for a pittance, [President Lyndon] Johnson guaranteed Korean security lock, stock, and barrel, and told him so.”) 7 Kim Se-jin, “South Korea’s Involvement in Vietnam and Its Economic and Political Impact,” Asian Survey 10, no. 6 (1970). 8 Han Sung-joo, “South Korea’s Participation in the Vietnam Conflict,” Orbis 21, no. 4 (Winter, 1978): 898. 16 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
felt completely comfortable relying on a tepid U.S. commitment to his defense, and yet the need to rely on the United States was a critical aspect of South Korean political and economic reality.
By the late 1960s, as it became clear that the United States was no longer willing to subsidize the Korean economy to the same level it had a decade earlier, and as it began to withdraw more than a third of its military forces in South Korea, 9 the Park regime was forced to cast about for new ways of safeguarding ROK security. Some consideration was being given to developing an indigenous nuclear deterrent. In South Korean eyes, the U.S. defense commitment was waning. Even in 1972, U.S. decisionmakers were asking, “Should we wish to be automatically involved in another Korean War were it to break out?”10
The worst-case scenario for South Korean leaders in the 1970s was the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula, which would leave the South vulnerable to North Korean subversion or invasion. President Carter’s effort to implement his campaign pledge to remove U.S. troops from the peninsula, for example, again unpleasantly reminded South Koreans of their keen vulnerability to U.S. actions, while raising questions about U.S. reliability as an ally. South Koreans came to resent their dependence on the United States, as well as such uncoordinated U.S. initiatives. The Carter effort to withdraw U.S. forces led to the infamous “Korea gate” scandal of 1976, in which an agent of the South Korean government, Park Tong-sun, was reported to be spending almost $1 million a year to bribe congressional and other officials as part of the government’s attempt to persuade the United States to remain in South Korea.11 Ultimately, President Carter’s efforts to downsize U.S. forces in Korea prompted a massive U.S. intelligence reassessment of the North Korean threat, which built a consensus that neutralized the Carter initiative.
E. Kwangju Incident The issue that most divided South Koreans in their perceptions of the United States was the furious debate over whether the United States had implicitly or explicitly supported Chun Doo-hwan’s so- called “creeping” coup d’état in 1980. This issue remains intensely emotional in South Korea, because much of the South Korean population remains convinced that Chun Doo-hwan could not have suppressed the Kwangju uprising without at least an implicit U.S. consent.12 The Kwangju massacre—more than any other single incident—led to a basic shift in opinions among many South Koreans. Anti-Americanism and anger at what was perceived as U.S. arrogance and high-handedness began to grow noticeably from that point onward.13 When such feelings were combined with perceptions of steadfast U.S. support for three decades of military governments, many South Koreans came to distrust, and indeed dislike, the United States.
9 In 1971, President Nixon withdrew one entire division, reducing troop levels from 62,000 to 42,000. Figures cited in Bruce Cummings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 359. 10 Staff report prepared for the use of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Korea and the Philippines: November 1972, Committee Print, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, February 18, 1973, 47. 11 William H. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 34. 12 Official estimates are that 200 civilians were killed by ROK troops, although informal estimates run as high as 10 times that amount. See John Adams Wickham, Korea on the Brink: from the 12/12 Incident to the Kwangju Uprising, 1979–1980 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999); and Linda Lewis, ed., Laying Claim to the Memory of May: A Look Back at the 1980 Kwangju Uprising (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, 2002). 13 Shin Gi-wook, “South Korean anti-Americanism,” Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (August 1996): 787–804. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 17
The assassination of President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979, laid the foundation for the Kwangju incident. Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah immediately became acting president under the constitution, and his government implemented martial law pending results of an investigation of the assassination. Army Major General Chun Doo-hwan led the investigation and ultimately led an internal coup against the army’s chief of staff and senior leaders on December 12, 1979 (the 12/12 Incident). General Chun emerged as the most influential person in Korea, the power behind acting President Choi and a growing source of concern to Koreans (and Americans) seeking greater democratization.
In the late winter and early spring of 1980, college students—“commonly considered the voice of Korea’s conscience”14—noted with alarm General Chun’s persisting influence in national decisionmaking and began to demonstrate against his creeping coup, thus prompting government countermeasures. Tension escalated in May with major demonstrations in Kwangju City, the capital of the southwestern South Cholla Province. The government again imposed martial law on May 18. It closed the National Assembly and arrested two future presidents—Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung—among other major opposition political leaders. Over the protestations of U.S. government officials, the South Korean government also dispatched military forces to suppress the Kwangju demonstrations, killing 240 people according to official ROK government documents and more than 2,000 people according to government critics. To create what it considered to be an appropriate force mix, the ROK government exercised its sovereign right to withdraw some units from the operational control of the CFC, whose peacetime mission is to deter North Korean aggression. Roughly three months after suppressing the Kwangju demonstrations, the National Conference for Unification elected General Chun as South Korea’s president on August 27, 1980.
Many South Koreans believed the United States had the power to stop Chun and blamed Washington for not doing so. Given the combined U.S.–ROK military command structure, in which the United States played a leading role, they mistakenly believed the United States controlled ROK military forces even when they are deployed for domestic purposes and thus could have prevented the incident. In fact, many South Koreans did not understand the sovereign nature of ROK government command of ROK military forces and the fact that the United States exercised no such control. General Chun’s government was understandably reluctant to clarify those relationships. In the aftermath of Kwangju, anti-American actions grew, including arson attacks against the U.S. Information Center in Seoul and the U.S. Cultural Center in Pusan in 1980 and 1982, respectively, plus demonstrations protesting the visit to Seoul of President Ronald Reagan in 1983.15 Persistent misapprehension concerning Kwangju seriously and deeply affected popular sentiment toward the United States within the idealistic, younger South Korean generation, sentiment that continues to resonate in South Korean society as that generation assumes elite status in the country nearly 25 years later.
F. North Korean Nuclear Crises: 1993-1994 The United States and the ROK discerned by the early 1990s that North Korea had embarked on a nuclear weapons development program. The relatively conservative administrations of U.S. president George H. W. Bush and ROK president Roh Tae-woo attempted to stop the program
14 Paul Chamberlin, Korea 2010, The Challenges of the New Millennium (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2001), 43. 15 Kim Ah-Young, “Old Waves or a New Surge? Anti-Americanism from a South Korean Perspective” (paper presented at the fifteenth New Zealand Asian Studies Society International Conference Asia: Images, Ideas, Identities, at the University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand, November 23, 2002), 6. 18 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE through diplomacy, which resulted in an inter-Korea joint denuclearization accord in December 1991. Unfortunately, the two Koreas could not agree on detailed arrangements to implement the accord.
In early 1993, the United States and the ROK each experienced a change in presidential leadership: Bill Clinton became the U.S. president in January; Kim Young-sam, a former dissident leader, became the ROK’s fourteenth president in February. North Korea quickly tested the two new administrations by sending signals that it was determined to become a nuclear weapons state. In mid-March 1993, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but diplomacy persuaded Pyongyang to remain (conditionally) adherent. However, in April 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally assessed North Korea as being in noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards agreement that required on-demand inspections of undeclared nuclear sites. In spring 1994, Pyongyang precipitated a crisis by removing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods from a research reactor without IAEA monitoring.
International concerns rose that North Korea was on the verge of becoming a nuclear weapons state. The Clinton administration reviewed its military options. Ultimately, during a visit by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, North Korea’s Kim Il-sung indicated he would “freeze” his nuclear program if the United States would provide advanced technology light-water nuclear reactors (LWR) to help North Korea with energy generation. On October 21, 1994, the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea signed the U.S.–DPRK Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework represented a major shift in U.S. policy toward North Korea as Washington concluded that traditional deterrence policy and confrontation could not stop Pyongyang from pursuing indigenous weapons programs. Engagement (apparently) succeeded where confrontation had failed.
The new U.S.–North Korea engagement policy had significant implications for South Koreans in the post–Cold War period. The Agreed Framework called for the construction of an LWR in North Korea under a newly established multilateral consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. It also called on the United States and North Korea to improve their bilateral relationship. The agreement thus provided an unprecedented opportunity for South Koreans to begin building a range of relationships with North Koreans. A series of natural disasters in North Korea in the 1990s provided additional opportunities for interaction through the provision of humanitarian assistance.
Growing contacts with North Koreans reinforced the perceptions of liberal South Koreans that North Korea was more to be pitied than feared. Such opinions and practical moves toward inter- Korean reconciliation became especially prevalent during the administration of President Kim Dae- jung, who commenced his five-year term of office in February 1998.
G. Engagement and Sunshine President Kim had long criticized conservative “military governments” for excessively politicizing the North Korean threat and impeding inter-Korea reconciliation efforts. As president, he called for a “sunshine policy” to engage North Korea and to start the reconciliation process. This approach complemented the Clinton administration’s engagement approach. It also helped reduce anti- American sentiment in South Korea, as the ROK and U.S. presidential administrations were both relatively liberal and less influenced by conservative “cold warriors” than their predecessors. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 19
Kim’s “sunshine policy” achieved a significant breakthrough in June 2000: an unprecedented summit between the ROK and North Korean heads of state. The next few months saw a flurry of political, commercial, and social exchanges, including reunions between families separated by the Korean War. According to some observers, South Koreans were “giddy” at the prospect of finally improving relations with their long-estranged brethren in the north. This elation was especially true among those who had not experienced the horrors of the Korean War and the brutality of North Korean forces killing innocent South Koreans when the North occupied ROK territory. Conservatives, especially those who had experienced the Korean War, were more wary of those developments in 2000.
Post-summit euphoria seemed to reach its zenith in October 2000 when the White House received a special envoy from Kim Jong-il. Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok and Secretary of State Madeline Albright signed a joint communiqué on October 12, 2000, “to fundamentally improve [the U.S. and North Korean] bilateral relationship.”16 Kim Dae-jung and fellow South Koreans were pleased, as were North Koreans. Conservatives in South Korea and the United States, however, were less euphoric. The promise of the joint communiqué quickly dissipated with the inauguration of a more conservative U.S. government headed by President George W. Bush, even as South Korean enthusiasm surged to seek an end to the cold war legacy of a divided Korea.
Pervasive U.S. Influence on ROK Modernization
The second strand that has characterized the U.S.–ROK relationship is the actual and presumed influence of the United States on South Korea’s culture and society.17 Perceptions of a dominant United States are inevitable in South Korea, simply because of the importance of the U.S. role in Korea’s modern history and the significant difference in size and situation of the two countries. South Korea’s rapid political and economic modernization and the U.S. model of a free-market, liberal democracy have also influenced significant changes in the transition of South Korea’s major social institutions—family, religion, education, economics, and politics—from an agrarian society to one of the world’s most advanced economies, including membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Those changes have stimulated exceptional anxiety among South Koreans who lament the diminution of cherished, traditional, Confucian-based cultural values. 18 Culturally, economically, and politically, the United States has directly or indirectly put an imprint on all aspects of South Korean life, leading in turn to a South Korean love-hate view of its ally.
A. Early Influence: Christian Missionaries In cultural terms, missionaries were a central aspect from the very beginning of American relations with Korea in the nineteenth century. The missionaries were not forced upon Korea by a colonial power, as was the case in many other countries. Rather, Koreans brought in Christianity and actively supported that religion’s growth. Missionaries founded major hospitals, schools, and universities, as
16 U.S. Department of State Office of International Information Programs, “U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué” October 12, 2000,
B. Democratization The United States influenced South Korean democratization consistent with a general belief that democracy was fundamentally a domestic affair and, therefore, could not be imposed on a friendly power, especially an ally such as the ROK. U.S. policy sought first to create a secure environment for South Korea in which it could develop a sound economy. Through development of a South Korean middle class, democratic changes would eventually follow. In its relations with South Korea during the Cold War, the United States put a premium on domestic stability and national security, particularly in relation to the North Korean threat, and thus it was reluctant to put too much pressure on authoritarian ROK regimes to reform for fear of negatively affecting important alliance unity in the face of what was viewed as a global Communist threat.
Nonetheless, the United States did play a large role in advising the emerging ROK democratic government in the 1940s on its new constitution and on activities as South Korea held its first democratic election in 1948. The United States twice prevented the execution of Kim Dae-jung: when he was kidnapped in the 1970s by Korean intelligence agents and again when he was sentenced to death after his arrest in May 1980. The United States also encouraged the democratic transition in 1987 that reflected broad social consensus for democratic government, making democratization a bona fide domestic development, not an imposed foreign objective.
The United States was not reluctant at times to use its strong economic leverage to promote democratization. When Park Chung-hee began to hedge on his promise to hold elections after his coup in 1961, for example, the United States applied pressure on him to relent, withholding portions of U.S. aid in an attempt to push the South Korean government to undertake economic and political reform. Without recourse to other sources of funding and facing a severe economic situation, Park acquiesced to U.S. demands in 1963 and held elections. Unfortunately, as South Korea’s economy got stronger and more immune to such pressure, strong economic leverage was not available to the United States.
Despite attending to national security as its primary alliance interest, the United States has assisted the evolution of South Korean democratization. Many South Koreans rightfully feel proud of their hard struggle in the 1980s to establish democracy in their country, but those same people tend to undervalue and underestimate the role the United States played in encouraging ROK authoritarian governments to accede to democratic demands. This lingering perception, particularly within younger generations of South Koreans, may have an effect on future trends in relations with the United States. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 21
C. Economic Development Although South Korea had a per capita income of $67 in 1953 and of $670 in 1976, by 1997 per capita income had risen to $11,400.19 Today the ROK is the third largest economy in Asia, a member of the OECD, and a major trading and investment nation throughout the world.
The United States invested heavily in South Korea’s economic development from 1945 through 1979, largely as a bulwark against Communist expansion during the Cold War. For the first 20 years of independence, the underlying source of economic activity and investment in South Korea was U.S. aid. From 1945 through 1979, when formal U.S. aid programs ended, the United States provided more economic assistance to South Korea than to any other country in the world except Vietnam and Israel.20 At one point during the 1950s, U.S. aid made up 70 percent of the ROK government’s budget.21 South Koreans vigorously capitalized on those investments to achieve virtually unmatched economic development. Few countries in the world have grown as quickly or as dramatically as South Korea. Unfortunately, many South Koreans do not seem to be well aware of the helpful U.S. role in the process.
In addition to South Korea’s economic numbers, the United States heavily influenced the ROK economic bureaucracy. During the 1950s, the Budget Bureau—headed by Lee Hahn-been – maintained particularly close links with the United States through the Combined Economic Board. Lee Hahn-been recruited college graduates and those completing American training programs to work in his bureau. This cadre also fed into the ROK’s Economic Planning Board (EPB) when it was established in 1961. So close was their relationship in the 1960s that the USAID offices were situated across the street from the EPB.
D. End of Military Government The reluctance of ROK presidents Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan to democratize their “military governments” and the South Korean popular misperceptions that the United States endorsed their authoritarian rule combined to produce major changes in U.S.–ROK relations as South Koreans began to accelerate the democratization process in 1987.22
In early June 1987, President Chun Doo-hwan reaffirmed his intention to step down at the end of his term in February 1988 and announced that retired Army Major General Roh Tae-woo would replace him. President Chun envisioned a traditional “indirect” election that would ultimately be decided not by direct popular vote but indirectly by an electoral college. South Korean citizens immediately protested this decision through nationwide demonstrations urging direct elections. Roh established calm after several weeks when he announced his intention to institute and participate in a direct presidential election.
19 Robert Wade, “East Asia’s Economic Success,” World Politics 44, no. 2 (January 1992): 277; and The World Bank, “Country Data Profile 2002,”
The popular election of Roh Tae-woo in the latter half of 1987 marked the beginning of a genuine transition to democracy and the end of three decades of military rule. Although subsequent elections have been marked by controversies typical of democratic politics, South Korea’s democracy has become increasingly consolidated and institutionalized. After decades of conservative, authoritarian government, under which free expression had been muzzled in the interest of alleged national security, democracy liberated South Koreans to express a wide range of ideas and opinions, many of which were progressive, if not leftist. From labor unions to blue-collar workers, intellectuals, and even middle classes, a vibrant political left began to emerge to counter the conservative establishment.
Some popular views during this period surprised many Americans. During the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics, for example, Americans were shocked to hear their South Korean allies vigorously cheer for teams opposing U.S. athletes, including teams from the Soviet Union and other U.S. adversaries. Indeed, anti-Americanism began to spread more widely within ROK society during this period of democratic transition, because of the traditional view that the United States served as an obstacle to political reform. By the early 1990s, however, this anti-Americanism developed into vague resentment against U.S. culture and U.S. political and economic domination, while maintaining some ideological elements among radical students who continued to protest U.S. military presence as an obstacle to peace on the peninsula.
E. 1997 Financial (IMF) Crisis In the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, anti-Americanism made a slight resurgence. The crisis stemmed in part from the inability of South Korea’s managed economy to respond to investor and creditor concerns about the ability of highly indebted South Korean companies to meet their debt servicing obligations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to provide financial assistance if South Korea would agree to implement major structural reforms. The incoming administration of President Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) agreed to the reforms and set about transitioning South Korea from a managed to a market economy.
South Korean critics of the reforms—and of the Kim government—perceived the IMF as acting on orders from the U.S. government, and they believed that the United States used the 1997 financial crisis as a lever to pressure South Korea to make concessions on trade and investment. Most South Koreans, however, acknowledged the importance of the IMF’s recommended political and economic reforms. The reforms enabled the Korean economy to begin an important transition to a more sound and efficient business model. Since 1998, South Korea has made impressive gains in eliminating crony capitalism and in moving toward becoming a market economy, although South Korea and the United States continue to spar over specific economic issues such as agricultural tariffs, finance, and high technology exports.
F. Cultural and Social Ties The U.S.–ROK relationship has developed broad cultural and social ties over the past half century. Most notably, almost two million ethnic Koreans now live in the United States, forming an important bond between the two countries that may serve well to promote understanding and to bridge cultural or social divides over time. Korean students come to the United States to study in great numbers every year. From 1990 to 2000, the Korean-American population in the United States A WORKING GROUP REPORT 23
grew by 34 percent.23 Those numbers are increasing steadily and are forming the basis of a lasting relationship. Korean-Americans have become present in all aspects of U.S. life, from politics to business to academia, and this trend will only increase.
While Korean fascination with American popular culture—movies, music, and fashion—is not unique, it is still an evidence of the pervasiveness of U.S. influence on South Korean life. Indeed, many South Koreans continue to view the United States as a nation that symbolizes and epitomizes opportunity and freedom. However, one should note that some South Koreans resent the spread of modern values associated with the United States, particularly when such values seem to degrade traditional values of Korean society. The United States may not be able to control this trend of resentment toward the United States, but perhaps it should remain aware of the trend’s potential effect over time.
Conclusion
The U.S.–ROK alliance has succeeded beyond expectations in maintaining peace at the strategic crossroads of Northeast Asia, in promoting ROK modernization, and in helping enable the development of a broad middle class that has increasingly demanded democratic government since the mid-1980s. The United States, of course, pursued mutual U.S.–ROK security interests in maintaining regional peace, which was the prerequisite for South Korean development. Sometimes, the U.S. approach may have seemed shortsighted to South Korean citizens hoping for foreign assistance in imposing democracy. The end of the Cold War and rise of relatively liberal Korean War “baby boomers” to influential positions in ROK society produced a thirst for inter-Korean reconciliation that conservative U.S. policymakers had difficulty accepting, perhaps because ofthe influence of long-held friendships with conservative South Korean counterparts.
This brief chapter has provided an overview of five decades of the U.S.–ROK relationship and of key enduring factors that have endured throughout the history of the Korean-American relationship and have informed contemporary South Korean sentiment toward the United States. The United States and South Korea have histories that are deeply entwined. Economically, politically, and culturally, the two nations have had a major effect on each other. From the opening of Korea to the outside world in the nineteenth century to Japanese colonization in the early twentieth century, from the division of the Korean Peninsula after World War II to the Korean and Vietnamese wars, the United States has served as a central component of Korean history, society, and security, especially in South Korea’s economic development and ultimately in its democratic transition. We should not overlook the many positive aspects of the relationship and much of the deep warmth that still exists between the peoples of the two countries. However, as this chapter has shown, aspects of this bilateral history have left lasting strains on South Korean sentiment, strains whose nature should require serious attention from authorities in both countries if they are to guide the relationship for the coming century.
23 Korean American Coalition-Census Information Center in partnership with the Center for Korean American and Korean Studies, California State University, Los Angeles, July 26, 2003,
Chapter III Yankee Go Home? A Historical View of South Korean Sentiment toward the United States, 2001–2004 Kim Seung-hwan
Introduction
The recent years of 2001–2004 have witnessed a dramatic transition in South Korean views toward the United States in the 50-year-old alliance between the two countries. With the start of the Bush administration in early 2001, tensions began to develop over issues surrounding policy approaches to North Korea and over specific events during this period that stoked South Korean public anger and resentment toward the United States. At the end of 2002, public outrage reached a peak when tens of thousands of people flooded the streets of Seoul, chanting “Yankee, go home” and when they burned the U.S. flag and effigies of Bush. The groundswell of anti-American street demonstrations was the largest ever in the history of the alliance.
The proximate cause of the groundswell of protests was the U.S. military tribunal’s acquittal on November 20, 2002, of two U.S. servicemen who were involved in a traffic accident that killed two South Korean schoolgirls. Before this event, however, various misunderstandings already existed within the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK), misunderstandings that created underlying discomfort and unease within South Korean society. Bush’s harsh rhetoric and hard-line policy toward North Korea, an incident between American and South Korean short- track speed skaters at the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, disputes related to the U.S. military presence in South Korea, and the U.S. war on Iraq—all were sources of popular resentment toward the United States. The confluence of such events and the 2002 South Korean presidential election collectively created a “perfect storm” whose aftereffects continue to resonate, despite some apparent moderation in 2003–2004.
Bush-Kim Summit in Washington
As 2001 dawned, President Kim Dae-jung had seen his “sunshine policy” of engagement with North Korea bear fruit with the historic South-North summit in June 2000 in Pyongyang. The resulting popular euphoria in South Korea and the political (and, as it turned out, economic) capital expended to achieve this landmark event led Kim to de-emphasize the fear of a military threat from North Korea and the possibility of a war on the peninsula. As a result, the South Korean public began to devalue the role of the U.S. military presence in the country and to focus on its burdens rather than its benefits. Despite the Clinton administration’s active support for Kim’s engagement policy with North Korea, some South Koreans viewed the U.S. presence as an impediment to reconciliation between the two Koreas. The Kim Dae-jung government made little effort to dissuade the South Korean public of this misperception. A WORKING GROUP REPORTd 25
When George W. Bush was inaugurated as president of the United States in January 2001, many in Seoul predicted that the honeymoon for Kim’s sunshine policy was over and that a series of policy conflicts would develop between the conservative Bush administration and the left-of-center Kim government. During the presidential election campaign, Bush’s foreign policy advisers had already disapproved publicly of Kim’s policy of unconditional engagement with North Korea and had provided a preview of changes to come in U.S. foreign policy toward the peninsula.
The Kim government got off to a rocky start in its relationship with the Bush administration. On February 27, 2001, two weeks before a scheduled U.S.–ROK summit in Washington, Kim openly took Russia’s side against the United States in supporting the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and opposing missile defense during an ROK–Russia summit in Seoul. Kim’s disapproval of Bush’s proposed missile defense program, a central element of the new president’s defense policy, publicly embarrassed the Bush administration and left Washington pondering the Kim administration’s intentions of cooperating with the United States as an ally in international affairs.
In March 2001, the U.S.–ROK summit in Washington further soured bilateral relations early in Bush’s term. At the summit, Kim tried to lecture the newly inaugurated president on the wisdom of the sunshine policy. He seemed to have believed that he could convince Bush to accept his advice on North Korean policy. Despite President Kim’s lecture that North Korea was changing to ensure the survival of its regime and that Washington and Seoul should help the process, Bush expressed considerable skepticism about the North Korean leadership, describing Kim Jong-il as unreliable and secretive.1 Kim Dae-jung’s recommendation for resuming the dialogue where the Clinton administration left off fell (mostly) on deaf ears, as the Bush team undertook a comprehensive review of North Korea policy.2 Bush felt that the Clinton administration had been too conciliatory and blind to North Korea’s evil and that Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy had propped up a bankrupt dictator and forestalled his collapse. Bush questioned the wisdom of negotiating with Kim Jong-il, whom he perceived as a dictator who starved his country’s people yet earned millions from selling weapons to rogue states.
Bush’s warning at the summit received broad support from conservatives and from many among the elite in South Korea because it offered them solid ground to criticize Kim Dae-jung and his unconditional engagement with North Korea. In their eyes, Bush’s remarks were indirect expressions of disapproval of Kim Dae-jung. They hoped that the Bush administration would serve as a hedge against the danger of the South making excessive concessions to the North.
Nevertheless, the cold reception of Kim Dae-jung in Washington and his failure to garner U.S. support for his policy of engagement with North Korea contributed to South Korea’s negative views toward the United States. In the view of the younger generation, liberal politicians, and civic groups, Bush’s policies were driving North Korea into a corner, risking provocative actions and damage to Seoul’s efforts to continue overtures for reconciliation with the North.
1 “Bush Tells Seoul Talks with North Won’t Resume Now,” The New York Times, March 8, 2001, sec. A, p.1. See also “Bush Casts a Shadow on Korea Missile Talks,” Washington Post, March 8, 2001, sec. A, p.1. 2 The exceptions to the new administration’s “deafness” to Kim’s entreaty apparently included the new secretary of state, Colin Powell, who, on the eve of the summit, expressed to the U.S. media an inclination to continue the process of dialogue with North Korea that the Clinton administration had started. President Bush publicly corrected Secretary Powell on this point the next day. 26 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCEd
Bush’s “Axis of Evil”
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, helped further strengthen the Bush administration’s hard-line posture vis-à-vis North Korea. In the aftermath of the epochal attack on U.S. soil, the Bush administration began to focus its attention more on ending hostile or rogue regimes than on managing them. Similarly, Washington also focused more intently on the potential proliferation threats posed by regimes like that in North Korea. North Korea was on the U.S. Department of State’s list of nations that sponsored terrorism and had a record of exporting missile technology and military equipment to so-called rogue states, including Iraq, Iran, and Syria. U.S. concerns about North Korea were reflected in Bush’s denunciation of North Korea as part of an “axis of evil” in his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002.
Bush’s harsh rhetoric toward the North after 9/11, including his enunciation in mid-2002 of a doctrine of military “preemption” that could be applied to North Korea, dismayed the liberal Kim Dae-jung government and disquieted many in South Korea, thereby raising fears that Washington could precipitate a crisis on the peninsula as part of its global war on terrorism.3 A senior South Korean diplomat in Washington complained that Bush’s speech dismayed the ROK government and warned about “unnecessary tensions or escalation of rhetoric.4 Some liberal legislators from both the ruling and the opposition parties also attacked Washington, issuing a statement that “Bush and his hawkish foreign policy advisers were heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula and expanding the war on terrorism in an attempt to justify an increased U.S. defense budget, detract from the Enron scandal, and lay the groundwork to win the November elections.”5
Bush’s perception of and approach to North Korea resonated negatively with much of the South Korean public. In particular, Bush’s personal attack on Kim Jong-il in a book interview, using words like “pygmy” and “loathe” to describe his views of the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), along with his explicit support for regime change in North Korea, led to growing resentment by the public over the subsequent rise of tensions, over Bush’s apparent lack of seriousness about engaging Kim Jong-il, and over the Bush administration’s perceived lack of understanding of how to operate effectively in an Asian context.6
Among South Koreans, 6 in 10 registered disapproval of Bush’s axis of evil statement.7 In February 2002, some student activists forced their way into the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Seoul to protest the pending visit of President Bush. Many in the younger generation, which now makes up a majority of the South Korean population, desired reconciliation with the North and saw Bush’s approach as both unilateral and high-handed.8
3 For an expanded study, see Kim Seung-hwan, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 1 (Winter 2002–03): 109–22. 4 Peter Slevin and Mike Allen, “Bush's Asia Trip Will Focus on Terrorism; President to Visit Japan, China, S. Korea,”. Washington Post, February 16, 2002, sec. A, p. 20. 5 “Statement of the Ruling and Opposition Party Members in the National Assembly over President Bush’s State of the Union Speech,” issued on February 4, 2002, by 16 ROK parliamentarians.
2002 Winter Olympics
In February 2002, a controversial incident during the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, further inflamed public opinion about the United States. South Koreans perceived an Australian referee as unfairly disqualifying South Korean short-track speed skater, Kim Dong-sung, for blocking an American skater. South Koreans’ belief that the United States stole a gold medal from South Korea seemed to be reflected in an Internet poll conducted in the United States by NBC in which 96 percent of respondents answered that the ruling was “unfair.”9 South Korean anger further intensified when NBC’s Jay Leno made a racially discriminatory remark that “the angry [South] Korean athlete went home, kicked his dog, and ate it.”10 When Leno’s comments were aired on South Korea’s major television networks, condemnation and protests spread throughout the country.
In an unprecedented move, angry young South Koreans responded with an anti-American campaign to boycott U.S. products, including Coca-Cola and franchised U.S. restaurants such as McDonald’s. Shortly thereafter, they also protested against the South Korean government’s selection of the Boeing F-15K fighter over European competitors as South Korea’s next-generation fighter, claiming that the selection was made because of pressure from the Bush administration. A poll showed that 64 percent of South Koreans opposed the selection of the Boeing fighter.11
Indeed, by fall 2002, a public survey reflected that despite the nearly 50-year alliance with the United States, South Koreans’ opinion of the United States was at a historic low. South Korea was one of only two non-Islamic nations where a majority of the population opposed the U.S. war on terror, which was the central concern of that long-time ally.12 One incident during the early summer crystallized this growing anger and brought the results into dramatic public display a traffic accident.
Traffic Accident of Two Schoolgirls
On June 13, 2002, two South Korean middle-school students were struck and killed by a U.S. armored vehicle that was participating in a training exercise. The incident severely exacerbated growing ROK resentment toward the United States. Although the accident was clearly unintentional, the way it was mishandled by the United States Forces Korea (USFK) led to anti-American protests throughout the country. For instance, the insistence by a U.S. military spokesman soon after the incident that “no one was at fault” was viewed as an extension of U.S. arrogance and as degrading to
up 51 percent of South Korea’s population in 2002.
the South Korean people.13 The rejection of South Korea’s request for jurisdiction over the case and the subsequent U.S. investigation, in which the South Korean police and military had little role, resulted in further ill will toward the United States.
On November 20, 2002, four weeks before the South Korean presidential election, a U.S. military tribunal acquitted the two U.S. servicemen involved in the accident, precipitating a spontaneous outburst of popular anger toward the United States. In the following weeks, the scattered street protests swelled into massive demonstrations. Tens of thousands of people in Seoul and other cities held candlelight vigils and demonstrated against the United States and the alliance almost daily, chanting “Yankee, go home” and calling for “revision of the SOFA” (Status of Forces Agreement).14 They burned U.S. flags and effigies of President Bush and hurled Molotov cocktails onto U.S. bases.
The anti-American demonstrations of late 2002, however, did not represent all of South Korean public opinion. Interestingly, public anti-American outrage in Seoul was soon followed by large-scale pro-American counterdemonstrations held by conservative South Korean civic groups as they expressed support for the U.S. military presence in South Korea and for the strengthening of the U.S.–ROK alliance and the condemning of North Korea for its nuclear program.15,16 Those demonstrations sought to demonstrate that a majority of South Koreans were still friends of the United States. Indeed, conservatives repeatedly insisted that participants at the anti-American protests represented only a small radical minority of South Korean society; however, polls at the time revealed that a majority of South Koreans disliked the United States (54 percent) and believed that North Korea’s nuclear intransigence was the result of the Bush administration’s hard-line policy (51 percent).17
Differences over DPRK Nuclear Crisis
The 2002 street demonstrations had been fueled, in part, by the nuclear crisis with North Korea that began in the fall of 2002. In October, North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, in response to allegations presented by the United States, apparently admitted to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in Pyongyang that North Korea was engaged in a uranium enrichment program to develop nuclear weapons.18 The United States viewed North Korea’s nuclear program not only as a violation of the 1994 Geneva Agreement (the so-called “Agreed Framework”), but also as a potential threat of international proliferation, given the violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the potential effect of a nuclear North Korea on the security calculations of other
13 See transcript of “Issues Focus,” Mun Hwa Broadcasting Corp., June 28, 2002. 14 “SOFA” refers to the “U.S.–ROK Status of Forces Agreement,” which governs jurisdictional and other questions related to U.S. forces stationed in South Korea. 15 A number of religious groups, members of the Korean Veterans Association, and other conservative nongovernmental organizations organized the pro-American demonstrations. 16 Hyo-Lim Son, “50,000 Christians Rally at the Square of Seoul City Hall, Opposing the Withdrawal of the U.S. Forces and Anti-Americanism,” Dong-A Ilbo, January 19, 2003,
regional states that have foresworn nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States feared that North Korea might be tempted to sell nuclear weapons-grade material to other nations or even to non-state actors, including terrorists, for cash. Those fears explained, in part, Washington’s strong reaction to the North Korean program. The United States announced it would terminate provision of heavy fuel oil to North Korea as required under the Agreed Framework and ultimately demanded that North Korea commit to “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” of all nuclear facilities throughout that country as a precondition for negotiating a settlement of the impasse.
South Koreans generally stood with the United States against North Korea. Nevertheless, many citizens had different perspectives on the “actual” nuclear threat posed by North Korea. South Korea’s consideration of national security has been based traditionally on peninsula stability rather than international considerations such as nuclear nonproliferation. Many in South Korea also believed that North Korea would not use nuclear weapons against South Korea even if the North did possess them and that Pyongyang developed its nuclear program only for defense against attack and not for offensive purposes.19 Many in the younger generation even contended that any nuclear weapons that the North may develop were “Korean bombs” and thus a source of national pride and an asset that perhaps would become theirs upon Korean reunification.
For many South Koreans, the Bush administration’s approach to North Korea was as much a source of the crisis as Pyongyang’s covert nuclear program. In February 2003, the U.S. television program “60 Minutes” quoted four South Korean college students as considering Bush more threatening than Kim Jong-il. In their view, the Bush administration needlessly aggravated tensions with the North by ridiculing Kim Dae-jung’s policy of engagement with North Korea, by labeling Pyongyang as part of an “axis of evil,” and by refusing to engage in dialogue with the North Korean leadership on its nuclear program.20
2002 ROK Presidential Election
On December 19, 2002, at the height of anti-American sentiment, South Korea held its presidential election. The dynamics of a political campaign provided additional fuel to the anti-American street demonstrations, which were, in turn, exploited for political purposes.
The conservative candidate Lee Hoi-chang held the view that South Korea and the United States should be closely aligned. Echoing the views of many Bush administration officials, Lee called Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy a “failed policy of appeasement” and said that he would halt economic exchanges until North Korea’s nuclear crisis was resolved. His opponent, Roh Moo-hyun, a former human rights and labor lawyer who once called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, distanced himself from the United States. Stressing that he would not “kowtow” to the Americans, Roh called for a new independence from the United States in ROK foreign policy and renegotiation of SOFA for the 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea. He also proposed to play a mediating role
19 Hong Young-rim, “Research on Korean Generations: Political Views of Those at Their 20s and 30s,” Chosun Ilbo, January 1, 2003. 20 In fact, the June 2000 South–North summit raised the expectations of the South Korean public to the point where it no longer tolerated anti–North Korean actions or criticism of Kim Jong-il. According to a January 2003 survey, 59 percent of South Koreans wanted to see the continuation of Kim Dae-jung’s policy of engagement with North Korea. See “Future Course of Korea: Policies toward North Korea and the United States,” Segye Ilbo, January 30, 2003. 30 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCEd
between Washington and Pyongyang on the North Korean nuclear issue, instead of taking the side of the United States as its ally. Roh also promised to continue pursuing Kim’s sunshine policy of unconditional engagement with North Korea.
It was widely believed in South Korea that the Bush administration was hoping for Lee to win the election. After the election, many South Korean political analysts asserted that a considerable number of South Koreans, particularly in the younger generation, voted for Roh not because he was necessarily the most desirable candidate, but because they disliked Lee, who was considered too “pro-American.”
Relocation of U.S. Troops
With the victory of Roh, South Korean analysts foresaw greater tension in the U.S.–ROK relationship. Indeed, in mid-January 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld blindsided President-elect Roh by revealing to a delegation from Roh’s transition team a U.S. decision to reorient the U.S. force presence in South Korea. On February 13, Rumsfeld publicly announced at a Senate hearing, “As part of a worldwide U.S. force structure review, the United States would like to see a number of its forces move away from the Seoul area and from near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and be consolidated into two hubs, air and sea, on the peninsula.”21 The U.S. plan included the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division—the main U.S. combat units located near the DMZ and the Yongsan base in Seoul—to south of the Han River, which would be beyond the reach of North Korean artillery, along with investing $11 billion over the next four years for new equipment and systems for the defense of South Korea.
Pentagon officials held that the redeployment of U.S. troops in South Korea would enhance the alliance’s capability to deter North Korean aggression. In their view, the traditional notion of a “tripwire”—that is, that U.S. soldiers had to be present near the DMZ to deter North Korea, and to guarantee U.S. involvement in a war should North Korea attack—was antiquated and irrelevant to current political and military realities on the peninsula.22
Concerned over the implications for ROK security of the sudden announcement of U.S. force restructuring, South Koreans pondered the reason for Rumsfeld’s plan. Some feared the U.S. decision was preparation for a preemptive strike against North Korea. Others viewed it as “spiteful” punishment for the anti-American demonstrations of 2002–2003.23 Many believed the United States intended to send a signal to tame the new liberal leadership in Seoul.
Indeed, liberal resentment toward the United States suddenly turned to considerable apprehension over national security in early 2003. The street demonstrations began to abate as the political season ended and as President Roh considered the implications of a poor U.S.–ROK relationship not only on the security but also on the political, economic, and social stability of his country. In fact, as anti-American street demonstrations had sharply intensified at the end of 2002,
21 Bradley Graham, “U.S. May Shift Troops In Korea,” Washington Post, February 14, 2003, sec. A, p.20. 22 James Brooke, “DMZ Twist: U.S. Retreat Unsettles North Korea,” The New York Times, June 16, 2003, sec. A, p.8. See also Doug Struck, “U.S. Troops Will Leave Korean DMZ,” Washington Post, June 6, 2003, sec. A, p1. 23 Victor D. Cha, “America and South Korea: The Ambivalent Alliance?” Current History 102, no. 665 (September 2003): 279. A WORKING GROUP REPORTd 31
members of the U.S. Congress, U.S. government officials, noted scholars, and journalists in Washington began to criticize the South Koreans as ingrates, and to talk about withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea. Roh quickly recognized the danger for South Korean interests of this mutually reinforcing dynamic between the two sides.
Ironically, however, in 2003 resentment began to grow within a broad segment of the traditionally pro-American South Korean elite, as the United States unveiled a plan that could change the strategic outlines of the U.S.–ROK alliance without any consultation with Seoul. This South Korean elite had defended the United States, the U.S. military presence, and the alliance in the face of increasing criticism within South Korean society only to see the United States undermine that position by unilaterally deciding to change the nature of its alliance commitment. The development insulted many in Seoul and angered a great number of pro-American conservatives, who began to criticize the Bush administration with terms such as “arrogant” and “unilateral”— terms that echoed the sentiments expressed by their more liberal counterparts only months earlier.
The South Korean government strongly opposed the U.S. plan. On March 6, Prime Minister Goh Kun, on behalf of Roh’s two-week-old government, made an unusual plea to U.S. ambassador Thomas Hubbard to abide by three tenets: no lessening of the U.S. deterrent, a continuation of U.S. troops’ status as a “tripwire,” and no relocation of U.S. forces until the impasse over North Korea’s nuclear program is resolved.24
The U.S. plan placed Roh in an embarrassing position. During the December presidential election, he campaigned on a call for the reduction of South Korea’s reliance on U.S. forces, and many of his supporters continued to demand that U.S. troops leave the peninsula. As the United States pushed for the relocation of its forces on the peninsula, Roh reversed his position and unsuccessfully urged the United States to delay the move.
Roh’s frustration over the Bush administration’s initiative was reflected in a speech on May 1, 2003: “There is a problem with the perception that we can’t defend this country without the U.S. army. The perception is undesirable that we will all die if USFK is not here.”25 Roh reemphasized the necessity of a self-reliant national defense, instructing the ROK Ministry of National Defense to devise a plan to achieve self-sufficiency.26
Roh-Bush Summit in Washington
In May 2003, Roh visited Washington for the first time in his life for a summit meeting with President Bush. In contrast to the Kim-Bush summit of March 2001, both parties were on their best behavior and sought to ensure a positive outcome to the talks. Roh belied his campaign rhetoric by showing a friendly attitude toward the Bush administration. Publicly supporting Bush’s war efforts in Iraq, Roh announced his decision to dispatch South Korean noncombatant engineering and medical units to the country despite opposition from his base of liberal civil organizations and
24 “Realignment of USFK,” Korea Herald, March 11, 2003. 25 Yun Sang-ho, “Seer,” Dong-A Ilbo, May 2, 2003. 26 For expanded explanation, see Kim Seung-hwan, “Self-Reliance in Defense without the Korea-U.S. Alliance?” Korea Focus 11, No. 5 (September–October 2003): 6–8. See also Kim Seung-hwan, “Self-Defense Without the Alliance with the United States,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 21, 2003. 32 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCEd
ruling-party politicians. Roh acknowledged the importance of U.S. forces in South Korea for peace and stability on the peninsula, admitting that his call for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea during his activist days was a mistake. Roh also seemed to side with Washington on the North Korean nuclear crisis, saying that he would not tolerate Kim Jong-il’s efforts to become a nuclear power. Regarding revisions in the U.S.–ROK alliance, Roh and Bush agreed to authorize their representatives to engage in “future of the alliance” talks and to work out the details for relocating Yongsan base and the 2nd Infantry Division south of the Han River.
Most in Seoul considered the Roh-Bush summit a success. Opposition-party members and conservatives in South Korea welcomed the outcome of the summit and hoped for a recovery in the U.S.–ROK relationship. Among some in the ruling party and the liberal nongovernmental community, however, the result was viewed with anger and with dismay over Roh’s apparent betrayal of the anti-American cause.
First Anniversary of Schoolgirls Incident
The Roh-Bush summit in Washington apparently resonated positively with public sentiment toward the United States. On June 13, 2003, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the traffic accident involving the death of two South Korean schoolgirls, liberal civic groups planned massive anti- American rallies throughout the country. However, they did not materialize. The approximately 35,000 participants at nationwide memorial rallies amounted to less than half the number who participated in the street protests in the winter of 2002–2003, and the hostility toward the United States expressed at the rallies was mild. This decrease was the result of concerted efforts by both the ROK and U.S. governments to moderate sentiment. On the eve of the rallies, Prime Minister Goh Kun strongly urged the nation to refrain from extreme acts at the memorial rallies. U.S. Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard met with the families of the two schoolgirls. In fact, opinion polls in June 2003 demonstrated that public outrage toward the USFK had declined and that the image of the Americans had improved.
War on Iraq
The U.S. war on Iraq in the spring of 2003, however, negatively affected South Korea’s view of the United States. According to a Gallup Korea survey, 8 of 10 respondents opposed the war, while only 1 in 10 supported it.27 Many South Koreans felt that the U.S. strike was unilateral and unjustifiable, and they feared that North Korea could be the next target after Iraq.
Interestingly, South Koreans were almost evenly divided over the issue of sending ROK troops to Iraq for specific missions.28 Many South Koreans believed that the dispatch of South Korean troops would serve their national interests, particularly in helping garner U.S. support in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. A majority of South Koreans ultimately approved of Roh’s decision
27 Gallup Korea News Release, March 20, 2003,
in the spring of 2003 to send medical and engineering units to Iraq to assist with postwar reconstruction.29
In the summer of 2003, Washington requested that South Korea dispatch additional troops to Iraq, preferably combat forces. This request generated strong popular opposition because of the “dangerous nature of the task” and the “high possibility of casualties.”30 Younger citizens and liberal civic groups considered acceptance of the U.S. request as submission to U.S. global policy, which they strongly opposed.
Nevertheless, a majority of National Assembly members endorsed the U.S. proposal, viewing the action as an alliance obligation.31 Many National Assembly members also believed that their decision to dispatch troops would be beneficial to the recovery of the U.S.–ROK relationship and of the South Korean economy, a view apparently also shared by senior officials in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense.32 On the strength of a United Nations Security Council resolution and National Assembly endorsement, the Roh government decided to dispatch ROK troops to Iraq in mid-October 2003, and a month later announced its decision to dispatch an additional 3,000 noncombatant troops along with $200 million of aid.
In light of the decision, Seoul asked that Washington soften its position on the nuclear standoff with North Korea, expressing South Korean concern that the dispatch could impair the second round of six-way talks over North Korea’s nuclear program, in view of North Korea’s opposition to the war.33 In late October, Bush accepted the South Korean request by offering to provide guarantees of multilateral security to North Korea in exchange for ending its nuclear weapons program, reiterating his intention to seek a diplomatic and political solution, not a military one, in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear activities.34
The ROK government welcomed the Bush administration’s more flexible position in dealing with North Korea. Those developments set the stage for close cooperation between South Korea and the United States at the second round of six-way talks held in Beijing in late February 2004.
Relocation of Yongsan Base
Most South Koreans welcomed the U.S. proposal in spring 2003 to move the Yongsan base south of the Han River by the end of 2006. Popular grievances had long festered over the U.S. military base on the grounds that it consumed a vast tract of prime real estate in central Seoul and had served as a major source of civil-military tensions for many years. The presence of Yongsan in midtown Seoul—with its attendant noise, environmental pollution, and chronic traffic congestion— has long rankled South Koreans’ sense of pride and offended their notions of sovereignty. The U.S. and South Korean governments had already agreed in 1991 to relocate the Yongsan garrison to a rear
29 KBS Poll Survey, March 24, 2003. See “An Editorial Article/Politics,” Seoul Shinmun, March 26, 2003. 30 Korea Research Report, September 16, 2003. 31 “A Majority of Koreans Agree to Send Troops to Iraq,” Hangyore Shinmun, October 20, 2003. See also “57% of the National Assembly Members Support the Troop Dispatch to Iraq,” Segye Ilbo, October 22, 2003. 32 “Strife among NSC Members over Issues Surrounding the Troop Dispatch,” Chosun Ilbo, October 29, 2003. 33 James Brooke, “South Korea May Send Troops to Iraq, but at a Price to U.S.,” The New York Times, October 7, 2003. 34 “U.S. Seeks Diplomatic Solution for North Korea, Powell Says” Washington File, January 11, 2004. For expanded explanation, see Colin L. Powell, “A Strategy of Partnership,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (January–February 2004): 22–34. 34 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCEd location, but the plan was delayed because of cost concerns and difficulty in finding an appropriate new home for U.S. forces.
In the fall of 2003, the South Korean government agreed to assume all costs (approximately $3– 5 billion) involved in the move. After some dispute over how much of Yongsan the United States might retain for a small number of residual forces, the United States decided to move all its troops, including its military headquarters, to the Osan-Pyeongtaek area to the south, to which the ROK government agreed in January 2004.
