MAO AND THE ECONOMIC STALINIZATION OF CHINA, 1948-1953 The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series Series Editor Mark Kramer, Harvard Un iversity

Resistance with the People: Repression and Resistance in Eastern Germany, 1945-1955 Gary Bruce

Triggering Communism's Collapse: Perceptions and Power in Poland's Tra nsition Marjorie Castle

Redrawing Na tions: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948 Edited by Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak

Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948-1953 Hua-yu Li MAO AND THE EC ONOMIC STALINIZATION OF CHINA , 1948-1953

Hua-yu Li

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Oxford ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Li, Hua-yu Mao and the economic Stalinization of China, 1948-1953 I Hua-yu Li. p. cm. - (The Harvard Cold War studies book series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-7425-4053-8 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7 425-4053-7 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. China-Economic policy-1912-1949. 2. China-Economic policy-1949-1976. 3. Mao, Zedong, 1893-1976-Philosophy. 4. Marxian economics. 5. Stalin, Joseph, 1879-1953-Influence. I. Title. II. Series. HC427.8.L475 2006 330.951 '055-dc22 2005024181

Printed in the United States of America

Q™ 'CJ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO 239.48-1992. To my late father Li Shaopeng To my mother Fujita Emi

Contents

List of Abbreviations forFrequently Cited Journals ix Acknowledgments xi Introduction 1

1 The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 13 2 Mao, Stalin, and TransformingChina 's Economy, 1948-1952 61 3 Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Socialist Economic Transformationof China in the Early 1950s 95 4 Mao's Formulation of the General Line forSocialist Transition, October 1952-September 1953 121 5 Mao's General Line forSocialist Transition, October-December 1953 149

Conclusion: Mao, Stalin, and China's Road to Socialism 185 Appendix 1 Table of Contents of Lenin and Stalin on Economic Construction, Volumes 5 and 6 191 Appendix 2 The Soviet Experience in Building Socialism: Selected Articles fromXuexi and New China 197

- vii - Vlll Contents

References in English 203 References in Chinese 211 Index 241 About the Author 251 Abbreviations for Fre quently Cited Jo urnals

AJCA Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs BNC Bainianchao [A tide of a hundred years] CQ China Quarterly Bulletin Cold Wa r International History Project Bulletin DW Dangde wenxian [Party documents] DYZ Dangshi yanjiu ziliao [Party history research materials] DY Dangshi yanjiu [Party history research] PEA Fa r Eastern Affairs JCWS Journal of Cold Wa r Studies NC Neibu cankao [Internal reference] xx Xuexi [Study] ZDY Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu [ CCP party history research] ZDZ Zhonggong dangshi ziliao [ CCP party history materials]

-IX-

Ac knowledgments

OMPLETING THIS BOOK HAS BEEN A LONG PROCESS, and I am grateful for the Csupport I received from mentors, the scholarly community, friends, and loved ones. My mentors, Professors Thomas P. Bernstein and Andrew J. Nathan, directed my dissertation research and writing and continued to be helpful as I revised my dissertation and turned it into a publishable book. With his keen eye fordetail and knowledge of Soviet history and politics, Professor Bernstein read the entire book manuscript and made important comments forchanges. I am lucky to have two great scholars as my mentors and appreciate their support and encouragement, and I owe each of them a tremendous intellectual debt. I have also benefitedfrom discussions with various scholars. I am especially grateful to the late Professors Benjamin I. Schwartz and Adam Ulam, and to Professors Stuart Schram, Janos Konai, Jean C. Oi, Andrew Walder, William C. Kirby, Richard Kraus, and Linda Grove fortheir knowledge and wisdom. Pro­ fessor Elizabeth J. Perry offered valuable suggestions at the early stages of the project, and Professor Robert S. Ross generously shared with me his collection of Chinese materials. Dr. Balazs Szalontai, a Hungarian scholar, read the en­ tire book manuscript and, drawing upon his intimate familiaritywith Eastern European history and politics, made valuable suggestions for changes. I ap­ preciate his humor and friendship. I am also thankful for the constructive comments made by outside reviewers. Special thanks go to scholars and friendsin China fortheir insights and gen­ erosity. Lin Yunhui provided special help and opened many doors for me. I have also received help from other scholars: Li Haiwen, Li Danhui, the late Li Shenzhi, Shen Zhihua, Yang Kuisong, Xie Chuntao, and Zhao Baoxu. I would

- XI - xii Acknowledgments

like to express my thanks for the many others in China who helped me but have chosen to remain nameless. My old friend Zang Jian has been an important source of support. She and her husband, Pan Qingde, always made my stay at Beida as comfortable and rewarding as possible, and I deeply appreciate their help and friendship. I would like to express my appreciation to three senior colleagues at Oregon State University, where I began my teaching career in 1996. Professors Lisa Ede and Erlinda Gonzales-Berry and Dean Kay F. Schaffer, each in her own way, gave me moral support during the writing process. I am grateful for their kindness, encouragement, and wisdom. While writing the book, I benefitedfrom thesupport of several institutions. A summer travel grant from the Stanford University East Asia National Re­ source Center in 1998 made it possible for me to use the Hoover Library. Three Valley Library Travel Grants from Oregon State University-in 1997, 1999, and 2002-enabled me to travel to Beijing and Hong Kong to conduct library research. While on leave in 2000-2001, Professor Dali L. Yang kindly sponsored me as an associate member of the Center forEast Asian Studies at the University of Chicago. I was able not only to have access to the East Asian collection at the university library, but also to participate in the activities of the Center. A somewhat differentversion of chapter 3 was published by Rus­ sian History/Histoire Russe as a journal article, and the journal has kindly given me permission to publish it as part of the book. It has been wonderfulworking with Dr. Mark Kramer, the series editor for this book. With his extensive knowledge of the world Communist system, Stalin, Mao, and their relationship, he has been an important source of ideas relating to my research and of suggestions for improvements in the manu­ script. I very much appreciate all the support he has given me throughout the process of writing this book. My thanks also go to several individuals at Rowman & Littlefield:April Leo in editorial production; Jessica Gribble, the associate editor; and Matt Evans, the copyeditor. April and Jessica helped me through the production process and always responded to my queries promptly. Matt went through the entire book manuscript carefullywith a keen editorial eye. My family has been a constant source of support for me. My mother, a strong Japanese woman, has set a moral example for her children through the way she has lived her life and inspired them by her hard work and professional dedication, first in China, and then in Japan. She kept the faith throughout the project. My father, Li Shaopeng, a professor of Russian studies, did not live long enough to see me begin this study, but if he had, he would have been sur­ prised at my choosing a topic involving the Soviet Union, where he studied during his youth. This book is dedicated to them. My in-laws have been kind, Acknowledgments Xlll generous, and supportive of my scholarly pursuits. It is very sad that my father-in-law, the late Professor Hiram J. McLendon, who was so interested in my book project, could not live to see the completion of this work. My husband, Jim McLendon, not only shared my frustration in writing the book but also made himself available to discuss ideas with me. He forcedme to explain and clarifymy ideas so that I could express them more effectively. I have often wondered how our marriage survived so many heated discussions concerning Stalin and Mao's views on socialism. Of course, I alone bear responsibility forany mistakes or shortcomings of the book.

Corvallis, Oregon Fall 2005

Introduction

N LATE SEPTEMBER 1953, more than six months afterJoseph Stalin's death and Itwo months afterthe Korean War armistice, Mao Zedong forthe first time publicly announced a new policy platform called the "general line forsocial­ ist transition." Inspired by Stalin's general line of 1929 and its approach to building socialism in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and 1930s, Mao called forthe transformation of the capitalist economy and forsocialist industrial­ ization and collectivization in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Aimed at accelerating China's transition to socialism, the general line reflected Mao's determination to eliminate the existing economic structure based on private ownership and to replace it with a new one based solely on state and collec­ tive ownership. Public statements promised gradualism, but Mao knew that drastic measures would be necessary to achieve his objectives. The general line came at a time when a Stalinist road to socialism was being challenged not only in the Soviet Union but also in the Eastern European people's democra­ cies, but Mao was committed to a Stalinist approach. The implementation of the general line began in 1954 and continued through the "high tide" (gao chao) of 1955 and 1956. By 1956, with the complete implementation of the general line, a Stalinist economic system had been established in China. The general line represented a major policy shiftfor the Chinese Commu­ nist Party ( CCP) in that it required the abandonment of the more moderate officialplan that the CCP had adopted in 1949 under the banner of New De­ mocracy. When the Communists seized power in 1949, Mao and the CCP had assured the nation that building socialism would be a task forthe distant fu­ ture and that a mixed economy and private ownership would continue fora

-1- 2 Introduction long time. The commitment to maintain private ownership in agriculture and handicraftswas explicitly stated.1 China's moderate economic-policy orienta­ tion in the late 1940s was shaped in large part by Stalin's policy recommenda­ tions at the time and by ideas associated with Vladimir Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s. The general line came as a surprise to the nation. When it was firstmade pub­ lic in late September 1953, many local party cadres were puzzled and confused,2 and the capitalists were shocked and felt betrayed by the party.3 Mao's call for socialist transformation under the general line produced widespread shock be­ cause it imposed a program of economic change farmore radical than anything contained in the party's propaganda up to that time. For Mao, at least, this pol­ icy shiftwas not as dramatic as it was forothers. In 1958, Mao admitted that in 1949 he did not reveal his real agenda and that it was merely a matter of tactics not to publicize it.4 In 1949, unsure of how effectively the party could govern the country, Mao projected an image of the party as being farless communist than it really was, hoping thereby to win support from all social groups-peasants, capitalists, merchants, small-shop owners, peddlers, artisans, and intellectuals. Mao's hidden agenda contradicted not only the party's officially stated policy but also many public statements he himself had made during that time. 5 The policy shift of19 53 has long been a mystery for many China scholars, and it has never been adequately explained. It was especially puzzling since in taking this course Mao was ignoring Stalin's advice. What caused the policy shift? Was it a response to the Cold War, intensified by the ongoing Korean War (1950-1953)? What happened to New Democracy? How did Mao justify such a drastic policy change? And what were the consequences of the policy shiftfor China, especially in the areas of elite politics and political economy? It is extremely important to understand the policy shift of 1953, forit was a key turning point in China's post-1949 economic development.6 It not only accelerated the transition to socialism by eliminating private property and the capitalist economy, but it also set the stage fora quarter century of disastrous socioeconomic experimentation, economic chaos, and elite conflict that ended only with Mao's death. The primary objective of this study is to piece together a plausible account of the events at the time in an attempt to unravel the mystery of the 1953 pol­ icy shiftby taking advantage of information made available in China since the beginning of the economic reformsin the late 1970s and in the former Soviet Union since the early 1990s. The key issue is not why Mao suddenly embarked on a Stalinist road to socialism in 1953 and thereby abandoned the economic policies adopted by the party in 1949. To pose the question in this way sug­ gests that Mao changed policy in 1953 primarily or even solely in response to new conditions. The policy change did not come about in this way. It was in- Introduction 3 stead the culmination of a process that grew out of a change in Mao's think­ ing in 1950 and consisted of his gradual and secretive imposition of a new pol­ icy program. To understand Mao's policy shift,it is necessary to place it within the larger context of the world Communist movement, Communist ideology, and Mao's relationship with Stalin. Two major reasons for the shift can be identified. First, Mao placed great importance on the Soviet experience of the 1920s and 1930s, as described in Stalin's History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course (hereinafter referred to as the Short Course),7 and he believed the Soviet experience of that period could be used as a tem­ plate forChina's development in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Mao was in­ spired by Stalin's Short Course and relied on this work as a roadmap to lead China to socialism. As Benjamin I. Schwartz eloquently pointed out in 1979, the same Mao «who dared to assume the mantle of theoretical leadership of the Chinese Communist Party during the Yenan period seems to have ac­ cepted without criticism the image of (socialism' projected in Stalin's Short Course on the History of the CPSU [sic] ."8 Second, Mao's policy shiftgrew out of his strong feelings of personal rivalry toward Stalin and of national rivalry toward the Soviet Union, which coexisted ambivalently alongside the respect and deference he felt toward Stalin for his achievements and the admiration he had forthe Soviet Union as the leading country of the Communist world. The precise timing of the policy shiftresulted not only fromMao's belief that China was ready to build socialism but also from his decision to use an am­ biguous statement from Stalin as an endorsement of Mao's plan to begin the transition to socialism immediately. One of the most intriguing findings to emerge from my study is the para­ dox of Mao instituting a form of Stalinism in China against the advice of Stalin himself. In doing so, Mao was compelled to contend with the differ­ ences between Stalin's earlier written works and his current policy recom­ mendations. The origin of this paradox can be traced to the Comintern's dec­ laration of 1938, no doubt at Stalin's direction, that the Short Course was the «encyclopedia of Marxism and Leninism."9 Like other leaders, Mao accepted the ideological preeminence of this work. Stalin's policy advice to Mao con­ cerning China in the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, was different from the radical policies Stalin described in the Short Course. While Stalin sup­ ported the ultimate economic Stalinization of China, he preached gradualism in achieving that goal. Stalin's moderate policy recommendations forChina's economic development in the late 1940s and early 1950s coincided with his radical Stalinist economic transformation ofthe East European countries. 10 There were three reasons for Stalin to take a different position with regard to China. First, Stalin believed that 4 Introduction

China's backwardness required a period of economic development before the transition to socialism could begin. Second, Stalin regarded China's capitalist class-in contrast to the capitalists in the Eastern European countries in their re­ lations to the Communist parties in those countries-as an ally of the CCP in the struggle against the imperialist powers, and he believed that this class should be allowed to continue to exist until the imperialists had been defeated. Third, Stalin believed that conditions in China in the early 1950s were dramatically different from the conditions that existed in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and early 1930s and that China did not need to repeat the harsh policies he had adopted in the past in the Soviet Union. Stalin showed no remorse for hisbrutal treatment of the kulaks in the Soviet Union, but he did admit to Liu Shaoqi in October 1952 that he had employed violent means in «relocating" some three million kulaks to Siberia. He believed that conditions in the Soviet Union at that time had required these actions and that there was no need for China to adopt similar measures. 1 1 Though Stalin made no mention of it in his statement, his violent treatment of the kulaks, of course, went farbeyond relocating them to Siberia. His pragmatic words of the late 1940s and early 1950s thus came into direct conflict with his earlier radicalism as expressed in the Short Course. Mao, because of his own radical tendencies and his ambition to outdo Stalin, was committed to followingStalin's written words in the Short Course. To do so, he paradoxically had to reject Stalin's moderate policy recommen­ dations. As will become clear, he often dealt with these conflictingclaims by giving the appearance of following Stalin's advice while pursuing his own agenda based on the Short Course. In order to win the support of other Chi­ nese leaders forhis policies, Mao on occasion misrepresented what Stalin had said in order to give legitimacy to his own agenda.

Sources and Methodology

In my research, I have relied heavily on archival materials released in China since the mid-1980s and in Russia since the early 1990s.12 These materials in­ clude records of conversations during meetings between Stalin and Mao and between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 13 the CCP's written reports to Stalin in the summer of 1949, 14 and records of high-level discussions in the late 1940s and early 1950s.15 These materials also include records of conversations between Nikolai Roshchin, the Soviet ambassador to Beijing, and top Chinese leaders, and between functionaries of the two countries in the late 1940s and early 1950s.16 Recent publications in English of Stalin's communications concern­ ing China with his lieutenants, such as Molotov and Dimitrov, have been uti­ lized.17 I have also consulted writings of Mao's that have recently been pub­ lished forthe first time;18 policy directives issued by Mao, Liu, and the CCP; Introduction 5 internal party reports, 19 chronicles,20 and declassified intelligence reports of the U.S. State Department;21 and CCP party propaganda that appeared in the Chinese media in the early 1950s.22 I have further made use of the memoirs and biographies, based on archival informationnot available to most scholars, written by top party leaders and other participants in the events of the early 1950s.23 My study draws upon the recent writings of Chinese academics and party researchers who have access to party archives,24 and I have received valu­ able new information and interpretative perspectives from interviews I have conducted with academics and party researchers since the early 1990s. I frequentlycite two memoirs: Bo Yibo's Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu (shangjuan) [Recollections of some important decisions and events, vol. 1] and Shi Zhe's Zai lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu [At the side of history's giants: Memoirs of Shi Zhe]. Both books were published in 1991 and are highly regarded in China and the West. Citing informationfrom the mem­ oirs of CCP leaders, however, has always been a tricky business, for these works are subject to bias of at least three types. First, leaders who suffered dur­ ing the Cultural Revolution are often motivated in their writings by a desire not only to set the record straight with regard to past policy issues, but also to restore their personal reputations. Second, leaders are ofteninfluenced in their writings by their loyalties toward other leaders, including sometimes past and present Communist leaders in other countries. Third, in writing their mem­ oirs, these leaders oftenavoid dealing with sensitive historical issues or adopt a position on them that adheres to the current party line. The books of both Bo and Shi are not memoirs in the usual sense. Bo had a group of party researchers to conduct research and do the writing forhim , while Shi had a smaller number of researchers to work on his book. Shi was fortunate,however, in benefitingfrom the assistance of the capable Li Haiwen, a researcher at the CCP Party History Research Office.Although these books were written using archival sources, it is still necessary to check with other sources to verify the accuracy of the information and interpretations pre­ sented in the books. This is where oral sources become essential. It would be wonderful if the Chinese archives were opened to scholars de­ siring to unravel historical puzzles. Until the archives are opened, scholars will have to continue to do their «detective" work, obtain information from all possible directions, and hope that they get it right.

Structure of the Book

This book consists of fivechapters, together with an introduction and a con­ clusion. In the introduction, I outline the broad issues addressed in the book, I set forth my central argument, and I describe my research methods and 6 Introduction

sources. In chapter 1, "The Historical Background and Contemporary Set­ ting," I examine the domestic and international conditions in which Mao for­ mulated his new policy program, the "general line for socialisttransition. " At­ tention is given to the constraints under which Mao operated as a result of his dependence on Stalin fornational security, economic and technological assis­ tance, and political support in the international community. I also describe Mao's deference to the post-Stalin collective leadership. In chapter 2, "Mao, Stalin, and Transforming China's Economy: 1948-1952," I argue that Mao largely ignored Stalin's pragmatic and moder­ ate advice in the late 1940s and early 1950s, preferring instead to draw his in­ spiration and guidance fromStalin's Short Course. Mao complied with Stalin's advice only on issues where he agreed with him. On matters where he dis­ agreed with Stalin, especially ones he considered to be important, Mao went his own way. Stalin's advice during this time at best served only to constrain Mao's radical tendencies. In chapter 3, "Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Socialist Economic Transfor­ mation of China in the Early 1950s," I examine the profoundimpact the Short Course had on Mao and the CCP. I first describe the broad influence of the book, from its introduction in China in 1938, when it was used to educate Communist cadres, until the early 1960s, when it became the inspiration for a CCP party-history textbook read by cadres, intellectuals, and university stu­ dents. I then present two cases in which Mao applied ideas from the Short Course. In one, I discuss the Rectification Campaign (1941-1944), in which Mao removed rivals frompower and rewrote party history in accordance with the "two-line struggle," as outlined in the Short Course. In the other, I describe the role of the Short Course in shaping China's post-1949 economic develop­ ment, especially the influence it had on Mao as he formulated thegeneral line forsocialist transition. He paid particular attention to several points, includ­ ing the economic preconditions forthe transition to socialism, the successive stages of the transition, the policies appropriate for each stage, and the time needed to complete the socialist transition. In chapter 4, "Mao's Formulation of the General Line forSocialist Transi­ tion: October 1952-September 1953," I examine Mao's conceptual framework forthe general line and his specific policies forthe socialist transformationof capitalist industry and commerce, including the imposition of joint public­ private ownership to replace private ownership. I also describe how, as he in­ stituted these policies, he took strong measures to prevent any expression of dissent from party leaders and social elites. In chapter 5, "Mao's General Line for Socialist Transition: October­ December 1953," I show how Mao took advantage of the grain crisis in summer 1953 to accelerate both the socialist transformation of the agricul- Introduction 7 tural sector and the elimination of capitalism in China. With Stalin gone, Mao could finally pursue his radical agenda unimpeded. I present Mao's justificationfor the general line, especially his insistence that the necessary conditions existed in China to begin building socialism and that the fun­ damental principles forthe general line had been established in 1949. I also offera comparison between Mao's general line of 1953 and Stalin's of 1929 and a discussion of how scholars and party researchers have come to view the general line during the reform era in China. In the conclusion, "Mao, Stalin, and China's Road to Socialism;' I argue that Mao was a devoted Stalinist, contrary to the conventional wisdom that he was an independent thinker and that he followed a Stalinist road only reluctantly. Mao's devotion, however, was to the radical Stalinism of the 1920s and 1930s, as embodied in the Short Course, not to Stalin's gradualist ideas of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Mao was determined to outdo Stalin, and, sustained by his belief in a continuing revolution, he remained true to his own deeply rooted radicalism. In the conclusion, I also discuss the legacy of the general line during the reformperiod.

Conclusion

In this study, I examine Mao's belief system, his dominant role in the eco­ nomic-policy process, and his complex relationship with Stalin. Central to Mao's belief system was his determination to destroy quickly the existing cap­ italist economy, to create and maintain an economy characterized by state and collective ownership, and to exclude market forces from the economy. Far frombeing guided by a "Yan' an round-table" style of decision making25 based on consensus building, as some have suggested, Mao dominated the policy process, was deeply involved in the details of decisions, and was increasingly intolerant of dissent or opposition. As a junior partner to Stalin, Mao worked within the tightly controlled world Communist system and fora long time followed therules of the game, reported to Stalin, and sought his advice on a regular basis. Mao depended on Stalin in many ways and derived his authority during the early 1950s in large part from his relationship with Stalin. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, in contrast to Mao's compliance with Stalin's advice on political matters, Mao often ignored Stalin and pursued his own agenda in economic matters. Dri­ ven by his own more radical ideological commitments and his competitive zeal to outdo Stalin and the Soviet Union in achieving socialism rapidly, Mao asserted his independence in economic matters, especially during the critical period of 1948 and 1949 and afterStalin's death in March 1953. 8 Introduction

Overall, it can be said that considerations of political power and ideology became intertwined with economic policy as Mao created an economic sys­ tem that was Stalinist to the core. Mao emerges from this study as the domi­ nant figurein China's economic-policy process, and, while he was dependent on Stalin forsupport, he was ready to ignore Stalin's advice so as to stay true to his own vision of Stalinism, as embodied in the Short Course, and to create a Stalinist China in accordance with that vision. Mao, however, began to recognize some of the «drawbacks" of the Stalinist economic system in the mid-l 950s as China nationalized its economy and im­ posed central planning. He made critical remarks about the Soviet system, es­ pecially after the de-Stalinization of 1956. He also conducted experiments in an attempt to correct the shortcomings of the Soviet system, particularly the tendency forexcessive centralized planning and bureaucratic control to over­ whelm local initiatives, and the imbalances created by an overemphasis on heavy industry at the expense of light industry and consumer-goods produc­ tion. His Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) was such an experiment, and it failed miserably and caused enormous human suffering. Mao did not, how­ ever, question the core fe atures of the Stalinist economic system: state owner­ ship of the economy, disdain formarket forcesand the private economy, and centralized planning. When Mao died in 1976, he leftbehind a system that was Stalinist to the core.

Notes

1. Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao 19 ce [ CCP history teaching reference materials, vol. 19] (hereinafter as Zhonggong 19) (Beijing: Guofangdaxue chubanshe, 1986), 3. 2. Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao 20 ce [ CCP history teaching reference materials, vol. 20] (hereinafteras Zhonggong 20) (Beijing: Guofangdaxue chubanshe, 1986), 195-96. 3. Zhonggong 20, 198. 4. Shi Zhongquan, Mao Zedong de jianxin kaituo, xin zengdingben [The hard pio­ neering road of Mao Zedong, the newly enlarged edition] (hereinafteras Kaituo) (Bei­ jing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1996), 178. 5. Li Rui, Mao Zedong de zaonian he wannian [Mao Zedong's early and late years] (hereinafteras Mao zaonian) (Guizhou: Guizhou chubanshe, 1992), 216-18. 6. For a similar argument, see Arlen Meliksetov, "'New Democracy' and China's Search forSocio- Economic Development Routes, 1949-1953" (hereinafter as "China's Search"), PEA, no. 1 (1996): 87. 7. Ganbu bidu (4): Sulian gongchandang (bu) lishi jianyao duben [Required books for cadres ( 4): History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course] (hereinafter as Liangong dangshi) (Jiefangshe, 1949). I first learned of Introduction 9 the importance of the Short Course from Su Shaozhi, a Chinese dissident, during an interview in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on March 4, 1992. 8. Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (hereinafteras Chinese Communism) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), v-vi. 9. "Liangong (bu) dangshi jianming jiaocheng dui zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue he yanjiu de yingxiang (zuotanhui fayan zhaideng)"[The effect of History of the Commu­ nist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course on teaching and research con­ cerning the history of the CCP (abstract of symposium)] (hereinafter as "Zuotan­ hui"), ZDY, no. 1 (1989): 16. 10. Ivan T. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944-1993: Detour from the Periph­ ery to the Periphery (New Yo rk: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 72-82. 11. For details, see Liu Shaoqi's cables to Mao fromMoscow, dated October 26 and 30, 1952. In the cables, Liu conveyed to Mao Stalin's policy recommendations. DW, no. 1 (2005): 10; fora Chinese discussion of this matter, see Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 530. 12. A large number of Russian archival materials already translated into Chinese were made available to me by an independent Chinese scholar, Shen Zhihua, who col­ lected them from two Russian archives: the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History. All Russian archival informationI cite in the book is fromwhat I call the Shen Zhihua Collection of Russian Archives. 13. Cold Wa r International History Project Bulletin (hereinafter as Bulletin), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1 996): 5-9, 10-20. 14. Andrei Ledovsky, "The Moscow Visit of a Delegation of the Communist Party of China in June to August 1949" (hereinafter as "The Moscow Visit"), PEA, no. 4 (1996): 64-86; 5 (1996): 84-97. 15. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue;' PEA, no. 1 (1992): 100-116; no. 2 (1992): 94-1 11; Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission to China in January and February 1949" (hereinafter as "Mikoyan's Secret Mission"), PEA, no. 2 (1995): 72-94; no. 3 (1995): 74-90. 16. The collection, which I call the Shen Zhihua Collection of Russian Archives, is extremely valuable, forit includes information concerning the CCP's requests foraid fromthe Soviet Union in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In addition, the collection in­ cludes records of conversations between Soviet ambassador Nikolai Roshchin and top Chinese leaders, including Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Dong Biwu, and Guo Moruo, between late 1949 and 1952. These records offerscholars a rare opportunity to understand how Chinese leaders assessed domestic and international conditions at the time. In general, the leaders appear to have spoken candidly with Rosh chin. 17. Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khleviuk, eds., Stalin's Letters to Molo­ tov: 1925-1936 (hereinafteras Stalin's Letters) (New Haven: Ya le University, 1995). Ivo Banac, ed., The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949 (hereinafteras The Diary of Dim­ itrov) (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). 18. See, for example, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Committee Document Research Office], Mao Zedong zai qida de baogao he jianhuaji 10 Introduction

[Mao Zedong's reports and speeches at the Seventh Party Congress] (hereinafter as Mao Zedong zai qida) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1995). Five articles that were never previously published are included in this collection. See also Zhong­ gong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [ CCP Central Committee Document Research Of­ fice], ed., Mao Zedong wenji, 8 juan [Collected writings of Mao Zedong, 8 vols.] (Bei­ jing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993, 1996, 1999). I found vols. 5 and 6 to be particularly important formy study. 19. ]ianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (shisance) [Selected writings of Mao Zedong since the founding of the PRC, 13 vols.] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987-1998). For my purpose, vols. 1-5 are extremely important. ]ianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao (sice) [Selected writings of Liu Shaoqi since the foundingof the PRC, 4 vols.] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998, 2005); Zhongyang dang'an­ guan [Central Committee Party Archives], Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xunji, 18 ce [Selected documents of the CCP Central Committee, 18 vols.] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1992). Vo ls. 16-18 are most useful for my study. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [ CCP Central Committee Document Re­ search Office], ]ianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, 17 ce [Selected important documents since the founding of the PRC, 17 vols.] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe). Vo ls. 1-4 are useful. Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao [CCP his­ tory teaching reference materials] (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1986). A mul­ tivolume internal publication of National Defense University, this collection contains a mixture of newspaper articles, party directives, and internal party reports. Vols. 18-20 are particularly useful.Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [ CCP Central Committee Document Research Office] and Zhongyang dang'anguan [Central Com­ mittee Party Archives], Gongheguo zouguo de lu-jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xu­ anbian: 1949-1952, 1953-1956 [The road the PRC has traveled: Selected important documents since the founding of the PRC, 1949-1952, 1953-1956] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991). Neibu cankao [Internal reference] (hereinafter as NC) is a multivolume collection of reports written by Xinhua wire-service re­ porters; these reports described the real conditions in the country at the time and were read only by high-ranking CCP leaders. 20. Pang Xianzhi et al., Mao Zedong nianpu (shang zhong xia juan) [A chronicle of Mao Zedong, 3 vols.] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993); Gu Longsheng, Mao Zedong jingji nianpu [An economic chronicle of Mao Zedong] (Beijing, Zhong­ gong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1993); Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yan­ jiushi [ CCP Central Committee Document Research Office], Liu Shaoqi nianpu (1898-1969) (shang xia juan) [A chronicle ofLiu Shaoqi, 1898-1969, 2 vols.] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996); Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Committee Document Research Office], Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949-1976) (shang zhong xia juan) [A chronicle of Zhou Enlai, 1949-1976, 3 vols.] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997); Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yan­ jiushi [CCP Central Committee Document Research Office], Ren Bishi nianpu [A chronicle of Ren Bishi] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, Renmin chubanshe, 1993); Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Committee Docu­ ment Research Office], Chen Yu n nianpu (1905-1995) (shang zhong xia juan) [A Introduction 11 chronicle of Chen Yun, 1905-1995, 3 vols.] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000). 21. In my view, those reports were objectively written and provide useful back­ ground information on Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s, on economic conditions in China and the bloc countries, and on policy changes that took place in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin in March 1953. These intelligence reports are housed at the National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. 22. I made extensive use of Renmin ribao [People's Daily] and other CCP publica­ tions, such as Xuexi [Study] . 23. Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu (shangjuan) [Recollections of some important decisions and events, vol. 1] (hereinafteras Huigu 1) (Beijing: Zhong­ gong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991); Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu [At the side of history's giants: Memoirs of Shi Zhe] (hereinafter as Zai lishi) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991); Hu Qiaomu, Hu Qiaomu huiyi Mao Zedong [Hu Qiaomu remembers Mao Zedong] (hereinafter as Huiyi Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994); Li Jiaji, Wo zuo Mao Zedong weishi shisannian [I worked as Mao Zedong's bodyguard forthirteen years] (hereinafter as Mao weishi) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000); Li Yuehan et al., Mao Zedong he sheng­ wei shuji men [Mao Zedong and provincial party secretaries] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000); Tao Lujia, Mao Zhuxi jiao women dang shengwei shuji [Chairman Mao taught us to be provincial secretaries] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996); Jin Chongji, Mao Zedong zhuan: 1893-1949 (shang, xia juan) [Bi­ ography of Mao Zedong: 1893-1 949, 2 vols.] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996); Jin Chongji and Huang Zheng, Liu Shaoqi zhuan (shang xia juan) [Biography of Liu Shaoqi, 2 vols.] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998); Zhou Enlai Zhuan (1949-1976) (shang xia juan) [Biography of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976, 2 vols.] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998); Cheng Zhongyuan, Zhang We ntian zhuan [Bi­ ography of Zhang Wentian] (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 1996); Huang Kecheng, Huang Kecheng zishu [Hung Kecheng's own account of his life] (Beijing: Ren­ min chubanshe, 1995); Gong Shiqi, Ya ng Xianzhen zhuan [Biography of Yang Xi­ anzhen] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1996); Li Weihan, Huiyi yu yanjiu (shang xiaju an) [Recollections and research, 2 vols.] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi zil­ iao chubanshe, 1986); Deng Zihui zhuan bianxiezu [Deng Zihui biography editorial group], Deng Zihui zhuan [Biography of Deng Zihui] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996); Tao Lujia, Yige shengwei shuji huiyi Mao zhuxi [A provincial party secretary's recollections of Chairman Mao] (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1993); Li Rui, Mao Zedong de zaonian he wannian [Mao Zedong's early and late years] ( Guizhou: Guizhou chubanshe, 1992); Gong Yuzhi, Gong Yuzhi lun zhonggong dangshi (shangxia­ juan) [Gong Yuzhi on the CCP's party history (2 vols.)] (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1999); Xue Muqiao, Xue Muqiao huiyilu [Memoirs of Xue Muqiao] (Tian­ jin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1997); Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [ CCP Central Committee Document Research Office], Zhongyang dang'anguan [Central Committee Party Archives], and Dang de wenxian bianjibu [Party Documents Editor­ ial Board], Gongheguo lingxiu yaoshi zhenwen [Untold stories about the leaders of the PRC] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998). 12 Introduction

24. Lin Yunhui et al., Ka ige xingji de shiqi [The period of the triumphant march] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1996) (hereinafter as Kaige); Pang Song and Lin Yunhui, Liguo xingbang: 1945-1956 nian de Mao Zedong [Establishing and pro­ moting the country: Mao Zedong in the years 1945-1956] (Beijing: Zhongguo qing­ nian chubanshe, 1996); Ya ng Kuisong, Mao Zedong yu Mosike de enen yuanyuan [Re­ sentments between Mao Zedong and Moscow] (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chuban­ she, 1999). 25. Roderick MacFarquhar argues that the Ya n'an "round-table" style of decision making was shattered only with the coming of the Cultural Revolution. See The Ori­ gins of the Cultural Revolution, 1: Contradictions among the People, 1956-1957 (New Yo rk: Columbia University Press, 1973), 3. 1

The Hi storical Bac kground and Contemporary Setting

NE OF THE MURKIEST AND MOST CONFUSING PERIODS in the early history of Othe People's Republic of China (PRC) was between summer 1952 and December 1953. It was during this time that Mao Zedong formulatedthe gen­ eral line forsocialist transition and set the stage forthe transformationof the Chinese economy. Western observers knew that there was a great deal of com­ munication between Beijing and Moscow during these months, 1 but they knew little or nothing of the content of these exchanges. The confusionof the time was further exacerbated by the death of Stalin in early March 1953, which precipitated profound change not only in the Soviet Union but throughout the Communist world. A first step toward understanding the general line forsocialist transition is to identify the significant historical and contemporary developments and events, both domestic and international, affecting China in the early 1950s. During this period, in the midst of the ongoing Korean War, the Chinese Com­ munist Party (CCP) stepped up its efforts to consolidate its power and extend its control over the country by imposing land reform and by launching brutal political campaigns against perceived opponents in the CCP and in the coun­ try more generally. The euphoria produced by the CCP's economic accom­ plishments during the PRC's first threeyears (1949-1952) evaporated and was replaced by deep anxieties over the grain crisis of summer 1953. In all he did, Mao had to contend with the constraints arising from his relationship with Stalin. With Stalin's death, Mao had to deal with the complexities of the post­ Stalin collective leadership in the Soviet Union. Beneath the surface,tensions

- 13 - 14 Chapter 1

were rising among the top Chinese leaders over how to transform China's largely private economy.

The Impact of the Korean War on Domestic Conditions in China

It is farbeyond the scope of this study to examine Mao's decision to enter the Korean War and his subsequent involvement with it. Since it began shortly afterthe foundingof the PRC, however, it is important to examine the impact, if any, of the war upon politics and policies in China, especially since the war erupted soon after Mao announced his plan to dedicate three years to eco­ nomic recovery. It is now evident that Mao was informedof Kim 11-sung's invasion plan and was consulted by both Stalin and Kim before the attack. Mao initially sup­ ported the plan but later showed concern about possible U.S. intervention. He nevertheless gave his blessing to Kim's plan. Mao was, however, kept in the dark about the details of military planning and the timing of the attack. 2 During the first four months after China's entry into the war in early Octo­ ber 1950, Mao was deeply involved in directing militaryoperations in Korea, su­ pervising the first and second military campaigns. Early in 1951, however, Mao withdrew from day-to-day conduct of the war, although he continued to work on overall military strategies, 3 and he redirected his attention to domestic polit­ ical and economic issues. Information recentlypublished in the PRC indicates that Mao was actively leading the Suppression-of-Counter-Revolutionaries (October 10, 1950-0ctober 1952), the Three-Anti (November 30, 1951-0cto­ ber 25, 1952), and the Five-Anti (January 26, 1952-0ctober 25, 1952) political campaigns.4 As will be shown later, Mao began to play the dominant role in do­ mestic economic-policy issues as well. By summer 1952, as Mao began to formulatethe general line, the two sides to the conflict had entered into armistice negotiations. He was by then con­ vinced that the Korean War would be only a regional conflict. He had arrived at this conclusion as a result of his judgment that none of the parties to the war had any intention of expanding it and that neither side was in a position to defeat the other. Given these calculations, the Chinese agreed to a ceasefire, peace negotiations, and finallya truce. Mao, of course, did everything possi­ ble to make sure that the Chinese were not shortchanged in the negotiations. 5 Mao finallycompleted the formulation of his general line forsocialist transi­ tion in December 1953, seven months after the Korean War had officially ended in July 1953. It seems clear that Mao wanted to minimize the influence of the Korean War on his domestic-policy agenda, and in this regard he was largely successful. The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 15

I do not intend, however, to minimize the impact of the war on China. The Korean War in fact had major consequences forChina in three major areas. First, internal political control was intensifiedin China. On October 10, 1950, two days after Mao announced China's entry into the Korean War, Mao launched the Suppression-of-Counter-Revolutionaries Campaign. Mao and the CCP were determined to crush anyone perceived as desiring the collapse of the Communist regime. Like the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, this one was also brutally carried out. Second, the Korean War increased the urgency for China to build a strong national-defense industry. As late as April 1950, just prior to the Korean War, Mao was reducing military expenditures by substantially decreasing the number of active military personnel.6 During the war, national resources were diverted fromeconomic development to support forthe war effort; as soon as the war was over, however, priority was again given to economic development, mainly in the heavy and defense industries. In addition, because of the war effort, many mech­ anisms were instituted to increase control over the national economy; an ad­ ministrative and organizational infrastructure was thereby created that later fa­ cilitated the furthercentralization of the economy under the general line. Third, as a result of China's participation in the Korean War, China was even furtherisolated from theWe st, especially the United States. For the first time in history, the Chinese and the Americans faced each other on the bat­ tlefield.The military confrontationwith the United States resulted in China's being effectively prevented fromtrading with the major Western nations. This was definitelynot what Stalin had in mind in the late 1940s when he advised Mao on how China should deal with the imperial powers. Stalin had at that time encouraged Mao and the CCP to continue to trade with the West.7 Al­ though after a period of time the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Japan reestablished some trade with China, it was minimal. Needless to say, China's enforcedec onomic isolation had a long-term negative impact on the nation's economic development.

Chinese Domestic Conditions: 1949-1952

To solidifysupport forthe CCP and the new regime among poor peasants and thereby assure the party's control over rural areas, Mao extended the popular yet brutal land-reform programto the newly liberated areas in winter 1950. The cruelty of land reformin China contrasted with the way it was conducted in most Eastern European people's democracies. In East Germany, Czechoslo­ vakia, Hungary, and Romania, forexample, land reformwas basically an ad­ ministrative measure, without mass meetings aimed at the humiliation of 16 Chapter 1

landlords, and it was essentially a peaceful process. The only exceptions were Yugoslavia and Albania, where Communist leaders carried it out more vio­ lently. When land reformwas completed in China in late 1952, the structure of land ownership had changed profoundly. Through this redistribution of land, some 310 million peasants were given land. 8 Although agricultural land was still privately owned, it was no longer in the hands of the landlords. To assure political stability, Mao and the CCP relentlessly pursued those perceived to be class enemies; they were determined to crush anyone sus­ pected of desiring the collapse of the Communist regime. As mentioned ear­ lier, in addition to the Suppression-of-Counter-Revolutionaries Campaign, two additional major political campaigns were launched during the early 1950s: the Three-Anti Campaign from November 1951 to October 1952 and the Five-Anti Campaign from January 1952 to October 1952. Unlike the Sup­ pression-of-the-Counter-Revolutionaries Campaign (October 1950-0ctober 1952), which attacked the "obvious" class enemies of the CCP, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns were directed at "corrupt" CCP officials and the na­ tional bourgeoisie, an ally of the CCP at the time.9 The national bourgeoisie can be thought of as occupying a position in the pre-1949 economic order in­ termediate between the powerful bureaucratic capitalists, to be discussed in chapter 2, and the small-scale petite bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie consisted of large and medium-size capitalist commercial and manufacturing enterprises. This class had few if any contacts with "foreign imperialists" and received little if any foreign capital. Mao considered the national bourgeoisie to be weak politically and economically.10 The petite bourgeoisie, even smaller scale than the national bourgeoisie, were the owners of shops and small pro­ duction facilitiesthat hired only a few workers. Although Mao initiated these campaigns at different times, he concluded them at about the same time, signaling his desire to move on to other things. His deep involvement in the campaigns is evident in the large volume of di­ rectives he initiated or reviewed on how to conduct them. 11 In addition, he was personally in charge of the Three-Anti Campaign at officesunder the di­ rect control of the CCP Central Committee in Beijing, and he led the cam­ paign in the city of Tianjin. 12 During this period, other top CCP leaders shared Mao's eagerness to stop the misdeeds of "corrupt" officials and capitalists. In March 1952, responding to queries fromNikolai Roshchin, the Soviet ambassador to China, concern­ ing the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi each explained the objectives and methods of the two campaigns. Both leaders­ Liu more strongly than Zhou-painted a bleak picture of how quickly some CCP officialshad become corrupt and how unlawfulsome capitalists had be­ come. Zhou and Liu also emphasized how determined the CCP leaders were The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 17 to find and punish offenders, especially the upper strata of the capitalist class.13 The Three-Anti Campaign was divided into two stages. Corrupt government officialswere the targets of the first stage, andcapitalists were targeted during the second stage. The CCP leaders recognized that corruption was rampant among party and governmental officials and among officialswho used to work forthe old regime, so it was decided to punish severely only the worst offend­ ers, or about 10 percent of all the officials who were caught.They lost their jobs and either were sent to reeducation camps, were imprisoned, or were exe­ cuted. 14 The others who were caught were let offwith light punishments. The Five-Anti Campaign was directed against the Chinese national-bourgeois, or capitalist, class. The goal was to punish severely or eliminate the top 5 percent of the class that owned large capitalist enterprises. In targeting only this top group, the CCP made a calculated decision. The CCP believed the party was not yet in a position to sever its ties with the national-bourgeois class and that it would thereforebe wise to limit its purge to the most powerful members of this class, whom the CCP considered to be the most reactionary. 15 The CCP was de­ termined to punish or execute about 300,000 capitalists during the campaign. In typical CCP fashion,4 percent of the total 5 percent of capitalist offenders would be treated less harshly than the richest 1 percent of the capitalists. Capitalists in the 4 percent group were to be fined more than they could pay; the fines were typicallylarger than the total worth of their businesses. The only way they could try to pay the fine was topay as much as they could and then declare bankruptcy. The remaining 1 percent of capitalist offenders, the owners of the largest capital­ ist entities, were first required to pay fines larger than the total worth of their businesses and were then either imprisoned or executed. 16 This was a clever way forthe CCP to eliminate the wealthiest capitalists and the largest capitalist enter­ prises. The CCP not only seized the wealth and factoriesof the richest capitalists, but it also eliminated the top strata of the class. Despite careful planning, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns were not entirely successful. NikolaiRoshchin, the Soviet ambassador to China, told his counterpart fromHunga ry, Emanuel Safranko,that Mao was successfulin curb­ ing corruption, waste, and bureaucracy, but that he had difficulty collecting finesfrom the capitalists. Although the government's annual report claimed that 25 to 30 billion yuan (old currency) had been collected in finesfrom the capi­ talists, the amount actually obtained was only about 5 billion yuan. When the government informedthe capitalists that they could pay a part of the fine at a later time, they replied that they were unable to pay the fines at all because the permitted rate of profit wastoo low. Aftera long discussion, the Politburo came to the conclusion that the finalconfrontation with thebiggest capitalists would have to be postponed so as to ensure continuous production. 17 18 Chapter 1

In their comments to Roshchin, neither Zhou nor Liu expressed any wor­ ries about the disruptions of production caused by these campaigns, but pri­ vately they were concerned. To carry out these highly charged political cam­ paigns, the party had to mobilize many workers, removing them from economically productive activities. Leaders such as Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and Bo Yibo fe lt that the situation needed to be corrected. On February l S, l 9S2, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Mao expressing their concerns. Zhou presented a plan that would gradually reduce the number of workers that were involved full-time with the Three-Anti Campaign.18 Despite these setbacks, by October l 9S2 Mao had largely consolidated the CCP's control over China by eliminating the threat from the enemy classes, including the landlords, reactionary capitalists, and counterrevolutionaries. He had sent a stern warning to party officials that they were being watched closely and that they should behave themselves. In addition, by severely punishing the leading members of the capitalist class and liquidating the most powerful ones, Mao had not only weakened the class as a whole, but he had also signaled to the country that it was now acceptable to attack the cap­ italist class. With the completion of the Five-Anti Campaign in October l 9S2, the party's policy of cooperation with the capitalist class effectively ended. On the economic front,in late summer 19S2, there was a general euphoria among CCP leaders over the party's economic accomplishments during the three years since the founding of the PRC in 1949. The CCP had already achieved a balanced budget by 19Sl, and it was expected that by the end of l 9S2 there would be a budget surplus. Heavy industry had been expanded, land reformwas near completion, and irrigation systems were being built on a grand scale.19 The euphoria was furtherheightened by the ''AugustReport" of l 9S2, an official party report that showed a large growth in the size of the state-owned industrial sector relative to the size of the overall economy. Since the expansion of this sector was viewed by Mao as a sure sign of the advance of socialism in the economy, he was very pleased and encouraged by the report. Based on his narrow understanding of what constituted the "preconditions" forthe transition to socialism, he believed that since the state­ owned industrial sector had produced more than SO percent of all industrial output, China was now in a position to begin to move toward socialism.20 The state-owned industrial sector was, in fact,not as large as stated in the "August Report"; it was about SO percent, not "more than SO percent."21 The euphoria about China's early economic success was not grounded in reality and was thereforefragile and short-lived. Stalin, however, shared in the euphoria of summer 19S2 when Zhou Enlai, visiting Moscow at the time, reported the CCP's accomplishments. He was en- TheHisto rical Background and Contemporary Setting 19 couraged by the news and expressed his high expectations forChina as the fu­ ture leader of Asia.22 Stalin's generosity in summer 1952 in providing aid to China forits First Five-Year Plan (FFYP) may have been influencedin part by the glowing economic reports coming out of China.

