Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.–Rok Alliance
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STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE Editor Derek J. Mitchell June 2004 About CSIS Since 1962, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has been dedicated to providing world leaders with strategic insights on – and policy solutions to – current and emerging global issues. CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, formerly U.S. deputy secretary of defense. It is guided by a board of trustees chaired by former U.S. senator Sam Nunn and consisting of prominent individuals from both the public and private sectors. The CSIS staff of 190 researchers and support staff focus primarily on three subject areas. First, CSIS addresses the full spectrum of new challenges to national and international security. Second, it maintains resident experts on all of the world’s major geographical regions. Third, it is committed to helping to develop new methods of governance for the global age; to this end, CSIS has programs on technology and public policy, international trade and finance, and energy. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., CSIS is private, bipartisan, and tax-exempt. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the authors. Cover photo: South Korean Protesters Chant Slogans by Candlelight during an Anti-U.S. Rally in Seoul. Cover photo credit: © Reuters/CORBIS. Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K St. N.W., Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.csis.org Contents Acknowledgments iv Introduction 1 I. Does Popular Sentiment Matter? / What’s At Stake? 5 Derek Mitchell II. A History of U.S.-ROK Relations to 2002 11 David Kang and Paul Chamberlin III. Yankee Go Home? A Historical View of South Korean Sentiment toward the United 24 States, 2001-2004 Kim Seung-hwan IV: South Korean Self-identity and Evolving Views of the United States 36 Bak Sang-mee V: Generational Change in South Korea: Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance 43 Lee Sook-jong VI: South Korean Civil Society and Alliance Politics 50 Katharine H.S. Moon VII: The Emergence of “New Elites” in South Korea and its Implications for Popular 59 Sentiment Toward the United States Lee Jung-hoon VIII: Friendship in Need of Substance: Perspectives of South Korean Business toward the 67 United States Kim Byoung-joo IX: The Role of the Media and the U.S.-ROK Relationship 73 Scott Snyder X: U.S. Popular Views toward South Korea 82 William Watts XI: Analysis of the September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND Polls 92 Eric Larson XII: Findings 107 XIII: Recommendations 114 Appendix A: Summary of September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND Polls 122 Appendix B: September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND Polls, Survey 1 131 Appendix C: September 2003 JoongAng Ilbo, CSIS, and RAND Polls, Survey 2 147 Appendix D: About the Contributors 165 Acknowledgments This project is the product of cooperation between the International Security Program (ISP) of CSIS and Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea. Derek Mitchell, ISP senior fellow, chaired the task force and edited this report. Professor Lee Jung-Hoon of Yonsei University’s Graduate School of International Studies (GIIS) also provided intellectual and financial support for the project. A select task force of senior practitioners and specialists in U.S.-Korean affairs provided essential guidance to the organization and implementation of the project from its inception, and substantive inputs to authors concerning their papers. The consistent commitment of task force members over several months was critical to the completion and quality of the study. The task force included: Bak Sangmee, Hankuk University of International Affairs Paul Chamberlin, Korea-U.S. Consulting, Inc. William Drennan, U.S. Institute of Peace Gordon Flake, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation David Kang, Dartmouth College Byoung-Joo Kim, Kim, Lee, & Partners, Inc. Seung-Hwan Kim, Myongji University Eric Larson, RAND Corporation Sook-Jong Lee, The Sejong Institute Norman Levin, RAND Corporation Michael McDevitt, CNA Corporation Katharine Moon, Wellesley College Don Oberdorfer, Johns Hopkins University Scott Snyder, The Asia Foundation William Watts, Potomac Associates The project benefited greatly from the administrative assistance of several CSIS staff members, including ISP research associate Kazuyo Kato, who took over at mid-course and ably shepherded the report to its conclusion, and ISP research assistant Alice Brennan, who guided the project during its early stages. ISP intern Janet Kang also assisted Mr. Mitchell and Ms. Kato with the editorial process. We would also like to extend appreciation to Eunice Chung and ISP research assistant Kristine Schenck for their artistic contribution to this publication. CSIS and Yonsei University are also deeply grateful for the institutional and financial support of the project from the Korea Foundation. Without the Korea Foundation’s vision and assistance, this study could not have been conducted. We are likewise grateful for the co-sponsorship of the South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo for the public survey conducted in September 2003 in support of this project. We would further like to thank the Korea office of the Asia Foundation for its financial support. The statements made and views expressed in this report, however, are solely the responsibility of the authors. iv Introduction Americans, in professing support for democracy around the world, sometimes overlook the fact that new democracies can create as many complications as benefits for U.S. bilateral relationships. On the one hand, dealing with autocracies is simple: convince the autocrat to side with you, and you can count—generally—on a stable relationship. Democracies, on the other hand, are moving targets. Leaders are constantly looking over their shoulders at political opponents and keeping an eye on popular opinion, which is often driven not only by considerations of national interest but also by miscellany such as culture, emotion, and historical memory. The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) provides a case study in this regard. As 2003 approached, the United States and South Korea seemed to have ample reason to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of their historic alliance. Established in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War, in which millions of Koreans and tens of thousands of Americans died, the alliance successfully contained and deterred potential aggression by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) and fostered a secure environment in which both the United States and South Korea could prosper. South Korea rose from the devastation of war to become a strong, stable, confident, and ultimately free and democratic society. Yet, as 2003 dawned, the South Korean people made international headlines when they flooded the streets of Seoul by the thousands to angrily denounce the United States. Their immediate grievance was frustration and resentment over perceived U.S. arrogance in the deaths of two South Korean schoolgirls who were accidentally run over by a U.S. military vehicle and the subsequent acquittal of the involved soldiers by a U.S. military tribunal. Demonstrators burned American flags; chanted “Yankee, Go Home”; held aloft placards denouncing the United States as imperialist; and, in late 2002, elected a new president whose rhetoric and platform, inter alia, called for a Korea that stood up to the United States. Public opinion polls taken in early 2003 showed South Korean views of the United States to be at a historic low, with a large majority deeming the bilateral relationship in poor shape. Viewing all these developments without context, the United States predictably reacted with surprise and anger at the apparent bitterness of its long-time ally. “How could the Koreans be so ungrateful?” “Why should we continue to put our forces in harm’s way, often separated from their families, for a society that not only does not want us there, but also deems us imperialists and burns our flag?” Members of Congress, newspaper columnists, cable television pundits, and even some U.S. officials began to talk about potentially withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea. Combined with ongoing frictions about policies toward North Korea and continuing tensions in general alliance management, a vicious downward spiral of action and reactionンand perhaps over- reactionンdeveloped that seemed to put the overall relationship in jeopardy. Far from celebrating the alliance’s golden anniversary, some commentators in 2003 were pronouncing the alliance “defunct.”1 1 Robyn Lim, “Japan as the ‘New South Korea?” ICAS (Institute for Corean-American Studies, Inc.) Special Contribution no. 2003-0305-RxL (2003): 1. 1 2 STRATEGY AND SENTIMENT: SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE Conservatives within the South Korean elite mobilized to reassure U.S. counterparts that the demonstrations did not represent true popular sentiment. They noted that “anti-American” demonstrations in South Korea are not new, that participants represented a small vocal minority of South Korean opinion, and that polls demonstrating otherwise were unsound. Although the entreaties of South Korean conservatives were not entirely inaccurate, the depth and breadth of South Korean resentment that was displayed toward the United States in late 2002 and 2003 seemed to signal something more complex and troublesome. What was at work