Opposition party members and conservatives criticized the Roh government, and they called for maintaining the U.S. military headquarters at Yongsan. Roh Moo-hyun, however, dealt with this issue from the perspective of “self-reliance in diplomacy.” He noted that “U.S. forces can fully perform their role even after they move to Pyeongtaek.”35 Officials in South Korea’s Department of National Defense endorsed Roh’s position, commenting that U.S. civilians in Seoul would also serve as a tripwire for U.S. intervention even if U.S. forces completely left Yongsan. Civic groups, liberal legislators, and younger South Koreans largely supported Roh’s position on Yongsan.
South Korea’s view of the move was accurately reflected in a remark made by U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in Seoul in mid-November 2003: “How would Americans feel if foreign troops occupied a large military base in Central Park in New York?” The process of consultation and ultimate agreement to relocate U.S. military forces and commands from Yongsan to the south indeed promises to remove a lingering irritant in the bilateral relationship in years to come.
Conclusion
Although the period since the winter of 2002–2003 has been marked by apparent moderation of South Korean sentiment toward the United States, anti-American sentiment is unlikely to disappear for the foreseeable future. Emotions have developed and accumulated over a protracted period and have complex roots and sources. Current trends in South Korean society—a change in demographic composition, a declining perception of threat, and a growing pride that expresses itself in a desire to be both more “equal” and more “independent” of the United States—suggest that South Korean resentment toward the United States remains a “dormant volcano,” which could explode at any time, given the right circumstances. Increasing nationalism both in South Korea and in the United States, plus the discrepancy in the two nations’ worldviews and policy goals, could create a serious rift even as cultural differences and growing mistrust continue to fuel emotional resentment. At this writing, the full implication of the April 2004 National Assembly elections—which led to majority control of the South Korean legislature by the liberal Uri Party and the ascension to power of a new generation of legislators—is not yet apparent but may serve as a further indication of transition in South Korea. It remains to be seen how this result will further challenge traditional notions of alliance management and mutual approaches to international security, including with North Korea. When a January 2004 poll reflects that more South Koreans consider the United States a greater threat to peace on the peninsula than North Korea, the trends are not encouraging.36
35 “President Roh: To Keep the UNC in Hold is an Obsolete Idea,” Chosun Ilbo, January 16, 2004. 36 A poll conducted by Research and Research (Seoul) on January 5, 2004, showed that the countries considered most threatening to the security of South Korea were the United States (39 percent), North Korea (33 percent), and China (12 percent). See “Number One Threat to South Korea’s Security is the United States,” Chosun Ilbo, January 12, 2004, A WORKING GROUP REPORTd 35
Popular sentiment may ultimately serve as the wild card to maintain a bilateral alliance that has served both sides so well for so long. Indeed, the alliance continues to operate under conditions of profound mutual interest and common values. South Koreans should remember the importance of the relationship for their national well-being, rather than allow emotionalism to control the alliance’s course in years to come.
Chapter IV South Korean Self-Identity and Evolving Views of the United States Bak Sang-mee
One of the most critical steps in constructing self-identity is to distinguish oneself from others and to establish relationships between oneself and others. Therefore, the process of locating and defining significant others is an important step in constructing one’s self-identity. Identity, which is contested and negotiated by members of society, constantly changes.
Important others relevant in the construction of a society’s identity are determined by the historical, political, and cultural circumstances in which the society is placed. For a significant part of human history, the West (Occident) has tried to define itself by creating the “Orient” as a place of imagination and fantasy. Politically and culturally, most people in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) perceive the United States in a very special way, which also is not devoid of imagination and fantasy. The relationship between South Korea and the United States is likewise not without creative and subjective characterizations of each other.
Changing geopolitical circumstances have determined who important others are for South Koreans. Since Korea found itself in a position to live in a delicate balance among powerful countries in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and especially since the end of Japanese colonialism in 1945, the United States has been an important factor in South Korea’s self-identity. How South Koreans perceive the United States and define the U.S.–ROK relationship has played an integral part in the way they think of themselves. Changing roles and images of the United States in South Korean history reflect the rapid change of South Korea’s position in the global scene. As the United States is perceived as the hegemonic power in today’s globalization process, South Koreans come to have yet another reason to be aware of the presence of the United States in defining their own position in the global scene.
Throughout this chapter, it will be argued that South Korean sentiments toward the United States are diverse. The notion of anti-Americanism needs to be carefully defined, taking into account the particular contexts in which the term is used. To achieve those tasks, one needs to examine the sociocultural landscape of South Korean society. Informal interviews with South Koreans of various backgrounds have been used as the main source of information, along with relevant literature, including media reports. To understand the sentiments of younger South Koreans toward the United States, I collected four- to five-page essays written by college students in Seoul in November 2003. The essays answered the following question: “In what ways has America influenced me in constructing my self-identity?” (This essay survey will be referred to as “College Student Essays” hereafter.) Qualitative analysis of the students’ texts has been the major analytical methodology used in this part of the study. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 37
Anti-Americanism
Recent surveys (Pew Research Center 2002, BBC 2003) reveal that there has been an increase of anti-American sentiment among South Koreans. At the same time, however, the findings suggest that South Koreans support many U.S. international policies. For example, in the BBC poll, while 49 percent of South Koreans agree with U.S. policy on terrorism, 70 percent of them agree with U.S. policy on AIDS.1 While 32 percent agree with U.S. policy on nuclear proliferation, 76 percent agree with U.S. policy on world poverty.2 Does this disparity mean that South Koreans are relatively ignorant about the United States and its policies? Or despite what they say, are South Koreans dwelling on emotional anti-Americanism (simply hating American people or anything American categorically) and not political anti-Americanism (opposing some U.S. policies on the basis of objective judgment)? Or is anti-Americanism a political ideology for South Koreans to share and pursue according to a purely philosophical stance?
A wide spectrum of sentiment toward the United States clearly exists today in South Korea. However, it is also quite evident that the proportion of South Koreans who express anti- Americanism of one kind or another has grown in recent years. In some sectors, the United States is used by members of the new generation of South Koreans to demonstrate (or assert) their newly established status in the global arena. In this context, the United States is certainly an important factor in considering developments in South Korean identity. Anti-Americanism per se can be understood as a tool to demonstrate one’s newly emerging national pride.
Shifting Self-Identities in the Era of Globalization
Is South Korea a victim of globalization? Many younger South Koreans, whose political consciousness developed in the context of dependency do not hesitate to align South Korea with the victims of globalization, who are said to compose 80 percent of world population while consuming only 20 percent of world production. On the opposite side, the United States is positioned prominently as one of the quintessential beneficiaries of globalization. While Americans make up only 20 percent of world population, they enjoy a vast majority of the world’s fruits. Given South Korea’s large volume of international trade and the country’s success in transforming itself into one of the world’s foremost exporters of high-tech products, it is not entirely convincing to portray South Korea as a helpless victim of an international conspiracy. When there is a trade conflict with the United States, South Koreans feel that the United States is exerting an unjust amount of pressure on them. When U.S. capital is presented in the form of multinational companies conducting business in South Korea, South Koreans feel the relative strength of the U.S. economy and weaker status of South Korea more keenly.3
Moveover, the newly heightened national pride resulting from several important international achievements, such as the 2002 FIFA World Cup Games, tells an entirely different story. In fact,
1BBC News, “Poll Results: What the World Thinks of America,” 2003,
However, the two seemingly opposite self-portrayals are not necessarily in conflict with one another. Opposing the new world order led by the United States, in which ruthless competition and the rule of survival of the fittest prevail, may coexist with South Koreans’ wish to have a more egalitarian stance vis-à-vis the United States in the current world order. But in those arguments, we witness the constant shifting of South Korean identities between helpless victims and proud achievers. Data from the College Student Essays demonstrate that respondents feel quite frustrated by their seemingly conflicting views toward the United States. In sum, they are quite comfortable and satisfied with U.S. consumption culture including popular culture, but many are quite unhappy with the role the United States has been playing in international politics. Several students mentioned that they feel embarrassed that they sometimes do not even consider U.S. culture as foreign, because it has been a familiar part of their upbringing. Even those who strongly expressed negative views of the United States wrote that they wanted to find jobs with U.S. firms. They also considered the English language a critical part of their future success. Many rationalized that benefiting from opportunities presented by the United States for their future can be, in fact, patriotic.
North Korea and the South Korean Identity
When anti-Americanism was equated with pro-Communism in South Korean society and when any association with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) meant severe political persecution, North Korea was not an integral part of South Korean identity but something to be overcome. But with the “sunshine” (engagement) policy of the Kim Dae-jung government and with increasingly frequent interaction between the Koreas, North Korea started to be incorporated into South Korean identity.
The younger generation’s view of the DPRK is clearly distinct from that of the older generation who experienced the Korean War and the difficult years that followed. Some younger South Koreans exhibit what can only be termed romantic nationalism. For them, North Koreans are the unfortunate compatriots with whom they will be reunited some day, and they even fantasize that a united Korea will be a powerful country after initial difficulties. After having lived through a long period of precarious balancing among powerful neighbors, any possibility of becoming a powerful country may be too sweet a dream to wake up from.
Added to the romantic fantasies is some South Koreans’ sense of real kinship with those North Koreans from whom they were separated during the Korean War. Recent official reunions with the DPRK people have put human faces on the abstract notions of Korean unity. The summit meeting in 2000 even made Kim Jong-il a leader with a human touch. Many younger South Koreans for nationalistic reasons detest U.S. actions that may make North Korean lives even more difficult than they already are. Those South Koreans worry that any U.S. provocation of North Korea may cause a war on the peninsula. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 39
In constructing a South Korean identity, North Korea is becoming more and more essential in one way or another. From North Korea’s point of view, South Korea is “contaminated” by U.S. influence. One student surveyed in the College Student Essays was a defector from North Korea who later entered a university through a special admissions process. She wrote, “My first year in South Korea was a year I struggled to learn American culture, since American influence was everywhere here. People use English words as if they are part of Korean vocabulary.” Indeed, many South Koreans agree that at least part of the reason why the North and South Korean identities have grown apart is the existence of American influence in South Korea.4
Diversity in Identities
National identity is constructed and manifested variously, according to the social and political positions of members of the society. Diverse identities compete with one another. In the process of negotiation, the nature of identities changes. As South Korean society steadily democratizes, for instance, and as the mode of communication becomes more egalitarian, the coexistence of diverse identities is quite pronounced. In the authoritarian ROK, diversity was buried under forced homogeneity. In today’s South Korean society, differences in class, generation, and gender have constructed different kinds of identities of South Koreans, and the United States is relevant in each identity in various ways.
A. Generational Differences The most prominent division in South Korean society displayed in the 2002 presidential election was generational. The election of Roh Moo-hyun was made possible through highly systemic and organized campaigns waged by younger South Koreans, both in cyberspace and on the streets. Those younger South Koreans wanted to see change in South Korean politics and campaigned for Roh, whom they regarded as not being part of the establishment. It is true that generational differences do not explain the election results entirely and that class background and ideological inclinations were also highly relevant. However, the emergence of South Koreans in their twenties and thirties into the mainstream of South Korean society brought profound changes in the political landscape of the whole society.
For some younger South Koreans, one of the most important historical aspects influencing their identities is that they are significantly freer from Cold War–era ideology than older South Koreans are. Many in the older generation still live with the legacies of that ideology. They continue to regard war on the Korean Peninsula as a real possibility, and they are willing to endure a less than equal U.S.–ROK relationship if that alliance helps to prevent another war. In addition, having experienced extreme poverty, the older generation is thankful to those who helped South Korea overcome poverty, and their sense of indebtedness makes them accept a certain degree of unfairness in the relationship between South Korea and its benefactors.
Many younger South Koreans do not accept such views readily. In the College Student Essays, a few students refuted the idea of sending combat troops to Iraq to repay the debt to the United States that South Korea accrued during the Korean War. They said that South Korea has already repaid the debt by participating in the Vietnam War. In fact, the very act of refusing to accept such a
4 Ibid., for further examination of evolving attitudes of South Koreans toward the United States and North Korea. 40 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE debt may be a clear statement that they are indeed a new generation of South Koreans. Many of those younger South Koreans were born around the time of the Kwangju democratic movement. The fact that the U.S. military headquarters in South Korea had known about the movement of the ROK army to Kwangju at the time of the uprising provides those South Koreans enough reason to believe that the United States at least condoned the killings of civilians. This perception serves as one of the critical reasons for anti-Americanism among some South Koreans.
Between the two generations, a certain amount of conflict exists. The younger ones see the older generation as a hurdle in advancing South Korean society to a more democratic and proud country, while the older ones are worried that what looks like naïve romanticism among the younger generation may put South Korea in great danger. The older ones also feel that they have been deprived of their chance to be the main players in South Korean society. When they were younger, they obeyed the authority of their seniors and they have patiently waited for their turn. But today’s younger South Koreans refuse to do the same. To bring positive change to South Korean society, they want to take charge and they claim that seniority does not necessarily bear wisdom and respectability. Some young students in the College Student Essays expressed frustration over what they deemed as a spineless approach to the United States among their older family members.
The notable development of information technology in South Korea and new methods of political organization have paved the way for the political advancement of members of the younger generation, who are more comfortable with new technologies. Information is shared more readily among the younger generation, and mobilizing a large number of people has become much easier with the help of the Internet. Once people share information and exchange views in cyberspace, they can move their online communities into offline streets when they deem it necessary.
Three examples include the street rallies supporting the South Korean national team during the 2002 FIFA World Cup games, the campaign events for candidate Roh during the 2002 presidential election, and the candlelight street vigil for the two schoolgirls killed in the June 2002 accident involving a U.S. military vehicle. For their part, many older South Koreans felt alienated and frustrated when they witnessed these new political dramas. Older South Koreans often feel helpless when they venture into cyberspace to participate in the new political arena, partly because of the more egalitarian mode of communication in cyberspace. For many older people, this method means interaction without proper respect for seniors. Old hierarchies are often ignored, and a newly created “cyber language” replaces the strict honorifics of Korean language. In such an environment, one finds it hard to maintain an upper hand simply because one is older.
Even with the clear division between generations in today’s South Korea, the United States is still important in constructing identities for both generations. For younger South Koreans, the very fact that they question the role of the United States is a statement that they are free from old ideas. For older South Koreans, a sense of indebtedness toward the United States and the requirement of peace on the Korean Peninsula are too important to exchange for anything else.
B. Women and Self-Identity Women have never taken a central position in constructing South Koreans’ self-identity. With the change toward respecting diversity in South Korean society, however, women and women’s perspectives have begun to be incorporated into this dynamic. Feminist scholars have long associated war, military culture, military bases, and authoritarian rule with masculine culture, and in A WORKING GROUP REPORT 41
South Korean society many of those items are also associated with the United States. The very presence of U.S. military bases on South Korean soil seems to warrant this association, while the alleged role of the United States during South Korea’s military dictatorship and authoritarian rule is taken as another piece of evidence to support that accusation.
In this mindset, the controversy over the death of the two schoolgirls in an accident involving a U.S. armored vehicle clearly demonstrates the perceived contrast between the “American/male aggressors” (although it was clearly an unfortunate accident) and the “Korean/female victims.”
The contrast is also between militarism and civilian victimhood. Many South Koreans were angry when the two U.S. military personnel were acquitted in a U.S. military tribunal, because they believed that someone should be punished for the death of two innocent girls. Many suspected that the two soldiers were acquitted because they were Americans and the victims were South Koreans. Some even accused the United States of having different human rights standards for foreigners. Throughout the series of candlelight vigils and street demonstrations, the image of the helpless victims was a powerful symbol in mobilizing ordinary South Koreans to ask openly for a more egalitarian U.S.–ROK relationship. For those who wanted to portray the United States as an arrogant and violent aggressor, the two schoolgirls were quite an effective symbol, drawing emotional support from ordinary South Koreans.
Colonies often are represented as helpless and innocent women violated by foreign aggressors. South Korea’s experience in the first half of the twentieth century and the Korean “comfort women” of Japan’s colonial period are powerful contributors to the image of Korea as a victimized colony. Although the nature of the recent schoolgirl accident and the issue of comfort women are clearly different, many South Koreans found similarity between the two cases. Although womanhood has never been a primary element of South Korean identity in recent history, it has been used as a powerful symbol to highlight the “victim” status that exists in South Korean minds.
C. Class Throughout South Korea’s history, the United States often has been associated with South Korean elites. Those favored members of South Korean society had access to higher education, which gave them the social and cultural capital to enjoy American culture and to benefit from U.S. economic affluence. Those who had the opportunity to study in the United States took American culture as part of their lifestyle. As reflected in the 2002 presidential election, the South Korean general public in part took out its anger toward the United States on this elite establishment. “Ours is good” is a motto adopted by some of those people in repudiating Western, and especially American, culture.
Conclusion
South Koreans define their identity according to their position and status in society. As a result, because of its important role in Korean history in the last century, the United States has been a critical factor in the development of South Korean identity. Reflecting South Korea’s increasingly important position in the international arena and the structural changes occurring within its society, South Koreans’ perceptions of and sentiment toward the United States have changed. This may be as much an expression of South Korea’s pride in achieving a more democratic and pluralistic political culture as a function of developments in the United States and U.S. policy itself. However, 42 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE as South Korean identity continues to evolve to reflect changes of the time, the U.S.–ROK relationship likewise must adapt and redefine itself appropriately to ensure that the relationship continues to benefit both the countries and their people. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 43
Chapter V Generational Change in South Korea: Implications for the U.S.–ROK Alliance Lee Sook-jong
Although mismanagement of the social problems associated with hosting U.S. forces was the direct cause of a recent spike in anti-American sentiment in South Korea, the roots of resentment toward the United States lie deeper in the rise of “assertive nationalism” in the Republic of Korea (ROK), especially among younger South Koreans. South Korean resentment against the United States has always been based on the premise that the United States is dominant and that South Korea is subject to U.S. interests and pressures. Prouder, younger South Koreans, who are heirs to successful economic development and burgeoning democracy, tend to rebel against the perceived subjection of South Korea to a hegemonic United States. They would like to see the United States recognize and respect South Korea as an “equal partner” in the bilateral alliance. They feel free to dissent against decisions that they deem as having been made unilaterally by the United States.
Although older South Koreans are content with their nation’s achievements and are comfortable with the existing order, younger South Koreans are more contentious about the status quo and they seek reforms. There are clear generational differences in South Korean views toward the United States. Opinion polls over the past several years reveal that younger South Koreans tend to have a less favorable image of the United States and are more critical of U.S. policies. As younger South Koreans’ political views take on more weight, Washington and Seoul must assess the political influence of South Korean youth on the U.S.–ROK alliance.
Generational Differences in Historical Memories and Sentiment toward the United States
As of the year 2000, the total population of South Korea was about 46 million. Of this total, 29 percent was under the age of 20 and had no voting rights. The remaining adult population of about 35 million makes up the following age groups: 17.3 percent aged 20–29, 18.0 percent aged 30–39, 15.1 percent aged 40–49, 9.4 percent aged 50–59, and 11.2 percent aged 60 and over. Those statistics demonstrate the sheer political weight of the younger generations, with two-thirds of the South Korean population being under the age of 40. Moreover, the statistics show that the South Korean voting population is divided roughly into two groups: (1) younger voters in their twenties and thirties, and (2) older voters in their forties and over.
As cultural and political dispositions differ the most along generational lines, understanding generational differences is key in explaining differences among South Korean views toward the United States. Various polls reveal that the younger generations tend to be more politically progressive and culturally liberal. The political progressivism of the younger generations tends to be expressed in terms of support for domestic reform and independent foreign policy. 44 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
The generational gap in South Korean views toward the United States also reflects the rapid changes that have taken place in South Korea over the past decades. South Koreans under age 30 are the generation of affluence and democratization. They were nurtured by prosperous parents and spent their youths in an increasingly liberal and democratized society. Those younger generations between the ages of 10 and 19 and between the ages of 20 and 29 feel a sense of cultural affinity with the United States. Raised on Western food and popular U.S. culture, plus being able to trot globally over the Internet, they are the most internationalized generation in South Korean history. Although those younger generations view the United States as a strong and important country, they also see it as an equal partner. Rejecting the hierarchical relationships at home, they tend to see intercountry relationships horizontally and are far more critical of U.S. foreign policies than older generations are. The anti-American sentiments of this youngest generation (those under age 30) are based on their confidence in their nation’s achievements and their optimism about their nation’s future. Those South Koreans become more critical of the United States when U.S. policies are perceived to be dominant and unilateral. Driven by specific issues, their opposition to the United States is influenced less by unpleasant historical memories and more by political activism.
In this vein, the views of the youngest generation of South Koreans, those under age 30, should be distinguished from those of South Koreans aged 30—39, whose criticism of the United States is based on the anti-U.S.-oriented student movement of the 1980s. South Koreans between the ages of 30and 39 are the most progressive generation. This unique generation tends to be the strongest advocate of reforming South Korea to become a more equal and democratic society. They are the so-called “3-8-6 generation”—a phrase coined for those who turned 30 during the 1990s, were born during the 1960s, spent their rebellious youths under the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo-hwan in the 1980s, and turned 30 during the 1990s. They were young students, some already in college, during the notorious Kwangju incident of May 1980. Their views toward the United States are strongly affected by their struggle for democratization after the Kwangju incident. Many South Koreans at that time believed that General John Wickham, the U.S. commander in South Korea, granted President Chun’s request on May 26 to release the South Korean army’s 20th Division to put down the rebellion in Kwangju, which in their eyes demonstrated U.S. complicity in massacring hundreds of South Korean citizens.1 This generation led the successful transition to democratization in 1987 through massive civic efforts. The generation’s success in the 1980s has provided it with a unique sense of empowerment that fuels an instinct for political activism.
South Koreans aged 40–49 share the spirit of the democratization struggle against the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun. However, as the first generation that benefited from the successful economic modernization in the 1960s and 1970s, they are more realistic and pragmatic. As the generation that desires both stability and reform, South Koreans in their forties could form a critical mass in the future course of South Korean politics and policy, the “swing vote” that may tip the delicate balance between the political stance of the younger South Koreans (aged
1 Regarding the U.S. involvement in the Kwangju incident, the U.S. government issued a statement nine years later, in June 1989, denying U.S. involvement. The statement emphasized that the United States was never responsible for the slaughter, because “neither troops of the Korean Special Warfare Command (SWC) nor elements of the 20th Division, employed by the Martial Law Command in Kwangju” were under the operational command of the Korean-American Combined Forces Command, and the United States “had neither prior knowledge of the deployment of SWC forces to Kwangju nor responsibility for the actions here.” “U.S. Government Statement on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980,” June 19, 1989. Adapted from Kim Jin-wung, “Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” Asian Survey 29, No. 8 (August 1989): 762. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 45
20–29 and 30–39), and the older generation (aged 50 and older). Concerning South Korea’s foreign policy and views toward the United States, this middle generation is ambivalent about whether to become independent of the United States or to remain dependent on the United States for South Korea’s survival and continuing prosperity.
Many South Koreans who are 50 and older spent their youth poverty-stricken. Many self-made men moved from the countryside to the cities to take advantage of better schools and greater job opportunities. South Koreans who are 60 and over represent a generation that survived the turbulent circumstances of colonial rule, the postindependence chaos of the late 1940s, and war. South Koreans who are in their sixties, in particular, were university students or young adults when they experienced the April 19 student uprising that toppled the authoritarian Syng-man Rhee government in 1960 and the military coup led by Park Chung-hee that followed in 1961. Those older generations feel that they have sacrificed their lives for their family and nation. Having lived through turbulent times, they prefer stability and order. Moreover, because they still harbor strong anti-Communist sentiments, older South Koreans are very suspicious of North Korea’s intentions and are wary of the “naïveté” of younger South Koreans’ views toward North Korea. For the much older South Koreans who remember the cruelty of Japanese colonial rule and the devastation of the Korean War, the United States is viewed with gratitude as a savior.
Thus, the radically different life experiences of the different generations help explain why South Korean views toward the United States vary significantly. The negative image of the United States is rooted mostly among younger South Koreans in their twenties and thirties. This negative image of the United States meshes with their positive image of North Korea. One will, however, find an exactly opposite picture among older South Koreans who are 50 and over.
The joint CSIS–JoongAng Ilbo poll of September 2003, for example, reveals that 35.4 percent of South Koreans in their twenties chose the United States as the least-favored country, while only 4.1 percent of them chose North Korea. By contrast, 25.3 percent of South Koreans in their fifties chose North Korea as the least-favored country, –– while only 5.3 percent chose the United States. The generational gap narrowed when South Koreans were asked to identify their reason for the anti- American sentiment. Approximately 6 in 10 respondents chose the answer “because of its [the United States] selfish pursuit of its own interests and benefits.” Conversely, 14.3 percent and 13.5 percent of respondents chose “dissatisfaction with U.S. forces in South Korea” and “disrespect toward South Koreans and past problems,” respectively. Only 4.5 percent attributed their dislike of the United States to U.S. policy toward North Korea.
The results seem to suggest that it is not the U.S. hard-line policy toward North Korean per se but the perceived unilateralist nature of U.S. foreign policy that arouses anti-American sentiments among South Koreans. However, the implication of those results becomes complicated by the conflicting response patterns to this question: “Cooperation with North Korea and the United States are both important, but which one do you think should come first?”: 39.4 percent answered that the inter-Korean cooperation must come first, while 24.4 percent answered in favor of U.S.– ROK cooperation. Another 34.4 percent answered that cooperation with each party is equally important. Only South Koreans in their fifties or older chose cooperation with the United States over that with North Korea: 38.8 percent to 26.4 percent.
The younger South Koreans’ negative image of the United States has not translated into any significant attempt to revise the U.S.–ROK alliance yet. Although younger generations skewed to 46 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
“pretty important” rather than “very important,” 83.5 percent of South Koreans in their twenties agreed on the importance of United States Forces Korea (USFK) to stabilize the security of the Korean Peninsula, a percentage that is not much lower than that of older South Koreans (95.2 percent). However, division among the generations appears again when asked about the future of U.S. troops. A greater number of younger than older South Koreans would like to see the timely withdrawal of the U.S. forces. More than one-third of South Koreans in their twenties and thirties supported the withdrawal of USFK from South Korea, while only 8.5 percent of South Koreans in their fifties or older supported the withdrawal—and 72.6 percent of those older South Koreans wanted the U.S. forces to remain for a lengthy period of time, with 18.4 percent supporting U.S. presence even after reunification with North Korea.
In a nutshell, the United States clearly has a serious image problem among younger South Koreans. Whereas older South Koreans seem to tolerate what appears to be U.S. unilateralism, younger South Koreans tend to challenge it. The negative image of the United States held by younger South Koreans seems to be behind the South Koreans’ confidence in demanding equal partnership in the alliance with the United States. The younger South Koreans perceive North Korea as a “poor brother” whom they should assist, rather than as a threat, which makes them even more critical of U.S. foreign policy.
Old and New Fears in Allying with the United States
The alliance with the United States has long provided a nearly complete sense of security to most South Koreans. When an alliance is forged between two asymmetrical powers, the weaker party has conflicting senses of “abandonment” and “entrapment.” Japan is a case in point. Although it has tried hard to be on the side of the United States on important issues to avoid being abandoned, Japan also has tried hard not to become entangled in major U.S. military conflicts. Although Japan has accommodated many U.S. demands for security assistance in recent years, pacifist public opinion and a constitutional barrier have limited such endeavors.
In the case of South Korea, the fear of entrapment has not been an issue. There was no serious opposition to sending troops to Vietnam in the mid-1960s out of any fear of entanglement. Facing a common enemy—North Korea—the mutual interest in the U.S.–ROK alliance was solid. Moreover, the fear of being abandoned by the United States has always been a prevalent factor. In the past, whenever talks of reducing or withdrawing U.S. forces took place, the South Korean government and civil society would become alarmed and would strongly back the position supporting the presence of USFK. For South Korea, securing a strong U.S. security commitment tended to prevail over potential resentment about being dominated in the alliance relationship.
This equilibrium of security psychology that held true in the past has changed a great deal with the partial but meaningful inter-Korean rapprochement and the burgeoning democratization of South Korean society. Fear of entrapment has started to rise among a significant number of South Koreans, in two ways. One is the fear of being involved in a preemptive war against North Korea by the United States to resolve the nuclear crisis. This fear has been assuaged only by repeated statements from Washington denying this possibility. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 47
The second is the fear of being involved in international actions precipitated by the United States. Challenging questions were raised in 2003–2004 as the South Korean government pondered the dispatchment of troops to Iraq at the request of the United States. On April 9, South Korea’s National Assembly approved a bill dispatching 566 engineering troops and 100 medical workers by a vote of 179 to 68, after President Roh made a last-ditch appeal in front of the assemblymen. When the necessary legislation was ratified in the National Assembly, the first decision to send engineering and medical units to Iraq in the spring of 2003 faced significant opposition from both civil society and ruling party politicians. This opposition intensified when the United States and South Korean governments began to consult with each other over the dispatchment of much larger-scale combat forces to Iraq. Finally, in October 2003, the National Security Council decided to dispatch ROK troops to Iraq without specifying their size. After several months, on February 13, 2004, the South Korean parliament ratified a plan to deploy 3,000 troops—1,400 combat forces and 1,600 military engineers and medics—to Iraq, by a 3 to 1 margin (155 to 50). This deployment will be South Korea’s largest dispatchment of troops overseas since the Vietnam War.
Although the decision demonstrated continued strength in the U.S.–ROK alliance at the governmental level, it divided South Korean society. Opinions about the issue were sharply and almost evenly divided along generational lines. Whereas the older generation viewed the troop dispatchment as an obligation of an ally and supported the proposal, the younger generation took a pacifist perspective and opposed the dispatchment on the grounds that the U.S.-led war against Iraq was unjustified and immoral. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) even threatened to make the issue a defining one in the spring 2004 general election by actively opposing politicians who voted for ratification.
Interestingly, whether for or against the troop dispatchment, most South Koreans do not see the troop dispatchment in terms of an act that would enhance South Korea’s global peacekeeping role. Rather, they view it as another example of South Korea’s subjugation to the will of the United States, largely because the security concerns of South Koreans are limited to the narrower inter-Korean conflict, rather than the wider regional or global peace.
The balance of the two fears in the U.S.–ROK relationship also appears to be different across generations. The fear of abandonment is less acute among younger South Koreans; however, they tend to believe that the United States would never abandon South Korea, because abandonment would not be in the United States’s own interest. They believe that the U.S.–ROK alliance is meant to serve U.S. hegemony and to benefit the United States more than it does South Korea. In contrast, older South Koreans fear that the anti-American voices of South Korean youth and the policy discord between Washington and Seoul regarding North Korea’s nuclear status will induce the United States to rethink the strategic value of South Korea and to abandon the U.S. commitment to South Korea’s defense.
Dealing with South Korea’s Assertive Nationalism
It is interesting to observe that younger South Koreans have targeted the United States to test national assertiveness and their newfound sense of independence. For many years, Japan had been the country that was most hated by the South Koreans. Having experienced colonial rule, older South Koreans have held strong anti-Japanese sentiments. Those sentiments were passed down 48 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
through the education system to middle-aged South Koreans, many of whom remain suspicious and resentful of Japan. Having received a more liberalized education, younger South Koreans today harbor less anti-Japanese sentiment, although full historical reconciliation has yet to be achieved. Instead, the younger generation is increasingly directing its suspicion and animosity toward the United States.
Two factors seem to facilitate this transition. First, the United States has emerged as the only superpower since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The economic and military power of the United States is perceived to be increasing at the expense of the United Nations. The Bush administration’s poor foreign policy record has further strengthened the image of U.S. unilateralism. Opposing U.S. unilateralism in international affairs has become politically correct among South Korean youth. Second, younger South Koreans tend to approach inter-Korean relations with a greater sense of nationalism than the older generation does. They view North Koreans as a fellow race and are less fearful and suspicious of North Korean political leaders. Thus, younger South Koreans are more willing to tolerate the survival of the North Korean regime and to support the expansion of inter- Korean economic exchanges. It is this perspective that makes the younger generation of South Koreans critical of the Bush administration’s hard-line policy stance toward North Korea, such as the U.S. refusal to engage in a dialogue with that county.
In less than a decade, today’s South Koreans who are in their twenties and thirties will become the critical mass within the demographic composition of South Korea’s population. Cautious South Koreans who are now in their forties will no longer be the pivotal generation that balances younger and older South Koreans’ political views, simply because they themselves will be part of the older generation. In a decade, their political preferences may even be sidelined, if political activism continues to be dominated by the younger generations. Today’s South Koreans who are in their fifties or older and who have been consistently pro-American in their views toward U.S. policy choices will become a political minority. Such a demographic change would dictate that political leaders in Washington and Seoul must take greater heed of rising assertive nationalism in South Korea and must find ways to accommodate it within the U.S.–ROK alliance.
The first step toward that goal should be to recognize the need for greater sensitivity to South Korean confidence and national pride. The United States, in particular, must apply far more resources and attention to addressing South Korean concerns and to consulting more actively with South Korea in major decisionmaking. Accommodating South Korea’s nationalism can be done both passively and actively. The passive approach would focus on taking steps to avoid situations or incidents that can create a sense of infringement of national sovereignty. Those steps would include the timely relocation of the Yongsan U.S. army base from downtown Seoul along with more active public relations efforts by the USFK. Rather than confining dialogue to South Korean authorities, the USFK would do well to actively seek constructive relationships not only with local communities but also with powerful NGOs in addressing many issues that affect South Korean society.
The active path would allow South Korea to carve out its own enhanced role in its alliance with the United States. Both countries must be able to produce a common vision for the long-term future of the alliance, one that is based on a genuinely equal partnership. Mutual cooperation in the alliance will benefit greatly from such a vision. The U.S.–ROK alliance will become truly stable only when it is linked to South Korea’s aspiration to become a major player in Northeast Asia. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 49
As the United States tries to resolve the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis, it is essential that any deal that it makes with North Korea be portrayed as adhering to the principles of maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula and of committing to South Korea’s national security. Should the negotiations with North Korea break down, the reason must be perceived as North Korea’s failure to cooperate with international partners and as the United States having exhausted all reasonable diplomatic efforts for a peaceful resolution. To aid in this effort, South Korea must do its part to better educate younger South Koreans, so that they may see the nuclear threat from North Korea as a serious security concern to both the United States and the international community.
It is important to understand that the rising dissent against the United States in South Korea reflects the rising assertiveness of South Korea and that its source is not cultural or religious. For this reason, anti-American sentiments in South Korea will be much easier to manage and alleviate than those found in other parts of the world. Accommodating South Korea’s confidence and vibrant democracy in the alliance relationship would be the right course to stabilize the alliance for a critical period of transition in South Korean society. 50 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Chapter VI South Korean Civil Society and Alliance Politics Katharine H. S. Moon
The growth and popularization of the anti-American movement in the 1990s and early 2000s are consequences of South Korea’s democratization and the accompanying diversification of issues, actors, and goals in foreign policy and national security. South Koreans had until then endured four decades of authoritarian rule during which independent assessments of the U.S.– Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) relationship and any critique or criticism of U.S. troops were actively and systematically suppressed by the government through the National Security Law. 1 According to one scholar, “An anti-American movement was identified with pro-Communism or a pro–North Korean movement.”2 Tensions in the bilateral relationship surfaced often during the decades of military dictatorship, but for the most part they were contained by the ruling elite for reasons of both domestic politics and national security. But since South Korea’s democratic transformation and the end of the Cold War in the West, the South Korean public—especially civil society organizations (CSOs)—has become active and vocal in national security discourse and policy formulation.
The early to mid-1990s ushered in a new era of political opportunities for civic activism on numerous public policy issues, including foreign policy. The Kim Young-sam administration highlighted the importance of “universally accepted values such as democracy, human rights, environmental protection, and social welfare,” plus citizen participation in policy considerations.3 The public responded in a rapid proliferation of civic groups and a growing sense of political legitimacy. For example, 74.2 percent of South Korean CSOs were established between 1987 and 1996, with an upsurge during the presidency of Kim Young-sam: Between 1993 and 1996, 62 percent of organizations advocating for citizens’ rights, 51.4 percent of those for the environment, 48.9 percent of those for youth, and 44.8 percent of those for human rights were established.4
In particular, the first half of the 1990s served as a crucible for the creation of organizations that have assumed leading roles in the organized criticism of U.S. policies and the terms and operation of the bilateral alliance. For example, the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops against Korean Civilians (National Campaign)—the clearinghouse organization focused solely on collecting, investigating, publicly addressing, and monitoring such crimes, both alleged and proven, by U.S. military personnel—was established in 1993 in response to the brutal murder of Yun Geum-i. Yun, a young woman who had worked and died in the entertainment and prostitution
1 Amnesty International, “South Korea: Prisoners Held for National Security Reasons,” New York, September 1991, 6: Article 7 of the 1980 National Security Law (NSL), regarding praise, encouragement, or sympathy toward an anti-state organization. It was “used to imprison people who have written or disseminated material about the North Korean system of government, or which criticized the South Korean Government or the presence of U.S. armed forces in South Korea.” 2 Kim Jin-wung, “Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” Asian Survey 29, no. 8 (August 1989): 754. 3Lee Jung-hoon, “Globalization, Nationalism, and Security Options for South Korea” in Moon Chung-in and Mo Jong- ryn, eds., Democratization and Globalization in Korea: Assessments and Prospects (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), 240. 4 Kim Hyuk-rae, “The State and Civil Society in Transition: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in South Korea” The Pacific Review 13 no. 4 (Winter 2000): 603. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 51 industry that caters to American personnel in Dongducheon (home of the 2nd Infantry Division [ID]) posthumously became a nationalist symbol of South Korea’s powerlessness and “victimization” by the United States. Her death became a catalyst for organized activism on issues related to the U.S. troop presence.5
In 1994, the banhwan (return-of-land) movement emerged in response to the proposed relocation of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Yongsan headquarters to Pyeongtaek-Osan in the early 1990s. In the middle of the decade, both the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and Green Korea United (GKU) were created, and Women Making Peace was launched in 1997. People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy—the nationwide umbrella organization for progressive issues and for citizen participation and representation in domestic and international policy matters—was established in 1994. And from 1995 on, when negotiations on the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was reintroduced on the bilateral security agenda, activists and CSOs began to make their voices heard through the media and transnational networks.
Additionally, the central government’s power and capacity to manage national security declined and became less coherent as local governments and residents gained political power and legitimacy with the new decentralization laws of 1991 and 1995. Since the popular election of local leaders was reinstituted in 1995, elected local officials have been keen on pursuing economic development, urban planning and renewal, and social policies to enhance the quality of life for their constituents. In tandem, decentralization has empowered local residents to organize and assert their interests at the municipal and provincial levels. It is not a coincidence that the very issues that critics of the U.S. bases and the SOFA have been publicizing reflect the quality-of-life concerns highlighted by officials and constituents alike: environmental damage and sound pollution, obstruction of city planning and development, crimes against South Korean civilians, property damage, and the safety of women and girls. Those issues also reflect the new political norms and the liberalization of the political process that was put into practice by the Kim Young-sam administration, then later rhetorically emphasized and selectively institutionalized under Kim Dae-jung. The popular expression of interest in national security matters was boosted by the second Kim’s “sunshine” policy and the North–South summit. Then “people power” became the official policy as Roh Moo-hyun sought to put a populist mark on his new presidency.
In 10 short but intense years, the meaning and content of national security increasingly became democratized so that citizens became freer to complain about the personal costs connected with national security. What authoritarian governments had once declared as dissidence became a civic right and duty in a democratic system of governance. The ambitious democratization and globalization campaign of the Kim Young-sam government coincided with and gained momentum from the larger trend toward the incorporation of human security as a vital part of national security. The Kim Dae-jung administration also rode this new wave of human security, promoted by the United Nations and by Western governments and intellectuals during much of the 1990s. It then withstood the shock and forced humility of the 1997 financial crisis, which reminded the public and political leadership that economic democratization—liberalization as well as transparency and accountability—was an urgent and legitimate necessity. Candidate and then president-elect Roh Moo-hyun adeptly mobilized a public that had grown increasingly impatient, vocal, and assertive about elite domination of domestic and international policies. In the winter of 2002–2003, the world
5 See Katharine H. S. Moon, “Gender, Nationalism, and ‘Anti-American’ Activism in South Korea,” 2003 (in press). 52 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE witnessed this explosive combination of popular opinion, political ambition, and alliance politics in the form of public protests against the U.S. handling of the death of the two teenage schoolgirls.
Organized Anti-Americanism
Anti-American activism is one of numerous social movements in South Korea and must be understood in the larger context of democratization, the political expression among ordinary people, and the political competition among CSOs. Social movements in South Korea tend to structure themselves as coalitions, with disparate, unrelated, and overlapping interest groups, goals, and commitments coming together periodically over a hot issue (for example, aggressive anti-Chosun activists are also aggressive anti-American activists). This dynamic also occurs in anti-American activism. Since the mid-1990s, people who organize around anti-base issues have included religious activists, law professionals, environmentalists, academics, radical students, peace activists, feminists and women’s activists, both the progressive KCTU and the conservative Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), leaders of mainstream nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), reunification activists, local government officials, common villagers, artists, pop celebrities, National Assembly members, and members of the media. It is not a monolithic phenomenon, not ideologically driven, and not prone to violence.
According to one leading activist in the late 1990s campaign to revise the SOFA, organized anti- Americanism is characterized by peaks and valleys: there is quiet and lull, then intensified attention and activism in response to an incident or policy issue, such as the revision of the SOFA, the alleged Nogun-ri massacre, the damage to people and property during strafing exercises by the USFK in Maehyang-ri, negotiations over FX fighter aircraft sales, the “axis of evil” speech by President Bush, and the death of the two teenage schoolgirls in June 2002. As issues lose steam, the activism also fades until the next round.6 Depending on the particular issue, some of these groups will take up leadership and assert their criticism or position more passionately and persistently than others. For example, although there has been civic opposition in the past several years to the proposed construction of the new U.S. embassy chancery and residences near Deoksu Palace, this coalition is not as large, vocal, or aggressive as the one advocating for the revision of the SOFA or the resolution of environmental problems on or near U.S. bases.
Within organized anti-Americanism, there are three main types of activism: (1)“professionals” and established NGOs, (2) local autonomy and residents’ movements, and (3) regional and international networks. Individual participants may span two or three of those categories, and their work may be loosely informed by and coordinated with one another. But significant differences exist in background, activist experience, ideological affinity, primary policy interests, political style, and personal stakes among the constituent groups.
A. Activist Establishment Anti-Americanism as a mainstream, nationwide phenomenon since the late 1990s has been made possible by the “activist establishment.” One sector of this establishment consists of the individuals who fought in the democracy–labor–student movements of the 1970s and 1980s. Their political awareness and orientation were shaped in the larger societal context of physical and rhetorical
6 Kathy Moon, personal interview by author with leading activists, May 2002, Cholla Province. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 53
confrontation with ruling elites, self-sacrifice (even of life), zero-sum outcomes, and strict loyalty to causes and leaders. Many directly endured government surveillance, imprisonment, and torture. Moreover, their exposure to the Kwangju uprising and identification with the victims of the massacre sensitized them to American actions and inactions in and toward South Korea. They grew adept at engaging in tujaeng (struggle, fight) as the one reliable resource and method of influence in a military-authoritarian society. Because they come from such a protest tradition, the professional activists target the remaining “big guns” in their country, namely, the USFK. Their political access and their influence on U.S. security policy and practice are limited, and so they rely on their comparative advantage: public demonstrations and media coverage. Targeting a sparring partner that is big and powerful also enhances the voice and stature of the CSOs. In the context of social movement analysis, this move is rational, because CSOs pursue their organizational interests (i.e., resource accumulation, increased membership, public recognition) in tandem with their political goals.
Another sector consists of self-declared moderates, especially those individuals from middle class and professional backgrounds who established their political base and cause in the period of democratic institutionalization, during the first half of the 1990s. NGOs and professional organizations such as the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (Kyongsillyon), the Korea Federation of Environmental Movements (KFEM), Green Korea United (GKU), the Korea House for International Solidarity (KHIS, Gukje yeondae), and the Lawyers for Democratic Society (Minbyeon) belong to particular citizens’ movements. They “rejected the class-based and confrontational strategies of the past in favor of a nonviolent, peaceful, and lawful movement style and specific policy alternatives.”7 In contrast to the anti-American “people’s movement” of the 1980s, which tended to be heavy on rhetoric (both nationalist and anti-imperialist) and light on empirical research and analysis, the current movement emphasizes expert investigation of problems; compilation of figures from citizens, scholars, and government; and comparative analysis with situations in other countries where the U.S. military has been present (Japan, Germany, and the Philippines). Those moderates then seek to build credibility and to persuade the government and sway public opinion. The effect of the moderate sector is evident in the current anti-American movement’s emphasis on nonviolent, legal activities and on the pursuit of issues through institutional channels, such as circulating petitions, lobbying local and national political representatives, submitting legislative proposals to the National Assembly, and filing lawsuits and requests for judicial reviews.8
B. Local Autonomy and Residents’ Movements The restoration of local self-rule after more than 30 years has awakened a new political consciousness among local officials and citizens alike and has fostered cooperation between citizens and officials in the areas housing U.S. bases. That cooperation is one of the most remarkable consequences of democratization and decentralization. Since the late 1990s, citizens have been exercising the new rights they gained to enact, alter, or abolish municipal regulations; conduct public audits and inspections; and demand transparency and accountability at all levels of government.9,10
7 Kim Sun-hyuk, “State and Civil Society in South Korea’s Democratic Consolidation: Is the Battle Really Over?” Asian Survey 37, no. 12 (December 1997): 1142. 8 See Katharine H. S. Moon, “Korean Nationalism, Anti-Americanism, and Democratic Consolidation” in Korea’s Democratization, Samuel S. Kim, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press), 2003. 9 Sohn Bong-scuk and Ahn Chung-si, “Citizen Participation in Local Governance in South Korea” (paper presented at the conference on “New Developments in Local Democracy in Asia: Appraising a Decade of Experience, Problems and Prospect,” Seoul National University, April 8–9, 2002), p. 9. 54 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
New rights and opportunities for local political participation have emboldened local populations to voice opinions about the activities and conduct of U.S. bases and service personnel. The logic goes like this: If citizens can scrutinize and hold ROK officials and government agencies to account, why must they be left in the dark and stay mum about the activities and conduct of U.S. troops on and off base? But because ROK laws that boost local residents’ access to information, transparency, and self-governance do not apply within USFK compounds and because military activities inherently require some secrecy, frustration results. From the politicized locals’ point of view, the SOFA and general limitations on citizens’ access to information and policy regarding national security become obstacles to exercising local democracy.
Until recent years, Koreans living near the U.S. bases and those farther away viewed these localities as “pariah towns” for their association with prostitution, drugs, gangsterism, mixed-race children, and “moral decadence.” And for most of the past 50 years, the educational, economic, and cultural development of local residents in those areas have been neglected by local leaders and the central government alike. Local officials tended to appease U.S. troops in order to maintain both the flow of U.S. dollars into the local economy and the approval and goodwill of provincial and central government bureaucrats who wanted to keep a lid on local civil-military conflicts.