Sino-Soviet Relations: 1948-1953

From the late 1940s, for bothideological and practical reasons, Mao and Stalin both expended considerable effort in nurturing a good working relationship and encouraged cooperative interactions between the leadership groups in China and the Soviet Union. There were close contacts between the two par­ ties and the two governments at all levels. In addition to seeking to improve relations with Mao and the CCP, Stalin decided to provide aid to the PRC, though only within a clearly defined scope and for well-defined purposes. Mao, forhis part, sought to build a good relationship with Stalin by assuming the role of a respectfulju nior partner so that he could receive badly needed aid from Stalin. Within the context of these relationships, Mao and the CCP had to accept certain constraints arising fromtheir dependency on Stalin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( CPSU) on a wide range of issues. Even afterStalin's death, on most issues Mao deferred to the post-Stalin Soviet leadership and followed its policy recommendations, particularly with regard to political matters. Mao, however, did assert his independence on issues af­ fe cting China's economy. He was also careful not to join post-Stalin Soviet leaders in their effort to discredit Stalin. Overall, from the late 1940s until Stalin's death in 1953, the relationship between the CPSU and the CCP im­ proved, and the two parties were on relatively good terms.

A Strained Relationship The CCP's victory over the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1949 marked a turning point in the relationship between the CCP and the CPSU. It served as a force­ fulrepudiation of the view held firstby Lenin and then by Stalin that the CCP was too weak to prevail in an armed revolution and that the CCP should therefore workwith the nationalists, led firstby Sun Yat-sunand then by Chi­ ang Kai-shek. As the CCP's imminent victory became clear in early 1948, Stalin finallyabandoned this view and admitted that his previous assessment of the CCP as too weak to win was wrong.23 More fundamentally, the CCP's victory in 1949 can be viewed as at least partially the result of Stalin's belated response to Mads repeated appeals since the mid-1930s to provide direct mil­ itary assistance to the CCP in its revolutionary struggle. Stalin's assistance in 20 Chapter 1

1945, during the early months of the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, gave the Chinese Communists a decisive advantage over the KMT and laid the foundation fora Communist victory. In 1949, Mao was vindicated in his view that direct Soviet aid to the CCP was essential to victory. The relationship between the CCP and the CPSU had been strained ever since the CCP joined the Comintern in 1923. There had similarly been a prob­ lematic relationship between Mao and Stalin since the early 1940s. Frictions on fundamental theoretical, strategic, and policy issues concerning the Chi­ nese Revolution existed from the very beginning between the CCP and the Comintern. Mao was not the first Chinese leader to disagree with Comintern directives or the first to deviate from or reinterpret directives issued by the Comintern. Chen Duxiu, forexample, in 1922 disagreed with the Comintern's analysis of the nature of the Chinese Revolution and objected to the require­ ment that CCP members join the KMT during the period of the United Front. Chen was finallyforced to accept the KMT membership requirement that was being pressed by Maring, the Co min tern representative. 24 In the late 1920s, Li Lisan, another early Chinese leader, deviated from the Comintern's directives on policies toward rich peasants and revolutionary activities in the cities.25 Before his ascendance to the CCP leadership in 1938,2 6 Mao also had his share of disagreements with Comintern policy directives, particularly with re­ gard to military strategies, policies toward rich peasants, the Xi'an Incident of 1936, and the creation of the Second United Front with the KMT. In almost all cases, Mao yielded to Comintern pressures. As forthe controversial Second United Front, it took Mao nine months to agree to the Comintern initiative and abandon his long-held "two-front-war" strategy-that is, fighting both the Japanese imperialists and the KMT-but he finallycame around.27 In the early 1940s, however, he became more resistant to the Comintern. Mao was the firstChinese leader to come up with the "heretical" notion of a peasant-based revolution, but it was endorsed by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 because it had worked in the Soviet areas controlled by the Chinese Red Army. 28 There is no evidence that Mao was singled out by the Comintern for attack because of his views on peasant-based revolution. Though Mao had problems with some of the Comintern agents during the early days, he also benefited from the help of some of them. In the winter of 1932-1933, for example, Mao was brought back to power by Comintern agents. Comintern agent Arthur Ewert and the party leadership in Shanghai objected to the treatment Mao was receiving from other leaders, including Zhou Enlai. They intervened primarily because they knew what an important role he was playing in the Soviet areas of China.29 In early 1934, Mao was elected as a Politburo member due to the intervention of some Comintern agents. 30 There is now a consensus among scholars that Mao's ascendance to The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 21 the de factoleadership of the party in 1938, thereby replacing Zhang Wentian, was endorsed by Stalin and the Comintern.31 Contrary to the conventional wisdom that Mao was mistreated by the Comintern, he in fact received its support at critical points in his rise to power.

Mao's Differences with the CPSU and the Comintern Aside from his idea of a peasant-based revolution, Mao had disagreed with the Comintern since the early 1930s on the role of the Soviet Union in the Chinese Revolution. According to Otto Braun, a German military adviser serving as a Comintern representative in China between 1932 and 1939,

Mao shared Li Lisan's opinion that the centre of world revolution had shifted east from Russia to China, just as it had from Germany to Russia in 1917. The primary contradiction in the world, therefore,was no longer the antagonism be­ tween the socialist Soviet Union and the capitalist states, but the struggle be­ tween Imperial Japan and China. He thereforeconcluded that the Soviet Union had an obligation to help revolutionary soviet China at any cost, even the cost of war, while a victorious revolutionary China took up the task of furthering world revolution. 32

Braun admitted in 1982 that Mao's views did not receive the attention they de­ served.33 In 1949, Stalin came to agree with Mao's view, believing that the revolution had shifted from Russia to China and from China to East Asia. 34 In the late 1940s, Stalin also began to see the rationale foraiding the Chinese Communists. From the mid- l 930s, Mao persisted in requesting that Stalin and the Soviet Union assist the Chinese in their revolutionary struggle. When Zhang Went­ ian and Mao sent Chen Yun to reestablish cable communications with the Comintern in 1935, Chen had the additional mission of persuading Stalin to provide military assistance to the Chinese Red Army. 35 In 1935, in deciding the finaldestination for theRed Army on the Long March, Mao preferred a place that would be geographically close to the Soviet Union;36 Mao was still hop­ ing to use Soviet assistance to win the Chinese Revolution. In fall 1940, dur­ ing the second ((anti-Communist tide," Mao again sought the Comintern's help. 37 In 1945, Mao yet again requested Soviet aid, 38 which came later that year when Stalin provided Mao with covert help in Manchuria. In 1949, Mao wanted to obtain Soviet aid forChina 's economic construction, though he was deeply concerned that it might not be possible because of the terrible losses the Soviet Union had suffered during World War II.39 He understood how im­ portant it was forthe CCP, given its many limitations, to obtain Soviet help in winning the armed struggle and building socialism. 22 Chapter 1

Mao's Lack of Cooperation with Stalin in the Early 1940s Chinese scholars generally agree that until the early 1940s, the CCP forthe most part accommodated itself to Comintern demands, even if there were oc­ casional disagreements and unfair criticism by the Comintern. In other words, a ((normal working relationship" was maintained between the CCP and the Comintern.40 This relationship changed in the early 1940s, however, as a result of an increase in tensions between Mao and Stalin over a series of pol­ icy issues, but mainly due to Mao's unwillingness to provide assistance to the Soviet Union afterit was attacked by Germany in 1941. In July 1941, less than one month afterthe German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Japanese Kwantung Army conducted large-scale military exercises in Manchuria. With the number of Japanese troops stationed in the region mounting to 700,000, it was believed that the Japanese military was planning to attack the Soviet Union. It was also thought that the Germans had pres­ sured the Japanese to attack the Soviets from the East.41 Although Stalin had signed a Neutrality Act with the Japanese on April 13, 1941, it did not seem to hold much promise of preventing a Japanese attack. Under such pressure, Stalin cabled Mao and asked him to move several Chinese Communist brigades or regiments to the Great Wall region in order to tie up the Japanese forces. Mao did not refuse outright, but he instead re­ sponded by saying that his troops were ill equipped and would suffer serious losses if drawn into a large-scale battle with the Japanese.42 In late 1941, Stalin made a similar request when Moscow was surrounded by Hitler's troops, to which Mao responded that it would be very difficultto move his troops.43 In July 1942, Hitler began his summer campaign against Stalingrad. Ru­ mors again pointed to possible Japanese military cooperation in the form of an attack on the Soviet Union fromthe East. To forestall sucha threat, Stalin, while fortifyingthe defenses of the city, cabled Mao forhelp three times. In the firstcable, Stalin suggested that Mao move one or two divisions of the Eighth Route Army to receive new Soviet weaponry at the border between Inner and Outer Mongolia. Mao's fear that the Japanese might bomb the large columns of Chinese troops outweighed his desire fornew weapons, and he responded that it was impossible to comply with the request.44 In the second cable message, Stalin asked Mao if it was possible to send guerrilla forces to receive weapons at the border between Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. Again, Mao responded negatively.45 In early 1943, in the third cable, Stalin asked if Mao could move several divisions to the Great Wall region to tie up the Japanese units so that they couldn't move on Soviet forces. This time, Mao decided that responding favorably to Stalin's request would not put Chinese forcesat risk of large-scale warfarewith the Japanese, and he moved the troops as asked. 46 The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 23

Mao's reluctance to comply with the firsttwo requests evidently infuriated Stalin. Through the Comintern, a series of telegrams was sent condemning Mao and the CCP.47 Even today, some Russian scholars are still bitter about Mao's refusal to help the Soviet Union on these occasions.48 The Comintern strategy in the early 1940s was to use all possible means to protect the Soviet Union, and every Communist party was supposed to do its part. Mao clearly did not cooperate with the Comintern strategy. It is possible that Mao did not believe he was in a position to help because his military forces had been seri­ ously crippled by the KMT's recent attack in southern China. It is also possi­ ble that Mao was retaliating forStalin 's past refusalto provide direct military aid to the CCP. According to Shi Zhe, who had access to all top-secret cables in the early 1940s, Stalin did not at first clearly state why the Chinese troops needed to be moved, but once Mao understood the reason forStalin's request, he quickly responded and moved some troops to the Great Wall region.49 Dur­ ing that time, Mao apparently did not fear that his behavior might result in his being ousted fromthe leadership of the CCP by the Comintern, as had hap­ pened to his predecessors. Supported by loyal comrades, such as Ren Bishi and Chen Yun, who had gone to Moscow in 1938 to lobby forMao's selection as the top leader of the party, 50 he presumably felt confidentthat his power base was sufficientlysecure in his own country to protect him from the wrath of the Comintern. In the early 1940s, Stalin was also irritated by Mao's Rectification Cam­ paign, which lasted from 1941 to 1944. While Stalin's hands were tied by the German invasion, Mao was busy getting rid of some Chinese leaders who had been trained in Moscow-Wang Ming, in particular. The RectificationCam­ paign was Mao's attempt to consolidate his own political power by getting rid of the "internationalists" within the CCP at a time when Stalin could not in­ terfere with him. Mao may have felt that he could eliminate real or potential rivals with less concern about external interference afterthe dissolution of the Comintern in June 1943, even though many of its functions weretransf erred to the CPSU's Department of lnternational Information (OMI),51 which con­ tinued to intervene informallyin the affairs of all Communist parties. On December 22, 1944, Dimitrov, formerlyof the Comintern and now an OMI official, sent a rather lengthy cable to Mao in which he expressed deep concern about what Mao was doing to Wang Ming and Zhou Enlai and about the "dubious" role played by Kang Sheng in the campaign. 52 Mao responded with two cables to Dimitrov in which he gave his account of the situation. In the firstcable message, of December 22, 1943, Mao told Dimitrov that he and Zhou Enlai were "on very good terms," that Wang Ming was "unreliable;' and that Kang Sheng was reliable.53 In the second cable, dated January 7, 1944, Mao assured Dimitrov that the CCP's policy was striving to improve party 24 Chapter 1 unity, and he predicted better conditions in the party in 1944. 54 On February 25, 1944, responding to Mao's two cable messages, Dimitrov expressed delight at the reassurances contained in Mao's second cable, and he reiterated his hope that Mao would do the right thing-that is, give his "friendlyremarks the serious attention they required" and "take the appropriate measures as dictated by the interests of the party and [their] common cause."55 In addi­ tion, Dimitrov politely asked Mao to inform him in detail of the results of Mao's policy for internal party unity. 56 As is well known, Mao, despite his communications with Dimitrov, proceeded with the RectificationCampaign . In 1945, as Wo rld War II was coming to an end, Stalin was still doubtfulthat the CCP could win the civil war. He took a dual approach: on the one hand, he provided covert help to the CCP in Manchuria; on the other, he pressured Mao to stop the civil war and go to Chongqing to negotiate with Chiang Kai­ shek. 57 Mao did not like the idea of negotiating with Chiang, but he went nonetheless, again yielding to Stalin's pressure. Years later, in March 1956, when Mao met with Pavel Yudin and talked about the mistakes that Stalin had made in China, Mao complained: "I was required to go [to Chongqing] since Stalin had insisted on this."58

Recognizing the Need to Improve Relations Toward the end of the 1940s, Stalin and Mao began to realize that they needed to improve their relationship forpractical reasons, forinstance, to deal with security issues,59 but more fundamentally they recognized that they needed to improve their relationship now that the KMT had been defeated and the CCP held the reins of power. Beginning in early January 1949, high­ level meetings were held between the CCP and the CPSU to sort out various issues. Mao, Stalin, and other senior leaders of the two parties worked together closely to repair the relationship between Stalin and Mao that had been strained forsome time. Stalin was excited at the prospect of a worldwide victory forsocialism, and he decided to assist China. In May 1948, he told Ivan Kovalev that he had de­ cided to help the Chinese Communists because they were winning:

Of course we will give new China all possible help. If socialism also triumphs in China and our two countries followthe same road, the victory of socialism in the world may be considered a foregoneconclusion ....That is why we cannot spare any efforts and resources to help the Chinese communists.60

Stalin's statement departed from his long-held view that the Chinese Com­ munists were not strong enough to win the war and that they should there- The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 25 forework with the KMT. A few days afterStalin's statement to Kovalev about helping China, Stalin read aloud to him passages written by Lenin on the im­ portance of the Chinese Revolution.61 Stalin's excitement about the victory of socialism in China, as a major step toward its triumph worldwide, did not necessarily arise purely from ideolog­ ical passion. Stalin was no doubt eager to extend his influence over a neigh­ boring country that shared his ideological commitments. The Chinese Com­ munist leader Zhou Enlai, at least, saw it that way and in 1954 commented to Liu Xiao, the newly appointed Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union: "Of course, after we won,Stalin was happy, because he had a new China as a neigh­ bor."62 Zhou's comment captured perhaps what other CCP leaders felt was Stalin's view: Stalin preferred to have as a neighbor a pro-Soviet Communist China rather than a pro-American Republican China. Stalin's actions toward China were motivated by both state and revolutionary interests. 63 In the late 1940s, although Stalin repeatedly expressed his willingness to as­ sist the Chinese Communists, his offers always carriedwith them certain lim­ itations. Such offers, however, were improvements on his view in 1927 that what the CCP really needed were Chinese-language versions of the Marxist­ Leninist literature and competent "Soviet nannies" who could teach the Chi­ nese Communists how to carry out a revolution.64 This time, Stalin offeredto help the CCP learn about government administration, industry, and whatever else they might wish to learn.65 Anastas Mikoyan, however, made it clear that the CCP was expected to pay for everything they received from the Soviet Union and that aid would be limited to organizing arms production and pro­ viding advisers. 66 Stalin, however, was generous when he met Mao face-to-face between late 1949 and early 1950 and in summer 1952. In addition to shared ideological commitments, Mao had two major prac­ tical reasons for wanting to improve his relations with Stalin and the CPSU. First, Mao was seriously concerned about whether the CCP could govern. In late 1947, as the news from thefront lines became more positive, he became more confidentthat victory was within reach, but he was beginning to face the challenge of governing, saying that "the issue is no longer whether we will win, but whether we dare to seize the victory." A meeting was held in Yangjiagou in December 1947 to resolve the issue "do we dare to take the victory?"67 Mao's feelingof being overwhelmed by the coming task of governing China was re­ vealed in his cable to Stalin in May 1948 in which he admitted that the CCP lacked experience in running the complex economies of big cities and he asked Stalin forhelp. 68 A second major reason Mao wanted to improve his relationship with Stalin and the CPSU was to be assured that the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European people's democracies would recognize the PRC as a legitimate nation 26 Chapter 1 once the new Communist regime was established. Mao expressed his concern by saying that "if no foreign countries recognize us three days afterwe estab­ lish the nation, we will be in trouble."69 It was never made clear why Mao was so obsessed with the fe ar that the PRC would not be recognized by other coun­ tries. His concern was nonetheless intense, and it increased his feeling of de­ pendency on Stalin and the countries of Eastern Europe. Although Mao disagreed with Stalin from time to time, in general he re­ ported to Stalin and took instructions from him on a regular basis via cable messages. This was especially true in the late 1940s, during the period of in­ tense preparation forruling the country. Mao wrote letters and exchanged ca­ bles with Stalin frequentlyto report on the war situation in China, on negoti­ ations with warlords, and on his analysis of the progress of the Chinese Revolution.70 These frequent communications between Mao and Stalin sug­ gest an improving relationship between the two men and a willingness on Mao's part to return to the old hierarchical and dependent relationship of re­ porting to the Comintern and Stalin and seeking advice fromth em. As early as 194 7, Mao made several attempts to visit Moscow to resolve dif­ ferences between the two parties and at the same time to consult with Stalin on substantive policy issues.71 This was especially true in the late 1940s, when the need forconsultation was more urgent in connection with the civil war. In his cable to Moscow on September 28, 1948, shortly after theimportant Sep­ tember Conference, during which the CCP leaders discussed postwar China's economic policies, Mao made known his desire to visit Moscow. In the cable, he indicated that it was essential forhim to be able to meet with Stalin in per­ son in order to report on developments in China and to receive instructions from Stalin.72 Again, Stalin offered neither an invitation to visit Moscow nor a straight answer as to why Mao should not come. Stalin finallyinformed Mao in spring 1949 that it was important forMao to remain in China at this criti­ cal juncture in the revolution. Stalin's comment recognizing Mao's impor­ tance to the revolution delighted him.73 Since Mao could not travel to Moscow, Stalin sent Anastas Mikoyan, a Soviet leader with stature, to China.

High-Level Meetings Mikoyan's visit to China was important because he was able to learn about the CCP's positions on a wide range of policy issues, including the CCP's plans for organizing a new governing structure after military victory. Mao also used this opportunity to convey to Stalin, via Mikoyan, his willingness to be a deferential junior partner. In the past, Mao had referred to Stalin as the boss,74 and during his conversations with Mikoyan in Xibaipo in early February 1949, Mao emphasized the willingness of the CCP to receive instructions and guid- TheHisto rical Background and Contemporary Setting 27 ance fromthe Central Committee of the CPSU. 75 Apparently, Mao fe lt it was not enough to express his loyalty orally. In written reports submitted to Stalin in summer 1949 when Liu Shaoqi visited Moscow, Mao reemphasized the readiness of the CCP to receive instructions as well as criticism from Stalin and the CPSU: «We wish the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee and Comrade Stalin not to hesitate in giving instructions to the CPC [sic] and in criticizing its work and policy."76 Such expressions of humility and subor­ dination continued and were especially evident when Mao needed help from Stalin. In summer 1952, when Zhou was negotiating Soviet aid for China's FFYP, the same forms of expression were used. 77 If there was still any doubt about the CCP's obedience, in the report delivered to Stalin by Liu, mentioned above, it was stated that the CCP would «submit to and resolutely carry out the decisions of the Soviet Communist Party."78 Mao's subservient posture toward Stalin was the result of Mao's awareness of all the areas in which he depended on Stalin forhelp as he prepared him­ self to rule China: aid in the finalstage of the war effort, assistance in forming a new regime, support in reaching out to the international community, mili­ tary protection from attack by other powers, and assistance in building a strong military and a strong socialist economy. Mao's dependency on Stalin affected the overall structure of their relationship, and Mao had to use caution and tact in dealing with Stalin. Conversely, Stalin was in a position to influ­ ence Mao's policies and actions. Maintaining an overtly humble posture did not mean that Mao would fol­ low Stalin's «instructions" to the letter. In general, Mao was more receptive to Stalin's advice on political matters;79 on matters concerning the economy, Mao was more selective and followed Stalin's advice only where he agreed with him. As it turned out, Mao honored only partially the pledge of obedi­ ence he made in summer 1949. It is doubtfulthat Mao ever had any intention of carrying out his pledge fully. He made it, almost certainly, to play to Stalin's ego and win his support. Liu's visit to Moscow in summer 1949 was significant because it resolved many outstanding issues and paved the way forMao's visit to Moscow. Most importantly, Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would recognize the PRC as soon as it was established.80 This put Mao's most serious concern to rest. Stalin admitted that the treaty the Soviet Union had signed with the KMT in 1945 was unequal in giving the Soviet Union control over Chinese ports and terri­ tory, and Stalin promised to abolish the treaty when Mao visited Moscow. With regard to Port Arthur, which was still being occupied by the Soviet Red Army at the time, Stalin offered a seemingly contradictory commitment. While emphasizing the importance of having the Soviet army stationed there, he agreed to withdraw his troops as soon as the United States removed its 28 Chapter 1

forces from Japan. He, however, added that he was ready to remove the Red Army at any time Mao asked him to do so.81 Stalin also took the initiative in improving relations with the CCP. On July 27, 1949, during a CPSU Politburo meeting attended by a Chinese delegation led by Liu, Stalin analyzed Liu's four-part written report.82 Stalin apologized forhis past interference in China's internal affairs and forany harm he had caused the CCP. He expressed regrets forhis intervention in the Chinese civil war and admitted that in pressuring Mao to go to Chongqing to negotiate with Chiang, he was supporting what could have been a dangerous mission forMao. Liu replied that Stalin had not interfered; that Mao did not need to go to Chongqing because Zhou was already there, but that it was good he had gone; and that Stalin had not caused any harm to the CCP. 83 The members of the Chinese delegation were impressed by Stalin's readiness to admit mis­ takes, 84 but Mao himself never really forgave Stalin forinte rfering in the civil war or forforcing him to negotiate with Chiang. 85 In addition to his apology, Stalin praised the Chinese Communists forthe experience they had obtained in the practical application of Marxism. Stalin stated that "the Soviet Union may know more about Marx's general theories, but we should learn from you about applications."86 Stalin's praise probably was more pleasing to Mao than to any other Chinese leader, forhe regarded himself as one who knew how to apply the theories of Marxism and Leninism to Chinese conditions. 87 In the early 1940s, Mao wrote an article entitled "On the Practice" to fightagainst what he perceived to be dogmatism in the study and application of Marxism within the CCP, and he launched his Rectification Campaign in 1941 on the basis of this view. Mao may have taken Stalin's praise as a vindication of his unique qualifications to apply Marxism to China's cir­ cumstances. Stalin carved out areas of responsibility forthe CCP in the world Commu­ nist movement. Stalin asked the Chinese Communists to assume more re­ sponsibility forthe world revolutionary movement, especially in the countries of East Asia. 88 Stalin believed that the center of revolution had "shifted from the West to the East, and now it [had] furthershifted to China and Asia." Stalin said to the Chinese delegation, "Your responsibility has grown even more .... Yo u must do your duty in regard to revolution in the countries of East Asia."89 Stalin's new assignment forMao and the CCP-to be the leader of the revo­ lutionary movement in the East Asian countries-inspired a new self-confi­ dence in the Chinese leaders. Mao and Liu "soon got down to formulating the original strategy and tactics of [a] revolutionary movement in [the] Asian countries."90 In my view, this statement by Stalin marked the beginning, with Stalin's blessing, of a leadership position for the CCP in third-world revolu­ tionary movements. The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 29

In spite of all the effort devoted to mending fe nces with the CCP, Stalin de­ cided to reject the CCP's request to join the Cominform,which was founded in 1947. It is difficult to understand his action, but Stalin was sure about his reasoning. In Stalin's view, since China was different from the Eastern Euro­ pean people's democracies, the policy orientation should also be different, and it was thereforenot necessary forthe CCP to join the Cominform.Stalin out­ lined two major differences between China and the countries of Eastern Eu­ rope. First, the Chinese had, fora long time, been oppressed by imperialism. In 1949, Stalin said that ((China [had] to exert tremendous efforts to resist pressure from imperialism."91 Second, the situation of the national bour­ geoisie in China was very different fromthat in the Eastern European people's democracies. It is not clear whether Mao ever accepted Stalin's explanation.

Mao's Visit to Moscow: December 1949 to February 1950 In mid-December 1949, Mao began his first visit to Moscow. Although Stalin had been slow in extending an invitation, Mao finallyreceived one after repeated requests made through his lieutenants.92 The official reason forthe visit was to celebrate Stalin's seventieth birthday, but Mao had his own agenda. Signing a friendshiptreaty with Stalin was a top priority. Other issues forMao included the Soviet base in Port Arthur, Soviet control of the Changchun Rail­ road, and the status of the port of Dalian, which was then under joint Soviet­ Chinese administration. These issues were important forMao because they all affected China's sovereignty. Mao, in addition, wanted to discuss with Stalin "key theoretical and practical problems of the communist movement in the world"; before going to Moscow, he therefore he spent considerable time preparing forhis visit. 93 One Chinese source who was close to Shi Zhe told me that Mao actually wanted to use the opportunity to ((pour out his bitter fe el­ ings" about his colleagues and their mistreatment of him during the 1930s. Mao, in fact, triedto do so at least twice during his meetings with Stalin, but Stalin was quick to change the subject.94 Unlike Liu's trip in summer 1949, which had produced little controversy, Mao's trip had more drama to it, including Stalin's initial snub of Mao and re­ fusalto meet with him,95 cultural differences, misunderstandings,96 and Mao's displeasure at being criticized by Stalin.97 The most surprising event was prob­ ably Stalin's unexpected criticism of Marshal Tito at the party given by Mao just prior to his departure.98 Aside fromall the drama, Mao's trip to the Soviet Union was quite successful. EvenMao himself expressed his satisfaction with what he was able to accomplish during his visit. Speaking to his aides in his special train on his way home, Mao said that he obtained the friendshiptreaty he had wanted and that he had received assurances from Stalin that Port 30 Chapter 1

Arthur, the Changchun Railroad, and Dalian would all eventually be returned to China. In addition, he signed several agreements with Stalin.99 Mao had good reason to believe that he had gained more from thefriendship treaty and other agreements negotiated with the Soviet Union than he had given away. In 1956, explaining the importance of the treaty, Mao said that it "determined the possibilities forthe furtherdevelopment of the PRC." 100 Mao did make certain concessions. He acquiesced to Stalin's requests in sev­ eral areas, including the terms governing the participation of Soviet personnel in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock companies101 and the guarantee of high salaries, good living conditions, and extraterritorial legal status forSoviet advisers and experts in China. 102 Mao also agreed to grow rubber trees in Hainan and then export the rubber produced to the Soviet Union. 103 Ambitious planting efforts began in late 1950. Soviet advisers and equipment were dispatched to the area to work with the Chinese. In the end, the program to build a large rubber plantation in the Hainan area failed becauseof the unsuitability of the climate forrubber trees. 104 In recent years, much has been written about how Stalin treated Mao in Moscow. The writings of Soviet officials who witnessed the interactions be­ tween the two leaders differ from those of the Chinese who observed the same events. The Soviet writers, with the exception of Nikolai Fedorenko, 105 typi­ cally report that Mao was treated badly by Stalin, while the Chinese portray Mao as having been treated well by Stalin.106 Mao would have agreed with most Russian writers; in 1958, in a conversation with Pavel Yudin, the former ambassador to China, he complained bitterly about how Stalin and others had attacked him while he was in Moscow.107 Mao expressed his view on the mat­ ter two years afterNikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization of 1956, when making statements critical of Stalin was acceptable. A recent account, by Li Jiaji, Mao's bodyguard, portrays Stalin as being at­ tentive to Mao on several occasions. First, Stalin sent his chief bodyguard and his favoriteattendant to the border to meet Mao and take care of his needs as soon as he entered Soviet territory. 108 Second, while Mao was in Moscow, he stayed at Stalin's villa.109 These generous gestures on Stalin's part might be considered trivial matters, mere shows of "superficial politeness," and in no way capable of compensating forhi s slowness in responding to Mao's desire fora friendship treaty, but it appears that Stalin did make some effort to be a good host. From his perspective as a non-Russian speaker and a lowly body­ guard who observed Mao's behavior and moods at the time, Li believed that Stalin was respectful toward Mao and that Stalin's respect forMao exceeded his respect forother world leaders. Li also observed that although Mao was usually deferential toward Stalin, Mao occasionally made provocative com­ ments to him.110 Li's account of Mao's dealings with Stalin accords with what Shi Zhe, another Chinese observer, describes in his book. 111 The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 31

Mao's Dependency on Stalin

From the late 1940s, as the CCP's victory in the civil war became clear, Mao became increasingly dependent on Stalin. This dependency began in 1945 with some military assistance, mainly in Manchuria. Mao greatly appreciated this early aid.112 Soviet support was then expanded to include economic, po­ litical, and technical assistance. Chinese requests for substantial Soviet aid began in late 1947 with regional leaders in Manchuria, such as Lin Biao and Gao Gang.113 In addition to regional leaders, top CCP leaders, including Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Ren Bishi, all requested Soviet aid when they met with Mikoyan in Xibaipo in early February 1949. They asked forweapon ry, equipment for weapons production, raw materials, steel rails, gasoline, vehi­ cles, and specialists of various kinds. In addition, Liu wanted Soviet help in re­ pairing the Anshan steel plant. Mao asked fora loan of $300 million, the most expensive request of all. 114 Since Soviet advisers were included as possible categories of aid on the list the Chinese received fromMikoyan, Mao and Liu asked Stalin in spring and summer 1949 to send Soviet advisers to China. In May 1949, Mao cabled Stalin and asked for Soviet advisers to help China in two areas: military and economic. 115 In early August of the same year, Liu, while in Moscow, wrote a personal letter to Stalin and made a strong appeal: "I beg you to give orders for speeding up the preparatory work of the Soviet specialists leaving forChina. "116 Liu's appeal was answered. As he concluded his successfulvisit to Moscow in August 1949, he took some eighty Soviet advisers with him to China. Unfortunately, these advisers did not stay in China long, for they were overqualified for the jobs that needed to be done.117 Lower-level experts and advisers, however, came after the establishment of the PRC. 118 Mao also depended on Stalin politically. As discussed earlier, as Mao pre­ pared to rule China, he was seriously concerned about whether his new regime would be recognized by the larger international community and was counting on immediate recognition by the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Mao was hoping that Stalin would act as a bridge to the larger international community and would help China gain the sympathy and re­ spect of other nations. One of Liu's most important missions during his July 1949 visit to Moscow was to convey Mao's wishes to Stalin.119 In addition to receiving military aid from the Soviet Union, Mao was also depending on Stalin's military assistance to liberate Xinjiang fromthe KMTin 1949, to deter Chiang Kai-shek fromconducting air raids on Shanghai in 1949, and to help China build modern air and naval forces beginning in 1949.120 Closely related to Mao's reliance on Stalin formilitary aid was his dependence on Stalin forChina's national security. Mao was keenly aware of this need and 32 Chapter 1 worked extremely hard during his visit to Moscow in the winter of 1949-1950 to get Stalin to sign the friendshiptrea ty. Afterthe establishment of the PRC in October 1949, Mao looked to Stalin forhelp in rebuilding the economy, strengthening and equipping the military to fight the Korean War, dealing with national emergencies, establishing schools to train officialsand cadres to run the country, and even in providing medical care forhis lieutenants. Mao's dependency on Stalin, as a result, con­ tinued to grow. It even extended to Mao's coming to rely on Stalin forChina's FFYP and industrialization. For reasons that are not clear, Mao did not re­ quest Stalin's help in providing relief forunemp loyed workers in Shanghai or forstarving peasants in several famine-stricken regions of China. Although it was not widely known until recently, Stalin provided substan­ tial aid to China during the economic recovery period (1949-1952). In Feb­ ruary 1950, during Mao's visit to Moscow, Stalin and Mao signed an agree­ ment that committed the Soviet Union to help China with forty-seven projects, which became the firstwave of the total of 156 projects forwhich the Soviet government provided assistance in connection with China's FFYP. Of the forty-sevenprojects, twenty-two consisted of rebuilding or expanding ex­ isting factories or industrial complexes; the other twenty-five were new in­ dustrial projects. The majority of the projects, thirty-six out of forty-seven, were in the Northeast. Between 1950 and 1952, seventeen of the twenty-five new projects were begun with Soviet aid; they covered five strategically im­ portant industrial sectors: coal, power, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, and machinery and engineering. Needless to say, these projects were important for China, not so much foreconomic recovery as for thecountry's later economic development.121 Mao's requests forec onomic assistance during this time were not only for large-scale industrial complexes, but also forspecial small-scale projects. For example, in late 1949, the Chinese government asked the Soviet government to provide assistance to alleviate the electricity shortage in Anshan, a northern industrial city.122 At about the same time, the Chinese government also asked the Soviet Union to send a group of naval officersto provide guidance and as­ sistance in raising a sunken ship. 123 In both cases, the requests were granted. China also asked forhelp in repairing the Jilin hydroelectric power station and providing aviation fuelfor aircraft used to train Chinese pilots. These requests were also granted, and Mao was informed of the positive Soviet response on January 6, 1950, while he was in Moscow.124 As the Korean War continued and China increased its war effort, Mao dis­ patched his minister forhea vy industry, He Changgong, to Moscow in early January 1951 to seek urgent help from Stalin to expand China's military in­ dustry, which was insignificant at the time. Specifically, Mao wanted to have The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 33 the capacity to repair airplanes and to produce the Soviet version of the Ford Model T A3-51 automobile. The Soviet version of the Model T A3-51 had proven itself to be effective in combat conditions. To build an airplane repair facility, the Chinese asked foradvisers, technology, equipment, materials, and parts. For the production of Soviet Model T A3-51, China sought both per­ sonnel and technical support.125 Building these facilities maynot have had an immediate impact on China's military capabilities, for it would take some time to complete these projects, but it was a sure way to build up China's mil­ itary industries. Mao also depended on Stalin's help in establishing a new university, called Renmin Daxue (Chinese People's University). The university was created to train officialsto run the government and lecturers to teach "political studies,, in China's colleges and universities. Mao's initial request for assistance was de­ livered to Stalin by Liu Shaoqi during his visit to Moscow in summer 1949. In late December 1949, the CCP issued a formalinvitation to the Soviet govern­ ment forfifty Soviet professors and lecturers to come to teach at Chinese Peo­ ple's University. In the beginning, the Chinese wanted to invite ninety, but the number had to be reduced due to a shortage of housing forvisiting faculty.1 26 At about the same time, Mao made a personal plea, through Ivan Kovalev, for nine instructors to be sent to Chinese People's University.127 It is not clear whether Mao was submitting his request as part of the Chinese government's overall request or as a separate one. In any event, the need forSoviet profes­ sors and lecturers for the newly established university was real. 128 In addition to Chinese People's University, the Beijing Institute forMarx­ ism and Leninism, later known as the Central Party School, was also in des­ perate need of experienced Soviet professors. By summer 1953, the institute had three Soviet professors. On July 27, 1953, the CCP Central Committee ca­ bled the CPSU Central Committee and requested that fouradditional profes­ sors be sent to teach at the institute. The Chinese specificallywanted profes­ sors who could do more than just teach Marxist and Leninist theories-who, forinstance, could help develop a party school or establish an academy forso­ cial sciences. 129 Mao also depended on Stalin when confrontedwith crises of various sorts. He had no hesitation, forexample, in seeking Stalin's help in fall 1949 to deal with an outbreak of plague that had already caused sixty deaths in the area north of the city of Zhangjiakou in Hebei Province. On October 28, 1949, Mao cabled Stalin and asked forvaccines and a team of plague experts to be sent and insisted on paying all of the expenses-but in goods, not in cash. 130 At the time Mao made this request, over thirty Soviet medical specialists were just returning from the Northeast where they had been dealing with an out­ break of plague; Mao was asking Stalin to send another such group to the area 34 Chapter 1

near Zhangjiakou. Stalin cabled the next day and agreed to Mao's request. Mao was grateful forStalin's help and quickly expressed his appreciation in a cable to Stalin the followingday. 131 Again, in June 1951, Stalin was asked forhelp in coping with a plague of Asian locusts in the Suzhou region in northern Anhui Province. If the situa­ tion were not controlled quickly, between August and October, the locusts would grow wings, become migratory, and destroy crops in other regions as well. The consequences forthe harvest in 1951 would be dire. On this occa­ sion, Mao was not directly involved. Instead, Wu Xiuquan, the deputy foreign minister, contacted an official at the Soviet embassy in Beijing on June 4, 1951, and asked forthree crop-dusting aircraftto be sent to China. As always, China would pay for all the expenses. Wu's request was quickly granted; five days later, on June 11, 1951, three crop-dusting aircraft were on their way to China.132 Mao asked Stalin for help and received it when other emergency situations arose. For example, on November 21, 1949, acting on the recommendation of Soviet doctors, Mao cabled Stalin and asked forper mission to send Ren Bishi, his loyal supporter and a senior member of the CCP, who was very ill, to Moscow formedical treatment.133 Stalin gave his permission. None of these requests approached the scale of Mao's request to Stalin in summer 1952 to support China's FFYP and the associated development of heavyind ustry. The entire effort rested upon Soviet aid. Mao may have felt he deserved the Soviet Union's help in return forChin a's intervention in the Ko­ rean War. Stalin responded generously to Mao's request. He promised to sup­ port the FFYP and China's heavy industrialization and said to Zhou Enlai, then in Moscow, "everything we can give you, we will." 134 Stalin's generosity may have been his way of expressing his appreciation forChina's role in the Korean War and forMao's success in rebuilding China's economy. Stalin's en­ gagement with China's FFYP did not stop with economic assistance; Soviet planners were deeply involved with redrafting the plan itself.135 Although ne­ gotiations forSoviet aid to support China's FFYP were not completed until well afterStalin's death, the commitment he made in summer 1952 shaped the overall scope of Soviet aid to China until the late 1950s. While highly dependent on Stalin in a wide range of areas, Mao did not seek aid from the Soviet Union in dealing with two problems. In the early 1950s, Shanghai suffered fromhigh unemployment; some 150,000 workers were out of jobs. In addition, a large number of rural areas faced famine due to poor harvests. Even though they were faced with such grave conditions, Mao and other CCP leaders were determined to find solutions on their own, without help fromthe Soviet Union. 136 It is not clear why Mao made a distinction be­ tween these situations, where he was unwilling to seek help, and the many oth- TheHisto rical Background and Contemporary Setting 35 ers where he requested assistance. Some Soviet leaders, especially those op­ posed to providing aid to China, argued that if China accepted Soviet assis­ tance in these two areas, Western "imperialists" could challenge the CCP's competence to run the country and manage the economy. 137 It is not known what Mao was thinking on these matters, but it is possible that he feared that China's national pride and prestige could be put at risk by making requests for assistance in these two areas.

Stalin's Constraints on Mao and the CCP

Stalin was able to impose a wide range of constraints on Mao and the CCP due to his stature, his past achievements, and Mao's dependence on him, as discussed above. Mao appeared to be particularly receptive to Stalin's sugges­ tions on political matters; in 1948, he followedStalin's advice and organized a coalition government that included non-Communist parties. Mao became even more compliant to Stalin's advice after Mao declared his "lean-on-one­ side policy" in summer 1949 and pledged to followStali n's "instructions." In that same year, Mao followedStalin 's advice in establishing the PRC much ear­ lier than he had originally intended. Later, in 1952, Stalin urged Mao to es­ tablish a one-party political structure based on a written constitution and a parliamentary body, and in 1954, as instructed, Mao instituted a one-party system based on a written constitution and a National People's Congress.138 In dealing with politically sensitive issues in the Communist world at the time, Mao was also compliant. In 1948, when Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform, Mao showed his unwavering support, and in 1949, to please Stalin, Mao also ignored Tito's offer to recognize the PRC. 139 Until March 1955, Mao continued to align himself with the harsh Soviet campaign against Tito. Mao labeled Tito's Yugoslavia a bourgeois country and declared that leaders like Tito and Kardelj could not be trusted, forthey were closely aligned with the imperialist states.140 Mao's attitude toward Tito and Yugoslavia, how­ ever, changed dramatically afterKhrushchev's de-Stalinization speech in 1956. As Mao tried to mend relations with Tito and the Yugoslav Communists dur­ ing that year, he presented himself as having been powerless in dealing with Stalin. In explaining his decision not to respond to Tito's offerto recognize China in 1949, he admitted that he had not been in a position to challenge Stalin.141 One particular constraint Stalin was able to impose on Mao that has re­ ceived little or no attention by Western scholars was Stalin's refusalto recog­ nize the existence of a school of thought called "Mao Zedong sixiang;' or "Mao Zedong thought," even though it had been recognized by the CCP since 1945. 36 Chapter 1

Whenever an official CCP document containing the term ((Mao Zedong thought" was received in Moscow, the term was deleted from thetext before the document was published in the Soviet press. 142 This treatment must have been frustrating and humiliating for Mao, who desperately wanted to be rec­ ognized as an accomplished Marxist theoretician. Since he was not in a posi­ tion to change the situation, Mao acquiesced to Stalin's wishes. Stalin's refusal, however, kept Mao from obtaining the recognition he desired, not only in the Communist world, but also in his own country. It was only after the Sino­ Soviet rift in 1960 that Mao finally felt free to use the term ((Mao Zedong thought" to refer to his ideas.143 In the late 1940s, as Mao's prestige grew within the CCP, some party lead­ ers suggested that the term «Maoism" ("Mao Zedong zhuyi") should be used in place of the term «Mao Zedong thought," but Mao was quick to dismiss such a usage. He told party leaders responsible foreducation in the liberated areas to make sure that all students learned the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and that they studied China's revolutionary experience. In early 1949, Mao also deleted the term ((Mao Zedong thought" from anofficial document. 144 In an effort to reassure Stalin and other Soviet leaders that he had no pretensions to being an important Marxist theorist, Mao told Mikoyan in early February 1949 that he had ((strongly objected to the idea oflinking his own name with those of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin," and he emphasized repeatedly that he was Stalin's disciple, 145 but Mikoyan was not convinced of Mao's sincerity.146 During the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Com­ mittee meeting in March 1949, Mao reiterated his position that it was wrong to list his own name along with those of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, the four Communist giants.147 Despite these overtures, Mao still wanted Stalin to recognize him as a serious Marxist theoretician. On December 16, 1949, during one of his meetings with Mao, Stalin sug­ gested that some of Mao's written works be published in Russia. 148 This was a turning point for Mao; while he was sometimes uncooperative in dealing with Stalin, Stalin's approval meant a great deal to him. Mao must have been over­ joyed to hear that his works would be published in the Russian language. He probably thought Stalin had finallyrealized that his writings represented an important school of Marxist thought, but he could not have been more wrong. Chinese sources state that Stalin justifiedthe publication of Mao's writings on the grounds that they would help the people of the Soviet Union under­ stand the Chinese revolutionary experience.149 The Soviet record of Stalin's meeting with Mao, however, indicates only that Stalin said to Mao, ccwe would like to receive from you a list of your works which could be translated into Russian."150 Both Soviet and Chinese sources report that Mao asked Stalin for The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 37 help with the Russian translation and foreditorial assistance with the Russian text, 151 and a Chinese source states that Stalin recommended Pavel Yudin to provide editorial support. 152 Mao arrived back in Beijing in early March 1950, and in April he cabled Stalin and invited Yudin to come to China. 153 In May, a Politburo meeting of the CCP was held, during which Stalin's suggestion was discussed, and it was decided to forman editorial committee. Chen Boda and Tian Jiaying, two of Mao's secretaries, were assigned the task of assembling Mao's writings. Mao, of course, would make the final decision as to which writings would be in­ cluded in the collection. 154 In December 1950, on the basis ofYudin's recommendation and Stalin's ap­ proval, an article entitled "On Practice," the first of Mao's works to appear in Russian, was published in the December issue of Bolshevik, a Soviet Party magazine. Yudin personally liked the article very much. A Russian translation of a Chinese editorial was also included explaining that Mao wrote the article to respond to the dogmatism of some Chinese leaders in their interpretation and application of Marxism in China. The editorial also blamed the party's two major military setbacks, in 1931 and 1934, on mistakes arising from dog­ matism. That same month, Mao's article was introduced to the Soviet public, accompanied by a recommendation from the editorial board of Pravda. 155 Mao wanted the Chinese public to know as soon as possible of the positive publicity he was receiving in Moscow. On December 28, 1950, just as the sec­ ond military campaign against UN forces in Korea was about to end, Mao wrote to Hu Qiaomu, who at that time was the head of the government news agency, and asked him to publish "On Practice" and the Pravda editorial, on two consecutive days, in Renmin ribao [People's Daily]. They appeared there during the next two days.156 In January 1951, Mao's "On Practice" was pub­ lished in the Soviet Union as a booklet. 157 On April 1, 1951, perhaps as an expression of appreciation and reciprocity, Mao cabled Stalin and asked permission to translate the Complete Wo rks ofStalin into Chinese and outlined the steps that had already been taken on the project.158 Apparently, Stalin agreed to Mao's proposal. On October 25, 1953, volume 1 of the Selected Wo rks of Stalin was published in China, but by then Stalin had al­ ready been dead formore than seven months. Meanwhile, on October 12, 1951, the firstvolume of the reedited Chinese-language version of the Selected Wo rks of Mao Zedong (Mao's works were first published in the base areas in 1944) was published in China;159 six months later, in April 1952, the first volume of the Russian-language version of the Selected Wo rks of Mao Zedong was published in Moscow. Before the end of 1952, all three volumes of the Chinese-language ver­ sion of the Selected Wo rks of Mao Zedong had been published in China, and by December 1953, all four volumes of the Russian-language version of the Selected 38 Chapter 1

Wo rks of Mao Zedong-the longer Russian translation required one more vol­ ume than the original Chinese text-were published in Moscow. 160 The publication of Mao's works in both China and the Soviet Union must have given an enormous boost to Mao's self-confidence and his stature within the CCP in ideological and policy deliberations. Mao had come a long way from the days in the late 1930s when he had fe lt inferior to Wang Ming and other party leaders in his command of Marxist theories.161 All his intensive study of Marxist philosophical works in the late 1930s and early 1940s had paid off, 162 and Chen Boda's help in formulating and structuring Mao's thought in the early 1940s had been of vital importance.163 Stalin's offer to publish Mao's writings in Russian meant farmore to Mao than the earlier compliment about the importance of his leadership in the rev­ olutionary struggle and civil war against the KMT. The publication of his works in the Soviet Union gave Mao a claim to greater authority within the CCP in ideological and policy issues. This change in Mao's standing in the CCP was reflectedin his hands-on approach to the formulation of the general line in the early 1950s and his active role in selecting appropriate theories from the works of Lenin and Stalin to provide ideological legitimacy forthe general line. Stalin, however, had never intended to elevate Mao to a position as an equal in the Communist world. Stalin regarded himself as a Marxist theorist unri­ valed by anyone except Lenin. He clearly did not consider Mao to be on a par with himself; he probably thought of Mao as a second-rate theorist. Mao's writings were published by Stalin mainly as a political gesture, not because Stalin attributed any real importance to Mao's thought.164 In the early 1950s, however, Mao became very conscious of his newly elevated status, which Fred­ erick Teiwes described when he wrote of"Mao's conception of himself as a sig­ nificantMarxist theorist and his preoccupation with theory despite no par­ ticular distinction in this area." 165 During this time, Mao even allowed the term "Mao Zedong sixiang," or "Mao Zedong thought," to be used in party publications. Mao Zedong thought was defined by Mao as a "synthesis of Marxism, Leninism, and the Chinese revolutionary experience that provides the most advanced system of thought forthe CCP and the guiding principles forthe Chinese Revolution."166 Mao, however, must have received some indi­ cation of disapproval fromeither Stalin or the CPSU about his using the term "Mao Zedong thought" in party publications, forMao soon removed all such references to it. Mao changed his mind several times thereafter on the use of the term. In September 1952, Mao deleted the term "Mao Zedong thought" from anoffi­ cial document and issued instructions not to use the term in propaganda.167 In April 10, 1953, he deleted the term from another officialdocument. 168 Mao TheHisto rical Background and Contemporary Setting 39 showed indecision in the use of the term again shortly after Stalin's death in April 1953, when volume 3 of the Selected Wo rks of Mao was published in China. In this volume, Mao included the CCP party resolution of 1945, which firstgave the term "Mao Zedong thought" officialrecognition. Beforethe vol­ ume was published, however, Mao deleted all references to "Mao Zedong thought" from the version of the resolution that appeared in the volume. At the same time, he modified theversion of the resolution appearing in the vol­ ume to increase the number of references to Stalin's contributions to the Chi­ nese Revolution and to increase the number of times Stalin's name appeared in the text. 169 Mao, however, made more changes. On May 24, 1953, more than two months after Stalin's death, fe eling less constrained, Mao increased the num­ ber of references to his works in party publications by issuing instructions that party publications should use the term ((Mao Zedong zhuzuo;' or "Mao Ze­ dong works;' in place of the term ((Mao Zedong thought";170 Mao gave the same instructions more than a year later in 1954.171 In that same month of May 1953, the Chinese press reported that university professors in Beijing had begun to study systematically Mao's article on contradictions, documents pro­ duced during the CPSU's Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952, and Stalin's last work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.172 Although Mao was prevented from using the term "Mao Zedong thought" in China, he was not prohibited frompublicizing in China how his works were read and loved by people in the Eastern European people's democracies. In January 1953, three months beforeStalin's death, the party newspaper Renmin ribao printed a fe ature story telling of the enthusiasm with which the Hun­ garian people were purchasing and reading volume 1 of Mao's Selected Wo rks.173 After the death of Stalin, between June and December 1953, the So­ viet propaganda machine gave more publicity to Mao's works in the Soviet Union, possibly reflecting a desire on the part of the post-Stalin leadership to work with Mao, who must have welcomed the attention fromthe post-Stalin collective leadership. Eager to elevate his own position as a respected theoreti­ cian in China, he saw to it that party publications reported the publicity his works were receiving in the Soviet Union. During this time, fourarticles com­ menting on the Russian version of volumes 2 and 3 of Mao's Selected Wo rks were translated into Chinese and reprinted in Renmin ribao, including a lengthy article by Nikolai Fedorenko, Stalin's formerinterp reter.174 Since 1945, Stalin had been able to thwart Mao's ambition to be recognized as a theoretician who had made a significant contribution to the interpreta­ tion of Marxist theories and their application to Chinese conditions. It must have been a sore point between the two leaders. Mao continued to be influ­ enced by Stalin's position on this issue, even after Stalin's death. Mao must 40 Chapter 1 have been extremely frustrated, but he never complained about Stalin's high­ handedness on the matter, at least not in public. Mao's frustration may have been alleviated by the fact that during this time, he had complete control over theoretical matters in China.175

Patterns of Communications with Stalin after 1951

Mao's direct communications with Stalin became less frequentafter 1951 and were limited mostly to exchanges of messages on ceremonial occasions or ex­ pressions of appreciation forSoviet assistance. 176 There were times when Mao asked his lieutenants to express his appreciation forStalin's help on his behalf rather than do it himself. On March 4, 1952, Mao cabled Gao Gang and asked him to send a cable to Stalin using Mao's name to express appreciation forthe help of the Soviet experts at the steel mill in Angang. 177 Stalin continued to meet with Mao's top lieutenants, including Liu and Zhou, in summer 1952 and later in the year. In general, however, high-level meetings between top leaders were replaced more and more with meetings between lower-level lead­ ers of the two countries. Nikolai Roshchin, the Soviet ambassador to China, also met regularly with top CCP leaders; from such meetings, he learned a great deal about events in China.

The Death of Stalin

In early March 1953, just as Mao was beginning to formulate the general line, the Communist world was shaken by the death of Stalin. In China, as in other Communist countries, Stalin's death was publicly mourned, 178 but there are indications that Mao's instructions to cancel all recreational activities forthree days to mourn Stalin were ignored. One such case actually occurred in Mao's home province of Hunan, no less. Officials there refused to call offa sched­ uled sports event on the grounds that it would cost more money to cancel it than to proceed with it.179 On March 7, 1953, two days after Stalin's death, Renmin ribao published an editorial entitled "Mourning Deeply Our Teacher, the Great Comrade Stalin." Two days later, in the same paper, Mao published his own tribute to Stalin in an article entitled "The Greatest Friendship," in which he lavishly praised Stalin forhi s contributions to the development of Marxism. 180 Mao's bodyguard witnessed a saddened Mao who actually "wailed" when he learned of Stalin's death.181 It will probably never be known forsure whether Mao was really heartbroken or merely putting on a show. Soon after Stalin's death, profoundchanges were set in motion, not only in the Soviet Union, but also throughout the Communist world. The new Soviet The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 41 collective leadership soon made policy changes both domestically and inter­ nationally. Mao was informed of some of these policy changes as they were being adopted or when they were about to be implemented, especially with re­ gard to the new policy forEast Germany. But he was not consulted about most of them and did not approve of some important ones. In particular, when the Soviet Presidium, at Molotov's behest, passed a resolution calling foran end to the Korean War, marking a fundamental reversalof Stalin's policy, Mao was deeply irritated. 182 For the most part, however, he merely watched closely and adhered to the policy positions of the post-Stalin leadership. He asserted his independence, however, concerning China's economic policies and refusedto participate in the reappraisal of Stalin's role in Russian revolutionary history then taking place in the Soviet Union. The immediate result of Stalin's death was a CPSU succession crisis, which quickly became known around the world. Mao watched the Soviet succession struggle closely and proceeded cautiously in his dealings with the Soviet Union, waiting to see who would be the next leader. He had reason to be con­ cerned, forhe was counting on the Soviet aid that Stalin had promised. Even before Stalin's death, Mao had been aware of the quarrels within the top So­ viet leadership. While Liu was in Moscow between October 1952 and January 1953, Stalin had told Liu of the disputes within the top leadership over who should be his successor. 183 It appears that Mao did not really care who suc­ ceeded Stalin, but he did want a quick resolution to the succession struggle. In Mao's words, ((the sooner things stabilize, the better it will be forus." 184 Soon after the post-Stalin collective leadership was able to sort out its in­ ternal working relationships, it started to reorganize the party and govern­ ment structures, and it did so in a rather smooth fashion. 185 It also reorgan­ ized the trade unions186 and restored some popular support by releasing political prisoners through an amnesty decree. 187 Drastic changes also took place in elite politics. Several of Stalin's closest associates who did his dirty work were purged, including the infamous former head ofthe KGB, Lavrenti Beria. 188 To gether with the political purge, a reappraisal of Stalin's historical role in the Russian Revolution was conducted, the results of which were re­ flected in official Soviet propaganda. Stalin was no longer viewed as the founderof the CPSU and the Soviet state, that honor now being bestowed on Lenin alone. 189 Although Mao supported the purge of Beria, he was cautious publicly. He quickly reprinted in Renmin ribao the statement made by the Presidium of the Central Council of the All Soviet Trade Union in support of the expulsion of Beria from the CPSU, 190 which was firstreported by the Ta ss wire service on July 11, 1953. Although he continued to keep the Chinese public informed of developments in the Soviet Union, 191 he made no public statements. In De­ cember 1953, shortly afterBeria 's trial and execution, Mao finallydenounced 42 Chapter 1

him publicly as «a person of wicked ambition." 192 On December 27, 1953, Ren­ min ribao published its own editorial entitled ((The Great Victory of the Soviet People in Defeating Beria's Clique, Which Had Betrayed the Country." Pri­ vately, Mao had supported the actions of the Soviet leadership all along. As early as July 17, 1953, the CCP sent a report to the CPSU expressing strong support for its handling of the Beria affair. Mao believed that it was ((com­ pletely correct and necessary to expel Beria from thepar ty."193 Mao had similarly supported, at least publicly, the Soviet decision to estab­ lish a collective leadership. As with the Beria case, on July 15, 1953, he reprinted in Renmin ribao a Pravda editorial of July 13, 1953, entitled «Strictly Follow the Principles of Collective Leadership." Mao did not pick up the theme again until later that year. On November 26, 1953, a Renmin ribao edi­ torial emphasized the importance of «collective leadership," as did the leaders of the Eastern European people's democracies. It was never known for sure how Mao truly felt about the collective leadership. Mao also followed the post-Stalin collective leadership in its handling of Stalin's last written work, The Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., which was published in October 1952, just before the Nineteenth Party Con­ gress of the CPSU. In this book, Stalin reiterated his commitment to heavy in­ dustrialization at the fastest possible tempo, supported by the appropriation of grain from thepeasants. Mao quickly made Stalin's book available to sen­ ior CCP leaders in Beijing to study, and on November 7, 1952, the Central Committee of the CCP issued a directive instructing all party senior members to study Stalin's last work.194 By early December 1952, senior cadres at some twenty work units in Beijing had already studied it.195 During the first three months of 1953, more and more senior civilian and military cadres in China studied Stalin's work, and their study was widely reported in the Chinese media.196 On March 11, 1953, Renmin ribao even printed a Ta ss story of March 7, 1953, on how other Communist parties, labor parties, and working-class people were studying Stalin's last work. The trend, however, soon changed. During the first three months after Stalin's death, although the study of his latest work continued in the Soviet Union, it lacked the earlier passion. 197 Since Mao had decided to follow the lead of the post-Stalin collective leader­ ship, he took a similar position. During the same period, the Chinese media reported nothing about the study of Stalin's last book except forone item in Renmin ribao in early July. 198 The post-Stalin collective leadership also made changes in international policies, including an easing of control over East Germany. The changes not only created uncertainty but also marked the beginning of the breakdown of the tightly controlled world Communist system. The situation became fluid: uprisings occurred in East Germany199 and Czechoslovakia. Mao communi- The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 43 cated to the Soviet leaders in charge of propaganda his belief that the uprising in East Germany was stirred up by the West. For Mao, what had happened in East Germany was a purely political matter and had nothing to do with eco­ nomic problems.200 As with the Beria case, Mao handled coverage of the up­ risings in Eastern Europe carefullywith his domestic audience. Mao made no official statements about the uprisings; he instead reprinted in Renmin ribao on July 20, 1953, the Soviet explanation, which blamed the West, especially West Germany, forfomen ting the unrest that led to the uprisings. In Septem­ ber of the same year, a lengthy report on the June uprising-written by re­ porters forthe Xinhua wire service stationed in East Berlin-was included in an internal publication, read only by senior party leaders. 201 Mao, however, did show his support openly forthe Soviet position when he learned of the ex­ pulsion of the "anti-party elements" in East Germany.202 In another important international matter, the armistice ending the Korean War, Mao also supported the position taken by the post-Stalin leadership, though reluctantly. Reversing Stalin's position, the new Soviet leaders decided to end the war as quickly as possible. Mao expressed his desire to continue the fight forabout another year, arguing that, "from a purely military point of view," there were advantages to prolonging the conflict.203 He nevertheless fell into line with the strong position taken by Moscow. There were two major policy areas where Mao maintained his indepen­ dence. Mao asserted his independence regarding economic policy. He was fullyaware of Malenkov's "New Course," which was launched in August 1953 and challenged some of the ideas at the core of Stalin's developmental strat­ egy, especially his emphasis on heavy industry. 204 None of these new Soviet policies altered Mao's commitment to a Stalinist approach to economic poli­ cies in China. Far fromchallenging Stalin's legacy or his ideas about the path to socialism, Mao was unwavering in his commitment to them. Mao's action showed his determination to forge ahead with the general line for socialist transition. Mao also assumed an independent position concerning the attacks on Stalin's personality cult and the reappraisal of Stalin's role in the history of the Russian Revolution. Mao had good reason to take such a position. He was concerned that his lieutenants might get ideas from what was happening in the Soviet Union and challenge him. Stalin's death in March 1953 affected Mao and the CCP profoundly. In general, the CCP leadership was saddened by the death of Stalin because they genuinely felt they had lost a giant in the Communist world. On the other hand, the death of Stalin was a liberating ex­ perience, especially for Mao, who over the years had been forced to put up with many constraints as a result of his dependence on Stalin. With Stalin's death, suddenly there was no one to constrain Mao as Stalin had while he was 44 Chapter 1

alive, and top CCP leaders sensed that Mao was anxious (zhaoji) to move for­ ward with building socialism in China. 205 Freed of constraints, Mao was able to move quickly to begin China's transition to socialism in 1953. At the same time that he felt liberated, Mao also became more conscious of his position within the party. The Soviet criticism of Stalin's cult of personal­ ity had an effect on the CCP. Following the Soviet example, top CCP leaders within the party began to join in the criticism of the cult of personality. Mao took the hint, and in October 1953, he issued instructions forparty members to refer to him as Comrade Mao rather than Chairman Mao.206 Mao's concern about his position in the party might explain why he expressed no opinion about the reappraisal of Stalin's role in the Soviet Union.

New Democracy and China's Transition to Socialism

Two terms-((New Democracy" and the ((transition to socialism"-were fre­ quently used during the period under study, so a brief explanation of their meaning is in order. The term ((New Democracy" has been closely associated with Mao; he firstemployed the term in 1940 when he described it as the first of two phases of the Chinese Revolution, that is, the phase that precedes the socialist revolution itself. Its principal goals were defined as theoverthrow of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. In late 1947, Mao de­ fined the ((bureaucratic capitalist class" as consisting of China's fourwealthi­ est families: the Jiangs, the Songs, the Kongs, and the Chens.207 These four families owned and controlled giant conglomerates that dominated two­ thirds of the pre-1949 national economy. They also had close ties with the «imperial powers" and depended upon foreign capital. ((New Democracy" was a usefulconcept throughout the 1940s, forit served as an important vehicle to rally the Chinese people around a common goal: to defeat the Japanese imperialists and expel other imperialists from China.After 1945, Mao periodically redefined the term to fit his changing policies. In­ creasingly, the term lost any consistent meaning as Mao manipulated its meaning to achieve his immediate tactical objectives. Mao's first serious redefinition of the meaning of ((New Democracy" took place in 1948 when he became convinced that the CCP would be victorious in the civil war. The CCP had already established its dominant position in the Northeast and had seized a large number of industrial complexes that had be­ longed to the KMT and the Japanese. He may have wanted at that time to de­ clare that the firststage of the Chinese Revolution, the New Democracy, had come to an end and that the country was now entering into the second stage of the Chinese Revolution, the socialist revolution, but he did not. Instead, he The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 45 redefined"New Democracy" in terms of several characteristics. He announced that New Democracy in 1948 already had "socialist elements"208 and that they were present in every aspect of New Democracy, including politics, culture, and economy. He furtheremphasized the leading position of the state-owned economy in the overall national economy.209 He attempted to show that, at a conceptual level, New Democracy was, in developmental terms, very close to socialism. He decided, however, that the Chinese economy should, for the time being, continue to be called the New Democratic economy.210 There were political reasons forMao not to call an end to New Democracy in the late 1940s just as the CCP was about to take control of the country. In the first place,Stalin would not have supported such a decision. As will be discussed later, Stalin had advised Mao in April 1948 to establish a non-Communist po­ litical and economic order immediately after the CCP's military victory, and New Democracy was a more suitable setting forcreating such an order than was a socialist revolutionary stage. Secondly, based on a Leninist analysis of China's economic conditions at the time, Mao and other leaders recognized that China in the late 1940s was nowhere near the point necessary to start building a so­ cialist economic order. There was a consensus among the senior leaders that with the state-owned economy formingonly about 10 to 20 percent of the over­ all economy, it was impossible to build socialism in China.211 Thirdly, Mao was concerned about gaining the political support of a wide range of social groups; he therefore had to be careful not to give the impression that China was rush­ ing into a socialist system. At the same time that Mao was redefiningNew Democracy, a new concep­ tual framework was being created. In the fall of 1948, Liu Shaoqi, the number­ two man in the CCP party hierarchy, put together a theoretical framework called "the transition fromNew Democracy to socialism," which he created by adapting Lenin's concept, first put forward in 1918 and again in 1921, of the transition fromcapitalism to socialism. In 1921, Lenin recognized that the Rus­ sian economy had become excessively nationalized and overly centralized dur­ ing the era of war communism and that there was a need to change the party's policy. The treatment of the peasants was particularly brutal during this pe­ riod, as they were forcedto sell all of their surplus grain, and sometimes their own food,to the state. These radical policies proved to be disastrous; they not only brought the economy to the brink of collapse, but they also alienated the Russian peasantry. Under the New Economic Policy (NEP), Lenin abandoned these old policies and established a new system based on taxes in kind to re­ place the previous surplus-appropriation system. At the same time, private trade was legalized, and private enterprises were allowed to operate again. In the early 1920s, Lenin also came to realize that the party was incapable of running a complex economy; it needed help from capitalists, merchants, 46 Chapter 1

and experts. As Lenin repeatedly said during those days, "we have to learn from those people."212 Lenin wanted to drive home the point that the Soviet Union could not advance from the existing economic situation to socialism without going through intermediary steps.213 He analyzed the nature of the Soviet economy and redefinedits components. Liu reportedly analyzed both New Democracy and socialism and the tran­ sition between them at the September Conference of 1948. Party records in­ dicate that Mao was pleased with Liu's analysis. In addition, Mao decided that the idea of a transition should be ((publicized." He therefore instructed those attending the meeting to disseminate the idea when they returned to their own regions.214 It was understood among the top leaders as well as the party rank and fileat that time that a ten-to-fifteen-yeartransitional stage between New Democracy, which was the current stage, and socialism would be re­ quired. Only aftercompleting this transition would the country start to build socialism.215 The Chinese people were told in 1949 that the political order that had just been established was based on New Democracy, that a mixed econ­ omy would continue to exist, and that private property would be protected.216 In the late 1940s, as the CCP began to achieve the goals they had set in 1940 forthe New Democratic revolution, Mao and other party leaders redefined ((New Democracy" to fitthe party's policy agenda. Party leaders seemed to be convinced that Lenin's assessment in 1921 of the Soviet Union applied equally well to China in the late 1940s. They felt that a backward country like China, with a predominantly agrarian economy, was in no position to implement a rapid nationalization of the economy. As a tactical response, therefore, they recognized the need for a long transition period. In the late 1940s, Lenin's gradualist NEP was influential. There was no indication at that time of any support foran economic program that resembled the 1953 general line. The only policy idea in the late 1940s that can be traced to Stalin's no-nonsense ap­ proach to building socialism was the notion of using agriculture as a source of capital forindu strialization.

Soviet Sources forMao and the CCP

Mao and other CCP leaders relied on fourpr imary sources of information to learn about the Soviet experience as a guide for building socialism in China. First, there was the Short Course, as discussed earlier, which Mao used as a gen­ eral road map. It provided an outline of the developmental stages of the So­ viet Union between 1917 and 1937. Second, the Chinese leaders studied the relevant writings and speeches of Lenin and Stalin. Third, the Chinese leaders examined the CPSU party resolutions on economic policies issued during The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 47 each developmental stage of the Soviet Union. Fourth, in formulating con­ crete policies, especially the important ones, the Chinese leaders relied on advice from Soviet leaders-especially Stalin, but also Mikoyan and other leaders-as well as Soviet advisers and government and party officialsduring their many personal contacts. Of the foursources, Stalin's Short Course and Stalin's policy recommendations were especially important. In fashioningtheir policy programs foreach developmental stage in build­ ing socialism, the Chinese leaders sought the advice of Stalin and other lead­ ers. The importance given here to personal contacts with Soviet leaders con­ trasts with the argument made by Deborah A. Kaple in her book Dream of a Red Factory: The Legacy of High Stalin ism in China. She takes the position that the Chinese leaders, to guide them in their adaptation of Soviet-style indus­ trial management to Chinese conditions, relied almost exclusively on written materials translated from Russian, rather than on direct observation of the Soviet Union's postwar experience during on-site visits.217 Kaple's argument overlooks some important facts.Between 1949 and 1953, the period she stud­ ied, communications between the two parties were intense, and there was a lot of human contact at all levels. One of the most important ways the Chinese used to learn about how to build socialism and govern a socialist state was to ask questions of Soviet leaders at the highest levels, as well as the lowest party functionarieswho had experience, knowledge, and expertise.218 Chinese lead­ ers also conducted on-site visits as often as they could. As discussed in chap­ ter 2, Stalin in the late 1940s was actively advising Mao on a variety of politi­ cal and military matters, and in the early 1950s, Stalin was consulted on all the important issues related to building socialism.

Learning fromthe Soviet Union

In the early 1950s, Mao recognized that in order to build a strong China, he needed to obtain not only economic but also technical assistance fromthe So­ viet Union. He was particularly intent on nurturing a close relationship with the Soviet Red Army so that China could build a modern military force,sec­ ond only to that of the Soviet Union.219 Mao's active involvement in creating a close working relationship between Soviet military advisers and Chinese military leaders during this time reflected Mao's strong desire that China's military officers learn as much as possible from the Soviet military advisers. Many Chinese military leaders--who had foughtin the civil war and the Korean War--didnot feel the need to learn from the Soviet military experts who were helping to modernize China's armed forces. From early 1950 to 1953, Mao frequently issued directives urging the 48 Chapter 1

Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) to learn as much as possible from the Soviet military advisers. In early 1951, Mao supported Gao Gang's instructions to the provinces in the Northeast to establish good relations with Soviet mili­ tary personnel, including those fromthe air forceand artillery units of the Red Army.220 Subsequently, Mao issued his own directives and encouraged his mil­ itary officers to improve their relations with the Soviet military experts and learn Soviet military science.221 Mao even warned his military leaders that they would be criticized if they did not behave in a respectful manner and learn ,, "wholeheartedly fromthe Soviet experts. 222 Mao also wanted the Chinese people to learn from theSoviet Union how to run an economy and how to achieve socialism. Just at the time that he was an­ nouncing the beginning of the FFYP and embarking on heavy industrializa­ tion, Mao launched a nationwide campaign forthe Chinese people to learn from the Soviet Union. In early February 1953, just ten days beforehe began his firstofficial inspectiontrip in southern China, he called fora "high tide of ,, learning from theSoviet Union to compensate forChina's lack of experience with economic construction. 223

Conclusion

In early fall 1952, Mao believed that the country was ready economically to move to the next stage of the Chinese Revolution and to begin the attack on the private-capitalist economy. Despite the financial burden incurred by the Korean War, he believed that he had brought the economy out of its crisis and at the same time had expanded the presence of the state-owned sector. Politi­ cally, China was much more stable than it had been in 1949. The CCP had not only extended its control over much of the country but had also suppressed and eliminated enemy classes through brutal political campaigns. Relations between China and the Soviet Union improved from the late 1940s, primarily as a result of the efforts of Mao and Stalin, who both recog­ nized, forideological as well as practical reasons, the importance of a good re­ lationship between the two countries. As relations improved, Mao's depend­ ency on Stalin increased as Mao sought to rebuild China and make it into a Stalinist state. Mao presented himself as a humble junior partner and, for the most part, followed the lead of Stalin and then of the post-Stalin collective leadership on political matters. He swallowed his pride and put up with ,, Stalin's rejection of the validity of "Mao Zedong thought. He forced his mil­ itary officersto learn from theSoviet Red Army and his countrymen to learn from the Soviet experience so that China could become a modern state just like the Soviet Union. As long as Mao was willing to follow and learn from The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 49

Stalin and the Soviet Union, a productive relationship could be maintained between the two leaders and the two countries. Mao, however, asserted his in­ dependence in the area that mattered to him the most: the economy. As will be discussed in chapter 2, in his dealings with Stalin, Mao maneuvered skill­ fully in matters concerning China's economy in order to pursue his own agenda and at the same time to maintain Stalin's support.

Notes

1. For a full account of this period, see "The Pattern of Sino-Soviet Relations: Au­ gust 1952-December 1953;' Foreign Service Dispatch, no. 1372 (January 25, 1954), 19. The dispatch was sent by the American Consul General in Hong Kong to the U.S. De­ partment of State in Washington, DC. The document is at the National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. 2. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Ko rean Wa r (hereinafter as Uncertain Partners) (Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 136-54. 3. ]ianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (dierce) [Selected writings of Mao Zedong since the founding of the PRC (vol. 2 )] (hereinafter as Mao wengao 2) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987), 666. 4. For more on Mao's active role in directing these political campaigns, see Mao wengao 2, 670-72; Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (disance) [Selected writings of Mao Zedong since the founding of the PRC, vol. 3] (hereinafter as Mao wengao 3) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987), 684-87. 5. Oral source, March 7, 1992. 6. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (diyice) [Selected writings of Mao Zedong since the founding of the PRC, vol. 1] (hereinafter as Mao wengao 1) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987), 310. 7. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 405. 8. Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiisskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), f. 0100, op. 45, p. 343, por. 12, 11. 30-42. 9. For a scholarly Chinese account of the two campaigns, see Xu Guang, "'Sanfan' 'wufan' yundong gaishu" [Speaking briefly about the "Three-Anti" and "Five-Anti" movements], DYZ, no. 8 (1998): 10-15. 10. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 383. 11. In late 1950, over a period of more than a month, Mao wrote numerous direc­ tives, instructions, and opinions concerning the "Three-Anti" campaign.Fifty of these documents are included in Mao wengao 2, as noted on page 671 of the volume. In 1951 and 1952, Mao wrote an even larger number of directives concerning the "Three­ Anti," "Five-Anti," and "New Three-Anti" campaigns. A total of 188 of these docu­ ments are included in Mao wengao 3, as noted on page 684 of the volume. 12. For the information that Liu provided to Nikolai Roshchin during their meet­ ing on March 18, 1952, see AV PRF, f. 0100, op. 45, p. 343, por. 12, 11. 30-42. so Chapter 1

13. AV PRF, f 0100, op. 45, p. 343, por. 12, ll. 30-42. For a recent study of the Five­ Anti Campaign, see Wang Shaozhong, "Lun jianguo chuqi de 'wufan' yundong" [The "Five-Anti" campaign during the early period after the establishment of the PRC], DYZ, no. 12 (2003): 1-13. 14. AV PRF, f. 0100, op. 45, p. 343, por. 12, ll. 43-46. 15. AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 45, p. 343, por. 12, ll. 30-42. 16. AV PRF, f. 0100, op. 45, p. 343, por. 12, ll. 30-42. 17. This information was made available to me by Dr. Balazs Szalontai of Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. The report was written on July 4, 1952, by the Hungarian ambassador to China, Emanuel Safranko.The report is at the Hungar­ ian National Archives (MOL), XIX-J-1-j [Top Secret Documents] China 1945-1964, 10. Doboz [box], 5/f, 001 503/1 952. 18. Zhou Enlai shuxin xuanji [Selected correspondence of Zhou Enlai] (hereinafter as Zhou Enlai shuxin) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988), 464-65. 19. For information on Zhou Enlai's description of domestic conditions in China at this time in a conversation with Andrei Vyshinskii on August 18, 1952, see AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 45, p. 342, por. 9, ll. 6-8. 20. An oral source, summer 2000. 21. An oral source, August 27, 1999. For a comprehensive study of China's economy during the first three years of the PRC, see Dong Zhikai, ed., 1949-1952 nian zhong­ guo jingji fe nxi [Analyzing China's economy: 1949-1952] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996). 22. Bulletin, nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1 996): 16. 23. Ivo Banac, ed., The Diary of Dimitrov, 443. 24. Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism, 38-41. 25. Richard C. Thornton, The Comintern and the Chinese Communists: 1928-1931 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 87-88, 103-1 06. 26. For a different perspective, see Thomas Kampen, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership (Copenhagen: NIAS Publishing, 2000), 120. Dr. Kampen argues that the CCP was led by a collective leadership until 1943 when Mao became the chairman of both the Politburo and the Secretariat. 27. John W. Garver, "The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party," CQ, no. 113 (March 1988): 40. 28. Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism, 179. 29. Otto Braun, A Communist Agent in China: 1932-1939 (hereinafter as A Com­ munist Agent) (Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 17. For a similar argu­ ment, see Ya ng Kuisong, "Kangzhan shiqi gongchan guoji sulian yu zhongguo gongchandang guanxizhong de jige wenti" [Several questions concerning the relation­ ship among the Comintern, the Soviet Union, and the CCP during the anti-Japanese war] (hereinafter as "Kangzhan"), DY, no. 6 (1987): 136. 30. Ya ng Kuisong, "Kangzhan:' 136. 31. John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Na tionalism (hereinafter as Chinese-Soviet Relations) (New Yo rk: Oxford University Press, 1988), 75-80; John W. Garver, "Comment: Mao, the Comintern, and the Second United Front," CQ, no. 129 (March 1992): 178-79; Ya ng Kuisong, "Kangzhan," 134-38. The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 51

32. Otto Braun, A Communist Agent, 1 O; for Li Lisan's view, see Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism, 143. 33. Otto Braun, A Communist Agent, 10. 34. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA,no. 2 (1992): 95. The in­ formation inthis article is based on interviews Goncharov conducted with Ivan Ko­ valev, Stalin's personal envoy to Mao Zedong in the late 1940s. 35. Otto Braun, A Communist Agent, 105. 36. Huang Qijun, "Zhonggong zhongyang zai 1935 nian zhi 1936 nian yu gongchan guoji huifu dianxun lianxi de jingguo" [The process of restoring cable communica­ tions between the CCP Central Committee and the Comintern from 1935 to 1936] DY, no. 2 (1987): 27. 37. Yang Kuisong, "Kangzhan," 142. 38. Steven I. Levine, Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945-1948 (New Yo rk: Columbia University Press, 1987), 41. 39. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 2 (1992): 107. 40. Ya ng Kuisong, "Kangzhan," 141. 41. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 213. 42. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 213. 43. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 213. 44. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 214-15. 45. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 215. 46. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 215; fora similar discussion of the subject, see Yang Kuisong, "Kangzhan;' 144-46. 47. Yang Kuisong, "Kangzhan," 144-45. 48. Ya ng Kuisong, "Kangzhan," 144. 49. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 215. 50. For the important role played by Ren Bishi on Mao's behalf, see John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, 7 6-77. 51. Ivo Banac, ed., The Diary of Dimitrov, xxxvii. 52. lvo Banac, ed., The Diary of Dimitrov, 290. 53. lvo Banac, ed., The Diary of Dimitrov, 295. 54. Ivo Banac, ed., The Diary of Dimitrov, 295-96. 55. Ivo Banac, ed., The Diary of Dimitrov, 299-300. 56. Ivo Banac, ed., The Diary of Dimitrov, 300. 57. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 307-8. 58. Bulletin, no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1 996): 165. 59. Goncharov et al., Uncertain Pa rtners, 1-2. 60. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 2 (1992): 94. 61. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue;' PEA,no. 2 (1992): 94. 62. Liu Xiao, Chushi Sulian banian [Eight years as ambassador to the Soviet Union] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1998), 3. 63. Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khleviuk, eds., Stalin's Letters, 33. 64. Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khleviuk, eds., Stalin's Letters, 142. 65. Stalin made his offerto Liu and the Chinese delegates on June 28, 1949. See An­ drei Ledovsky, "The Moscow Visit," PEA, no. 4 (1996): 70. 52 Chapter 1

66. Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," PEA, no. 3 (1995): 79, 81. 67. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 350. 68. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 1 (1992): 102. 69. Shi Zhe, "Mao Zedong zhuxi diyice fangwen Sulian jingguo" [Chairman Mao Zedong's firstvisit to the Soviet Union], in Xinzhongguo waijiao fe ngyun [The storm of new China's diplomacy] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1990), 8. 70. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 348, 351, 370. 71. For a comprehensive discussion of Mao's requests to travel to Moscow, begin­ ning in early 1947 and continuing until Mikoyan's visit to Xibaipo in early 1949, see Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," PEA, no. 2 (1995): 74-78. 72. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 36. 73. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 2 (1992): 108. 74. See Mao's cable to Moscow on September 28, 1948, in Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," PEA, no. 2 (1995): 77. 75. Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," PEA, no. 2 (1995): 89. 76. Andrei Ledovsky, "The Moscow Visit," PEA, no. 4 (1996): 85. For similar state- ments, see also 76, 78. 77. Bulletin, nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1 996): 11, 19. 78. Andrei Ledovsky, "The Moscow Visit," PEA, no. 4 (1996): 84. 79. See my article, "The Political Stalinization of China: The Establishment of One­ Party Constitutionalism, 1948-1954" (hereinafter as "The Political Stalinization of China"), JCWS 3, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 28-47. 80. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 405. 81. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 405. 82. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 2 (1992): 95. 83. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 414. 84. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 414-15. 85. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 490. For Mao's conversation with Pavel Yudin on March 31, 1956, see A. Grigoriev and T. Zazerskaya, "Mao Zedong on the Comintern and Stalin's China Policy," PEA, nos. 4-5 (1994): 137-38; Bulletin, nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 165. 86. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 412; Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 2 (1992): 95. 87. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 235. 88. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 2 (1992): 95; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 412. 89. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 2 (1992): 95; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 412. 90. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 2 (1992): 97. 91. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 2 (1992): 96-97. 92. For information on the conversation on November 10, 1949, between Zhou Enlai and Nikolai Roshchin, the Soviet ambassador to China, concerning Mao's invi­ tation to Moscow, see AV PRF, f. 100, op. 42, por. 19, p. 288, 11. 81-85. For the conver­ sation between Wang Jiaxiang, the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, and a So­ viet official on November 11, 1949, concerning the invitation, see AV PRF, f. 100, op. 42, p. 288, d. 17, ll. 27-29. The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 53

93. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 2 (1992): 108. 94. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 435, 45 1. 95. Sergei N. Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue," PEA, no. 2 (1992): 109-10. 96. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 436-37. 97. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 454-58. 98. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 465. 99. Li Jiaji, Mao weishi, 168. 100. "Record of Conversation with Comrade Mao Zedong, March 31, 1956:' Bul­ letin, nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 165. 101. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 447. For a Russian account of how the Soviet managers mis­ handled two joint-stock companies, see G. Ganshin and T. Zazerskaya, "Pitfalls along the Path of 'Brotherly Friendship"' (A look at the history of Soviet-Chinese relations), PEA, no. 6 (1994): 63-70. For a scholarly Chinese account of joint-stock companies during this time, see Shen Zhihua, "Jianguo chuqi Sulian duihua jingji yuanzhu de jiben qingkuan (xuqian)" [Basic conditions of the Soviet economic aid to China during the initial stage of the foundingof the PRC (continuation)], DYZ, no. 4 (2001): 21-26. 102. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 446. 103. For details, see Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 522-23. 104. For details, see Office of Intelligence Research, "Probable Failure of Commu­ nist China's Rubber Plantation Program:' Intelligence Report, no. 7059 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, October 17, 1955), 1-2. 105. For details, see N. Fedorenko, "The Stalin-Mao Summit in Moscow," PEA, no. 2 (1989): 136-48. 106. For a discussion of opposing views, see Mark Kramer, "The USSR Foreign Ministry's Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, September 1959," Bulletin, no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1 996): 171-73. For a German account of Stalin's bad treatment of Mao, see Dieter Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance, 268-69. 107. "Minutes, Conversation between Mao and Ambassador Yudin, 22 July 1958," Bulletin, nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 156. 108. Li Jiaji, Mao weishi, 114, 116. 109. Li Jiaji, Mao weishi, 163. 110. Li Jiaji, Mao weishi, 159-60. 111. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 458-59. 112. Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission:' PEA, no. 3 (1995): 78. 113. For detailed information on the Chinese requests and Soviet responses, see AV PRF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 53, d. 738, 11. 2-5; AVPRF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 53, d. 739, 1. 2; AV PRF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 53, d. 739, 1. 3; AV PRF f. 06, op. 10, p. 53, d. 738, 11. [page nos. missing]; AV PRF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 53, d. 738; AV PRF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 52, d. 734, 1. 8; AV PRF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 53, d. 738, 11. 12-14; AV PRF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 52, d. 734, 1. 5; AV PRF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 53, d. 738, 11. 19-20; AV PRF, (06, op. 11,p. 15, d. 231,11. 3-6, 7-8, 9-10. 114. Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission:' PEA, no. 3 ( 1995): 80-82. 115. Pang Xianzhi et al., Mao Zedong nianpu, xiajuan [A chronicle of Mao Ze­ dong, vol. 3] (hereinafter as Mao nianpu 3) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chuban­ she, 1993), 496. 54 Chapter 1

116. Andrei Ledovsky, "The Moscow Visit," PEA, no. 5 (1996): 96. 117. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 425-26. 1 18. For a detailed discussion of the impact of Soviet advisers on China's economy, see Shen Zhihua, "Jianguo chuqi Sulian duihua jingji yuanzhu de jiben qingkuan (xuqian)" [Basic conditions of the Soviet economic aid to China during the initial stage of the founding of the PRC (continuation)], DYZ, no. 5 (2001): 9-14; Shen Zhi­ hua, Sulian zhuanjia zai zhongguo, 1948-1960 [Soviet experts in China, 1948-1960] (Beijing: Zhonguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2003). 119. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 395. 120. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 405-8. 121. For details, see Shen Zhihua, "Jiangguo chuqi Sulian duihua jingji yuanzhu de jiben qingkuan" [Basic conditions of the Soviet economic aid to China during the ini­ tial stage of the foundingof the PRC], DYZ, no. 3 (2001): 5-7. 122. AV PRF, f. 100, op. 42, p. 288, d. 18, 11. 30-3 1. 123. AVPRF, f. 100, op. 43, p. 302, d. 10, 11. 47-49. 124. "From the Diary of A. Y. Vyshinsky: Memorandum of Conversation with the Chairman of the People's Central Government of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong, 6 January 1950," Bulletin 8-9, (Winter 1996/1997): 230. 125. AV PRF, f. 0100, op. 44, p. 322, por. 11, 11. 1-3. 126. AVPRF, f. 100, op. 43, p. 302, d. 10, 11. 50-52. 127. AV PRF, f. 100, op. 43, p. 302, d. 10, 11. 47-49. 128. For a recent PhD dissertation that discusses Chinese People's University in the 1950s, see Douglas Stiffler, "Building Socialism at Chinese People's University: Chinese Cadres and Soviet Experts in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1957" (PhD diss., University of California,San Diego, 2002). 129. Ts entr khraneniia sovremennoi dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), f. 5, op. 28, d. 38, 11. 34-35. 130. Mao wengao l, 98. 131. Mao wengao 1, 99. 132. AV PRF, f. 0100, op. 44, por. 14, p. 322, 11. 38-40. 133. Mao wengao 1, 148. 134. "Record of Conversation between Comrade I. V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 Au­ gust 1952:' Bulletin, 6-7 (Winter 1995/1 996): 14. Stalin's promise to support China's industrialization was also mentioned in a written report of October 23, 1952, by Emanuel Safranko, the Hungarian Ambassador to China. The report is located in the Hungarian National Archives: XIX-J-1-j Kina 1945-1 964, 12. doboz [box] , 5/i, 001952/1 952. This information was made available to me by Dr. Balazs Szalontai of Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. 135. For a discussion of the role played by Soviet planners in redrafting the FFYP, see Shen Zhihua, "Jianguo chuqi Sulian duihua jingji yuanzhu de jiben qingkuan (xuqian)" [Basic conditions of the Soviet economic aid to China during the initial stage of the founding of the PRC (continuation)], DYZ, no. 5 (2001): 15-18. For a Chinese translation of Soviet views concerning China's draft FFYP, see "Sulian guojia jihua weiyuanhui guanyu zhonghua renmin gongheguo wunian jihua renwu de yi- The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 55 jianshu" [Opinions of the Soviet National Planning Commission on the PRC's tasks forthe five-yearpla n], ZDZ 69 (1999): 1-13. 136. AV PRF, f. 100, op. 43, p. 305, d. 32, 1. 12. For Liu's instructions (2/20/1950) on how to help unemployed workers in Shanghai, see Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao (diyice) [Selected writings of Liu Shaoqi since the foundingof the PRC, vol. l] (here­ inafteras Liu wengao 1) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 433; fora de­ scription of the grave economic conditions caused by natural disasters in China, see Liu wengao 1, 181-82(1). For Chinese scholarly discussions of how the Shanghai mu­ nicipal government coped with the situation, see Yuan Zhiping, "Jiefangchuqi Shang­ hai dui shiye gongren de jiuji he jiuye anzhi" [The Shanghai municipal government's providing of relief and jobs forunemp loyed workers during the initial period afterlib ­ eration], ZDY, no. 5 (1998): 48-54. 137. AV PRF, f. 100, op. 43, p. 305, d. 32, 1. 12. 138. For a fuller treatment of the subject, see my article, "The Political Stalinization of China," JCWS 3, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 28-47. 139. AV PRF, f. 0100, op. 42, por. 18, p. 288, 11. 28-31. 140. Paul Wingrove, "Mao's Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, 1953-55;' Wo rking Paper No. 36, Cold War International History Project (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center forScholars, April 2002): 30. 141. See "Minutes, Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Dele- gation, Beijing, [undated] September 1956;' Bulletin, no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 148. 142. Hu Qiaomu, Huiyi Mao Zedong, 329. 143. Hu Qiaomu, Huiyi Mao Zedong, 329. 144. Hu Qiaomu, Huiyi Mao Zedong, 328. 145. Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," PEA, no. 2 (1995): 91-92. 146. Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," PEA, no. 2 (1995): 89. 147. Hu Qiaomu, Huiyi Mao Zedong, 328-29. 148. Bulletin, nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 6-7; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 459. 149. Mao wengao 2, 672; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 459; Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 41. 150. Bulletin, nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1 996): 6-7. 151. Bulletin, nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1 996): 7; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 459. 152. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 459. 153. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 475. 154. Mao wengao 2, 672-73; Shi Zhe, Zai lish� 475. For a detailed discussion of the subject, see Liu Jintian and Wu Xiaomei, "Mao Zedong xuanji" chuban de qianqian houhou [The whole story of the publication of "The selected works of Mao Zedong"] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1993), 104-16. For Tian Jieying's role, see Dong Bian et al.,Mao Zedong he tade mishu Tian Jiaying (zengdingben) [Mao Zedong and his secretary Tian Jiaying, enlarged and expanded edition] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), 39-46. For Chen Boda's role, see Ye Yonglie, Mao Zedong de mishumen [Mao Zedong's secretaries] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1996), 172-74. 155. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 478-79. 156. Mao wengao l, 739; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 479. 157. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 479. 56 Chapter 1