But democratization and decentralization have clearly reversed such trends, to the point that the central government and the USFK’s proposals to move the U.S. headquarters out of Yongsan have stalled for a decade (as have other plans that have been negotiated by Seoul and the U.S. government, such as new construction on the Yongsan compound and around Deoksu Palace). Increasingly, local power is no longer relegated to the periphery, and people-to-people relations— interactions between U.S. troops and South Korean residents—cannot easily be dismissed as not political or irrelevant to alliance relations. To the contrary, incidents, conflicts, and grievances that arise in the localities serve to legitimate the activism of the larger CSO networks; in turn, those networks become necessary for raising local cases to the level of national and bilateral policy dilemmas.
Yet, the meaning of democracy and the process of democratization would be vapid if all local governments and residents held uniform views and advocated the same policy measures regarding the U.S. bases. Regrettably, the U.S. media by and large has portrayed citizen activism in South Korea since the late 1990s in just that manner. But such is not the reality on the ground; not all civic activism in local areas is anti-base oriented. Pyeongtaek, which houses the U.S. (Osan) Air Force Base, has been the venue of several pro-U.S. demonstrations during 2003. For example, in mid- January 2003, pro-U.S. demonstrators gathered for the first time in a base area to denounce the candlelight-vigil-goers as radical leftists and to thank the U.S. military for its continued presence.11 In addition to Pyeongtaek residents, about 300 people from Seoul, Inchon, Suwon, and other areas came together to form a crowd of 900 in support of the U.S. military and the “patriotic defense of the South” against the Communist North.12 More recently, with the talk of moving the U.S. Eighth
10 Since the implementation of the Laws Relating to the Disclosure of Information by Public Organizations in 1998, citizen requests for public disclosure of information have steadily risen from 42,930 in 1999 to 61,586 in 2000. This increase is attributed largely to “civilian-group activities aimed at watching municipal administration and assembly activities.” See Sohn and Ahn, p. 12. 11 Joong-ang Ilbo, January 14, 2003. 12 Pyeongtaek Simin Sinmun, January 15, 2003,
Army headquarters from Seoul to Pyeongtaek, many local businesses are gearing up for increased sales to an enlarged U.S. presence.13 At the same time, anti-base activists, some of whom had opposed the first proposed plan to move USFK headquarters from Seoul to Pyeongtaek in the early 1990s, began to prepare for another fight to prevent the relocation of troops to that region.14
C. Transnational Networks It is also important to recognize that anti-American and anti-base activism is not simply “made in Korea.” Rather, it is connected to the regional and international networks aimed at peace and antiwar activism, environmental protection, human rights, women’s rights, and international solidarity. Since the mid- to late 1990s, professional activists as well as local residents and governments in South Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Vieques (Puerto Rico) have regularly exchanged information about organizational activities, agendas, political strategies, mobilization of resources, and methods of political expression. They have also periodically rendered physical and moral support to one another’s causes. For example, South Korean and Okinawan activists have exchanged and coordinated information, agendas, and “personnel” to address and publicize social and legal problems related to the U.S. troop presence in their respective localities.
After the 1995 gang rape of an Okinawan girl by U.S. marines stationed in Okinawa and the ensuing intensification of citizen activism, Japanese activists have reached out toward South Koreans and vice versa. In August 1996, one of the first coleaders of the National Campaign visited Japan to help commemorate the 51st year of the bombing of Hiroshima, where he learned about specific issues related to the U.S. presence in Japan (namely “private” leasing of land and “rent” paid by the Japanese government) and the diversity and dynamism of peace and anti-base activism among Japanese. In 1997, Okinawans visited Seoul to participate in the weekly Friday demonstration in front of Yongsan Garrison (organized by the National Campaign). In 1998, Okinawans formed the Han-Oki minjung yeondae (People’s Solidarity) with the purpose of educating themselves about U.S. military-related problems affecting South Koreans in particular, and of networking with peace activists in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico.15
In addition, anti-base activists from Vieques, Puerto Rico, have built bridges of cooperation and solidarity with South Koreans, especially those protesting the use of the Koon-ni range for bombing practice. Ismael Guadalupe Ortiz, a leader of the anti-base movement in Vieques, visited Maehyang- ri in July 1999 and expressed alarm at how much worse the situation is for the South Korean villagers, given that they live much closer to the strafing area than their Vieques counterparts.16 Such words of empathy were highlighted by the South Korean media and NGO groups in their newsletters and periodicals. More recently, Guadalupe sent a message of “solidarity with the people of Korea,” condemning and protesting the U.S. troops’ role in the deaths of the two teenage girls, a message that was delivered to South Korean and other “netizens” around the world by various websites.17. In return, ROK activists have visited the island to learn about the nature of the problems that the Puerto Rican citizens face and the organization and activities of the Puerto Rican
13 Jeremy Kirk, “South Korean merchants fear troop relocation would hurt business,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, June 19, 2003. 14 Ohmynews, March 18, 2003, Pyeongtaek NGO, April 18, 2003. 15 Hankyore sinmun, August 2, 2000. 16 Saram i saram ege (October/November, 2000): 25. 17Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques, Puerto Rico, “Puerto Rican Solidarity with Korean People,”Building A Solidarity Electronically, 21st Century (Base21), July 11, 2002,
The coalition activism within South Korea, the transnational activism across national borders, and the central role of the Internet as the tie that binds disparate groups will readily allow for the exchange of information, adoption of issues, and spread of protest methods and styles. Heightened discontent over the U.S.–ROK alliance, particularly after the explosion of popular protests in the winter of 2002–2003, made it relatively easy for South Koreans to focus their political energy on the war in Iraq. Organizations protesting the deployment of South Korean troops to Iraq could quickly gain a national and international audience through their links on various anti-U.S. base websites and the websites of mainstream progressive organizations like the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD).18
Conclusion: Diversity in Dialogue
Even though alliance management is a matter between the two governments, the power and voice of independent civic groups and local interests in South Korea have grown stronger and louder. U.S. and South Korean policy elites need to focus more attention and concerted effort on understanding the rapid and revolutionary changes in the system and style of governance in South Korea over the past 10 years. Engaging in that endeavor requires establishing and maintaining ongoing, open contact with local officials, citizens’ associations, media, and local residents. Reducing the size of the U.S. footprint does not mean that the military must seclude itself and hide behind closed gates. Rather, the opposite course of action is needed—that is, one that accepts the importance of public support for the various aspects of the relationship and that genuinely incorporates civilian-military dialogue into the institutional and cultural life of the USFK.
In particular, the USFK and U.S. authorities in South Korea need to diversify their public base and to aggressively seek dialogue with the very organizations that are vocal and assertive in their criticism of the United States. There are at least three requirements to this task. First, overtures for dialogue must be persistent. South Korean CSOs and their leaders tend to look at dialogue with their political opposition and compromise as matters of losing face and akin to selling out. The exterior appearance of sticking to their cause and their list of demands is essential for maintaining leadership, but South Koreans are also highly pragmatic. The key factors are trust and credibility, which are sorely lacking between Koreans and Americans at the level of civil society engagement other than with the elites.
18 For example, PSPD has a quick link to the international movement opposing the U.S.-U.K. occupation of Iraq. Koreans, together with other citizens around the world, planned to hold an antiwar and anti-occupation demonstration on March 20, 2003. The major U.S. sponsors were United for Peace and Justice, Act Now to Stop War and End Racism, and in the United Kingdom, the Stop the War Coalition. (See http://320act.or.kr/link.htm.) A WORKING GROUP REPORT 57
Second, trust and credibility cannot be nurtured if Americans perceive dialogue as a means to one particular end: improving the image of the United States through public diplomacy. To do so invites South Koreans to assume that there is nothing to be gained through dialogue, because South Koreans do not share that goal. With such a formula for dialogue, the South Korean side is bound to view U.S. efforts at dialogue as tokenism or condescension. What South Koreans want instead is for Americans to listen with open minds and hearts and to acknowledge that there are legitimate grievances. This approach requires U.S. officials not to respond with defensiveness and to assume the worst-case scenarios. Unfortunately, both South Korean CSOs and U.S. officials have viewed the attempts at dialogue over the past few years with more cynicism than optimism.
Such a negative dynamic must be broken, as must the tendency to seek out those who are already converted—for example, the USFK seeking support from South Korean veterans’ groups and other conservative organizations, plus activist South Koreans who are reaching out to antimilitarists and peace movements in South Korea, the United States, and elsewhere. In terms of public diplomacy, the activist South Koreans have gained the political edge, because South Korean veterans, establishment elites, and others who view themselves as the guardians of the alliance tend to be significantly older, less technology-savvy, and without a broad political base. Their rhetoric also appeals to more narrow nationalist, anti-Communist, and bilateralist mindsets. In contrast, the anti-Americanists tend to be younger and proficient at spreading their messages through cyberspace and through networking, both among themselves and across national borders. They are better able to frame their concerns in terms that generate internationalist, human rights, and transnational solidarity.
Third, attempts at dialogue must be sustained over the long term and contextualized in a larger web of U.S.–South Korean civil society interactions that focuses on joint education and cultural exchange. In contrast to the 1960s and 1970s—when the U.S. Peace Corps was active, when veterans’ groups visited each other’s country, and when U.S. adoption of South Korean children allowed for commitments of moral responsibility and for respect, emotions and affections to grow—today fewer institutional mechanisms systematically bring South Koreans and Americans together. Although we do not need to return to the past, South Korea is not a place that needs or will tolerate gestures of noblesse oblige, regardless of how sincerely they are offered. Therefore, Americans must learn to meet South Koreans on their own terms, that is, as new democrats, government watchdogs, independent thinkers, and civil society builders. The few South Korean activists who have recently met with their comparable American counterparts have found the encounters valuable, because they were exposed to firsthand advice from American activists about the do’s and don’ts of lobbying, the pursuit of facts from multiple perspectives, the effective and ineffective ways of dealing with the press, and the importance of persuading elected officials to support and represent their issues. The institutionalization of civil society concerns into the political establishment in a more orderly and systematic way is still taking place in South Korea. This development is one area in which a more experienced democracy like that of the United States has something valuable to share with newer democrats across the Pacific.
In summary, new life must be pumped into the SOFA Joint Committee and Subcommittees so that they better serve as formal channels for the exchange of information and perspectives, as well as for the communication of respective bureaucratic procedures between U.S. commands and South Korean civic groups, local residents, and governments. Those efforts may help the U.S. side recognize that many South Koreans harbor accumulated and event-driven grievances that can be considered legitimate, rather than just anti-American sentiment. And the South Korean side may 58 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE come to understand that the standard operating procedures, legal norms and standards, and specific imperatives of mission-planning and training within the USFK and the larger U.S. government have a logic that are unfamiliar to most South Koreans. The point is that through formal and informal interactions, both sides must work hard at dislodging the mistrust and mutual suspicion that have come to color U.S.–ROK relations in recent years. The larger challenge is to balance the practice of democracy among South Koreans with the security commitments between South Korea and the United States. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 59
Chapter VII The Emergence of “New Elites” in South Korea and its Implications for Popular Sentiment Toward the United States Lee Jung-hoon
The Issues
The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) stands at an important juncture in its postindependence history as the nation faces both old and new challenges that could have significant political as well as security implications. At the least, South Korea can be said to be in a transitional phase as the nation comes to terms with a mid-life crisis as manifested in the debate between conservatives and liberals over a wide spectrum of issues. This debate, immeasurably significant in terms of the future direction of South Korea, is fast affecting the dynamics of South Korean society, as seen in the belligerent labor–business relations, the way the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) is perceived and dealt with, the presidential election of December 2002, and the general elections of April 2004. Of course, the sudden transformation is also making a difference in the way South Koreans view relations with the United States. Fifty years after the end of the Korean War, questions are being raised about how important the United States still is to South Korea. Such questions are being raised against the backdrop of three key developments: (1) emerging divergence in perceptions of and policy toward the regime in Pyongyang, (2) growing negative sentiment toward the United States, and (3) changing U.S. global military strategy.
As noted in previous chapters, a series of incidents negatively affecting relations between the United States and the ROK, coupled with changing South Korean self-identity—especially among the more assertive younger generation—have contributed to the recent rise in negative sentiment toward the United States. Perhaps the most significant development affecting the way the United States and the alliance are viewed is the change in the makeup of the elite establishment in South Korea. Those elites, especially in the sociopolitical realm, have undergone a major transformation. The new elites, spearheaded by progressive civic organizations, pro-government media, and the “3-8- 6” generation in government and politics, have effectively put an end to traditional views of the United States, that is, as a patron and defender against the threat from North Korea. Who are the new elites in South Korea? What are their views, and what are the bases for those views? What are the consequences for the broader alliance with the United States? Can the U.S.–ROK alliance survive the new challenges? In answering these and other questions, this chapter examines the causal link between the emergence of new elites and the rising tide of South Korean negative sentiment toward the United States, plus the implications of these developments for the future direction of U.S.–ROK relations. 60 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
The Rising Tide of South Korean Negative Sentiment toward the United States
Negative sentiment toward the United States is certainly not a new phenomenon in societies that have endured a patron-client relationship with the superpower over the past half-century. Wherever there is U.S. military presence, some degree of anti-American sentiment may be present, be it in Japan, Germany, or South Korea. South Korea had its share of anti-Americanism during the course of U.S.–ROK relations in the post–Korean War period. But what has transpired since the inter- Korean summit in June 2000 merits special attention, because subsequent expressions of negative sentiment toward the United States have become more systematic, harsh, and broad-based. Increasingly, the United States is viewed less as a patron of South Korean security and more as an obstacle to the progress of inter-Korean relations.
It is true that in most public opinion polls in South Korea throughout 2003 the respondents have consistently recognized that (1) maintenance of the alliance is in the best national interest of South Korea, (2) the U.S. military presence is helpful in securing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and (3) bilateral relations should be maintained or strengthened (see table 7.1). Yet, when asked about broader U.S. policy, especially under the current administration of President George W. Bush, respondents have been negative and at times even antagonistic. For those expressing negative sentiments, primary reasons often cited were U.S. unilateralism, condescending U.S. attitudes toward South Koreans, and U.S. interference in domestic affairs (see table 7.2).
Table 7.1: Poll Results on the Importance of U.S.–ROK Alliance (percentage) Alliance is considered Alliance is good for Alliance should be Poll important peace and stability maintained or strengthened CSIS-Joongang Ilbo-RAND 93.0 82.0 73.0 Dong-A Ilbo 84.8 N/A N/A Hankook Ilbo N/A N/A 75.8 Sources: CSIS-Joongang Ilbo-RAND (Sept. 22, 2003), Dong-A Ilbo (April 1, 2003), Hankook Ilbo (June 8, 2003)
Table 7.2: Reasons for Negative Sentiment Toward the United States Rank Reason (percentage) 1 U.S. unilateralism 58 2 U.S. military presence and interference in domestic affairs 14 3 U.S. ignorance of Korea and aloofness 14 4 U.S. hardline policy toward North Korea 4.5 Source: CSIS-Joongang Ilbo-RAND (September 22, 2003).
In the survey conducted by CSIS, Joongang Ilbo, and RAND on September 15–17, 2003, 58 percent of respondents cited U.S. “unilateralism” as the main reason for their negative sentiment. In another survey conducted by Minju Pyonghwat’ongil Chamunhoeui (Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification) on June 23–24, 2003, 94.4 percent of the 1,200 teenagers surveyed were of the opinion that “U.S.-South Korea relations were not equal.” (Hankook Ilbo, July 3, 2003). The same group ranked the United States fourth (41.6 percent) after Japan (61.6 percent), North Korea (53.0 percent), and China (49.0 percent) among countries they favored the most (see tables 7.3A, 7.3B). A WORKING GROUP REPORT 61
Table 7.3A: Surrounding Countries in Order of Preference by Korean Teenagers Country Teenagers preferring (percentage) Japan 61.6 North Korea 53.0 China 49.0 United States 41.6 Russia 28.4
Table 7.3B: Korean Teenagers’ Opinion on the Fairness of U.S.–ROK Alliance Opinion Teenagers agreeing (percentage) U.S.–ROK relations are definitely unequal 66.8 U.S.–ROK relations are somewhat unequal 27.6 Sources: Polls conducted by Minju Pyonghwat’ongil Chamunhoeui on June 23–24, 2003. Poll results carried in Hankook Ilbo, July 3, 2003.
Herein lies the paradox of South Korean society. On the one hand, South Koreans openly admit the need to keep the United States close for their national well-being. On the other hand, there appears to be something about the United States and its policies that an increasing number of South Koreans are reading as a disdainful, if not outright contemptuous. When it comes to the United States, South Korea seems caught in a complex yet dependent relationship, quite similar to the relationship that South Korea has had over the years with Japan. Negative sentiments toward Japan are understandable, given the colonial past. Explaining rising negative sentiment toward the United States, with whom South Korea fought on the same side in two major wars, is much more challenging.
The prospect of such negative sentiment toward the United States being translated into government policy is an unfamiliar development in the alliance’s history. In the past, South Korean leaders rejected negative public sentiment in its decisionmaking. Today, however, public sentiment seems to be a significant factor in the way the new South Korean leadership makes major policy decisions. What has happened to account for the change? Although growing public empowerment is one key element, more fundamentally the change can be attributed to the transformation of the political leadership, the core of what constitutes the South Korean elite. The change in the makeup of South Korea’s elite, in other words, has led to a situation in which hitherto commonly held strategic values in the traditional alliance can no longer be taken for granted.
South Korea’s “New Elites”
Much of the growth in negative sentiment toward the United States within South Korea in recent years has been traced to the younger generation, those people in their twenties and thirties. Although they do not yet form the core of the new South Korean leadership, the policies of the Roh Moo-hyun government reflect the opinions and views expressed by the younger generation. This slant is an anomaly, given the South Korean government’s traditional conservatism. Being conservative in South Korea is roughly defined as being anti-Communist and fundamentally favorable toward the United States. The elite establishment in South Korea, which would include those in the government, politics, major corporations, the military, religious groups, the mass media, and academia, has by and large been considered conservative (with the exception of those in academia). Since the advent of the Roh Moo- hyun administration, things have changed. What is seen as the convergence of the persepctive of the 62 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
younger generation and the policy orientation of the government underscores a revolutionary change in the makeup of South Korean society, especially in the elite ranks.
For the past year, Roh Moo-hyun’s so-called participatory government has pursued a transfer of power to reshape South Korea’s mainstream establishment. The strategy has involved three aspects: (1) replacement of Seoul-based elites with regionally based individuals, (2) transformation of former student activists into institutional leaders, and (3) infusion into power centers of people from outside the traditional mainstream of ROK politics and bureaucracy.1 As one key aid of President Roh suggested at the outset of the administration, “A sea change in our society’s elite establishment will now begin quietly.” In the main, the “elite establishment” here refers to those who wield political power and make important decisions of national magnitude. Members are government and political leaders, plus heads of government-run organizations, including the media networks such as KBS and MBC.
The two most notable new factors in the elite echelon in recent years are the proliferation of civic organizations and the so-called 3-8-6 generation. In the case of the civic organizations, often referred to broadly as NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), the seeds were sown during the Kim Dae-jung era. Picking up on populist issues such as human rights, environmentalism, pacifism, anticorruption, these NGOs (Ch’amyoyondae [People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy], Kyongsilryon [Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice], Hwankyongjongui Siminyondae [Citizens’ Movement for Environmental Justice], Noksaekyonhap [Green Korea United], T’ongilyondae, Kukminuihim [Kukmin Power]) have not only proliferated but also grown in power to exert an inordinate amount of influence on the way South Koreans consider and deal with certain issues. Repeated criticism about the problems of U.S. military presence in South Korea and broader U.S. foreign policy by some of the more vocal NGOs and organizations, such as the radical Hanch’ongryon (Teachers’ Union), has affected the way many South Koreans view these issues.
Accidents or incidents (oil spills from the 8th Army base, for example) related to the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) provide a welcome opportunity for such organizations to mobilize and widen their anti- American support, thus increasing their influence. Many NGOs are led by those who would not, in the traditional sense, be considered representative of South Korea’s mainstream. If anything, the NGO leaders represent the antithesis of the traditional elites, whom they attack as being too old, corrupt, authoritarian, and even unpatriotic. Anti-Americanism comes into play here because the United States is seen to be closely linked with the traditional elites. Some progressive NGOs have adopted anti- American rhetoric as a means to hit at the existing order of South Korean society.
The other major factor rapidly altering the makeup of the South Korean elite is the emergence of the 3-8-6 generation as the new power base of the Roh Moo-hyun government. Members of this generation are individuals who are in their thirties, entered university in the 1980s, and were born in the
1 Examples of the three aspects are plentiful. Notable examples of the first aspect are Lee Jong-wu, former Kyongbuk University professor, becoming the director of planning in the Blue House; Mun Chae-in, former lawyer in Pusan, becoming senior secretary to the president for civil affairs; Ho Song-gwan, former Dong-A University professor, becoming minister of government administration; and Kim Tu-gwan, former Namhae County head, also becoming minister of government administration. Some examples of the second aspect are listed on page 52 in this chapter. Finally, examples of the third aspect are Kim Pyong-jun, former Kukmin University professor, becoming chairman of the government’s powerful committee for government reforms, Lee Ch’ang-dong, former movie director, becoming minister of Culture, Lee Chong-sok, former research fellow at the Sejong Institute, becoming the deputy-director of the National Security Council (NSC); and Park Chu-hyon, former NGO activist, becoming senior secretary to the president for people’s participation. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 63
1960s. Although many people fit into this category, the term 3-8-6 is used more specifically to refer to individuals in politics and government. What distinguishes these politicians and government officials is that they are mostly former student activists from the 1980s, during the days of military government under Chun Doo-hwan. Many of them have served prison terms or have been on the run from the police for their antigovernment activities. The irony, of course, is that the former activists are now very much a part of the government. They are large in number because the anti-government demonstrations in the 1980s became widely supported by the population as a whole. This number means that there is a very large pool of 3-8-6 activists who are aspiring to become the new political elite of South Korea.
The participation of the 3-8-6 generation today in politics and government, especially in the all- powerful Blue House, is staggering. Of the 281 high-ranking Blue House staff at the start of the Roh presidency, 236 were members of the 3-8-6 generation. This number represented 84 percent of the president’s top aides in an institution that wields an inordinate amount of power and influence. Some of the more representative members of the 3-8-6 group in the Blue House have included Yun Tae-yong spokesperson), Lee Ho-ch’ol (political affairs), Kwak Hae-gon (monitoring), Kim Man-su (publicity), Lee Kwang-jae (situation room), Kim Hyon-mi (domestic press), and Kim Hyong-wuk system reform). Despite a series of reshuffles in the first year of the Roh government, the 3-8-6 generation remains a core component of the Blue House staff.
Outside the Blue House, the 3-8-6 generation has also made significant inroads, especially in politics. A good number of its members have already made it to the National Assembly, interestingly, into both the ruling and the opposition camps. Examples are Won Hi-ryong and Oh Kyong-hun of the opposition Grand National Party, and Song Yong-gil, Kim Song-ho, Oh Yong-sik, and Yim Jong-sok of the new ruling Uri Party. (The Millennium Democratic Party [MDP] split into the ruling Uri Party and a smaller MDP opposition party.) Kim Min-sok, formerly of the MDP and the party’s former Seoul mayoral candidate, is another prominent representative of the 3-8-6 generation in politics. In the general elections held on April 15, 2004, more members of the 3-8-6 generation made it to Youido, the home of the National Assembly. In fact, the number of former student activist leaders in the 17th National Assembly has increased to 14. Eleven are former presidents of student associations of various universities.
Even among the 3-8-6 student activists of the 1980s, important distinctions are made between those involved in activism before and after the June Resistance (6wol Hangjaeng) of 1987. Those who were activists before June 1987 are generally from the Minjungminjuju-ui (PD) faction or Chehonuihoep’a (CA) faction. PD members have Marxist views on capitalism, thereby championing labor force and class struggle. The CA faction, which broke off from the PD faction, is also firmly leftist in its vision of creating a ‘people’s’ legislature and state. Post-1987 student activists are mostly of Minjokhaebang Minjungminjuju-ui (NL) faction, the intellectual backbone of the militant Hanch’ongryon’s predecessor, Chonguk Taehaksaeng Taepyojahyopuihoe (Chondaehyop). The NL members’ key emphasis is on national liberation from U.S. imperialism. The NL members have pursued unification through inter-Korean cooperation. In the 17th National Assembly, former PD members include Kim Yong-ch’un, Song Yong-gil, Ko Jin-hwa, Kang Ki-jong, Lee Hwa-yong, and Lee Kwang-jae. Former NL members are Lee In-yong, Wu Sang-ho, Kim T’ae-nyon, Oh Yong-sik, and Yim Jong-sok.
Whether NL, PD or CA, the former activists’ two most significant and constant political platforms are wariness of the United States and a nationalist, indigenous approach to inter-Korean relations. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the former student activists’ loyalty to such tenets have not changed much over the years. Although President Roh is not of the 3-8-6 generation himself, some 64 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
of his remarks and policy orientation suggest a strong influence from his 3-8-6 associates. Perhaps it is in such a context that President Roh has spoken of an “independent foreign policy” and once noted, “So what if you’re anti-American?” The recent row over the dispatch of South Korean troops to Iraq can also be looked at in a similar light. Although a decision has been made to dispatch another 3,000 troops (including combat units), opposition is expected to grow both in and out of the legislature. This expectation is natural, given the policy orientation of the new legislators. In a poll conducted by Dong-A Ilbo (April 19, 2004), the newly elected legislators have shown a clear preference for China over the United States (55 percent to 44 percent) concerning which country is more important to South Korean foreign policy in the future, while 94.9 percent have responded positively to a policy of engagement with North Korea.
Meanwhile, traditional establishment members—the TK (Taegu/Kyongbuk) the politicians, the major newspapers (Chosun, JoongAng, and Dong-A), the judiciary, the conglomerates, the Seoul National University graduates, etc.—remain extant but are keeping a low profile in the face of the advent of the “nouveau elites,” who are vocal, purposeful, and most important, in power. Among the traditional South Korean elites, the two largest conservative newspapers—Dong-A and Chosun—have proved to be most resistant to change, especially in the ideological sense. Beginning with their opposition to former President Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine” policy, Chosun and Dong-A have called for a more realistic approach to North Korea through close coordination of policy with the United States. Veterans, Christians, and other conservatively minded individuals and groups have also begun to raise their voices to counter the government’s policy of engagement with North Korea and to oppose anti-American demonstrations. In 2003, anti-U.S. demonstrations were always juxtaposed with even larger demonstrations favoring the United States and opposing Kim Jong-il and nuclear power.
Moreover, a rise in conservative civic organizations such as Par╠n sahoer╠l wihan simin hoeui (Citizens United for Better Society), Chayu simin yondae (Free Citizens’ Alliance of Korea), and Hankuk jayu ch’ongyonmaeng (Korea Freedom League), and Web sites such as Tokrip shinmun (The Independent), KONAS Net (Korean National Security Net), Chayu minju minjok hoeui (National Congress of Freedom and Democracy), and Ch’ongnyong wup’a yondae (Coalition of Rightwing Youth), have helped sustain the conservative cause. The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) has also taken cautious steps to downplay expressions of negative sentiment toward the United States in support of the alliance. FKI representatives, for example, visited the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division on November 26, 2003, to demonstrate their support for the alliance. The FKI has also made a public statement in support of additional deployment of forces to Iraq. Such efforts by traditional elements of the South Korean elite and other newly emerging conservative forces within civil society have moderated somewhat the effects of broader changes in South Korean society.
Policy Implications for U.S.–ROK Relations
The Roh government seems torn between the realistic need to keep pace with U.S. pressure on North Korea on the one hand, and the idealistic hope to bring about a settlement through inter- Korean dialogue and cooperation on the other hand. Under the pretext of not provoking North Korea and of keeping alive inter-Korean cooperation, the Roh government has so far continued to emphasize a talks-only approach as the only viable alternative in handling the North Korean nuclear issue. Instead of applying pressure, various economic incentives have been offered. Against this A WORKING GROUP REPORT 65 background, the regime in Pyongyang has continued to pursue its brinkmanship tactics and is quite happy to try to play the United States and South Korea off one another. A genuine resolution, therefore, is not likely to materialize until the United States and South Korea converge on the fine details of policy toward North Korea. This convergence has proved difficult to achieve in recent years because of changes in both South Korea and the United States.
For the United States, maintaining an alliance with South Korea amid growing South Korean public demand for a “more equal” partnership is a delicate challenge—especially at a time when there is an apparent policy gap between the two governments. The proposed relocation of both the 8th Army base in Seoul and the 2nd Infantry Division near the Demilitarized Zone is seen by some as loosening U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea. On this issue, South Korean reaction has been uniformly negative. Even those traditional elites who favor a strong alliance with the United States have expressed concerns about a possible power vacuum resulting from what seemed like a rather unilateral action. Those who are more cynical claim that the move is meant to keep U.S. forces out of North Korean artillery range, thus freeing up U.S. military options, to include even the ability to strike the DPRK without the fear of collateral damage to U.S. forces. Korea-related decisions by the U.S. government thus have to be made with utmost care, because they could end up antagonizing both the conservative and the progressive forces in South Korea, albeit for different reasons.
For now, however, one may be cautiously optimistic about the future direction of U.S.–ROK alliance. The U.S. government announced a commitment to invest US$11 billion by 2006 to upgrade its military capability in South Korea. Under the Roh government, despite concerns about its rhetoric upon taking power, steps have been taken to honor the alliance. The deployment of troops to Iraq is one example. In other words, the rapid change in South Korean society has not yet translated into a revolutionary shift in its policy. However, given the emergence of a new political leadership that is negatively inclined toward the United States, the situation may change rapidly. Negative views may one day be reflected fully in policy choices that could be damaging to the alliance.
Conclusion
It suffices to say that South Korea's security may still be best ensured by the continuation of a close alliance with the United States. Yet the rise in negative sentiment toward the United States and the change in the sociopolitical leadership in South Korea have altered the traditional ingredient—anti- Communism—that has bound the alliance for decades. Indeed, the new political force— armed with partisan public broadcasts, an array of online and off-line networks, bureaucratic leverage, and civic organizational support—has set the course for a major sociopolitical transformation. Central to this transformation is an independent, nationalist approach to inter-Korean relations. With two successive governments dwelling on the merits of engagement policy, many people have come to identify North Korea not as a threat, but rather as somewhat of a “lost brother.” In the process, the distinction between the Kim Jong-il regime and the North Korean people has blurred. Sympathy for the people of North Korea has somehow been extended to the regime in Pyongyang as well. Such sympathy for North Korea is, in fact, one of the primary sources of negative sentiment toward the United States, because the United States is viewed alternatively as a big power pushing around a weak and small country with blood ties to the South, or as an outside power unnecessarily creating tension and instability on the peninsula. 66 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
The Roh government, the anchor of the new elites, finds itself in a dilemma as it strives for an independent foreign policy that does not provoke estrangement in the alliance. After a year of trial and error, however, the Roh government has become far more cognizant of the realities of international politics. As a result, efforts have been made to prevent further fallout in traditional U.S.–ROK relations. The Roh government might usefully apply the lessons it has learned about the importance of the alliance by serving as the most credible source of moderation for members of the new political leadership and their like-minded supporters from civic organizations and the media. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 67
Chapter VIII Friendship in Need of Substance: Perspectives of South Korean Business toward the United States Kim Byoung-joo
Introduction
How do businesses in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) view the United States, and why do they have those views? What at are the key issues for consideration in the context of the U.S.–ROK alliance?
Within the South Korean business community, large corporations care the most about the state of U.S.–ROK relations and maintain a consistently favorable stance toward the United States. This stance originates largely from a perception of dependency on the U.S. market. Because of this situation, South Korean businesses have been considerably passive in acting on their concerns about U.S. behavior and policy over the years. However, to build a more productive relationship with the United States in the future, South Korean businesses should adopt a more proactive strategy in reaching out to a wider segment of U.S. society.
Who Cares about the United States among South Korean Businesses?
The segment within the South Korean business community that has the most serious stake in friendly relations with the United States is big business. The interests of the rest of the businesses are not much different from those of average, upper-middle-class South Koreans.
The size of South Korean trade—exports and imports combined—amounts to as much as 68.2 percent of South Korea’s gross domestic product (GDP), compared to 18.5 percent in the United States. This comparison suggests that South Korea’s economic actors—particularly businesses—are engaged in higher levels of international trade and are, therefore, generally more sensitive to the state of foreign relations than may be the case in other countries with relatively smaller shares of international trade, such as the United States.
However, this analysis does not mean that South Korean businesses all share the same perspectives on international issues and on U.S.-related issues, in particular. The United States is the second largest export market for South Korea after China, taking up about 18 percent of South Korea’s total exports, leaving more than 80 percent of exports going elsewhere in the world (see table 8.1). Theoretically, the producers of the products that make up that 18 percent have direct and immediate stakes in South Korea’s relationship with the United States. 68 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Table 8.1: Share of Exports to the United States within Korea’s Total Exports Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Share 19.6 18.4 19.2 20.7 20.1 18.4 17.7 (%) Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
How widely do those producers represent the general South Korean business community? If we look at the product-category breakdown of South Korea’s exports to the United States, we can see that the picture is heavily dominated by a rather limited number of product categories. As Table 8.2 shows, automobiles, semiconductors, electronics, textiles, and steel products account for more than 77 percent of South Korea’s total exports to the United States. Those products represent the most influential and powerful industrial sectors of South Korean businesses. Therefore, although we cannot say a large number of South Korean businesses hold direct interest and immediate stakes in U.S.–ROK relations, the most prominent members of the South Korean business community clearly do.
Table 8.2: Commodity Composition of South Korea’s Exports to the United States (2002) Transport Industrial Electronic Household Made-up Iron Commodities Equip. Electronics Components Electronics Textiles and Others Steel Share (%) 25.8 21.5 12.5 7.8 6.9 2.8 22.7 Source: Korea International Trade Association, Korea and the World: Key Indicators 2003, 47.
An additional point to note is the fast-growing importance of China. The Chinese market has emerged as the number one destination of South Korea’s outgoing foreign investment and as the number two destination of South Korea’s exports. For most South Korean businesses—small- and medium-sized enterprises in particular—China is fast becoming a market that is as important as, if not more important than, the United States.
Friendliness Expressed Outside: Consistent Support
The view of South Korea’s large corporations toward the United States can be characterized as consistently supportive, without significant fluctuations or changes. Some people have wondered, for instance, how big business felt when the 1997 economic crisis hit and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervened in the South Korean economy with austerity policy packages that drove numbers of South Korean businesses into bankruptcies. Many South Korean citizens viewed the IMF action as serving the interests of U.S. firms and perhaps as being influenced by the motivation of some in the U.S. business community to either take over South Korean competitors or drive them out of business. In the eyes of many proud South Koreans, the IMF was the cause of South Korea’s pain and humiliation, including unemployment not seen in decades. Likewise, the IMF was associated intimately with the United States (as it was elsewhere in the world under similar circumstances). Demonstrations led by progressive South Korean nongovernmental organizations provided vehicles for expression of anti-Americanism in this environment. However, no evidence exists that any large South Korean corporations expressed sympathy for conspiracy theories surrounding the U.S. government or big business either during or after the 1997 economic crisis in South Korea. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 69
Given such consistent support for the United States, South Korea’s business community has played two contrasting roles in recent years: first, it acted independent of the ROK government; second, it supported the government in improving South Korea’s relationship with the United States. Before the December 2002 election of President Roh Moo-hyun, South Korean business leaders repeatedly expressed concerns over his stance toward the United States. Roh called for “a more equal relationship with the United States” and for the United States to modify its hard-line approach about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). Roh’s desire for an “independent foreign policy” caused considerable alarm within South Korea’s business community, which favored the conservative agenda opposing Roh’s agenda during the elections. The conservative camp, in turn, sought to highlight the business community’s concerns in order to define Roh as an unreliable national leader.
Following the 2002 presidential election, however, the situation changed quickly. Business leaders made considerable efforts to mend fences with the new president. One important and effective way of doing so, the business leaders found, was working on the frontlines to improve bilateral relations with the United States.
The opportunity came during President Roh’s visit to the United States in May 2003. For the first time ever, the chairmen of Samsung, Hyundai, and LG all joined the presidential entourage, sat through presidential dinners, traveled to areas of the United States where their local operations were located, and demonstrated their full support for the new Roh administration’s efforts to improve ties with the United States. For this support, President Roh repeatedly expressed his deep appreciation.
In fact, many in the South Korean media noted that the trip to the United States became a turning point; it was then that the foundations of trust and cooperation between the Roh administration and the South Korean business community began to be built. The nascent relationship ran into some strain during a series of labor strikes that swept across South Korea in May and June 2003. However, relations soon got back on a positive track with additional presidential trips to Japan and China that were in the summer of 2003 and that promoted the international interests of ROK businesses.
As noted, the key characteristic of the ROK business community’s support for the United States has remained its consistency. Through official U.S.–ROK disagreements over DPRK policy in the Kim Dae-jung administration, anti-American candlelight vigils in late 2002 over the death of the two South Korean schoolgirls struck by a U.S. military vehicle, or over controversy surrounding U.S. actions in the year leading up to the war in Iraq, South Korea’s business leaders never took the side of the increasing number of South Korean citizens expressing anger, resentment, reservations, or doubts toward the United States. South Korean businesses rarely articulated reasons it was lending such constant support for the United States; rather, it seemed to share the position of South Korea’s conservative camp and of the older generation that, no matter what, and regardless of the circumstances, it is unwise to oppose or raise any contentious issues with the United States. 70 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Friendliness Held Inside: Dependency and Passivity
How do we understand where this apparently unconditional support comes from? To those who do not share the same view as South Korea’s business leaders, this firm position seems to originate not from keen understanding of ever-changing U.S. political and policy dynamics, but from a historically formed sense of vulnerability and fear whose roots go back to the years of U.S. military occupation during the 1940s and the Korean War.
South Koreans in their mid-forties and younger notice fundamental differences in the way older generations—particularly those over age 60—view the United States. In those who are old enough to have experienced the Korean War, younger Koreans notice a strong sense of both gratefulness and apprehension toward the United States, something that they do not fully comprehend or accept.
The question, then, is whether this old way of thinking still dominates South Korea’s business community. After all, particularly during the past decade or so, many of the largest business groups in South Korea have seen their founders hand over corporate control to the next generation.
The answer, however, seems affirmative. Even though members of the founders’ generation are no longer active, a considerable number clearly are still highly influential in South Korean business circles. Many second-generation leaders are also not young enough to fully sympathize with the views of South Korea’s younger generations. Many of them are in their mid- to late fifties and have been trained and raised under the charismatic leadership of the founding fathers of their businesses. Therefore, second-generation business leaders do not hold a view toward the United States that is significantly different from that of their predecessors.
Furthermore, there is something other than historically formed perceptions in the South Korean business community’s support for the United States, something possibly much more powerful: clear and present interests. Their interests lie in maintaining full access to the world’s largest export market, the largest and most advanced economy, where global business rules and standards are set and where path-breaking business innovations are produced—simply put, the center stage of today’s global business.
This understanding of what is at stake creates a sense of vulnerability as well as appeal. This sense of vulnerability is further amplified by the imbalance in the bilateral economic relationship: although the United States is Korea’s second largest export market, Korea is only the sixth largest market for U.S. exports, the destination of only three three percent of U.S. exports.
This imbalance is even larger on the investment side. Although the United States is the largest source of South Korea’s inbound investment, the size of South Korea’s investment in the United States ranks about twenty-fourth in the United States, as Table 8.3 shows. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 71
Table 8.3: Foreign Direct Investment Position in the United States on a Historical Cost Basis, 2001 (US$ million) Rank Country Amount 1 United Kingdom 217,746 2 Japan 158,988 3 Netherlands 158,020 4 Germany 152,760 5 France 147,207 6 Switzerland 125,521 7 Canada 108,600 8 Luxembourg 40,232 9 Ireland 28,195 10 Australia 23,488 11 Sweden 23,299 12 U.K. Islands, 18,244 Caribbean 13 Bermuda 15,748 14 Belgium 14,721 15 Finland 8,762 16 Mexico 7,418 17 Singapore 6,502 18 Italy 5,916 19 Spain 5.092 20 Venezuela 4.722 : 24 Korea, Republic of 3,121 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (June 2003).
What are South Korean businesses doing to address this sense of vulnerability and imbalance? One action has been to hire representation in the United States, mostly in Washington, D.C. Records compiled under the U.S. Justice Department’s Foreign Agents Registration Act for the first half of 2002 show that the ROK hired 16 representatives—mostly law firms and lobbying firms—at a total cost of US$26 million. This figure presents an interesting comparison with the cases of Taiwan and Israel, both of which have highly visible lobbies in Washington: Taiwan also hired 16 representatives but for only US$2 million; Israel hired only four representatives for US$4 million.1
From this data, it is evident that South Korean businesses recognize their need to be heard in the United States, but their efforts seem to be less efficient than those of the most skillful operators, such as Taiwan and Israel. Indeed, the facts speak for themselves: in the wake of U.S. steel safeguard measures and countervailing DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory) duties, many observers have pointed out that South Korea has been rather consistently ineffective in promoting its trade
1 See Foreign Agents Registration Unit (FARA) Counterespionage Section, “FARA Semi Annual Reports – First Half, Year 2002,”
Needed for the Future: More Active Engagement with the United States
What should the South Korean business community do to improve its situation for the future? One possible approach would be to have a very active and stable presence in Washington. At least the top three to five South Korean businesses should maintain permanent representatives in Washington. They need individuals who will spend many years in the city and will build close personal networks with various players in the U.S. federal and local governments, business organizations, media, think tanks, and other organizations. Such Washington representatives should have direct channels of communication with the top management in South Korea to ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency in their operations. The rest of the business community—the smaller companies—should push for a similar type of presence in Washington, through more effectively organized Washington offices of key business associations such as the Federation of Korean Industries or the Korea International Trade Association.
Like South Korea as a whole, ROK businesses need a more sophisticated understanding of the U.S. political system. On military or security issues, the United States may be more likely to show one face and to speak with one voice (which clearly does not always happen). In business and economic affairs, however, various players are active in the U.S. system and are less likely to act in unison. South Korean business leaders, and top managers in particular, should thus understand an important principle when dealing with the United States: most aspects of U.S.–ROK bilateral relations relevant to them are ones they can and should seek to “manage,” rather than remain passive or just reactive. If such a change in thinking takes place, South Korea may expect the overall relationship between the United States and South Korea to develop further and to become more mature, stable, and productive in coming years. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 73
Chapter IX The Role of the Media and the U.S.–ROK Relationship Scott Snyder
The role and influence of the media in shaping public perceptions of the U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) relationship has taken on greater prominence in recent years, especially where there exists the potential to sensationalize or politicize specific aspects of the relationship. The media have played a prominent role as a filter and as a shaper of broad public perceptions of key events in the U.S.–ROK relationship by framing the issues, by highlighting or “priming” them as key subjects for public debate, and by setting the agenda for public discussion in South Korea. According to South Korean observers, South Korean public opinion as expressed through the print and broadcast media is polarized.1 The rise of intense competition among South Korean media outlets has seen increasing criticism that sensationalist South Korean media coverage has exacerbated, misrepresented, and thrown into stark relief some of the substantive disagreements and difficulties that have existed between the two governments.
There have been recurring criticisms among some South Korean consumers that the media’s role in shaping public perceptions has been subject to manipulation by special interest groups that seek to draw attention to or exaggerate differences over sensitive issues in the U.S.–ROK relationship as a way of achieving their specific goals. Others have suggested that the media will reflect only one side, either entirely conservative or entirely progressive views, depending on the leadership, orientation, or audience of the particular media outlet in question. Washington-based South Korean correspondents routinely complained in the late 1990s that, if the stories they wrote did not conform to editorial expectations or understanding of portrayals that would be acceptable to South Korean readership, those stories would be rewritten—regardless of the facts at hand or the conclusions of the reporters on the ground. To outside observers with knowledge of specific events, South Korean media culture often appears to be one in which providing affirmation to an in-group of loyal readers is more important than attempting to convey objective facts and allowing readers to draw their own conclusions.
The role of the media in South Korean society may be perceived as different from that of the U.S. media in terms of journalistic standards, editorial selection criteria based on differing perceptions of readers’ interests, and expectations regarding objectivity or the separation of fact from opinion or analysis. This chapter attempts to provide a structure for understanding the origins and context of South Korea’s media culture and for assessing how the South Korean media are influencing South Korean public perceptions of the United States and the U.S.–ROK relationship. It concludes with some comments about the roles that international media play in a cycle of misperception and misunderstanding between the two countries.
1 Presentation by Auh Taik-sup, “Korean Media’s Influence on Public Opinion: Theoretical Framework” (presentation at conference on the Korean Media and Perceptions of U.S.–ROK Relations, sponsored by The Asia Foundation and the Korean American Association, January 8, 2003). 74 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
South Korean Media and Their Role in U.S.–ROK Relations: Historical and Political Context
The South Korean media have long played a critical role as intermediary in shaping—and in some cases, distorting—the context and substance of U.S.–ROK relations. The historical evolution of the South Korean media still has a residual influence on the media’s current role in South Korean society.
Only one generation ago, the South Korean media were under strict control by an authoritarian military-led ROK government that maintained a very cozy and controlling relationship with newspapers and broadcasting stations, which essentially played the role of mouthpiece for the government. The government gave strict instructions to media outlets on how to cover which stories, and there was very little straying from the government line as determined by government officials, who exercised close editorial oversight of all forms of South Korean media coverage. This historical legacy of interlocking influence and manipulation of the media by the government —and the backlash against government attempts to control media messages in the context of Korea’s democratization—are significant factors in shaping both the current relationship between the South Korean media and the government and ways in which the South Korean media have been conditioned to view issues in the U.S.–ROK relationship.
Chun Doo-hwan’s control over the media at the early stages of his dictatorship had a direct effect on U.S.–ROK relations. The United States had no effective way of countering Chun’s efforts to limit timely public knowledge within South Korea and abroad of the events that took place during the 1980 Kwangju uprising or to portray the U.S. government as fully supporting the Chun regime’s efforts to put down the uprising.2 Throughout its tenure, the military dictatorship manipulated the media regularly in order to avoid taking the political heat on many aspects of U.S.–ROK relations. At the same time, the South Korean media became adept at covering the international news, which occasionally became a trusted vehicle for “leaking” to the South Korean public matters that were too embarrassing or sensitive to be covered by the local media. Some of the biggest journalistic coups of The New York Times and other international papers contained news that was well known inside South Korea but was too sensitive for publication or broadcast.
Thus, the legacy of authoritarian politics in influencing government-media relations—and the development of that relationship in the context of South Korea’s democratization—are key factors that have had a direct effect on public perceptions of U.S.–ROK relations. For decades during the Cold War, public expression of negative opinions about the United States, among many other issues, were artificially constrained by the South Korean government. As South Korea underwent the transition to democracy, areas that were formerly forbidden became irresistible tools both for testing the extent of South Korea’s openness and for expressing views that had formerly been deemed unacceptable, including public criticism of the United States. Thus, media expressions of anti- American views or sharp critiques of U.S. policy have ironically become a measure of proof of South
2 See Henry Scott-Stokes, and Lee Jai-eui, eds., The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea’s Tiananmen (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2000, and William Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution), 1999. Written from perspectives that differ on the question of U.S. responsibility, both accounts illustrate the effectiveness with which the Chun government manipulated accounts of Kwangju for its own purposes, distorting Korean public understanding of the U.S. position and role in those events. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 75
Korea’s democratic freedoms and of progress in South Korea’s democratic development, even if those freedoms may now be having negative practical effects on the U.S.–ROK relationship.