158. Mao wengao 2, 227. 159. Ma Qibin et al., eds., Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishinian [The forty­ year rule of the CCP] (hereinafteras Zhizheng sishinian) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989), 40. 160. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 485. 161. Ya ng Kuisong, "Kangzhan,'' DY, no. 6 (1987): 147. 162. Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuji [Collection of Mao Zedong's annotations and com­ mentaries on philosophical writings] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988). 163. Raymond Finlay Wylie, The Emergence of Maoism: Mao Ts e-tung, Ch'en Po-ta, and the Search fo r Chinese Theory, 1935-1945 (Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press, 1980); fora Chinese view on how the term "Mao Zedong thought" firstdeveloped in Ya n' an, see Zhongyang We nxian Ya njiushi [The CCP Central Documents Research Of­ fice] and Zhongyang Dangan'guan [CCP Central Archives], "Guanyu 'Mao Zedong sixiang' tichu de lishi guocheng" [The historical process through which the term "Mao Zedong thought" was established], We nxian yu yanjiu [Documents and research], no. 1 (1982): 10-16. 164. Based on a conversation on December 26, 1999, with Dr. Mark Kramer, direc­ tor of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies and editor of the Journal of Cold Wa r Studies. Dr. Kramer has wide access to Russian archives and the archives of formerbloc countries. 165. Frederick C. Te iwes, "Mao Texts and the Mao of the 1950s," AJCA, no. 33 (Jan- uary 1995): 137. 166. Mao wengao 2, 423. 167. Mao wengao 3, 563, 563(2). 168. fianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (disice) [Selected writings of Mao Zedong since the founding of the PRC, vol. 4] (hereinafter as Mao wengao 4) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990), 192. 169. Hu Qiaomu, Huiyi Mao Zedong, 328-30. 170. Mao wengao 4, 238. 171. Mao wengao 4, 623. 172. Renmin ribao, April 16, 1953. 173. Renmin ribao, January 23, 1953. 174. On June 15, 1953, Renmin ribao published a Chinese translation of an article that appeared in Pravda commenting on the Russian version of Selected Wo rks of Mao Zedong (vol. 2). On July 10, 1953, Renmin ribao published a Chinese translation of a long article on the publication of the second volume of the Selected Wo rks of Mao Ze­ dong. On July 17, 1953, Renmin ribao published a Chinese translation of a long article on the publication of the third volume of the Selected Wo rks of Mao Zedong. On Oc­ tober 24, 1953, Renmin ribao published a Chinese translation of Nikolai Fedorenko's article on the third volume of the Selected Wo rks of Mao Zedong. 175. Mao wengao 1, 384-85; Mao wengao 2, 509-10, 510-12(1)(3)(7); Mao wengao 4, 268, 268-69(3), 605. 176. Mao's cable to Stalin on the first anniversary of the Sino-Soviet alliance, Mao wengao 2, 123; Mao's cable to Stalin on the sixth anniversary of VJ day, Mao wengao 2, 435; Mao's cable to Stalin on the thirty-fourth anniversary of the October revolution, The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 57

Mao wengao 2, 495-96; Mao's cable to Stalin on the seventh anniversary of VJ day, Mao wengao 3, 531-32; Mao's cable to Stalin on the thirty-fifthanni versary of the October revolution, Mao wengao 3, 605-6; Mao's cable to Stalin expressing appreciation forthe return of the Changchun Railroad, Mao wengao 3, 681. 177. Mao wengao 3, 295. 178. For Mao's instructions on March 6, 1953, see Mao wengao 4, 89. 179. NC, no. 53 (March 9, 1953): 206. 180. Mao wengao 4, 104-105. 181. Li Jiaji, Mao weishi, 160. 182. Based on a conversation with Dr. Mark Kramer on December 26, 1999. 183. Shi Qiulang, ed., Feng yu gu: Shi Zhe huiyilu [Between summit and valley: mem­ oirs of Shi Zhe] (hereinafteras Feng yu gu) (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1992), 102. 184. Shi Qiulang, ed., Feng yu gu, 103. 185. For a full treatment of the subject, see Office of Intelligence Research, "Soviet Adjustments to Stalin's Death;' Intelligence Report, no. 6226 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, March 9, 1953), 1-5. 186. Officeof Intelligence Research, "Current Status of the Soviet Trade Unions," Intelligence Report, no. 6321 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, August 27, 1953), 1-2. 187 Officeof Intelligence Research, "New Soviet Regime Bids forPopular Support by Amnesty Decree;' Intelligence Report, no. 6259 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 16, 1953), 1-6. 188. Officeof Intelligence Research, "Highlights of Recent Soviet Internal Propa­ ganda," Intelligence Report, no. 6400 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Au­ gust 25, 1953 ), 1-6. For a full treatment of the Beria case, see Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 189. Office of Intelligence Research, "Highlights of Recent Soviet Internal Propa­ ganda," 2. 190. Renmin ribao, July 13, 1953. 191. Again on December 21, 1953, Renmin ribao published a translation of a Ta ss article of the previous day about people in the Soviet Union asking for Beria to be se­ verely punished as a traitor. 192. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Committee Docu­ ment Research Office], ]ianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (disice) [Selected important documents since the founding of the PRC, vol. 4) (hereinafter as We n­ xian xuanbian 4) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 730; Mao wengao 4, 407. 193. TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 28, d. 38, ll. 30-33. 194. Zhongong 19, 594. 195. Mao wengao 3, 633, 633(2). 196. Renmin ribao reported on January 19, 1953, that senior cadres in the Huabei region would begin to study Stalin's last work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U. S.S.R. On February 22, 1953, Renmin ribao reported that senior military cadres in the Southwest region had also begun to study the work. Study of the work continued until shortly afterStalin's death in early March 1953. 58 Chapter 1

197. Office of Intelligence Research, "Highlights of Recent Soviet Internal Propa­ ganda," Intelligence Report, no. 6400 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Au­ gust 25, 1953), 5. 198. On July 4, 1953, Renmin ribao reported that a theory study group at a high­ level government office in Huadong region had completed the study of Stalin's latest work. 199. For details, see Office of Intelligence Research, "Consequences of the Distur­ bances in East Germany," Intelligence Report, no. 6330 (Washington, DC: U.S. Depart­ ment of State, June 24, 1953), 1-6. 200. An oral source, August 10, 1999. 201. NC, no. 213 (September 11, 1953): 128-65. 202. Mao wengao 4, 470-7 1. 203. Evgeniy P. and Natalia Bajanova, "The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953: The Most Mysterious War of the 20th Century (Based on Secret Soviet Archives)" (Unpublished manuscript), 190, 198. This unpublished manuscript was made available to me by Professor William Stueck of the University of Georgia. See also Alena Vo lokhova, "Armistice Talks in Korea: 1951-1953" (Based on Documents from the Russian For­ eign Policy Archives), PEA, no. 2 (2000): 74-9 1. For a Chinese account, see Qiao Guan­ hua, "Guanyu chaoxian zhanzheng yu tingzhan tanpan" [The Korean War and the armistice negotiations], in Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi [CCP Central Committee Party History Research Office] and Zhongyang dang'anguan [Central Committee Party Archives], eds., ZDZ 68 (1998): 26-33. 204. For a study of the "New Course" in the satellite countries, see Officeof Intel­ ligence Research, "Development of'New Economic Courses' in Soviet Satellites in Sep­ tember 1953," Intelligence Report, no. 6443 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, October 14, 1953), ii, 1-9. For a study of the "New Course" in Hungary, see Of­ fice of Intelligence Research, '"New Course' in Hungary: Politics and Prospects," Intel­ ligence Report, no. 6424 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, September 29, 1953), 1-2. 205. An oral source, August 19, 1999. See also Cheng Zhongyuan, ed., "Yang Shangkun he Liu Ying de yici tanhua" [A conversation between Yang Shangkun and Liu Ying] , BNC, no. 6 (1998): 26. 206. Mao wengao 4, 353. 207. Mao Zedong xuanji, disijuan [Selected works of Mao Zedong, vol. 4] (here­ inafteras Mao xuanji 4) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 1253. 208. Gongheguo zouguo de lu-jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian: 1949-1952 [The road the PRC has traveled-selected important documents since the revolution: 1949-1952] (hereinafter as Gongheguo 1949-1952) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991), 22. 209. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 16. 210. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 16. 211. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 21. 212. Ganbu bidu (5): Liening Sidalin lun shehuizhuyi jingji jianshe (shangce) [Re­ quired readings forcadres (5): Lenin and Stalin on socialist economic construction, vol. 1] (hereinafteras Ganbu bidu 5) (Jiefangshe, 1949), 370, 383, 386. The Historical Background and Contemporary Setting 59

213. Ganbu bidu 5, 360-67. 214. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 16. 215. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 48-49. 216. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Committee Docu­ ment Research Office], ]ianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (diyice) [Selected important documents since the founding of the PRC, vol. 1] (hereinafter as We nxian xuanbian 1) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), 2. 217. Deborah A. Kaple, Dream of a Red Factory: The Legacy of High Stalin ism in China (New Yo rk: Oxford University Press, 1994), 5-7. 218. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 386-88, 419-24; Li Yueran, Wa ij iao wutai shang de xinzhong­ guo lingxiu [New China's leaders in the diplomatic arena] (hereinafter as Wa ij iao wutai) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989), 22-23; Chen Zhiling, "Zhong­ guo zhengfu daibiaotuan fu Su shangtan duihuajingji yuanzhu wenti jishi, 9/1 952-5/1 953;' [An account of the Chinese mission to the Soviet Union to negotiate Soviet economic aid forChina, September 1952 to May 1953], ZDZ 43 (1992): 183. 219. Mao wengao 4, 1-2. 220. Mao wengao 2, 9-10. 221. Mao wengao 3, 643, 673, 673-74(3). 222. Mao wengao 3, 607-08. 223. Mao wengao 4, 45-46.

2

Mao, Stalin, and Transforming China's Ec onomy, 1948-195 2

ETWEEN APRIL 1948 AND OCTOBER 1952, over the course of four and a half Byears, Mao consulted Stalin on issues that were vital to China's socialist economic transformation. When should the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP) begin to eliminate the old economic structure? What should be done with the rich peasants, who were the country's most productive peasants? How should the CCP handle the national bourgeoisie? Since the ultimate goal was to eliminate capitalism and build socialism, the most important question facingthe party was when and how the CCP should put an end to capitalism. In response to Mao's inquiries, Stalin provided advice and policy recommen­ dations that were both pragmatic and moderate. Some scholars, especially in Eastern Europe, have suggested that Stalin urged moderate policies on both China and North Korea during this period in order to prevent them from achieving high economic-growth rates and to keep them in a subordinate position. 1 Although this view has some merit, it is not necessarily supported by the historical evidence presently available. Stalin's moderate economic-policy recommendations to China were based on his understanding of the current stage of the Chinese Revolution, the nature of the Chinese national-bourgeois class, the unfoldingexperiences in the East­ ern European people's democracies, and, most importantly, his past experi­ ence in carrying out a socialist transformation in the Soviet Union. While Stalin's recommendations did not stray from a Marxist ideological frame­ work, they were based on a pragmatism derived fromhis experience in the So­ viet Union and on his analysis of conditions in China. In other words, in ad­ vising Mao during the period under study, Stalin was not as radical as he had

- 61 - 62 Chapter 2

been in the late 1920s and early 1930s. He appears to have been more inter­ ested in supporting economic policies that would contribute to China's eco­ nomic development than he was in adhering to ideological principles or en­ couraging class warfare. Stalin did not take the initiative in giving advice; he typically responded to queries from the Chinese. 2 The one known exception to this pattern was in April 1948, when Stalin offered the unsolicited advice to Mao that he not change the existing economic structure. Although Stalin persistently advo­ cated gradualism and moderation, his counsels had limited impact upon Mao. Stalin was consequently unable to shape Mao's economic policies to the extent he was able to influence Mao on political matters. Stalin's advice, however, may have had more impact upon other top Chinese leaders-Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, forexample -who had more direct contact with Stalin than Mao did. These leaders at various points disagreed with Mao's radical policies and forcedhim to make compromises. It is clear, however, that Stalin's policy rec­ ommendations, whether communicated directly to Mao or indirectly through other leaders, had the effect of either moderating Mao's policies or postpon­ ing their implementation. This was especially true afterthe summer of 1949, when Mao officially pledgedhis commitment to follow Stalin's"i nstructions." In this chapter, I discuss Stalin's overall policy orientation in advising Mao and Mao's reactions to three major pieces of advice that Stalin provided be­ tween April 1948 and October 1952. Mao's behavior was different in each case and was the result of his effort to balance incompatible ideological goals and practical requirements that had to be met to achieve those goals. Ideologically, Mao was genuinely committed to building Soviet-style socialism in China as quickly as possible. At the same time, to do this, he knew he had to win Stalin's political support forhis plan and enlist Soviet ideological, organizational, tech­ nological, financial,and military assistance to achieve his ideological and eco­ nomic goals. Mao, however, was not as obedient to Stalin as some have argued: Mao was instead selective and strategic in followingStalin's suggestions. 3

Stalin's Overall Orientation

Between the late 1940s and October 1952 (the last time Mao sought Stalin's advice), Stalin shared his views on the national bourgeoisie, economic recov­ ery, "rich peasants," growth rates for China's First Five-Year Plan (FFYP), and the proper timing forcollectivization. In each case, Stalin preached modera­ tion and thus put constraints on Mao. There is some evidence of a direct link between Stalin's advice and changes, if only temporary, in Mao's policies. In late 1948, the CCP adopted a two-pronged policy in its dealings with the national bourgeoisie. It emphasized both cooperation and control. Stalin, Mao, Stalin, and Transforming China's Economy 63 however, emphasized cooperation and encouraged the CCP to improve its re­ lations with the national bourgeoisie.4 Stalin expressed his views on this mat­ ter to Chen Yun around March 1949, and to Liu Shaoqi in summer 1949. Stalin's advice to Chen Yun, who was running the regional economy in the Northeast, was very clear and specific and was conveyed to Chen Yun by Ko­ valev, Stalin's special envoy to Mao:

Te ll Crde. Chen that we Russian communists think that the Chinese communists should not alienate the national bourgeoisie but invite it to cooperate as a force capable of helping them in the struggle against imperialism. Thereforewe advice [sic] that they should encourage the trade activities of the national bourgeoisie both in China and abroad. For instance, trade with Hong Kong or other foreign capitalists. 5

Stalin's recommendations concerning the Chinese national bourgeoisie were shaped by his views on the nature of the Chinese Revolution. In the late 1940s, Stalin believed, as he had in 1927,6 that the Chinese Revolution was fo­ cused on fightingimperialism and that it would continue to do so. Therefore, in Stalin's opinion, the political structure of a new China should reflectthe na­ ture of its revolution by including a wide range of social groups. Stalin made a clear distinction between the Chinese national bourgeoisie and the capital­ ists in the Eastern European people's democracies, emphasizing that the for­ mer did not join forces withthe imperialists, whereas the latter did. He argued that the Chinese national bourgeoisie should be included in a united front.He maintained that the national bourgeoisie should not be alienated or elimi­ nated, at least forthe time being; the CCP should instead use them and be co­ operative with them.7 The emphasis Liu Shaoqi placed on cooperation with the capitalists in a se­ ries of speeches in Tianjin in April 1949 may have been influenced by Stalin's advice to Chen Yun in March 1949, but Liu's speech to cadres in the Northeast on August 28, 1949, almost certainly reflected Stalin's influence. As Liu re­ turned fromMoscow to Beijing in summer 1949, he visited the Northeast and told local cadres that the CCP's policy toward the national-bourgeois class was to maintain cooperation with them on a long-term basis,8 thereby emphasiz­ ing only one side of the CCP's two-pronged officialpolicy as stated above. In summer 1949, Stalin advised Liu and the Chinese leaders on how to pro­ ceed during the economic recovery period. He stressed the importance of a steady, step-by-step approach in rebuilding the economy; he warned against attempting anything inappropriate forthe current stage, forfe ar that it would bring chaos to the economy.9 To what extent the CCP leaders were receptive to Stalin's counsel is not clear. As discussed in chapter 3, Mao set aside only three years for economic recovery, two years fewer than the time Stalin had 64 Chapter 2 needed to complete the economic recovery period in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. In the summer of 1952, Mao proudly reported on his success in taking fewer than three years to achieve economic recovery. From the late 1940s, Mao persistently sought to cut corners, despite Stalin's moderate advice. In summer 1952, Stalin cautioned Chinese leaders to be realistic in setting the targets forecon omic-growth rates during the FFYP. He encouraged them to allow fora margin of error and to reduce their planned annual growth rate forind ustrial output from 20 percent to about 15 percent. 10 Even Stalin's rec­ ommended growth rate of 15 percent was high compared to growth rates in industrializing nations both then and now. Stalin, however, was able to get Mao to reduce the target growth rate from 20 to 15 percent when he revised the CCP's targets forits FFYP in 1953. 11 During one of his last meetings with Liu and his delegation in late 1952, Stalin recommended that the CCP organize agricultural cooperatives and collectivize farms gradually. 12 In October 1953, approximately seven months afterStali n's death, Mao not only rejected Stalin's advice but also rejected his own earlier moderate position and accelerated the drive to organize collec­ tives so that China could move one step closer to socialism. As the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has shown, Mao's responses to Stalin's recommendations varied widely depending upon the issue, as will become evident in looking at Mao's reactions to three of Stalin's policy recommen­ dations.

The First Case: Stalin Recommends Keeping the Status Quo, April 1948

On April 20, 1948, responding to two cable messages dated November 30, 1947, and March 15, 1948, Stalin offered suggestions on what Mao and the CCP should do about the country's existing economic structure afterseizing power. In this case, Mao did not comply with Stalin's policy recommenda­ tion of keeping the existing economic structure unchanged foran unspeci­ fied period of time. At this early stage, in responding to Stalin's first eco­ nomic-policy recommendation, Mao showed his independence in his handling of economic matters, while at the same time saying he fullyagreed with Stalin's policy recommendations. Contrary to Stalin's advice, Mao in­ stituted a policy aimed at establishing the foundations fora rapid transfor­ mation of the economy. Stalin recommended that Mao keep the economy unchanged, for he be­ lieved that ((the Chinese government in its policy will be a national revolu­ tionary-democratic government, not a Communist one."13 In more concrete terms, this policy of maintaining the status quo meant the following: Mao, Stalin, and Tra nsforming China's Economy 65

That nationalization of all land and abolition of private ownership of land, con­ fiscationof the property of all industrial and trade bourgeoisie frompetty to big, confiscationof property belonging not only to big landowners but to middle and small holders exploiting hired labor, will not be fulfilled for the present. These reformshave to wait for some time.14

While Stalin was clear about wanting Mao to pursue a policy of maintain­ ing the status quo, he was not certain how long such a policy should be con­ tinued. 15 There is no way of knowing whether Stalin had any knowledge of the land-reformprogram in the areas occupied by the CCP and in the Northeast beginning in 1946, or of the policy of confiscatingproperty from theso-called bureaucratic capitalists that was officiallyadopted in the fall of 1947. In any case, Stalin recommended a policy of preserving the status quo. There is also no way of knowing exactly how Mao really felt about Stalin's policy recommendations. We do know that in Mao's cable to Stalin on April 26, 1948, responding to the cable message mentioned above, Mao stated his complete agreement with all of Stalin's policy recommendations. 16 In 1948, while Mao followedStali n's advice on political matters almost to the letter, on economic matters, by contrast, he paid partial lip service to Stalin and at­ tempted to maintain as much policy autonomy as possible. Mao was deter­ mined to pursue land reform and to confiscate the property of the bureau­ cratic capitalists. However, responding to Stalin's views, Mao decided to limit land reform or in some regions to terminate it altogether. Mao, at the same time, was adamant about continuing his policy of confiscatingthe property of bureaucratic capitalists. Prior to Stalin's policy recommendation favoring the preservation in China of the economic status quo in April 1948, the CCP was in the midst of cor­ recting mistakes made during land reform. Ren Bishi, a senior CCP leader, de­ livered an important speech on January 12, 1948, aimed at correcting serious mistakes that had occurred during land reform,such as erroneously targeting peasants who were not landlords or rich peasants.17 During the month of Feb­ ruary, in order to gain the support of the peasants, Mao intervened to narrow the scope of land reform in the newly liberated areas, where support forthe CCP was limited. In cable communications to his two lieutenants, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, Mao described land reform asconsisting of two stages in the newly liberated areas. During the firststage, only the landlords would be targeted; the rich peasants would be leftalone during this stage so that their opposition could be neutralized. The rich peasants would then be targeted during the second stage.18 At around the same time, Mao also issued a direc­ tive stating the same position.19 In addition, Mao issued another directive crit­ icizing the radicalism of the propaganda during land reform,20 presumably to 66 Chapter 2

reduce the fe rvor of lower-level cadres who were implementing the land re­ formand of the poor peasants who were taking over the land that was being confiscated. Afterthe cable exchange with Stalin in April 1948, Mao held firm andcon­ tinued land reform in the old liberated areas, where peasant support forthe CCP was strong. He decided, however, to abandon his two-stage land-reform policy in the newly liberated areas and return to the policies the CCP had pur­ sued during the anti-Japanese war. In his cable to Deng Xiaoping, dated May 24, 1948, Mao called for an((overall reconsideration" of land-reformpolicy for the newly liberated areas. Instead of urging the immediate implementation of a two-stage land-reform program, he recommended a reduction of rents on land and of interest on loans to protect the peasants from beingoverly bur­ dened by the war effort.Mao was ready to postpone land reform in the newly liberated areas foras long as three years after order had been established, to allow the peasants time to prepare for land reform.21 Mao's strategy made sense, because his ultimate objective was to defeat the Kuomintang (KMT), and forthis purpose he wanted to win the support of the peasants and the landlords. Mao then proceeded to establish more stringent requirements for those parts of the old liberated areas in which land reform had not yet begun. Mao was aware of the abuses that had resulted from radical practices in the past and was determined not to repeat them. Mao made it clear that land reform could be carried out only in those parts of the old liberated areas where cer­ tain conditions had been met. On May 25, 1948, Mao drafted a directive in which he ordered cadres to select, during the next three months, the areas where land reformcould be carried out, and he emphasized that such areas had to meet three conditions. First, the area had to be stable and free of all enemy armed forces. Second, there had to be support forland reformfrom an overwhelming majority of the tenant peasants, poor peasants, and middle peasants. Third, local cadres had to know how to handle land reform.22 The timing of Mao's decision to halt his two-stage land reformin the newly liberated regions was significant. He was probably influenced by Stalin's cable message. Mao's unwillingness to comply fullywith Stalin's recommendations, however, can be interpreted as both politically and ideologically motivated. Despite the radical mistakes that had occurred during land reform, the policy was becoming popular, especially among tenant peasants and poor peasants, who were obtaining land through land reform.It generated political support for the CCP, which was vital to military victory. Further, Mao and the CCP were ideologically committed to the idea of abolishing the old land-ownership structure by taking land away fromthe rich and giving it to the poor. Afterall, that was precisely what the Communists in Russia had done afterthe October Mao, Stalin, and Transforming China's Economy 67

Revolution, as described in the Short Course. Mao was willing to modifythe policy in order to make it more workable, but not to abandon it. Mao reaffirmed a month later his determination to follow the directive of May 25, 1948, in deciding the regions where land reformcould be carried out. In doing so, he hoped to avoid repeating past mistakes. 23 Once the situation improved, however, Mao planned to continue with land reform. In October 1948, he instructed cadres in certain areas in Shanxi that had been recently captured by the CCP to begin land reform in the winter of that year. In early January 1949, before Mikoyan'svisit to Xibaipo, the CCP decided to continue land reform.24 Mao announced publicly for the first time his policy of confiscating the property of the bureaucratic capitalists in October 1947.25 In December of that year, he announced that the property of the bureaucratic capitalists would be confiscatedby the CCP and that the class would be eliminated. 26 In his statement to the important September Conference of 1948, however, Mao expanded the scope of his plans and said the party would "confiscateall large industries, large banks, large commercial entities, regardless of whether they are bureaucratic or not." Such a policy would be implemented "within a pe­ riod of time afterthe victory." This is what he called the "New Democratic economic principle."27 His newly stated policy of confiscatingproperty from all big capitalists contradicted the CCP's publicly stated position of just con­ fiscatingthe property of bureaucratic capitalists. His newly stated policy, in ef­ fe ct, replaced the CCP's officialpolic y. The seizure of a large number of industrial, financial, and transportation enterprises in the Northeast beginning in 1947 was, in Mao's view, vitally im­ portant to the CCP forboth political and economic reasons. Seizing the prop­ erty of the rich and powerful minimized political opposition and made it eas­ ier forthe CCP to consolidate its power. Further, converting the confiscated enterprises into state-owned companies made it possible for Mao and the CCP to create a state-owned sector in a short time. As early as September 1948, based on his assessment of the size of the state-owned economy in com­ parison to the total economy, Mao believed that China was close to establish­ ing a socialist economy. As soon as the CCP occupied Tianjin in January 1949 (the firstmajor industrial city outside of the Northeast it had seized), the CCP confiscated the property of the bureaucratic-capitalist class there, including factories,mines, railroads, postal services, telegraphs, and banks. 28 In 1948, Mao asserted his independence on economic matters and mini­ mized his compliance with Stalin's economic-policy recommendations. Mao probably calculated that if he complied in one area, the political domain, he could gain a free hand in another, the economic domain. There were other possible reasons forMao's selectivity in carrying out Stalin's policy proposals. 68 Chapter 2

Mao desperately wanted to begin the process of building a socialist economy, , and the CCP s economic success in the Northeast may have given him the confidence to transfer the experience gained there to other regions. Mao prob­ ably believed he could get away with acting more independently than Stalin would have liked. Afterall, Mao had, without penalty, ignored Stalin's objec­ tions to the Rectification Campaign. Mao probably thought he could ignore Stalin's advice again with impunity.

Policy and Policy Formulation for China after Military Victory Mao's plans for changing China's economic structure became more evident between the September Conference of 1948 and the enlarged Politburo meet­ ing in January 1949. This was an important time for Mao and the CCP, for they began to assert their independence fromStalin on economic matters, and they developed their own policy program for China after victory. Although Mao had little to do with the formulation of a conceptual frameworkor con­ crete policies, his lieutenants, especially those who were better schooled in the theories of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, played crucial roles. During this period, reports were written, speeches delivered, ideas expressed, and compromises made. Although Mao would have preferred to have a chance to meet with Stalin face-to-facebefore making finalpolicy decisions, Stalin did not give him the opportunity. Stalin instead sent Mikoyan, at that time a mem­ ber of the Soviet Politburo, to Xibaipo in early 1949 forconsultations with the Chinese leaders. Mao and his lieutenants tried their ideas out on Mikoyan. Fi­ nally, the economic blueprint was adopted and was included in the finalreso­ lution of the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee meeting of March 1949. Officialpositions expressed in the CCP resolution of March 1949 did not contain all of the ideas that the CCP leaders had forChina. Some ideas that would have damaged the CCP's relations with influential segments of so­ ciety and the larger population were intentionally omitted. Other ideas were kept vague so that they could be reinterpreted at a later time. At the beginning of this period, in September 1948, the Communist leaders, fe eling confidentabout the outcome of the civil war, held a meeting in Xibaipo to discuss future plans. The meeting lasted forsix days, and it was important because it set the tone forthe party's future policies. One of the topics dis­ cussed was the transition from NewDemocracy to socialism.29 As discussed in the introduction, inspired by Lenin's ideas of the «transition from capitalism to ,, socialism in the early 1920s, the CCP leadership sought to formulate its own version of the transition to socialism. For Mao and the Chinese leaders, the de­ cision to establish a transitional period beforebeginning to build a socialist sys­ tem was probably not a difficultone. The big challenge facing the leaders was Mao, Stalin, and Transforming China's Economy 69 to figure out how to interpret and apply the Soviet experience to conditions in China. How long should the transition period last, and at what point should the building of socialism begin? How, in a Chinese setting, should nonsocialist economic elements be incorporated into a socialist economy? Finally, how could the party mobilize all the resources necessary to build a strong industrial base and thereby provide the basis forthe advance to socialism? In addition to these practical policy issues, there were fundamental ideological questions, such as how much freedomshould be given to capitalists, entrepreneurs, and rich peasants in a primarily private transitional economy. The ideas at the foundation of the economic program for building a tran­ sitional economy did not originate with the central leadership. They were de­ veloped instead by regional leaders in the Northeast. Many of their ideas were adopted by party leaders and became the basis fornational economic policy through the early 1950s. These ideas grew out of practical experiences in the Northeast in the late 1940s and were given formas a regional policy program by Zhang Wentian, a provincial party secretary. The program was approved by the regional leadership in the Northeast. It was then revised by Liu and finally approved by Mao as the party's policy. Mao wanted the text of the policy pro­ gram to be circulated as an internal document and not to be published in any party newspapers.30 Zhang's policy program was greatly influencedby Lenin's economic ideas, as well as by the policies he pursued under the New Economic Policy (NEP). Zhang's formulation combined Lenin's ideas about guiding nonsocialist eco­ nomic elements-especially the private-capitalist economy and the small­ commodity economy--onto thetracks of socialism with Stalin's emphasis on building a strong state-owned economy. The principle underlying Zhang's policy was to ((increase the socialist economic elements within the

The Impact of Lenin's Ideas on Policy Formulation in China Writing in 1921, Lenin described the Soviet economy between 1918 and 1921 as a ((transitional economy" because in his view ((the existing economic order contains elements of both capitalism and socialism."33 He identifiedfive sepa­ rate kinds of economy as coexisting in the Soviet Union: ( 1) patriarchal, i.e., a 70 Chapter 2

largely natural, peasant economy; (2) small-commodity production; (3) private capitalism; ( 4) state capitalism; and (5) socialism. Small-commodity produc­ tion, called by Lenin the «petty-bourgeois" economy, was identified as the pre­ dominant type in the Soviet economy and the principal enemy of socialism. 34 According to Lenin, «at present, it is petty-bourgeois capitalism that domi­ nates;'35 and, in his view, a transition from this type of capitalism to socialism was required. Under the general frameworkof the NEP, Lenin introduced first«state cap­ italism" and then «cooperative socialism" as his two principal policies. These policies, which shiftedaway from theprevious radical methods of nationaliz­ ing the Soviet economy, had a great impact on Chinese policy-makers from the late 1940s when they began to assemble their economic program. Chinese leaders, therefore, did not learn about «state capitalism" from the Short Course, forit was mentioned there only briefly.They learned about it in­ stead from Lenin's ((Tax in Kind" (1921), where ((state capitalism" is discussed extensively. Lenin put ((state capitalism" into practice from 1921 to 1925 as part of the NEP. Lenin's notion of ((cooperative socialism," by contrast, was presented in the Short Course only afterbeing reinterpreted by Stalin, and this reinterpreted version is apparently the one that was accepted by Chinese pol­ icy-makers. I will first describe Lenin's «state capitalism" and then his «coop­ erative socialism," as well as Stalin's reinterpretation of it.

Lenin's State Capitalism State capitalism was neither a type of economy, as suggested by Lenin, nor a theory; Moshe Lewin argues that Lenin put forward the idea in order to bring some kind of«order" to the ideological «confusion"at the time of the in­ troduction of the NEP. 36 In my view, state capitalism was merely a mechanism forthe state to assert control over a capitalist economy. State capitalism had its origins in Germany. It was derived from the((extensively and strictly state­ controlled German war economy."37 Lenin was so impressed by the German success that he adopted the practice afterthe October Revolution in 1917 and then reintroduced it twice, once in 1918 and again in 1921. Lenin introduced fourtypes of state capitalism. The firstwas called «con­ cessionary state capitalism,"38 which was based on the contractual relationship between the Soviet state and foreigncapitalists who could help run those parts of the Soviet economy that the state was unable to manage. Lewin explains Lenin's intention:

Russia needed a long period of capitalist development in order to assimilate or­ ganizational methods and technical expertise, and to acquire the capital and the Mao, Stalin, and Transforming China's Economy 71

intellectual abilities that the Workers' State did not yet possess. Obviously, the state must remain constantly vigilant and create the necessary methods of su­ pervision and control. Thus Lenin hoped to build socialism with the help of "foreign hands," who, he thought, would not reject his offers if it was made worth their while to accept them. 39

The second type ofstate capitalism was called "cooperative state capitalism" or "cooperative trade," in which the state engaged in business transactions and trade with cooperative societies, including small handicraft and patriarchal industries.40 In the third type, "commission-agent state capitalism;' merchants were enlisted on a commission basis to buy and sell goods forthe state.41 In the fourth,the state leased state-owned industrial establishments, such as oil fields,forests, and land, to the capitalists under arrangements similar to those established in the concessionary type. 42 State supervision and control were central to all four types. State capitalism, however, did not work out as Lenin had hoped, and he re­ luctantly abandoned it in 1923.43 Its failurecould be explained by the difficul­ ties encountered by the state in attracting "distrustful"foreign investors44 and "big capital."45 In addition, the practice was politically unpopular among the party rank and file; many of them considered working with capitalists as a "betrayal" of the revolution and the working class. Since state capitalism was not discussed in any detail in the Short Course, very few Chinese leaders had heard of it in the late 1940s. It took someone like Zhang Wentian, who was fa­ miliar with Lenin's and Stalin's writings, to propose its application in China.

Lenin's Cooperative Socialism Toward the end of his life, Lenin looked fora way to advance the peasants and the whole of Soviet society on the road to socialism. He believed he had foundit in "cooperative socialism;' and he began to organize cooperative so­ cieties. In 1923, Lenin announced his cooperative plan and called forthe or­ ganization of the peasants "on a sufficientlywide scale"46 into cooperative so­ cieties:

There is only one thing we have not done yet: that is to make our citizens to have a level of "civilization" that will allow them to understand the benefits of participation in cooperatives ....That is the only thing we need to do. At pres­ ent, to achieve the transition to socialism, we do not need any other brilliant methods.47

Lenin's "gradualist" approach to achieving socialism required a long-term "cultural revolution" to educate the peasants. Lenin believed that "if all the 72 Chapter 2

peasants joined cooperatives, we would be able to stand firmly on the foun­ dation of socialism."48 One issue that Lenin left forhis followers to sort out concerned the kind of cooperatives that should be organized. Lenin talked mainly about rural consumers' cooperatives, not production cooperatives. 49 Lenin's lack of specificityleft the door open forlater reinterpretation.

Stalin's Reinterpretation of Lenin's Cooperative Socialism AfterLenin's death in 1924, Soviet leaders tried to prove to one another that each was Lenin's political successor:

Leading individuals and factionswould, in each instance, stress certain parts of Lenin's Bolshevism, disregard or de-emphasize others, and transmute still others into something new-claiming all the while that they were upholding Lenin's or­ thodoxy, as Stalin for example did in his lectures of 1924 on the Foundations of Leninism. [sic]5°

Kolakowski explains that Stalin's series of lectures, published in Pravda in April and May 1924 under the title «Foundations of Leninism," was not only part of his effort to prove himself to be the legitimate heir to Lenin but also his ((first attempt to codifyLenin's doctrine afterhis own fashion."51 Stalin's ef­ fortto ((codify"Lenin's ideas about cooperatives, «afterhis own fashion," began with this series of lectures and then continued in the Short Course:

Lenin pointed out that the road to follow in the development of agriculture in our country should be to enlist the peasants in the construction of socialism through cooperatives and gradually to incorporate collective principles into agriculture, firstin selling, and then in agricultural production. 52

It has been generally agreed among scholars that Lenin had little to say about production cooperatives. 53 There is also no indication that Lenin ever outlined such a two-step approach to organizing such cooperatives. Stalin had his own agenda: he wanted to increase the state's control over agricultural out­ put by absorbing the existing scattered individual farmsinto production co­ operatives as a step toward collectivizing the Soviet peasantry. He accordingly reinterpreted Lenin's ideas to serve his own purposes. He identified produc­ tion cooperatives as an important new phenomenon emerging in the Soviet countryside and argued that they represented the future of agriculture in the Soviet Union. Although, to his credit, Stalin allowed consumers' cooperatives to continue to operate in the Soviet countryside well into the late 1920s, the question of how closely to follow his two-step approach became a major source of friction among Chinese leaders. Mao, Stalin, and Tra nsforming China's Economy 73

Offering an example of this new phenomenon, Stalin praised a special growers' organization called the "Flax Centre" and noted the role it played in connecting agricultural growers to state industry. The Flax Centre supplied peasants with the seeds needed forplanting and then sold the flax produced by the peasants to the state market. In the process, the Flax Centre provided the peasants with a guaranteed profit and provided state industry with a steady supply of flax. 54 Stalin called this newly emerging phenomenon the "domestic system of state-socialist production in the sphere of agriculture;'55 and he hoped to jus­ tifyhis own attempts to impose agricultural production cooperatives both by claiming that the concept originated with Lenin and by pointing to the expe­ rience of the West. There were, however, fundamental flawsin his argument. Stalin dismissed the fact that the cottage industry and the later development of capitalism in the West were, to a large extent, based on individual, not state, effortsand driven by the market, not by state control.

Building a Strong State-owned Economy in China Zhang Wentian believed that the CCP should give priority to developing the state-owned economy, especially the heavy and defense industries, at the fastestpossible speed. Zhang presented two complementary policies forbuild­ ing a strong state-owned industrial sector. The first drew on Stalin's policy prescription "to use all possible means" to accumulate capital to invest in the state-owned economy, especially in the heavy and defense industries. The sec­ ond, based on Lenin's ideas, relied on state capitalism to absorb the private­ capitalist economy into the state-owned economic system. 56 Though Zhang did not specifyhow to accumulate capital, Ren Bishi later elaborated a strat­ egy fordoing so. 57 Finally, Zhang emphasized unified state management and planning vis-a-vis the national economy.58

SMCs as the First Step Zhang Wentian recommended that cooperatives of various kinds be organ­ ized in such places as villages, factories,and government officesand that SMCs be established mainly in rural areas. Peasants were encouraged to join mutual­ aid production teams, which were based on the private ownership of land and voluntary participation. Collectivization would not be instituted until later. Zhang went furtherthan Lenin in ascribing importance to the SM Cs. In Zhang's view they would serve to link the different parts of rural society together:

At present, SMCs in the countryside [are] the economic headquarters that di­ rect the economic activities of small producers and the central linkage between 74 Chapter 2

agricultural production and consumption. After the land reform, they [were] the most important formof organization for peasants and small handicrafts­ men. Without cooperatives, it would be impossible to organize economically thousands and thousands of small agricultural producers. 59

Zhang, following Stalin's interpretation of Lenin's ideas, emphasized a two­ step approach in organizing cooperatives, establishing them firstin commerce and then in production. At this early stage, Zhang believed that only SMCs should be organized.60 Zhang's goal was eventually to link the peasant economy to the state-owned industrial and commercial economy, and he steadfastlyupheld this position in 1950 when disputes arose among party leaders on agrarian policies in the Northeast.61 In his opinion, the party should "ensure private ownership among small producers and encourage them to produce more and accumu­ late family wealth," while at the same time encouraging the commercial activ­ ities of the SMCs. To achieve these objectives, Zhang recommended that the peasants be strictly organized into mutual-aid teams in accordance with three principles: maintain private land ownership for all members, tolerate in­ equality, and allow members freelyto join and leave. 62 Zhang's SM Cs were subject to more control by the central government than were Lenin's consumer cooperatives. Zhang's cooperatives were supposed to deal directly with state economic organizations and to operate in accordance with central planning. In Zhang's view, this was the only way to avoid un­ wanted competition. The cooperatives would additionally be linked vertically to the central government through branch offices organized at district, city, county, and provincial levels. The idea was to create a state-controlled, na­ tionwide commercial network that would eventually control all economic ac­ tivity. Zhang also suggested that SMCs be organized in certain industries, such as salt and fisheries.63 In the late 1940s, Zhang's ideas about organizing SMCs in the rural areas were widely accepted by the leadership. It is now clear that the consensus shared by the leadership was in many ways a fragile one. Mao went along with the two-step approach in building cooperatives, but he had always been more inclined to organize production and multi-function coopera­ tives, like the ones that had been organized in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region since 1942. Although Mao went along with the proposals of other leaders in the late 1940s, his commitment was never very deep. In 1951, Mao changed his position and rejected the proposal presented by Liu and Zhang to give priority to the development of SMCs, supporting instead some provincial and county-level cadres who favored organizing produc­ tion cooperatives. Mao, Stalin, and Transforming China's Economy 75

Organizing State Capitalism Zhang, like Lenin, believed that the continuation of private capitalism was unavoidable because the state-owned economy was simply not big enough to meet the nation's needs. The situation in the Northeast, where the state­ owned economy was not adequate to support an ongoing war and fe ed the population, demonstrated the point. Zhang proposed a policy toward private capitalism that combined utilization and restriction. He believed that it was particularly important not to "put restrictions on the capitalist economy that 'currently' was still useful to the national economy."64 Taking Lenin's position, Zhang argued forthe usefulnessof state capitalism in the development of the New Democratic economy. While it is not clear whether or not Zhang knew about the failuresof state capitalism in the Soviet Union, he asked party leaders to adopt this approach.65 He further identified fourtypes of state capitalism that already existed in the Northeast: the leasing system (chuzuzhi), the commission-agent system (daimaizhi), the system of processing goods (jiagongzhi), and the system of ordering goods (dinghuozhi). The first and second types were borrowed from Lenin, and the third and fourthtypes were developed by Zhang and other leaders in the Northeast. Under the leasing system, the government enters into a contractual relation­ ship with the capitalists and leases to them the farms,mines, and forests that the government is not capable of operating. The capitalists retain their profits, while the government is able to collect leasing fees from the capitalists.66 The leasing system did not work in either the Soviet Union or China. The commis­ sion-agent system allows private retailers to sell goods on a commission basis on behalf of the government. This system was supposed to be a short-term measure and was to be replaced by SMCs.67 The system of processing goods was based on a contractual relationship in which the state provided the mate­ rials, which the capitalists processed. The capitalists made profitsby producing goods forthe state.68 The system of ordering goods consisted of the state plac­ ing orders formanufactured goods, which the capitalists then produced. 69 These last two types of state capitalism were widely used in major cities be­ tween 1949 and 1954, until the "high tide" of socialist transformation of in­ dustry and commerce in 1955 and 1956. Both of these practices gave the state tremendous control over the capitalists, forthe state became the most power­ ful player in providing them with jobs and markets. The capitalists came to depend upon the Communist state fortheir survival. As discussed earlier, state capitalism did not work well in the Soviet Union, but, in a variety of modified forms,it survived in China, partly because wartime conditions required that the state work with the capitalists, and partly because the Chinese capitalist class was relatively small and was thereforeeasily controlled by the state. 76 Chapter 2

Zhang's major contribution was in formulating this gradualist transitional economic program by applying Lenin's and Stalin's ideas to China's practical reality and by introducing Lenin's concept of state capitalism into China's eco­ nomic and political policy debates. With the probable exceptions of Chen Boda and Liu Shaoqi, very few Chinese leaders were acquainted with this con­ cept.70 Through his experiments in the Northeast, Zhang developed two new types of state capitalism that were suitable forChina. They were firstpu t into operation in the Northeast, and by 1950 the CCP was utilizing them in major Chinese cities such as Tianjin and Shanghai. Zhang also elaborated Lenin's concept of cooperatives and defined their proper structure and function in China. To Lenin's concept of cooperatives, Zhang added Stalin's notion of the two-step approach to organizing them. Zhang envisioned China eventually developing Soviet-style collective farms, but he did not believe this would happen soon. He recognized that they could be established only if there was an industrial base to support agricultural mechanization and a willingness among the peasants to join collective farms and give up their land to collective ownership.71 Zhang shared Lenin's view that it would be unwise to rush the peasants into cooperative production. Zhang's program, however, was weakened by two inherent contradictions. First, the party's plan to utilize the private-capitalist economy to promote eco­ nomic growth fundamentally contradicted the party's commitment to the elimination of the private-capitalist economy. A second contradiction existed between the party's plan to keep agriculture under private ownership for a prolonged period of time and the objective of enlarging state-owned industry at the fastestpo ssible speed. The CCP's decision in 1949 to rely on resources derived from agriculture to support industrialization in the state-owned economy, with little attention given to increasing agricultural productivity, undermined the balance between the two sectors and led inexorably to the de­ cline of agriculture as a self-sustaining part of the larger economy and as a foundation for supporting industrialization in the state-owned sector. The three-pronged approach, the core of the party's officialeconomic pro­ gram, was difficult to sustain because of the party's contradictory ideological orientation. It was impossible to maintain a balance between one part of the economy, agriculture, which was being kept under private ownership for a prolonged period of time, and another part of the economy, state-owned in­ dustry, which the party was seeking to enlarge at the fastestpossible speed. It was particularly difficult since the party had decided from the beginning to depend heavily on deriving resources from agriculture to support industrial­ ization. The party's plan to use the capitalist economy fundamentallycontra­ dicted the party's commitment to eliminate the capitalist economy. How to manage a three-pronged approach to economic development became a seri­ ous challenge forthe party in the years immediately following 1949. Mao, Stalin, and Transforming China's Economy 77

Mao's Orientation In the late 1940s, Mao was committed to certain ideas. Some of them he openly shared with his lieutenants, and others he revealed only to his closest associates. Among the latter were his ideas concerning the definition and in­ terpretation of New Democracy forconditions in China in the late 1940s, the future course of China's economic development, the proper role of the Soviet Union in China's socialist transition, and the appropriate treatment of China's capitalist class. Among these ideas, only Mao's insistence on Soviet aid for China's socialist transition was included in the officialpolicy program. Mao's unpublicized ideas are important, forthey reflected Mao's real thinking and gave an early indication of the policies he would implement later. Mao also had firm views on the future direction of China's New Demo­ cratic economy. In January 1949, at an enlarged Politburo meeting, Mao stated that China's economy, though still in its New Democratic stage, was moving toward socialism. It would be wrong, he said, to think it was moving toward freetrade, freecompetition, and capitalism. Mao also stressed the im­ portance of the state-owned economy-despite its still-insignificant size-in asserting that socialism in China depended on the growth of the state-owned economy.72 In the late 1940s, Mao was confident that the Soviet Union would assist China with the ((preparation for the completion of the transition from New Democracy to socialism." Mao believed that economic development would be the first areain which the Soviet Union would provide assistance.73 His opti­ mism was probably based on the help Stalin had given to the CCP in seizing control of the Northeast in 1945 beforethe KMT could enter the region. Mao's expectation of Soviet assistance in the economic development of China arose fromhis view that the Soviet Union had a historical responsibility to help the Chinese Revolution. Managing China's capitalist class was not an easy task in the late 1940s. The dilemma for the CCP was how to maintain the proper balance between uti­ lization and restriction, the official policy of the CCP toward the capitalist class since October 1948. It was a contradictory policy, forit was almost im­ possible to reconcile the two opposing goals. When necessary, the CCP em­ phasized the need to work and cooperate with the national bourgeoisie and even to learn from them;74 most of the time, however, the CCP gave priority to controlling and limiting the activities of this class. As stated earlier in this chapter, Mao, though not directly involved in creat­ ing the conceptual frameworkof the Northeast model, gave finalapproval to it as the basis forChina 's national economic policy. At the same time, he made known his views on several issues that contradicted key elements of the new national policy, and these views shaped China's later economic development. 78 Chapter 2

He was determined, for instance, contrary to the official policy, to allow the capitalist economy to survive foronly a limited period of time. In a letter dated October 26, 1948, Mao told Liu of changes he had made in Zhang Wentian's policy proposals, pointing out that he had added the words ((at the present time" to the text ((the party should not put restrictions on the part of the capitalist economy that was still beneficial to the national econ­ omy."75 This addition showed Mao's eagerness to limit the time that the capi­ talist economy could continue to function. In the same letter, Mao reiterated his view that the party's policy should be to restrict private capital:

As for our overall economic policy, it must be to restrict private capital .... In order to achieve this, [we] must regularly fight against private capital that at­ tempts to get off the [socialist] tracks. Although the private capital has been brought on to the [socialist] tracks, it always wants to get offthe tracks. To re­ strict [private capital], therefore,will be an unceasing struggle.76

The Chinese characters for ((restrict" (xianzhi) and ((unceasing" (jingchang buduan) were underscored by Mao. Although his comments might seem to follow the party line, his uncompromising insistence that the party maintain control over the capitalists and that any cooperation with them should be only temporary shows how much his views in fact differed from the party's pub­ licly stated position at that time. Mao's priorities with regard to the cities were also quite different from the party's officialline, that after 1949, attention would be shiftingfrom the rural areas to the cities and from war efforts to economic construction. Huang Kecheng, a PLA general and fellow Hunanese, learned of Mao's priorities for the cities in May 1949, only two months afterthe CCP's Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee meeting, when important policies for post-1949 China were decided. Huang, who had led the Communist takeover of the city of Tianjin in early 1949, was asked by Mao to come to Beijing to report on the situation in Tianjin. During their luncheon, Mao asked Huang what the party's priorities should be in the cities. Huang has reported that he responded, with­ out hesitation, «the development of production." Huang's answer reflected the official policies adopted during the Second Plenum. Mao, however, according to Huang, shook his head and said in a serious manner, ((Wrong! The priority should be class struggle, and [we] need to resolve the issue of the bourgeois class."77 Huang realized right then that «there was a big gap between Mao's thinking and my own,"78 but it would be more accurate to say that there was a gap between Mao's priorities and the party's officialpolic y. Mao occasionally confided his most private thoughts to his closest associ­ ates, and, on this occasion, he shared them with Huang, a fellow Hunanese. What is extraordinary about this episode is that even someone as close to Mao Mao, Stalin, and Transforming China's Economy 79 as Huang could be caught by surprise on firstlearning of Mao's real intention. It is clear from Mao's later actions that he meant what he said privately to Huang in May 1949. In the early 1950s, Mao was dedicated to eliminating the Chinese bourgeois class as quickly as possible, and throughout his rule of China, he emphasized class struggle.

Discussions with Mikoyan: Late January and Early February 1949 There is no informationavailable as to whether or not Mikoyan was aware of Stalin's cable to Mao recommending a policy of maintaining the economic status quo immediately after themilitary victory over the KMT. What is clear, however, is that during their meetings in early February 1949, both Mao and Liu told Mikoyan about some of their plans. Mao informed Mikoyan of the CCP's intention to carry out land reformin the newly liberated areas but said it would be carried out by stages and according to the situation on the war front. In addition, Mao spoke of the need to maintain a mixed economy, 79 but he gave no indication as to how long such a mixed economy would be main­ tained. There is no record currently available of how Mikoyan responded to Mao. It is clear, however, that Mao told Mikoyan what he planned to do, knowing it was not exactly what Stalin had recommended. There seemed to be no concern on Mao's part about revealing to Mikoyan the extent to which the CCP's policies deviated from Stalin's policy recommendations. Liu, like Mao, in stating views that differedfrom Stalin's recommendations, revealed to Mikoyan that the CCP intended to confiscate private property other than just that belonging to bureaucratic capitalists, including the prop­ erty belonging to the so-called comprador bourgeoisie, "under the guise of the confiscation of bureaucratic capital."80 Liu's statement was a clear indication that the CCP was eager to confiscateas much private property as possible but did not want to admit to it publicly. Further, Liu told Mikoyan that the CCP would nationalize and confiscate the enterprises belonging to the national bourgeoisie as quickly as possible, in a year or two at most. 81 Mikoyan made his views known to Liu. He suggested that the CCP pursue a "cautious policy" toward the national bourgeoisie and that "[f]or the moment one should not talk about nationalising [sic] their enterprises. It is better to keep a close watch on them and when the power has consolidated itself, raise the question of their future."82 In response, the record indicates that Liu ex­ pressed his complete agreement with Mikoyan. 83 There is no indication, how­ ever, that either Mao or Liu ever took Mikoyan's recommendations seriously. The frequency and content of communications between Stalin and Mao from the time Mikoyan leftXibaipo in early February 1949 until the conven­ ing of the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee meeting in early 80 Chapter 2

March 1949 remains unclear. It is not known, for example, whether Stalin made any recommendations to Mao concerning policy issues afterStalin was briefed by Mikoyan upon his return from China. In the short span of time fromfall 1948 to summer 1949, the Chinese lead­ ers developed an economic program, derived mainly from the Northeast model, to guide their way toward socialism. Instead of followingStalin's rec­ ommendation of maintaining the existing property-ownership structure, to which Mao had originally agreed, Mao and the CCP established a policy pro­ gram aimed at building, from the beginning of the PRC, the economic foun­ dation to pursue socialism. 84 Most of the senior leaders, including Liu and Zhang, were genuinely committed to such an approach, but they were evi­ dently unaware of Mao's deeply rooted beliefs about class struggle and the bourgeois class, and they failedto comprehend adequately his zeal to achieve socialism in China fasterthan Stalin had achieved it in the Soviet Union. With such major differences in ideas dividing Mao from other senior leaders, and with the expectations of the party rank and file and the general public being shaped by party propaganda that differed fromthe thinking of Mao as well as that of the other senior leaders, problems were bound to arise when the time came to implement a policy program.

The Second Case: Mao's Change of His Policy Concerning Rich Peasants, 1950

In early 1950, Mao made concerted efforts to follow Stalin's suggestion to adopt a "two-stage" land-reform policy in newly liberated areas that would allow rich peasants to retain ownership and control of their land during the first stage of land reform; under this policy, the land of the rich peasants would not be confiscated until the second stage. In this case, compliance was easy forMao, as Stalin's suggestion happened to coincide with the two-stage land-reform policy that Mao had temporarily instituted in northern China in early 1948. Mao also followed Stalin's policy recommendation in conformity with his commitment in summer 1949 to followStalin's instructions on pol­ icy issues. He no doubt fe lt under greater pressure to accept Stalin's policy rec­ ommendations when he met Stalin face-to-face in Moscow, as he did in early 1950 when Stalin made his policy recommendation on rich peasants. During Mao's trip to Moscow, in February 1950, he informedStalin of the CCP's land-reform policy for the newly liberated areas. Evidently, Mao and the CCP had decided to carry out land reformin these regions in winter 1950. While there is no detailed information about their conversation, it is clear that Stalin did not object to Mao's plan to implement land reform. He did, how- Mao, Stalin, and Tra nsforming China's Economy 81 ever, make suggestions on how to handle the rich peasants. Stalin suggested that land reform should be carried out through two distinct stages, one for landlords and another forrich peasants, with a long period of time separating the two stages. In Stalin's typical combination of shrewdness and pragmatism, he suggested that any potential resistance from the rich peasants should be neutralized by leaving them undisturbed at the time the landlord class was being eliminated, so that agricultural production would not be affected. Fur­ ther, Stalin told Mao how to manipulate the poor peasants' desire to take pos­ session of the land belonging to the rich peasants. In Stalin's view, the CCP should take an officialposition of neither forbiddingnor accepting such con­ fiscations. 85 Discipline would be required to implement this policy. To pursue a policy of neutralizing the rich peasants and at the same time allowing the poor peas­ ants to confiscate the land of the rich peasants could create conditions that would be difficult forthe party to control. Stalin, while ready to let the rich peasants survive a while longer, did not in any way minimize the serious na­ ture of the eventual struggle against the rich-peasant class. Stalin's two-stage policy should be seen as a purely tactical maneuver, owing nothing to ideo­ logical considerations. Stalin later provided similar advice to Communist leaders in other countries. In January 1951, Stalin told Bulgarian Communist leaders "not to carry out a dispossession of the kulaks, not to copy the Soviet experience of the 30s and to artificiallyheighten the tension in the country."86 Stalin's suggestion effectively ended the plan then being considered to confis­ cate the land of the rich peasants in Bulgaria. 87 Stalin's suggestions came at a time when the CCP was having serious prob­ lems with landlords and rich peasants in the newly liberated areas. Fearing land reform and political persecution, many landlords and rich peasants had either sold their land or used other means to disperse their land and other property in an attempt to change their ownership status. The consequences were disastrous. First, a large number of hired laborers who had worked for the landlords and rich peasants became unemployed and lost the means to support themselves and their families.Second, the dispersion of land resulted firstin a decline in grain cultivation and then in a reduction in the grain har­ vest, forcingthe government to purchase grain on the international market. Liu told Nikolai Roshchin, then the Soviet ambassador to China, of the grave situation. 88 In an attempt to correct the situation, a CCP directive was sent to all affected regions in early February 1950. Using strong wording, the CCP warned both landlords and rich peasants not to disperse their land. 89 Afteragreeing to Stalin's proposal of a two-stage land-reformpolic y, Mao, wanting to put land reformon hold until he could return to Beijing, changed the party's approach in the newly liberated areas. On February 17, 1950, Mao 82 Chapter 2 cabled Liu, who was in Beijing running the government on a day-to-day basis, and told him to delay land reformin the newly liberated regions. 90 In keeping with the separate treatment of landlords and peasants under the two-stage land-reform policy, Mao decided while still in Moscow to remove from the rich peasants the prohibition on the dispersal of lands. Accordingly, on March 2, 1950, Liu sent a cable to the Huadong Bureau announcing that the prohi­ bition on the dispersal of land and property applied only to landlords.91 Mao recognized that if he agreed to Stalin's policy recommendations concerning land reform,landlords, and rich peasants, he would have to revise the existing land-reform policy and land law established in 1947 in the old liberated areas in northern China, as both the policy and the law failedto distinguish between rich peasants and landlords. 92 There were practical considerations, too. If the two-stage land-reform policy were to be implemented in the newly liberated areas in the south, what could Mao say to the rich peasants in the old liberated areas in the north who had already lost their land and property? Mao returned to Beijing in early March 1950 and took extraordinary mea­ sures to comply with Stalin's recommendations concerning rich peasants. Mao recognized that he needed to establish not only a new land-reformpol­ icy but also a new land law to replace the 1947 land law. Mao behaved in a ((democratic" fashionand consulted a wide range of Communist party leaders before formulating the new policy. The whole process lasted about three and a half months, from around mid-March to late June 1950, and consisted of three rounds of consultations. The final policy, which allowed the rich peas­ ants to keep their land,93 adhered to Stalin's recommendations. The firstround of consultations were held with Deng Zihui of the Zhongnan Bureau, who was reputed to be an expert on peasant issues. Deng was asked to expand the consultations to include the regional leaders in Huadong, Huanan, Xibei, and Xinan, where land reformhad not yet been implemented. This round of consultations began on March 12, 1950.94 By March 25, Mao had received two responses from Deng and one fromWa ng Shoudao of Huanan. Both lead­ ers supported the idea of implementing a two-stage land reform as Stalin had suggested, but both also added that they favoredconfiscating the rental property of the rich peasants and distributing it to the poor peasants during the firststage of land reform,when the landlords were the targets.95 In a second round of con­ sultations, Mao included more leaders and asked more pointed questions. On March 30, he cabled the leaders of all six central bureaus as well as the CCP party committees at the provincial, municipal, and district levels. Although the cables also solicited opinions on the new land law, about half of the fourteen questions asked how to handle the rich peasants during land reform.96 In a serious attempt to obtain feedback from party leaders on Stalin's ideas without mentioning his name, Mao sought the leaders' views on whether land Mao, Stalin, and Tra nsforming China's Economy 83 reform could be carried out in stages, with intervals of several years between stages. He also wanted the opinions of party leaders as to whether it was pos­ sible to neutralize the opposition of the rich peasants during the firststage of land reform byconcentrating only on the landlord class. On a related ques­ tion, he wanted the leaders' judgment on how much land the poor peasants should receive as a result of redistributing the land confiscatedfrom the land­ lords and the rental property seized fromthe rich peasants. He also wanted to know whether the confiscation of the rental property of the rich peasants would undermine the neutralization of the rich peasants. 97 The thoroughgoing manner with which Mao conducted these consulta­ tions shows how much he wanted to ensure the success of land reform.In ad­ dition, perhaps he did not want other Chinese leaders to think that he was just following Stalin's instructions. He wanted instead to create the impression that the CCP could draw upon its past experience in craftinga successfulland­ reform policy. By this time, however, most of the regional leaders probably knew that Stalin was the source for the ideas upon which they were being asked to provide comments. By late April, Mao had received responses from allthe regional leaders, in­ cluding a third response fromDeng Zihui. All the regional leaders had taken the position that it would be wise to implement land reform in two stages and to omit the rich peasants from the firststage. There was disagreement, how­ ever, on whether the rental property of the rich peasants should be confiscated and then redistributed to the poor during the first stage. Deng Zihui, in his third response, forcefullyexplained why he continued to favor the seizure of the rental property of rich peasants. 98 Deng's strong statement of his position prompted Mao to initiate the third round of consultations on April 30, 1950, but this time only one person, Rao Shushi of the Huabei Bureau, was consulted.99 Mao had probably liked Rao's initial response and wanted him to elaborate on his views so that they could be used to persuade Deng. Rao's initial response emphasized that the amount of rental property belonging to the rich peasants in Huabei was small and that whatever minor benefits the CCP gained through seizure of their property would be outweighed by the problems resulting fromthe resistance of the rich peasants. He furthersuggested that the issue of the rich peasants should be re­ solved during the socialist stage.100 Not even waiting forRao's response, Mao cabled Deng on May 1, 1950, to state his position on the issue, which was sim­ ilar to Rao's. To keep the peace between Deng and Rao, Mao asked each to drafthis own version of the land law and to bring their draftsto Beijing. 101 In the end, the land law of 1950, adopted on June 30, 1950, not only incorporated Stalin's suggestions but also allowed exceptions to be made. In areas where there was a need to confiscate some or all of the rental property of the rich 84 Chapter 2

peasants, it could be done. Such exceptions, however, had to be approved by the central authorities. 102 Mao may have included these exceptions to pacify Deng Zihui and others who had supported the seizure of the rental property of rich peasants. Mao skillfullyresolved the issue of the rich peasants to the satisfactionof all the party leaders involved, but the land-reform policy still had to be tested against the reality of conditions in China. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Mao put new emphasis on bringing the countryside under tighter control and on eliminating bandits and counterrevolutionaries. As part of this general approach, Mao sought to accelerate land reform in the newly liberated areas.103 Shortly thereafter, Mao had to caution regional lead­ ers to avoid ((leftist"practices, formany local leaders had abused the rich and middle peasants and had violated the economic interests of both.104 Mao and other leaders made great efforts to reverse the existing land-reformpolicy to respond to Stalin's recommendations, but, at the implementation stage, Stalin's proposals produced little change in the existing policy. Mao, however, followingStalin's recommendation, changed the party's approach in the newly liberated regions. As a result, on the rich-peasant issue, Stalin was able to make Mao adhere to his wishes. Mao tried to disassociate himself from the two-stage land-reformpolicy in February 1953 when he made the decision to accelerate the transformationof China's economy during his inspection tour in southern China. At that time, Mao told local leaders in the south that it was Stalin who had suggested that the rich peasants' economy be preserved during land reformto avoid negative consequences for production. Mao further stated that ((China's agricultural production development depended not on rich peasants, but on mutual-aid cooperatives." 105 In doing so, Mao not only severed his ties with a policy that he had been actively involved in establishing in 1950, but he also set the stage foradopting a new policy.

The Third Case: Stalin and the Introduction of Mao's New Plan for the Transition to a Socialist Economy, Fall 1952

By the fall of 1952, Mao had already made up to his mind to jump ahead of the officialtimetable for the transitionto socialism. Aftersharing his new vi­ sion and plans with a small group of senior leaders in September 1952, he de­ cided it was time to report his preliminary plans forChin a's socialist transi­ tion to Stalin and to seek his support. In fall 1952, there were also other important issues Mao needed to discuss with Stalin, such as the timing of the first session of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the draftingof the Mao, Stalin, and Tra nsforming China's Economy 85

PRC's first constitution, which were matters of great importance to Stalin. Mao's priority, however, was China's transition to socialism. Mao preferred to wait until after China had entered socialism beforedeciding on a new politi­ cal structure. Stalin, however, with different priorities forChina, was eager to complete the political Stalinization of China quickly, and so he urged Mao to move up the date forthe opening of the NPC and to expedite the draftingof a new constitution. 106 With regard to the transition to socialism, Stalin sup­ ported the gradualist program that Liu had presented to him at the beginning of the Nineteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( CPSU) in Moscow in October 1952. Upon his arrival at the Nineteenth Party Congress of the CPSU in October 1952, Liu saw to it that a letter, dated October 20, 1952, outlining the CCP's plans was delivered to Stalin.107 From summer 1949, when the leaders of the CCP began their intense consultations and negotiations with Stalin, they had developed a pattern of submitting reports or letters to Stalin before meeting with him. It was an efficient way to prepare Stalin for what the Chinese wanted to discuss; it also gave Stalin an opportunity to come up with answers beforehand.On October 24, fourdays afterStalin received the letter, Liu and three high-ranking Chinese leaders-Chen Yi, Wang Jiaxiang, and Rao Shushi-had the chance to meet with Stalin and discuss a wide range of im­ portant issues. Due to the complex circumstances surrounding Liu's letter, several points need to be made beforediscussing the contents of the letter. First, it was Mao who asked Liu to write the letter to Stalin requesting instructions fromhim on fourmatters: the timing of China's transition to socialism, the CCP's tentative plan for holding the first meeting of the National People's Congress, the Japanese Communist Party, and the Communist parties of Vietnam and In­ donesia.108 Second, fora long time, only the first part of Liu's letter to Stalin was made public;109 in early 2005, the second part of the letter was finallypub­ lished. 110 The third and fourth parts have not yet been released. Third, prior to October 1952, the Chinese leaders had already given considerable thought to China's transition to socialism-as is evident in the firstpart of Liu's letter to Stalin-but no consensus had been achieved yet on many of the issues pre­ sented in Liu's letter, as is clear from Liu's statement that "the ideas expressed in the letter were only tentative ideas of some comrades and had been dis­ cussed only during informal conversations."111 Further, the letter offered no timetable forthe implementation of the measures it described. 112 Fourth, Liu explicitly stated in the first part of the letter that the CCP leadership was not certain about the "correctness" of their proposed plans with regard to China's socialist transition, especially concerning the "new element" that had been in­ troduced in the letter. Liu did not clarify whathe meant by the "new element," 86 Chapter 2 but it is reasonable to assume that he was obliquely referring to the idea that China should now begin its socialist transition. On this point in particular, it appears, Liu wanted Stalin to provide instructions.113 Liu, in his letter, provided Stalin with a detailed analysis of China's eco­ nomic conditions, the future outlook forvario us industries, and the relative strengths of the private and public sectors in the coming five to ten years. Ac­ cording to Liu's predictions, if current policies were followed,the CCP would be in a strong position to eliminate capitalism in ten years. By that time, ac­ cording to the letter, the state-owned industries would be in a dominant po­ sition in the economy.114 The ideas presented in Liu's letter were neither new nor radical. The Chinese transition to socialism would be achieved through peaceful means and long-term efforts.115 The thread of thought running through the letter was to a large extent in line with the ideas that the CCP had adopted in 1949. The plan was to move the nation's economy toward social­ ism by gradually expanding the state's presence in the urban economy and the role of collectives in the rural economy. Liu also included a lengthy discussion of the methods the CCP planned to use in dealing with the capitalist class and capitalist industries during the next ten years. Liu provided a detailed expla­ nation of these plans, as if he felt there was a need to justify them. Some old ideas, however, were missing in Liu's letter, forinstance the priority previously given to SMCs in the rural areas. Since Stalin agreed with the CCP's "attitude" toward the capitalist class, a description of the party's position on the capital­ ists is in order. Liu told Stalin in his October 1952 letter that the CCP planned to nation­ alize capitalist industry in ten years. Liu believed that the CCP could do so eas­ ily, forby that time, over 90 percent of industry would be state owned, and capitalist industry would be part of the planned economy and thus almost un­ able to operate independently. At that time, the CCP would ask the capitalists to donate their factories to the state and make arrangements with the state concerning their remaining property and their livelihood after givingup their factoriesand most of their property. 116 Liu gave Stalin five reasons for the CCP's confidence that most capitalists would agree to donate their factories to the government. These reasons were related to the nature of the Chinese capitalists, the policies that the CCP had already applied to the capitalist class, the changes that had already taken place within the capitalist class, and, finally, the relative strength of the socialist economy afterten years. Liu told Stalin that the CCP had been applying a two­ pronged policy, that is, allowing the capitalists to make some profitsand at the same time punishing those who acted unlawfully. As a result, in the long run, only the law-abiding capitalists would survive. Alongside this two-pronged policy, other policies were being pursued that would make the capitalists in- Mao, Stalin, and Transforming China's Economy 87 creasingly dependent on the government in all areas relating to their business operations. Liu also noted that the capitalists were being supervised by the labor unions. 1 17 Liu made it clear that he was confidentthat state-owned industry would be­ come dominant in ten years and that, under such circumstances, there would be no way forthe capitalist class to do anything but surrender to CCP control. Liu's confidencein 1952 was probably reinforcedby the success of the Three­ Anti and Five-Anti political campaigns in suppressing the capitalist class. Liu also told Stalin of the party's plans in rural areas. No new ideas were offered. The CCP's commitment was clear: to move the private rural economy toward a collective economy. By the fall of 1952, some 40 percent of the agricultural workforce had already been organized into mutual-aid teams, but the goal was to institute higher-level collectives, such as agricultural production coopera­ tives and collective farms,during the next ten to fifteenyears. Liu told Stalin that the rich-peasant class had become rather small and unimportant and that the CCP would determine how to eliminate this class when the time came.118 Liu also identifiedtwo areas where the party had encountered difficultiesin expanding the state presence: the retailing and handicraftsectors. With regard to retailing, the expansion of state-owned entities had been restricted because of the CCP's concern that a rapid expansion would cause unemployment among millions of shop owners, shop clerks, and peddlers, and would pro­ duce social unrest, something that the CCP wanted to avoid. As forthe hand­ icrafts,it was a different problem: the lack of any party organizational pres­ ence in the industry, which was fragmented,made it difficultfor the party to organize cooperatives as originally planned.1 19 During the meeting with Stalin on October 24, 1952, Liu and the other Chinese leaders had a chance to discuss with Stalin China's transition to so­ cialism and other ideas contained in the letter.120 Very few records of the con­ versations that took place during the meeting have been made available; only Stalin's officialresponse to Liu's letter has been made public. On October 26, 1952, two days after meeting with Stalin, Liu cabled Mao and informedhim of Stalin's response to Liu's letter. Stalin approved the gradualist plan con­ tained in the letter Liu had delivered at the beginning of the Nineteenth Party Congress of the CPSU.121 In Stalin's brief spoken reply, he said, "Your ideas are correct. After seizing power, the party should carry out the transition to so­ cialism in a gradual manner. The attitude that you have adopted towards the Chinese capitalist class is correct."122 In his short and carefullyworded state­ ment, Stalin expressed support for the proposed gradualist approach for China's transition to socialism. There is no indication that Stalin attempted to address any concrete policy measures or the question of timing for the social­ ist transition. In his statement about the Chinese capitalist class, he supported 88 Chapter 2 the "attitude" adopted by the CCP leadership, but again he did not address any concrete policy issues. Why did Stalin make such an ambiguous statement in response to this important policy query fromMa o, in sharp contrast to the clear and lengthy answer he provided to Mao's questions concerning the scheduling of the first meeting of China's National People's Congress?123 Further, why did Stalin avoid addressing directly the most urgent question Mao had in mind at the time, namely, the correctness of embarking now on a transition to so­ cialism? One interpretation would be that Stalin did not pay attention to the word "now" (xianzai) in the letter. It only appeared twice in the text: once at the be­ ginning of the letter, and again later in the section describing the policies that the CCP would apply to the capitalist class. One could speculate that Stalin, being sick and busy at the time, overlooked the presence of this word and paid attention only to larger issues. Another interpretation, however, would be that Stalin did not agree with the idea of China's beginning a socialist transition at this time but decided not to give any negative answers. Instead, he made an ambiguous statement. To be sure, Stalin had his own ideas about the appropriate policies for China at the time, and he wanted to see his ideas prevail in China. He wanted Mao first to establish a one-party political structure dominated by the CCP with a constitutional fac;:ade and then to push foreconomic change.124 Stalin was forceful in his arguments, and in the end he got his way. As urged by Stalin, Mao established a one-party political structure with a written consti­ tution in 1954. There is no informationavailable on the CCP's internal discussions concern­ ing Stalin's response. It is known, however, that Mao chose to interpret Stalin's response as supporting his own plan. The CCP leadership fell in line and went along with Mao's interpretation.125 Beginning in the first half of 1953, the top CCP leaders-including Mao, Liu, Zhou, and others-set about the task of for­ mulating a policy for an immediate transition to socialism that would suit China's economic conditions.126

Conclusion

During the fourand a half years from the time Stalin recommended a policy of maintaining the existing economic structure to the time he supported a gradual transition to socialism, he was consistent in his moderate policy ap­ proach to land reform, rich peasants, the national bourgeoisie, the pace for economic growth during the FFYP, and finallythe speed with which the tran- Mao, Stalin, and Transforming China's Economy 89 sition to socialism should be carried out. Stalin provided advice and aid, but he also sought to put constraints on Mao's radical policy orientation. Stalin had some success in this endeavor. As long as Stalin lived, Mao was forcedto exercise some restraint in his policies. Mao acted differently in each of the three cases presented in this chapter. In the first case, Mao disagreed with Stalin's recommendation that the CCP should maintain the existing economic structure unchanged foran unspeci­ fied periodof time. Mao did not tell Stalin of his objections; he instead paid partial lip service to Stalin as a way of disarming him. Mao held firmto the policies that were important to him. Between 1948 and 1949, Mao pursued a policy program different from the one recommended by Stalin, and it had long-lasting implications forChina. In the second case, Mao at first agreed with Stalin's advice and acted in accordance with it; later, he disassociated himself fromStalin's advice when it conflictedwith his new policy. In the third case, Mao tried to assert his independence as much as possible, but in the end he needed to borrow Stalin's authority, even if it required misrepresenting Stalin's position, to advance his own program. It was only afterStali n's death that Mao had a freehand to pursue his own radical agenda.

Notes

1. This view was expressed to me on June 30, 2002, by Dr. Balazs Szalontai, at that time a PhD candidate at Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. 2. For a discussion of interactions between Stalin and Liu Shaoqi in the summer of 1949, see Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 418. 3. See my article, 'The Political Stalinization of China: The Establishment of One­ Party Constitutionalism, 1948-1954," JCWS 3, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 31. 4. Arlen Meliksetov, "'New Democracy' and China's Search forSocio-Economic Development Routes (1949-1953)" (hereinafter as "China's Search"), PEA, no. 1 (1996): 80. 5. Sergei Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue;' PEA, no. 2 (1992): 99-100. 6. For the speech that Stalin delivered in Moscow on April 5, 1927, as well as intro­ ductory comments by the editor A. M. Grigoriev, see "Joseph Stalin's Unpublished Speech on China," PEA, no. 1 (2001): 64-77. 7. Sergei Goncharov, "The Stalin-Mao Dialogue;' PEA, no. 2 (1992): 96-97. 8. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [ CCP Central Committee Document Research Office], Liu Shaoqi nianpu (1898-1969) (xiajuan) [A chronicle of Liu Shaoqi, 1898-1969, vol. 2] (hereinafteras Liu nianpu 2) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chuban­ she, 1996), 222; Jin Chongji and Huang Zheng, Liu Shaoqi zhuan (xiajuan) [Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2] (hereinafter as Liu Shaoqi zhuan 2) (Beijing: Zhongyang wen­ xian chubanshe, 1998), 655. 9. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 416. 90 Chapter 2

10. Bulletin, nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 14. 11. We nxian xuanbian 4, 709. 12. For an account of what Liu Shaoqi told V. V. Kuznetsov, Soviet ambassador to China, about Stalin's suggestions during their meeting in fall 1952, see Arlen Melikse­ tov, "China's Search," 80-8 1. 13. Odd Arne We stad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Al­ liance, 1945-1963 (hereinafteras Brothers in Arms) (Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1998; Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 299; Andrei Ledovsky, "Two Cables from Correspondence between Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin" (hereinafter as "Two Cables"), PEA, no. 6 (2000): 94-95. These two cables were also published in China in ZDY, no. 2 (2001): 87-89. Mao's response to Stalin on April 26, 1948, however, was not published in China. 14. Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms, 299. Also see Andrei Ledovsky, "Two Cables," 95. 15. Odd Arne We stad, ed., Brothers in Arms, 299; Andrei Ledovsky, "Two Cables," 94-95. 16. Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms, 299. 17. For a brief discussion of the subject, see Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yan­ jiushi [CCP Central Committee Document Research Office], Ren Bishi nianpu [A chronicle of Ren Bishi] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, Renmin chubanshe, 1993) (hereinafter as Ren Bishi nianpu), 566-67. 18. Mao xuanji 4, 1278; Zhongyang dang'anguan [Central Committee Party Archives], Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 17 ce [Selected documents of the CCP Central Committee, vol. 17] (hereinafteras We njian xuanji 17) (Beijing: Zhong­ gong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1992), 45. 19. Mao xuanji 4, 1283-84. 20. Mao xuanji 4, 1280-82. 21. Mao xuanji 4, 1326-27. 22. Mao xuanji 4, 1329. 23. Gu Longsheng, Mao Zedong jingji nianpu [An economic chronicle of Mao Ze­ dong] (hereinafter as Mao jingji nianpu) (Beijing, Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1993), 245. 24. Hu Qiaomu, Huiyi Mao Zedong, 536. 25. Fan Shouxin, "Jianguo chuqi dui guanliao ziben de moshou he gaizao" [Con­ fiscationand transformationof bureaucratic capital during the early days of the PRC], DY, no. 5 (1984): 48; Hu Qiaomu, Huiyi Mao Zedong, 543; Zhongyang dang'anguan [Central Committee Party Archives], Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 16 ce [Se­ lected documents of the CCP Central Committee, vol. 16] (hereinafteras We njian xu­ anji 16) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1992), 552. 26. Mao xuanji 4, 1254. 27. Hu Qiaomu, Huiyi Mao Zedong, 543-44. 28. For the CCP directive dated January 15, 1949, see Zhongyang dang'anguan [Central Committee Party Archives], Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 18 ce [Se­ lected documents of the CCP Central Committee, vol. 18] (hereinafteras We njian xu­ anji 18) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1992), 31-33. For a Mao, Stalin, and Tra nsforming China's Economy 91 study of the CCP's policy and practice with regard to the confiscation of property from the bureaucratic capitalists, as well as the property of foreign investors, in the early 1950s, see Liu Zhiguang, "Jianguo chuqi zhongguo gongchandang dui guanliao ziben he zaihua waiguo ziben de zhengce" [The CCP's policy concerning bureaucratic capital and foreigncapital in China during the early days of the PRC], ZDZ 71 ( 1999): 101-15. 29. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 29-35. 30. For Mao's instructions, see Zhonggong 18, 549. 31. Zhang We ntian xuanji [Selected works of Zhang Wentian] (hereinafteras Zhang We ntian xuanji (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985), 416. Zhang's proposal was revised by Liu Shaoqi and approved by Mao in the fall of 1948. In my analysis, I use Liu's re­ vised version of Zhang's proposal, forit reflects the final form of the CCP's policies. Zhang's original proposal was published in 1995 in Zhang Wentian wenji bianjizu [Editorial group forthe collected works of Zhang Wentian], Zhang We ntian wenji (di­ sijuan) [Collected works of Zhang Wentian, vol. 4] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1995), 17-28. 32. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 415-16. 33. Ganbu bidu 5, 341-42. 34. Ganbu bidu 5, 341-42. 35. Ganbu bidu 5, 347. 36. Moshe Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle (New Yo rk: Pantheon Books, 1968), 26. 37. Moshe Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle, 26. 38. Ganbu bidu 5, 360-62. 39. Moshe Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle, 26-27. 40. Ganbu bidu 5, 362-64. 41. Ganbu bidu 5, 364-65. 42. Ganbu bidu 5, 365. 43. Moshe Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle, 28. 44. Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR: 1917-1991, 3rd ed. (hereinafter as Economic History) (New Yo rk: Penguin Books, 1992), 84. 45. Moshe Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle, 28. 46. Ganbu bidu 5, 494. 4 7. Gan bu bidu 5, 496-97. 48. Ganbu bidu 5, 501-2. 49. Moshe Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle, 115-16; Alec Nove, Economic History, 105. 50. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (here­ inafteras Stalin in Power) (New Yo rk: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), 39. 51. Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism 3: The Breakdown (New Yo rk: Oxford University Press, 1981), 22. 52. Liangong dangshi, 407. 53. Moshe Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle, 115-16; Alec Nove, Economic History, 105. 54. J. V. Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1976), 65. 55. J. V. Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1976), 65. 92 Chapter 2

56. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 397, 399. 57. For Ren Bishi's speech delivered to the CCP's Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee meeting on March 13, 1949, see Ren Bishi xuanji [Selected works of Ren bishi] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987), 467-70. 58. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 398-99. 59. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 402. 60. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 401-402. 61. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 200-201. 62. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 412. 63. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 403-4. 64. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 408-9. 65. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 407. 66. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 406. 67. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 406. 68. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 406. 69. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 406. 70. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 22; Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 63-64. 71. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 412. 72. Hu Qiaomu, Huiyi Mao Zedong, 544. 73. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 17. 74. For a discussion of the CCP's decision in January 1949, see Bo Yibo, Qishinian fe ndou yu sikao (shangjuan) [My seventy-year struggle and my reflectionson it, vol. 1] (hereinafteras Qishinian 1) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1996), 498-500. 75. Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao 18 ce [CCP history teaching reference materials, vol. 18] (hereinafter as Zhonggong 18) (Beijing: Guofangdaxue chubanshe, 1986), 549; Gongheguo 1949-1952, 85. 76. Zhonggong 18, 549. 77. Huang Kecheng huiyilu (shang) [The memoirs of Huang Kecheng, vol. 1] (Bei­ jing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989), 364-65; Huang Ke chengzishu [Huang Kecheng's ac­ count in his own words] (hereinafter as Zishu) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995), 217. 78. Huang Kecheng huiyilu (shang) [The memoirs of Huang Kecheng, vol. 1], 365; Huang Kecheng, Zishu, 217. In his 1995 book, Huang repeated the same account he had given in his 1989 book of Mao's statement to him in May 1949. 79. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 29. 80. Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," PEA, no. 3 (1995): 86. 81. Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," PEA, no. 3 (1995): 86. 82. Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," PEA, no. 3 (1995): 86. 83. Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," PEA, no. 3 (1995): 86. 84. Hu Qiaomu, Huiyi Mao Zedong, 543. 85. Mao wengao 1, 264. 86. Vladimir Migev, "The Bulgarian Peasants' Resistance to Collectivization (1948-1958)," Bulgarian Historical Review, no. 1 (1997): 62-63. 87. Vladimir Migev, "The Bulgarian Peasants' Resistance to Collectivization (1948-1958)," Bulgarian Historical Review, no. 1, 63. Mao, Stalin, and Tra nsforming China's Economy 93

88. For Liu's conversation with Nikolai Roshchin on August 26, 1950, see AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 43, p. 302, por. 10, ll. 157-79. 89. For the cable, dated February 9, 1950, that Liu sent to the South-Central Bu­ reau at the time, see Liu wengao l, 402. 90. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 205; Mao wengao 1, 264-65; We nxian xuanbian l, 126-27. 91. Liu wengao 1, 459. 92. We njian xunji 16, 546-50. See especially item 8 on page 548. 93. We nxian xuanbian 1, 337. 94. Mao wengao 1, 272-73; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Cen­ tral Committee Document Research Office], ed., Mao Zedong wenji, diliujuan [Col­ lected writings of Mao Zedong, vol. 6] (hereinafter as Mao wenji 6) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999), 47-48; We nxian xuanbian l, 137-38. 95. Lang Yingjie, "Mao Zedong yu baocun funong jinji zhengce" [Mao Zedong and the policy of preserving the economy of the rich peasants] (hereinafter as "Mao yu baocun"), DYZ, no. 9 (2001): 10-11; Deng Zihui zhuan [Biography of Deng Zihui] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996), 404-5. 96. Lang Yingjie, "Mao yu baocun," DYZ, no. 9 (2001): 10. 97. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 210-12; We nxian xuanbian 1, 167-69. 98. Lang Yingjie, "Mao yu baocun;' DYZ, no. 9 (2001): 11-12; Deng Zihui zhuan, 405-6. For Deng's cable to Mao on April 25, 1950, see We nxian xuanbian 1, 206-9; Gongheguo 1949-1952, 213-15. 99. Lang Yingjie, "Mao yu baocun;' DYZ, no. 9 (2001): 12. 100. Lang Yingjie, "Mao yu baocun," DYZ, no. 9 (2001): 11. 101. For Mao's response on May 1, 1950, see Gongheguo 1949-1952, 216; Mao wen- gao 1, 323. 102. We nxian xuanbian 1, 337. 103. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 219; Mao wengao 1, 680. 104. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 221-22. 105. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong de Mao Zedong [The Mao Zedong I knew] (here- inafter as Wo yangzhong) (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1990), 42. 106. Liu Shaoqi zhuan 2, 758; DY, no. 1 (2005): 11-12. 107. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 218. 108. DW, no. 1, (2005): 10. 109. For the text of the first part of the letter, see DW, no. 5 (1988): 53-55; Zhong­ gong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [ CCP Central Committee Document Research Of­ fice], Liu Shaoqi lun xinzhongguojingji jianshe [Liu Shaoqi on new China's economic construction] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 239-43; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [ CCP Central Committee Document Research Office], Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, disance [Selected important documents since the foundingof the People's Republic of China, vol. 3] (hereinafteras We nxian xuanbian 3) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe), 367-71; Zhongyang dang'anguan [Central Committee Party Archives], ed., Gongheguo wushinian zhengui dang'an, shangce [Valu­ able archives of the fiftyyears of the PRC, vol. 1] (hereinafteras Zhengui dang'an 1) (Bei­ jing: Zhongguo dang'an chubanshe, 1999), 229-32. See also Liu nianpu 2, 304-5. 94 Chapter 2

110. See DW, no. 1 (2005): 9. 111. Liu Shaoqi, "Guanyu zenyang cong xianzai zhubu guodudao shehuizhuyi qu de wenti" [How to achieve a gradual transition to socialism beginning now] , DW, no. 5 (1988): 53(*); Gongheguo zouguo de lu-jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian: 1953-1956 [The road the PRC has traveled-selected important documents since the revolution: 1953-1956] (hereinafter as Gongheguo 1953-1956) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991), 18(1); We nxian xuanbian 3, 371(1); DW,no. 1 (2005): 9. For a brief discussion of this letter, see Mao wengao 3, 695. 112. Liu Shaoqi zhuan 2, 723. 113. DW, no. 1 (2005): 9. 114. DW, no. 5 (1988): 54. 115. DW, no. 5 (1988): 54-55. 116. DW, no. 5 (1988): 54. 117. DW, no. 5 (1988): 54. 118. DW, no. 5 (1988): 55 119. DW, no. 5 (1988): 53, 55. 120. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi, 529-30. 121. Liu Shaoqi zhuan 2, 723. For Liu's cable to Mao, see DW, no. 1 (2005): 10. 122. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 221; Liu Shaoqi zhuan 2, 723; Mao wengao 3, 695. 123. For details, see DW, no. 1 (2005): 11-12. 124. For a detailed treatment of this matter, see my article "The Stalinization of China: The Establishment of One-Party Constitutionalism, 1948-1 954," JCWS 3, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 28-47. 125. Liu Shaoqi zhuan 2, 724. 126 Liu Shaoqi zhuan 2, 724-25. 3

Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Socialist Economic Transformation of China in the Early 1950 s

Introduction

s DISCUSSED IN THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS BOOK, Mao's emulation of the ASoviet model depended upon both his consultations with Soviet leaders, especially Stalin, and his readings of Soviet written works. Stalin's advice, as shown in chapter 2, served mainly as a constraint on Mao's radical plan to cre­ ate a socialist system in China as rapidly as possible. The Soviet texts-espe­ cially Stalin's Short Course, the most important of these works forMao-ex­ ercised a more profoundimpact upon his thinking in pursuing a Stalinist path to socialism. In this chapter, I discuss Mao's reliance on Stalin's Short Course in establishing a Stalinist economic system in China in the early 1950s. To emphasize the importance of the Short Course does not diminish the im­ portance of other sources of ideas during this period, including the writings of Lenin, other writings of Stalin, speeches and political reports by Soviet leaders in the early 1950s, and oral advice provided by Stalin and by Soviet leaders, planners, and officials. The importance of the Short Course is that it served as a road map forbu ildingsocialism in China, and it can be said with­ o'ut exaggeration that the post-1949 socialist transformationof China largely followedthe stages described in the Short Course. A few Western scholars have made mention of the impact of Stalin's Short Course on Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Benjamin Schwartz, for example, commented on Mao's uncritical acceptance of the image of "socialism" as described in the Short Course, 1 while Tony Saich de­ scribed Mao's effort torewrite past CCP party history during his Rectification

- 95 - 96 Chapter 3

Campaign as inspired by what Stalin had done with the Short Course, that is, to have a party history based on a Maoist discourse. 2 Agreeing with Schwartz, I believe that in the early 1950s Mao was devoted to the view of«socialism" de­ scribed in the Short Course. I go further, however, in arguing that Mao also created a Stalinist economic structure, largely following the steps outlined by Stalin in the Short Course. Mao relied on Stalin's radical ideas of the 1920s and 1930s, expressed in the Short Course, especially his ideas about the measures that needed to be taken to destroy the old economic structure and establish a new socialist system in its place. Mao paid particular attention to Stalin's dis­ cussion of the conditions under which capitalism could be eliminated and the time required to complete the process of socialist transformation.While es­ sentially followingthe steps outlined in the Short Course, Mao was ready to take shortcuts so that he could complete each step on the road to socialism in China faster than Stalin had in the Soviet Union. Mao's commitment to Stalin's written work reveals the paradox of Mao's, on the one hand, being sus­ picious of Stalin's gradualist advice and, on the other, accepting uncritically Stalin's earlier radical writings. What does Mao's heavy reliance on the Short Course tell us about Mao and his ideological orientation, his commitment to Stalinism and a Stalinist road to socialism, and his capabilities as an independent thinker? To set the stage formy discussion, I will firstbriefly introducethe Short Course. I will then dis­ cuss the history of the application of the Short Course in China and Mao's re­ lationship with this work.