Legacies of Authoritarian Government and Current Reform Efforts
The relationship between the media and the ROK government has continued to be politicized under the Kim Dae-jung administration. The Kim administration initiated tax audits of the major media organizations with the ostensible purpose of promoting reforms in the relationship between owners and editorial staff members. Those tax audits also served the purpose of taming the media by implicitly threatening retaliation for criticisms of Kim administration priorities, including the “sunshine” policy and the inter-Korean summit. To avoid the consequences of direct criticism of South Korean government policies, the media might indirectly criticize the handling of issues related to the policies in question, that is, the U.S.–ROK relationship. For instance, media criticisms over the government’s North Korea policy were couched in terms of reported difficulties in U.S.–ROK policy coordination on the issue. The highlighting of tensions in the U.S.–ROK relationship has served as an indirect way to express opposition without directly criticizing the South Korean government.
During the Kim administration, many of the government’s institutionalized efforts to curb media criticism of the government remained in place, for instance, through the government’s vetting of “early-bird” (day-before) editions of newspapers. The Blue House practice of vetting early-bird editions remained in place until early 2003, when the Roh Moo-hyun administration decided to abolish that practice.
The Roh administration has continued the traditional practice of trying to shape media coverage to its advantage, however. Roh’s explicit statements criticizing Chosun Ilbo and the Blue House’s attempts to discriminate against Chosun Ilbo and other “unfriendly” media outlets on interview requests, etc., cannot help but be viewed with concern by those who know the history of South Korean governments’ efforts to intimidate the press. President Roh’s persistent attacks on a single media outlet seem clearly political. The Roh government’s apparent aggressiveness in challenging publication of false rumors or incorrect information, for instance, may have the long-term effect of improving reporting accuracy, but it may also be used to intimidate.
In contrast to his attacks on Chosun Ilbo and other leading print dailies, however, President Roh has praised the broadcast medium, at one point even going so far as to suggest that he owed his election to the favorable coverage he received on KBS and MBC. One of President Roh’s early decisions as president was to choose a new chairman for KBS. After having his first choice rejected by the KBS labor union, Roh chose newspaper editor Chung Yun-ju. Chung was a long-time Washington correspondent for the newspaper Hangyore, and he had been quite critical of the United States when he had promoted revisionist historical views of the U.S. role on the Korean Peninsula as a member of the Hangyore editorial board. Thus, Chairman Chung quickly instituted significant changes in KBS news documentary production, including the promotion of a series on pro- democracy and pro-labor leaders who had faced persecution by previous authoritarian regimes. This series included a one-hour documentary lauding the role of Professor Song Du-yul, who upon his return to Seoul from Germany in the fall of 2003 was arrested, tried, and convicted on allegations of having served as a North Korean spy and member of the Politburo in the Democratic People’s 76 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Republic of Korea (DPRK). The revelations led Chairman Chung to issue a public apology at a National Assembly hearing for KBS’s laudatory coverage of Professor Song as a pro-democracy hero.
Roh has also opened up the press room system within various ministries and has established the practice of daily briefings, both of which may be positive innovations but have served to reinforce tendencies toward “pack journalism” rather than gumshoe investigative reporting. Although enhanced flexibility has created a more competitive atmosphere within the media, it also brought with it a great deal of repetition and copying among papers to ensure that no one is scooped on a big story, even if it means plagiarizing sensationalist or incorrect lead stories in order to “serve” the readers.
South Korean Media and U.S.–ROK Relations: Current Context
Since democratization, there has been a rapid diversification of media choices and channels, including the broadening of the print and broadcast media and the revolutionizing arrival of the Internet. Indeed, the opening up of the South Korean media and the adjustment of the media’s role in the context of South Korea’s democratic consolidation has been both evolutionary and revolutionary. For instance, Hangyore newspaper emerged as an early nongovernmental competitor in the print medium in 1988 and led the expansion of news from nongovernmental sources. Diversification of media outlets has increased competition and has allowed a somewhat greater diversity of opinion to be expressed. However, most of the new media outlets have been niche or special interest publications. The expression of available opinion did not necessarily occur through a deepening of political or policy debate on the editorial pages of major media outlets themselves.
The primary vehicles for influence have essentially remained the same. State-owned KBS and MBC are the main television outlets, and three major daily newspapers,—Chosun, JoongAng, and Dong-A—occupy 80 percent of the South Korean media market, with the remaining 20 percent shared by a variety of smaller papers that have struggled financially to remain in the game. Corporate publishers connected with some of South Korea’s leading conglomerates have influenced the print medium in particular. Reforms of the print medium in recent years have gradually reduced direct control of conglomerates through the cutting of ties between publishers and editors in an attempt to diminish inordinate corporate influence on the editorial agenda of those papers.
During the past several years, the rapid expansion of the Internet as a source of information in highly wired South Korea has begun to have an influence on popular views of politics and policy. The pioneers in Internet news coverage have been the Oh My News! site and Pressian, but new competitors are rapidly emerging. Those sites have revolutionized the way that the younger generation in particular gets its news, and the sites have allowed new media with a much more progressive bent and a tendency to sensationalize stories to get an audience and to promote agendas that had traditionally been beyond the reach of the mainstream media. Through the immediacy of the Internet, Oh My News! has capitalized on the concept of an “unmediated media,” through which an army of citizen reporters are able to present a wide range of direct reporting to consumers. The amateur reporters do not have journalistic training, and the editorial role in mediating opinion is substantially diminished or removed altogether, yielding a raw and direct, unvarnished style of reporting. The ability of readers to comment immediately on citizen reporter submissions has A WORKING GROUP REPORT 77
stimulated a lively and active debate among readers and direct participation in news functions. However, at the same time, it has blurred the distinction between straight news and opinion or news analysis, because reporting and immediate reader comments are displayed alongside each other.3
There has also been an expansion of softer media outlets that deal with political issues. There has been a proliferation of weekly and sports magazines, for example, that compete for subway and bus readers. Those weeklies have picked up celebrity aspects of the news as they dramatize the people or the issues, especially when it comes to differences in the U.S.–ROK relationship. Some weeklies (e.g., JoongAng Weekly, Hangyore21) provide extended coverage on hot topics that might not be possible in the daily newspaper editions because of space considerations and that are often written by the same reporters who staff their daily counterparts.
The role of broadcast medium has also expanded over the past decade, particularly as an influential source for reaching voters in national election contests. New challengers on cable networks (e.g., Yonhap 24-hour news, Maeil Economic News channel) are already enhancing broadcast competition by capturing niche audiences.4 Finally, there are the monthly magazines (e.g., Wolgan Chosun, Sindonga), which provide the most in-depth analysis and detailed coverage of issues. In many cases, those magazines have provided the best examples of serious investigatory journalism or extended interviews on critical policy issues facing South Korea.
Furthermore, a distinction has developed as well between political coverage of the print and broadcast media, with the latter much more susceptible to government influence and more able to influence broad public perceptions of politics. Those developments have added complexity to the debate over the politicization of the media and the question of whether the various media set the agenda for public discourse or whether the media are simply reflective of public concerns. The nine o’clock evening news shows on KBS and MBC, the leading public and semipublic stations with the deepest audience penetration, have a profound influence in setting the agenda for national debate. The ways in which those institutions cover the news have grown increasingly controversial because the chairmen of the two institutions are hand picked by the Blue House. MBC’s negative angle toward the U.S.–ROK relationship in the fall of 2002, for instance, drew attention because the president of MBC was known to be a strong critic of the United States. Sensationalist and even incendiary reporting on the deaths of the two schoolgirls on June 13 brought MBC attention and harsh criticism from the U.S. Embassy for its bias.
The relative positions of the Chosun, JoongAng, and Dong-A dailies in the South Korean newspaper market, the degrees of their political influence, and the challenges that they face with the diversification of new outlets may be compared with those of the three main broadcast stations in the United States in the 1970s: NBC, ABC, and CBS. The nightly news may have then been the main focus for Reagan-era political campaigners to get their messages across, but the diversification of the media market in the United States has steadily eroded the influence of the “Big Three.”
3 I owe these observations to comments on an earlier version of this paper by Eric Larson and to my conversations with Professor Kim Hak-soo of Sogang University, a specialist on South Korean media. This concept is parallel to the development of “blogging” as a new form that is influencing journalistic form and practice. 4 For instance, the Yonhap Television Network plays a role in South Korea that is analogous to the role played by CNN in the United States, because many government officials in Seoul keep their television tuned to the channel in the background throughout their workday. 78 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Likewise, Chosun, JoongAng, and Dong-A have probably already embarked on a similar path, as their overarching influence in prioritizing news is eroded by the expansion of media outlets and forms.
The structure of the South Korean media is evolving, with one critical question being the extent to which upstart Internet media outlets such as Oh My News! begin to look more like their more established print counterparts, especially as they compete for and attract new web readers and sponsorship by mainstream advertisers, including some of South Korea’s most well-known companies. Thus, while the Internet has further intensified overcompetition in the South Korean media, it may also moderate the output of web outlets with ambition, as they move to suit the changing tastes of South Korea’s target audiences.
U.S. Government, U.S. Forces Korea, and the South Korean Media
The Asia Foundation sponsored a day-long seminar on January 8, 2003, at which several representatives from the South Korean media and the U.S. government participated in a discussion of the difficulties surrounding coverage of the United States and the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). This series of discussions highlighted some of the important practical issues that explain the role and perceptions of the South Korean media as it relates to alliance issues inside South Korea. The discussion elucidated many of the practical challenges that the U.S. Embassy, the USFK, and the South Korean media face in understanding and managing public perceptions of the U.S.–ROK relationship, or in avoiding anti-American sentiments throughout South Korea.
Using the June 13 accident as a case study, Professor Auh Taik Sup argued that all South Korean media viewed the event through a single frame, 5 creating a “falsified consensus” in the interpretations of facts and assignation of blame. Auh claimed that this resulted in a “spiral of silence,” in which the threat of social isolation stifled information and views discordant with prevailing public opinion. The spiral of silence, or perceived lack of dissent, makes the dominant opinion appear stronger than it actually is, allowing one view to predominate while others disappear from the public eye. He suggested that the June 13 case represented a general approach by the South Korean media to public events.
Kil Jeong-woo, senior editorial writer from the JoongAng Ilbo, commented that neither the ROK nor the United States is paying enough attention to changes in the bilateral relationship. The USFK needs to understand that it is viewed in South Korea as a symbol of U.S. power that influences South Korean perceptions of the United States as a whole. He asserted that the USFK has a lack of understanding of the rise of South Korean pride, and thus certain situations have been mishandled. On the ROK side, there has been a fundamental shift from once “hysterically” protesting against the withdrawal of U.S. forces to a greater desire for autonomy in its international affairs. The two governments need to speak more often and more clearly to one another. They each cannot ignore the accusations leveled at them, and they need to balance the situation through more public diplomacy.
Stephen Rounds, minister-counselor for Public Affairs of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, examined the role that the South Korean press has played, for example, in influencing the public’s opinion
5 This frame might be described as the view that USFK “arrogance” allows the U.S. military to act with an impunity that disrespects and violates Koreans. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 79 over environmental issues, over the building of a new U.S. chancery, and over the sale of fighter jets. He asserted that anti-U.S. groups will push their agenda regardless of the facts and that the media’s easy acceptance of their assertions has negative effects on the relationship.
Rounds acknowledged that the United States is also at fault for its inability to get information to the South Korean public through the local media. First, he said, U.S. press statements often are released too late for newspaper deadlines. Second, because U.S. officials must receive approval of the content and language of any message before they can go on record to the media, South Korea’s reporters are reluctant to call them for comment. However, Rounds urged that the South Korean media report all the facts, not merely the perceptions, and give due attention to the American response to stories. Rounds argued that the media must end their reliance on press campaigns by South Korean nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and must make sure their reporting does not stoke the fires by misleading public opinion or fanning public emotion. The cumulative weight of one-sided reporting, he added, is damaging to the spirit of friendship and cooperation that characterizes the overall relationship.
Lee Dong-kwan, associate editor of the political desk of the Dong-A Ilbo, agreed with Mr. Rounds on many points and offered an explanation of the structural causes of such reporting. The competition between South Korean newspapers is fierce, he noted, and the news often caters to the readership. Among the major newspapers, progressive and conservative voices compete for readers. The newspapers are not sufficiently staffed, he said, which affects even domestic reporting.
Mr. Lee also commented that from the ROK perspective, the U.S. Embassy Public Affairs Office is too bureaucratic. He contended that the environmental issue to which Mr. Rounds referred was mishandled on the U.S. side as well. NGOs were calling every day but with no response, and the United States provided only one press release after the incident. The United States, he concluded, must accept the fact that the ROK may not always be receptive to the U.S. side of the story.
Colonel Samuel T. Taylor, public affairs officer of United Nations Command (UNC), the Combined Forces Command, USFK, stated that in a conversation with a ROK reporter he was told that the United States was the “new playground” for the South Korean media. In the past, ROK military leaders prevented the press from reporting negatively on the United States. In the current democratic society, no such tethers are placed on the media. Positive stories on the USFK cannot be run just to be positive, he asserted; likewise, positive portrayals of the United States in the South Korean media must be incidental to a story. He too shared the sense that ROK reporting was often one-sided, despite efforts by the USFK to reach out.
Concerning the June 13 incident, Colonel Taylor acknowledged that it appeared to the South Korean public that the USFK was slow to respond to the incident. Taylor asserted, however, that the USFK immediately took several proactive steps that were not reported in the South Korean media. He acknowledged that the USFK is often too slow but does make an effort. There was reason for South Korean anger over the June 13 accident. However, Taylor asserted, the media helped fan anger unnecessarily. He added further that media outlets were uninterested in stories 80 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
about USFK community relations activities, which could also help moderate popular views of the U.S. military in South Korea.6
The International Media and the U.S.–ROK Relationship
If there is media bias and sensationalism internal to the South Korean media, this characteristic is also not absent from international media coverage of South Korea, which, in turn, also affects the quality of the U.S.–ROK relationship. For example, how do Americans judge the implications of the North Korean nuclear crisis or the prospects for war on the peninsula? Repeated threats from the North simply roll off the backs of South Koreans who are accustomed to North Korea’s high- octane propaganda and penchant for exaggeration. The legacy of cozy government–media relations inside South Korea may cause international reporters to shrug off the seeming normalcy of daily events in the South to go for the “big” story, speculating once again about a coming war that seems never to come. And, of course, most of the reporters cover the story from Seoul, with little ability either to go to Pyongyang or to verify the intent of North Korean hyperbole as it is picked up and translated to the world in Seoul and Tokyo.
North Korea’s public affairs operation has clearly been more effective in drawing attention to the Korean Peninsula than any tourism advertising campaign that has been launched in South Korea. Although Kim Jong-il is far better known in the United States than South Korea’s new President Roh Moo-hyun, however, should not the Wall Street Journal know, at least, enough about the Korean Peninsula to run Roh’s picture with its story rather than a picture of South Korea’s former President Roh Tae-woo from a decade ago? And should not members of a recent 2010 Olympic selection committee who visited Pyongchang, South Korea, avoid getting worried calls from their relatives who thought that the proposed Olympic site was in Pyongyang, North Korea?
From a South Korean perspective, aspects of U.S. media treatment of the South Korean presidential elections and North Korean brinkmanship often seem distorted through the unique lens of U.S. views. For instance, many South Koreans objected to William Safire’s editorial in The New York Times that was shortly after South Korea’s presidential election and that stated Roh Moo-hyun rode anti-Americanism to the presidency, plus stating that South Korea enjoyed freedom only because the United States has provided it. The editorial argued that because South Korea is protesting the forward deployment of U.S. troops on the peninsula amid growing anti-Americanism, the United States should withdraw its forces. A story on the CBS television news magazine 60 Minutes added to this distorted perspective by oversimplifying South Korean sentiment toward the United States and by showing a USFK general crying as he talked about anti-American demonstrations.
Far from communicating what the majority of South Koreans intended from the demonstrations (that is, to revise the bilateral relationship in a more balanced fashion), the Safire editorial and 60 Minutes story led to an anti-Korean backlash among senior U.S. opinion makers and even senior policymakers in the United States. The backlash was viewed by South Koreans to be driving, at least
6 A positive story broadcast on KBS in the fall of 2003 concerning USFK humanitarian efforts to help airlift material to victims of Typhoon Maemi may be an important benchmark of progress in this regard. However, it appears premature to project too much change in the orientation of South Korean media toward the United States from this one example. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 81 in part, the U.S. effort to reconfigure its troop presence on the Korean Peninsula. This unfortunate convergence of an emotional spike in South Korean frustrations and a global strategic adjustment of U.S. military forces resulted in increased mutual mistrust. Indeed, such a spiral of mistrust among U.S. and South Korean security specialists is much more dangerous than any single popularly led event or demonstration and may severely challenge the durability of the U.S.–ROK alliance itself.
Conclusion
The various South Korean media continue to evolve in line with the social changes that are accompanying South Korea’s increasing prosperity and vibrant democratization process. But the infrastructure to support and sustain strong U.S.–ROK relations has not been developed to meet new circumstances. It is no longer necessary or sufficient to expect that the South Korean government is the only actor that will determine the future quality and substance of the U.S.–ROK relationship. A stronger infrastructure of communication channels at all levels is necessary to sustain the relationship among a new generation of South Koreans who do not remember the Korean War or who have a historical sense of the U.S.–ROK relationship.
At the same time, there is a need for maturation of the South Korean media to a level that can effectively serve a sophisticated democratic citizenry. The international media must also catch up to the increasing complexity of the Korean story and must try to understand the conflicting responses and trends within South Korea toward the North, rather than just visiting Starbucks in Seoul in order to quote young women with Gucci handbags about whether or not they are concerned about North Korea’s nuclear threat.
In the absence of cooperation between the U.S. and ROK governments on public affairs efforts, plus the absence of a recognition by senior representatives of the U.S. government that they must reach out proactively not only to their government counterparts but also directly to the public, the relationship will continue to be subject to the vicissitudes of the media—hardly a strong foundation. The initiative for framing, shaping, and constraining options for the future of the U.S.–ROK relationship would be subject to potential misinterpretation and politicization by the South Korean media and a few distant U.S. pundits of otherwise manageable issues. In such an environment, it is unlikely that there will be space for a rational public discussion of U.S. and ROK national interests and enhanced cooperation or of whether such close cooperation is truly durable and desirable in the new security environment unfolding in East Asia. 82 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Chapter X U.S. Popular Views toward South Korea William Watts
Changing Views
U.S. views toward South Korea have undergone substantial change in recent years. A Potomac Associates study conducted in mid-1980, for example, found that Americans chose the following stereotypes as most applicable to South Korea: “political unrest”; “underdeveloped”; “crowded, too many people”; and “dirty, poor sanitation.” Other studies around that time found that Americans tended to think of South Korea in terms of the Korean War (hugely unpopular in its later phases), the efforts at influence-buying on Capitol Hill (“Koreagate” and the activities of Korean businessman Park Tong-sun), the highly popular television series “M*A*S*H” (reminding viewers of the Korean War and generally showing Koreans in an unfavorable light), the antigovernment student demonstrations and tear-gassing, the activities of Reverend Moon and his Unification Church (seen by many as deluding and defrauding many of its adherents, especially trusting and possibly naive younger people), and the hostile actions by North Korea, again keeping the Korean War in the limelight. All of these stereotypes meant that the image of South Korea was marked with powerful negatives, potentially undermining bilateral ties and calling into question the U.S. security commitment.
In the following pages, we will examine survey findings contained in reports by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the Gallup Organization, the Harris Poll, the Opinion Dynamics Corporation, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, the Potomac Associates, and the Roper Organization. Many of the survey questions and responses deal solely with specific aspects of U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) ties and issues. Others include third countries to provide a comparative perspective. Hence in the latter cases, findings about South Korea may be colored by the relative views of the respondents about larger regional concerns. That comparative sense is a natural human condition and hopefully serves to put the findings into a broader context.
As will become apparent, the studies reveal much that is positive about feelings and assessments that many Americans have of South Korea and of U.S.–ROK ties. We find marked improvement in a number of key areas if we compare the present findings to the Potomac Associates studies in the 1970s and 1980s. There are, as well, areas of ignorance, weakness, and negativity in views of South Korea. Those factors have played out in recent times within the framework of media coverage of South Korea and events on the Korean Peninsula, coverage that is heavily weighted toward ongoing problems with Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s often-unpredictable leader and his regime’s nuclear program.
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A Word of Caution
Before turning to specifics, caution dictates that a crucial caveat be introduced. In assessing U.S. views of and policy toward countries around the world, we must remember that the primary focus of attention for most Americans is the domestic scene, not the international environment. Only in times of crisis—such as the war on terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, or in light of the war in Iraq—does attention turn sharply to events abroad. Even then, the attention span can be quite short, as may be reflected in the general lack of interest in the United States about developments in Afghanistan.
In this regard, it may be useful to think in terms of a radar screen analogy. For most countries around the globe, the United States registers one of the biggest—often the biggest—blip on their radar screen. This blip certainly is the case for South Korea. Decisions concerning the U.S. economy, actions to expand American exports or control imports into the United States, problems and crimes involving U.S. service personnel, or questions pertaining to deployment of U.S. forces, for example—all of those set off explosive alarm signals on South Korea’s radar.
For most Americans, however, South Korea represents just one blip among many, which means that the daily torrent of information, both domestic and international, in the U.S. mass media, can bury events that have significant meaning to South Koreans. A particularly telling example is the death in June 2002 of two young South Korean girls, who were inadvertently crushed by a passing U.S. military vehicle. This tragic episode has been a major focus of South Korean attention ever since it occurred. It has, however, drawn scant attention in the United States, having been pushed aside by coverage of the flood of other events in the daily lives of Americans. Further, as just noted, U.S. media coverage of events in South Korea tends to concentrate on topics with negative, even threatening, overtones. All this coverage makes it difficult for South Korea to put its best face forward.
Key Findings: The Plus Side
Let us look first at several specific measurements of opinion, including shifts that have emerged over time. For the most part, those shifts represent the views of a cross-section of the American public. Where results are available, we also will take note what is said by opinion leaders, i.e., those individuals who by the nature of their experience have special awareness of the U.S.–South Korean equation.
A. “Vital Interest” South Korea’s standing as a “vital interest” to the United States (combining “very strong” and “fairly strong” responses to surveys) has risen in recent years. The following question, repeated in surveys by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Opinion Dynamics/Potomac Associates, sheds some interesting light on this theme (throughout this chapter, n/a means “not asked”):
[The Question]: Many people believe that the United States has a vital interest in certain areas of the world and not in other areas. That is, certain countries of the world are important to the United States for political, economic, or security reasons. I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell
84 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE me whether you feel the United States has a very strong vital interest, a fairly strong vital interest, not much of a vital interest, or no vital interest at all in that country.
Table 10.1: “Very Strong” and “Fairly Strong” Responses (percentage) 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2003 Japan 78 82 77 79 85 87 83 80 China 70 64 60 47 68 74 83 77 South Korea 61 43 58 49 65 54 69 77 USSR/Russia 74 n/a n/a 83 79 77 81 76 North Korea n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 62 69 Taiwan 53 51 53 46 49 52 65 62
The most recent findings concerning South Korea are the highest numbers in a series covering the past quarter of a century, putting South Korea essentially on par with its neighbors: Japan, China, and Russia, which is a strong endorsement of the U.S.–ROK relationship. The fact that North Korea (included only in recent studies) is not far behind reflects an awareness driven by negative media coverage.
B. Temperature Readings Another useful ongoing survey method by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations records U.S. citizens’ feelings of “warmth” or “coolness” toward a specified country on a thermometer scale of 0–100 degrees, with 50 being “neutral.”
Table 10.2: Mean (Average) Reading 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 Japan 56 53 61 52 53 55 60 USSR/Russia 34 26 32 59 54 49 55 Taiwan 51 49 52 48 48 51 50 China 44 47 53 45 46 47 48 South Korea 48 44 51 47 48 50 46 North Korea n/a n/a n/a n/a 34 36 34
By this measure, South Korea does only moderately well. It has consistently hovered at or below the mid-point, just below the “neutral” line. Shifts over the years have been minimal. This clustering around the middle mark is in line with other findings that suggest a good deal of uninformed, noncommittal sentiment.
Japan remains at the head of the list, with Russia closing the gap. The consistently high ranking of Japan—even as economic circumstances change and as the Asia-Pacific region undergoes fundamental reorientation with China’s rise—will come as some reassurance to those with special concerns about the Tokyo–Washington link. The steady improvement since 1990 almost certainly results from easing of the Japanese economic threat during this period.
C. Ally-to-Enemy Spectrum For a number of years, Potomac Associates/Opinion Dynamics and the Roper Organization have tracked the degree to which Americans view various countries as friend or foe. Here are findings concerning East Asia:
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[The Question]: I’d like to have your impressions about the overall position that some countries have taken toward the United States. As I read down a list of countries, do you believe that country has acted as a close ally of the United States, has acted as a friend but not a close ally, has been more or less neutral toward the United States, has been mainly unfriendly toward the Unites States but not an enemy, or has acted as an enemy of the United States?” (bold type added for clarity and emphasis)
Table 10.3: “Close Ally/Friend” Responses (listed in 2003 order) (percentage) General Public Opinion Leaders 1987 1989 1990 1991 1994 1999 2003 2003 Japan 66 62 52 59 59 65 69 100 South Korea 39 42 n/a 41 n/a 52 60 94 Taiwan n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 54 54 87 USSR/Russia 4 16 36 43 48 41 40 43 China 26 16 19 17 25 32 28 20 North Korea n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 18 5 –
The standing of the ROK has advanced markedly over the years, leaving it second only to Japan as either close ally or friend. The current margin between the two among the general public is the smallest in more than 16 years.
Various factors likely have contributed to the increasingly positive views of South Korea both as a close ally or friend and as important to U.S. interests: (1) former President Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine” policy and receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize; (2) a growing appreciation of the impressive advances in South Korea’s economic and political growth; (3) improved awareness of South Korea and South Koreans in American life (still limited, as we will see below), as larger numbers of Korean-Americans have become small- and medium-sized business owners, entrepreneurs, and operators of consumer-oriented enterprises, such as restaurants, grocery stores, and cleaning establishments; (4) the more active role of Koreans in American political life; and (5) the nuclear threat and security challenges of North Korea under the regime of the reclusive Kim Jong-il. Those and other factors have left their mark on the thinking of many Americans, with South Korea a clear beneficiary. The political uncertainty surrounding the impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun may have had some negative impact on views. That event has not, however, drawn widespread attention in the mass media, being more a focus of interest among policymakers and regional experts.
D. U.S. Forces in South Korea In several Potomac Associates studies over the years, conducted with the Gallup Organization and Opinion Dynamics, a majority of Americans has favored maintaining U.S. troop strength at either current or increased levels (even though, in response to specific questions, knowledge about the numbers of troops stationed in South Korea is sketchy). Thus, we find the following:
[The Question]: Under present circumstances, do you think the commitment of U.S. forces in South Korea should be increased, kept at the present level, reduced, or ended altogether?
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Table 10.4: Responses (percentage) 1979 1999 2003 Increased 9 11 21 Kept at present level 49 55 52 Reduced 16 19 11 Ended altogether 17 10 9 Don’t know/not sure 9 5 7
As findings discussed in the next section suggest, there has been a dramatic rise in the perception of North Korea as the principal threat to peace and stability in East Asia. The events of September 11, 2001, have had a dramatic effect on the average American’s sense of physical security. Other surveys have reflected a broad willingness to commit U.S. forces in President Bush’s declared “war on terrorism.” Such factors may have helped to increase the percentage of Americans who favor an increase in U.S. force levels in South Korea. The longer-term effect of developments in Iraq can only be guessed at, with support for U.S. military deployments abroad depending in part on the ultimate outcome there.
E. Willingness to Come to the Defense of South Korea Such factors also appear to have sharply enhanced public willingness to come to the defense of South Korea if attacked by North Korea. Although opinion leaders have been consistently supportive on this issue over the years, the general public has been far more reticent. One recent Potomac Associates survey, however, suggests a dramatic turnaround on this score: a near 4–1 majority now favors defending South Korea “with military force” against attack from North Korea, a level of support for military commitment previously unseen:
Table 10.5: Defend South Korea if Invaded by North Korea (percentage) General Public Leaders Don’t Don’t Yes No Know Yes No Know 2003 71 19 10 100 n/a n/a 2002 36 56 8 82 16 2 1998 30 58 12 74 24 2 1994 39 48 13 82 16 2 1990 26 61 13 57 40 3
Table 10.6: Defend Taiwan if Invaded by China (percentage) General Public Leaders Don’t Don’t Yes No Know Yes No Know 2003 50 34 16 70 10 20 2002 32 58 10 52 44 4 1998 27 58 15 51 47 2
The turnaround in public opinion in support of coming to the defense of both Taiwan and, especially, the ROK—with military force specified—is remarkable. That support can be attributed, at least in part, to the factors just cited concerning the stationing of forces in South Korea.
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F. Anti-Americanism Underscoring what was characterized above as the generally inward-looking focus of most Americans, an April 2003 Potomac survey found that only a minority of respondents were aware of anti-American demonstrations and protests in Seoul and elsewhere in South Korea during the winter of 2002. Just one in ten looked upon those activities as presenting a serious threat to the bilateral relationship. In support of this low-key reaction, preferred responses favored the nonconfrontational: “wait and see” and “seek diplomatic solutions” rather than taking more significant steps, such as recalling the U.S. ambassador, turning to some kind of sanctions, boycotting South Korean goods, or withdrawing some of the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea.
Such lack of awareness of major events in South Korea—events that reflect core South Korean concerns about U.S. policy and actions–can have implications for the overall relationship. That many Americans, despite a huge U.S. military presence and substantial political influence in South Korea, appear to have little knowledge of, involvement in, or concern about the affairs of their supposed friend and ally may add to the prevailing sense of U.S. callousness, disrespect, and lack of concern about ROK interests that fuels anti-Americanism. This lack represents a clear manifestation of the analogy of the lopsided radar screen, noted at the outset of this chapter.
G. Fairness as a Trading Partner South Korea is increasingly seen as a “fair” trading partner, as recorded in an ongoing Potomac Associates survey:
[The Question]: I’m going to read you a list of countries, and I’d like you to tell me whether each country is generally fair or unfair when it comes to trading with the United States.
Table 10.7: “Fair” and “Unfair” Responses (percentage) 1999 2003 Fair Unfair Fair Unfair Taiwan 52 30 66 (+14) 15 (-15) Japan 37 53 66 (+29) 23 (-30) South Korea 47 33 57 (+10) 21 (-12) China 27 61 42 (+15) 42 (-19)
These responses connote a substantial turnaround in overall U.S. popular views of the international trading environment. For each of the four East Asian countries tested, the perception of “fairness” in trading practices has risen. This perception is a far more benign assessment of the international trading environment than might have been expected.
Japan, the former “economic animal” that was feared as winning in the economic arena what it had lost on the battlefield, is now seen by a near 3-to-1 majority as a fair trader (with a huge 59 percentage point swing over a four-year period). South Korea’s image has also improved substantially (with a smaller, but still significant 22 point shift), putting it almost on par as a “fair” trading partner with Japan and Taiwan. Opinion on China, whose goods seem to flood many sectors of the U.S. domestic economy, is evenly divided, but still considerably better than four years earlier (with a 34 point shift).
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During a period of widespread anxiety about the state of the U.S. economy, one might have expected a readiness to look for scapegoats and a willingness to single out “unfair” trading partners. That tendency has been true in earlier years, especially in relation to Japan. Somewhat surprisingly, that is not reflected in the findings under review here. At the same time, any prolonged U.S. economic setback could foster a renewal of such thinking, as recent growing attention to surging Chinese exports underscores. Indeed, that opinion may well shift in a more negative direction should the “China issue” surface the 2004 presidential election debate. Such a setback could also affect views toward South Korea, as we shall now see.
H. Imports as Perceived Threat to U.S. Jobs The potential for a change in perception is clearly evident in the fact that China and Japan top the list of Asian trading partners whose exports to the United States are seen to threaten the jobs of U.S. workers:
[The Question]: The United States imports large quantities of goods from many countries around the world for sale here. As I read you the names of several countries, please tell me whether you think imports from any of them pose a serious threat now to the jobs of American workers? (listed in order of “serious threat”)
Table 10.8: “Serious Threat” and “Not Serious Threat” Responses (percentage) Serious Threat Not Serious Threat 1999 2003 1999 2003 China 60 61 33 34 Japan 58 51 36 45 Taiwan 46 45 45 46 South Korea 29 35 60 56
South Korean exports to the United States are seen as the least threatening among the economies tested. But it must be noted that only in the case of South Korea was there a statistically significant increase (six percentage points) over the four-year span in the number who consider that threat to be on the rise. This possible warning signal is worth noting. Prolonged economic uncertainty in the United States could bring broadened and unwelcome attention to the issue of Asian imports.
Timeline trends as developed in the ongoing Potomac/Opinion Dynamics survey, underscore the full-blown emergence of China as “concern number one,” however. Thus, we see the following:
Table 10.9: “Unfair” as Trading Partner and “Serious Threat” to Imports Responses (percentage, listed in “unfair”/“threat” order) “Unfair” as Trading Partner “Serious Threat” to Imports 1989 1994 1999 2003 1980 1985 1994 1999 2003 China 27 53 61 42 China 18 22 58 60 61 Japan 51 70 53 23 Japan 76 74 76 58 51 South Korea 32 32 33 21 Taiwan 44 52 n/a 46 45 Taiwan n/a n/a 30 15 South Korea 16 20 40 29 35
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I. Human Rights South Korea’s human rights image has improved dramatically, moving from a net negative to a 2–1 positive balance.
[The Question]: Now I am going to ask you specifically your impression of the situation in various countries today as it concerns the human rights issue, that is, the degree to which the rights and liberties of their individual citizens are protected. What is your impression about the situation in [country name] concerning human rights—very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?
The following table combines recent readings with earlier Potomac Associates findings:
Table 10.10: “Very/Somewhat Favorable” and “Very/Somewhat Unfavorable” Responses (percentage) Very/Somewhat Favorable Very/Somewhat Unfavorable 1979 1999 2003 1979 1999 2003 Japan n/a 66 72 (+6) n/a 25 17 (-8) South Korea 32 47 57 (+10) 39 37 29 (-8) Taiwan n/a 49 55 (+6) n/a 34 23 (-11) China n/a 31 18 (-13) n/a 62 73 (+11) North Korea 18 n/a 6 (-12) 53 n/a 84 (+31)
Japan receives the most favorable ratings on human rights. Views of China and, especially, North Korea are both sharply negative—and getting worse.
South Korea’s improved numbers are almost double what they were a quarter of a century ago, allowing it to edge past Taiwan in the latest reading. This change has surely been triggered by a broadly oriented list of substantive image-enhancing events in recent years: a series of free presidential elections, Kim Dae-jung’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, the absence from American television screens of scenes of student demonstrators being tear-gassed, the minimal attention given to recent anti-American demonstrations, the 1988 Summer Olympic Games, and the 2002 World Cup soccer competition that was hosted jointly by South Korea and Japan. These developments have all contributed to more favorable perceptions of the overall human rights condition in the ROK. And, to the extent that attention is paid to reporting on conditions in North Korea, the image of the South almost certainly benefits by comparison.
Key Findings: Negatives
The shape of views is not, to be sure, purely one-sided. Other findings point to meaningful areas of weakness or softness in the way Americans view South Korea.
A. Ignorance Respondents in a variety of Potomac Associates/Opinion Dynamics surveys have evinced marked ignorance on some basic facts. Thus, we find the following:
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· Barely one in six realized that the ROK is one of the United States’ 15 largest trading partners; most thought it ranked far lower. · The U.S. public lacks basic awareness of specific ROK product identity. Few Americans associate South Korea with products they buy such as Hyundai automobiles, Samsung cell phones, or LG sports equipment—despite the South Korean producers’ extensive penetration of the U.S. market. This lack suggests a public education and information opportunity that South Korean authorities might well want to examine. · Large majorities agreed (incorrectly) with the proposition that “the United States provides major economic assistance to South Korea.” · A 1999 study found only 45 percent disagreeing with the statement that “the capital of North Korea is Seoul”; 39 percent said, “Yes.” · In 2003, just one in three correctly identified the number of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea as being in the 30,000–50,000 range.
This lack of basic knowledge and information comes as yet another example of the lopsided radar image we have noted before. How many Americans, for example, can correctly name who was president of the ROK before his recent impeachment? The proportion of South Koreans who can identify George W. Bush as Roh Moo-hyun’s counterpart would come as a telling and embarrassing contrast.
B. Partner for a “Stable and Peaceful Asia” A Potomac Associates trend question asking U.S. citizens to rate countries as partners of the United States for peace and stability in Asia finds South Korea well down on the list:
[The Question]: In terms of U.S. interests in a stable and peaceful Asia, which country in the region do you think will be most helpful: China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, or some other country?
Table 10.11: “Most Helpful” Country Responses (percentage) 1999 2003 Japan 38 40 China 20 20 Russia 13 10 South Korea 8 10 Some other 9 7 Don’t know, not other 12 13
Given South Korea’s high ranking as “close ally” or “friend,” one might have expected a somewhat stronger reading. But pride of place here is ceded to ROK’s surrounding neighbors— presumably seen as bigger, more powerful and, therefore, in a better position to be of influence. (This underscores the comments made at the outset of the chapter, noting that comparative responses can give a different reading from those dealing in a purely bilateral context.)
C. Perceptions of Current and Future Ties Various testings of opinion on both the state of current relations and expectations for the future tend to cluster around the middle: 3 on a scale of 1-5, “so-so,” or “stay about the same.” Middle-
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ground, safe-center responses often mask ignorance, show lack of interest, or represent merely a superficial guess. Such ignorance can represent both a problem and an opportunity. Poor information and lack of awareness can easily lead to poor analysis and policy formulation. At the same time, the situation presents a useful opening for an intensive round of public education, public diplomacy, and broad binational efforts to plug the information gaps.
D. Sources of Information As one would expect, television and television news programs, along with daily newspapers, are overwhelmingly cited by the general public as the principal sources of information and knowledge about South Korea. This type of source points to a fundamental problem. As noted earlier, news coverage of events in South Korea focuses almost in its entirety on problems. At present, the North Korean nuclear issue commands prime space most days. In the past, political unrest, student demonstrations, and—earlier—“M*A*S*H,” “Koreagate,” and the Korean War were the stories that dominated the mass media. These stories have all contributed to an image of South Korea that suggests instability or danger. Although there is an improving awareness of South Korea’s economic and political advances, large information gaps remain.
Disconcerting Ambiguity: The Soft Middle
On balance, the findings point to a view of South Korea and U.S.–ROK relations that is, in many respects, solid and supportive. The security commitment is remarkably strong. Assessments of South Korea’s importance to U.S. interests and alliance ties are high. But those views are also marked by considerable ambiguity, with some evaluations of bilateral ties that are soft and noncommittal and are apparently tinged with ignorance.
This point deserves special emphasis. The combination of poor levels of awareness about major recent events in South Korea, lack of knowledge of basic points of information, and soft noncommittal views about the nature of bilateral ties represents a fundamental weakness in the way average Americans look at South Korea and U.S.–ROK relations. Without a reservoir of positive knowledge, views could be sharply affected by future developments. They could easily move dramatically in one direction or another—either positive or negative—depending on the course of events.
It is worth noting, for example, that U.S. views of Saudi Arabia—which had long remained quite positive—plummeted as Americans have focused on the role of Saudi-born terrorists, the Kingdom’s dubious human rights record, and its autocratic rule. A similar volatility in U.S. views of China has marked the relationship for decades. A people with few or no firm views about a foreign land can be very fickle and can be all too easily swayed by changing developments on the ground or by the latest headline to shake fundamental assessments of a longstanding relationship.
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Chapter XI Analysis of the September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND Polls Eric Larson1
This chapter provides an analysis of the results of two polls that were conducted by JoongAng Ilbo and CSIS in September 2003 and were developed in cooperation with the RAND Corporation.2 This analysis leads to six main conclusions:
First, the September 2003 polling data provides further evidence that a recovery in favorable sentiment toward the United States is under way and that the downturn of 2002–2003 is now behind us. Second, belief that alliance relations are in poor shape—apparently residual effects from the deaths of two schoolgirls in June 2002, the war against Iraq in the spring of 2003, and other developments that have buffeted the alliance—continue to drag down a recovery in favorable sentiment toward the United States.3 Third, there continues to be substantial support for the alliance and continued U.S. military presence in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea), which buoys overall favorable sentiment toward the United States, although there also is support for further revisions to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Fourth, the ongoing nuclear crisis and what is perceived as a harsh position on the part of the United States toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) seem to have led to growing concern among many South Koreans that U.S. actions could pose as great a threat to South Korea as North Korean ones. Fifth, the data suggest that younger and better-educated South Koreans may be turning from more mainstream sources of information such as television and newspapers to untraditional, niche sources such as Internet sites and specialty magazines whose viewpoints are less orthodox, and, possibly, less favorably disposed toward the United States. Finally, although it is impossible to say whether views have shifted and stabilized at a new—and possibly lower—level, ample reasons exist for long-term concern about South Korean views toward the United States. South Korean sentiments bear close monitoring, and active efforts should be made to ensure that changes in South Korean views do not foreclose the possibility of a close relationship that is in the interests of both Washington and Seoul.
The chapter begins with some essential background on the most recent trends in favorable and unfavorable South Korean views toward the United States, reviews the data from the two September 2003 polls by JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND, presents an analysis and key findings from those polling data, and offers some conclusions.
1 The author is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, which specializes in national security and public opinion on national security issues. The opinions expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the RAND Corporation or its sponsors. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Derek Mitchell, Paul Chamberlin, Scott Snyder, and other participants in the CSIS task force for their comments on earlier versions of this chapter. 2 The RAND Corporation cooperated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and JoongAng Ilbo in the development phase of the polls by providing a suggested questionnaire for the polls and then provided an analysis of the polling results that are reported in this chapter. 3 An excellent discussion of the various developments that have dogged U.S.–South Korean relations in the past several years can be found in Lee Jung-hoon, “The Emergence of ‘New Elites’ in South Korea and its Implications for Popular Sentiment toward the United States,” in chapter 7 of this volume. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 93
Background
An analysis of available trend data on South Korean views toward the United States over the past 15 years suggests that there were two recent downturns in favorable sentiment toward the United States (see figure 11.1).4
Figure 11.1: Favorable and Unfavorable Views toward the United States, 1988–2003
I would like to ask your opinion of several countries. Please use this card [HAND CARD] to tell me your feelings about various countries. Overall, do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the U.S.? (U.S. State Dept) Percent 80 Net favorable Net unfavorable Don't know
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0 7/88 7/90 7/92 7/94 7/96 7/98 7/00 7/02
The proximate cause of the first downturn, occurring in late February 2002, was the incident in which a South Korean Olympic speed skater was forced to forfeit the gold medal for having obstructed an American skater. President Bush’s “axis of evil” comments in his State of the Union 5 speech the month before also seem to have contributed somewhat. This incident led to the lowest level of favorable sentiment observed for the entire 1988–2003 period.6 The second downturn was in December 2002, following the acquittal of the U.S. servicemen whose armored vehicle accidentally killed two South Korean schoolgirls in June 2002. This downturn may have been prolonged by the U.S. war in Iraq, but showed a slight recovery by May 2003.7 Polling by JoongAng
4 See Eric V. Larson and Norman D. Levin, with the assistance of Baik Seon-hae and Bogdan Savych, Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation) (see footnote 18). This analysis relied primarily on polling by the U.S. Department of State but also made use of other publicly available results. 5 Polling by the Sisa Journal in early March 2002 found that 65 percent of the people attributed their worsening impression of the United States primarily to the speed skating incident, and another 19 percent attributed it primarily to President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech. 6 This effect was no doubt in part due to the timing of the poll: Gallup Korea polled immediately after the incident, when passions were at their highest; by contrast, the U.S. State Department generally tries to wait until sentiments have stabilized. 7 Polling by Gallup Korea showed a decline in the percentage of South Koreans holding a favorable opinion from 66 percent in July 2001 to 34 percent in late February 2002, a recovery to 53 percent in August 2002, another downturn to 37 percent in mid-December 2002, and a slight recovery to 46 percent in May 2003. Gallup Korea polled for the U.S. Department of State, for the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, and for its own purposes. See also Pew 94 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Ilbo and Hankook Ilbo in May and June 2003 also suggested a recovery from the December 2002 downturn.8
Thus, the September 2003 polls by JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND came out during a period in which at least a partial recovery already appeared to be under way. Whether this recovery will continue or will stall at the present, relatively low levels remains to be seen.9
Review of the Data
JoongAng Ilbo and CSIS conducted two separate national polls of South Korean adults aged 20 and over on September 15–17, 2003: one asked 15 questions of 1,000 respondents, and the other asked 17 questions of 710 respondents.10 To simplify my presentation, I will divide my discussion of the results of the two polls into five broad categories: (1) basic views toward the United States, (2) views toward the U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) alliance and the bilateral relationship, (3) views toward the U.S. military and its presence in South Korea, (4) views toward threats and other regional issues, and (5) media usage.
A. Basic Views toward the United States The two polls asked a number of questions about basic views toward the United States that are of policy interest. A particularly significant finding was that 50 percent said that they were either highly (5.3 percent) or somewhat amicable (44.7 percent) toward the United States; an equal number were somewhat (41 percent) or very (9 percent) critical of the United States.11 As described earlier, this result is consistent with a partial recovery in favorable sentiment since December 2002 but is low by historical standards.12
Also noteworthy was the fact that while nearly one in five (18.5 percent) mentioned the United States as the country they liked most, fully 23.7 percent mentioned it as the country they liked least;13 the latter measure also was much higher than the 7 percent JoongAng Ilbo got in a September 2001 poll.14 The dominant reason that respondents gave for people disliking the United States was “selfish
Research Center for People and the Press, Views of a Changing World 2003; War With Iraq Further Divides Global Politics, Washington, D.C., June 2003. 8 See An Pu-kun, “Poll Shows More Support for Military Ties With US,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 12, 2003, accessed at FBIS KPP20030612000008, August 25, 2003, and “ROK Daily Polls Public Views on US Relations, ROK President,” Hankook Ilbo, June 9, 2003, accessed at FBIS KPP20030609000060, June 20, 2003. 9 It is important to note that the downturn in favorable sentiment toward the United States that has taken place in South Korea is not unique. Polling by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, for example, suggested that the war in Iraq had “widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global public support for the pillars of the post–World War II era—the U.S. and the North Atlantic Alliance.” See Pew Research Center, Views of a Changing World 2003; War With Iraq Further Divides Global Publics, Washington, D.C., June 3, 2003,
pursuit of its own interests and benefits,” mentioned by nearly 6 in 10 (58 percent), a relatively common theme in such questions.15
Finally, when asked to assess the breadth of anti-American sentiment in South Korea, a modest majority of 55.2 percent judged that anti-American sentiment was spreading from the young generation to the older generations (34.8 percent) or already had spread throughout South Korean society (20.4 percent).16
B. Views Toward the U.S.–ROK Bilateral Relationship One of the key predictors of South Koreans’ favorable and unfavorable sentiment toward the United States is their opinion on the bilateral relationship. Those who have a favorable view of the relationship are more inclined to view the United States favorably.17 According to polling by Gallup Korea for the U.S. Department of State, from 1996 to September 2001, the percentage judging that U.S.–ROK relations were very or fairly good ranged between 60 and 80 percent, although those beliefs were somewhat more volatile than overall favorable and unfavorable sentiment toward the United States.