The Short Course

Largely unknown in the West, the book is usually referred to simply as the Short Course, in place of its full title, Short Course of the History of the All­ Russian Communist Pa rty (Bolshevik). The Short Course was firstpu blished in Moscow in 1937. It was written under the supervision of Stalin and then heav­ ily edited by him. Stalin's actual contribution was limited to only one section of chapter 4, where he wrote about dialectical and historical materialism, a subject in which Mao was interested. After World War II, Stalin claimed sole authorship of the entire work,3 and the Chinese Communists continued to believe that Stalin alone had written the Short Course.4 In contrast to most in­ fluential books in the West, which enjoy a wide appeal due to the originality and power of their ideas, Stalin imposed the Short Course on the Communist world and used it as an instrument in its Stalinization. Between 1938 and 1953, over 42 million copies of the book were issued, in 301 printings and 67 languages. 5 Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Transformation 97

The book covered the early history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( CPSU) and the historical stages of the revolution and socialist trans­ formation in the Soviet Union during the period from 1883 to 193 7. In the Short Course, the history of the CPSU was written in such a way as to suggest that every significant development was the result of political struggles be­ tween the correct line, represented by Lenin and Stalin, and the incorrect po­ sitions adopted by various antiparty groups. Prominent in the book was Stalin's justificationof his brutal purges of opponents, such as Trotsky, and of others such as Bukharin who had helped him rise to power but later disagreed with him. Since these former((comrades" were now labeled as "antiparty" ele­ ments, they deserved to be crushed without mercy. Throughout the book, his­ torical factswere twisted and ideas were distorted to show the correctness of the party's policies, even during the darkest days of Stalin's policies, and to glorify Stalin and his leadership role in the Russian Revolution and in the building of socialism in the Soviet Union. The work was also an expression of Stalin's value system, his worldview, and his approach to building socialism. The Short Course was viewed in the Communist world from the late 1930s until Khrushchev's de-Stalinization of 1956 as an encyclopedia of Marxism and Leninism and as the authoritative source for((formal interpretations" of Soviet party history and forbasic knowledge of Marxism and Leninism. This view was expressed in the CPSU's propaganda resolution of November 14, 1938, at the time of the publication of the Short Course.6 For many years, the Short Course was believed to contain authoritative answers to questions con­ cerning ideology, party politics, economic policies, and socialist transforma­ tion. 7 This view was accepted by the leaders of all the Communist countries, including Mao, who, as will be shown below, was particularly enthusiastic about the book. After 1956, the Short Course waned in importance in most of the Communist world, but it continued to exercise influence in China after that. Mao continued to revere the Short Course as a sacred text, and he re­ mained uncritical in his embrace of it. Mao and the Chinese Communist lead­ ership were inspired by it and used the ideas expressed in it to guide them in their policy deliberations on ideological, political, social, and economic mat­ ters beginning in 1938, when the Chinese translation of the work, published in the Soviet Union, firstarrived in China.

The History of the Application of the Short Course in China

The Short Course was translated from Russian to Chinese by Bo Gu and Xie Weizhen in Moscow. 8 Ren Bishi, one of Mao's most loyal supporters, played an important role in getting the translated work published in Moscow. As the 98 Chapter 3

CCP delegate to the Comintern, Ren worked closely with the Soviet Foreign Language Publishing Bureau and helped it to check the Chinese translation of the Short Course. In addition, he translated one section of chapter 4.9 Inter­ estingly, fromthe book's firstarrival in China in 1938 until the 1970s, despite the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese continued to use the 1938 Chinese-language edition printed in the Soviet Union. 10 Soon after the book arrived in Ya n'an, it was quickly used as ((crash-course teaching materials"11 to educate young cadres at the party schools.12 Li Weihan, who taught the Short Course in Yan'an, said in the mid-1980s that during the 1930s and 1940s CCP leaders learned Marxism and Leninism through the Short Course. 13 This practice continued until the 1960s. As a result, the Short Course was used to educate several generations of Chinese Communist leaders.14 The Short Course was not only being circulated in the Ya n' an area but was also being sent to other CCP-occupied areas. The book seems to have been in great demand. In late 1939, of the one hundred to two hundred copies of the Short Course sent to Shandong fromYa n' an, only seven copies arrived at their final destination; the rest had been taken by cadres along the way.15 The book was also received by the Communists in the Japanese-occupied areas. One source told me of her father'sbeing put in danger because he had a copy of the Short Course in his possession. As a young Communist working in the Japan­ ese-occupied areas, the fatherwas one day traveling along a country road with two peasants when he saw Japanese troops approaching. To avoid arrest, he quickly hid the book in the fields.Later, he asked one of the peasants to return to the area and retrieve the book for him. 16 It is probably difficult formost people today to understand the appeal of the Short Course, but forthose who believed in Marxism at that time, it was like the ((gospel." 17 The Short Course served not only as a source for teaching Communist cadres how to think but also as a source of inspiration. Some Communists were so inspired by the Short Course that they decided to take action. A young fe male student in Yan' an was so moved by what was said in the conclusion of the Short Course concerning the need forthe Communists to form close ties with the masses, that she decided to have a peasant familyraise her newborn baby son so that she could be in touch with the masses. 18 The CCP leader Liu Shaoqi quoted inspirational phrases from the Short Course when discussing the darkest period of CCP history. Liu made a parallel comparison between what had happened in Soviet party history between 1905 and 1912 and CCP party history after 1927, and he believed that the outcome of the CCP's dark­ est period was identical to that of the Soviet Communist party as described in the Short Course: ((We went through dark periods, [but we] not only preserved [our] revolutionary flags, but also [our] revolutionary organizations."19 Mao was inspired by quite differentideas expressed in the Short Course; he learned Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Tra nsformation 99

from the conclusion that Stalin criticized the ideas of both Marx and Engels and that, therefore,even great theoreticians could make mistakes.20 By 1945, the CCP had identifiedthe Short Course as one of the five"must­ read" texts forCo mmunist cadres.21 The CCP, moreover, was eager to extend the influence of the ideas contained in the book to the general public and quickly stocked the bookstores in the vast newly occupied areas in the North­ east with the book. The first sale of the book in a bookstore took place on April 6, 1948, in a city called Jiamusi, and the occasion was marked by a cere­ mony. Regional leaders such as Zhang Wentian not only attended the cere­ mony but also worked alongside the store clerks selling the books.22 The en­ thusiasm shown by the CCP leaders in seeking to spread the influence of the book was extraordinary. In 1949, Mao began to devote more attention to the systematic theoretical education of CCP cadres. He arranged forthe compilation of a twelve-volume collection called Gan bu bidu [Required readings forcadres ]. The Short Course was included as volume 4.23 Realizing the need to establish principles to guide economic reconstruction afterthe civil war, Mao also arranged forthe compi­ lation of two volumes containing the selected writings of Lenin and Stalin on economic construction, entitled Liening Sidalin lun shehuizhuyi jingji jianshe (shangxiace) [Lenin and Stalin on socialist economic construction]. These two volumes became volumes 5 and 6 of the twelve-volume Ganbu bidu. Signifi­ cantly, the works of Lenin and Stalin that were selected forthese two volumes were written during almost the same period ( 1921-1938) as that covered by chapters 9 through 12 of the Short Course (1921-1937); the book itself covered the period from 1917 to 193 7. (See appendix1, Liening Sidalin lun shehuizhuyi jingjijianshe [Lenin and Stalin on socialist economic construction].) The firstof the two volumes on Lenin and Stalin contained primarily the works of Lenin, including his writings and speeches from 1917 to 1923, dur­ ing the time of the October Revolution, the civil war, and the New Economic Policy (NEP); this volume also included some of Stalin's writings. The second volume contained only the writings and speeches of Stalin, from 1924 to 1939, and they were divided into the periods of industrialization, collectivization, and the completion of socialism, as in the Short Course. Mao was preparing as early as 1949 to lead China onto a path of socialist economy based largely on Stalinist principles. After 1949, the intended audience forthe Short Course expanded to include the larger Chinese society. The CCP continued to use the Short Course to edu­ cate its cadres at the Central Party School until 1957.24 Beginning in 1958, how­ ever, it became an important text forteaching college and university students about Marxist theory. 25 Chinese students who majored in the Russian language found the Short Course usefulin other ways; many of them tried to memorize 100 Chapter 3

the Short Course and hoped thereby to master the Russian language. 26 As their knowledge of the Russian language improved, they must have realized that the range of vocabulary used in the Short Course was quite limited. The Short Course also had an impact on the style of written Chinese. In the early 1960s, when the leaders of the CCP were engaged in debates with the Soviet leaders, they published a series of open letters to the CPSU. Among these letters, the ninth one was the most important, forit explicitly attacked the Soviet Union, and it was written in the ideologically highly charged style of the Short Course.27 In 1964, just two years before the Cultural Revolution, the Short Course was still included in a list of selected works forsenior cadres to read.28 After the late 1950s and early 1960s, as China's economy moved beyond the initial transition stage, the usefulnessof the Short Course as a source forideas on the economy diminished. It was gradually replaced by other books, such as Stalin's last book, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U. S.S.R., and Soviet political-economy textbooks.29 The usefulnessof the book in other areas con­ tinued to be recognized, especially as a model forwriting CCP party-history textbooks to educate party cadres. The CCP party history of 1961 was written in such a way as to give particular attention to «two-line struggles." Ten such «two-line struggles" were identified, as compared to the fifteen in the Short Course. It also portrayed Mao as the central figurein the party's history. Mao's name appears 1 ,000 times, as compared to the 650 times the names of either Lenin or Stalin appear in the Short Course. In addition, about 150 pages, or about one-third of the text, were devoted to discussions of Mao's works, as compared to the 100 pages in the Short Course containing discussions of the works of Lenin or Stalin. 30 The Chinese editors followedthe Short Course as a model of style, even in chapter headings and punctuation.31 CCP cadres con­ tinued to read the party-history textbook of 1961 well into the 1970s and, in the process, continued to have their thinking shaped, indirectly and in a Chi­ nese historical context, by the fundamentalsof Stalin's Short Course. With the beginning of the reforms in the late 1970s, scholars and party re­ searchers started to criticize the negative impact of the Short Course on China, particularly in the areas of research and teaching. During a symposium held in 1989 and attended by many liberal-minded party researchers and univer­ sity professors, the Short Course was harshly criticized, and its negative impact on China was condemned.32 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, how­ ever, muted such criticism in China. CCP leaders feared that permitting un­ fettered criticism of the Short Course might lead to attacks on the CCP's past policies and cause the collapse of the Communist regime in China, as had happened in the Soviet Union. As a result, liberal-minded younger scholars in China have foundit difficult to make critical remarks about the book, 33 since it has never been officiallyrepudiated. Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Tra nsformation 101

What exactly did the Chinese Communists learn from the Short Course? And to what extent did the book shape their way of thinking, their worldview, and their way of governing China? Although they came into contact with many ideas, the most important lesson they learned was the importance of ap­ plying Marxist theory to China's reality, as Lenin and Stalin had done in the Soviet Union. Mao had repeatedly emphasized this theme since the early 1940s, and he identified himself as the one who had led the effortto apply Marxist theories to the Chinese reality, just as Lenin and Stalin had in the So­ viet Union. The Chinese Communists also became accustomed to the idea that the history of the CPSU was fullof brutal "two-line struggles" and ruth­ less political purges. They came to understand the different stages of eco­ nomic development through which the Soviet Union had passed; the Stalinist path to socialism; and the time required to achieve socialism through the elimination of capitalism, rapid industrialization, and collectivization. They also learned that at the core of the process of building socialism is the strug­ gle between capitalism and socialism, or, as Lenin firststated and Stalin later repeated, there is the question of "who will win" in this struggle.

Mao and the Short Course

Unlike other CCP leaders who had received systematic training in Marxist and Leninist theory in the Soviet Union, Mao studied on his own in China and read fewer books. Thus, Mao's knowledge of Marxist theory was quite limited. Mao quickly adopted the officialSoviet position that Stalin's Short Course was an encyclopedia of Marxism and Leninism. In May 1941, as Mao began his quest to reshape Marxist learning within the CCP, he argued that the CCP should use the Short Course as its authoritative source forMarxism because it summarized the essence of the world Communist movement during the pre­ vious one hundred years and because it served as "a model of the integration of theory and practice, and the only one that has ever existed."34 The same Mao who resisted Comintern policies accepted the ideological authority of the Short Course. Mao reaffirmedthis view in his eulogy of Stalin on March 9, 1953, when he identified three of Stalin's written works as formingthe ency­ clopedia of Marxism and Leninism: the Short Course; the Foundations of Leninism; and Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., Stalin's last writ­ ten work.35 After de-Stalinization, Mao stated that he had praised Stalin's works only reluctantly. 36 Mao liked the Short Course very much, though he admitted in the 1940s that he had never read the entire book, just the concluding section of each chapter. He took pride in not having read the entire book, forhe believed that 102 Chapter 3

by grasping just the essence of the book from the conclusions of the chapters, he was better prepared than other Chinese leaders to apply the book's ideas to the Chinese reality. 37 In 1942, Mao stated that the main lesson he had learned from the Short Course was the importance of Bolshevism and the correctness of its methods in creating the Soviet Union. He also said that he had learned fromthe Short Course that Bolshevism was created by Lenin and his party by applying Marxist theory to the Russian reality. 38 Mao also liked the conclusion of the Short Course, which consists of six items. There were several occasions between the early 1940s and the early 1950s when Mao asked party cadres to study the conclusion of the Short Course.39 Mao particularly liked items 4 and 5 of the conclusion.40 Item 4 em­ phasized the importance of intraparty struggles against undesirable elements in the history of the CPSU, and item 5 stressed the importance of the CPSU's ability to acknowledge mistakes in order to be able to achieve its revolution­ ary goals. It is understandable that Mao felt an affinityfor these two items, for Mao liked to conduct intraparty struggles against his rivals and those who dis­ agreed with him, and he also liked to make them acknowledge their mistakes. Mao's unwavering faith in the Short Course continued beyond the de­ Stalinization of 1956. In 1959, long afterthe repudiation of Stalin and Stalin­ ism in the Soviet Union, Mao continued to rely upon the Short Course as a source of ideas and theoretical inspiration. During a trip he took in October of that year, Mao took twenty-three books with him, and the Short Course was one of them.41 It is ironic that Mao brutally attacked CCP leaders who had studied in Moscow, particularly Wang Ming and Zhang Wentian, fordogma­ tism in their application of Marxism to China's reality, while Mao was, at the same time, uncritically promoting the Short Course as an encyclopedia of Marxism and Leninism forthe CCP. Despite his reputation forbeing an inde­ pendent and original thinker, Mao surprisingly never challenged the views ex­ pressed in the Short Course.

Mao's Application of the Short Course in China

There were two periods afterthe Short Course arrived in China when Mao ap­ plied it most intensively. The firstwas between 1941 and 1944, during the Rec­ tification Campaign. He skillfullyused ideas expressed in the Short Course to solidifyhis power and establish himself not only as the undisputed leader of the CCP but also as a Marxist theorist. From this book, he learned about the application of Marxist ideas, political purges of undesirable elements within the party ranks, "two-line struggles" as the basic framework forinterpreting intraparty politics, and, as Tony Saich has argued so powerfully, the impor- Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Transformation 103 tance of establishing a CCP party history-as Stalin had done with the Short Course in the Soviet Union--based on a Maoist discourse.42 Mao was system­ atic and shrewd in his approach, and he was, in the end, successful. Mao's second period of intensive application of the Short Course was in the early 1950s, when he was imposing a Stalinist economic system in China. As will be discussed in detail below, beginning in 1950, Mao followedthe devel­ opmental stages described in the Short Course to put China on a Stalinist road to socialism, and he used the forms ofeconomic analysis presented in the book to justifyhis economic policy decisions. In 1953, as Mao put together his general line forsocialist transition, he put China on a Stalinist road to social­ ism. To ensure party conformitywith his new policy, Mao launched a study campaign in April 1953 in which he required party cadres to spend the next eighteen months studying chapters 9 through 12 of the Short Course.43

The Short Course and Mao's Rectification Campaign (1941-1944)

In the early 1940s, Mao sought to reshape the ways senior cadres interpreted the CCP's history. In the name of introducing new ways of learning and prac­ ticing Marxism and Leninism, Mao attacked his rivals, especially those senior leaders who had opposed him in the past, even though they knew Marxist the­ ory better than he did. Mao launched his attacks with a series of speeches, de­ livering the firstone, entitled "Let's ReformOur Learning Habits," in Yan' an in May 1941. In this speech, Mao said that the party should abandon its "static" and "isolated" ways of learning, should develop new ways of approaching Marxism and Leninism, and should study how Lenin and Stalin applied Marxism to Soviet reality. 44 Mao's call fora new way of learning and practicing Marxism did not receive the response he wanted, so he organized senior cadres to collect and study CCP party documents fromthe past. 45 As part of the RectificationCampaign, Mao instructed senior leaders to read selections fromthe Short Course and re­ lated materials,46 and he forcedmany of these leaders to admit their past mis­ takes.47 In 1943, afterMao had succeeded in getting most senior leaders to adopt his approach to Marxist theory, he carried out a purge among the party's rank and filebased on the political histories of individual party mem­ bers. During this part of the campaign, Mao resorted to brutal methods, mis­ treating many of his victims and even killing some. 48 The RectificationCam­ paign ended with senior cadres again studying Marxist theory and CCP party history. Although Stalin was not happy with the Rectification Campaign, he was in no position to stop it, first, because he wastoo busy fightingthe war, and second, because the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 had deprived 104 Chapter 3

him of an important formal instrument for intervention. As discussed in chapter 1, Dimitrov cabled Mao and expressed his personal concerns about what Mao was doing to his "comrades." By 1945, with the completion of the RectificationCampaign, Mao had suc­ ceeded in consolidating his already powerful position by eliminating or put­ ting his rivals in their places. A new pecking order was created among the top leaders that would last until the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. In addition, thanks to the campaign, Mao had succeeded in establishing his thought as the leading ideology of the CCP. With this new authority, Mao adopted a CCP party history based on a Maoist discourse that emphasized "two-line struggles," with his views representing the "correct" line. In the early to mid-1 940s, Stalin's Short Course served as a critical vehicle for Mao to achieve supremacy within the CCP. Mao was indeed a good student of the Short Course.

The Short Course as Mao's Road Map forBuilding Socialism

China's use of the Soviet experience as a guide for building socialism relied heavily on the Short Course. Li Rui, at one time Mao's secretary but purged after the Lushan Conference in 1959, described the importance of the Short Course forMao: in the early 1950s, the "one work to which Mao attached the most importance and which Mao asked the whole party to study carefullyand thoroughly was the Short Course, the 'classic' written by Stalin."49 Mao paid particular attention to fourchapters of the Short Course, chapters 9 through 12, which dealt with the developmental stages of the Soviet Union from 1921 to 1937: chapter 9, "Transition to the PeacefulWo rk of Economic Restoration (1921-1925)"; chapter 10, "Socialist Industrialization (1926-1929)"; chapter 11, "Collectivization (1930-1934)"; and chapter 12, "The Struggle to Com­ plete the Building of the Socialist Society (1935-1937)."What exactly did Mao learn from these chapters? How did the ideas expressed in these chapters af­ fe ct Mao's thinking and policies? And how did Mao treat these ideas differ­ ently from the advice he was receiving fromStalin? Since the Chinese leaders, particularly Mao, paid so much attention to the Stalinist approach to building socialism as presented in chapters 9 through 12 of the Short Course, a summary description of these chapters is in order. Chapters 9 through 12 outline in a distorted manner the process through which socialism was built in the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1937, and they describe the tasks and achievements of each stage in the process. Accord­ ing to the version of history offeredin the Short Course, this process was never easy. The party was constantly challenged: by antiparty groups from within, Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Transformation 105 by external class enemies such as the kulaks, and by foreign enemies. But in the end, led by Lenin and then Stalin, the party was able to defeat all of its en­ emies. By 1937, when the party had completed the process of building social­ ism, the country was described as having achieved modernity and the national economy as being supplied with first-rate technology.50 Such an idealized image of the Soviet Union in 193 7 and the idea that socialism could be achieved in such a short period of time were misleading, to say the least, but many Chinese leaders, including Mao, believed what they read. Mao's com­ mitment to such distorted views may have been reinforced during his ex­ tended visit to the Soviet Union between late 1949 and early 1950. During his stay, Mao visited some of the most modern factoriesin the Soviet Union. Chapter 9 of the Short Course, entitled ((The Bolshevik Party in the Period of Transition to the Peaceful Wo rk of Economic Restoration (1921-1925)," deals with the CPSU's challenges and accomplishments from 1921 to 1925. Major achievements included the adoption of the NEP, Lenin's cooperative plan, and the policy of socialist industrialization. In chapter 9, two policy shifts are identified as having occurred during this period: first, from ((war communism" to Lenin's NEP, and then, fromthe NEP to Stalin's new program forbui lding socialism. A justification was givenfor the shiftfrom Leni n's NEP to Stalin's own economic program. It was pointed out that, although Lenin had said that the retreat associated with the NEP was intended to be only tem­ porary, and although he ended the policy afterone year, he in factchanged his position by stating in 1922 that an ((NEP Russia will definitelybecome a so­ cialist Russia."51 In the Short Course, it was emphasized that Lenin's statement of 1922 departed fromhis earlier characterization of the NEP as a ((temporary retreat." In 1924, it was noted that Stalin, while not explicitly rejecting Lenin's position, questioned whether Russia could pursue a two-pronged approach to building socialism-on the one hand to push forthe expansion of socialism, and on the other to permit a temporary development of capitalism under the NEP.52 Stalin's shift froqi the NEP to his own economic program was ex­ plained as stemming from this concern. According to chapter 9, Stalin declared in 1924, the year Lenin died, that the country ((had everything needed forthe building of a socialist economic sys­ tem, forthe building of a complete socialist society,"53 and he explained that since 1917, a series of political and economic measures had been taken to cre­ ate the conditions forbui lding socialism. Politically, a Communist dictator­ ship had been established, and, economically, steps had been taken to destroy the old economic order and to establish a new one:

The confiscationof the property of the capitalists and landlords; the conversion of their land, factories, transportation, equipment, and banks into state-owned 106 Chapter 3

property; the adoption of the New Economic Policy; the establishment of state­ owned socialist industries; and the implementation of Lenin's plans forcooper­ atives. The main task is to establish a new socialist economy nationwide and in time to crush capitalism completely in its economic domain.54

There are many ideas that Mao could have drawn upon from this chapter, but it appears that he paid particular attention to two themes: first, certain measures needed to be taken before embarkingon the transition to socialism, and, second, Stalin had begun the drive forsocialist transformation in the So­ viet Union in 1924, when he believed conditions were ripe, even before the "economic restoration period" ( 1921-1925) had officiallyended. In the early 1950s, chapter 10, entitled "The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle forthe Socialist Industrialization of the Country (1926-1929);' was probably the most important chapter forMao, forit outlined the steps that Stalin had supposedly taken after the period of economic recovery. The chapter opens with a description of the CPSU's efforts to implement Stalin's general line, which was his new policy for industrialization at the fastest possible pace, made possible by appropriating resources fromthe countryside. There was no detailed description in the Short Course, however, of how the general line was formulated. It is known, however, that Stalin and other senior leaders engaged in heated debates over the policy platform.Stalin skillfullydefeated Bukharin, who was "the greatest representative of an alternative 'general line."'55 Stalin fi­ nally obtained the CPSU's endorsement of a version of the general line farless radical than the one he eventually implemented. 56 As will be discussed later in this study, Mao began to formulate his own general line in the fall of 1952 to guide the CCP in its efforts to build socialism in China. In chapter 10, an account is also given of the problems the CPSU encoun­ tered with socialist industrialization, the party's success in overcoming these problems, and the party's other achievements. During this period, the party also began its campaign against the kulaks, put into effect the First Five-Year Plan (FFYP), and launched a mass-collectivization campaign to deal with poor agricultural output. In 1927, only one year into the industrialization drive, Stalin decided that the socialist (i.e., state-owned) industrial sector had become dominant and that the issue of "who will win" had been resolved in the industrial sector in favorof socialism. 57 Three major decisions were made during the Fifteenth Congress in 1927: (1) "to extend and consolidate plans for collective farms and Soviet farm networks," (2) "to continue the attacks upon the kulaks and to adopt a number of new measures to restrict the de­ velopment of capitalism in the countryside and guide the peasant economy towards socialism," and (3) "to draw up a FFYP in order to organize the na­ tional economy to conduct systematically the finalassault of socialism against Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Transformation 107 capitalism."58 The chapter ends in 1929 on a high note, with the party adopt­ ing the FFYP and beginning collectivization. Chapter 11, "The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle forthe Collectivization of Agriculture (1930-1934)," probably contains the most distorted interpreta­ tion of historical events of any chapter in the book. The shiftin party policy fromrestricting the kulaks to eliminating them as a class was justifiedas being not only dictated fromabove but also as supported frombelow. 59 This period also saw the furtherexpansion of collectivization and the completion in four years of the FFYP, completing the victory of socialism in all sectors. Chapter 12, entitled "The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle to Complete the Building of the Socialist Society (1935-1937)," focuseson the progress made in industry and agriculture and the fulfillment of the second Five-Year Plan (FYP). As with the first, thesecond FYP was completed ahead of schedule. In 1936, a new constitution was adopted. In describing the "profound"changes that had taken place since the early 1920s, chapter 12 makes the ringing dec­ laration that

During this period the balance of class forceswithin the Soviet Union had com­ pletely changed; a new socialist industry had been successfully established, the kulaks had been destroyed, the collective farm system had triumphed, and the socialist ownership of the means of production had become the foundation of the national economy. 60

It furtherstates that in 1936, "The capitalist elements had been completely elim­ inated and the socialist system had triumphed in all spheres of economic life:'61 From these four chapters, Mao also learned to use statistics to measure China's economic progress, especially with regard to the changing position between the state-owned sector and the private sector, and to determine the optimum point at which to eliminate capitalist economic components. Throughout these chapters, statistical measures, usually expressed as percent­ ages, were used to show the progress the Soviet Union had made in achieving socialism and eliminating capitalism. In industry-particularly large-scale heavy industry-and commerce, Stalin used percentages to show the chang­ ing ratio between the socialist (state-owned) and private sectors. One year afterthe beginning of the industrialization drive, according to the Short Course,

The socialist industrial sector was growing rapidly at the expense of the private sector, its output having risen from eighty-one percent of the total output in 1924-1925 to eighty-six percent in 1926-1927, while output in the private sec­ tor dropped from nineteen percent to fourteen percent in the same period.62 108 Chapter 3

It was also reported that large-scale socialist industry grew at a record rate of 18 percent from 1926 to 1927. A remarkable change also occurred in the rela­ tive sizes of the socialist and private components of the retail and wholesale sectors: the market share of private retailing had fallen from 42 percent in 1924-1925 to 32 percent in 1926-1927, and the market share of private wholesaling had fallen from 9 percent to 5 percent in the same period. 63 It was never made clear whether Stalin ever intended to suggest that these areas of the economy should be considered important indicators of progress toward a socialist economy. Stalin also failed to specify the percentage at which the socialist sector in each of these economic areas could be definedas dominant and the elimination of the capitalist elements from the national economy could begin. These omissions did not prevent the Chinese leaders, particularly Mao, from attempting to establish numerical indicators to mark the progress of China's economy toward socialism. From his study of the Short Course, Mao learned about the four stages through which socialism was built in the Soviet Union, the tasks that were com­ pleted during each stage, and the duration of each stage. These stages were as follows: economic recovery (1921-1925), industrialization (1926-1929), collec­ tivization (1930-1934), and the completion of the socialist society (1935-1937). Mao saw that afterthe economic recovery period (1921-1925), Stalin promptly began to implement the general line, with its emphasis upon rapid industrial­ ization at the expense of the Russian peasants; to draft theFFYP; and to prepare forthe finalassault against capitalism. Most importantly, Mao learned from the Short Course that building socialism meant getting rid of the private economy and market forces,a tenet of Stalinism that Mao followedto the very end. Mao's awareness of the Short Course and his recognition of it as containing a road map forfollowing a Stalinist path to socialism in China long predated his use of it in the early 1950s to build socialism in China. On at least two oc­ casions, once in 1942 and again in 1945, Mao shared his rather crude under­ standing of ideas contained in the book with party cadres. In both cases, Mao paid particular attention to the time needed to complete the process of build­ ing socialism in the Soviet Union and to the points at which the kulaks and the capitalists should be eliminated and collectivization imposed. In 1942, in an address to party cadres concerning ideas he had learned from the Short Course, Mao said the book showed how Stalin had created a social­ ist state by adopting three five-yearplans .64 It is not known exactly how Mao arrived at this conclusion, but the idea that three five-year plans constituted the correct amount of time to build socialism registered with him profoundly, for he frequentlymentioned this idea in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In April 1945, in a speech to the CCP's Seventh Party Congress, he again used the Short Course as the base fordescribing the Soviet experience of build- Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Transformation 109 ing socialism. This time, he spoke of how the CPSU had handled the capitalist economy after theOctober Revolution. He recognized that the CPSU had fora period of time pursued the NEP and, according to his understanding, had al­ lowed roughly 50 percent of the economy to remain as a private-capitalist economy. He furtherindicated that the CPSU did not eliminate the capitalists and the rich peasants or impose collectivization until the time of its second five-year plan.65 By 1945, Mao seemed to have developed a rather crude un­ derstanding of the Soviet experience in building socialism, and it was this un­ derstanding that would dictate his policy formulationsin the early 1950s. The path of post-1949 economic development in China to a large extent followed, with Chinese variations, what was described in the Short Course. Mao allowed a shorter period foreconomic recovery than the Soviet Union had, and Mao began drafting the FFYP earlier than Stalin had. As Mao brought the economic recovery period to an end, he quickly started to for­ mulate the general line for thetransition to socialism, which was aimed at ac­ celerating the pace of eliminating the capitalist economy in China. Mao in­ cluded in his general line of 1953 what Stalin had included in his general line of 1929: rapid industrialization, collectivization, and an economy based solely on state ownership by eliminating all capitalist economic elements. To achieve all these objectives, Mao acted with discretion and, when necessary, resorted to manipulation, forhe had to deal with other top leaders who were hesitant to support his push forrapid change. He often disclosed his intentions only partially or kept his plans so vague that even his closest associates did not know what lay ahead. In so doing, Mao was able to get exactly what he wanted with minimum resistance from other leaders.

Mao's Call fora Three-Year Economic Recovery Period

In early December of 1949, before Mao left forMosco w, he was already ex­ pressing confidence that China would be able to complete its economic re­ covery within three to five years and would be able to achieve great economic advances within eight to ten years.66 He was careful, however, not to specify exactly how many years it would take to complete economic recovery and to achieve these economic advances, allowing himself a margin of error in his economic predictions. Two months after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Mao made his first trip to Moscow, finally obtaining an invitation fromStalin afterseveral earlier efforts had failed. Upon returning fromhis ex­ tended visit in Moscow, Mao formalizedhis earlier thoughts and called fora three-year economic recovery period, two years less than that outlined in the 110 Chapter 3

Short Course for the Soviet Union, from 1921 to 1925, and two years less than what Mao had announced in December 1949. Mao announced his plan fora shorter economic recovery period in June 1950 at the Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee meeting, some twenty days beforethe outbreak of the Korean War. In his speech to the Third Plenum, he conceded that the na­ tion was in no position to begin economic reconstruction, except in the Northeast, where it had already begun. In his view, before embarking on a planned economy, certain issues had to be resolved: land reform, the regula­ tion of capitalist industry and commerce, reduction of state expenditure, un­ employment, and social disorder and banditry. In his view, these changes might take a long time-threeyears, or a little longer. 67 Mao began as early as February 1951 to prepare forChina 's postrecovery period. According to the Short Course, the major tasks during the postrecov­ ery period in the Soviet Union between 1926 and 1929 were the implementa­ tion of Stalin's general line, industrialization, the beginning of the FFYP, the beginning of the elimination of nonsocialist economic elements, and the be­ ginning of collectivization. In February 1951, Mao addressed the issue of the FFYP. Although the Korean War was still being fought and conditions on the battlefieldhad not yet stabilized, Mao was eager to move forwardwith his do­ mestic economic agenda. The decision to begin the FFYP in 1953 was made during the enlarged Politburo meeting of February 1951.68 Mao set in motion the draftingof the FFYP and gave the drafters twenty-two months to complete it. During the same enlarged Politburo meeting on February 18, 1951, Mao put forward a new guiding principle called ((three-year preparation and ten-year planned economy."69 As pointed out by party researchers who have compiled Mao's post-1949 writings, Mao never explained how this principle should be re­ flected in concrete policies. For instance, he never made clear what he meant by the «three-year preparation" or what goals he had in mind forthe ((ten-year planned economy." Was the ((three-year preparation" intended by Mao to be equivalent to his «three-year economic recovery period"? He never explicitly linked either of these ideas to the preparation forthe transition to socialism. Mao already had the idea in 1951 to achieve socialism aftera ten-year period of planned economic construction, but he did not want to alarm anybody, so he kept it to himself. Mao, nonetheless, asked Liu Shaoqi to introduce these principles in his talks with cadres, and Liu did so on several occasions. 70 In the two major speeches that Liu delivered in 1951 to explain Mao's ideas, however, Liu omitted any mention of the new principle and instead adhered to the original plan the leaders had decided upon in 1948 and 1949.71 Liu pre­ sented Mao's ideas, as he understood them, and his comments indicate that he still believed that Mao was committed to the idea central to the original plan: Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Transformation 111 that New Democracy would last forsome time to come. Liu told his close as­ sociate Bo Yibo in spring 1951 that "it appears that New Democracy will last for a while."72 Liu's words indicate that he did not expect any major policy changes forsome time. Mao may have hinted to Liu that there would not be any major policy changes. Whatever the case, Liu continued to talk as if no major departures from theoriginal plan were being contemplated. In speak­ ing with Bo, however, Liu, the number-two man in the party hierarchy, also leftthe impression that he did not have much control over the direction of na­ tional economic policy. In the early 1950s, it was Mao who had the ultimate control over economic policy.

Preparing the Party and the Nation for a New Stage

Between June and September 1952, events pointed in one direction: Mao had begun to prepare the party and the nation fora new set of economic priori­ ties. Well beforeJune 1952, as discussed earlier, Mao had already decided that economic conditions in China justifiedthe establishment of a planned econ­ omy. By June 1952, unbeknownst to most leaders, Mao had reached the con­ clusion that it was time to step up the effort to transform China's predomi­ nantly private economy into a socialist one, and he and a few senior leaders began to talk in concrete terms about the transition to socialism. But to the CCP as a whole, Mao's new plans were totally unexpected. Perhaps Mao was concerned about potential opposition to the sudden shift in policy associated with the general line, forhe kept his policy plans so vague that his closest lieu­ tenants, even Liu Shaoqi, did not know exactly what he had planned for the future ofthe country. Mao prepared the party and the nation forthe change in five steps. First, he began to speak within the party of the "advance to socialism" in the context of building a planned economy. In early June 1952, the draftFF YP was discussed at the National Conference on Financial and Economic Wo rk, and Mao was briefed on the results of these discussions. Afterward,he stated,

In order to ensure national independence, the priority of the FFYP should be heavy industry so that national defense can be strengthened and socialism ad­ vanced. Aftera five-year economic construction, relations between the state and private sectors will change as state-owned heavy industry becomes dominant.73

Though the idea of giving priority to state-owned heavy industry was not new, the ongoing Korean War gave added urgency to his statement. Mao's op­ timistic assessment of the changing ratio between the state and private indus­ trial sectors after theFF YP corresponds to a similar assessment by Stalin in the 112 Chapter 3

Short Course. Mao never made any concrete statements about "advancing to socialism" or the "transition to socialism" before early June 1952.74 In step two, Mao began to redefine the characteristics of the Chinese na­ tional bourgeoisie in the context of definingsocietal contradictions. He did so beforehe officiallyended the Five-Anti Campaign. In comments concerning the party's policy toward the United Front written on June 6, 1952, Mao indi­ cated that societal contradictions had changed in China after land reform. Specifically, he said that the national bourgeoisie was no longer a middle-of­ the-road class.75 Although Mao did not categorize it as an enemy class, his in­ tention was clear: he was preparing the party, at a theoretical level, to elimi­ nate the national bourgeoisie as a class. In step three, Mao began to make organizational changes in the party. The reorganization, according to Mao, was necessitated by the country's new chal­ lenge: economic construction. The process began when Mao cabled Stalin on June 20, 1952, and expressed his preference forusing the Soviet Central Com­ mittee as the model forchanges in the CCP's Central Committee. Mao asked Stalin to appoint a person familiar with party organizational issues to conduct discussions with Zhang Wentian, at that time ambassador to the Soviet Union.76 Mao was serious about creating a party organization capable of managing an increasingly complex economy. He was therefore specific in his instruc­ tions to Zhang We ntian as to the kind of information he wanted. Mao was most interested in knowing the organizational structure of the Central Com­ mittee of the CPSU, particularly the functions and interrelationsamong the three components of the CPSU Central Committee-the Politburo, the Orga­ nizational Bureau, and the Secretariat.77 Zhang was instructed to talk with Malenkov and other leaders in the Central Committee and to ask about "the nature, tasks, organizational components, and authority of the offices,and the relations among them." Zhang was given a freehand to ask whatever questions he considered relevant to learn about the party organizational structures of the Soviet republics, as well as the republics that were under the direct control of the central government, and he was asked to report his findingsto the CCP Central Committee. 78 In step four, Mao officiallybrought the period of economic recovery to an end. In early August 1952, in an attempt to make a clear-cut departure from past policies, Mao announced at a meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference ( CPPCC) that "the tasks for national economic re­ covery have been accomplished and were achieved ahead of schedule." In the same meeting, Mao also announced that China "was about to enter a new stage of planned economic construction."79 In September 1952, a wave of ar­ ticles written by party and government officials responsible forthe economy Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Tra nsformation 113 and other areas appeared in party publications. The leaders included Bo Yibo, Xie Juezai, Xue Muqiao, Liao Luyan, Luo Ruiqing, Li Fuchun, and Yao Yilin.80 Each writer wrote an article dealing with his area of responsibility. Bo, the finance minister, presented an overall assessment of the govern­ ment's achievements. Xie, the minister of internal affairs, examined the estab­ lishment of the regime and the operation of civil administration. Xue, the di­ rector of the newly created Statistics Bureau, described the nation's economic achievements. Liao, the deputy secretary general under the Government Ad­ ministration Council, which became the State Council in 1954, described the progress in land reform.Luo, the minister forpu blic security, reported on the party's success in suppressing counterrevolutionaries. Li, the deputy chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee, reported on industry, and Yao, the deputy minister of commerce, reported on commerce. These articles all supported the party's position that the period of economic recovery was coming to a successful completion andthat the country was eco­ nomically ready to move on to the next stage. Even by Stalinist standards, these articles greatly exaggerated the economic achievements of the PRC up to ,, that point. The concept of ((economically ready has a strong Stalinist conno­ tation; in fact,it echoes a statement made in the Short Course justifying the policy shift toward the end of the economic recovery period in the Soviet Union, as discussed earlier. In 1952, however, Mao used the term ((economi­ ,, cally ready very narrowly to mean that in 1952 the point had been reached where state-owned industry accounted for67.3 percent of overall industrial output,81 a substantial increase over the 1949 figure of 43.8 percent. As faras most of the senior leaders and the party rank and fileknew in the summer of 1952, the country was about to begin a period of planned economic con­ struction. A small group of senior leaders would soon learn that Mao had other plans.

Mao's Unexpected Statement: Fall of 1952

In the late summer and early fall of 1952, Mao was certain that China was ready to begin the transition to socialism. He had already made up his mind not to wait for tenor more years before beginningthe process, as had been originally established in the party's officialpolicy in 1949; instead, he planned to begin the transition immediately. At this point, probably only Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai knew of Mao's plan. By September 1952, however, Mao was ready to share with a select group of senior leaders his new vision to achieve socialism in the next ten to fifteen years.As an early step toward achieving so­ cialism, Mao was ready to begin his attack on the national bourgeoisie. As 114 Chapter 3

mentioned above, in early June 1952, Mao had already identifiedthe national bourgeoisie as no longer a middle-of-the-road class, thereby implying that it could now become the target of party attacks. On September 24, 1952, Mao told those attending a Secretariat meeting, "We are going to use ten to fifteenyears to achieve socialism; [we are not going to wait to begin] the transition to socialism ten years from now."82 Bo Yibo, who attended the meeting, admitted in 1991, as Huang Kecheng had in 1949, that he did not expect such a declaration from Mao. He said that Mads talk "left a deep impression" on him and that it was the first time he heard Mao express this idea. When Bo heard Mao's words, though puzzled, he neverthe­ less decided that "Mao must have made this new assessment in response to changing conditions." Bo felt that Mao's new vision departed from the origi­ nal plans the party and Mao had outlined in 1949. Like other leaders who were present at the meeting, however, Bo did not raise objections. 83 Under the CCP's original plan, the establishment of the PRC would be fol­ lowed by New Democracy, which would last at least ten to fifteenyears. Dur­ ing that period, the party would follow itsor iginal ideas of 1949 forbui lding a transitional economy. Only after this stage was completed would the party begin to build socialism. According to Mao's new vision, the party would begin the transition to socialism immediately. In Mao's newly articulated view, socialism would be achieved within ten to fifteen years. Under this sce­ nario, New Democracy would be omitted. Clearly, Mao had departed radically fromthe official plan of 1949. On September 24, 1952-the same day that Mao made his declaration­ Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing from a monthlong visit to Moscow. 84 During Zhou's visit, Stalin had made a strong commitment to aiding China in its FFYP; Zhou, in accordance with normal practice, undoubtedly cabled this in­ formation to Mao, who must have been very encouraged upon receiving the report of Stalin's commitment. It has been known since 1991 that Mao in fact met with Zhou before making his declaration. 85 Such aid would allow China to industrialize and increase the presence of the state-owned industrial sector in the overall economy more rapidly than would have otherwise been possible. During that same meeting of September 24, 1952, Mao reported on the progress the party had made in expanding the state's presence in industry and commerce. Based on economic ideas presented in the Short Course, Mao be­ lieved that the larger the state-owned sector became, the closer the economy would come to achieving socialism. In addition, Mao, again followinghis own interpretation of the Short Course, believed that when the state-owned sector reached a dominant position, it would be time to eliminate the capitalist residue in the economy. Although Mao made no direct reference to the Short Course in presenting his new vision, he was obviously applying criteria introduced in that book in Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Tra nsformation 115 measuring China's progress. According to Mao, by September 1952, the state­ owned and private sectors produced, respectively, 67.3 percent and 32.7 per­ cent of total industrial output. 86 In 1949, the figures had been very different: the state-owned industrial sector had accounted foronly 34 percent; the co­ operatives, about 3 percent; and private industry, 63 percent. 87 In trade and re­ tailing, however, the changes had not been so great: the private sector was still dominant, at about 60 percent, while the state sector was about 40 percent. Mao was optimistic, however, that changes would occur in private industry and commerce in the direction of what he called a "new type of capitalism."88 During that same September meeting, Mao also presented his timetable for collectivization, as well as the preconditions that had to be met beforeimple­ menting it. "Based on preliminary calculations;' Mao declared, "agricultural collectivization will be implemented only upon completion of the FFYP if the sizes of the state-owned and private industrial sectors attain a ratio of 9: l ."89 It is likely that in setting this precondition, Mao had looked at the ratio of ap­ proximately 6:1 (86 percent vs. 14 percent) between the two sectors in the So­ viet Union when Stalin called forcollectivization in late 1927, as described in the Short Course,90 and believed that a ratio of 9:1 was more appropriate for China. Mao, however, did not followhis own plan in this regard in 1953, when he decided to radicalize and accelerate the process. In formulatingthe general line between 1952 and 1953, Mao continued to rely on the Short Course as his major source forideas, specificallyStalin's em­ phasis on building an economy based solely on state ownership by eliminat­ ing capitalist economic components.91 Most importantly, Mao was influenced by the idea presented in the Short Course that once the state-owned economy became dominant, it would be time to eliminate the capitalist economy. His decision in 1952 to establish the general line-that is, to begin to eliminate the capitalist economy in China-stemmed fromthis notion.92 He, of course, re­ definedthe meaning of"dominant" by adopting the view that the state-owned economy became dominant once it constituted 50 percent of the overall economy. In calculating the time needed for China to complete the process of social­ ist transformation, Maoalso consulted the Short Course. Mao's designation of a time frame of ten to fifteen years to complete the socialist transition in China was derived from two sets of calculations. The first set was based on how long Mao thought it took the Soviet Union to achieve industrialization, and the second set was based on how long he thought it took the Soviet Union to complete the process of eliminating capitalism and achieving socialism. Mao believed that it took the Soviet Union eight years to industrialize; based on his reading of the Short Course, he identifiedthe starting date forSoviet in­ dustrialization as 1926, and he chose 1933--the year cited in the Short Course as the time when the CPSU achieved decisive success in industrialization--as 116 Chapter 3

the year the Soviet Union had achieved industrialization.93 Relying on a speech by Stalin on November 25, 1936, Mao also believed that it took about thirteen years forthe Soviet Union to eliminate capitalism and complete its transition to socialism. In this speech, Stalin identified the year 1924 as the starting point for the process, and he defined 1936 as the year when the process had ended with the resounding defeat of capitalism in all spheres of the Soviet economy. Mao took these time periods-the eight years needed to complete industrialization and the thirteen years required to achieve the so­ cialist transition-as benchmarks forhis own calculations and came up with a time period of ten to fifteenyears forChina 's transition to socialism.94 From Mao's point of view, he was being conservative in his estimates, forhe was al­ lowing China a longer period of time to complete the process than it had taken the Soviet Union to do so. Mao's way of calculating, however, was flawed, to say the least. Clearly, he neither questioned the historical accuracy of the stories told in the Short Course nor doubted their applicability to China's economic reality. Although Mao eventually accepted fifteen year�that is, three five-yearplan�as the time required to complete industrialization and socialist transformation in China, he was not really committed to this plan. Mao wanted to complete the process in a shorter period of time, but in 1953, he had to compromise in order to get other top leaders to go along with his program.

Conclusion

In the early 1950s, the Short Course served as an important road map forMao to build a socialist economic structure in China. Based on his own reinterpre­ tation of the Stalinist notion of the "conditions being ready" to begin building socialism, in 1953 he put China on a Stalinist road to socialism. Mao's close association with the Short Course and his commitment to the ideas expressed in it show that he was a dedicated Stalinist. Far from being an independent thinker, Mao can at best claim to be a theoretician with great limitations. Mao went even furtherthan Stalin had, however, forhe radicalized Stalin's ideas in order to build socialism in China fasterthan Stalin had in the Soviet Union. His dogmatic application of Stalin's economic thought to China in the early 1950s and beyond produced disastrous consequences forChina. Mao's handling of the Short Course was part of his paradoxical approach to dealing with Stalin's ideas. Mao was, on the one hand, drawn to the radical Stalinism he found in the Short Course, but, on the other, he ignored Stalin's pragmatic and moderate advice in the late 1940s and early 1950s, forMao saw this advice as stifling his revolutionary zeal and frustrating his desire to achieve socialism in China faster than Stalin had in the Soviet Union. Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Tra nsformation 117

Notes

1. Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism, v-vi. 2. To ny Saich, "Writing or Rewriting History? The Construction of the Maoist Resolution on Party History," in New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolu­ tion, ed. To ny Saich and Hans van de Ven (hereinafter as New Perspectives) (Armonk, "NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 303, 315. 3. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution fr om Above (hereinafter as Stalin in Power) (New Yo rk: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), 531. For a discussion of the creation and development of the book, see David Brandenberg, "Appendix: Civic History Textbook Development, 1934-1 955;' National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Cul­ ture and the Formation of Modern Russian Na tional Identity, 1931-1956 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 251-60. 4. For an example of the common practice of referring to the work as "Stalin's Short Course;' see Li Rui, Mao zaonian, 221. 5. N. N. Maslov, "Short Course of the History of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)-An Encyclopedia of Stalin's Personality Cult," Soviet Studies in History 28, no. 3 (Winter 1989-1990): 42. 6. "Liangong (bu) dangshi jianming jiaocheng dui zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue he yanjiu de yingxiang (zuotanhui fayan zhaideng)" [The effect of History of the Com­ munist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course on teaching and research concerning the history of the CCP (abstract of symposium)] (hereinafteras "Zuotan­ hui"), ZDY, no. 1 (1989): 16. 7. Janos Kornai, interview, Cambridge, Massachusetts, February 2, 1994. 8. Based on my interview with an oral source. 9. Ren Bishi nianpu, 375. 10. This informationwas provided by an oral source. 11. Lou Shenghua, "Liangong (bu) dangshi jianming jiaocheng zai zhongguo de yingxiang," [The Short Course and its impact on China] (hereinafter as "Liangong"), DYZ, no. 1 (1997): 24. 12. Li Weihan, Huiyi yu yanjiu (shangjuan) [Recollections and research, vol. 1] (hereinafteras Huiyi 1) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1986), 434. See also Gong Shiqi, ed., Ya ng Xianzhen zhuan [Biography of Yang Xianzhen] (hereinafter as Ya ng Xianzhen zhuan) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1996), 111. 13. Li We ihan, Huiyi l, 388. 14. Li Rui, Zhiyan: Li Rui liushinian de you yu si [Speaking bluntly: Li Rui's sixty years of worries and thoughts] (Beijing: Jinri zhongguo chubanshe, 1998), 324. 15. Li We ihan, Huiyi l, 434. 16. The story was told by Li Haiwen. 17. Adam Ulam, interview, Cambridge, Massachusetts, February 22, 1993. 18. Gong Shiqi, ed., Ya ng Xianzhen zhuan, 117. 19. Liu Shaoqi, "1948 nian qiyue yiri zai ganbu huiyishang de jianghua" [Address to the cadres conference on July l, 1948], DY, no. 3 (1980): 10-11. 20. Mao Zedong wenji 6, 347. 21. Lou Shenghua, "Liangong," DYZ, no. 1 (1997): 25. For the titles of the five books, see Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [ CCP Central Committee 118 Chapter 3

Document Research Office], Mao Zedong zai qida de baogao he jianhuaji [Mao Ze­ dong's reports and speeches at the Seventh Party Congress] (hereinafter as Mao za­ iqida) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1995), 226. 22. Wei Ya nru, ed., Zhang We ntian zai Hejiang [Zhang We ntian in Hejiang] (Bei­ jing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1990), 422-23. 23. For a title list of the twelve books, see Ye Yo nglie, Mao Zedong de mishumen [Mao Zedong's secretaries] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1996), 13. 24. Gong Shiqi, Ya ng Xianzhen zhuan, 158. 25. "Zuotanhui," ZDY, no. 1 (1989): 14. 26. Based on my discussion with an oral source, summer 1999. 27. Based on my discussion with an oral source, summer 1999. 28. Lou Shenghua, "Liangong," DYZ, no. 1 (1997): 25. 29. After19 58, Mao suggested on several occasions that the section of this textbook dealing with socialism be studied by CCP leaders. Between December 10, 1959, and February 9, 1960, Mao led a small study group to study the book. For details, see Shi Zhongquan, "Guanyu Mao Zedong du Sulian 'Zhengzhi jinjixue (jiaokeshu)' de tan­ hua" [A discussion of Mao Zedong's reading of the Soviet work "Political Economy (Textbook)"]. Dangshi tungxun [Party history newsletter], no. 10 (1986): 35-39; "Mao Zedong du Sulian 'Zhengzhi jinjixue (jiaokeshu)' tanhua jilu xuanzai (1-6)" [Selected published records of Mao's speeches on his readings of the Soviet work "Political Economy (Textbook)" (1-6) ], DW, no. 1 (1992): 3-14; no. 4 (1992): 3-6; no. 5 (1992): 3-6; no. 4 (1993): 8-20; no. 3 (1994): 3-7; no. 5 (1994): 3-5. 30. Lou Shenghua, "Liangong," DYZ, no. 1 (1997): 27; "Zuotanhui," ZDY, no. 1 (1989): 10. 31. "Zuotanhui," ZDY, no. 1 (1989): 15. 32. "Zuotanhui," ZDY, no. 1 (1989): 7-16. 33. An oral source told me in summer 2000 that critical remarks he made about the Short Course in a soon-to-be-published journal article were all removed by the editors. 34. Mao Zedong xuanji (disanjuan) [Selected works of Mao Zedong, vol. 3] (here­ inafter as Mao xuanji 3) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 802-3; "Zuotanhui," ZDY, no. 1 (1989): 9. 35. Mao wengao 4, 105. 36. Shi Zhongquan, Ka ituo, 197. 37. Shi Zhe, Zailishi, 235. 38. Mao Zedong, "Ruhe yanjiu zhonggong dangshi" [How to study CCP history] (hereinafter as "Ruhe"), Dangshi ziliao zhengji tongxun [Bulletin on the collection of materials on party history], no. 1 (1985): 8. 39. Chongji Jin, Mao Zedong zhuan: 1893-1949 (xia) [Biography of Mao Zedong, vol. 2] (hereinafteras Mao Zedong zhuan 2) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), 648. For Mao's instructions, see Mao wengao 4, 371. 40. "Zuotanhui," ZDY, no. 1 (1989): 9. 41. Gong Yuzhi, Pang Xianzhi, and Shi Zhongquan, Mao Zedong de dushu shenghuo [Mao Zedong's reading habits] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1996), 16-17; Lou Shenghua, "Liangong:' DYZ, no. 1 (1997): 28. 42. Tony Saich, New Perspectives, 299-338. Stalin's Short Course and Mao's Economic Transformation 119

43. For the instructions, see Renmin ribao of April 25, 1953. 44. Mao xuanji 3, 802-3. 45. Jin Chongji, Mao Zedong zhuan 2, 630. 46. "Mao Zedong guanyu Ya n'an zhengfeng de yizu handian: 11/1941-12/1943" [A series of telegrams sent by Mao concerning the Rectification Campaign: November 1941-December 1943], We nxian he yanjiu [Documents and research] (hereinafteras WHY),no. 8 (1984): 1-2. 47. See Mao's letter to Peng Dehuai, dated June 6, 1943, WHY, no. 8 (1984): 6-7. 48. For the famous case of Wang Shiwei, who was purged during Mao's Rectifica­ tion Campaign, see Dai Qing, Wa ng Shiwei and Wild Lilies: Rectification and Purges in the Chinese Communist Party, 1942-1944 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993). 49. Li Rui, Mao zaonian, 221. 50. Liangong dangshi, 522. 51. Liangong dangshi, 406. 52. Liangong dangshi, 423. 53. Liangong dangshi, 424. 54. Liangong dangshi, 424-25. 55. Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938 (New Yo rk: Oxford University, 1973), 335. For a full account of Bukharin's downfall, see pp. 270-336. 56. For a fulleraccount of the struggle, see Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power, 69-80. 57. Liangong dangshi, 445. 58. Liangong dangshi, 449-50. 59. Liango ng dangs hi, 4 7 4. 60. Liangong dangshi, 530. 61. Liangong dangshi, 531. 62. Liangong dangshi, 445. 63. Liangong dangshi, 446. 64. Mao Zedong, "Ruhe," 8. 65. Mao zaiqida, 126-27. 66. Mao wengao 1, 174. 67. Mao wengao l, 393. 68. Wo men de Zhou zongli [Our premier Zhou] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991), 153. 69. Mao wengao 2, 126; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Committee Document Research Office], ed., Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuebian 2 [Collections of selected important documents since the foundingof the PRC, vol. 2] (hereinafteras We nxian xuanbian 2) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), 39; Zhengui dangan l, 132. 70. Mao wengao 2, 663-64; forMao's instructions to Liu, see Mao wengao 2, 206. 71. Gongheguo 1953-1956, 10-18. 72. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 58. 73. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 14. 7 4. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 14. 75. Mao wengao 3, 458; for more on this topic, see Mao wengao 3, 687-92. 120 Chapter 3

76. Mao wengao 3, 474. 77. Mao wengao 3, 474-75(2). 78. Mao wengao 3, 475(2). 79. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 15. 80. Zhonggong 19, 564-93; Xue Muqiao, "Sannian yilai zhongguo jingji zhanxian­ shang de weida shengli" [The great victory on the Chinese economic front in the last three years], XX,no. 7 (1952): 3-6. 81. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 213. 82. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 15; Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 213. 83. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 214. 84. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 15. 85. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 213. 86. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 213. 87. We nxian xuanbian 4, 703 88. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 213. 89. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 15. 90. Liangong dangshi, 445. 91. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 10-1 1. This informationis also based on discussions with other oral sources. 92. Li Rui, Mao zaonian, 223. 93. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 217. 94. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 217-18. In his discussion, Bo Yibo did not say explicitly that it was Mao who did the calculations, but judging by Mao's central role in policy for­ mulation and his commitment to the Short Course, there can be little doubt that Mao was the individual who made these calculations. 4

Mao's Formulation of the General Line for Socialist Transition, October 1952-September 1953

AO BEGAN THE SERIOUS FORMULATION OF THE GENERAL LINE for socialist Mtransition afterhe claimed that he had received Stalin's endorsement for the immediate transformation of China's capitalist economy. Wishing to "re­ solve smoothly the socialist transition of capitalist industry and commerce," he sought ways to transformthe capitalist economy without triggering social unrest.1 Although he believed that he had already found, as early as 1952, the means to transform China's private agricultural sector,2 he was not ready to begin collectivization. In September 1952, he decided to postpone collec­ tivization until 1957, when certain conditions could be met.3 He was also not ready to start transforming the private handicraft industries. Even he recog­ nized that the transformation of agriculture and the handicraft industry would be tasks that would be "more strenuous" than the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, though he knew both would be "enormous undertakings."4 Zhou Enlai was of the same opinion; in describing the task the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP) facedin transforming private farming and the handicraftindust ry, he spoke of them as the "two oceans."5 The formulationof the general line took place in two stages. During the first, between late October 1952 and late September 1953, Mao largely completed his conceptual frameworkfor China 's transition to socialism and the policies for transformingcapitalist industry and commerce. During the second, between early October and December 1953, Mao reversed his decision of September 1952 to postpone collectivization until 1957. In so doing, he was disregarding the advice Stalin had given to Liu in Moscow in late 1952 when Stalin had urged the CCP "not to hurry over the setting up of agricultural cooperatives

-121 - 122 Chapter 4

and collective farms."6 Mao's change of mind was precipitated by the grain cri­ sis in summer 1953. Moreover, Stalin was no longer around to restrain him. The process of formulating thegeneral line can be characterized by several features. First, it was an evolutionary process, forit involved constant modifi­ cation of both concepts and policies to fit practical realities. Second, the for­ mulation process revealed Mao's dictatorial behavior in dealing with his lieu­ tenants and his dominance in policy decisions. He set the tone for policy discussions and determined which policies supported CCP goals. He criti­ cized and attacked anyone offering views that differedfrom his own, enlisting Gao Gang to assist him in these attacks. Third, Mao effectively mobilized party propaganda to advance his agenda.

Mao's Activities afterStalin's "Endorsement"

From late October 1952, Mao began to share his plan forthe general line with high-level cadres, but he was discreet about whom he informed. He was also careful at this point not to try to implement his plan too quickly. In his propaganda to the nation, he avoided any mention of the general line. Between late October 1952, aftersup posedly receiving Stalin's "endorsement" foran immediate transition to socialism, and early February 1953, before Mao made his firstinspection trip in southern China, he spoke about the transition to socialism at meetings of the Secretariat and, on at least one occasion, at a small gathering of senior provincial and municipal cadres. In his early comments about the general line, he said that no final decision had yet been made and that therefore only certain people should be informed. At this point, he emphasized the need for his listeners to maintain secrecy and withhold information about his new plans fromlower-ranking cadres. He had good reason to insist on secrecy, forhis new ideas departed sharply fromthe policy that the CCP had adopted in 1949. His concern proved to be justified, as local cadres reacted very negatively when the general line was made public in October 1953. Mao, however, was lenient to Luo Ruiqing, then the head of public security, when he requested to be disciplined for unwittingly telling some lower-ranking cadres of Mao's new ideas.7 Mao wanted to eliminate the capitalist class and capitalist economy in China, but he was not prepared to try to do so in a single stroke. Stalin's em­ phasis on gradualism may have influenced Mao's approach, and possibly his lieutenants went along with him only on the condition that he followa grad­ ualist path. Mao also probably fe ared social unrest if change occurred too quickly. Whilenot yet spelling out either the timing or the means, he was cer­ tain that capitalism should be eliminated in a step-by-step manner.8 By early Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Tra nsition 123

February 1953, he had succeeded in identifying the sectors that had become largely socialist and those that still needed to be restructured. Among the for­ mer were state-owned industry, transportation, and the wholesale sector. The latter included agriculture, the handicraftindust ry, and capitalist industry and commerce. Mao stressed the need to expand the state-owned sector in retail­ ing, while at the same time recognizing the necessity of dealing with the rising social tensions caused by large-scale unemployment in the private re­ tailing sector.9 In early 1953, as Mao became more certain about his plans, he used propa­ ganda to prepare not only CCP party members but also the general public for what lay ahead. Four themes were emphasized in propaganda at the time: the economic accomplishments of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European people's democracies, 10 the successful industrialization efforts in the North­ east, 11 Stalin's ideas about the necessary conditions for the transition to so­ cialism and then Communism, 12 and the Soviet experience with its First Five­ Year Plan (FFYP) and industrialization.13 The timing of this propaganda effort was significant. Mao wanted the Chi­ nese people to believe that the Eastern European people's democracies were doing much better than the advanced capitalist economies in Europe. An ar­ ticle entitled "The Great Achievements of the People's Democracies in Their Economic Construction in 1952;' written by Chen Yo uwei and appearing in Renmin ribao on February 1, 1953, was part of this effort. Chen not only re­ ported the production results of the Eastern European people's democracies forthe past year, but he also included a chart comparing the growth rates of industrial production in the Eastern European people's democracies and in the Western European capitalist economies forthe years 1937 to 1952. The Eastern European people's democracies included in the chart were Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, and the Western European economies included France, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Greece, and Luxembourg. Chen's study showed a remarkable growth in in­ dustrial production forthe Eastern European people's democracies. In addition to using Chen's article to show the superiority of the economic systems of the Eastern European people's democracies, Mao was also using propaganda to tell the nation that the Northeast was ahead of the rest of the na­ tion in its drive forindustrialization and that the region should become a model for thenation. Finally, he employed propaganda to say that China should follow in the steps of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European people's democracies and embark on a planned economy and a transition to socialism, and eventu­ ally Communism. By early 1953, most Chinese people were aware of the CCP's intention to start the FFYP and industrialization; they were less aware, however, of Mao's plan to carry out an immediate transition to socialism by eradicating 124 Chapter 4

the whole capitalist economy. They could not begin to imagine the dire conse­ quences of his plan for theirlives forthe next quarter century. Mao, on the other hand, was certain about what he wanted for China.

Mao's First Inspection Trip: February 1953

By mid-February 1953, Mao had probably already succeeded in getting the members of the Politburo to agree to his plan to begin a transition to social­ ism immediately. It is also possible, however, that he had encountered some disagreement fromwary leaders such as Liu and Zhou. At this time, Mao went to Wuhan and Nanjing to observe forhimself the conditions in the country. It is significant that Mao made his inspection tour after he had arranged, at Stalin's urging in October 1952, forthe convening of a National People's Con­ gress (NPC) and the draftingof a new constitution. In addition, on February 15, 1953, just before he leftfor his inspection trip, Mao made two major deci­ sions that had important consequences later. First, he completed the draft resolution on mutual-aid teams, originally written in December 1951, and made an important change in the section of the resolution dealing with the conditions under which collectives should be established.14 The CCP had fora long time adhered to the Leninist idea that mechanization must precede collectivization. From 1950, however, Mao had begun to support local cadres in Shanxi in challenging private land ownership in the countryside. Mao was fe eling unhappy with the old Leninist principle and decided to modifythe resolution. In place of setting mechanization as the precondition for collectivization, he modified the text of the resolution to read that collectivization could begin "with the complete consent of the peas­ ants and suitable economic conditions."15 Using a vague term such as "suitable economic conditions" gave Mao a free hand to begin collectivization when­ ever he wished. He thereby managed to change dramatically the existing pol­ icy on collectivization. Also, on February 15, 1953, Mao made an important decision concerning joint state-private ventures. Mao signaled his support forBo Yibo's argument that, forthe time being, the government should not rush into a joint venture that was being planned with a private shipping company, on the grounds that the CCP lacked the necessary fundsand experience to take part in such an ex­ periment. While generally agreeing with Bo's position, Mao maintained that such a practice would be inevitable in the future.16 He then asked Zhou Enlai to take charge of matters relating to joint state-private ventures;17 Zhou quickly approved two new joint state-private ventures.18 In February 1953, beforeMao leftBei jing forhis inspection trip, he was already certain about a few things: he Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Transition 125 was convinced that collectives could be established without mechanization and that joint state-private ventures would have to be formed at some point. He would test those ideas in southern China as he sought the means to transform China's predominantly private economy into a socialist one. Although this trip in February 1953 was Mao's firstformal inspection tour since 1949, he had made a seven-day trip in October 1952 that had combined a vacation with an inspection tour along the Yellow River basin. While Mao spent most of his time touring historical sites, he also had opportunities to visit villages and speak with peasants about agricultural production and truces. In addition, he spoke at considerable length with those who were working on plans to get the Yellow River under control.19 Mao arrived in Wuhan late in the day on February 16 and left for Nanjing before noon on February 19, 1953. During his visit in Wuhan, he met with party leaders at all levels, including those in the South-Central Bureau and in provincial, municipal, district, and neighborhood party organizations. By this time, Mao had already developed his own style of travel. He had his own spe­ cial train and rode it fromplace to place whenever he desired. Since his main purpose was to collect information,he would pick up local cadres along the way to ride with him and answer his questions. According to the available in­ formation,he picked up at least one local official,Zhang Yumei, the head of Xingtai Prefecture in Hebei Province.2 0 During the time they were together, Mao asked him a wide range of questions. While traveling by naval vessel from Wuhan to Nanjing, Mao brought along a cadre by the name of Liu Huinong to ask him about his experience as the government's representative in a joint state-private shipping company. One of Mao's principal goals for the trip was to investigate the outcome of the Suppression-of-Counter-Revolutionaries Campaign,21 but he had four other objectives forhis inspection trip. One of these was to study conditions in the country and to obtain informationas part of his preparations forthe tran­ sition to socialism. He was also interested in learning about the Three-Anti and Five-Anti political campaigns, mutual-aid teams, agricultural production co­ operatives, manufacturing industries, port workers, joint public-and-private ownership, the life of urban residents and neighborhood associations, and the handicraftindust ry, which Mao knew was a difficult area to transform.22 Second, in the spring of 1953, Mao was looking forways to transform not only capitalist industry and commerce, but also the capitalists. Just as a boat is needed to cross a river, Mao said that China's socialist transformationrequired the means to move from one stage to another. 23 His search fora way to expe­ dite the transformation may account for his intense interest in mutual-aid teams, agricultural production cooperatives, and successful examplesof joint enterprises based on state-private ownership. 126 Chapter 4

Third, Mao went to Wuhan to spread his ideas about the transition to so­ cialism. He was not being as secretive as he had been three months previously at the meeting on November 12, 1952. In fact, during his inspection tour, he made a point of informing the leaders of Xiaogang District of the new plan for socialist transition, and he asked them to tell county-level cadres of his plans.24 These ideas were neither officialnor public yet, but he was eager to try them out on lower-level cadres, but not on cadres below the county level. He observed the same caution in May of that same year.2 5 His decision to inform cadres down to the county level probably came from his growing confidence in his plan and from his realization of the need to build support forit among the lower-ranking cadres. How did Mao definethe meaning of the transition to socialism during his trip? In February 1953, still followingthe conceptual frameworkestablished in fall 1948, he told a group of regional leaders that New Democracy was a tran­ sitional stage to socialism.2 6 He, however, redefined the tasks that should be carried out during this transitional stage. He identifiedthree tasks that had al­ ready been accomplished during the transition: the overthrow of imperialism, the end of fe udalism, and the elimination of bureaucratic capitalism. He also definedtasks that needed to be taken care of in fourareas : the national bour­ geoisie, private agriculture, handicrafts,and illiteracy. 27 He believed that these areas had to be approached in a way different fromthat used to deal with en­ emies. He planned to use redemption ( shumai) to transform the national bourgeoisie and to replace private farms and handicrafts, respectively, with state farmsand cooperatives. 28 Mao also expressed his views on how long the transition would last: «In my estimation, it will probably take roughly three five-yearplans to complete the transformation of agriculture, handicraft in­ dustry, and private industry and commerce."29 As early as 1942, commenting on important things he had learned from the Short Course, he noted that Stalin used three Five-Year Plans (FYPs) to establish socialism. Fourth, Mao used his trip to Wuhan as an opportunity to criticize two ideas that he believed to be wrong. Speaking to a group of senior leaders from the South-Central Bureau, Hubei Province, and fromWu han City, he declared, «I think it's wrong to speak of the consolidation of the New Democratic society and the 'four freedoms."'30 Probably intended as a preliminary response to concerns raised by senior leaders about his new initiatives, his statement set the stage for his later attacks on several top party leaders, including Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Zihui, and Bo Yibo, during the summer of 1953. Why did he make these comments at this time? Was he testing the waters for his later attacks? Alternatively, was he seeking to build support forhis plan for the transition to socialism fromthe lower levels of the party? Mao oftentried his ideas out on audiences he could count on to be respectfuland receptive. Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Transition 127

Although the idea of the "consolidation of the New Democratic order" has oftenbeen linked to Liu Shaoqi, other leaders, however, had also used it and supported it. In draftinga political report in February 1953, forexample, both Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping stated that "the New Democratic social order had been established." When Mao read this statement, he was alarmed and considered it to be harmful.After careful consideration, he removed the state­ ment fromthe draftpolitical report.31 It is generally recognized among Chinese scholars that in the early 1950s, Liu believed that the party had to consolidate the New Democratic order be­ foretaking any steps toward socialism, and that his view was in line with the CCP's original plan of 1949.32 There was, in fact, only one occasion when he made an official statement about the "consolidation of the New Democratic order" in describing the goals of the CCP. In a speech delivered to the First Na­ tional Conference on Organizational Wo rk in March 1951, he spoke of the present, future, and ultimate goals of the CCP: ''Atpresent it is to struggle for the consolidation of the New Democratic order; in the future,it is to struggle for thetransition to socialism; and ultimately, it is to struggle to achieve Com­ munism."33 These three goals of the CCP were later included among the eight principles that Communists should uphold; these principles were approved by the Central Committee.34 Mao's later criticism of the idea of the "consoli­ dation of the New Democratic order" during his inspection tour to Wuhan, however, was interpreted by other leaders as an attack upon Liu Shaoqi. The notion of the "four freedoms" originated with Deng Zihui, who pro­ moted it during the First National Conference on Rural Work in April 1953. The fourfreedoms included the freedomto hire labor; the freedomto borrow and lend money; the freedomto buy, sell, lease, and rent land; and the freedom to trade. When Deng talked about these freedoms,however, he said they were not unconditional freedoms.35 Loans offered by loan sharks at high interest rates, forinstance, would not be included in the fourfreedoms. Mao criticized Deng's statement because any association of the "fourfreedoms" with the con­ cept of New Democracy interfered with his plans forthe general line. During his tour, Mao learned both positive and negative things about mutual-aid teams, agricultural cooperatives, and joint state-private enter­ prises. Overall, however, the tour convinced him of the value of these organi­ zational arrangements. He was pleasantly surprised by the speed with which the mutual-aid teams were being established in the old liberated areas, and probably even more pleased when told by local cadres that the idea of organ­ izing mutual-aid teams had become rooted in the minds of the people.36 He also learned that experiments with agricultural production cooperatives, a more advanced form of organization, had been conducted during the last two years, from 1951 to 1953, in Xingtai Prefecture, an old liberated area, and that 128 Chapter 4

those experiments were successful. He attempted to advance the cause of col­ lectivization by promoting two ideas: "mutual-aid cooperation is better than farmingon one's own"37 and "it is possible to achieve collectivization without mechanization, and thereforeChina does not have to followthe Soviet way of doing things."38 Mao continued to reiterate these ideas as he began to formu­ late the general line forsocialist transition. Mao's eagerness during his inspection tour to collect informationon a suc­ cessful joint state-private enterprise suggests that he was already serious about establishing joint state-private ownership nationwide as a means of trans­ forming capitalist industry. He left Wuhan on February 19, 1953, aboard a naval vessel--probably a small one, as China did not yet have a naval force--and arrived in Nanjing three days later. Liu Huinong, a CCP official who had been appointed general manager of Minsheng Shipping Company and represented the government in the management of this joint state-private enterprise, was asked to accompany Mao to Nanjing so that he could brief Mao on the shipping industry along the Yangtze River and explain how a large private shipping company like Minsheng had become a jointly owned state­ private entity. 39 Minsheng's case was a special one. As a financiallydistressed private com­ pany, it had sought help from thegov ernment, only to see the government seize total control of it. Founded by Lu Zuofu in 1925, it was the largest pri­ vate company in the inland water-transportation business. In 1949, the com­ pany had begun to suffer serious losses due mainly to poor management. Dur­ ing the eighteen months after the Communists took power in 1949, it was estimated that the company had accumulated debts of 13 million yuan (old currency). As early as March 1950, Lu contacted Zhou Enlai through the com­ pany's Beijing office to seekthe government's help. As part of the arrange­ ment, the company allowed a government representative to sit on its board of directors. In 1952, Lu, through his representatives in Beijing, contacted the Ministry of Transportation and initiated discussions concerning a possible joint state-private partnership. In September of the same year, the Minsheng Shipping Company officiallybecame a joint state-private entity.40 Mao was "extremely interested" in the Minsheng Shipping Company and "asked detailed questions about the company and the whole process through which the company had become a joint state-private enterprise." Liu Huinong explained that the government took control of the company in three steps. First, the government provided loans and fuel to keep thebusin ess going. Sec­ ond, a joint state-private entity was formedin which the government invested 10 million yuan (old currency). Third, the government became the source of all employee benefits.41 Although the business was supposedly being run jointly by the original owner and the government's representative, the gov- Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Transition 129 ernment was in fact in charge. Not surprisingly, shortly after the general line was firstannounced in late September 1953, the story of Minsheng appeared in Renmin ribao on October 11, 1953. It was described as «a case of a birth without pain," and a short editorial also appeared praising Minsheng as "a model of joint state-private ownership."42 When Mao left Wuhan for Nanjing on the morning of February 19, 1953, he must have felt great satisfaction.Not only had he gathered valuable infor­ mation, but he was also able to spread his ideas and to criticize the "wrong ideas" expressed by several senior leaders. Most importantly, Mao had the op­ portunity to experience the enthusiasm the common people felt forhim. He was so moved by the experience that he went back to Wuhan in 1966 to ener­ gize himself by making his highly publicized swim in the Yangtze River just beforelaunching the Cultural Revolution. Wang Renzhong, the party secretary of Wuhan City in the early 1950r-who later accompanied Mao on his swim in 1966--tells of the warm reception Mao received fromthe local people when he toured East Lake dur­ ing his short stay in Wuhan in February 1953. So as not to be recognized by the masses, Mao covered his nose and mouth with a large white mask, the kind used by the Chinese during the winter to ward offgerms and the cold air. He was soon recognized, however, by an elementary school student who spread the word, shouting, «Chairman Mao is here!"43 Wang watched as thousands upon thousands of people surged toward Mao and gathered around him. The people were elated to see Mao, according to Wang.44 An emotional Mao re­ sponded by saying, "Wuhan people are really great!" (Wuhan renmin zhen hao yaf)45 It is likely that Mao returned to Beijing with renewed self-confidence and vigor and was ready to push his new agenda. In spring 1953, Mao was de­ termined to move China quickly toward socialism, and he was ready to crush anyone who stood in his way.

Li Weihan's Investigation of State Capitalism: March 1953

In spring 1953, the CCP's policies toward capitalist industry differedfrom its policies toward capitalist commerce. Toward the former, the CCP pursued policies based on the party's interpretation of state capitalism, as described in chapter 2, and emphasized control over capitalist industries. Toward the lat­ ter, the CCP applied a policy called «paichu," or "squeeze out;' which sought to eliminate capitalist commercial enterprises, both large and small, and re­ place them with either state-owned or cooperative-owned entities. In spring 1953, however, there was a search fora workable means to transform capital­ ist industry rather than just control it. Aside fromMao's brief inspection trip 130 Chapter 4

to southern China in February 1952, more ambitious investigative work was being conducted on this topic. In spring 1953, Li We ihan, then the head of the United Front Department, was asked to lead a group of cadres to conduct field investigations in several large cities in southern China, including Wuhan, Shanghai, and Nanjing. One of Li Weihan's major goals forthe investigation was to examine how state cap­ italism had been implemented in large industrial cities in the past several years.46 In March of that year, Li Lisan also conducted a field investigation concerning the handicraft industry in Wuhan for more than a month, 47 though not much is known about his activities or findings. After conducting his investigation, Li Weihan submitted his report to the central leadership in May 1953. The report was entitled «Issues Concerning Public and Private Relations in Capitalist Industries."48 Liu Shaoqi foundthe report to be important and suggested that it be discussed in upcoming Polit­ buro meetings.49 Li's report was also appreciated by Zhou Enlai, who was also looking at that time forthe means to transformprivate capitalism. 50 As with the policy proposal written by Zhang Wentian almost fouryears earlier, Mao was interested in Li's report. Mao even spoke with Li by phone and suggested they discuss the report in future Politburo meetings.51 Li's investigation revealed that between 1949 and 1952, state capitalism as proposed by Zhang We ntian had been widely applied to capitalist enterprises in large cities and that the output of these enterprises had grown rapidly. Li offered a detailed analysis of all the formsof state capitalism that were in operation at that time. These included «purchase state capitalism" (shougou), in which state­ owned commercial entities purchased products under short-term contracts frompri vately owned factories; «sole-agent state capitalism" ( baoxiao) , in which state-owned entities acted as the sole sales agents forprivate manufacturers;and "processing-goods state capitalism" (jiagong) and "ordering-goods state capital­ ism" (dinghuo), both of which were discussed in chapter 2. The Li report also showed that the wide acceptance of state capitalism by the capitalists after 1952 was spurred by the brutal Five-Anti Campaign be­ tween January 26 and October 25 of 1952. The campaign targeted owners of factories and shops and subjected them to grueling psychological and some­ times physical abuse. By the end of the campaign, the CCP had broken the spirit of the Chinese national bourgeoisie and had forcedits members to sub­ mit to Communist rule. In 1952, they had no alternative but to accept state capitalism in whatever form it was imposed. 52 In the seven largest industrial cities, the industrial output of enterprises that were under state capitalism, as a percentage of all industrial output, was impressive: Shanghai, 58 percent; Wuhan, 65.5 percent; Xian, 70.3 percent; Harbin, 76 percent; Hangzhou, 63.7 percent; Shenyang, 55.9 percent; and Guangzhou, 32.8 percent.53 Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Transition 131

Li categorized the various formsof state capitalism and outlined the devel­ opmental trajectory from the most elementary to the most advanced form: shougou, baoxiao, jiagong, dinghuo, and gongsi heying (joint state-private own­ ership). The firsttwo were identified as elementary; the next two, intermedi­ ate; and the last one, gongsi heying, the most advanced formof state capital­ ism. s4 Li came to the conclusion that the transformation of capitalist ownership should be carried out by utilizing state capitalism in general and gongsi heying in particular. It should be pointed out, however, that Li's inves­ tigations were conducted afterMao's inspection tour in the Wuhan region. Li's recommendation that joint state-private ownership be instituted was, most likely, no coincidence; Mao had probably suggested that Li make this recom­ mendation. Li recognized that joint state-private ownership was still an in­ significantoperation in 1952, when only 5.7 percent of the industrial output came from state-private enterprises, and that many practical problems re­ mained. He nevertheless continued to recommend that it be utilized as a "principal method" for changing capitalist ownership. ss Between 1948 and 1953, the state capitalism of Zhang Wentian was used to get the Chinese cap­ italist class under control. After 1953, the state capitalism of Mao, centered upon joint state-private ownership, had assumed a new meaning and func­ tion: it was to be used to change the ownership of the capitalist economy and to bring it a step closer to socialism. The idea of using gongsi heying to trans­ form thecapitalist economy enjoyed strong support among the other leaders. During discussions in summer 1953, both Zhou and Chen Yun expressed their views on the need to expand the scope of gongsi heying. They both believed, however, that the implementation of joint state-private ownership should be gradual.s6 Joint state-private ownership did not fit neatly into any of Lenin's cate­ gories of state capitalism; the Chinese, therefore, had to come up with some justificationto give it credibility. Both Li Lisan and Zhou Enlai defended it on Mao's behalf without giving persuasive reasons. Li argued that "the state cap­ italism practiced in China [was] entirely in accordance with Lenin's princi­ ples" and that "gongsi heying in China [was] equivalent to concessionary state capitalism" as practiced in the Soviet Union. s7 Zhou offered his justification forjoint state-private ownership in his concluding remarks to the Forty-Ninth Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Confer­ ence (CPPCC) in September 1953. Zhou spoke of how China's state capital­ ism resembled the Soviet Union's and shared characteristics with it, and he then added the seemingly contradictory comment that China's state capital­ ism "differed from theirs in format and content."S8 Both men's justifications seemed tenuous, but the Chinese leaders were desperate in the early 1950s to fit Chinese practice into Soviet orthodoxy. 132 Chapter 4

In spring 1953, as Mao clarifiedhis approach to the elimination of capital­ ism in the urban economy, he decided it was time to let the whole party know what lay ahead. He used ideas expressed in the Short Course to persuade the party's rank and file. On April 23, 1953, a Central Committee directive in­ structed the whole party to use a year and a half, between July 1953 and De­ cember 1954, to study the Short Course, specificallychapters 9 through 12.59 This directive appeared in the CCP's official newspaper, Renmin ribao, two days later. It sent a strong signal to the nation that Stalinism and Stalin's path to socialism were there to stay, and it marked the beginning of the Staliniza­ tion of China, both ideologically and economically. Beginning in May 1953, articles began to appear in the party publication Xuexi [Study] describing the content of these chapters (see appendix 2). Between mid-July and late No­ vember 1953, Renmin ribao ran a series of articles reporting on how CCP cadres working at many different levels-in the central government, min­ istries, regional offices, and at the Central Party School-were studying the Short Course.60

Mao's Use of Criticism to SolidifySupport

In October 1953, reflectingon the importance of the National Conference on Financial and Economic Wo rk held in Beijing from June 13 to August 13, 1953, Mao wrote that issues associated with the general line could not have been resolved without the conference. 61 The main purpose of the conference had been to discuss the general line, and his assessment was accurate. His goal forthe conference was to redirect the thinking of top party leaders away from concern with building a New Democratic economy, the official line since 1949, and toward a new focus on building socialism by eliminating capitalism and private ownership. During the conference, he exerted great efforts to get all party leaders to rally around this new policy initiative. To justifyhis poli­ cies and win support, he cited the ideas of Lenin and Stalin, and he criticized and attacked his lieutenants when they argued in favor of ideas associated with past polices. He also enlisted Gao Gang, an ambitious party leader who shared Mao's "leftist" policy orientation, to attack leaders who disagreed with him. 62 In the end, Mao succeeded in getting all the Politburo members and all 163 delegates to the National Conference forFina ncial and Economic Work to agree to his new policy platform. Mao relied upon the writings of Lenin and Stalin to persuade other leaders, especially members of the Politburo, to support his policy initiatives. He arranged forseveral relevant selections of their writings to be printed between June and July 1953 and distributed at Politburo meetings in summer 1953.63 Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Transition 133

On July 29, 1953, the Central Committee decided to distribute these reference materials to cadres at both ministerial and commission levels. 64 In compiling these materials, Mao used excerpts not only from the Short Course but also from the writings of Lenin and Stalin. He paid particular attention to Lenin's writings on the New Economic Policy (NEP) and his theory of state capital­ ism and to Stalin's writings on industrialization and collectivization. Mao's in­ terest in these topics was evident in the titles given to the compilations of writ­ ings produced under his direction in summer 1953, at the height of the policy formulationprocess: Lenin and Stalin on State Capitalism and the NEP, Stalin on the Basic Route fo r Soviet Industrial Development, and Questions Concern­ ing Price Policy and Collectivization Described in the Short Course. These col­ lections brought together a broad range of Lenin's writings and speeches: «The Tax in Kind," originally published on April 21, 1921; ((General Outline Report on the Strategies of the CPSU," a speech delivered in June 1921 to the Third Congress of the Comintern; the text of a political report that Lenin de­ livered to the Eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on March 27, 1922; ((New Economic Policies and the Tasks of the Po­ litical Education Department;' published on October 17, 1921; ((On New Eco­ nomic Policies;' published on October 29, 1921; «On Cooperatives," published on January 6, 1923; and, of course, Stalin's Short Course.65 Li Lisan also put together a collection of reference materials, called Lenin on State Capitalism. It is not clear whether Li was asked to do this job or volun­ teered forit. It is possible that Li's familiarity with the writings of Marx and Lenin led to his being asked to produce the collection. Li Lisan drew upon four of Lenin's works: ((The Current Tasks of Soviet Power;' published on April 29, 1918; ((The Tax in Kind" of April 21, 1921; ((A Speech on the Tax in Kind," de­ livered on May 26 and 27, 1921; and the text of a political report that Lenin de­ livered to the Eleventh Congress of the CPSU on March 27, 1922.66 Two days after the conference was convened, an important enlarged Polit­ buro meeting was held on June 15. In addition to Politburo members, it was attended by Central Committee members whose responsibilities were related to the issues under discussion; the CCP party secretaries of ten major cites also attended the meetings.67 Mao's main goal, as indicated earlier, was to per­ suade top party leaders to change the party's policy fromone of pursuing New Democracy to one of eliminating capitalism and private-property ownership. During the meeting, he delivered a speech in which he officially introduced his conceptual frameworkfor the general line for socialist transition. In the process, he criticized both ((leftist" and «rightist" thinking-but especially ((rightist" thinking-warning against any departures fromthe general line and any «leftist"or «rightist" mistakes. Also during this meeting, a new policy for transformingcapitalist industries was established. 134 Chapter 4

Beginning in September 1952, Mao presented to various audiences his con­ ceptual framework for China's transition to socialism. The wording of the conceptual framework, however, changed over time and continued to evolve until December 1953. In contrast to the statement he had made in February 1953 during his inspection trip, by June 1953 he was no longer speaking of a transition from New Democracy to socialism. Instead, dropping the term ,, ((New Democracy entirely, he now identified the transition period as ((ex­ tending from the establishment of the PRC in 1949 to the completion of the ,, socialist transformation. He also definedthe tasks to be completed during the transition period as ((basically to achieve national industrialization and the so­ cialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft industries, and capitalist in­ ,, dustry and commerce over the course of a considerable period of time. 68 In June 1953, Mao did not specifyexactly how long he expected it would ,, take ((basically to complete the process of socialist transition, instead using ,, the vague language ((over the course of a considerable period of time. He had used this expression in the past, typically to mean three years. He avoided any mention of gradualism, despite the emphasis Stalin gave to it in October 1952 during his last meetings with Liu Shaoqi and other CCP leaders. Over the next few months, however, to make his ideas more acceptable to the general public and other top CCP leaders, Mao modified thisaspect of his conceptual frame­ ,, work by adding the term ((gradualism and by specifyingthat it would require three five-yearplans to achieve a transition to socialism. In my view, the con­ ceptual framework he presented on June 15, 1953, largely reflected his real thinking at the time. He did not want to offer a timetable or include any ref­ erence to gradualism, for he wanted if possible to complete the socialist tran­ sition in China in a short time. His new conceptual framework reflectedhis attempt to wrap a Stalinist program of building socialism in a mantle of grad­ ualism while emphasizing the key features of the Stalinist road to socialism as described in the Short Course: industrialization, collectivization in the coun­ tryside, and all-out war on the capitalist economy. During the conference, many leaders could not grasp the meaning of what Mao meant by a gradual transition fromcapital ism to socialism. His effortsat explaining the transition were based on a crude interpretation of the Stalin­ ism described in the Short Course. In his economic analysis, Mao borrowed Stalin's idea that the size of the state-owned economy relative to that of the capitalist economy served as an indicator of progress toward socialism. In Mao's estimation, as a result of recent policies, the state-owned and socialist economy had grown, and capitalist commerce and industry had either been diminished in size or brought under government control. If the CCP contin­ ued to apply the policy of paichu (squeeze out) toward capitalist commerce, Mao believed that the capitalist wholesale sector would be eliminated in five Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Transition 135 to ten years, and the capitalist retail sector in ten to twenty years. He also be­ lieved that the size of capitalist industry had been reduced as well. In his view, when the CCP began to institute joint state-private ownership, China would be ready to move to socialism.6 9 While Mao was optimistic about the future elimination of capitalism, he did not underestimate the power of the capitalists, forthere were still some 3.8 million workers in capitalist enterprises. As a result, he did not think the CCP could simply eliminate the capitalists; he recognized he would have to work with them for a period of time. 70 In June 1953, Mao, like other top leaders, publicly supported the view that peaceful means should be applied in trans­ formingboth the capitalist economy and the capitalists. When it came time to carry out the transformation, however, severe measures were in fact em­ ployed. At the Politburo meeting on June 15, 1953, Mao criticized three "rightist" expressions.71 Like Stalin in 1928 and 1929, Mao in the early 1950s labeled any person or idea he disagreed with as "rightist" and therefore an obstacle to achieving socialism. The first "rightist" expression that Mao criticized--"the consolidation of a New Democratic order"-was the same one that he had targeted in February 1953 in Wuhan. During the same Politburo meeting on June 15, 1953, Mao was specificin his criticism:

This way of posing the question is harmful. Changes are taking place every day, and it is very difficultto establish order.... The transition period is full of con­ tradictions and struggles, and our present revolutionary struggle is more pro­ foundthan past armed revolutions. This is a revolution that will completely bury the capitalist system as well as all exploitative systems. The idea of consolidating a "New Democratic order" is not in accordance with the real conditions of the struggle and hinders the advancement of the socialist cause.72

Mao's wording was strong, to say the least, and reflected his rejection of the past policies associated with New Democracy. Since these past policies posed a threat to the new position he had adopted on the transition to socialism, he certainly could not tolerate anyone espousing these policies. The second "rightist" expression that Mao criticized--"walking toward so­ cialism from New Democracy"73-came from Zhou Enlai. This expression was commonly used in the early 1950s, and it was nothing out of the ordi­ nary. Mao's response was, "It's vague to put the issue this way.... 'Walking to­ ward' means [the destination or goal] has not yet been reached. This way of putting the question looks fine, [but if] analyzed closely, it is inappropri­ ate."74 His criticism, again, reflectedhis eagerness to sever all ties with New Democracy. 136 Chapter 4

Mao also criticized a third "rightist" expression--"protecting private property" in the countryside-as "incorrect." In April 1953, Deng Zihui, to calm peasant fears during the CCP's drive to organize mutual-aid teams in the countryside, had spoken of the need to "respect the land ownership rights of the peasants" and "make sure the private property rights of the peasants [were] not violated."75 While knowing perfectly well the context in which the statements were made, Mao still claimed they were incorrect,76 al­ though he did not specifywhy. Mao faced no real challenge to the general line, but his criticisms were intended to suppress all discussion of past poli­ cies associated with New Democracy. He had gone along with them in the past, but he never really took them seriously as long-term policies; he in­ stead supported them as short-term tactics.77 His criticisms were successful in eliminating support forthese earlier policies and in suppressing potential resistance to the general line.