By comparison, when respondents to the poll by JoongAng, CSIS, and RAND in September 2003 were asked to judge how good or bad the relationship between South Korea and the United States was, the result was notable ambivalence: only about one in three (32.5 percent) said that it was very good (1.6 percent) or pretty good (30.9 percent); this figure was much lower than the 73 percent who described relations between the United States and South Korea as very good (6 percent) or fairly good (67 percent) in the polls by the U.S. Department of State and Gallup Korea in September 2001.18 Thus, in contrast to the modest recovery in overall favorable sentiment toward the United States described earlier, South Korean opinions on the bilateral relationship had, as of September 2003, evidenced few signs of a recovery.19
When asked to assess the strength of four regional alliances—the United States and South Korea, North Korea and China, the United States and Japan, and North Korea and Russia—a plurality of 39.4 percent of the respondents judged the U.S.–ROK alliance to be the strongest of the four.20 When respondents were asked to identify the most important factor weakening the alliance, the top three causes cited were the anti-American sentiment in South Korea, the harsh policy of the United States toward North Korea and the improvement in relations between North Korea and South Korea.21
Respondents were also asked to judge the importance of the benefits that flow to South Korea as a result of the U.S.–ROK relationship.22 A very high 93.1 percent said that the relationship yielded very important (43.7 percent) or somewhat important (49.4 percent) benefits to South Korea. South
15 Appendix A, Table 1.5. 16 Appendix A, Table 2.5. 17 Eric V. Larson et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the United States (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-141-SRF, March 2004), pp. 77–80. 18 Gallup Korea poll for U.S. Department of State’s Office of Research, July 2001, N = 1,505. 19 As will be discussed later, this information may help account for the fact that there has been only a partial recovery in overall favorable sentiment. 20 Appendix A, Table 1.13. 21 Appendix A, Table 2.4. 22 Appendix A, Table 2.1. 96 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Koreans conceive of those benefits primarily in terms of the security the alliance confers. More than 8 in 10 (81.7 percent) said that they felt that the U.S.–ROK military alliance contributed a lot (32.3 percent), or somewhat (49.4 percent) to Korean peace, stability, and the avoidance of war.23
Respondents also were presented with a question that probed their beliefs (1) about the importance of the Korean Peninsula to the United States relative to the Middle East and (2) about U.S. credibility more generally. The result was decidedly mixed: in the event of concurrent crises in the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula, only one in three (33.3 percent) thought the United States would focus on Northeast Asia.24
Respondents were asked whether they thought reunification was possible, and, if so, whether it would be necessary to maintain the military alliance with the United States.25 Of the 62 percent who thought reunification was possible, 33.3 percent felt that the alliance should be maintained after reunification, whereas 28.7 percent did not.26 When asked about the preferred future direction for the U.S.–ROK alliance, South Koreans appeared quite bullish: 54.1 percent thought the alliance should be maintained and another 19.1 percent felt it should be strengthened, whereas 26.2 percent felt that the alliance should be reduced.27
In the event that the U.S.–ROK alliance weakened, nearly half (49.8 percent) felt that South Korea should strive to develop the closest political and diplomatic relationship in the region with China, while another 20 percent cited North Korea and 18.7 percent mentioned Japan.28
C. Views toward the U.S. Military All told, the poll by JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND asked more than a dozen questions about the U.S. military. We now turn to those polls.
A key predictor of favorable and unfavorable sentiment toward the United States is respondents’ beliefs about the importance of U.S. forces to Korean security: those who believe that U.S. forces are important also are more likely to have favorable views toward the United States.29 According to the U.S. State Department’s data, South Korean views on the importance of U.S. forces to protect South Korean security have historically been among the most stable views of all. Since 1988, the belief that U.S. forces are very or somewhat important to South Korean security generally has ranged between 70 and 90 percent, although there was some deterioration since late 1998, generally corresponding with the era of the “sunshine” policy.
When respondents to the poll by JoongAng, CSIS, and RAND were asked how important they felt U.S. forces were in stabilizing South Korean security, the result was a strong endorsement of the U.S. role: 87.3 percent felt that U.S. forces were either very (35.2 percent) or pretty (52.1 percent)
23 Appendix A, Table 2.2. 24 Appendix A, Table 1.14. 25 Appendix A, Table 1.9. 26 Although the question was not asked of the 36.5 percent who felt that there was no possibility of reunification, presumably many or most of those people also supported maintaining the alliance over the long term. 27 Appendix A, Table 2.3. 28 Appendix A, Table 1.11. 29 Eric V. Larson et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the United States (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-141-SRF, March 2004), pp. 77–80. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 97
important.30 By comparison, in the U.S. Department of State and Gallup Korea polling of September 2001, 76 percent scored the presence of U.S. forces as very (31 percent) or somewhat (45 percent) important, and Gallup Korea’s polling in July 2003 found 82 percent who said U.S. forces were important to South Korean national security.31 Although differences in question wording may be partly accountable for the difference, it may be that the renewed salience of concern about the North Korean nuclear program has further buoyed beliefs about the importance of U.S. forces.32
On the question of the continued stationing in or withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, there was also strong support for a continued U.S. presence. Nearly three in four (73 percent) thought that U.S. forces should “stay for a decent amount of time” (62.9 percent) or stay even after reunification (10.1 percent), whereas only 26.4 percent advocated withdrawal soon (22.4 percent) or immediately (4.0 percent).33 Another question that asked whether it was necessary for U.S. forces in Korea to stay or leave resulted in an even stronger endorsement of U.S. forces: 82.8 percent said that they thought U.S. forces should stay, whereas 17.2 percent thought the forces should leave.34
Among those who thought U.S. forces should continue to stay in South Korea, the two most frequently cited reasons were to prevent a sudden attack or invasion by North Korea (55.4 percent) and the economic benefits and protection of sovereignty (23.5 percent).35 Among those who thought U.S. forces should not stay, the most frequently mentioned reasons were improving North Korean–South Korean relations (25.6 percent) and achieving self-sufficiency in security (25.2 percent).36
The second of the two polls also asked a number of questions about the decision to reposition U.S. forces south of the Han River. Whereas 77 percent of those polled had heard or seen news that U.S. forces would be relocating south of the Han River and moving some bases,37 respondents were about equally divided on its desirability. Only 47.2 percent agreed strongly (7.9 percent) or agreed somewhat (39.3 percent), whereas 47.9 percent disagreed strongly (13.9 percent) or somewhat (34 percent).38 Among those who agreed with the move, the most frequently cited reason was reviving Seoul (32.5 percent), presumably by making the land currently occupied by the Yongsan garrison available for commercial or residential development.39 Among those who disagreed with the move, the main reason (endorsed by 48.3 percent) was that it made them feel nervous having U.S. forces farther away from the 38th parallel.40
Somewhat surprisingly, given the recurring salience of the issue and its widespread discussion in the South Korean press, fully two in three (65.8 percent) said that they had heard about SOFA and its problems but did not really know its details or problems (60.9 percent), or that they had just
30 Appendix A, Table 1.6. 31 Gallup Korea, July 1–10, 2003, N = 806. 32 As described earlier, our statistical modeling work suggests that beliefs about threats are an important predictor of views on the importance of U.S. forces. 33 Appendix A, Table 1.7. 34 Appendix A, Table 2.6. 35 Appendix A, Table 2.7. 36 Appendix A, Table 2.8. 37 Appendix A, Table 2.9. 38 Appendix A, Table 2.10. 39 Appendix A, Table 2.11. 40 Appendix A, Table 2.12. 98 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
heard of it that day or not at all (4.9 percent).41 Of the roughly one in three who knew something about SOFA, nearly half (49.5 percent) thought that SOFA needed to be changed right away.42 All of the respondents in the second poll—whether they knew anything about SOFA or not—were asked which problems related to SOFA should be solved first. Not surprising given that two in three knew little of SOFA: fully 66.8 percent were unable to give an answer. The most frequently mentioned problem (by 23.2 percent) was changing SOFA to better handle criminal and justice matters involving U.S. troops.43 When asked whether there had been any effort to improve SOFA since the June 2002 deaths of the two schoolgirls, again, two in three (66.1 percent) were unable to give an answer, and one in five thought that not much effort (15 percent) or no effort at all (5 percent) had been made.44 Finally, when asked how the United States responded to the June 2002 deaths of two schoolgirls as a result of an accident involving a U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) armored vehicle, a majority said that the United States had apologized (50.4 percent); a quarter (23.4 percent) said they did not know what the United States had done.45
D. Threats and Regional Matters Respondents were asked whether they thought it possible that North Korea could invade South Korea with a full attack in the next three years. The results showed that slightly more than one in three (35.7 percent) thought an attack was very (3.7 percent) or somewhat (32 percent) possible in the next three years, whereas two in three (63.5 percent) felt that there was little or no possibility of an attack.46 By comparison, the U.S. State Department found only slightly more (39 percent) in January 1999 who thought that there was a great (6 percent) or fair (33 percent) amount of danger of a full-scale attack in the next three years.
In a particularly striking finding, when respondents were asked which country they thought was most threatening to South Korea, the most common response, cited by 45 percent, was North Korea; the United States received second ranking with a bit more than one in four (26.1 percent).47 This result suggests only slightly less alarm about the United States than was expressed in a July 2003 Gallup Korea poll, in which 58 percent identified North Korea as the greater threat, and 32 percent identified the United States.48
In a similarly striking finding, when asked whether cooperation with North Korea or the United States should have a higher priority, 4 in 10 (39.4 percent) said that North Korean–South Korean cooperation should come first, whereas only about one in four (24.4 percent) preferred cooperation with the United States. A little more than one in three (34.4 percent) thought they should be of equal importance.49
41 Appendix A, Table 2.13. 42 Appendix A, Table 2.14. 43 Appendix A, Table 2.15. 44 Appendix A, Table 2.16. 45 Appendix A, Table 2.17. 46 Appendix A, Table 1.8. 47 Appendix A, Table 1.12. 48 Gallup Korea, July 1–10, 2003, N = 806. 49 Appendix A, Table 1.10. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 99
E. Media Use Finally, the first of the two polls asked respondents which medium they found most influential. Nearly 8 in 10 (78.9 percent) identified television as their main medium source. The next most frequently mentioned sources were newspapers, mentioned by 13.8 percent, and the Internet (6.2 percent). Only 0.9 and 0.2 percent mentioned radio and magazines, respectively.50
Analysis
This brief review of the public opinion data generated by the two polls lays the foundation for a somewhat broader and deeper consideration of South Korean views toward the United States, the alliance, the U.S. military presence, and other matters, plus the challenges facing the alliance.
RAND’s recent analysis of South Korean views toward the United States suggested that a small number of key views and demographic characteristics can account for overall favorable or unfavorable sentiment toward the United States, and a simple model can be used to analyze and diagnose the public opinion data.51 This work suggests that favorable and unfavorable sentiment toward the United States can be predicted from short-term opinions on the current state of U.S.– ROK relations,52 and longer-term consideration of the importance of U.S. forces for protecting South Korea. The former tends to be somewhat volatile, while the latter tends to introduce stability and to constrain wide swings in opinion, thereby buoying support during periods where the bilateral relationship is going through a downturn.
The question in the poll by JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND on favorable and unfavorable sentiment toward the United States (Table 1.3 in Appendix A) showed just 50 percent holding a favorable opinion of the United States. This figure is low relative to the high levels that preceded the tumultuous 2002–2003 period but generally is consistent with the recovery that seems to have been under way since the end of the Gulf War. And as described earlier, only about one in three respondents in the polls by JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND gave a favorable opinion of the bilateral relationship in September 2003 (Table 1.4 in Appendix A), much lower than the 73 percent who had a generally favorable opinion of the bilateral relationship in September 2001. This finding helps to account for the low reading on overall favorable sentiment relative to the earlier period. In effect,
50 Appendix A, Table 1.1. 51 The main demographic factors of interest are age, education, and student status. Using a family of logistic regression models, RAND was able to correctly predict favorable or unfavorable sentiment for 65–73 percent of the respondents in the April 1990, October 1991, September 1993, June 1995, and July 2001 Gallup Korea surveys conducted for the U.S. Department of State. Moreover, the predictive accuracy was higher in the more recent polls than the older ones, suggesting that the model is both robust over time, and increasing in its accuracy. See Larson et al. (2004). 52We conjecture that short-term opinion on the current state of U.S.–ROK relations is influenced by the relative balance of favorable and unfavorable developments related to the alliance, as reported by the media. This view of public opinion, that is, that it responds to positive and negative developments reported in the media, is a fairly widely accepted one in U.S. public opinion circles, and various content analyses of media reporting and public opinion have supported this view. Two particularly noteworthy efforts in this regard are Richard A. Brody, Assessing the President, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), which assesses the relationship between positive and negative media reporting on the president’s approval rating, and John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 100 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE continuing doubts about the health of the alliance appear to be placing a drag on a full recovery in favorable sentiment.
The question on the importance of U.S. forces suggested, however, that more than 8 in 10 continue to view U.S. forces as playing an important role in protecting South Korean security. This figure is higher even than the three in four (76 percent) who said that U.S. forces were very or somewhat important to South Korean security in the U.S. Department of State’s polling in September 2001. Those beliefs have helped to buoy favorable sentiment during the recent downturn.
The polls also provided insights into some key predictors of opinion on the importance of U.S. forces. Only about one in three were fearful of a North Korean conventional attack in the next three years, for example, and only about one in three were convinced that the Korean Peninsula would receive top priority in the event of concurrent crises in the Middle East and Northeast Asia. Taken together, doubts about U.S. credibility might be expected to discount the importance of U.S. forces, while the hedging apparent in beliefs about the need for the alliance following reunification helps explain why overall favorable sentiment toward the United States is nearly 20 points higher than it would be if it depended entirely on short-term assessments of the bilateral relationship, but nowhere near the 8 in 10 who judged U.S. forces as important to South Korean security.
Also apparent in the September 2003 polls by JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND are the importance of what we call “lenses”—factors such as age, education, and student status—that operate at the individual level to magnify, diminish, or otherwise color the significance of specific developments, perceived changes in threat, and other factors, or that otherwise predispose individuals to hold favorable or unfavorable views of the United States. To illustrate how those factors interact, we next present results to the question on overall views toward the United States and the question’s two key predictors: opinions on the state of U.S.–ROK relations and on the importance of U.S. forces to South Korean security broken out by age (figure 11.2), educational attainment (figure 11.3), and student status (figure 11.4).
As shown in figure 11.2, favorable and unfavorable sentiment toward the United States and views on the state of U.S.–ROK relations and on the importance of U.S. forces are related to age. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 101
Figure 11.2: Key South Korean views toward the United States by Age53
Percent % US Forces 100 Important 90
80 % Favorable toward US 70
60 % Favorable 50 US-SK Relations 40
30
20
10
0 20s 30s 40s 50s & above
Figure 11.3: Key South Korean views toward the United States by Education
Percent
100 % US Forces 90 Important
80
70
60
50
40 % Favorable toward US 30 % Favorable 20 US-SK Relations 10
0 Middle-school grad. High-school grad. College grad. & above
53 The wording and results for the question for the line marked “% U.S. Forces Important” are reported in Table 1.6 in Appendix A; “% Favorable toward United States” is reported in Table 1.3; and “% Favorable US–SK Relations” is reported in Table 1.4. 102 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
In general, the older the respondents, the more favorable their views toward the United States overall, and the more likely the respondents were to believe that U.S. forces are important to South Korean security.54
Figure11.3 shows that favorable opinion toward the United States and U.S.–ROK relations are also related to education. The better educated that respondents are, the less likely they are to have a favorable view, which is particularly worrisome given the increasing rates of college attendance among younger South Koreans.55
Figure 11.4 shows that university students were less inclined to hold a favorable view of the United States or believe that U.S. forces were important to South Korean security, but they were more likely to have a favorable view of U.S.–ROK relations at the time. One conjecture is that university students were more aware of the thawing in relations since the spring of 2003.
We also highlight one other important finding from the poll by JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND. South Koreans systematically differ in their reliance on different media as their main source of news. To illustrate, figure 11.5 presents the results of this question broken out by educational attainment. As shown in the figure, the higher the level of education, the lower the reliance on television for news and the greater the reliance on newspapers and the Internet. Indeed, those who have a college degree or higher-level training are more than three times likely to rely on the Internet as their main source of news information than those who are high-school graduates; the polling data suggest that middle-school graduates are not at all inclined to rely on the Internet as their main source for news.56
54 The data on U.S.–ROK relations do, however, show a more complex pattern: a decline in favorable opinion of the relationship from the twenty-somethings to the fortysomethings, perhaps suggesting that the oft-cited “3-8-6 generation”—those who were in their thirties in the 1990s, were democracy activists during their university days in the 1980s, and were born in the 1960s—was more inclined to be pessimistic about the bilateral relationship than other age groups. 55 Perhaps two-thirds or more of South Korean high school students have continued on to college in recent years. The growing rate of higher education coupled with the increased propensity of better-educated Koreans to hold unfavorable views of the United States obviously are potentially worrisome developments. It is possible that the increasing rate of higher education among younger South Koreans may itself contribute to South Koreans becoming more critical of the United States over time. Because little is known about the various influences that lead Korean youths to more critical views of the United States, this topic is worthy of scholarly study and policy analysis. I wish to thank Paul F. Chamberlin for suggesting that I clarify this point. 56 Not shown in the figure, the results are even more striking for university students: those with student status rely on television as their main source of news only slightly less than the average South Korean (74.2 vs. 78.9 percent); 21.8 percent of the students said they rely primarily on the Internet, whereas only 6.2 percent of the total sample did; and students’ use of newspapers also is much lower (about 2 percent vs. 13.8 percent for the total sample). See Table 1.1 in Appendix A. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 103
Figure11.4: Key South Korean views toward the United States, Total Sample and Students
Percent Total sample 100 Students
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0 % favorable toward U.S. % favorable US-SK % US forces important relations
Figure11.5: Primary Media Channel for News by Education
Percent 100
90
80
70 Television
60
50
40
30
20 Newspapers 10 Internet Others 0 Middle-school grad. High-school grad. College grad. & above
Finally, it is important to note a gap that has emerged between the United States and South Korean public views toward key U.S. security issues: views on terrorism and recent U.S. military actions have diverged (see table 11.1). As shown in the table, more Americans than South Koreans consider terrorism to be a serious problem. Moreover, large majorities of Americans have supported recent U.S. military action, whereas South Koreans generally have opposed them. In fact, Americans 104 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE are about twice as likely to view the problem of terrorism as a big problem, nearly four times as likely to support the U.S. war on terrorism, twice as likely to agree with the U.S. action in Afghanistan, and more than three times as likely to support the U.S. military action in Iraq was justified.
Put another way, it is not just that South Koreans oppose U.S. security policies: a fundamental gap has emerged in American and South Korean views of the war on terrorism, a war that is likely to be the principal focus of U.S. national security policies for the foreseeable future. Moreover, this gap ultimately may be harder to bridge than any gaps that exist between the two nations’ leaders.
Table11.1: South Korean and American Views on Key Security Issues (percentage)
South Koreans Americans View terrorism as a …a Very big problem 15 50 Moderately big problem 29 37 Very/moderately big problem 44 87 Favor U.S. war on terrorismb 24 89 Agree with U.S. military action in Afghanistanc 43 88 Believe military action in Iraq justifiedd 20 68 Sources: a. Pew Center for People and the Press, December 2002. b. Pew Center for People and the Press, June 2003. c. Gallup International, December 2001. d. Gallup International, May 2003.
Implications and Conclusions
Taken together, these polling results present a decidedly mixed picture. On the one hand, the data lend additional support to the proposition that a recovery in overall favorable sentiment toward the United States is under way. On the other hand, it is too early to say whether we can expect a full recovery.
Continued beliefs regarding the benefits that South Korea derives from the alliance, especially including its contribution to peace and stability, the widespread desire to maintain or strengthen the alliance, the importance of U.S. forces to South Korean security, and the consequent continued strong support for the U.S. presence also are quite reassuring. So too is the position, held by 6 in 10, that U.S.–ROK cooperation should be given an equal or higher priority than North Korean–South Korean cooperation.
Nevertheless, there also are reasons for some concern. The low reading on the health of the bilateral relationship is quite worrisome, as is the belief held by slightly more than one in four that the United States poses a greater threat to South Korea than does North Korea. The former suggests that many bilateral issues continue to trouble South Koreans, and our modeling would suggest that it could well be responsible for the desultory—and only partial—recovery in overall favorable sentiment toward the United States. For its part, the latter opinion obviously reflects the A WORKING GROUP REPORT 105
fear that a harsh U.S. policy toward North Korea may precipitate a war, the consequences of which would primarily fall on South Korea.57
Also troubling is the position, held by nearly 4 in 10, that North Korean–South Korean relations should be given a higher priority than U.S.–ROK relations, and the view, held by about one in four of those who favor withdrawal, that U.S. forces should leave South Korea so as to reduce its effect on the improved Korean relations. Finally, the mention by nearly 6 in 10 of “selfish pursuit of its own interests and benefits” as a reason people dislike the United States suggests that this explanation may be acquiring the status of a crystallized belief. The majority belief that anti- American sentiment—cited by more than one in three as the most important factor weakening the alliance—is spreading beyond younger age cohorts and students also is quite worrisome.
The data on media usage suggest that younger and better-educated South Koreans may be turning from traditional—and more mainstream—sources of information, and may be relying more extensively on untraditional, niche sources such as Internet sites and specialty and other magazines whose viewpoints are less orthodox, and, possibly, less favorably disposed toward the United States.58
Looking toward the future, the view that the threat from North Korea is the most important reason for U.S. forces remaining in South Korea suggests that once the threat from North Korea is gone, this change might well usher in a period characterized by more volatile opinions on the bilateral relationship and the United States. Thus, majority support for a continued U.S. military presence might even be lost. Although North Korea’s persistence in the face of many predictions of its imminent demise suggests caution regarding the making of predictions of how and when this demise might come about, the potential consequences should be considered, and efforts should be made to ensure that the rationale for the alliance is a durable one. In addition, the large percentage of South Koreans who express an affinity for China should the alliance with the United States weaken suggests that a more durable foundation for the alliance—and possibly, the continued presence of U.S. forces—may be needed,59 and that, in many South Korean minds, China would be a natural partner for South Korea. While one should be careful not to place undue weight on the results of any single poll or polling question, the picture painted by the September 2003 poll by JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND suggests that some of the tectonics of South Korean views toward the United States may have shifted or be shifting, and that those views bear close attention to ascertain whether or not these changes are ephemeral ones, are accountable to the somewhat mercurial quality of South Korean
57Other surveys also have suggested that many South Koreans believe that the United States is more of a threat than North Korea is. 58 For example, anecdotally, a South Korean Internet news site called OhMyNews!, which tends to take a fairly critical position toward U.S.-related issues, is a popular website among younger South Koreans. The site’s avowed aim is to balance media coverage by actively offsetting what it sees as a largely conservative, mainstream media. Its motto is “every citizen is a potential reporter.” See Howard French, “Online Newspaper Shakes Up Korean Politics,” The New York Times, March 6, 2003, sec. A, p.3. According to GNP (Grand National Party) leader Choe Byung-yul, “Some 47 percent of the eligible voters in their 20s and 30s no longer read newspapers.” Mr. Choe spoke at a forum hosted by the Kwanhun Club, a fraternity of senior journalists. Song Tae-kyong, “GNP to Woo Young Voters On-line,” The Korea Times, July 28, 2003. 59 For a discussion of future challenges facing the alliance, see Gregory F. Treverton, Eric V. Larson, and Spencer H. Kim, “Bridging the ‘Open Water’ in the U.S.–South Korea Military Alliance,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, XV, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 153–76. 106 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE public opinion, or are more durable ones that will have a lasting effect on a key foundation of the U.S.–ROK alliance: the continued support and goodwill of the South Korean people. At best, the data from those polls suggest cautious optimism, close monitoring, and active efforts to ensure that any fundamental changes in the views of South Koreans will not foreclose the possibility of a relationship that is desirable both to Washington and to Seoul. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 107
Chapter XII Findings
The year 2003 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). That year should have been filled with fanfare and celebrations in commemoration of an enduring and historically successful strategic relationship. Yet the mood was tempered by a sense of unease. Expressions of negative sentiment toward the United States in South Korea provoked in turn angry and bitter reaction in the United States. Overt demonstrations of South Korean resentment have lessened in the year that followed; however, the relationship remains relatively strained, and the alliance in transition.
Elites in both South Korea and the United States traditionally reassure observers that calculations of overarching national interest will ultimately transcend emotionalism or popular sentiment to drive national policy. This pragmatism generally holds true but, as Derek Mitchell writes in chapter I, it must not serve as an excuse for complacency.
Public sentiment in a democracy can have measurable influence on the development and conduct of a nation’s public policy. It can constrain the choices of national leaders by raising the political cost of a particular policy. It can influence electoral outcomes. When mixed with strong emotions of pride and nationalism as in South Korea, it can undermine the foundations of trust and mutual respect that may shape a nation’s strategic choices over the long run, particularly as strategic circumstances change (in South Korea’s case, should the threat from North Korea recede or disappear). Expressions of negative sentiment on one side can also lead to countervailing resentment on the other, creating a mutually reinforcing dynamic of action and reaction that could devolve beyond the ability of leaders to control.
In South Korea, rapid political and social transformation is putting unique strains on its historic relationship with the United States. Indeed, the success of the progressive Uri Party in the April 2004 National Assembly elections, and the failure soon thereafter of a conservative-led legislative effort to oust President Roh through impeachment in May 2004, reflected changes in South Korea’s political landscape away from the traditional domination of conservatives to a younger, more progressive leadership.
However, it is the apparent difference in perceptions of and policy toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea), that is challenging most seriously the foundations of the alliance. Fear of North Korea within South Korea no longer overhangs public discourse. Meanwhile, the United States, particularly since 2001, has taken a more assertive, if not aggressive, posture toward North Korea, whether over the DPRK’s human rights abuses at home or over its potential development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological) internationally. Indeed, with anti-Communism no longer a sufficient unifying principle, old assumptions about common threat perceptions and rationales for the alliance and U.S. military presence are coming into question (most recently reflected in the Bush Administration’s announcement in May 2004 of an apparently permanent reduction in U.S. ground forces to be stationed in South Korea after a brigade departs for deployment to Iraq). The two nations are suddenly 108 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE faced with the task of searching for broader goals for the alliance beyond those that have traditionally bound them.
The present study reflects the need to assess and analyze developments in South Korea, especially as they relate to the evolution of popular sentiment toward the United States and its impact on the future of the alliance. The dynamics of sociopolitical change in South Korean society are much too profound to dismiss as simply transient. This fact is one of the key findings of this study. Justified or not, the South Korean grievance about the continuing “asymmetry” in U.S.-ROK bilateral relations requires a new prescription to keep the traditional alliance strong. Indeed, given the common values and interests that remain, there is no reason that the alliance cannot continue on a strong and constructive path into the future. However, a better understanding of the dynamics and complexities of change in South Korean society is now a necessary condition for such a solid and fruitful relationship.
This report, an outcome of combined studies by both South Korean and U.S. specialists, presents several findings on the nature, challenges, and implications of developments in South Korean public sentiment toward the United States. Policy recommendations based on these findings follow in chapter XIII.
A. South Korean sentiment toward the United States is complex and diverse, and does not conform to simplistic notions of “anti-Americanism,” “radical youth,” or other traditional generalizations. What is happening in South Korean society today is not as simple as what was assumed by many elites in South Korea and the United States in 2002ヱ2003. The consistent reassurances from the ROK elite—that all is well in the relationship and that the demonstrations were expressions of only a radical young minority—and U.S. counter-reaction—that the protests demonstrated that South Koreans were anti-American ingrates who sought to sever the alliance and force the withdrawal of U.S. forces—failed to capture the complex nature of trends in South Korean sentiments toward the United States.
As authors in this volume have noted repeatedly, a foundation of positive sentiment toward the United States remains in South Korea, particularly among businessmen, senior bureaucrats, veteran academics, and others who continue to recognize the alliance’s contribution to peace, stability, economic growth, and overall South Korean security. Substantial majorities in public opinion polls, even during the worst period of anti-U.S. street demonstrations in 2002ヱ2003, continue to express support for maintaining the alliance and for a continuing U.S. force presence on the peninsula. South Koreans continue to display their admiration for U.S. culture, values, and educational opportunities, and they have a positive personal opinion about Americans in general when they have the opportunity to interact with them.
It is likewise true that perceived arrogance, disrespect, and unilateralism by the U.S. government in its dealings with South Korea and in its conduct of foreign policy, in general, have created deep resentment among a growing percentage of South Koreans, including those within traditionally supportive elite circles. As Eric Larson notes in chapter XI, opinion within South Korea on the health of the relationship is at a low, a rating that often indicates overall sentiment toward the United States over time. According to the September 2003 polls conducted by CSIS, JoongAng, and RAND, South Koreans preferred inter-Korean cooperation (40 percent) over U.S.–ROK cooperation (24.4 percent) A WORKING GROUP REPORT 109 as a priority in its foreign policy, with a little more than a third of respondents (34.4 percent) favoring equal priority between the two countries. Such a trend reflects growing mistrust in the United States as a security partner and growing rifts in a core principle underlying the relationship.
Furthermore, the contention that a generation gap exists in views of the United Statesンthat younger, more educated citizens are among those most unfavorably disposed toward the United Statesンis evidently accurate, according to polls taken over time. However, the nature and degree of the younger generation’s concerns about the United States are not uniform. Some youth, particularly those in leadership posts in various South Korean citizens groups, labor organizations, teacher and student unions, and other such groups, are instinctively if not ideologically anti-American. Others have grown angry in recent years over a series of specific incidents of perceived arrogance by the U.S. government in its international policy and in its treatment of South Korea.
Indeed, evidence is lacking for the notion that the younger generation in South Korea is overwhelmingly radical or ideological; likewise, there is no evidence that the youth of today will either moderate or maintain their relatively negative views toward the United States as they age. The way in which the U.S. and ROK governments handle individual events and the overall relationship in coming years will play a large part in shaping South Korean popular sentiment over time. If left to continue on its current course without attention, the growing breadth of negative views within the population and the apparent cross-currents of sentiment within individuals will create profound uncertainty about the quality, if not the maintenance, of the bilateral relationship in coming years.
B. South Korean popular sentiment toward the United States has recovered somewhat since the public demonstrations of 2002-2003, but remains a troublesome trend. As Kim Seung-hwan notes in chapter III, public demonstrations against the United States peaked during the fall and winter of 2002-2003 and declined as President Roh Moo-hyun took power in early 2003. Even on the first anniversary of the 2002 schoolgirls accident, which precipitated the original demonstrations, protests marking the occasion were relatively small. Various reasons may be cited for the decline in public anger toward the United States, including Roh’s desire to keep the relationship stable for domestic economic reasons and to contain a U.S. backlash that seemed evident when the administration of President George W. Bush announced in early 2003 that it intended to withdraw its forces from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). However, recent polls on sentiment toward the United States reflect continued high levels of deep mistrust and resentment within the South Korean public, sentiments that may erode the relationship over time, despite the disappearance of large popular demonstrations.
C. Current South Korean sentiments toward the United States did not spring forth merely from recent events but reflect the sum of South Korea’s long historical memory and experience with major powers over many years. As David Kang and Paul Chamberlin write in chapter II, the roots of current South Korean views toward the United States may be traced deep into the history of the relationshipンfrom the Taftヱ Katsura Agreement of 1905; through the division of the peninsula and the Korea War; through U.S. support for South Korean security during the Cold War. Indeed, the Korean Peninsula has been a theater for major power rivalry for centuries, a role that colors its view of itself and of its security environment. Expressions of frustration that stem from perceived disrespect, injustice, and inequality in its relationship with the United States are, therefore, the residue both of particular events in the 110 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
bilateral relationshipンincluding the effect of having U.S. military forces on its soilンand of many years of insecurity over the effect of major powers in general on its internal affairs.
D. Negative trends in ROK sentiment toward the United States today are not the same as the “anti-Americanism” of the 1980s and early 1990s. A generation ago, as David Kang and Paul Chamberlin note in chapter II, public demonstrations in the aftermath of the Kwangju uprising of 1980 and during South Korea’s transition to democracy in the mid-1980s sharply criticized perceived U.S. support for authoritarian ROK regimes. The demonstrations identified the United States more as a protector than as an opponent of the unjust status quo. By the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, however, vocal and visible anti-American street demonstrations became largely the province of what the ROK establishment called “dissident radicals,” particularly university students. The students had extreme notions of Korean nationalism, idealistic sympathy for North Korea, and a desire for a new political and social system that would oust U.S. presence and influence from both the ROK government and society. Much of this anti-Americanism occurred in tandem with South Korea’s early transition to a more open and democratic society.
Unlike those demonstrations, deep ideological distaste for the United States is not evident in today’s protests. Opposition to U.S. culture or values and overt sympathy for North Korean juche philosophy are rare in today’s demonstrations. Instead, protests today are more event-driven and reactiveンfor instance, to protest apparent unfairness and injustice in ROK society related to U.S. foreign policy or the U.S. military presence. In contrast to the theatrical violence and conflicts with riot police of the past, mainstream nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social groups have organized the recent demonstrations through legal processes consistent with their democratic rights. In 2002ヱ2003, those groups also attracted a wider segment of South Korean society than was apparent in the streets of Seoul in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although instances of U.S. flag-burning and isolated attacks on U.S. servicemen have occurred, today’s protests tend to be relatively peaceful, with candlelight vigils preferred, reflecting a broader and more moderate constituency.
As a result, the undercurrents of South Korean sentiment toward the United States today are more subtle than those manifested in the 1980s and early 1990s even as they are more widespread. The protests of recent years are, therefore, of even more concern than those of 20 years ago.
E. The development of negative sentiment toward the United States is a function, in part, of social changes within South Korea during recent years. As Bak Sang-mee notes in chapter IV, South Koreans have developed enormous civic pride in their political, economic, and cultural achievements of the past several decades. The economy has rebounded since the 1997 financial crisis. The success of the 2002 World Cup, which South Korea cohosted, and of the South Korean team itself in the contest has led to a surge in pride and self-confidence. At the same time, the development of democracy, civic freedoms, and communications technologies has suddenly allowed expression and transmission of public views more widely than ever possible before, thereby enabling public demonstrations of national sentiment in the wake of the 2002 Olympics. Those demonstrations gave South Koreans a new sense of empowerment and civic muscle that soon thereafter turned the country’s attention against the United States in the wake of the 2002 schoolgirls accident. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 111
In recent years, the United States has become the object of rebellion for those, particularly in the younger generation, who want to express their new “assertive nationalism” and self-confidence publicly in an acceptable fashion. To some, anti-Americanism has become a way to demonstrate one’s patriotism and to express frustration over the apparent failure of the United States to recognize the nation’s development and achievements.
As Lee Sook-jong writes in chapter V, new generations of South Koreans are coming to dominate ROK societyンrepresented not only by the election of Roh Moo-hyun in 2002, but also in the younger profile of those elected to the National Assembly in April 2004ンand they bring with them different historical experiences and memories from those of their parents and grandparents. They do not remember years of deprivation, nor do they harbor Cold War notions of a North Korean threat. Rather, their development occurred during the democracy struggle of the 1980s and 1990s, which left them with a sense of pride and empowerment over political and social changes at home. They thus are less willing to accept traditional notions of “younger brother” status to the United States. Indeed, calls for a “more equal” partnership, which have spread throughout South Korean society in recent years, suggest less a desire for real equality with a superpower than for a general attitude of respect from the United States, in form and substance, both in how Americans view South Korea and in how the U.S. government handles the bilateral relationship.
New perspectives on Korean identity and wariness of U.S. influence have also become part of a broader dynamic of social transition in South Korea. As Lee Jung-hoon writes in chapter VII, a new elite is emerging in South Korea as the “3-8-6” generation rises to positions of authority in ROK society. The perspectives of this new elite are replacing those of traditional elites in business, mass media, academia, and government to create new dynamics in South Korean domestic affairs and in the bilateral relationship. The ascension to power of this younger generation, which occurred during the 1990s and early 2000s, is represented prominently in the Roh Moo-hyun administration, as well as in the establishment of numerous liberal NGOs, social groups, and new media, particularly on the Internet. The new generation is vocal and assertive in challenging all forms of status quo in South Korean politics, including the traditional ROK relationship with the United States.
F. The issue of the ROK’s growing negative sentiment toward the United States is not merely a social or cultural challenge, but a strategic one, and ought to be treated as such. As in Japan in the 1990s (and perhaps in the future) over Okinawa, the effect of growing resentment toward the United States spilling over into the bilateral relationship as a whole has strategic importance. The viability of the relationship remains a critical deterrent against North Korea, and the alliance provides a sense of security and stability on the peninsula that has been of profound mutual benefit.
The alliance serves as one of the pillars upon which regional stability rests, thereby enabling East Asia’s historic development over the past 50 years. Cracks in the viability or strength of the security structure that is based on the alliance, or in the U.S. ability to maintain its regional military presence, will affect the strategic calculations of nations throughout Northeast and Southeast Asia. Popular pressures in South Korea to loosen its bonds with the United States could influence similar popular dynamics in Japan. In the absence of a viable alternative regional structure to provide a sense of security and promote mutual trust, traditional rivalries and tensions could reemerge to dominate the strategic dynamics of the region, thus affecting its stability and development.
Even short of severing the alliance or of expelling U.S. forces, negative sentiment could severely 112 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE complicate—if not threaten—the full functioning of the alliance’s deterrent and stabilizing functions. Growing South Korean negative sentiment reflects, in part, a deeper and more critical emerging rift in overall threat perception and the preferred responses between the two countries. This rift has important implications on coordinated efforts toward North Korea, including the nuclear weapons issue. The growing political and emotional divide also may offer solace to the DPRK’s hopes for undermining the relationship over time.
In addition, as the two countries envision a more regional focus for the partnership and for U.S. forces on the peninsula, any challenges to that vision would affect the strategic future of the region. Indeed, should South Koreans manifest their resentment or anger toward the United States in extreme ways, such as repeated flag-burning and violence against U.S. personnel, U.S. citizens, in turn, will resent South Korea’s perceived ungratefulness for the historical U.S. sacrifices and commitments to ROK security. This resentment will lead many, including some in the U.S. government, to question the rationale for maintaining such commitments. “If they don’t want us there, let’s just leave” could become a common U.S. refrain as began to occur in the wake of the 2002ヱ-2003 demonstrations. Should the United States perceive that the ROK government is failing to take adequate responsibility for defending the United States and the alliance publicly, resentment among U.S. policy-makers, opinion leaders, and citizens alike will grow, potentially affecting U.S. strategic choices in years ahead.
G. Both countries bear responsibility for the deterioration in South Korean popular sentiment toward the United States and for reversing this trend. The failure of both the United States and South Korea to recognize, understand, and account for changes in ROK society in recent years has had a great influence on the continued decay in popular views of South Koreans toward the United States. For its part, the United States has been complacent about the prospect of popular sentiment complicating the relationship and has underestimated how social changes, including the rise of civic pride and democracy, require more deft and creative handling of bilateral frictions associated with both the U.S. military presence and U.S. peninsular policy.
Indeed, U.S. mishandling of its response to the 2002 schoolgirls accident and the failure of U.S. civilian and military representatives to interact effectively and consistently with newly empowered media, local communities, and NGOs have hurt its standing with average citizens. Those missteps have reinforced a sense of U.S. disrespect for South Koreans and their concerns. Likewise, U.S. hardline policies toward North Koreaンfrom the “axis of evil” statement to the U.S. approach to North Korea’s nuclear programンand unilateral decisions concerning U.S. force posture and deployments on the peninsula further exacerbated a growing sense within both the liberal and conservative communities in South Korea that the United States did not understand the sensitivities of peninsula diplomacy and blithely acted only in its own interests even if at the expense of South Korean stability and well-being. Such factors underlay the demonstrations of 2002ヱ2003 and continue to inform tensions in the bilateral relationship.
Moreover, South Korean actions are duly responsible for assisting in the deterioration in sentiment toward the United States. South Korean elites will acknowledge that they and their government have not done a good job of educating the South Korean people on the continued purpose and responsibilities of the alliance and the U.S. military presence. The South Korean elites have denied, dismissed, or otherwise failed to account for changes in the popular dynamics of South Korea’s rapidly changing society. U.S. observers complain that ROK government officials have, instead, leveraged anger toward the United States to maintain the officials’ political positions. Observers complain that A WORKING GROUP REPORT 113
ROK officials often use the United States as a scapegoat for their reluctance to take responsibility for bilateral understandingsンsuch as those under the Status of Forces Agreement (which governs U.S. military forces present on the peninsula)ンthat may be awkward politically to defend. Such a perception is prevalent in many policy-oriented circles in the United States, and it must be addressed for the health of the relationship.
Furthermore, as Scott Snyder notes in chapter IX, an intensely competitive environment has led editors in South Korean news media to sensationalize or to tailor reporting to fit a particular reader profile. In an atmosphere of growing nationalism and resentment toward the United States, this selective presentation of facts and reports has reinforced and magnified prevailing anti-American sentiments. Snyder comments, for instance, on the media’s “spiral of silence” in reporting the facts concerning the 2002 schoolgirls accident: no media outlet dared to dissent from the prevailing public view for fear of isolation and “punishment” from South Korean society at large.
In the case of NGOs and other citizen organizations, Katharine Moon writes in chapter VI that grievances against the United States sometimes provide useful opportunities for them to organize and promote themselves in a highly competitive civic environment. Indeed, activist organizations are strategic about the issues they decide to address and publicize. In the end, if the United States should do a better job of reaching out to those groups in good faith, some groups would welcome such engagement in the interest of clearing up misunderstandings and solving disputes, while others would remain ideologically and practically uninterested in any U.S. outreach. In either case, the rise of civil society will continue to challenge both the United States in South Korea and the efforts to stabilize or mitigate negative sentiment toward the United States in coming years. This situation will require the United States to learn to navigate among and interact more effectively with different types of groups in modern ROK society.
H. Leaders on both sides can have an important impact on negative popular sentiment toward the United States. As indicated above, leaders on both sides can do much to encourage South Korean sentiment in either a positive or a negative direction. Emotional or short-term political responses to the complex issues surrounding the development and expression of South Korean sentiment in recent years have exacerbated the negative trend. Given mutual commitment to keeping the relationship solid and secure, plus a desire to understand the roots and nature of the problem, leaders in both countries can develop effective coordinated strategies for addressing the issue. 114 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Chapter XIII Recommendations
The findings presented in this study lead to the following recommendations for action by the United States and South Korea, both individually and together, to address the issue of growing negative South Korean sentiment toward the United States.
United States
A. The United States government should upgrade the quality of the bilateral alliance and should engage in a process of real consultation with counterparts in the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) to demonstrate due respect for changes in the nature of the relationship. The United States should understand that South Koreans’ call for a “more equal and balanced” relationship with the United States is a cry for respect rather than a demand for real parity with a superpower. In response, the United States must consider ways to demonstrate in its public and private actions its understanding of a new dynamic in South Korean society, where the new generation feels proud and empowered to assert a nationalistic South Korean identity in a period of political and economic development.
Indeed, as much as any substantive changes in policy, the process and attitude through which the United States engages with South Korea in the future are the key elements in addressing core South Korean grievances and resentments. South Koreans pay close attention to how the United States treats other allied nations, particularly Japan, relative to itself. Washington should ensure that South Korea receives appropriate respect in relation to its other allies. Actions should include regular senior visits and real consultation on substantial peninsular and global issues.
Respect also means attending to issues that seem relatively minor from the U.S. perspective but that affect South Korean pride and sensibility. An example is the requirement that ROK citizens receive visas to travel to the United States; South Koreans are well aware that Japanese citizens can come and go without such a procedure. Although U.S. ambassadors to the ROK have been uniformly excellent in recent years, the United States should consider raising the stature of its ambassadors in Seoul by appointing individuals who have special access to the most senior levels of the U.S. government, including Congress, and who can apply their political experience and influence to bridge relations between Washington and Seoul. Appointing such individuals would serve as a small but symbolic statement of respect for South Korea as an important strategic ally for the future, and it could serve as one element in addressing ROK insecurities in the bilateral relationship.
Similar attention to process and attitude in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy—particularly toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) as the most sensitive issue in South Korean society—is essential if South Koreans are to be assured that the United States cares about more than its self-interest and that it cares about the effect of its policy on the interests of its A WORKING GROUP REPORT 115 long-time ally. Actions that raise peninsula tensions or threaten conflict and that are undertaken without consulting with the ROK government will shake South Korean confidence in the good faith of its ally to settle the impasse peacefully and to promote the stability that undergirds ROK economic development. Similarly, U.S. attention to explaining its foreign policy internationally and to conducting that policy with due humility will help ameliorate growing wariness within South Korean society concerning U.S. international goals and intentions.
B. Both the U.S. embassy in Seoul and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) should assign officers specifically to track social and cultural developments in South Korean society. To account adequately for changes in South Korean society in conducting alliance management, the United States must monitor and analyze closely the nature of such changes and their effects on U.S. interests. The United States should treat this exercise as an essential element of its strategic posture in South Korea and should designate officials to focus specifically on the subject and to report to their superiors regularly. Those findings, along with ongoing U.S. State Department surveys of South Korean public sentiment, should be shared with South Korean government counterparts to coordinate assessments and practical responses.
C. The United States should place greater attention on formalizing and upgrading public affairs training and on embassy and USFK outreach to South Korean society. The importance of deteriorating South Korean sentiment toward the United States requires that priority attention be given to ensuring that U.S. public affairs efforts are of the highest professional quality and effectiveness. Embassy and USFK public affairs staff members have had to labor under extremely difficult conditions. Local media, NGOs, and government officials have had agendas not necessarily consistent with conveying all the facts or sides to an issue or with preserving the health of the bilateral relationship as a whole. Indeed, the events of 2002–2003 served as a wake-up call that created changes in the seriousness with which U.S. embassy and USFK public affairs staff members took the issue of responding to incidents and accidents involving U.S. civilian and military personnel stationed in South Korea.
The United States might consider several initiatives to enhance its public affairs operations. First, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense should consider applying additional resources to their public affairs operation in South Korea, perhaps placing as much attention on maintaining good relations with the South Korean people as they have on maintaining a military deterrent posture over the past 50 years. This action would mean assigning more personnel and increasing budgets in support of the public affairs effort.
The U.S. government might consider hiring public affairs professionals and country experts outside the governmental system—and even South Koreans—to consult with embassy and military public affairs officers. In partnership with those specialists, local public affairs personnel should develop a coherent and comprehensive strategic plan to address issues, including a community outreach strategy. Such a plan should involve priority attention to areas in proximity to U.S. bases, secondary schools, and universities and should show particular attention to the unique domestic dynamics of South Korea.
Embassy and military personnel should also prepare crisis response plans to enable rapid and effective reaction to future events. They should apply lessons learned from experiences in South Korea and elsewhere, including Japan and Germany. Such plans should be discussed and coordinated with 116 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
ROK government counterparts to ensure predictable responses and to enable appropriate cooperation in the event of an incident. The ability to respond quickly and effectively to incidents or accidents may help mitigate unnecessary future damage to the relationship.
U.S. public affairs officers and senior officials, in consultation with their South Korean counterparts, will also need to find ways to bridge the gap between the Korean cultural view of apology as an admission of deep sorrow and regret and the U.S. legal culture of apology as an admission of guilt and liability. Such culture clashes may be managed through careful bilateral consultation.
U.S. embassy and USFK personnel should also diversify their base of outreach in South Korean society. One criticism leveled at U.S. officials in South Korea is that they tend to preach to the converted and to engage with elements of ROK society that already are favorably oriented toward the United States, such as veterans groups and other conservative organizations. Officials must avoid this tendency and must instead reach out proactively to the “new elites,” those individuals and organizations that are rising in power and status within South Korean society, and that are increasingly vocal and assertive in criticizing the United States. Although some of those groups will prove ideologically or otherwise predisposed to maintain a hostile posture toward the United States and the U.S. military presence regardless of U.S. outreach, many others have proved open to engagement and merely seek the kind of dialogue and face that suggests respect both for their grievances and for their new status within South Korean society.
As Katharine Moon notes in chapter VI, the key factors are trust and credibility, each of which is lacking between Americans and South Koreans at the civil society level. Many social groups and NGOs want the United States and its representatives to listen with open minds and hearts and to legitimize their grievances. At the same time, they do not want dialogue simply as a tool for political ends but instead as an honest effort to understand the perspective of South Koreans and the burdens that the U.S. presence places upon them, both materially and psychologically. To this end, U.S. engagement must be persistent, transparent, and responsive, rather than perfunctory, forced, or reactive. Indeed, the United States should partner in its outreach efforts with ROK government officials and sympathetic South Korean NGOs as much as possible to enhance the credibility of its effort.
Finally, as they do in Japan, U.S. military representatives should enhance the transparency of their operations, including activities on military bases. They should enhance the ongoing commitment to “Good Neighbor” dialogue with and assistance to local South Korean communities to demonstrate good faith regard for the U.S. military’s status as guests in an allied environment.
Since September 11, the United States has expressed a commitment to strengthening its public diplomacy around the world to combat persistent negative images of the United States, particularly in the Muslim world. Given the reservoir of goodwill toward the United States within South Korea, however, the fruits of a relatively small but committed public diplomacy campaign in the country may be particularly great, and at relatively little cost, compared with the more challenging efforts necessary elsewhere around the globe.
A WORKING GROUP REPORT 117
D. The United States should develop a comprehensive media outreach strategy to balance its engagement of “traditional” and “new” media. Given that increasing numbers of younger South Koreans are receiving their news and information from sources other than the traditional major media outlets, the United States needs to pay particular attention to the “new media” in its public affairs strategy. Although Internet sites such as OhMy News! might tend toward sensationalization and emotionalism rather than sober exchange of facts and perspectives, to ignore this new vehicle through which South Koreans are receiving their information would be to unilaterally disarm in the battle to win over an important segment of South Korean society.
Indeed, U.S. outreach to the new South Korean media has begun in the aftermath of the events of 2002–2003. U.S. representatives should continue this effort, including regular engagement in online chat rooms or in weekly question-and-answer forums on popular Web sites to address issues of concern about the alliance, about U.S. policy toward North Korea, about the U.S. military presence, and about similar issues. The United States should also consider ways to partner with government officials, local NGOs, or others within South Korean society that are sympathetic to the perspective of the United States and to the strategic relationship. It would be helpful to encourage them to engage in online discussions as well, as part of a coordinated media strategy.
At the same time, U.S. media strategy should maintain a balance in outreach between new and old media to ensure that relationships with the major, traditional media outlets do not become strained. Traditional media outlets remain the primary source of news for most South Koreans. Thus, cultivating a constructive and mutually supportive working relationship with those outlets should remain the primary focus of U.S. media outreach efforts. Such a relationship will require U.S. public affairs officers to provide timely and accurate information according to South Korean news deadlines, plus efficient access to key U.S. personnel, as appropriate, to enable balanced and timely reporting of a news story.
E. The U.S. government should accept that some negative views of the United States will always exist in some South Korean quarters. One can never expect to abolish negative sentiment entirely, nor should one try. The United States must not overreact to expressions of anger or frustration within South Korean society or to extreme actions that offend the sensibilities and pride of the United States (for example, burning of the U.S. flag and chants of “U.S., Go Home”). The key factors to consider are the strategic value of the relationship and the mutual commitment of both countries to safeguarding the health of the alliance over time. The United States should place any popular demonstrations in South Korea in context, should act to minimize the level of anger when possible, and should partner with ROK leaders to prevent outbursts from getting out of hand in South Korea or counter-reactions from getting out of hand in the United States.
South Korea
A. The ROK government should take appropriate responsibility for growing negative sentiment in South Korea toward the United States and must do its part in reversing this trend. It may be easy for South Korean leaders to blame U.S. policies, “arrogance,” or other factors for the rise in anti-American sentiment. However, South Korean elites, particularly in the older generation, 118 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
will acknowledge the nation’s failure to educate their younger counterparts on the benefits of the relationship or to defend the relationship when under siege. Schoolteachers, school curricula, the mass media, and other public institutions are shaping young opinion toward the United States for the worse and are creating a trend in national mood that South Koreans may feel pressured to follow.
South Korean leaders, therefore, must take ownership of the problem and must assume the initiative in partnership with teachers, the media, and NGOs to reverse the trend and to turn perceptions around. Such an initiative includes persistent and assertive public statements in support of the relationship even when the trend is negative. It also means close consultation and partnership with Washington and with U.S. representatives in Seoul to address and contain nationalist sentiment so that expressions of popular opinions critical of the United States do not exacerbate bilateral tensions. Perhaps most important, South Korean elites need to acknowledge and account for changes in their own society rather than denying that such changes have taken place. Without recognition of a problem at home, it is unlikely that an appropriate response to the changes will emerge—individually or in cooperation with the United States.
B. ROK national and civic leaders should minimize the politicization of issues surrounding the U.S. presence in South Korea. South Korean leaders at times have used the United States as a scapegoat for difficult decisions that are politically controversial at home. The “U.S. card” can be a convenient ploy to gain domestic favor and to play off nationalist sentiment. The United States has been patient with this political dynamic, but recent events have demonstrated the danger of continuing to play politics with sensitive matters in the bilateral relationship. ROK politicians must recognize that there are real costs to the South Korean economy, security, and other national interests when national sentiment toward the United States deteriorates.
Similarly, members of South Korea’s civil society, (e.g., NGOs and the media) should assume responsibility for their role in facilitating a new, healthy relationship between the ROK and the United States. Should the United States engage in increased good faith dialogue with civic groups and NGOs to address specific grievances, those organizations should respond in kind rather than seek to gain political advantage by grandstanding or rejecting U.S. overtures. For instance, they should welcome U.S. representatives to engage in open and transparent dialogue with members and local communities. They should maintain an open mind concerning the efforts made by both the U.S. and the ROK governments to balance the requirements of national security and local needs. Likewise, if U.S. representatives should handle their relationship with the ROK media more effectively, the media will need to assume greater responsibility for reporting accurately—and in a timely and balanced fashion—the nature and context of U.S. statements and actions. Thereby, the media will serve as responsible stewards both of South Korea’s new democracy and of the country’s interest to maintain a sound relationship with the United States over time.
C. The ROK government should take greater responsibility for attending to regional and global, not just peninsular, issues in safeguarding the future of the bilateral alliance and in reducing negative popular sentiment toward the United States. With the end of the Cold War, the United States has become the world’s only superpower, with unique global responsibilities for safeguarding international security. Since the attacks of September 11 in particular, the United States has focused increasingly on transnational threats of radical Islamic terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and safety of sea lanes, as it deals with its new, A WORKING GROUP REPORT 119 keen sense of vulnerability. As the United States turns to face challenges internationally, it will seek the support of allies and friends. The South Korean public, even if it disagrees with the methods of the U.S. government, will need to understand the new psychology of the United States after September 11 and its responsibilities as a global power if the relationship is to remain on a solid footing in coming years. This understanding will require patience and adaptation by the South Korean people.
To the degree that the ROK government chooses to focus on reconciliation with the DPRK as the primary, if not the only, major issue in its foreign policy, South Koreans will do likewise and will ignore other critical matters related to North Korea and international security more generally. This focus will have a profound effect on the future of the U.S.–ROK alliance and, in turn, of South Korean sentiment toward the United States. Indeed, Washington views North Korea not only as a peninsular problem but also as a humanitarian and international security challenge affecting international interests of nonproliferation (weapons of mass destruction and missiles), drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and human rights. Failure by South Korea to view such matters as important to address either on its own or in partnership with the United States—or South Korea’s choosing instead to engage with North Korea in ways that suggest disregard for those issues—will challenge the viability of the alliance in the long run.
Without ROK leadership in promoting the importance of such issues to a domestic audience, U.S. policies that incorporate those elements in their approach to North Korea will lead to popular resentment in South Korea over perceived meddling or obstruction in the reconciliation process. The combination of silence on the part of ROK leaders and apparent public apathy over those matters will create resentment toward South Korea in the United States for the ROK’s failure to take part in this broader fight. This sequence of events will create a spiral of discontent between the two countries that may have lasting effects.
The future of the alliance lies in broadening the relationship to address regional and international security concerns. The ROK’s difficult decision in 2003–2004 to dispatch 3,000 troops in support of the U.S.-led reconstruction effort in Iraq was very helpful progress in this regard. The East Asian security environment is changing rapidly and will require greater attention by the United States and its allies if stability and security are to be maintained in coming years. The implications of China’s rise, Japan’s emergence as a player in international security affairs, and growing transnational threats—along with North Korea— are all critical issues for the alliance to consider in coming years.
The Roh Moo-hyun government is reportedly preparing to release a new national security strategy by the summer of 2004. Should the document incorporate a longer-term vision of South Korea’s future foreign policy and role in international affairs, its relationship with North Korea, and its partnership with the United States, such a document can serve as an important step in defining the parameters of a strong bilateral alliance for the future. A public national security strategy would also force the ROK government to explain its vision and goals to its people and to the United States, and serve as a blueprint for action that at best would both mitigate South Korean resentment toward the United States and strengthen the bilateral relationship over the long term.
120 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
United States and South Korea
A. The two countries should establish vehicles for increased regular interaction and dialogue between their citizens, particularly among the younger generations, and should increase the level of information sharing with Korean citizens. The 2002 Pew Center poll measuring international views of the United States noted that familiarity with the United States bred favorability among South Koreans.1 William Watts in chapter X expressed concern that while U.S. citizens generally had a favorable impression of South Korea and of U.S. security obligations toward the ROK, their awareness and understanding of South Korea was shallow. Without a reservoir of positive cues, the relationship could be subject to wild swings. Indeed, South Koreans’ recognition of this lack of U.S. knowledge or attention to South Korea is itself a point of resentment. To ameliorate this precarious situation, the two countries should promote opportunities for greater people-to-people interaction and cultural exchange through visiting scholarships, site visits, and the like, with particular emphasis on engaging schoolteachers as the vehicle for educating a new generation in the benefits and importance of the U.S.-ROK relationship. The United States should also engage in dialogue students in secondary schools and universities to help allay the concerns, misconceptions, and ignorance that can pervade ROK perspectives on the United States and U.S. actions.
Legislators from both countries should also establish greater contact with each other, and each other’s society, through regular country visits. Very few U.S. congressional delegations visit South Korea, perhaps one a year, which may contribute to U.S. misunderstanding in the future about developments in South Korean policy and society. Likewise, the results of the April 2004 ROK legislative elections highlight the need for a new generation of South Korean leadership to interact with Americans, and to develop a more complete understanding of the United States, U.S. policies, and the benefits of the longstanding bilateral relationship. Programs that promote visits to the United States by members of this new generation in the National Assembly would assist this process and enable the United States in turn to build ties with, and understand better the perspectives of new South Korean leaders.
In South Korea itself, the U.S. and ROK governments should work to promote greater information-sharing with South Korean society overall concerning issues related to the alliance and to the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. South Korean NGOs express frustration over their ability to gain even basic unclassified information from local base communities and their own government on issues such as training schedules and road use around bases. A greater mutual commitment to transparency as a principle can go a long way toward creating an atmosphere of good faith in handling potential tensions.
B. The two countries should reinvigorate the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Joint Committee process for handling bilateral disputes over the effect and responsibilities of the U.S. military presence in South Korea. As Katharine Moon advises in chapter VI, the United States and South Korea should use more effectively the SOFA Joint Committee and Subcommittee process that was established as a vehicle for resolving problems related to the U.S. military presence. The Joint Committee meets rarely, but it can
1 Pew Global Attitudes Project, What the World Thinks in 2002 (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2002), 56. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 121 serve as a formal channel to exchange information and perspectives, and to better communicate U.S. bureaucratic procedures to South Korean NGOs, local governments, and citizens. Such a process will serve dual purposes: it will demonstrate to the United States that many South Koreans harbor accumulated, event-driven grievances that are honest and legitimately held, rather than holding ideological anti-American sentiment. The South Koreans may come to understand that USFK standard operating procedures, legal norms and standards, and specific imperatives of mission planning and training have a legitimacy and logic of their own.
C. The two countries should develop, articulate, and affirm publicly a new vision for the future of the alliance partnership. Working from their respective national security strategies, and building on the principles laid out in the U.S.–ROK Joint Statement of May 14, 2003 (which followed the Bush-Roh summit meeting in Washington, D.C.), the ROK and the United States should work in tandem in the near term on a document setting forth a common vision for the future of the alliance over the long term. This common vision would harmonize each country’s perspectives on future threats and responses, and would take into account respective interests and goals. The process of developing such a document would reflect progress toward the respect and “equal” partnership that South Korea desires, while the implementation of the vision would challenge both countries to live up to their rhetoric: (1) the United States would be required to engage in close consultation with South Korean leaders; (2) South Korea would be challenged to back up its demand for equality and respect as a developed and mature power by agreeing publicly to engage in a broad range of international security matters in partnership with the United States.
Indeed, the vision embodied in such a document would signal to the public in both countries a renewed investment in the bilateral relationship, thus arresting the drift and politicking that have led to steady weakening if not deterioration in views toward one another in recent years. It would force the leaders to take full responsibility in the eyes of their constituents for the pact’s development and implementation. Such a pact would force the two countries, in essence, to renew their vows by reaffirming their commitment to one another after more than 50 years, which would represent a fresh investment in a new era of challenge and opportunity.
The domestic transition underway in South Korea has placed the U.S.–ROK alliance under some stress in recent years. However, the negative trend in sentiment is neither irreparable nor irreversible, nor is anything fixed or certain about the future of South Korea or the U.S.–ROK alliance. One must remember that the U.S.–ROK bilateral relationship is larger than the sum of public sentiment at any given moment, and greater even than the military alliance. The relationship has developed on a foundation of many economic, social, cultural, and historical ties built over more than a century. With appropriate sensitivity, initiative, leadership, and cooperation between the two countries, the new dynamics of democracy and social change in South Korea should serve to strengthen rather than weaken the foundations and promise of the historic alliance for years to come. 122 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Appendix A: Summary of September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo- CSIS-RAND Polls
The first of the two surveys conducted by JoongAng Ilbo and CSIS on September 15-17, 2003 asked 15 questions of its 1,000 respondents.
Table 1.1: Most Influential News Medium
Q. 1 “What form of media do you usually get your news from? Tell me the most influential media channel for you.”
Percent Opinion 78.9% TV 13.8 Newspaper 0.9 Radio 0.2 Magazines 6.2 Internet
Table 1.2-1: Most-Liked Country
Q. 2-1 “Please tell me the country you like the most.”
Percent Opinion 26.9% No answer/ refused 18.5 United States 10.2 Australia 7.7 Switzerland 6.9 Canada 4.7 France 4.3 Japan 4.1 New Zealand 2.6 England 2.1 Netherlands 2.0 China 1.3 Sweden 1.2 Germany 1.2 Singapore 0.7 North Korea A WORKING GROUP REPORT 123
Table 1.2-2: Least-Liked Country
Q. 2-2 “Please tell me the country you like the least.”
Percent Opinion 32.5% No answer/ refused 25.6 Japan 23.7 United States 12.7 North Korea 1.9 Iraq 1.9 China 0.6 Russia 0.4 Italy 0.1 Ghana 0.1 Finland 0.1 Vietnam 0.1 Myanmar 0.1 Thailand 0.1 India 0.1 Pakistan
Table 1.3: Views toward the United States
Q. 3 “Considering the United States as a country, do you have a feeling of amity or criticism toward it?”
Percent Opinion 5.3% Highly amicable 44.7 Somewhat amicable 40.6 Somewhat critical 9.0 Very critical 0.4 No answer
Table 1.4: Opinion on U.S.-ROK Relationship
Q. 4 “How good or how bad is today's relationship between South Korea and the United States?”
Percent Opinion 1.6% Very good 30.9 Pretty good 61.0 Pretty bad 5.4 Very bad 1.1 No answer 124 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Table 1.5: Reasons That People Dislike the United States
Q. 5 “There are a lot of people around us that dislike the United States. For what reason do people dislike the United Sates in your point of view?”
Percent Opinion 58.0% Selfish pursuit of its own interests and benefits 14.3 Dissatisfaction against the U.S. forces 13.5 Disrespect toward South Koreans and the problems from the past 6.7 Show-off of its power and wealth 4.5 US’ harsh policy towards North Korea 1.3 Resistance against American society and culture 1.8 No answer
Table 1.6: Importance of U.S. Forces to Stabilizing South Korean Security
Q. 6 “In order to stabilize Korea's security, how important of a role do you think the U.S. forces in South Korea play?”
Percent Opinion 35.2% Very Important 52.1 Pretty important 10.7 Not that important 1.8 Not important at all 0.1 No answer
Table 1.7: Views Regarding Stationing or Withdrawing U.S. Forces in South Korea
Q. 7 “The United States states that as long as North Korea remains as a threat and as long as South Koreans and Americans wish, it will station US forces in Korea. What is your opinion on U.S. forces in South Korea?”
Percent Opinion 4.0% Immediate withdrawal 22.4 Withdrawal soon 62.9 Stay for a decent amount of time 10.1 Stay even after reunification 0.7 No answer
Table 1.8: Likelihood of a North Korean Attack in the Next Three Years
Q. 8 “In next three years, how possible do you think North Korea could invade South Korea with a full attack?”
Percent Opinion 3.7% Very possible 32.0 Somewhat possible 47.1 Not really possible 16.4 Zero possibility 0.8 No answer A WORKING GROUP REPORT 125
Table 1.9: Desirability of Maintaining the Military Alliance With the United States After Reunification
Q. 9 “Do you see Korea reunification possible? If possible, do you think maintaining the military alliance with the United States is necessary after reunification?” Percent Opinion 33.3% Maintain the alliance 28.7 No need to maintain the alliance 36.5 Zero possibility for reunification 1.5 No answer
Table 1.10: Relative Priority of Cooperation With North Korea and the United States
Q. 10 “The cooperation with North Korea and the United States are both important, but which one do you think should come first?”
Percent Opinion 39.4% Inter-Korean cooperation 24.4 US-South Korea cooperation 34.4 Equal ratio 1.7 No answer
Table 1.11: Country Having Closest Relations With South Korea If U.S.-ROK Alliance Weakens
Q. 11 “If the U.S.-ROK alliance weakens, which other country in your view should South Korea politically and diplomatically maintain the closest relationship?”
Percent Opinion 49.8% China 20.0 North Korea 18.7 Japan 2.0 Russia 9.5 No answer
Table 1.12: Most Threatening Country to South Korea
Q. 12 “Which country do you think is the most threatening to South Korea?”
Percent Opinion 45.0% North Korea 26.1 USA 14.8 Japan 9.5 China 1.8 Russia 2.7 No answer 126 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Table 1.13: Assessments of the Strength of Four Alliances
Q. 13 “Out of the following four alliances I am going to tell you, which one do you feel is the strongest (firmest) and least problematic?”
Percent Opinion 39.4% U.S.-ROK alliance 20.6 North Korea-China 19.2 U.S.-Japan 6.9 North Korea-Russia 13.8 No answer
Table 1.14: Likely U.S. Priority Given Concurrent Crises in the Middle East and Korean Peninsula
Q. 14 “If the Middle East and Korean Peninsula face threatening situations at the same time, which side do you think the United States will focus more?”
Percent Opinion 46.9% Middle East 33.3 Korean Peninsula 18.2 Depend on different situations 1.6 No answer
The second survey conducted by JoongAng Ilbo and CSIS on September 15-17, 2003 asked 17 questions of its 710 respondents.
Table 2.1: Importance of U.S.-ROK Relationship to South Korea’s Benefit
Q. 1 “How important do you think U.S.-ROK relationship is to South Korea's benefit?”
Percent Opinion 43.7% Very Important 49.4 Somewhat important 6.3 Not that important 0.5 Not important at all 0.1 No answer
Table 2.2: Contribution of U.S.-South Korean Military Alliance to Stability and Avoidance of War
Q. 2 “How much do you think the U.S.-ROK military alliance has contributed to the Korean Peninsula's peace stability and the avoidance of war?”
Percent Opinion 32.3% Contributed a lot 49.4 Contributed somewhat 16.0 Contributed not much 1.9 No contribution 0.3 No answer A WORKING GROUP REPORT 127
Table 2.3: Preferences Regarding Changes in the U.S.-ROK Military Alliance
Q. 3 “From now on, should we strengthen the U.S.-ROK military alliance, reduce it, or keep the current level?”
Percent Opinion 19.1% Strengthen 26.2 Reduce 54.1 Maintain 0.6 No answer
Table 2.4: Most Important Factor Weakening the U.S.-ROK Alliance
Q. 4 “What is the most important weakening factor for the U.S.-ROK alliance?”
Percent Opinion 34.8% Anti-American sentiment in South Korea 27.0 US’ harsh policy towards North Korea 23.9 Improvement in inter-Korea relations 9.8 End of Korean War & regional stability in Northeast Asia 4.6 No answer
Table 2.5: Assessments of Breadth of Anti-American Sentiments in South Korea
Q. 5 “Who, in your view, has anti-American sentiment in South Korea today?”
Percent Opinion 15.6% Very small number in young generations 27.3 Only young generations 34.8 Spreading from young to older generations 20.4 Spread overall 2.0 No answer
Table 2.6: Necessity of U.S. Forces Staying or Leaving
Q. 6 “Do you think it is necessary for the U.S. forces in South Korea to continue to stay or leave?”
Percent Opinion 82.8% Stay 17.2 Leave
Table 2.7: Reasons U.S. Forces Should Stay in South Korea
Q. 7 “For those who said the U.S. forces should continue to stay in South Korea, for what reason should they stay?”
Percent Opinion 55.4% To prevent North Korea’s sudden attack or invasion 23.5 Economic benefit & protection of sovereignty 12.5 To maintain US-ROK relations 8.6 To stabilize relations with China, Russia, and Japan 128 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Table 2.8: Reasons U.S. Forces Should Not Stay in South Korea
Q. 8 “If you think the U.S. forces should not stay, why is it not necessary for them to stay?”
Percent Opinion 25.6% To improve inter-Korea relations 25.2 To achieve self-security 17.3 For South Koreans' peaceful lives 16.2 Considering South Koreans' anti-American sentiment 15.0 To reduce the possibility of war on Korean Peninsula 0.7 No answer
Table 2.9: Awareness of the Decision to Relocate U.S. Forces South of the Han River
Q. 9 “Before today, have you heard or seen the news that the U.S. forces will relocate to south of Han River and move some bases?”
Percent Opinion 77.3% Yes 22.7 No
Table 2.10: Approval of Relocation of U.S. Forces South of the Han River
Q. 10 “Do you agree to the relocation of the U.S. Forces to the south of Han River and the move of some bases?”
Percent Opinion 7.9% Strongly agree 39.3 Somewhat agree 34.0 Somewhat disagree 13.9 Strongly disagree 4.9 No answer
Table 2.11: Reasons for Agreeing with Relocation of U.S. Forces South of the Han River
Q. 11 “(For those who strongly agreed or agreed) For what reason do you agree? Explain briefly.”
Percent Opinion 32.5% To revive Seoul 24.9 No answer 11.0 Location does not matter 8.8 To help South Korea’s well-being 8.4 To develop self-reliant security power 5.2 To reduce the tensions of inter-Korea problems 3.0 In case of conflicts, it is better to protect the southern part of the country 2.6 It is good to disperse the forces 1.4 To improve economically 1.1 U.S. possesses too many technological weapons 0.8 Pollution 0.3 Personal reasons A WORKING GROUP REPORT 129
Table 2.12: Reasons for Disagreeing with Relocation of U.S. Forces South of the Han River
Q. 12 “(For those who answered to Q.10 with disagree or strongly disagree) For what reasons do you disagree? Explain briefly.”
Percent Opinion 48.3% Nervous for having the U.S. forces farther away from the 38th parallel 18.5 No answer 10.3 Too costly to move 7.3 The way things are right now is good 5.1 South Korea is being controlled by the United States 3.1 Worried for the economy of the to-be-relocated area 2.4 Want the U.S. forces to withdraw 1.8 Anti-American sentiment 1.4 If a war occurs, only the U.S. can avoid the damage 1.1 Don't want non-South Korean owned land to expand 0.7 Pollution
Table 2.13: Knowledge of Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
Q. 13 “How well do you know about SOFA and its problems?”
Percent Opinion 2.2% Know well 32.0 Know somewhat 60.9 Heard of it, but not know details and problems 4.9 Heard just today or not know at all
Table 2.14: Opinion on Rewriting Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
Q. 14 “(For those who answered "know well" or "know somewhat") What is your opinion on rewriting SOFA?”
Percent Opinion 49.5% Need to change right away 32.8 Change after resolving North Korea’s nuke issue 14.5 No change until prepared for the mid-long run 1.5 No need to change 1.8 No answer
Table 2.15: First SOFA-Related Problem That Should Be Solved
Q. 15 “Which problem of the current SOFA do you think should be solved first?”
Percent Opinion 23.2% U.S. troop criminal, justice, and hand-over issues 6.0 Solving complaints against American soldiers 2.8 Pollution due to the US bases 1.2 Base usage payment issue 66.8 No answer 130 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Table 2.16: Knowledge of Efforts to Improve SOFA Since Middle School Girls’ Deaths
Q. 16 “Since the death of two middle-school girls, do you think there has been any effort to improve SOFA or not?”
Percent Opinion 1.9% A lot of effort 12.1 Some effort 15.0 Not much effort 5.0 No effort at all 66.1 No answer
Table 2.17: Knowledge of U.S. Response to Middle School Girls’ Deaths
Q. 17 “In your knowledge, how did the United States respond to the middle-school girls' death?”
Percent Opinion 50.6% Apologized to South Koreans 14.2 Apologized and gave money to the girls' families 5.4 Apologized and those responsible were charged 3.5 All three of them 23.4 Don’t know what the United States did 3.0 No answer A WORKING GROUP REPORT 131
Appendix B: September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo - CSIS - RAND Polls, Survey 1
Survey participants: 1.00 number % Total 1000 100.0 Male 493 49.3 Gender Female 507 50.7 20s 253 25.3 30s 263 26.3 Age 40s 201 20.1 50s & above 282 28.2 Middle-school grad. 172 17.2 Education High-school grad. 379 37.9 College grad. & above 448 44.8 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 3.8 Independent 160 16 Blue collar 77 7.7 Occupation White collar 144 14.4 House wife 378 37.8 Student 87 8.7 Unemployed/Etc. 117 11.7 Big city 484 48.4 Area size Medium/small city 403 40.3 Rural cities 113 11.3 Seoul 225 22.5 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 24.5 Gangwon 33 3.3 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 9.3 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 11.6 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 11.3 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 16.3 Je-ju 11 1.1 Seoul 39 3.9 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 8.6 Gangwon 42 4.2 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 18.8 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 26.8 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 16.4 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 15 Je-ju 12 1.2 North Korea/etc. 51 5.1 Lee Hoi-chang 299 29.9 Roh Moo-hyun 428 42.8 Kwon Young-kil 22 2.2 Who They Voted For Other candidates 4 0.4 No answer 158 15.8 Abstain 88 8.8 132 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (1): “What form of media do you usually get your news from? Tell me the most influential media channel for you.”
TV Newspaper Radio Magazines Internet number % % % % % Total 1000 78.9 13.8 0.9 0.2 6.2 Male 493 74.6 17.8 1.3 0 6.3 Gender Female 507 83.2 9.9 0.4 0.3 6.2 20s 253 75.9 6.2 0 0.7 17.2 30s 263 80.6 15.5 0 0 3.9 Age 40s 201 77.8 16.8 2 0 3.5 50s & above 282 81 16.8 1.7 0 0.5 Middle-school grad. 172 90.7 8 1.3 0 0 Education High-school grad. 379 81.1 14.2 1.2 0 3.5 College grad. & above 448 72.6 15.7 0.4 0.4 11 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 84.5 13.4 2.1 0 0 Independent 160 73.6 24.1 0.5 0 1.8 Blue collar 77 76.9 11.6 3.2 0 8.3 Occupation White collar 144 69 18.7 0 0 12.3 House wife 378 86.9 9.9 0.6 0 2.6 Student 87 74.2 2 0 2 21.8 Unemployed/Etc. 117 75.6 16.6 2 0 5.7 Big city 484 76.8 14.8 1 0.4 7.1 Area size Medium/small city 403 79.6 13.9 0.6 0 5.9 Rural cities 113 86.1 8.8 1.4 0 3.7 Seoul 225 77.6 13.7 0.7 0 8 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 73.4 17.7 0 0 8.9 Gangwon 33 87.4 12.6 0 0 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 72.6 16.7 0 0 10.7 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 81.7 11.1 2.1 0 5.2 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 84.7 8.7 3.5 1.5 1.6 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 83.9 13 0 0 3 Je-ju 11 93.6 0 6.4 0 0 Seoul 39 66.9 19.2 0 0 13.9 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 69.3 18.7 0 0 11.9 Gangwon 42 86.7 10.7 0 0 2.6 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 80.3 12.5 0 0 7.2 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 79 11.2 1.5 0 8.2 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 84.7 9.3 2.9 1 2.1 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 79.5 17.9 0 0 2.6 Je-ju 12 85.1 14.9 0 0 0 North Korea/etc. 51 70.4 24 0 0 5.6 Lee Hoi-chang 299 81.4 15.6 1.3 0 1.7 Roh Moo-hyun 428 78.5 12.7 0.7 0.4 7.6 Kwon Young-kil 22 68.8 18.7 0 0 12.5 Who They Voted For Other candidates 4 41.7 58.3 0 0 0 No answer 158 80.7 10.5 1 0 7.9 Abstain 88 73.9 15.5 0 0 10.6
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 133
Question (2-1): “Please tell me the country you like the most.” United States New Zealand Netherlands Switzerland No answer Singapore Germany N. Korea N. Australia England Sweden Canada France Japan China Other
number%% %%%%% %%%%%%%%% Total 1000 26.9 18.5 10.2 7.7 6.9 4.7 4.3 4.1 2.6 2.1 2 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.7 5.4 Male 493 30.4 22.6 8.2 5.8 5.8 3.2 4.6 3.6 1.9 2.1 3.2 1.7 0.9 1.3 1.3 3.4 Gender Female 507 23.5 14.5 12.1 9.6 7.9 6.3 4.1 4.6 3.3 2.1 0.9 0.9 1.6 1.1 0 3.4 20s 253 26.4 11.3 10.3 6.9 9.6 5.4 9 3.4 2 4.1 3.6 0.7 1.3 0 0 7.4 30s 263 23.7 6.2 13.3 12.4 6.6 7.8 2.7 7.5 2.5 1.9 0.8 1.8 1.8 2.8 0.4 6.1 Age 40s 201 26.5 15.1 13.7 7.6 6.5 4.7 3.2 3.1 4.3 1.7 2 2.3 0.4 1.6 1.2 8 50s & above 282 30.6 38.8 4.9 4.2 5 1.4 2.5 2.4 2.1 0.8 1.8 0.6 1.3 0.5 1.1 6.1 Middle-school grad. 172 39.2 33.5 3.5 2.7 2.5 1.9 3.4 1.1 3.1 0.8 1.5 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.1 Education High-school grad. 379 24.3 16.2 15.6 8.7 9.4 5 4.1 3.7 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.5 0.8 1.7 0 2.5 College grad. & above 448 24.3 14.7 8.3 8.9 6.4 5.6 4.9 5.6 3.1 2.8 2.8 1.4 1.6 0.7 1 3.8 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 35.3 31.8 2 6.2 6 2.2 2.1 0 2 0 4.9 0 0 0 2.1 8 Independent 160 29.5 15.8 12.4 7.2 7.9 1.7 3.4 3.7 0.9 1.6 3.1 2 2 1.9 0.9 5.3 Blue collar 77 40 19.2 7.5 8.7 5.5 3.7 2.6 3.5 2 0 0 4.5 0 1.7 0 5.8 Occupation White collar 144 26.1 10.2 11.4 6.1 8.3 6.9 9.1 0.9 2.5 1.7 2.8 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.9 1 House wife 378 23.1 15.1 13.5 10 8.3 5.1 2.4 5.9 3.5 1.9 0.8 0.7 1.5 1.5 0 8.2 Student 87 24.3 12.7 2.2 6 4.3 9.8 10.3 4.1 3.9 6.2 6.5 2.2 1.9 0 0 6.7 Unemployed/Etc. 117 27.2 42.9 5.8 4.3 2 2.7 3.4 4.8 1.9 2.9 0.7 0 0 0 1.3 5.7 Big city 484 27.1 18.5 9.2 7.7 8.8 5.2 4 3.8 2 1 3.1 1.6 1.4 1.2 0.3 0 Area size Medium/small city 403 26 16.2 11.3 8.1 5 5.6 5.5 5.6 3.1 3.3 0.7 0.8 1.4 0.9 0.9 5.2 Rural cities 113 29.2 26.5 10.8 6.8 5.3 0 1.7 0.6 3.9 2.5 2.3 1.8 0 2.4 1.4 5.9 Seoul 225 25.8 19.3 8.8 6.9 8.6 4.3 5.9 4.9 1.4 1.2 2 1.9 2.3 0.9 0.4 5 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 24.9 13.5 13 8.4 7.1 5.1 3.3 7.1 4.1 2.1 1.8 0.7 2.3 0.4 1.1 5.4 Gangwon 33 32.7 29.8 5 2.2 3.4 0 5 0 2.3 0 0 0 0 2.1 2.3 4.9 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 26.5 20.5 15.4 5.6 1.7 2.4 2.9 5.6 1.7 2.5 4.7 1.3 0 2.5 0 15 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 22.3 17.2 8.5 10.7 6.1 8.4 5.1 1 5.4 3 2 0 0 3.7 0.7 6.8 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 22.2 22.1 10.5 12.5 7 2.1 7.6 2.4 1.7 3.3 0 1.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 5.8 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 36.6 19.9 7.8 4.4 8.9 5.6 1.8 2.2 1.5 1.3 2.7 2.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.8 Je-ju 1132.619012.5015.20 0 014.3000003.7 Seoul 39 21.3 14 22.2 5.6 5.7 11.1 2 2 4.4 0 0 4.1 0 0 2 6.4 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 20.1 13.9 11.7 9.8 9.6 6.6 2.8 8.8 4.2 1 1.3 0 2.7 1.3 2.2 5.5 Gangwon 42 33.9 20.1 6.5 1.7 9.9 0 6.7 7.9 1.8 0 4.5 0 1.8 0 0 4.2 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 23.8 20.4 11.3 9.2 5.6 3.9 2.3 4.6 1.7 1.2 2.8 2.1 2.8 2.1 0.4 5.4 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 25.9 16.6 11.1 7.9 3.8 5.1 6 4 3.7 2.8 2.7 0.7 0.7 2.3 0.6 5.8 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 24.6 21.7 8.9 7.2 11.1 3.4 6.7 3 1.6 2.7 1.2 1.2 0 0.5 0.5 6.3 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 34.8 18.1 8.8 8.6 7.5 6.3 2 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.3 1.5 0.4 0 0.5 5.5 Je-ju 1241.118014.6013.60 0 012.7000003.9 North Korea/etc. 51 33.8 22.2 4.3 1.5 8.2 0 6 3.1 2.8 3.3 1.5 2.1 2.9 0 0 0 Lee Hoi-chang 299 24.6 24.7 10.3 6.7 7.6 4.7 2.9 4.4 2.4 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.5 0.8 8.1 Roh Moo-hyun 428 27 14.9 10.5 9.4 7.3 5.2 4.2 4.2 3.1 2.1 2.8 1.4 0.9 1.2 0 5.2 Who They Kwon Young-kil 22 37.4 0 14.2 8.4 15.3 4.5 0 4.8 3.4 0 0 0 0 3.7 0 5.9 Voted For Other candidates 4 29.20 047.90 0 0 0 0 0 000008.2 No answer 158 29.1 22.7 9 3.9 2.7 4.4 6 3.1 0.9 3.3 2.1 0.9 2.2 2.1 2.3 23 Abstain 88 27.4 12.9 10.4 7.8 8.3 3.7 7.9 4.5 4.1 3.5 0 1.4 1.8 1.3 0.9 5.4
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 134 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (2-2): “Please tell me the country you like the least.” United States No answer Myanmar N. Korea Pakistan Thailand Vietnam Finland Russia Ghana Japan China India Italy Iraq
number% % % % % % %%%%%%%%% Total 1000 32.5 25.6 23.7 12.7 1.9 1.9 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Male 493 29 28 21.9 15.7 2.1 1.3 0.8 0.9 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 Gender Female 507 35.8 23.3 25.5 9.7 1.8 2.5 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 20s 253 26.8 30.1 35.4 4.1 1.5 1.3 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30s 263 27.1 23.8 34.9 6.7 2.3 3.1 0 1.3 0.4 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 Age 40s 201 37.6 24 20.2 13.6 2.6 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50s & above 282 38.8 24.5 5.3 25.3 1.6 1.6 1.4 0.3 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 Middle-school grad. 172 45.2 22.2 7.2 20.1 2.6 0 2.3 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 Education High-school grad. 379 29.6 29.1 21.8 14.5 1.4 2.2 0.5 0 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0 College grad. & above 448 29.9 24 31.7 8.3 2.2 2.5 0 1 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.1 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 31.6 20.4 10.2 26.1 0 5.6 4.3 0 0 0 0 1.9 0 0 0 Independent 160 26.7 28.5 24.5 15.3 3.9 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Blue collar 77 34 26.7 24.2 11.7 1 0.9 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Occupation White collar 144 28.3 27.8 27.1 10.7 0.5 2.1 1.2 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 House wife 378 38.4 22.2 23.1 10.5 2 2.5 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 Student 8725.122.747.92.12.20 000000000 Unemployed/Etc. 117 30.7 33.3 6.5 22.8 1.9 2.7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Big city 484 30.7 27.8 25.2 11.8 1.6 1.8 0.5 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Area size Medium/small city 403 33 22.9 25.6 12.7 1.7 1.9 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0 Rural cities 113 38.1 26.1 10.7 16.6 4 2.6 0.7 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 0 0.6 Seoul 225 27.8 27.5 25 16.4 0.7 1.9 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 29.6 24.8 30.5 9.9 1.6 1.7 0.3 0.9 0 0.4 0 0 0 0.3 0 Gangwon 33 32.1 24.6 5.6 23 2.1 9.2 0 0 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 38.3 30.9 11.8 13.3 2.2 2.6 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 31.8 21.7 31.5 10.4 1 1.7 1.3 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 32.5 24.1 22.2 16.8 3 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 39.5 26.3 17.7 8.6 3.9 1.7 0.5 1.3 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 Je-ju 11 43.6 12.5 24.9 6.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.5 0 0 6.1 Seoul 3930.623.13212.320 000000000 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 35.4 24.6 24 8.8 1.8 4.1 0 0 0 1.3 0 0 0 0 0 Gangwon 4225.240.68.82104.4000000000 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 31.9 26.7 17.1 17.4 2.1 3.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 28.5 26.5 32.1 9.8 0.3 1.1 1.5 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 33 23.3 25.8 14.1 3 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 40 22.4 17.2 9.4 4.5 2.4 0.6 1.6 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.4 Je-ju 12 51.6 14.6 22.2 5.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.8 0 0 0 North Korea/etc. 51 29.2 27.9 23 17.2 1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.3 0 Lee Hoi-chang 299 35.2 23.2 13.4 19.8 3.5 2.5 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.2 0 0 0 0 Roh Moo-hyun 428 29.7 26.4 29.4 9.8 0.6 2.6 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 Who They Kwon Young-kil 2219.631.948.60 0 0 000000000 Voted For Other candidates 4 29.2 0 52.1 0 0 18.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 No answer 158 36.9 30.7 16.2 12.2 3.1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 Abstain 88 31.6 20.4 36.9 7.4 1.7 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 135
Question (3): “Considering the United States as a country, do you have a feeling of amity or criticism toward it?”
Highly Somewhat Somewhat Very (1+2) (3+4) No answer amicable amicable critical critical number % % % % % % % Total 1000 5.3 44.7 50.1 40.6 9 49.5 0.4 Male 493 7.4 45.5 52.8 36.7 9.9 46.6 0.5 Gender Female 507 3.3 44 47.3 44.3 8 52.4 0.3 20s 253 1.4 35.5 36.9 48.1 14.3 62.4 0.7 30s 263 1.8 39.7 41.5 47.5 11 58.5 0 Age 40s 201 3.4 42 45.4 45.6 8.3 53.9 0.8 50s & above 282 13.5 59.7 73.2 23.8 2.7 26.5 0.3 Middle-school grad. 172 11.1 59.4 70.5 25.8 3.3 29.1 0.4 Education High-school grad. 379 3.2 48.6 51.8 41.2 6.3 47.5 0.7 College grad. & above 448 5 35.8 40.8 45.8 13.3 59.1 0.2 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 8.8 60.5 69.3 26.7 3.9 30.6 0 Independent 160 8.6 43.7 52.3 33.4 13.9 47.3 0.5 Blue collar 77 5.5 46.8 52.3 41.9 5.8 47.7 0 Occupation White collar 144 1.9 36.1 38 44.8 15.9 60.7 1.3 House wife 378 3.6 44.5 48.1 45.9 5.5 51.4 0.4 Student 87 2.2 31.4 33.6 52.1 14.3 66.4 0 Unemployed/Etc. 117 11.9 60.7 72.6 22.9 4.5 27.4 0 Big city 484 4.8 43.1 47.9 42.8 9 51.8 0.3 Area size Medium/small city 403 4.6 43.2 47.8 41.8 10.3 52.1 0.2 Rural cities 113 10.4 57 67.4 26.9 4.1 31 1.6 Seoul 225 6.2 37.6 43.8 47 8.8 55.8 0.3 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 4.9 39.9 44.8 42.4 12.8 55.2 0 Gangwon 33 9.1 46.5 55.6 44.4 0 44.4 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 5.6 58 63.6 31.3 5 36.3 0 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 7.4 40.4 47.8 44.6 7 51.6 0.6 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 5.1 47.1 52.2 41.2 6.6 47.8 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 3 54.6 57.6 30.7 10.1 40.8 1.6 Je-ju 11 0 54 54 31.7 14.3 46 0 Seoul 39 4.8 43.4 48.2 36.8 15 51.8 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 3.4 44.2 47.6 42.5 9.9 52.4 0 Gangwon 42 9 40.3 49.3 40.9 9.7 50.6 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 6 46.1 52.1 41.6 6.3 47.9 0 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 5.3 39.3 44.6 47.5 7.5 55 0.3 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 6.3 44.3 50.6 39.7 9.3 49 0.5 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 4.5 53.8 58.3 28.4 11.6 40 1.7 Je-ju 12 0 44.3 44.3 43 12.7 55.7 0 North Korea/etc. 51 4.3 48.2 52.5 38 9.6 47.6 0 Lee Hoi-chang 299 7.7 51 58.7 31.3 9.5 40.8 0.5 Roh Moo-hyun 428 4.7 41.3 46 46 7.3 53.3 0.6 Kwon Young-kil 22 0 34.3 34.3 44.5 21.2 65.7 0 Who They Voted For Other candidates 4 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 No answer 158 4.4 52.6 57 37.6 5.4 43 0 Abstain 88 3.8 30.5 34.3 46.9 18.7 65.6 0
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 136 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (4): “How good or how bad is today's relationship between South Korea and the United States?”
Very good Pretty good (1+2) Pretty bad Very bad (3+4) No answer number %%%%%%% Total 1000 1.6 30.9 32.5 61 5.4 66.4 1.1 Male 493 2 34.7 36.7 56.4 5.9 62.3 0.9 Gender Female 507 1.3 27.2 28.5 65.5 4.8 70.3 1.2 20s 253 1.4 30.6 32 62.1 5.3 67.4 0.6 30s 263 1.4 25.4 26.8 67.9 4.8 72.7 0.4 Age 40s 201 0.8 25.1 25.9 64.3 8.4 72.7 1.5 50s & above 282 2.7 40.5 43.2 51.2 3.8 55 1.8 Middle-school grad. 172 3.1 43.6 46.7 50.2 2.2 52.4 0.9 Education High-school grad. 379 1.3 31.6 32.9 60.8 4.5 65.3 1.9 College grad. & above 448 1.4 25.4 26.8 65.4 7.3 72.7 0.5 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 4.1 34.5 38.6 55.3 4 59.3 2.1 Independent 160 1.3 26.7 28 58.5 12.5 71 1 Blue collar 77 2.5 34.6 37.1 58.1 4.9 63 0 Occupation White collar 144 2.1 26.9 29 66.3 3.8 70.1 1 House wife 378 1 27.9 28.9 66.4 3.9 70.3 0.8 Student 87 2 36.6 38.6 55.5 5.9 61.4 0 Unemployed/Etc. 117 2 43.3 45.3 48.5 2.8 51.3 3.3 Big city 484 1.2 29.3 30.5 63.7 5 68.7 0.8 Area size Medium/small city 403 1.8 30.6 32.4 59.7 6.5 66.2 1.4 Rural cities 113 3.1 38.7 41.8 54.2 2.7 56.9 1.3 Seoul 225 1.6 22.6 24.2 71.7 3.4 75.1 0.7 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 1 27.4 28.4 62.3 8 70.3 1.3 Gangwon 33 2.2 13.5 15.7 79.8 4.5 84.3 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 0.8 39.1 39.9 49 8.7 57.7 2.4 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 2 39 41 55.5 3.5 59 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 2.3 27.3 29.6 65.7 4 69.7 0.7 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 2.5 44.4 46.9 47.2 5 52.2 0.9 Je-ju 11 0 12.5 12.5 73.2 0 73.2 14.3 Seoul 39 0 14.5 14.5 70.7 13 83.7 1.8 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 0 27.4 27.4 68.3 4.3 72.6 0 Gangwon 42 1.7 23.7 25.4 67.5 5.3 72.8 1.7 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 2.5 34.6 37.1 55.5 6.2 61.7 1.3 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 1.1 31.2 32.3 60.9 5.7 66.6 1.1 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 3.1 30.6 33.7 62.1 3.7 65.8 0.5 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 1.9 39.4 41.3 53 4.5 57.5 1.2 Je-ju 12 0 17.7 17.7 69.5 0 69.5 12.7 North Korea/etc. 51 0 18.7 18.7 75.2 6.1 81.3 0 Lee Hoi-chang 299 0.5 26.6 27.1 65 6.6 71.6 1.3 Roh Moo-hyun 428 1.4 30.8 32.2 63.1 4.4 67.5 0.4 Kwon Young-kil 22 0 17.2 17.2 79 3.7 82.7 0 Who They Voted For Other candidates 4 0 29.2 29.2 52.1 18.8 70.9 0 No answer 158 4.9 39.6 44.5 48.1 5.1 53.2 2.3 Abstain 88 1.4 33.7 35.1 56.6 6.1 62.7 2.2
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 137
Question (5): “There are a lot of people around us that dislike the United States. For what reason do people dislike the United States in your point of view?”
Disrespect Dis-satisfaction against U.S. Selfish persuit of Harsh policy Resistance against Show-off of towards South forces stationed in South its own interests against North American society Its power & No answer Koreans & past Korea & military and and benefits Korea and culture wealth problems diplomatic interference number % % % % % % % Total 1000 58 13.5 14.3 4.5 1.3 6.7 1.8 Male 493 57.8 13.4 12.4 5.8 1.1 6.8 2.7 Gender Female 507 58.2 13.6 16.1 3.3 1.5 6.5 0.9 20s 253 60 8.2 22.9 2.7 1.4 4.8 0 30s 263 66.8 11.2 10.9 3.6 0 7 0.4 Age 40s 201 62.4 12.7 11.6 3.1 1.9 7.9 0.4 50s & above 282 44.7 20.9 11.6 8.1 1.9 7.2 5.6 Middle-school grad. 172 46.4 21 11.8 7.2 2.2 6.6 4.9 Education High-school grad. 379 58.2 12.5 14.6 4.6 1.5 6.9 1.7 College grad. & above 448 62.3 11.5 14.9 3.4 0.7 6.5 0.7 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 54.5 14.3 14.6 4.3 1.8 4.2 6.3 Independent 160 55.5 16.6 6.9 4.1 1.5 11.3 4 Blue collar 77 63.5 17 9.3 4.6 0 4.7 0.9 Occupation White collar 144 66.3 12.8 12.6 1.1 0.5 6.7 0 House wife 378 58.4 13.5 15.4 3.8 1.3 6.4 1.2 Student 87 55.2 5.9 30.7 4 2 2.2 0 Unemployed/Etc. 117 49.1 13.3 13.7 12.1 2 6.6 3.2 Big city 484 59.3 15.1 12.8 4.6 1.6 5.8 0.8 Area size Medium/small city 403 59.3 10.9 13 4.6 0.8 8.5 2.9 Rural cities 113 47.4 15.8 25.1 4.2 1.3 4.1 2.1 Seoul 225 63.1 15.2 12 3.3 1.4 4.6 0.4 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 61.4 11.5 11.6 3.7 0.3 8.7 2.8 Gangwon 33 56.5 13.8 23.1 0 2.3 4.4 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 64.7 12.9 12.3 4.4 1 3.1 1.7 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 60.6 6.3 15.9 6.1 0.6 7.7 2.7 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 44.8 18 17.4 7.5 3.6 8.6 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 51.1 16.6 14.6 5.6 1.6 7.3 3.3 Je-ju 11 31.7 12.9 55.3 0 0 0 0 Seoul 39 67.3 9.7 10.8 8.1 4.1 0 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 62.7 10.2 18 5.2 0.9 3 0 Gangwon 42 53.9 16.3 20 4.5 0 5.3 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 62.8 13.4 10.1 4.3 1.3 5.9 2.2 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 62.7 12.2 11.9 4.3 0.3 6.3 2.3 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 44.7 16 17.3 7.2 3.6 10.4 0.9 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 54.2 16.2 16.5 1.6 0.4 8 3.1 Je-ju 12 33 17.6 49.4 0 0 0 0 North Korea/etc. 51 63.8 9.9 8.8 3.7 1.5 9.6 2.8 Lee Hoi-chang 299 52.7 13.8 15.8 5.5 1.6 9.1 1.5 Roh Moo-hyun 428 62.5 13 12.8 4.9 0.5 4.6 1.8 Who They Kwon Young-kil 22 79.3 9.9 10.8 0 0 0 0 Voted For Other candidates 4 52.1 0 0 18.8 0 0 29.2 No answer 158 45 16.4 20.6 3 3.7 8.4 2.8 Abstain 88 71.9 11.4 6.6 2.9 0 7.3 0
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 138 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (6): In order to stabilize Korea’s security, how important of a role do you think the U.S. forces in South Korea play?
Not that Not important Very Important Pretty important (1+2) (3+4) No answer important at all number % % % % % % % Total 1000 35.2 52.1 87.3 10.7 1.8 12.5 0.1 Male 493 43.9 45.3 89.2 8.4 2.3 10.7 0 Gender Female 507 26.8 58.8 85.6 12.9 1.3 14.2 0.2 20s 253 24.3 59.2 83.5 14.4 2.1 16.5 0 30s 263 23.1 60.5 83.6 14.1 1.9 16 0.5 Age 40s 201 30.9 55.2 86.1 11.1 2.8 13.9 0 50s & above 282 59.4 35.8 95.2 4 0.8 4.8 0 Middle-school grad. 172 48.4 43.3 91.7 7.9 0.4 8.3 0 Education High-school grad. 379 29 55.8 84.8 12.1 2.7 14.8 0.3 College grad. & above 448 35.4 52.4 87.8 10.7 1.5 12.2 0 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 54.1 35.9 90 8.2 1.8 10 0 Independent 160 39.2 45.3 84.5 12.3 3.3 15.6 0 Blue collar 77 34.3 57.7 92 7 1 8 0 Occupation White collar 144 30.3 53.2 83.5 11.4 5.1 16.5 0 House wife 378 29.8 59.5 89.3 9.3 1.1 10.4 0.3 Student 87 24.9 55 79.9 20.2 0 20.2 0 Unemployed/Etc. 117 55.5 35.8 91.3 8.7 0 8.7 0 Big city 484 37.1 50.1 87.2 11.1 1.4 12.5 0.2 Area size Medium/small city 403 31.6 54.3 85.9 11.8 2.3 14.1 0 Rural cities 113 39.8 53.4 93.2 5.1 1.6 6.7 0 Seoul 225 41.1 47 88.1 9.3 2.1 11.4 0.5 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 37.9 49.9 87.8 10.1 2.1 12.2 0 Gangwon 33 42.8 50.6 93.4 6.6 0 6.6 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 32.6 58.3 90.9 7.7 1.5 9.2 0 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 31.3 54.4 85.7 14.3 0 14.3 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 29.7 52.4 82.1 16.5 1.4 17.9 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 28.4 60 88.4 8.3 3.3 11.6 0 Je-ju 11 54.4 15.2 69.6 30.3 0 30.3 0 Seoul 39 31.5 55.7 87.2 10.8 2 12.8 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 39.2 52 91.2 7.9 0.9 8.8 0 Gangwon 42 41 50.3 91.3 6 2.7 8.7 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 33.5 54.7 88.2 11 0.9 11.9 0 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 32.8 52.8 85.6 12 1.9 13.9 0.4 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 36.6 47.3 83.9 14.1 2 16.1 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 31.6 58.9 90.5 6.6 3 9.6 0 Je-ju 12 56.2 22.4 78.6 21.4 0 21.4 0 North Korea/etc. 51 47.2 41.1 88.3 10.1 1.6 11.7 0 Lee Hoi-chang 299 43.8 46.4 90.2 8.4 1.5 9.9 0 Roh Moo-hyun 428 29.3 56.3 85.6 12.3 1.8 14.1 0.3 Who They Kwon Young-kil 22 31.8 47.2 79 17.6 3.4 21 0 Voted For Other candidates 4 22.9 47.9 70.8 29.2 0 29.2 0 No answer 158 37.4 53.2 90.6 8 1.4 9.4 0 Abstain 88 32.3 50.9 83.2 13.2 3.5 16.7 0
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 139
Question (7): The United States states that as long as North Korea remains as a threat and as long as Koreans and Americans wish, it will station U.S. forces in Korea. What is your opinion on U.S. forces in South Korea?
Immediate Withdrawal Stay for a decent Stay even after No answer withdrawal soon amount of time reunification number % % % % % Total 1000 4 22.4 62.9 10.1 0.7 Male 493 3.6 16.8 65.1 14.4 0.2 Gender Female 507 4.4 27.8 60.7 5.9 1.2 20s 253 5.6 28.5 59 6.9 0 30s 263 4.7 35.2 55.1 4.1 0.9 Age 40s 201 4.8 19.1 64.4 10.2 1.5 50s & above 282 1.3 7.2 72.6 18.4 0.5 Middle-school grad. 172 1.9 11.2 69.3 16.4 1.3 Education High-school grad. 379 4.8 27 59 8.4 0.8 College grad. & above 448 4.2 22.8 63.6 9.1 0.3 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 6.1 14.6 70.5 8.8 0 Independent 160 6.6 20.1 59 14.3 0 Blue collar 77 4.5 19 64.1 12.4 0 Occupation White collar 144 4.6 29.7 56.2 9 0.5 House wife 378 4 24.4 63.8 6.3 1.6 Student 87 2 27.9 61.8 8.3 0 Unemployed/Etc. 117 0 10.7 71 18.3 0 Big city 484 3.9 21.8 63.5 10.5 0.3 Area size Medium/small city 403 3.8 24.2 63.2 7.5 1.3 Rural cities 113 5.1 18.6 58.7 17.5 0 Seoul 225 2.6 21 66.2 10.3 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 4.5 25.9 60.3 8.6 0.7 Gangwon 33 5 18.3 65.4 11.2 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 5.2 21.7 63.6 9.4 0 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 2.9 27 57.2 10 2.9 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 5.1 21.2 59.6 13.4 0.7 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 4.4 18.2 68 8.9 0.5 Je-ju 11 0 16.1 55.5 28.5 0 Seoul 39 1.9 28.4 67.9 1.8 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 2.5 23.1 67.2 6.3 0.8 Gangwon 42 8.4 15.8 62.5 13.3 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 5.2 20.9 64.1 9.5 0.4 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 3.6 27.6 57.7 10.6 0.5 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 3.5 25.3 57.6 13.5 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 4.1 15.7 69.8 8.7 1.7 Je-ju 12 0 8.7 65.9 25.4 0 North Korea/etc. 51 4.6 13.9 70.1 9 2.4 Lee Hoi-chang 299 4.4 15.1 70.1 10.2 0.3 Roh Moo-hyun 428 2.2 28.5 58.3 10 1 Kwon Young-kil 22 9.4 23 60 7.6 0 Who They Voted For Other candidates 4 0 58.3 41.7 0 0 No answer 158 5.3 19.2 61.7 13.3 0.5 Abstain 88 7.8 21.1 64.2 5.8 1.2
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 140 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (8): In next three years, how possible do you think North Korea could invade South Korea with a full attack?
Very possible Somewhat possible (1+2) Not really possible Zero possibility (3+4) No answer number % % % % % % % Total 1000 3.7 32 35.7 47.1 16.4 63.5 0.8 Male 493 3.1 29.4 32.5 44.4 22.1 66.5 0.9 Gender Female 507 4.2 34.5 38.7 49.7 10.9 60.6 0.7 20s 253 4.4 36.1 40.5 45.9 13.6 59.5 0 30s 263 3 30.8 33.8 49.2 17 66.2 0 Age 40s 201 3.5 29.5 33 44.9 21.7 66.6 0.4 50s & above 282 3.8 31.3 35.1 47.7 14.6 62.3 2.7 Middle-school grad. 172 5 28.8 33.8 47.9 15.6 63.5 2.6 Education High-school grad. 379 3.3 31.9 35.2 46.8 16.9 63.7 1 College grad. & above 448 3.4 33.3 36.7 47 16.3 63.3 0 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 4.6 16.3 20.9 57.7 21.5 79.2 0 Independent 160 3 28.6 31.6 44.2 23.2 67.4 1 Blue collar 77 8.4 32.7 41.1 30.7 28.3 59 0 Occupation White collar 144 0 34.1 34.1 41.3 24.5 65.8 0 House wife 378 4.4 34.2 38.6 51 9.7 60.7 0.8 Student 87 4.2 30.4 34.6 54 11.4 65.4 0 Unemployed/Etc. 117 3 32.6 35.6 47.9 13.2 61.1 3.3 Big city 484 3.5 30.5 34 48.9 16.1 65 1 Area size Medium/small city 403 3 34.7 37.7 44 17.8 61.8 0.5 Rural cities 113 7 28.6 35.6 50.5 12.7 63.2 1.3 Seoul 225 3.6 28.1 31.7 53 13.5 66.5 1.7 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 3 33.6 36.6 41.5 21.6 63.1 0.3 Gangwon 33 2.2 32 34.2 47.1 14.3 61.4 4.4 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 1.8 24.8 26.6 52.4 20.2 72.6 0.8 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 3.6 29 32.6 46.8 20.6 67.4 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 7.2 37.9 45.1 42.9 11.3 54.2 0.7 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 3.8 36 39.8 47.5 12.2 59.7 0.5 Je-ju 11 0 49.3 49.3 43.9 6.8 50.7 0 Seoul 39 2.8 34 36.8 48.6 12.5 61.1 2.1 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 5.6 30.2 35.8 48.7 15.5 64.2 0 Gangwon 42 1.7 30 31.7 56.6 11.6 68.2 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 1.7 28.4 30.1 46.6 21.7 68.3 1.6 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 2.1 31.6 33.7 46.8 18.9 65.7 0.6 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 7.5 32.1 39.6 46.8 12.7 59.5 0.9 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 4.2 36.3 40.5 47.3 12.2 59.5 0 Je-ju 12 0 41.8 41.8 46.3 11.9 58.2 0 North Korea/etc. 51 4.9 35.1 40 39 18.1 57.1 2.9 Lee Hoi-chang 299 4.4 37.5 41.9 44.1 13 57.1 1 Roh Moo-hyun 428 2.4 29.9 32.3 49.1 18.4 67.5 0.2 Who They Kwon Young-kil 22 8.4 15.5 23.9 55.9 20.2 76.1 0 Voted For Other candidates 4 0 29.2 29.2 41.7 29.2 70.9 0 No answer 158 5 26.2 31.2 53.2 13.2 66.4 2.4 Abstain 88 3.8 38.2 42 34.6 22.6 57.2 0.8
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 141
Question (9): Do you see Korean reunification possible? If possible, do you think maintaining the military alliance with the United States is necessary after reunification?
Maintain the No need to Zero possibility alliance maintain for reunification No answer number % % % % Total 1000 33.3 28.7 36.5 1.5 Male 493 39.6 29.7 29.8 1 Gender Female 507 27.2 27.8 43 2 20s 253 33.1 26.4 39.1 1.3 30s 263 31.8 35 33.2 0 Age 40s 201 33.4 30.9 34.6 1.1 50s & above 282 34.7 23.4 38.6 3.3 Middle-school grad. 172 30 23.9 43.5 2.7 Education High-school grad. 379 30.3 27.1 41 1.6 College grad. & above 448 37.1 32 30 0.9 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 29.1 28.2 40.8 1.9 Independent 160 39.9 29.6 29.5 1 Blue collar 77 35.7 33.8 30.5 0 Occupation White collar 144 41.8 29.9 27.8 0.6 House wife 378 27.3 27.1 43.6 2 Student 87 36.2 30.9 30.9 2 Unemployed/Etc. 117 30.7 26.7 40.6 2 Big city 484 36.7 27.5 33.7 2.1 Area size Medium/small city 403 30 30.7 38.6 0.8 Rural cities 113 30.5 27 41.2 1.2 Seoul 225 36.9 26.4 33.5 3.2 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 32 29.6 38.2 0.3 Gangwon 33 20.1 35.8 44 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 31.3 22.8 44.9 0.9 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 34.9 33 28.9 3.2 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 29.3 26.6 43.5 0.7 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 35.3 31.7 32.6 0.4 Je-ju 11 41.1 18.9 33.6 6.5 Seoul 39 33.3 25.8 40.9 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 33.5 26.5 39 0.9 Gangwon 42 31.2 35.6 31.5 1.7 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 33.5 25.8 39.5 1.2 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 35.5 30.5 32.4 1.7 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 31.5 26.7 40.4 1.4 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 33.8 31.1 34 1.2 Je-ju 12 36.7 11.6 45.9 5.8 North Korea/etc. 51 26.2 34.4 36.4 3 Lee Hoi-chang 299 29.8 25.7 44 0.5 Roh Moo-hyun 428 34.4 32.3 32.5 0.7 Kwon Young-kil 22 26.5 22.7 50.8 0 Who They Voted For Other candidates 441.758.30 0 No answer 158 40.7 22.9 31.4 5 Abstain 88 27.9 32.1 37.4 2.6
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 142 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (10): The cooperation with North Korea and the United States are both important, but which one do you think should come first?
Inter-Korean cooperation U.S.-ROK cooperation Equal ratio No answer number % % % % Total 1000 39.4 24.4 34.4 1.7 Male 493 40.3 28.2 30.1 1.4 Gender Female 507 38.6 20.8 38.7 1.9 20s 253 46.2 17.6 34.8 1.4 30s 263 44.7 18.6 35.4 1.2 Age 40s 201 42.4 20.6 37.1 0 50s & above 282 26.4 38.8 31.4 3.5 Middle-school grad. 172 27.5 33.1 34.5 4.9 Education High-school grad. 379 38.9 22.1 36.8 2.2 College grad. & above 448 44.5 23.1 32.4 0 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 36.6 36.1 20.9 6.4 Independent 160 38.3 27.8 32.6 1.2 Blue collar 77 44 20 36 0 Occupation White collar 144 43.9 24.7 29.6 1.8 House wife 378 37.1 21.2 40 1.7 Student 87 52 11.9 36.1 0 Unemployed/Etc. 117 31.9 38.4 26.9 2.8 Big city 484 41.4 24.1 33.1 1.3 Area size Medium/small city 403 38.5 23.8 36.4 1.4 Rural cities 113 34.4 28 33.4 4.3 Seoul 225 39 24.5 35.4 1.1 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 42.1 23.2 32.9 1.8 Gangwon 33 15.8 34.6 47.4 2.3 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 33.7 28.9 35.6 1.8 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 45.1 14.6 40.3 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 45.6 27.5 26.2 0.7 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 37.4 25 34 3.5 Je-ju 11 16.5 46.2 27.6 9.7 Seoul 39 37.1 36.4 26.5 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 31.2 23.9 44.2 0.8 Gangwon 42 28.6 34 32.1 5.2 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 38.6 26.2 32.4 2.9 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 47 18.1 34.2 0.7 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 43.7 28.7 26.7 0.9 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 33.9 23.1 40.7 2.3 Je-ju 12 21.2 35.8 34.4 8.7 North Korea/etc. 51 34.1 23.1 41.3 1.5 Lee Hoi-chang 299 35.7 31.5 31.3 1.5 Roh Moo-hyun 428 44.7 23 31.7 0.7 Kwon Young-kil 22 41.4 23.8 34.8 0 Who They Voted For Other candidates 4 18.8 22.9 29.2 29.2 No answer 158 35.3 21.1 38.4 5.2 Abstain 88 34.7 13.9 51.4 0
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 143
Question (11): If U.S.–ROK alliance weakens, which other country should South Korea politically and diplomatically maintain the closest relationship in your view?
N. Korea China Japan Russia No answer number % % % % % Total 1000 20 49.8 18.7 2 9.5 Male 493 18 51.7 19.6 2.3 8.5 Gender Female 507 22 48.1 17.8 1.6 10.5 20s 253 19.6 50.1 22 2.2 6.2 30s 263 18.3 59.7 16 1.7 4.3 Age 40s 201 24.3 47.3 17.6 1.1 9.8 50s & above 282 18.9 42.2 19 2.6 17.3 Middle-school grad. 172 21.3 38.9 17.4 3.1 19.3 Education High-school grad. 379 20.5 47.4 20.3 2.1 9.6 College grad. & above 448 19.1 56.1 17.8 1.4 5.7 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 25.5 40.5 17.4 2.1 14.4 Independent 160 16.2 55.9 21.3 0.7 5.9 Blue collar 77 24.3 57.6 12.1 0 6 Occupation White collar 144 18.5 52.3 20.1 3.6 5.6 House wife 378 21.7 47.8 17 2 11.4 Student 87 23.1 48.8 17.6 2.2 8.3 Unemployed/Etc. 117 14.7 43.5 24.3 2.5 14.9 Big city 484 20.6 51.9 16.4 1.5 9.7 Area size Medium/small city 403 18.6 50.6 20.7 2.3 7.9 Rural cities 113 22.7 38.5 21.1 3 14.8 Seoul 225 23.7 54.1 13.2 1.8 7.2 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 17.3 48.4 22.2 2.7 9.4 Gangwon 33 14.8 50 24.1 0 11.1 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 26 40.6 22.4 1.9 9.2 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 22.4 49 18.2 1.4 9.1 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 21.5 52.2 17.5 2 6.8 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 14.7 51.8 17.1 1.5 14.8 Je-ju 11 6.1 29 45.7 6.5 12.8 Seoul 39 15.9 59.1 15.1 2 7.8 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 24.7 54.7 18.1 0 2.5 Gangwon 42 18.3 49.5 20.9 0 11.3 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 17 53 17.3 2.5 10.2 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 20.9 47.5 20.2 2.7 8.7 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 23.4 49.5 18.9 1.8 6.5 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 17.8 49.1 16.1 2.1 14.8 Je-ju 12 0 29.3 40.8 5.8 24.2 North Korea/etc. 51 23.9 43.4 19.5 0 13.3 Lee Hoi-chang 299 19.9 50.3 16.9 2.2 10.6 Roh Moo-hyun 428 20.3 53.4 17.7 2.3 6.3 Kwon Young-kil 22 13.2 50.1 28.5 4.8 3.4 Who They Voted For Other candidates 4 77.1 0 22.9 0 0 No answer 158 19.7 38.5 24 1.4 16.4 Abstain 88 18.4 53.2 17.1 0 11.3
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 144 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (12): Which country is the most threatening to South Korea?
N. Korea United States Japan China Russia No answer number % % % % % % Total 1000 45 26.1 14.8 9.5 1.8 2.7 Male 493 45.7 20 18.2 11.4 2.2 2.6 Gender Female 507 44.4 32 11.6 7.8 1.4 2.9 20s 253 38.4 38.1 10.5 8.9 1.4 2.7 30s 263 34.3 31.2 18.4 11.7 2.3 2.2 Age 40s 201 41.6 27.1 14.7 11.6 1.9 3.2 50s & above 282 63.5 9.8 15.6 6.5 1.6 3 Middle-school grad. 172 63.3 12.3 16.5 2.7 2.5 2.7 Education High-school grad. 379 42.9 26.5 15.1 11.6 1.6 2.3 College grad. & above 448 39.8 31.1 14 10.4 1.6 3.1 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 51.8 14.7 17.9 11.5 4 0 Independent 160 39.1 25.4 19.3 11.8 1.8 2.5 Blue collar 77 49.4 21.5 15.4 10.5 1 2.2 Occupation White collar 144 36.7 28.4 17.9 11.2 1.4 4.4 House wife 378 45.3 29.4 12.9 8.3 1 3.1 Student 87 35.3 38.2 8.2 12.3 4 2 Unemployed/Etc. 117 64.6 11.3 14.9 4.8 3.1 1.3 Big city 484 44 26 14.2 10.7 2 3.1 Area size Medium/small city 403 45.9 27.5 13.4 9.6 1.4 2.1 Rural cities 113 46.1 21.4 22.9 4.4 2.1 3.1 Seoul 225 46.9 24.7 15.2 10.1 1.7 1.4 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 39.8 27.7 16.2 12 1.5 2.8 Gangwon 33 64.5 11.7 20.1 3.6 0 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 45.1 16.5 23.7 8.5 3 3.2 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 36.7 37.1 12.8 8.5 3.4 1.5 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 51.9 34.2 6.1 5.3 2.5 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 47.5 20.7 12.9 11.1 0.4 7.3 Je-ju 11 43.3 24.9 25.8 0 0 6.1 Seoul 39 36.6 25.3 20 16.1 0 2 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 43.5 18.9 17.1 19.8 0 0.8 Gangwon 42 57.3 21.1 19.9 0 0 1.7 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 44.4 21.4 20.1 7.8 2.1 4.2 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 41.3 32.7 11.9 9.1 2.4 2.6 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 49.9 29.2 9.4 6.8 2.6 2.1 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 46.4 22.4 15.5 10.9 1.2 3.5 Je-ju 12 38.8 22.2 17.6 14.9 0 6.5 North Korea/etc. 51 47.2 27.5 14 7.2 2.8 1.3 Lee Hoi-chang 299 53.1 23.9 12.2 7.5 1.8 1.5 Roh Moo-hyun 428 41.9 28 16.7 10 1.5 1.9 Kwon Young-kil 22 29.2 35.9 8.8 21.3 4.8 0 Who They Voted For Other candidates 4 0 58.3 18.8 22.9 0 0 No answer 158 45.2 22.3 15.4 9.9 2 5.2 Abstain 88 38.5 27.2 15.2 9.9 2.1 7.1
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 145
Question (13): Out of the following four alliances I am going to tell you, which one do you feel is the strongest (firmest) and least problematic?
U.S.-ROK alliance U.S.-Japan N. Korea-China N. Korea-Russia No answer number % % % % % Total 1000 39.4 19.2 20.6 6.9 13.8 Male 493 45.1 18.8 19.7 4.5 11.9 Gender Female 507 33.9 19.6 21.6 9.3 15.6 20s 253 33 27.3 23.4 8.2 8.1 30s 263 29 23.4 25.9 8.2 13.4 Age 40s 201 38 12.9 24.1 10.4 14.5 50s & above 282 55.9 12.5 10.8 2.1 18.7 Middle-school grad. 172 50.8 9.9 9.5 4.5 25.3 Education High-school grad. 379 38.5 21.7 19.5 7 13.3 College grad. & above 448 35.8 20.8 25.9 7.8 9.7 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 51 10.2 12.1 6.1 20.6 Independent 160 44.9 13.5 24 6.4 11.1 Blue collar 77 39.3 22.3 22.7 3.5 12.2 Occupation White collar 144 32.5 24.7 25.3 7.5 10.1 House wife 378 35.4 19.8 20.4 7.7 16.7 Student 87 34.6 24 22.8 10.3 8.3 Unemployed/Etc. 117 53.3 15.8 10.6 4.5 15.7 Big city 484 38.2 19.9 20.7 9.1 12.2 Area size Medium/small city 403 39.8 19.9 20.4 4.8 15.1 Rural cities 113 43.5 14.1 21 5.2 16.3 Seoul 225 38.2 20.2 22.3 7.7 11.6 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 34.2 23.8 20.8 6.8 14.4 Gangwon 33 38.4 20.2 26.8 0 14.7 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 44 13.3 18.2 6.5 18 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 42.9 11.8 22.1 8.7 14.5 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 48.1 17.9 19.3 5.5 9.2 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 39.4 20.2 18.1 7.2 15 Je-ju 11 19 20.7 21.6 9.7 29 Seoul 39 32.8 7.3 32.5 17.5 9.9 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 31.9 30.3 20.9 2.9 14.1 Gangwon 42 51.5 16.9 15.4 0 16.2 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 36.7 17.8 22.7 5.3 17.5 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 39.6 19.3 21.4 7.2 12.5 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 40.5 19.7 21 9.5 9.3 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 43.1 18.8 15.6 7.8 14.6 Je-ju 12 23.5 18.5 22.4 8.7 26.9 North Korea/etc. 51 45.8 16.1 17 4.4 16.7 Lee Hoi-chang 299 42.5 18.3 16.5 8.1 14.6 Roh Moo-hyun 428 37.4 16.9 26.4 7.7 11.6 Kwon Young-kil 22 27.6 38.8 20.6 0 13 Who They Voted For Other candidates 4 18.8 29.2 22.9 0 29.2 No answer 158 45.5 19 13.5 4.4 17.6 Abstain 88 32.1 28.3 19.2 5.8 14.6
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 146 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (14): If the Middle East and Korean Peninsula face threatening situations at the same time, which side do you think the United States will focus more?
Korean Depends on different Middle East No answer Peninsula situations number % % % % Total 1000 46.9 33.3 18.2 1.6 Male 493 45.8 36.2 16.8 1.2 Gender Female 507 47.9 30.5 19.6 2 20s 253 52.4 28.2 18.7 0.7 30s 263 56.3 26.6 15.3 1.7 Age 40s 201 49.4 30.2 19.6 0.8 50s & above 282 31.3 46.2 19.5 2.9 Middle-school grad. 172 23.5 50 23 3.5 Education High-school grad. 379 46.1 33 19 1.9 College grad. & above 448 56.6 27.1 15.7 0.6 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 38 34.8 46.3 12.6 6.2 Independent 160 53.5 31.3 14.7 0.5 Blue collar 77 30.2 37.5 32.3 0 Occupation White collar 144 61.4 20.7 17.9 0 House wife 378 46 32.3 19.3 2.5 Student 87 50.1 35.3 12.6 2 Unemployed/Etc. 117 35.5 46.3 16.6 1.6 Big city 484 50.6 33.2 15.1 1.1 Area size Medium/small city 403 45.3 32.6 20.7 1.4 Rural cities 113 36.7 35.8 22.8 4.7 Seoul 225 47.6 29.9 21.3 1.2 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 245 53.8 26.1 18.8 1.3 Gangwon 33 42.3 34.1 21.5 2.1 Daejeon/Chungchung 93 55.2 28.7 12.5 3.6 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 116 51 42.2 6.1 0.7 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 113 37.3 39.4 22 1.4 Busan/Gyoung-nam 163 37.5 38.8 22 1.7 Je-ju 11 18.6 58.8 12.9 9.7 Seoul 39 57 25.1 17.9 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 86 56.5 23 20.5 0 Gangwon 42 51.3 35.3 10 3.5 Daejeon/Chungchung 188 45.6 29.7 22.1 2.6 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 268 51.9 35 12.4 0.7 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 164 37.5 39.2 20.7 2.5 Busan/Gyoung-nam 150 39.1 36.8 22.4 1.8 Je-ju 12 26.5 46.8 18 8.7 North Korea/etc. 51 56.1 26.5 17.4 0 Lee Hoi-chang 299 41.8 35 23 0.3 Roh Moo-hyun 428 48.7 35.2 15 1.1 Kwon Young-kil 22 60.1 16.9 22.9 0 Who They Voted For Other candidates 4 81.2 18.8 0 0 No answer 158 44 33.5 15.8 6.7 Abstain 88 56 22.5 21.5 0
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 147
Appendix C: September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo - CSIS - RAND Polls, Survey 2
Survey participants 1.00 number % Total 710 100.0 Male 350 49.3 Gender Female 359 50.7 20s 179 25.2 30s 189 26.6 Age 40s 143 20.2 50s & above 199 28 Middle-school grad. 131 18.4 Education High-school grad. 276 38.9 College grad. & above 303 42.7 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 45 6.4 Independent 90 12.6 Blue collar 57 8.1 Occupation White collar 112 15.8 House wife 253 35.6 Student 61 8.6 Unemployed/Etc. 92 12.9 Big city 342 48.1 Area size Medium/small city 288 40.5 Rural cities 80 11.3 Seoul 161 22.7 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 24.3 Gangwon 22 3.2 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 10 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 11 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 11.9 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 16 Je-ju 8 1.1 Seoul 33 4.7 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 9 Gangwon 38 5.3 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 17.5 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 21.8 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 19.3 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 14.9 Je-ju 6 0.8 North Korea/etc. 47 6.7 Lee Hoi-chang 208 29.4 Roh Moo-hyun 307 43.3 Kwon Young-kil 15 2.1 Who They Voted For Other candidates 3 0.4 No answer 127 17.9 Abstain 50 7 148 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (1): How important do you think U.S.–ROK relationship is to South Korea's benefit?
Very important Pretty (1+2) Not that Not important at all (3+4) No answer important important number % % % % % % % Total 710 43.7 49.4 93.1 6.3 0.5 6.8 0.1 Male 350 50.8 42.9 93.7 5.8 0.4 6.2 0 Gender Female 359 36.8 55.6 92.4 6.8 0.5 7.3 0.3 20s 179 36.9 54.3 91.2 8.7 0 8.7 0 30s 189 32.4 61.2 93.6 5.3 0.5 5.8 0.5 Age 40s 143 41.1 47 88.1 10.6 1.2 11.8 0 50s & above 199 62.4 35.3 97.7 2 0.3 2.3 0 Middle-school grad. 131 52.1 43.5 95.6 3.7 0.7 4.4 0 Education High-school grad. 276 38.2 51.3 89.5 9.6 0.6 10.2 0.4 College grad. & above 303 45.2 50.1 95.3 4.4 0.3 4.7 0 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 45 52.5 45.5 98 0 2 2 0 Independent 90 49.6 43.9 93.5 5.7 0.7 6.4 0 Blue collar 57 30.9 55.4 86.3 13.7 0 13.7 0 Occupation White collar 112 51.1 45.2 96.3 3.7 0 3.7 0 House wife 253 37.7 54 91.7 7.2 0.8 8 0.4 Student 61 30.4 62.4 92.8 7.2 0 7.2 0 Unemployed/Etc. 92 58.1 36.4 94.5 5.5 0 5.5 0 Big city 342 44.8 48.2 93 6.5 0.4 6.9 0 Area size Medium/small city 288 42.7 51.6 94.3 4.9 0.4 5.3 0.4 Rural cities 80 42.5 46 88.5 10.3 1.1 11.4 0 Seoul 161 49.7 46.7 96.4 3.6 0 3.6 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 41 52.7 93.7 4.7 1 5.7 0.6 Gangwon 22 55.1 36.5 91.6 8.4 0 8.4 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 40.8 48.1 88.9 11.1 0 11.1 0 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 44.6 49.9 94.5 4.3 1.2 5.5 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 51 39.1 90.1 8.8 1 9.8 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 33.8 57.1 90.9 9.1 0 9.1 0 Je-ju 8 29.8 70.2 100 0 0 0 0 Seoul 33 60.8 29 89.8 10.2 0 10.2 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 46.1 47.9 94 3.3 2.6 5.9 0 Gangwon 38 51.5 43.3 94.8 2.5 0 2.5 2.7 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 39.8 47.9 87.7 12.3 0 12.3 0 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 41.4 54.7 96.1 3.3 0.6 3.9 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 52.9 42.4 95.3 4.6 0 4.6 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 29 61.1 90.1 9.1 0.8 9.9 0 Je-ju 6 40.8 59.2 100 0 0 0 0 North Korea/etc. 47 46.9 49.4 96.3 3.8 0 3.8 0 Lee Hoi-chang 208 51 44.2 95.2 4.4 0.4 4.8 0 Roh Moo-hyun 307 40.7 53.1 93.8 5.6 0.5 6.1 0 Kwon Young-kil 15 15 85 100 0 0 0 0 Who They Voted For Other candidates 3 0 100 100 0 0 0 0 No answer 127 43.1 43.4 86.5 12 0.7 12.7 0.8 Abstain 50 44.2 49.8 94 6 0 6 0
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 149
Question (2): How much do you think the U.S.–ROK military alliance has contributed to the Korean Peninsula’s peace stability and the avoidance of war?
Contributed Contributed Contributed (1+2) No contribution (3+4) No Answer a lot somewhat not much number % % % % % % % Total 710 32.3 49.4 81.7 16 1.9 17.9 0.3 Male 350 45 43.7 88.7 9 1.8 10.8 0.5 Gender Female 359 19.9 55.1 75 22.8 2.1 24.9 0.2 20s 179 15.2 50.8 66 31.5 2.5 34 0 30s 189 19.5 60.2 79.7 17.9 1.7 19.6 0.5 Age 40s 143 33.9 53 a 9.4 3.7 13.1 0 50s & above 199 58.6 35.4 94 5 0.3 5.3 0.7 Middle-school grad. 131 45.4 43.6 89 7.8 2.1 9.9 1 Education High-school grad. 276 28.2 52.5 80.7 17.3 1.6 18.9 0.4 College grad. & above 303 30.4 49.1 79.5 18.3 2.2 20.5 0 Agriculture/Fisheries/F orest Services 45 55.6 34.3 89.9 6.5 2 8.5 1.5 Independent 90 41.5 46.3 87.8 11.1 1.1 12.2 0 Blue collar 57 15.1 67.7 82.8 12.6 1.6 14.2 2.9 Occupation White collar 112 39.9 41.9 81.8 16.7 1.5 18.2 0 House wife 253 23.2 58.1 81.3 17 1.6 18.6 0 Student 61 21.9 34.1 56 36.6 7.3 43.9 0 Unemployed/Etc. 92 45.3 43.9 89.2 10.1 0.7 10.8 0 Big city 342 30.5 48.4 78.9 18.1 2.8 20.9 0.2 Area size Medium/small city 288 32.3 52.5 84.8 13.4 1.1 14.5 0.6 Rural cities 80 39.9 42.8 82.7 16.1 1.1 17.2 0 Seoul 161 33.6 43.5 77.1 20.2 2.7 22.9 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 35.2 50.1 85.3 11.9 1.8 13.7 1 Gangwon 22 51 40.7 91.7 5.1 0 5.1 3.1 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 28.2 48.4 76.6 21.9 1.5 23.4 0 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 29.3 51.7 81 17 2 19 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 32 49.1 81.1 17.9 1 18.9 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 26.2 57.7 83.9 13.7 2.3 16 0 Je-ju 8 44.5 55.5 100 0 0 0 0 Seoul 33 31.2 51.9 83.1 14.1 2.8 16.9 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 36.5 42.3 78.8 17.9 1.6 19.5 1.6 Gangwon 38 42.2 44.2 86.4 11.7 0 11.7 1.8 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 30.1 51.5 81.6 15.8 2.6 18.4 0 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 29 50.4 79.4 18.3 2.3 20.6 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 36.6 52.2 88.8 11.2 0 11.2 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 25 51.7 76.7 21.6 1.7 23.3 0 Je-ju 6 40.8 59.2 100 0 0 0 0 North Korea/etc. 47 39 38.6 77.6 14.3 6.7 21 1.4 Lee Hoi-chang 208 44 43.1 87.1 11.3 0.9 12.2 0.6 Roh Moo-hyun 307 26.3 54.4 80.7 16.7 2.3 19 0.3 Kwon Young-kil 15 23.9 31.3 55.2 44.8 0 44.8 0 Who They Voted For Other candidates 3 53.4 46.6 100 0 0 0 0 No answer 127 32.6 46.8 79.4 16.8 3.8 20.6 0 Abstain 50 20.9 57.3 78.2 21.8 0 21.8 0
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 150 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (3): From now on, should we strengthen the U.S.–ROK military alliance, reduce it, or keep the current level?
Strengthen Reduce Maintain No answer number % % % % Total 710 19.1 26.2 54.1 0.6 Male 350 24 20.6 55.2 0.2 Gender Female 359 14.3 31.6 53 1 20s 179 17.9 37.7 44.4 0 30s 189 8.8 35.1 55 1.1 Age 40s 143 10.7 23.6 65.7 0 50s & above 199 36 9.3 53.6 1.1 Middle-school grad. 131 28.5 11.8 58.1 1.6 Education High-school grad. 276 18.9 25.8 54.5 0.8 above 303 15.2 32.8 52 0 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 45 37.5 11.6 50.9 0 Independent 90 23.7 21.1 55.2 0 Blue collar 57 7.6 27.6 64.7 0 Occupation White collar 112 15.7 31.7 52.6 0 House wife 253 13.2 27.9 57.5 1.4 Student 61 14.6 37.1 48.2 0 Unemployed/Etc. 92 36.2 18.8 44.2 0.8 Big city 342 16.6 26.7 55.9 0.7 Area size Medium/small city 288 20.6 26.1 52.8 0.6 Rural cities 80 24.3 24.4 51.2 0 Seoul 161 19.8 26.8 52.7 0.7 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 11.9 32.3 55.2 0.6 Gangwon 22 39.3 9.3 51.4 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 22.3 21.5 55.2 1 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 20 22.6 57.4 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 22.7 30.8 46.5 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 17.6 21.4 59.8 1.2 Je-ju 8 52.5 26.7 20.8 0 Seoul 33 13.2 19.6 67.2 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 14.6 29.7 55.7 0 Gangwon 38 19.4 19.7 58.2 2.7
Daejeon/Chungchung 124 18.3 23.2 57 1.5 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 19.8 26.6 53.6 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 23.6 29.9 46 0.5 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 15.5 28.2 55.6 0.7 Je-ju 6 52 35.8 12.2 0 North Korea/etc. 47 20.4 21.4 58.1 0 Lee Hoi-chang 208 24.7 17 58.2 0 Roh Moo-hyun 307 15.9 32.4 51.5 0.2 Kwon Young-kil 15 4.7 54.2 41.1 0 Who They Voted For Other candidates 3 0 46.6 53.4 0 No answer 127 22.7 25.8 48.7 2.8 Abstain 50 11.5 17.7 70.8 0
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 151
Question (4): What is the most important weakening factor for the U.S.–ROK alliance?
End of Korean war Improvement in U.S.' harsh Anti-American & regional stability inter-Korean N. Korea No answer sentiment in Korea in NE Asia relations policy number % % % % % Total 710 34.8 9.8 23.9 27 4.6 Male 350 37 10.1 21.5 26.8 4.6 Gender Female 359 32.5 9.5 26.2 27.3 4.6 20s 179 28.1 12.6 24 31.7 3.7 30s 189 31.3 10.3 23.8 31.1 3.5 Age 40s 143 34 10.6 22.3 30 3.1 50s & above 199 44.6 6.1 25 16.8 7.4 Middle-school grad. 131 35.2 9.6 26.7 15.8 12.6 Education High-school grad. 276 33.1 8.9 26.6 28.3 3.1 College grad. & 303 36.1 10.6 20.2 30.7 2.4 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 45 36.3 10.1 25 13.4 15.2 Independent 90 38.9 8.3 25 25.8 2.1 Blue collar 57 23.5 7.8 24.8 40.3 3.6 Occupation White collar 112 32.6 14.1 24 26.5 2.7 House wife 253 32.9 9.3 25.2 27.9 4.7 Student 61 37 7.6 14.5 37.4 3.5 Unemployed/Etc. 92 43.1 9.8 24.1 17.8 5.3 Big city 342 36.3 9.8 25.5 25.5 2.9 Area size Medium/small city 288 33.6 9.9 21.2 30.2 5.1 Rural cities 80 32.1 9.3 26.6 21.8 10.1 Seoul 161 40.3 4.8 27.4 23.4 4 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 34.2 8.1 21.5 31.8 4.3 Gangwon 22 41.5 14.9 17.5 23 3.1 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 31.7 15.4 19.8 28.6 4.5 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 25.3 9 27.6 25.8 12.2 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 36.1 13.6 20.5 26 3.9 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 34 13.3 25.2 25.7 1.8 Je-ju 8 29.1 0 38.1 32.8 0 Seoul 33 31.6 8.9 26.4 26.3 6.9 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 36.6 5.9 14.4 41.1 2 Gangwon 38 27.8 14.4 31.2 23.9 2.7 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 43.2 7.3 22.4 21.9 5.1 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 31.5 9.5 24.3 26.1 8.6 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 34.3 11.1 22.4 29.7 2.4 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 32.8 13.7 26.5 22.8 4.1 Je-ju 6 19.9 19.4 32.1 28.7 0 North Korea/etc. 47 35.4 5.6 29 28.5 1.5 Lee Hoi-chang 208 40.5 12.1 17.4 26.7 3.4 Roh Moo-hyun 307 31.3 8.3 28.5 29.4 2.4 Who They Kwon Young-kil 15 14.9 0 42.5 36.7 5.9 Voted For Other candidates 3 53.4 46.6 0 0 0 No answer 127 37.5 7.9 24.9 21.7 8 Abstain 50 29.9 15.4 15.4 25.3 14.1
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 152 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (5): Who, in your view, has anti-American sentiment in South Korea today?
Very small Spreading from Only young Spread number in young young to older No answer generations overall generations generations number % % % % % Total 710 15.6 27.3 34.8 20.4 2 Male 350 17.6 29.4 30.4 20.7 1.8 Gender Female 359 13.5 25.2 39.1 20.1 2.2 20s 179 11.2 14 49.4 23.1 2.4 30s 189 8.8 23.2 40.4 26.5 1.2 Age 40s 143 15.7 31.9 31.7 20 0.7 50s & above 199 25.8 39.8 18.7 12.4 3.4 Middle-school grad. 131 18.9 36.5 23.4 15.8 5.4 Education High-school grad. 276 14.9 29 32.7 22.4 1 College grad. & above 303 14.7 21.8 41.6 20.5 1.4 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 45 22.9 36.3 21.7 16.3 2.9 Independent 90 20.8 29.1 29.5 20.6 0 Blue collar 57 9.5 22.3 35.4 31.2 1.7 Occupation White collar 112 13 20.3 46.6 20.1 0 House wife 253 12.9 27.5 36.7 20.6 2.2 Student 61 18 7.3 45 26.1 3.5 Unemployed/Etc. 92 19.2 45.4 19.5 11.3 4.6 Big city 342 15.7 25.2 35.9 21.4 1.8 Area size Medium/small city 288 16.2 29.1 33.6 18.3 2.8 Rural cities 80 12.9 29.3 34.4 23.4 0 Seoul 161 12.4 27.9 36.9 21.3 1.6 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 14.4 26.4 35.2 22.7 1.2 Gangwon 22 27 31.1 23 18.9 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 21.9 31.7 19.2 26.2 1 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 18.1 29.6 24.8 22.7 4.9 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 16.1 19.9 53.6 9.6 0.8 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 14.5 28.3 33.9 19.4 3.9 Je-ju 8 0 23.4 67.7 8.9 0 Seoul 33 16.8 26.8 47.7 8.8 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 14 36 30.3 19.7 0 Gangwon 38 18.2 24.5 26.3 31 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 13.6 30.6 28.5 25.7 1.7 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 13.9 25.6 35 22.2 3.3 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 19.9 25 40.7 11.9 2.6 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 16 23.5 35.5 22.8 2.1 Je-ju 6 0 32.1 36.4 31.5 0 North Korea/etc. 47 13.2 29.2 35.8 18.9 2.9 Lee Hoi-chang 208 22.6 29.9 32.4 14.7 0.3 Roh Moo-hyun 307 11.4 26.2 38 22 2.4 Who They Kwon Young-kil 15 4.7 4.2 35.9 50.5 4.7 Voted For Other candidates 3 0 28.6 46.6 24.7 0 No answer 127 17.2 29.5 31.2 18.5 3.6 Abstain 50 11.7 23.9 33.2 29.3 1.9
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 153
Question (6): Do you think it is necessary for the U.S. forces in South Korea to continue to stay or leave?
Stay Leave number % % Total 710 82.8 17.2 Male 350 87.7 12.3 Gender Female 359 78 22 20s 179 72.3 27.7 30s 189 78.7 21.3 Age 40s 143 84.6 15.4 50s & above 199 94.6 5.4 Middle-school grad. 131 91.9 8.1 Education High-school grad. 276 78.6 21.4 above 303 82.6 17.4 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 45 92.9 7.1 Independent 90 85.6 14.4 Blue collar 57 69.9 30.1 Occupation White collar 112 85.2 14.8 House wife 253 82.9 17.1 Student 61 74.3 25.7 Unemployed/Etc. 92 85.3 14.7 Big city 342 81.2 18.8 Area size Medium/small city 288 83.5 16.5 Rural cities 80 86.6 13.4 Seoul 161 80.5 19.5 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 79.3 20.7 Gangwon 22 94.9 5.1 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 91 9 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 79.7 20.3 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 83.6 16.4 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 86 14 Je-ju 8 70.9 29.1 Seoul 33 76.5 23.5 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 84.5 15.5 Gangwon 38 82.6 17.4 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 80.3 19.7 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 81.3 18.7 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 87.9 12.1 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 80.5 19.5 Je-ju 6 80.1 19.9 North Korea/etc. 47 86.8 13.2 Lee Hoi-chang 208 87.3 12.7 Roh Moo-hyun 307 81.1 18.9 Kwon Young-kil 15 51.7 48.3 Who They Voted For Other candidates 3 100 0 No answer 127 83.7 16.3 Abstain 50 80.2 19.8
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 154 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (7): For those who said the U.S. forces should continue to stay in South Korea, for what reason should they stay?
To prevent N. Korea's To stabilize rel'ps with Economic benefit & To maintain U.S.- sudden attack or China, Russia and protection of Korea relations invasion Japan sovereignty number % % % % Total 587 55.4 12.5 8.6 23.5 Male 307 60.2 8.5 7.9 23.4 Gender Female 280 50.1 16.9 9.4 23.6 20s 129 43.6 19.7 0 36.7 30s 148 44.8 18.3 12.5 24.4 Age 40s 121 49.8 8.8 13.2 28.3 50s & above 188 75.4 5.3 8.5 10.7 Middle-school grad. 120 79 4.4 4.6 11.9 Education High-school grad. 217 50.7 13.4 8.9 27 College grad. & 250 48.1 15.6 10.3 26 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 42 83.3 4.8 1.6 10.3 Independent 77 52 11.5 14.8 21.7 Blue collar 40 52.1 7.9 9.2 30.8 Occupation White collar 95 45.5 16.1 11.5 27 House wife 210 51.5 14.1 9 25.5 Student 46 50 19.8 0 30.2 Unemployed/Etc. 78 71.2 7 6.6 15.2 Big city 277 52 15 8.5 24.5 Area size Medium/small city 240 55.7 10.6 10.2 23.5 Rural cities 70 67.8 9.1 3.6 19.5 Seoul 130 52.6 7 10.7 29.7 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 137 56.8 9.1 11.7 22.4 Gangwon 21 76.6 11.2 0 12.1 Daejeon/Chungchung 64 59.5 11.8 12.5 16.2 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 62 61.8 12 2.6 23.5 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 70 53.2 16.4 4.3 26.1 Busan/Gyoung-nam 97 47.7 22.5 8.3 21.5 Je-ju 5 45.5 17 0 37.5 Seoul 25 69 2.5 6.9 21.6 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 54 57.1 7.8 8.9 26.2 Gangwon 31 61.5 10.5 2.7 25.4 Daejeon/Chungchung 100 58.4 8.9 11.4 21.3 Family Gwangju/Jeon-la 126 52.1 10.8 7.2 30 Origin Daegu/Gyoung-buk 120 53 19.7 6.8 20.5 Busan/Gyoung-nam 85 51.2 17.1 8.7 23 Je-ju 4 55.2 20.6 0 24.2 North Korea/etc. 41 58.6 8.6 17.6 15.2 Lee Hoi-chang 182 57.4 12 9.8 20.9 Roh Moo-hyun 249 55.6 11.5 9.9 23 Who They Kwon Young-kil 8 28.7 0 13.8 57.5 Voted For Other candidates 353.40 0 46.6 No answer 106 54.8 16.8 4.6 23.8 Abstain 40 51.5 12.9 5.8 29.8
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 155
Question (8): If you think the U.S. forces should not stay, why is it not necessary for them to stay?
Considering South To reduce the possibility of To improve inter- For Koreans' To achieve self- Koreans' anti-Amrican No answer war on Korean Peninsula Korean relations peaceful lives security sentiment number % % % % % % Total 122 15 25.6 17.3 25.2 16.2 0.7 Male 43 21.2 23.2 9.6 24.7 21.3 0 Gender Female 79 11.7 27 21.5 25.5 13.4 1.1 20s 49 18.7 23 17.8 18.1 22.4 0 30s 40 8.1 24.1 21.5 30.1 16.2 0 Age 40s 22 20.4 31.8 7.8 32.3 3.9 3.8 50s & above 11 13.1 30.9 18.2 24.9 12.9 0 Middle-school grad. 11 24.1 18.7 29.9 12.6 6.8 7.9 Education High-school grad. 59 14.8 22.2 15.2 21 26.8 0 College grad. & above 53 13.5 30.8 17 32.4 6.2 0 Agriculture/Fisheries/Fore st Services 328.40 00 71.60 Independent 13 7.5 33 19.6 26 13.9 0 Blue collar 17 26.9 27.9 6.7 12.2 26.4 0 Occupation White collar 17 10.2 17 14.2 58.6 0 0 House wife 43 6.1 19.8 27 25.9 19.2 1.9 Student 16 28.9 43.5 0 14 13.6 0 Unemployed/Etc. 13 22.2 30.4 25.2 16.8 5.3 0 Big city 64 17.6 25 21.8 24 11.6 0 Area size Medium/small city 47 10.9 32.3 8.3 25.5 21.2 1.8 Rural cities 11 17.9 0 29.8 31 21.2 0 Seoul 31 13.3 26.8 18.4 26.6 14.8 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 36 11.4 23.1 22 18.9 22.3 2.3 Gangwon 10 0001000 Daejeon/Chungchung 6 0 35 17.3 47.7 0 0 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 16 26.3 23.6 17.6 0 32.6 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 14 7.8 30.2 11.1 51 0 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 16 30.9 14.9 13.1 35.7 5.4 0 Je-ju 20 10000 0 0 Seoul 8 0 58.6 0 41.4 0 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 10 0 20.7 53.8 18.9 6.6 0 Gangwon 7 33.5 0 32.7 16.4 17.4 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 24 12.1 34.8 19.9 7.5 22.2 3.4 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 29 17.5 16.2 9.7 16.8 39.8 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 17 20.6 25.2 10.1 37.8 6.3 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 21 11.6 18.7 20.6 49 0 0 Je-ju 10 10000 0 0 North Korea/etc. 6 37.7 37.7 0 24.6 0 0 Lee Hoi-chang 26 11.5 25.5 18.4 28.1 16.4 0 Roh Moo-hyun 58 14.2 25.6 17.3 26.8 16 0 Who They Kwon Young-kil 7 30.9 12.2 16.2 40.7 0 0 Voted For No answer 21 23.5 29.9 18.8 13.5 10.3 4 Abstain 10 0 26.6 11.6 21.5 40.4 0
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 156 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (9): Before today, have you heard or seen the news that the U.S. forces will relocate to the south of Han River and move some bases?
Yes No number % % Total 708 77.3 22.7 Male 349 82.8 17.2 Gender Female 359 72 28 20s 179 67 33 30s 189 79.7 20.3 Age 40s 143 82.4 17.6 50s & above 197 80.8 19.2 Middle-school grad. 131 67.7 32.3 Education High-school grad. 274 74.3 25.7 above 303 84.2 15.8 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 44 67.2 32.8 Independent 90 85.3 14.7 Blue collar 57 64.2 35.8 Occupation White collar 112 80.7 19.3 House wife 253 77.2 22.8 Student 61 74.7 25.3 Unemployed/Etc. 91 80.7 19.3 Big city 341 77.4 22.6 Area size Medium/small city 287 79 21 Rural cities 80 71.4 28.6 Seoul 160 81.3 18.7 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 83.4 16.6 Gangwon 22 84.5 15.5 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 80 20 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 77 69.5 30.5 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 70.6 29.4 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 69.1 30.9 Je-ju 8 88.1 11.9 Seoul 33 87.4 12.6 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 81.3 18.7 Gangwon 38 89.8 10.2 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 78.4 21.6 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 154 73.2 26.8 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 76.3 23.7 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 69.5 30.5 Je-ju 6 100 0 North Korea/etc. 47 83.5 16.5 Lee Hoi-chang 208 86 14 Roh Moo-hyun 307 73.7 26.3 Kwon Young-kil 15 55 45 Who They Voted For Other candidates 3 100 0 No answer 127 72.6 27.4 Abstain 50 81.1 18.9
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 157
Question (10): Do you agree to the relocation of the U.S. Forces to the south of Han River and the move of some bases?
Strongly agree Somewhat agree (1+2) Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree (3+4) No answer number % % % % % % % Total 710 7.9 39.3 47.2 34 13.9 47.9 4.9 Male 350 9.5 39.8 49.3 27.8 19.5 47.3 3.3 Gender Female 359 6.3 38.8 45.1 40.1 8.5 48.6 6.4 20s 179 5.2 41.7 46.9 38 13.7 51.7 1.3 30s 189 10 42 52 37.7 6.8 44.5 3.5 Age 40s 143 10.5 43.9 54.4 31.9 10.1 42 3.7 50s & above 199 6.4 31.3 37.7 28.5 23.6 52.1 10.1 Middle-school grad. 131 7.1 32.1 39.2 32.8 16.2 49 11.7 Education High-school grad. 276 7.5 40.1 47.6 35.8 12.8 48.6 3.9 College grad. & above 303 8.6 41.7 50.3 32.9 14 46.9 2.8 Agriculture/Fisheries/F orest Services 45 6.6 35.9 42.5 26.6 23.7 50.3 7.2 Independent 90 3.7 49.4 53.1 34.6 10.4 45 1.8 Blue collar 57 12.6 59.3 71.9 19.9 5.5 25.4 2.8 Occupation White collar 112 12.5 33.8 46.3 32 21.1 53.1 0.6 House wife 253 7.4 40.6 48 37.7 7.7 45.4 6.5 Student 61 7.4 33.6 41 44.3 10.9 55.2 3.8 Unemployed/Etc. 92 5.5 25.4 30.9 31.4 28.4 59.8 9.2 Big city 342 9.4 39.4 48.8 32.7 13.3 46 5.3 Area size Medium/small city 288 7.6 37 44.6 37.9 13.5 51.4 4 Rural cities 80 2.5 47.4 49.9 25.8 18.1 43.9 6.2 Seoul 161 9.6 41 50.6 31.8 11.7 43.5 5.9 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 8 39.9 47.9 31.6 17.5 49.1 2.9 Gangwon 22 3.1 30.4 33.5 42.7 20.7 63.4 3.1 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 7.8 41.2 49 33.9 13.5 47.4 3.6 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 5.5 43 48.5 28.2 13.6 41.8 9.6 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 2.9 43.8 46.7 36.9 14.9 51.8 1.5 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 12.1 31.3 43.4 38.7 11 49.7 7 Je-ju 8 0 29.8 29.8 70.2 0 70.2 0 Seoul 33 7.6 55.9 63.5 22.4 14 36.4 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 7 40.5 47.5 36.6 11.9 48.5 4 Gangwon 38 1.8 52.3 54.1 24 20 44 1.8 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 10.2 38 48.2 35.9 11.7 47.6 4.2 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 9.2 33.6 42.8 36 13.8 49.8 7.4 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 6.1 38 44.1 38.7 14.5 53.2 2.6 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 7.4 37.4 44.8 36.2 13.8 50 5.2 Je-ju 6 0 40.8 40.8 39.8 0 39.8 19.4 North Korea/etc. 47 11 45.5 56.5 16.2 18.2 34.4 9.1 Lee Hoi-chang 208 6.7 39.2 45.9 34.3 16.2 50.5 3.6 Roh Moo-hyun 307 9.5 40.9 50.4 32.5 12.2 44.7 4.9 Who They Kwon Young-kil 15 7.8 44 51.8 43.5 0 43.5 4.7 Voted For Other candidates 3 71.4 0 71.4 0 28.6 28.6 0 No answer 127 1.3 39.9 41.2 37.1 13.9 51 7.8 Abstain 50 16.6 28.9 45.5 33.8 18.5 52.3 2.2
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 158 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (11): (For those who strongly agreed or agreed) For what reason do you agree? Explain briefly.
In case of Develop self- Reduce the Location spreading to Too many To revive No Help Korea's reliant nervousness of Good to diperse Improve Personal doesn't South, good technological Pollution Seoul answer well-being security inter-Korea the force economically reasons matter position to weapons power problems protect number % % % % % % % % % % % % Total 335 32.5 24.9 11 8.8 8.4 5.2 3 2.6 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.3 Male 173 27.6 26 13.4 10 8.2 5.1 4.1 2.2 2 0.9 0.4 0 Gender Female 162 37.8 23.7 8.3 7.5 8.6 5.2 1.9 2.9 0.7 1.3 1.3 0.6 20s 84 24 35.7 13.4 7.8 5.6 5.6 0 0 2.7 2.5 2.6 0 30s 98 38 25.2 7.7 7.6 10 2.2 2.3 3.5 2.4 0 0 1 Age 40s 78 32.3 20.7 13.6 10.4 8 4.6 3.3 5.8 0 1.1 0 0 50s & above 75 35.1 17 9.8 9.7 9.8 9 7 0.9 0 0.8 0.8 0 Middle-school grad. 51 36.9 21 6 10.7 1.7 10.8 5.2 6.5 0 0 1.2 0 Education High-school grad. 131 28.8 30.7 11.1 11.2 7.5 2 3.1 3.2 0 0.7 1.6 0 College grad. & above 152 34.3 21.2 12.5 6 11.5 6 2.2 0.7 3 1.8 0 0.7 Agriculture/Fisheries/F orest Services 19 33.6 34.1 10.5 6.9 3.5 3.5 3.4 0 0 4.5 0 0 Independent 48 34.3 23.7 5.8 15.4 9.5 6.4 2.7 2.3 0 0 0 0 Blue collar 41 26 35.3 14 5.2 4.8 3.7 2.7 2.8 5.6 0 0 0 Occupation White collar 52 34.5 11.8 15.7 11.7 12.2 8.3 2.3 0 2.3 1.2 0 0 House wife 122 38.4 25.6 8.9 6.9 8 2.2 2.5 3.9 1 0 1.8 0.8 Student 25 26.7 28.1 18 0 9.4 9.4 0 0 0 8.4 0 0 Unemployed/Etc. 28 14.7 23.9 10 14.6 9.3 9.5 10 5.8 0 0 2.2 0 Big city 166 37.9 22.3 11.3 5.1 10 6.6 3 2.4 1.4 0 0 0 Area size Medium/small city 128 28.4 28.9 10.2 10.5 6 3.8 3.5 3.7 1.8 2.1 0.5 0.8 Rural cities 40 23.5 23.1 12.2 18.7 9.8 3.5 1.6 0 0 2.2 5.4 0 Seoul 81 47.8 14.3 11.5 3.2 10.9 7.1 1.7 3.4 0 0 0 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 83 36.4 21.5 12.9 10.2 7.8 2.3 2.6 1 0 3.3 0.8 1.2 Gangwon 8 15.2 50.3 9.3 0 12.6 0 0 12.5 0 0 0 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 35 20.8 33.8 7.2 13.5 11.3 2.1 8.5 2.8 0 0 0 0 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 38 36.3 17.8 10.6 7.1 8.8 11.7 1.7 0 6.1 0 0 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 39 18.7 38.4 10.6 12.9 7.1 1.7 7.8 2.8 0 0 0 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 49 21.1 32 10.8 10.9 3.9 6.3 0 4.1 4.7 1.8 4.4 0 Je-ju 2 0 40.4 0 29.8 0 29.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 Seoul 21 47.4 11.9 19.7 0 6.5 11.1 0 3.3 0 0 0 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 30 35.8 15.9 10.6 21.8 2.8 0 2.1 0 0 9 2.1 0 Gangwon 20 54.9 28.8 11.6 0 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 60 30.8 27.3 9 9.7 10.8 4.2 3 3.5 0 0 0 1.7 Family Gwangju/Jeon-la 66 32.8 18 8.9 10.3 13.2 7.3 3.3 2.7 3.5 0 0 0 Origin Daegu/Gyoung-buk 60 33.9 32.4 10.1 4.7 4.6 4.7 6.1 3.3 0 0 0 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 47 18.1 26.6 18.8 8.4 4 8.5 0 4.2 4.9 1.8 4.6 0 Je-ju 2 0 40.4 0 29.8 0 29.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 North Korea/etc. 27 28.3 33 2.5 10.2 19 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 Lee Hoi-chang 96 31.8 20.8 10.5 9.6 9.4 8.6 2.7 4 1.2 0.7 0.7 0 Roh Moo-hyun 155 35.9 22.9 6.1 8.1 9.7 5 3.1 3.1 2.2 1.9 1.4 0.7 Who They Kwon Young-kil 8 43.9 27.2 0 28.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Voted For Other candidates 2 65.4 0 34.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 No answer 52 17.7 39.6 24.3 8.8 4.1 2.6 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 Abstain 23 40.6 23.8 17.7 4 8.6 0 5.3 0 0 0 0 0
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 159
Question (12): (For those who answered to Q.10 with disagree or strongly disagree) For what reasons do you disagree? Explain briefly.
Worried for When war Too Don't want Nervous from the economy Want the U.S. Anti- occurs, only No costly Right now Controlled non-Korean being farther from of the to-be- forces to American U.S. can Pollution answer to is good by U.S. owned land north border relocated withdraw sentiment avoid the move to expand area damage number % % % % % % % % % % % Total 340 48.3 18.5 10.3 7.3 5.1 3.1 2.4 1.8 1.4 1.1 0.7 Male 166 60.6 6.8 11.7 3.6 5.1 3.2 1.8 3.3 2.3 0.9 0.6 Gender Female 175 36.6 29.6 8.9 10.7 5.1 3 3 0.4 0.6 1.2 0.9 20s 92 26.9 31.8 9.7 11.6 2.4 7.6 2.4 5.2 2.4 0 0 30s 84 40.4 25.9 12.8 4 6.7 2.6 3.9 0 1.3 2.5 0 Age 40s 60 49.5 8.6 12.1 8.9 9.1 1.4 4.6 0 1.5 1.4 3 50s & above 104 73 6.5 7.7 5.1 3.9 0.6 0 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 Middle-school grad. 64 62.1 14.9 9.9 5.5 2.1 1 1.4 1.1 1 1 0 Education High-school grad. 134 46.5 21.4 10.8 7.8 6.8 2.5 2.2 0 0 0.8 1.2 College grad. & 142 43.8 17.3 9.9 7.5 4.9 4.7 3.1 3.8 2.9 1.3 0.7 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 23 75 9.2 5.8 5.9 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 Independent 40 56.9 12 6.5 3.8 12.3 0 2.4 0 1.6 2.2 2.3 Blue collar 15 39 23 22.8 0 6.6 4.3 0 4.3 0 0 0 Occupation White collar 59 45.6 16.5 14.9 7.2 3.1 0 5.7 0 7 0 0 House wife 115 38.7 21.5 11.9 11.7 5.8 4.6 2.6 0 0 1.8 1.4 Student 34 27.1 32.6 13.3 6.2 6.7 7 0 7 0 0 0 Unemployed/Etc. 55 69.4 13.1 1.3 3.7 1.3 4.4 0 5.7 0 1.2 0 Big city 157 49.2 17.8 10.5 6.7 5.8 1.5 1.3 3 3.1 0 1 Area size Medium/small city 148 45.4 17.9 10.8 8.6 5 5.6 3.6 0.9 0 1.8 0.6 Rural cities 35 56.5 24.2 6.8 4.3 2.8 0 2.6 0 0 2.9 0 Seoul 70 49.7 19.2 13.8 3 3.6 3.4 1.6 3.4 0 0 2.3 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 85 43 16.1 14.7 10.8 3.8 2.9 1.2 0.7 5.7 1.2 0 Gangwon 14 57.4 12.9 0 0 8 16.8 0 4.9 0 0 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 34 48.4 20.4 6.8 3.3 8.9 10.2 0 0 0 2 0 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 33 58.7 17.5 9.8 2 6.3 0 5.8 0 0 0 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 44 47.7 15.1 5.4 16.1 4 0 9.5 0 0 0 2 Busan/Gyoung-nam 56 47.3 26.6 6.9 4.9 6.6 0 0 4.3 0 3.4 0 Je-ju 5 41.4 0 20.9 37.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Seoul 12 77 0 10.9 0 7 0 0 5.2 0 0 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 31 42.5 12.9 16.4 7.1 2.1 8.1 3.3 7.7 0 0 0 Gangwon 17 53.2 17.6 6.5 0 4.2 14.3 0 4.2 0 0 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 59 44.2 27.4 11.2 1 8 2 0 0 4.4 1.8 0 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 77 56.2 17.4 10.1 7.5 4.1 0 2.4 0 0 1.3 0.9 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 73 42 15.4 7.9 16 2.5 3.3 4.5 3.3 3 0.9 1.2 Busan/Gyoung-nam 53 43.3 28.7 6.2 4.2 10.3 0 3.8 0 0 1.6 1.8 Je-ju 25000500000000 North Korea/etc. 16 54.4 0 24.7 7.1 0 13.8 0 0 0 0 0 Lee Hoi-chang 105 60 12.7 10.6 5.3 4.1 1.1 3.1 0.7 1.5 0 0.9 Roh Moo-hyun 137 48.4 17.4 11.4 6.7 5.9 3 2.1 1.8 0.8 2 0.6 Who They Kwon Young-kil 6 10.8 52.3 0 13.6 9.7 0 0 0 0 13.6 0 Voted For Other candidates 1 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 No answer 65 39.3 31.6 7.7 10.8 3.5 4.6 1.4 1 0 0 0 Abstain 26 30.3 7.2 12.2 8.1 8.1 9.2 4.4 9.2 8.6 0 2.7
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 160 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (13): How well do you know about SOFA and its problems?
Heard of it, but Know Heard just today Know well not know details somewhat or not know at all and problems number % % % % Total 710 2.2 32 60.9 4.9 Male 350 3.8 37.9 53.7 4.7 Gender Female 359 0.8 26.2 68 5 20s 179 0 28.3 66.8 4.8 30s 189 2.3 27.9 68.1 1.8 Age 40s 143 4.4 43.7 50.8 1.2 50s & above 199 2.6 30.7 56.2 10.5 Middle-school grad. 131 0.5 18.9 66.6 14.1 Education High-school grad. 276 2 27.3 66.5 4.3 College grad. & 303 3.2 41.9 53.4 1.4 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 45 1.4 19.7 60.6 18.3 Independent 90 4.2 39.9 55.2 0.7 Blue collar 57 1.2 23.4 74.1 1.2 Occupation White collar 112 6.1 53.8 40.1 0 House wife 253 0.8 25.3 69.2 4.7 Student 61 0 33.9 59.1 6.9 Unemployed/Etc. 92 2.2 25.8 62.5 9.6 Big city 342 2 32.6 62.5 2.9 Area size Medium/small city 288 3.1 32 59.6 5.2 Rural cities 80 0 28.9 58.9 12.2 Seoul 161 2 35.5 59.8 2.7 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 2.4 36 56.2 5.4 Gangwon 22 0 37.5 43.9 18.6 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 4.1 26.3 64.6 4.9 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 0.9 28.7 65.7 4.7 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 2.6 25.3 70.6 1.5 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 2.3 30.8 60.8 6.1 Je-ju 8 0 26.4 55.8 17.8 Seoul 33 4.5 31.2 64.3 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 1 32.7 61 5.3 Gangwon 38 0 46.7 42.3 11 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 4.4 27.7 60.9 7 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 0.4 32 63.5 4.1 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 1.7 33.5 63.4 1.5 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 0.6 29.9 62.7 6.8 Je-ju 6 0 0 75.7 24.3 North Korea/etc. 47 9.9 34.8 52.5 2.9 Lee Hoi-chang 208 2.3 38.3 56.6 2.9 Roh Moo-hyun 307 2.6 33.2 60.9 3.3 Kwon Young-kil 15 0 25.5 69.8 4.7 Who They Voted For Other candidates 3 0 0 100 0 No answer 127 1.7 21.6 64.8 11.9 Abstain 50 2.1 27.8 65 5
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 161
Question (14): (For those who answered "know well" or "know somewhat") What is your opinion on rewriting SOFA?
After resolving No change until Need to change No need to N. Korea nuke prepared mid- No answer right away change issue long run number % % % % % Total 243 49.5 32.8 14.5 1.5 1.8 Male 146 46 36.6 13.8 1.4 2.2 Gender Female 97 54.7 26.9 15.7 1.6 1.1 20s 51 50.5 35.4 9.3 0 4.7 30s 57 64.8 19.4 13.9 0 1.8 Age 40s 69 49.7 35.4 12.4 1.2 1.2 50s & above 66 35.3 39.4 21.2 4.2 0 Middle-school grad. 25 43.3 28.1 23.1 5.5 0 Education High-school grad. 81 46.5 34 12.3 1.9 5.3 College grad. & above 137 52.4 32.9 14.3 0.5 0 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 10 44.1 28.1 27.8 0 0 Independent 40 52 36.6 9.2 0 2.1 Blue collar 14 63.3 26.9 9.8 0 0 Occupation White collar 67 53.7 30 12.8 0 3.5 House wife 66 49.9 31.8 14.4 2.3 1.6 Student 21 56.3 21 22.7 0 0 Unemployed/Etc. 26 22.4 51.1 18.5 8 0 Big city 118 51.5 28.1 17.2 1.2 2 Area size Medium/small city 101 46.5 37 13.2 2.2 1 Rural cities 23 51.9 37.9 6.6 0 3.6 Seoul 60 45.1 30.6 19.2 1.2 3.9 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 66 51.4 33 14.3 0 1.3 Gangwon 8 55.7 19.4 16.6 8.2 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 22 56.1 26.8 17 0 0 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 23 57.3 42.7 0 0 0 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 23 36.3 38.7 22.2 2.8 0 Busan/Gyoung-nam 37 51.5 31.2 10.3 4.2 2.8 Je-ju 245550 00 Seoul 12 53.4 29.6 17 0 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 21 53.3 33.9 8.8 0 4 Gangwon 18 57 21.9 17.2 3.9 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 40 56 28.1 15.9 0 0 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 50 46.9 40.5 4.7 3.1 4.7 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 48 41.5 37.7 17.2 1.4 2.2 Busan/Gyoung-nam 32 60.9 31.1 5.8 2.2 0 North Korea/etc. 21 31.4 24.1 44.5 0 0 Lee Hoi-chang 84 41.6 36.5 19.1 1.6 1.2 Roh Moo-hyun 110 52.9 35.7 7.7 1.4 2.2 Who They Voted For Kwon Young-kil 4 81.6 0 0 18.4 0 No answer 30 57.1 24.3 18.6 0 0 Abstain 15 45.4 14.4 34.5 0 5.7
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 162 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (15): Which problem of the current SOFA do you think should be solved first?
U.S. troop criminal, Solving complaints Base usage Pollution due to justice, and hand- against American No answer payment issue U.S. base over issues soldiers number % % % % % Total 710 23.2 6 1.2 2.8 66.8 Male 350 29.1 6.3 1.8 3.4 59.4 Gender Female 359 17.5 5.7 0.5 2.3 74 20s 179 20.6 5.3 0 2.4 71.7 30s 189 20.9 6.9 0.6 1.2 70.4 Age 40s 143 31.9 6.2 2.5 5.7 53.7 50s & above 199 21.5 5.7 1.7 2.7 68.4 Middle-school grad. 131 12.2 1.6 1.1 1 84 Education High-school grad. 276 19 5.5 1.2 2.6 71.7 College grad. & above 303 31.8 8.3 1.2 3.9 54.8 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 45 19.6 0 0 1.6 78.8 Independent 90 31 6.2 0 6 56.8 Blue collar 57 15.9 6.1 2.7 0 75.4 Occupation White collar 112 44.2 10.8 1.7 3.2 40.1 House wife 253 15.7 5 0.7 3.3 75.2 Student 61 26.4 7.6 0 0 66.1 Unemployed/Etc. 92 14.9 4.5 3.3 2.4 74.9 Big city 342 23.2 6.9 1.2 3.1 65.6 Area size Medium/small city 288 24.9 4.3 1.5 2.9 66.5 Rural cities 80 17.1 8.6 0 1.5 72.9 Seoul 161 26.1 6.2 2.5 2.8 62.5 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 25.1 7.2 0.5 3.8 63.3 Gangwon 22 29.4 0 5.1 0 65.5 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 20.6 4.7 2.3 2 70.5 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 21.3 4.3 0 2.8 71.6 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 17.7 5.5 0 4.7 72.1 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 22.8 6.8 0.6 1.5 68.4 Je-ju 8 11.9 14.5 0 0 73.6 Seoul 33 21.7 11.3 0 2.6 64.3 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 19.1 9 1.3 1 69.6 Gangwon 38 39.6 0 3 0 57.4 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 25.4 3.8 1.3 1.1 68.4 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 19.2 7.2 1.1 4.5 68.1 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 23.2 4.5 1.7 4.6 66.1 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 20.7 6.5 0 3.3 69.5 Je-ju 6 0 0 0 0 100 North Korea/etc. 47 32.5 9.2 1.5 1.5 55.4 Lee Hoi-chang 208 25.7 9.8 1.3 3.2 60 Roh Moo-hyun 307 26.8 4.3 1.2 2.9 64.8 Kwon Young-kil 15 20.8 0 0 0 79.2 Who They Voted For Other candidates 3 0 0 0 0 100 No answer 127 14.8 4.6 0 1.8 78.8 Abstain 50 14.1 6.1 3.6 4.5 71.8
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 163
Question (16): Since the death of two middle-school girls, do you think there has there been any effort to improve SOFA?
A lot of effort Some effort (1+2) Not much effort No effort at all (3+4) No answer number % % % % % % % Total 710 1.9 12.1 14 15 5 20 66.1 Male 350 1.9 16.7 18.6 17.2 5.3 22.5 58.9 Gender Female 359 1.8 7.6 9.4 12.8 4.8 17.6 73 20s 179 1.3 6.6 7.9 11.6 8.8 20.4 71.7 30s 189 1.1 8.8 9.9 16.8 3.5 20.3 69.8 Age 40s 143 3.7 19.9 23.6 18.3 6.2 24.5 51.9 50s & above 199 1.7 14.6 16.3 13.8 2.3 16.1 67.7 Middle-school grad. 131 1.7 8.9 10.6 5.9 1.9 7.8 81.6 Education High-school grad. 276 2.2 10.9 13.1 11.4 4.7 16.1 70.8 College grad. & above 303 1.6 14.5 16.1 22.1 6.7 28.8 55.1 Agriculture/Fisheries/ Forest Services 45 0 6.6 6.6 11.7 1.4 13.1 80.3 Independent 90 0 25.1 25.1 11.5 7.6 19.1 55.9 Blue collar 57 1.8 6.6 8.4 12.2 3.9 16.1 75.4 Occupation White collar 112 3 17.1 20.1 31 8.8 39.8 40.1 House wife 253 1.7 7.6 9.3 13.7 3.2 16.9 73.9 Student 61 0 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 22.6 66.1 Unemployed/Etc. 92 4.9 12.3 17.2 7.9 1.4 9.3 73.5 Big city 342 1.9 14.3 16.2 15.2 2.8 18 65.8 Area size Medium/small city 288 2.3 11.3 13.6 13.6 7.8 21.4 65 Rural cities 80 0 5.4 5.4 18.9 4.7 23.6 71.1 Seoul 161 1.6 15.2 16.8 18.5 1.7 20.2 62.9 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 2.7 11.2 13.9 16.3 7.5 23.8 62.3 Gangwon 22 3.1 14.5 17.6 4.2 15.8 20 62.5 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 0 12.2 12.2 12.2 6 18.2 69.5 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 1.7 9.7 11.4 12.9 5.2 18.1 70.5 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 1.8 7.6 9.4 14.8 3.7 18.5 72.1 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 2.1 14.2 16.3 12.4 4.4 16.8 66.9 Je-ju 8 0 0 0 26.4 0 26.4 73.6 Seoul 33 0 9.8 9.8 25.9 0 25.9 64.3 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 0 11.1 11.1 13.2 7.3 20.5 68.3 Gangwon 38 4 12.7 16.7 14.7 15.2 29.9 53.3 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 0 13.6 13.6 11.7 6.3 18 68.4 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 2.7 10.5 13.2 14.1 5.2 19.3 67.5 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 4.1 12.3 16.4 15.8 2.9 18.7 64.8 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 0.8 11.8 12.6 14 3.8 17.8 69.5 Je-ju 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 North Korea/etc. 47 2 17.1 19.1 22.4 3.1 25.5 55.4 Lee Hoi-chang 208 1.3 19.5 20.8 15.1 4.4 19.5 59.8 Roh Moo-hyun 307 1.7 10.9 12.6 18 5.2 23.2 64.2 Who They Kwon Young-kil 15 4.7 0 4.7 0 20.8 20.8 74.2 Voted For Other candidates 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 No answer 127 3.6 5 8.6 8.9 4.8 13.7 77.7 Abstain 50 0 10.5 10.5 16.5 3 19.5 70.1
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. 164 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Question (17): In your knowledge, how did the United States respond to the middle-school girls' death?
Apologize & gave Apologized & Apologized to All three of Don't know what money to the girls' those responsible No answer S. Koreans them the U.S. did familes were charged number % % % % % % Total 710 50.6 14.2 5.4 3.5 23.4 3 Male 350 46.7 15.9 4.2 3.9 27.3 2 Gender Female 359 54.4 12.5 6.4 3.1 19.7 3.9 20s 179 53 14 6.1 2.6 23 1.2 30s 189 57.3 13.3 4.6 1.2 18.4 5.1 Age 40s 143 56.3 15.7 5.6 4.3 14.3 3.8 50s & above 199 38 14.1 5.2 5.8 35 1.9 Middle-school grad. 131 37.1 8.9 5.4 3.7 43.4 1.5 Education High-school grad. 276 52.4 12.1 5.3 4.3 22.3 3.4 College grad. & above 303 54.8 18.3 5.4 2.6 15.8 3.2 Agriculture/Fisheries/F orest Services 45 34.6 6.1 2.9 4.9 50 1.5 Independent 90 52.9 18 4.8 2.3 18.6 3.4 Blue collar 57 44.5 3.1 5.4 2.7 40.8 3.6 Occupation White collar 112 61.8 17.2 7.2 2.1 10.8 0.8 House wife 253 54.4 13.6 6.2 2.9 19.2 3.7 Student 61 44.6 22.6 3.4 3.8 22.1 3.4 Unemployed/Etc. 92 39.9 13.8 3.8 7.2 32 3.2 Big city 342 52 13.8 5.6 4.2 20.2 4.2 Area size Medium/small city 288 48.2 16.4 6.3 3 25 1.1 Rural cities 80 53 8 0.8 1.9 31.7 4.6 Seoul 161 50 16.4 5.2 4.9 19.8 3.7 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 173 51.8 15.7 4.6 2.2 22.5 3.2 Gangwon 22 57.7 12.4 8.2 3.1 18.6 0 Daejeon/Chungchung 71 46.3 14.8 3.5 2.2 31.5 1.6 Provinces Gwangju/Jeon-la 78 34.1 15.5 5.4 6.1 36.8 2.2 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 84 57.9 9.9 6.8 2.6 21.8 1 Busan/Gyoung-nam 113 57.7 10.9 6.6 3.3 16.9 4.7 Je-ju 8 38 14.5 0 0 38.6 8.9 Seoul 33 55.2 18.3 2.1 7.3 17.1 0 Inchon/Gyoung-gi 64 58.4 15.7 4.8 1 18.6 1.5 Gangwon 38 58.6 12.1 8.7 1.8 16 2.7 Daejeon/Chungchung 124 42.5 15.3 3.7 3.9 30.6 4 Family Origin Gwangju/Jeon-la 155 40.9 13.4 5.9 4.3 32 3.6 Daegu/Gyoung-buk 137 55.6 14.1 5.8 2.5 20.8 1.2 Busan/Gyoung-nam 106 56.5 11.9 7.5 2.8 17.3 4 Je-ju 6 32.1 19.9 0 0 16.5 31.5 North Korea/etc. 47 58.1 14.9 2.9 6.4 15.6 2 Lee Hoi-chang 208 54.5 16 5.9 5.1 16.6 1.8 Roh Moo-hyun 307 52.5 13.8 4.2 4 22.6 2.8 Kwon Young-kil 15 61.9 4.7 0 0 27.5 5.9 Who They Voted For Other candidates 3 46.6 24.7 0 0 28.6 0 No answer 127 41.2 10.6 6.8 1.2 36.6 3.6 Abstain 50 43.3 20 8 0 22.1 6.5
Note: Total responses of each category add up (round up) to 100%. A WORKING GROUP REPORT 165
Appendix D: About the Contributors
Bak Sang-mee is an associate professor of cultural anthropology at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Dr. Bak’s current research interest is on how identity is related with social differentiation, culture of consumption, and cultural heritage. She has been working on the projects related to Korea, Taiwan, and China. Before joining the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Dr. Bak was an assistant professor in Queens College of the City University of New York. She received her Ph.D. degree in cultural anthropology from Harvard University with a dissertation on Professional Women’s Work, Family, and Kinship in Taiwan Society.
Paul F. Chamberlin has been a Korea specialist since the early 1970s. Mr. Chamberlin’s expertise rests on political-military and commercial experience as a business consultant, adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and assignments as a U.S. military attaché in U.S. Embassy in Seoul, national security planner on the U.S. Joint Staff in Washington, D.C., and a broad variety of other positions demanding and expanding in-depth understanding of the complex U.S.- ROK relations. He is the author of Korea 2010: The Challenges of the New Millennium (CSIS Press, 2001) and other publications addressing the Korean Peninsula and the U.S. relationship with both South Korea and North Korea.
David Kang is an associate professor of government, an adjunct associate professor, and a research director at the Center for International Business at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College. He is also a member of the editorial boards of Business and Politics and the Journal of International Business Education. Dr. Kang has scholarly interests in both business-government relations and international relations, with a focus on Asia. At Tuck, he teaches a course on conducting business in Asia, and manages teams of MBAs in the Tuck Global Consultancy Program. Dr. Kang regularly consults for U.S. and Asian firms across the Pacific and has worked with various government agencies on issues of Asian international economics and politics. Previously, he was a visiting associate professor at Yale University, a visiting assistant professor at Korea University in Seoul, and a visiting professor at the University of California at San Diego. Dr. Kang is the author of Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge University Press, 2002) and co-authored Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies with Victor Cha (Columbia University Press, 2003). He has published scholarly articles in numerous journals and newspapers related to international politics, security, organization, and development. He received a B.A. degree with honors from Stanford University and a Ph.D. degree from University of California at Berkeley.
Kim Byoung-joo is currently an adjunct professor in the Graduate School of International Studies at Ewha Womans University. Dr. Kim is also the chief executive partner of Kim, Lee & Partners, Inc. (KL&P), a consulting firm. Before establishing KL&P, Dr. Kim served as executive vice president and partner at another consulting firm, CJK Strategy Inc. Prior to consulting, he served under two of South Korea’s trade ministers as a policy counselor and special assistant for four years, developing international economic policies and public relations strategies. Dr. Kim has also represented South Korea's private sector as the Korea International Trade Association’s director of public relations and research in Washington, D.C. He was also a consultant at the World Bank's (IBRD) Economic Development Institute in Washington, D.C. Dr. Kim has taught at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies as adjunct professor of American Studies for four years. Dr. Kim
166 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE received his B.A. degree from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a Ph.D. degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Kim Seung-hwan is a professor of international affairs at Myongji University and the executive supervisor of Global Education of Myongji Foundation (GEM) in Seoul. He is also a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Dr. Kim specializes in U.S.-Asia affairs with particular interests in the U.S. relationship with the Koreas and strategic-security issues in Northeast Asia. He frequently travels between U.S. and South Korea and has made extensive trips to China, Japan, Russia and Southeast Asian countries for policy discussions with policymakers, scholars, business leaders, and journalists. Previously, Dr. Kim taught at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and served as senior fellow and the director of the Northeast Asia Program at CSIS. He has contributed a number of scholarly articles to international publications and has written numerous editorial pieces in U.S. and Asian daily newspapers. Dr. Kim received a B.A. degree from the University of Iowa and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Georgetown University.
Eric Larson is a senior policy analyst at RAND with more than two decades of experience in national security, defense and foreign affairs, and technology policy. Dr. Larson recently led a research project on South Korean attitudes toward the United States sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation and a project on American attitudes toward the global war on terrorism for the U.S. Army. Prior to joining RAND, he had served in various government agencies, including the Institute for Defense Analyses from 1987 to 1989, National Security Council from 1983 to 1987, and the White House Office of Planning and Evaluation from 1981 to 1983. Dr. Larson is the author and co-author of numerous articles and books on strategy, policy, and technology. The most recent of which are Toward a Long-Term Strategy for Assuring Access in Key Strategic Regions (RAND, forthcoming), “Bridging the ‘Open Water’ in the U.S.-South Korea Military Alliance” (Korea Journal of Defense Analysis, Fall 2003), and Interoperability of U.S. and NATO Allied Air Forces: Supporting Data and Case Studies (RAND, 2003). His press interviews have included ABC News’ “Nightline” program, The New York Times, Washington Post, and China Jiangsu TV (JSTV).
Lee Jung-hoon is the associate dean and associate professor of international relations in the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) at Yonsei University. He joined the faculty at Yonsei University in 1996, where he is also the director of the Center for European Studies at the Institute for East and West Studies. Outside the campus, Dr. Lee holds a number of board and committee memberships including CSCAP-Korea’s Executive Committee, where he served as secretary-general. He is also an advisor to the National Assembly concerning North Korean nuclear issues. In addition, Dr. Lee hosts a weekly global TV program on current affairs called ‘In Focus’ on Arirang TV. Dr. Lee’s former positions include a full-time lecturer at the department of international & area studies of the University of California at Berkeley, a research fellow at the University of Tokyo, and a non-resident visiting fellow at CSIS in Washington, D.C. He also served as an advisor to South Korea’s National Security Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Dr. Lee has written widely on East Asian affairs, with special focus on foreign policy and security issues. He is the editor of Comprehensive Security in Asia: Conceptions and Realities (Yonsei University Press, 2000). Dr. Lee received his B.A. degree from Tufts University, M.A.L.D. degree from the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, and Ph.D. degree from the University of Oxford.
Lee Sook-jong is a visiting fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies of the Brookings Institution and a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute. Her research interests include
A WORKING GROUP REPORT 167
Japanese political economy, civil society in Korea and Japan, and political opinion studies. Dr. Lee has been involved in surveys and has written reports on South Korean attitudes toward the United States. She has also been active in organizing international conferences and workshops on democracy in East Asia. Previously, Dr. Lee served as an editor of the Korean Association for Contemporary Japanese Studies’ biannual journal, The Korean Journal of Japanese Studies, and as an international committee member of the Korean Sociological Association. Dr. Lee has written extensively on Japanese political economy, Korea-Japan relations, and Japanese society in general. Her works have frequently appeared in Sejong Institute’s publications and many journals including Asian Perspective and Journal of East Asian Studies. She also contributed chapters in books published by Stanford University Press and Hudson Institute Press, most recent of which include Japan’s New Political Economy (1998, co-authored) and Korea-Japan Relations in Transition (2002). In addition, Dr. Lee studies Korean society from the perspective of political sociology and has published numerous articles on Korea. Dr. Lee received a Ph.D. degree in sociology from Harvard University.
Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow for Asia projects in the CSIS International Security Program (ISP). He joined CSIS in 2001. In this position, Mr. Mitchell is responsible for managing all Asia- related studies conducted in ISP, which currently include projects involving the security of the Taiwan Strait, the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance, U.S.-China relations, South Korean popular sentiment toward the United States, and maritime security in East Asia. Mr. Mitchell was primary author of the 2002 CSIS Working Group report “Blueprint for U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea.” Mr. Mitchell served at the Department of Defense as special assistant for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1997-2001, when he served alternately as senior country director for China, Taiwan, Mongolia, and Hong Kong (2000-2001), director for regional security affairs (1998-2000), country director for Japan (1997-1998), and senior country director for the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore (1998-1999). Mr. Mitchell was the principal author of DoD’s 1998 East Asia Strategy Report. Prior to joining DoD, Mr. Mitchell served as a senior program officer for Asia and the former Soviet Union at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in Washington, D.C., and as assistant to the senior foreign policy adviser to Senator Edward M. Kennedy. Mr. Mitchell received an M.A. degree in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1991, and a B.A. degree from the University of Virginia in 1986.
Katharine H.S. Moon is the Jane Bishop Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College and a non-resident scholar at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University. She also serves on the editorial board of several journals of international relations and consults for NGOs in the United States and South Korea and on policy task forces designed to examine current U.S.-Korea relations. Previously, Dr. Moon was a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and the George Washington University from 2002 to 2003. She also served in the Office of the Senior Coordinator for Women’s Issues in the U.S. Department of State and as a trustee of Smith College. Dr. Moon is the author of Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.- Korea Relations (Columbia University, 1997; Korean edition by Sam-in Publishing Co., 2002) and other works on women and international relations, migrant workers, and social movements in East Asia. She is currently writing a book on “anti-Americanism” in South Korea from the perspective of democratization and social movement analysis and assesses the implications for foreign policy. She received a Fulbright Senior Research Fellowship in Korea to conduct this research. She received her B.A. degree from Smith College and her Ph.D. degree from Princeton University.
168 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE
Scott Snyder is a senior associate in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS, and is based in Washington, DC. He spent four years in Seoul as the Korea Representative of The Asia Foundation during 2000 to 2003. Previously, Mr. Snyder has served as a program officer in the Research and Studies Program of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and as the Acting Director of The Asia Society's Contemporary Affairs Program. He has recently edited with L. Gordon Flake a study entitled Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea (2003), and is the author of Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (1999). Mr. Snyder was the recipient of an Abe Fellowship, administered by the Social Sciences Research Council, from 1998 to 1999, and was a Thomas G. Watson Fellow at Yonsei University in South Korea from 1987 to 1988. He received his B.A. degree from Rice University and M.A. degree from the Regional Studies East Asia program at Harvard University.
William Watts is the president of Potomac Associates, a foreign policy research organization in Washington, D.C. Prior to founding Potomac Associates in the summer of 1970, Mr. Watts served as the staff secretary and senior staff member of the National Security Council (NSC) in the White House. He resigned in opposition to the U.S. invasion of Cambodia. Prior to serving at the NSC, Mr. Watts had served in the U.S. Foreign Service from 1956 to 1965. Assignments included: the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Soviet Affairs) in Washington, D.C.; vice consul and political officer in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Korea; Russian language study in Oberammergau, Germany; cultural affairs officer in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, USSR; Chinese language study in Washington, D.C.; and the State Department’s Office of Asian Communist Affairs. Mr. Watts is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs, the Asia Society, the Washington Center of the Asia Society, the Japan Society, the Korea Society, and the Cosmos Club.