Disagreements over the Socialist Transition

In June 1953, there was broad agreement among the leaders on the goals of China's transition to socialism, but there were disagreements over the amount of time and the methods to be used to achieve it. 78 One area of disagreement was over whether capitalism should be eliminated in China. The term "elimina­ tion" implied nationalization of all private businesses by force rather than through peaceful means. The majority of the party's top leadership supported a policy of peaceful and gradual transformation of capitalist enterprises. Gao Gang, representing a minority point of view within the party, supported the outright elimination of capitalism.79 Mao and Li Weihan were both aware of Gao's opposition to the party's gradualist policy. Mao asked Gao to express his views during a Politburo meeting; Gao, however, kept quiet during the me�ting. Afterthe meeting, Gao asked Li Weihan if he was aware of Bukharin's views in support of a peaceful transition to socialism.80 By asking about Bukharin's views, Gao was indirectly expressing his opposition to the party's policy of peacefultransformation and was suggesting that it violated ideological ortho­ doxy, forit was well known that Bukharin had supported a policy of peaceful transition to socialism in the 1920s and was brutally criticized by Stalin forit. During the June discussions, some minor disagreements also emerged over what the capitalists should be transformed into. Li We ihan's proposal was to transform them into "socialist citizens." An opposing view was expressed from an unexpected quarter, Lin Boqu, a mild man who rarely expressed his oppo­ sition, but Lin's comments have not yet been made public. Mao backed Li's proposal, and it was adopted.81 Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Tra nsition 137

The Policy of Transformingthe Private Retailing Sector and Its Reversal

In June 1953, Mao and the CCP decided it would continue its long-standing policy, based on the principle of paichu (squeezing out), of transformingthe private retailing sector.82 Each year, a certain number of private retailing enti­ ties would be eliminated and replaced with state-owned and cooperative en­ tities. 83 Mao, however, was forcedto modifythis policy, at least temporarily, as it was applied more widely. On June 28, Mao decided to replace paichu with a policy of gradual elimination,84 which would rely on the use of state capital­ ism. In early September 1953, he officiallychanged the policy. He offeredtwo reasons to justify the policy reversal. First, he said, "further research was needed, due to the lack of experience" in dealing with economic issues. Sec­ ond, he argued that private retailing was still useful.85 In fact,practical politi­ cal considerations had forcedMao to forsakethe paichu policy; the policy had produced disastrous results and had to be dropped. Mao was concerned about the threat of social unrest resulting from widespread unemployment if the party moved too quickly to eliminate private retailing entities. This policy reversal also reflecteda fundamentalproblem that the CCP was facingat the time: how to balance the party's ideological commitment to elim­ inating capitalism and at the same time not offendthe social groups whose livelihood would be affected by the party's policies. Since first attempting to apply the paichu policy to private retailing, the party had encountered serious problems as the government systematically eliminated private retailing enti­ ties. Many workers lost their jobs in the process and blamed the CCP fortheir misfortune.To reduce social tensions, a new policy was adopted in June 1952, aimed at slowing the pace of elimination, and a ratio of 25 percent to 75 per­ cent between state-owned and private retail entities, respectively, was estab­ lished as a goal. By November of the same year, as more workers became un­ employed, tensions worsened. Fearing social unrest, the CCP issued a lengthy directive aimed at correcting the situation by slowing the process of eliminat­ ing the private commercial sector.86 Commenting on the directive, Mao gave instructions that the ratio of 25 percent to 75 percent should be maintained and that it could be changed only with the prior approval of the CCP Central Committee. 87 Even with this emphasis on keeping a 25 percent to 75 percent proportion in favorof private retailing entities, the survival of these entities was threat­ ened by the state's support for increasing the presence of state-owned retail­ ing entities. Many private retailing entities were on the edge of bankruptcy. In responding to these circumstances, Mao was prompted in early 1953 to sup­ port an inherently contradictory policy that had been proposed by leading cadres at the Ministry of Commerce. The new policy encouraged state-owned 138 Chapter 4

commercial entities to make as much money as possible but at the same time not to destroy the private merchants.88 How could a balance be struck be­ tween the state-owned entities making as much money as possible and not de­ stroying their private-merchant competitors in the process? Instead of continuing the policy of paichu, the CCP decided to apply state capitalism to capitalist commerce, as the party had already applied it to capi­ talist industry. The policy was announced in October 1953, afterthe end of the Emergency Meeting on Grain. It was decided to use the method of «sell on commission" ( daixiao or jingxiao) to get capitalist commerce under control. This policy was developed afterthe policy of «the state monopoly forthe pur­ chase and marketing of grain, cotton, and cooking oil" ( tonggou tongxiao) was formulated in the fall of 1953.

Mao's Effortsto Reshape the Thinking of 163 Leaders

Mao let it be known how far hewas willing to go to solidifysupport for thegen­ eral line. After he criticized several senior leaders at the June 15 enlarged Polit­ buro meeting, he extended his attacks to Bo Yibo and his new tax law, which Mao associated with the policy orientation of New Democracy. Mao enlisted Gao Gang to lead the attacks on Bo during the National Conference on Financial and Economic Wo rk, which ran fortwo months, from June to August 1953. Mao then enlisted Zhou Enlai to attack Bo in his concluding remarks to the conference on August 11. On August 12, 1953, the day beforethe conference was finally con­ cluded, Mao gave a speech in which he continued the attack on Bo. 89 Mao used the attacks on certain senior leaders during the conference to re­ shape the thinking of the 163 leaders participating in the conference and to force them to support the general line. At the same time, he was telling them that they should no longer think in terms of building a New Democratic economy and that they should instead prepare to embark immediately on the transition to socialism. When Bo revised the tax law in fall 1952, he believed that he was following the guidelines contained in the Common Program and current party policies, which called forthe tax burden to be shared equally by the state-owned and private sectors. Bo announced the new tax law on December 31, 1952, with­ out consulting Mao, who learned of it through reports published in the press in early January 1953. Mao was furious. He wrote a letter to Zhou and not only asked to be briefed but also wanted to make sure his displeasure con­ cerning the matter was conveyed to other leaders.90 Mao was actually angrier at not being consulted than at the content of the tax law. After this incident, Mao became more sensitive about not being informedof policy decisions, and Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Transition 139 he made a point of expressing his displeasure whenever it happened. He be­ came particularly unhappy with Liu Shaoqi, the number-two man in the party hierarchy, and Yang Shangkun, the director of the general office forthe CCP Central Committee. On May 19, 1953, Mao sharply criticized both Liu and Yang forbehavior that was "wrong" and "in violation of the rules."91 In early June 1953, beforethe National Conference on Financial and Economic Work was convened, Mao, in preparation for his attacks on Bo's new tax law, dis­ tributed to certain leaders fivedocuments containing the communications be­ tween Bo and other leaders in January and February 1953.92 Mao's attack on Bo on August 12, 1953, was a brutal climax to nearly two months of attacks against him by various leaders during the National Confer­ ence on Financial and Economic Wo rk. Bo was attacked forthe two <

Mao's Courtship of Prominent Figures and Business Leaders

In early fall 1953, after Mao had intimidated important party leaders into supporting the general line, he tried to win acceptance of the general line from leading non-Communist national figures and business leaders. In particular, he wanted to persuade them to participate in joint state-private enterprises based on joint state-private ownership, a key institution in his concept of state capitalism. In dealing with socially prominent figuresand business leaders, he was cunning. He did not try to force his ideas on them; he instead reassured them and convinced them that the process would be a gradual one, without any "shocks" or "uneasiness." He had good reason to be carefulwith this group of people, at least at this stage, forhe still needed their goodwill and support to make the CCP and himself look good in the eyes of the public. He was ultimately successfulin persuading this group of people that he was not going to upset their world or eliminate them anytime soon. 95 140 Chapter 4 ,, Mao's Attacks on an "Old Friend

Before announcing the general line to the general public, Mao had to inform the influential non-CCP members of the CPPCC.96 During a CPPCC meeting in September 1953, some of Mao's policies were questioned and criticized by one of his old friends. Mao did not hesitate to launch a brutal counterattack on his old friend, Liang Shuming, a well-known Confucian scholar. Mao's readiness to make this attack showed how defensive and sensitive he was about having his new policy challenged. Mao and Liang firstmet in the 1930s, and they maintained their friendship until their clash at the meeting in September 1953. Before 1949, Liang had been actively involved with social experimentation in rural China in an effort to improve the level of civic culture there. Liang believed it was essential to modernize rural China before the whole nation could be modernized.97 After 1949, Liang, like many well-known non-Communist figuresin China, was in­ vited to join the CPPCC. On September 8, 1953, Liang attended the enlarged Forty-Ninth Standing Committee meeting of the CPPCC, during which he, along with others, was told about Mao's general line forsocialist transition. Liang supported the gov­ ernment's new policy program, including the FFYP. After listening to Zhou Enlai's speech, however, Liang expressed some concerns about the priority the government was placing on industry, and he criticized the CCP's handling of rural affairs. Liang's behavior was typical of Chinese intellectuals, who erro­ neously believed the party propaganda that they would be allowed to express their thoughts candidly. Unfortunately, Liang's questions and criticisms led Mao to strike back at him in an almost irrational manner, precipitating an un­ pleasant exchange between the two men before a large audience. The friend­ ship of some twenty years between Mao and Liang ended as a result. In his firstquestion, responding to the party's emphasis on heavy industry, Liang wanted to know if the government had a plan to develop light industry and transportation during the FFYP. He also made two comments that ex­ pressed his views on the party's rural policies. In one comment, he said he be­ lieved that the peasants were living in hell while the workers were living in heaven. In another comment, he said the CCP had forgottenthe peasants. He specificallyco ndemned the behavior of some lower-ranking rural cadres and described them as using "coercion" and "running things without consulta­ tion."98 His remarks were accurate assessments of conditions in the rural areas, and Mao himself was aware of the problems Liang identified.99 His comments, however, were seen by Mao as a frontalassault on the general line, and he was determined not only to win the fight with Liang, but also to use the fightto scare offany potential opposition to the general line. Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Transition 141

On September 12, 1953, the day after Liang spoke, Mao responded to Liang's remarks before a large audience by suggesting, without naming him, that Liang was opposing the general line. It was abundantly clear to everyone present, however, that Mao was attacking Liang. Although surprised at Mao's accusation, Liang decided not to yield. Instead of having an open argument with Mao, Liang decided to write a letter to Mao. The two men actually met forabout twenty minutes on the evening of September 13. The exchange did not go well, for Mao continued to insist that Liang was opposing the general line. A determined Liang continued to search for an opportunity to defend himself against this charge. When Liang was given an opportunity to speak on September 16, he reiterated the positions he had previously stated. The next speaker, a top CCP leader, delivered a long speech in support of Mao and re­ peatedly labeled Liang as a counterrevolutionary. During this speech, Mao in­ terrupted and again accused Liang of opposing the general line, this time, however, attacking him face-to-facein public.100 The confrontationbetween Liang and Mao reached its climax on Septem­ ber 18, 1953, when Liang again tried to defend himself. After an exchange of words with Mao, Liang was eventually booed offthe stage. 101 Such a public challenge to Mao had not occurred since 1949. Liang was probably the first, and undoubtedly the last, person who ever dared to reason with Mao in pub­ lic. In retaliation, during a subsequent meeting attended by Liang, an almost irrational Mao struck back and spoke of Liang as if he were the worst possible human being on earth. Mao's enormous anger toward Liang might have been precipitated by the factthat Liang was being praised by the Taiwan media in 1952. Afterlearning of this from an internal report, Mao initiated a search forthe actual text so that he could read it. 102 In typical fashion,Mao looked for any ideas Liang had expressed in the past so that they could be used to attack him. During the meeting, in his anger, Mao criticized things Liang had done in the past and la­ beled him a class enemy: ((Liang is a downright reactionary"; ((he is a repre­ sentative of the landlord class and a helper of the landlord class"; ((he is a ca­ reerist and a hypocrite"; and, finally, ((he can't be trusted with our plans." 103 Despite his anger, Mao did not persecute Liang or imprison him. Instead, Mao decided to allow Liang to keep his position on the committee of the CPPCC, 104 and in 1955, two years later, Mao launched a nationwide campaign to criticize Liang's ideas. 105 As result of the campaign, Liang was shunned by Mao and the party. It is probably not difficultto understand why Mao behaved the way he did. He was defensive about his new policy initiative, for it departed from the CCP's publicly stated policy. He hoped to suppress dissent by creating an in­ tolerant and intimidating atmosphere inside and outside the party. Liang's 142 Chapter 4 question about light industry and transportation industry was legitimate, and his criticisms of the party's agrarian policy and the misbehavior of rural cadres were accurate. There was never any indication that Liang ever opposed Mao's general line. In any case, in 1953, Mao seemed to be honoring an an­ cient rule of Chinese political control: kill one as a warning to a hundred. By striking at a few, Mao had eliminated all opposition to the general line.

Conclusion

By early fall 1953, when Mao announced to the nation the general line forso­ cialist transition, a new set of policies had been established to transform cap­ italist industry and commerce in China. The 1949 policy of utilization and re­ striction had been replaced in 1953 with a policy of utilization, restriction, and transformation.106 The change could be more accurately described as changing from control to absorption. In 1949, Mao and the CCP wanted to get the capitalist economy under control, but in 1953 Mao wanted to absorb the capitalist economy quickly so that he could alter the existing economic structure and build a new one on top of the old one. In formulating the general line forsocialist transition during summer 1953 and up until late September 1953, Mao intensifiedhis involvement in the pol­ icy process and imposed his ideological orientation on the party and on the country. It was fromthis time that he began to emphasize the "two-line strug­ gle" between the socialist and the capitalist roads in China's economic devel­ opment. It was also from this time that Mao began his campaign against the influence of bourgeois thinking by attacking other party leaders, such as Bo Yibo. Mao's actions during this time set the stage forthe "second act," during which Mao completed the process of formulatingthe general line (to be dis­ cussed in chapter 5), and foreconomic policy making more generally after summer 1953.

Notes

1. Liu Shaoqi zhuan 2, 725. 2. An oral source, December 19, 2001. 3. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 15. 4. Zhou Enlai xuanji (xiajuan) [Selected works of Zhou Enlai, vol. 2] (hereinafter as Zhou Enlai xuanji 2) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), 109. 5. Zhonggong 20, 147. 6. Arlen Meliksetov, "China's Search," FEA, no. 1 (1996): 80-81. 7. Mao wengao 3, 609. Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Transition 143

8. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 214. 9. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 214; Mao wengao 3, 610-11. 10. "The great development of the Soviet national economy," Renmin ribao, edito­ rial, January 29, 1953; Chen Yo uwei, "The great achievements of the People's Democ­ racies in their economic construction in 1952," Renmin ribao, editorial, February 1, 1953. 11. For a discussion of how the state-owned enterprises in the Northeast had accu­ mulated large sums of capital fornational industrialization, see Renmin ribao, January 7, 1953. For information on directives issued by the Northeast Bureau on the produc­ tion of the state-owned industries, see Renmin ribao, January 9, 1953. 12. "Stalin on preparations forthe transition to communism," Renmin ribao, Jan­ uary 6, 1953 (translated fromthe Russian original). 13. For a translation from the Russian of Stalin's "Summarizing the FFYP," on the twentieth anniversary of its original publication, see Renmin ribao, January 7, 1953; for additional information, see Sha Ying, "Stalin on national industrialization," Renmin ribao, April 17, 1953. Sha's article consists of fourparts: Stalin as the creator of the the­ ory of socialist industrialization, methods of national industrialization, the speed of national industrialization, and the accumulation of capital fornational industrializa­ tion. 14. Mao wengao 4, 62, 62-63(1). 15. Mao wengao 4, 62. 16. Mao wengao 4, 64. For a brief description of Bo Yibo's report to Mao, see Mao wengao 4, 64-65(2). 17. Mao wengao 4, 64. 18. For Zhou Enlai's letter to Bo Yibo, dated February 21, 1953, see Zhou Enlai shuxin, 488. 19. Pang Song and Lin Yunhui, Liguo xingbang: 1945-1956 nian de Mao Zedong [Establishing and promoting the country: Mao Zedong in the years 1945-1956] (here­ inafteras Liguo xingbang) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1996), 318-19. For an extensive discussion of this trip, see Li Jaiji, Mao weishi, 189-296. 20. Zhang Yumei, "Wo xiang Maozhuxi huibao nongye hezuohua;' [I reported to Chairman Mao about agricultural cooperativization] (hereinafter as "Wo huibao"), ZDZ 48 (1993): 99-112. 21. Pang Song and Lin Yunhui, Liguo xingbang, 319. 22. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 41, 43-45. See also Li Yuehan et al., Mao Zedong he shengwei shujimen [Mao Zedong and provincial party secretaries] (hereinafter as Mao he shengwei shujimen) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 36-38. 23. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 42. 24. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 215; Gong Yuzhi, "Xinminzhu zhuyi, guodu shiqi, shehui zhuyi chujijieduan" [The New Democracy, the transition period, and the initial stages of socialism] (hereinafteras "Xinminzhu"), ZDY, no. 1 (1988): 19. 25. Mao wengao 4, 232. Also see Mao wengao 4, 232(3). 26. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 42. 27. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 44. 28. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 44. 144 Chapter 4

29. Li Yuehan et al., Mao he shengwei shujimen, 28-29. 30. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 41-42. 31. Pang Song and Lin Yunhui, Liguo xingbang, 322. 32. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 46-49. 33. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 46; Lin Yunhui et al., Ka ige, 298. 34. Mao wengao 2, 664. 3S. Gao Huamin, "19S3 nian jiuzheng nongye huzhu hezuo yundongzhong de jizao maojin wenti" [The correction of the rash advance during the mutual-aid coop­ erative movement in 19S3] (hereinafteras "Jiuzheng"), DY, no. 3 ( 1981): 23-24. 36. Zhang Yumei, "Wo huibao:' ZDZ 48 ( 1993): lOS. 37. Zhang Yumei, "Wo huibao," ZDZ 48 ( 1993): 104. 38. Zhang Yumei, "Wo huibao," ZDZ 48 ( 1993): 110. 39. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 46-S3. 40. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 49 41. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 49, Sl. 42. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, SO. 43. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 42. For a more detailed description about how Mao was recognized by the local people and how he was received, see Li Yuehan et al., Mao he shengwei shujimen, 32-3S. 44. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 42. 4S. Li Yuehan et al., Mao he shengwei shujimen, 3S. 46. Li Weihan, Huiyi yu yanjiu (xiajuan) [Recollections and research, vol. 2] (here­ inafteras Huiyi 2) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1986), 739. 47. Tang Chunliang, Li Lisan zhuan [Biography of Li Lisan] (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1989), 193. 48. Li Weihan, Huiyi 2, 74 1. This report is now included in Li We ihan xuanji [Se­ lected works of Li We ihan] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987), 263-67; forhis report on state capitalism, see 268-84. Both reports also appear in We nxian xuanbian 4, 212-32. 49. Xu Dixin, "Dang dui zibenzhuyi gongshangye shixing liyongxianzhi gaizao de weida chengjiu" [On the great success of the party's utilization, restriction, and trans­ formation of capitalist industry and commerce], DY, no. 4 ( 1980): 23; Frederick C. Teiwes, Politics at Mao's Court: Gao Gang and Pa rty Factionalism in the Early 1950s (hereinafter Politics at Mao's Court) (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), S9. SO. Li Weihan, Huiyi 2, 7 48. Sl. Li Weihan, Huiyi 2, 742. S2. Xu Dixin, "Dui woguo gaizao zibenzhuyi gongshangye licheng de huiyi" [Rec­ ollections of China's transformationof capitalist industry and commerce] (hereinafter as "Gaizao"), ZDZ 14 ( 198S): 6S-66. S3. Li We ihan xuanji, 270; Zhonggong 20, 147. S4. Xu Dixin, "Gaizao:' 67. SS. Li Weihan, Huiyi 2, 7 42. S6. Xu Dixin, "Gaizao," 67. S7. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 9-10. S8. Zhonggong 20, 146. Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Transition 145

59. We nxian xuanbian 4, 141-46; Ma Qibin et al., eds., Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishinian [The forty-year rule of the CCP] (hereinafteras Zonggong zhizheng) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989), 63. 60. The themes and dates of the Renmin ribao articles include the following: both advanced and middle-level groups within the administrative bodies directly con­ trolled by the central government studied the Short Course (7/18/53); over 3,000 cadres belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and its related special companies participated in the study of the Short Course (7 /23/53); cadres in the Northwest region were already studying the Short Course (7/24/53); middle-level and high-level military cadres studied party history and the selected works of Mao Zedong (8/9/53); cadres working forthe administrative bodies directly controlled by the central government had begun to study the Short Course (9/6/53); a story about a man who helped with the study of the Short Course (9/8/53); cadres of administrative bodies directly under the South-Central Bureau and cadres at all levels of the municipal government of Guangzhou had completed the study of chapter 9 of the Short Course ( 11/29/53). 61. Mao Zedong xuanji (diwujuan) [Selected works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5] (here­ inafteras Mao xuanji 5) (Beijing, Renmin chubanshe, 1977), 122. 62. For a detailed discussion of the role played by Gao Gang during the National Conference on Financial and Economic Work in the summer of 1953, see Frederick C. Teiwes, Politics at Mao's Court, 52-78. Since the publication of Teiwes' comprehensive study of the Gao Gang incident, a number of Chinese studies have appeared, including the following: Lin Yunhui, "Gao Gang fanan yu zhonggong qijie sizhong quanhui de zhaokai" [Gao Gang's attack and the convening of the Fourth Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee meeting], ZDZ 57 (1996): 132-55; Lin Yunhui: "Gao Gang jin­ jing-Gao Gang shijian shimo (zhiyi)" [Gao Gang coming to Beijing: The whole story of the Gao Gang incident (part l)], BNC, no. 8 (1999): 11-18; no. 9 (1999): 14-22; no. 11 (1999): 42-50; Liu Shaoqi zhuan bianxiezu [Liu Shaoqi biography editorial group], "Gao Rao shijian zhong de Liu Shaoqi" [Liu Shaoqi and the Gao Rao incident], DW, no. 5 ( 1998): 38-44; Yang Shangkun, "Huiyi Gao Rao shijian" [Recollections of the Gao Rao Incident], DW, no. 1 (2001): 14-22; no. 2 (2001): 16-23, 85; Nie Jiahua et al., "Dui 'Gao Rao shijian' zhong jige wenti de kaochao" [An investigation concerning several is­ sues surrounding the "Gao Rao affair"], ZDY, no. 2 (2004): 44-50; Dai Maolin and Zhao Xiaoguang, "Guanyu 'Gao Rao shijian' jige wenti de zai tantao" [Another inquiry concerning several issues relating to the "Gao Rao affair"], ZDY, no. 6 (2004): 75-79. 63. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 9. 64. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 9. 65. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 9-10. 66. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 9. 67. Li We ihan, Huiyi 2, 7 42. 68. Zhonggong 20, 133; Mao wengao 4, 301. For an outline of Mao's speech at the Politburo meeting on June 15, 1953, see Mao wengao 4, 251. 69. Pang Song and Lin Yunhui, Liguo xingbang, 321-22. 70. Pang Song and Lin Yunhui, Liguo xingbang, 321. 71. A small section of his June 15, 1953, talk was included in Mao xuanji 5, 81-82. The complete text of the talk was published in DW, no. 4 (2003): 20-22. 146 Chapter 4

72. DW, no. 4 (2003): 20-21. 73. DW, no. 4 (2003): 21. 74. DW, no. 4 (2003): 21. 75. Pang Song and Lin Yunhui, Liguo xingbao, 323. 76. DW, no. 4 (2003): 21. 77. An oral source, summer 2000. 78. Gongheguo 1953-1956, 34. 79. Li Yueran, Wa ijiao wutai, 6-7. 80. Li Weihan, Huiyi 2, 744; Xu Dixin, "Gaizao," ZDZ 14 (1985): 68; Frederick C. Te iwes, Politics at Mao's Court, 61-62. 81. Xu Dixin, "Gaizao," 68-69. 82. Zhang Kai, "Zibenzhuyi shangye de shehuizhuyi gaizaofangzhen detichu guocheng chutan" [Initial explorations into the process for formulating the guiding principles forthe socialist transformation of capitalist commerce], DY, no. 2 ( 1986): 21. 83. Zhang Kai, "Zibenzhuyi shangye;' DY, no. 2 (1986): 21. 84. Mao wengao 4, 255. 85. Mao wengao 4, 324-25. 86. We nxian xuanbian 3, 413-20. 87. Mao wengao 3, 610-11. 88. Mao wengao 4, 7(3). 89. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 238-46; Te iwes, Politics at Mao's Court, 62-71; Zhonggong 20, 133-34. 90. Mao wengao 4, 27. 91. Mao xuanji 5, 80. 92. Mao wengao 4, 245, 245(2). 93. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 235. 94. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 235. 95. For Mao's talking points in meetings on September 7, 1953, with non-Com­ munist leaders and industrialists, see Mao wengao 4, 324-27; Mao wenji 6, 291-93; We nxian xuangbian 4, 344-46. For discussions of his meetings with these groups, see DW, no. 4 (2001): 53-54; Guo Xiaoyan, "Yu minzhu renshi tan duizi gaizaao" [Speak­ ing with democratic personages about the transformation of capitalism], in Mao Ze­ dong de zuji [Mao Zedong's footprints], ed. Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yangjiushi keyanju [ CCP Central Committee Party History Research Office Scientific Research Bureau] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi chubanshe, 1993), 379-85. 96. See Zhou Enlai's speech on September 11, 1953, Zhonggong 20, 145-50. 97. For details, see Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chi­ nese Dilemma of Modernity (hereinafter as The Last Confucian) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 192-215. 98. Dai Qing and Zheng Zhishu, "Liang Shuming yu Mao Zedong" [Liang Shum­ ing and Mao Zedong] (hereinafter as "Liang Shuming"), We nhui yuebao [Wenhui Monthly], no. 1 (1988): 30. 99. For a detailed internal report on the abusive behavior of local rural cadres in Guizhou, see NC, no. 62 (March 19, 1953): 467-69. 100. Dai Qing and Zheng Zhishu, "Liang Shuming," 30-3 1. Mao's Formulation of the General Line fo r Socialist Transition 147

101. Dai Qing and Zheng Zhishu, "Liang Shuming;' 31-32; formore on this topic, see Lin Yunhui et al., Kaige, 358-68; Wang Donglin, Liang Shuming yu Mao Zedong [Liang Shuming and Mao Zedong] (Changchun: Jilin chubanshe, 1989); Wang Donglin, Liang Shuming wendalu [Records of questions to Liang Shuming and his an­ swers] (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 1988); Zheng Dahua, Liang Shuming zhuan [Bi­ ography of Liang Shuming] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2001), 429-42. 102. Mao wengao 3, 565. 103. Mao xuanji 5, 108, 111. 104. Mao xuanji 5, 112; Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian, 327. 105. Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian, 327-28. 106. Li We ihan, Huiyi 2, 743.

5

Mao's General Line for Socialist Transition, October-December 1953

N DECEMBER 1953, MAO PUBLISHED A PROPAGANDA OUTLINE [hereinafter as I((propaganda outline"] forthe general line forsocialist transition. The prop­ aganda outline was in fact a blueprint fortransforming China 's private econ­ omy, and it offered a systematic explanation of the measures to be taken to transformChina's largely private economy into a socialist economy. 1 It was a Stalinist text. It was modeled on the relevant chapters of the Short Course, and it copied not only the ideas but also the writing style of the Soviet text.2 Although the propaganda outline was not written by Mao, it was prepared under his close supervision and can be viewed as a Maoist text. It was drafted by Mao's trusted secretary Hu Qiaomu. It went through many drafts,and Mao read carefullythrough all of them. He became ((relatively satisfied"only upon the completion of the seventh draft. Mao made revisions to the drafts and added several lengthy inserts to the text. 3 In the propaganda outline, Mao made major modifications to the general line he had announced in late September 1953. Among the notable changes, the general line now provided forthe establishment of advanced agricultural cooperatives and the replacement of capitalism with an economy based on the principle of ownership by the people as a whole. In addition, he provided an extended justificationfor adopting the general line in 1953. As his policies be­ came more radical, he reiterated his commitment to gradualism in an appar­ ent effort to appear moderate and to reassure more prudent party leaders and a suspicious public. As stated in chapter 4, by summer 1953, Mao had already settled on an over­ all conceptual framework for the general line. Collectivization, which was

- 149 - 150 Chapter 5 based on the organization of agricultural producers' cooperatives, and the transformation of the handicraft industry, which consisted of the elimination of individually owned handicraftenterprises and their replacement with hand­ icraft cooperatives, were given low priority for the time by party leaders be­ cause of their recognition of the enormous challenges they faced in these two areas.4 The dramatic addition of advanced agricultural collectives to the agenda reflected a change in Mao's thinking and a defeat forthose who had in­ sisted on following the original plan of giving priority to developing supply and marketing cooperatives (SMCs) in the countryside. The crises in grain col­ lection in summer 1953 offeredMao a golden opportunity to expand and rad­ icalize agricultural collectivization, its implementation thus far having been spotty at best. In late 1953, collectivization took on new significance as a way of mobilizing grain procurement in support of the rapid industrialization then occurring in China. In addition, with Stalin now dead, Mao felt safe in ignor­ ing Stalin's warning in fall 1952 against rushing into collectivization too soon. In chapter 5, I examine the policy process that led to the decision to collec­ tivize the countryside and thereby reshape the rural economic structure as part of building socialism in China. I also present Mao's justification forthe general line of 1953 and make a comparison between Mao's general line of 1953 and Stalin's general line of 1929. Finally, I discuss the reappraisal of the general line that has taken place during the reform era in China.

Implementing the Northeast Model

When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) outlined its rural policies in 1949, as discussed in chapter 2, it was understood that the priority in the country­ side, forat least ten to fifteen years, would be to organize SMCs, as Zhang Wentian had proposed. The peasants were also encouraged to join mutual-aid teams similar to those already operating in Yan'an, the Northeast, and other liberated areas, but private land ownership was to be maintained. The peas­ ants were further encouraged to accumulate family wealth. Beginning in the late 1940s, SMCs were organized in large numbers, appearing first in the Northeast and then spreading quickly to the liberated areas in Hebei. They were quite successful. These SMCs were government-run entities that oper­ ated in the countryside at all levels, but mainly in the villages. They were ver­ tically organized, with management officesat the regional, provincial, munic­ ipal, and county levels,5 as proposed by Zhang Wentian. The SMCs served two major functions. First, the SMCs supplied the peas­ ants with things that were necessary fortheir agricultural and other produc­ tion activities as well as fortheir daily life, including fertilizer, tools, pesticides, Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 151 salt, and cooking oil. Second, they helped the peasants to sell their products, including nonagricultural sideline products. The SMCs penetrated deeply into the lives of the peasants. In addition to selling tools and fe rtilizers to the peasants, the SMCs taught the peasants how to use them. In the event of nat­ ural disasters, peasants were also able to receive relief quickly from the gov­ ernment through the SMCs.6 In order to establish a monopoly in the countryside that would displace the private merchants, the government maintained a multilevel price structure for grain procurement and thereby effectively eliminated any meaningful busi­ ness dealings between peasants and private merchants.7 The SMCs were im­ portant to the government in that they provided it with the means to control the procurement of agricultural products and limit the role played by private merchants in rural China. Beginning in 1951, the government used the SMCs to purchase major products such as grain, cotton, hemp, tea leaves, cooking oil, wool, and silk. From 1952, the government relied on the SMCs to handle all procurement of cotton, hemp, and the bulk of tea leaves and wool. 8 The activities of the SM Cs crossed regional boundaries. The regional SM Cs in the Northeast, northern China, and central China engaged in large-scale exchanges with one another. Grain and soybeans from the Northeast were sold in northern and central China, while cotton, dates, pepper, and other products fromnorthern and central China were sold in the Northeast.9 Cheng Zihua, who headed the national organization of the SMCs, said that in the early 1950s, China ((had built an independent and new type of commercial network, deeply rooted in the rural economy throughout the country." 10 In the early 1950s, the SMCs were the most thoroughly implemented part of Zhang Wentian's proposed program.

Agrarian Policy in Flux: 1950-1953

Ever since mid-1950, the CCP's agrarian policy had been in flux, the result largely of the competing visions different party leaders had for rural China. How soon should the party move rural China toward socialism? How should the party go about replacing private ownership of land with collective owner­ ship? When should the party begin to eliminate the rich peasant class? And, fi­ nally, how should the party handle the ((new rich peasants" who had emerged afterland reform?These questions required the party's attention because of de­ velopments in the old liberated areas: the reconcentration of land in the hands of a few well-to-do peasants and the reemergence of a private labor market.11 Policy debates among the leaders took place in 1950 and 1951. In 1950, the debate focused on whether the so-called rich-peasant economy should be al- 152 Chapter 5 lowed to flourish and, a related question, whether party members should be allowed to hire laborers and even become "rich peasants."12 In 1951, another policy debate took place about whether to upgrade the existing mutual-aid teams to a more advanced form. In both cases, Mao took a strong position in support of the more radical viewpoint. In the 1950 debate over whether party members should be allowed to hire laborers, Gao Gang, the regional leader of the Northeast, opposed the prac­ tice, argued that party members should not be engaging in exploitation, 13 and submitted a report to the Central Committee asking for instructions. Liu Shaoqi, in charge of the day-to-day operations of the party, responded to Gao's report and disagreed. Liu took the position that each individual party member should decide whether to hire laborers and that any member choos­ ing to do so should not be disciplined or expelled from the party. He also ar­ gued that it was almost inevitable that capitalist economic development would occur in the countryside and that some party members would become "new rich peasants." 14 Liu shared his views with An Ziwen, and An's notes on the conversation were later shown to Mao. According to Gao's account, Mao was extremely angry at Liu's statements15 but did not intervene to resolve the dispute. Al­ though ideologically it was clearly unacceptable forparty members to practice exploitation, even Mao must have realized that the situation was not that sim­ ple. The question of whether party members could hire laborers had arisen even back in Yan'an, and it had been leftunresolved there also.16 In June 1952, almost two and a half years later, the party issued a directive stating that "party members [were] not allowed to become rich peasants." 17 In February 1953, al­ most three years after the debate, the party finallypublished instructions spec­ ifying the circumstances under which a party member would be allowed to hire laborers. 18 The second major policy dispute of 1951 involved a fundamentalquestion: should the party upgrade the existing mutual-aid teams to lower-production cooperatives (LPCs ), which were more socialist in character, or should the party continue to pursue the Leninist approach in rural China as originally planned and give priority to the development of SMCs? Many party officials, from county-level cadres to senior regional and central government leaders, were involved in the debate; Mao eventually intervened and settled the matter. It all began in the spring of 1951 with a report from party officials in Changzhi County, Shanxi Province, to the Shanxi party committee that the mutual-aid teams in Changzhi were developing in undesirable directions: some were near collapse, and others were becoming the "manors of rich peas­ ants." 19 To correct the situation, the Changzhi cadres wanted to institute some socialist methods to solidifythe mutual-aid teams organizationally. One such Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 153 method was to increase the communal fund, and another was to put into ef­ fect the socialist principle of «distribution according to labor."20 The Changzhi cadres also suggested that cooperatives be organized with a view to eventually eliminating private land ownership in the countryside.21 These proposals were quite different from the party's policies of 1949, but Lai Ruoyu, the Shanxi provincial party secretary, supported the proposals of his subordinates. 22 Liu Lantao, the head of the North China Bureau, and others took a quite different position. They communicated with Bo Yibo, who agreed with their view and reported the dispute to Liu Shaoqi. Siding with Bo Yibo and Liu Lan­ tao, Liu Shaoqi stated that he could not support the views expressed by the Changzhi cadres. During the next two months, Liu expressed his views on the matter in various ways.23 He introduced two principles: first, no attempt should be made to undermine private land ownership in the countryside be­ cause the rural areas were still in the New Democratic stage; and, second, mechanization was necessary beforecollectivization could be pursued in the countryside. Liu further accused those who wanted to begin collectivization in the countryside of seeking to pursue «utopian socialism."24 In 1951, Liu took a position that adhered strictly to the policies forec onomic construction that the party had adopted in 1949. The idea of not undermining private land ownership in the countryside, in fact, came first from Mao, not Liu Shaoqi. Mao articulated this view during the Jin-Sui Conference in 1948, and his speech attracted a great deal of attention within the party. The Xinhua News Agency even established a special mailing address to which readers could send their questions about the idea.2 5 This principle was also incorporated in Zhang Wentian's proposals in 1948.26 When Mao learned of the policy disputes, he decided to intervene. He firstin­ formed Liu Shaoqi, Bo Yibo, and Liu Lantao that he could not support their views and that he agreed with the Shanxi leaders. 27 Mao gave reasons for his po­ sition that echoed arguments Stalin had expressed in the Foundations of Lenin­ ism in 1926. Mao asserted that just as the British putting-out system (i.e., cottage industry) had provided the foundation fora new set of production relations as­ sociated with industrialization, the Chinese mutual-aid teams could performa similar function in the creation of new production relations associated with so­ cialism. According to Bo, the three were persuaded by Mao's argument.28 Since Liu Shaoqi had, at Mao's urging, abandoned his own viewpoint, he decided to withdraw it from publiccirculation. The North China Bureau's re­ port, which had been revised by Liu, was thereforenot distributed to the pub­ lic. Liu also arranged forthe written version of his speech, which had been dis­ tributed as study materials to the students at the Institute of Marxism and Leninism, to be returned to him. As Bo Yibo put it in 1991, the debate over the issue of mutual-aid teams was thus ended forthe time being. 29 154 Chapter 5

The policy dispute in 1951 and its subsequent resolution by Mao reflected sev­ eral of Mao's important attributes as well as the dynamics of elite politics in the early 1950s. First, Mao was paying close attention to Stalin's ideas and did not hesitate to associate himself with them. Second, Mao was at that time in such a powerful position that he was able to persuade other senior leaders, including Liu, without having to resort to attacks, as he did later. Third, and probably most important of all, events in 1951 suggested that Mao was far from being a "cen­ trist" in policy debates, as some have suggested. 30 In fact,Mao was oftenready to support more radical positions, especially when confrontedwith the larger and more fundamentalissues associated with building socialism in China. In 1951, Mao succeeded in getting other leaders not only to abandon their ideas but also to promote his own agenda. Not satisfiedwith persuading Liu and his associates to abandon their way of thinking, Mao took furthersteps to neutralize Liu and others. Mao instructed Chen Boda to organize a conference on mutual-aid teams.31 This was the first time that Mao had requested a con­ ference to deal with this topic. The conference was held in September 1951 and was chaired by Mao, who used the opportunity to criticize both "leftist" and "rightist" thinking concerning mutual-aid teams.32 Early in the conference, a draft document written by Liu Shaoqi that sup­ ported the development of SMCs was shelved.33 Liu had prepared the draft even though he was aware of Mao's views on mutual-aid teams, but it was never even discussed by the Central Committee. 34 One Chinese scholar has suggested that Mao might have done so in order to promote his own policy pri­ orities.35 This interpretation is supported by the fact that right afterthe con­ fe rence of September 1951, Mao supervised the writing of a draft resolution concerning production mutual-aid cooperation; it was distributed internally in early December 1951.36 On December 15, 1951, Mao issued instructions forthe draft resolution to be printed and made public. 37 Mao took other actions to promote his agenda. He supported Gao Gang's report on the positive develop­ ment of mutual-aid teams in the Northeast and decided that the success stories ought to be publicized.38 He also encouraged the distribution of reports writ­ ten by regional offices offering positive accounts of the development of mu­ tual-aid teams. One such report, written by cadres working in the Hebei party office, described a record increase in the number of mutual-aid teams organ­ ized in the region. Within only one year, according to the report, the number of mutual-aid teams had jumped from 600,000 to 1 million.39

Curbing the "Rash Advance" in 1953

Afterthe draftresolution on mutual-aid teams was distributed to the rank and file in December 1951, there was a surge in the number of mutual-aid teams Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 155

formednationwide.40 Village-level cadres used abusive methods to force peas­ ants to join mutual-aid teams so that targets could be met. Deng Zihui, the head of the newly formedRural Wo rk Department, learned of the widespread problems that were occurring in the countryside and reported them to the Central Committee. In spring 1953, the CCP decided to correct the situation and stop the "rash advance" (maoj in) in organizing mutual-aid teams in the countryside.41 Within two months, a series of party directives was issued to bring to an end the "rash advance" and to stop the abusive conduct of lower­ level cadres.42 During this period, the overwhelming concern of the top lead­ ership was spring planting and agricultural production. 43 Everything else seemed to be of lesser importance. There were no directives written by Mao on combating the "rash advance" at this time. It is highly likely that leaders like Liu who still remembered Stalin's advice of fall 1952 that China should not collectivize too quickly had gained the upper hand on agricultural policies and were able to impose their agenda. Mao, however, showed remarkable tolerance forthose who had refusedto join mutual-aid teams and insisted on farmingon their own. He encouraged local leaders not to discriminate against those peasants in any way. Mao's comments were published by Renmin ribao on March 26, 1953.44 The new policy of curb­ ing the "rash advance" was publicized by the CCP propaganda machine on a grand scale. Beginning in early April 1953, Renmin ribao described the party's efforts to correct the orientation of local cadres who were blindly organizing agricultural production cooperatives, and the cases where production cooper­ atives had reverted to mutual-aid teams. The newspaper also reported on lo­ calities where the "rash advance" tendency had been halted and the campaign to establish mutual-aid teams was progressing steadily.45

The Politics of Grain Collection: Summer and Fall 1953

If summer 1952 was a time of great euphoria about China's economic accom­ plishments, summer and fall 1953 could best be characterized as a time of un­ certainty because of the looming grain crisis in summer 1953. Beginning in 1952, the CCP leaders found themselves in a difficultsituation. The govern­ ment had met its grain-procurement targets forthe year, but it did not have enough grain to feed the rapidly growing urban population. To deal with these shortages, the government dug into its grain reserves. In 1953, the party faced a new problem: an inability to purchase enough grain to meet the planned pro­ curement targets forthe year.46 Natural disasters in important grain-producing regions such as the Northeast were identifiedas the main cause of the problem. It was estimated that in the Northeast alone there would be a grain-production shortfall of about 8 million metric tons. 47 156 Chapter 5

The grain crisis of 1953 was viewed by some party leaders as an extremely serious and potentially explosive matter. It was also believed that the party would be in serious trouble unless drastic measures were taken. This view was expressed most strongly by Chen Yun,48 who was alarmed by the outbreaks of protest among the people in the regions hit by natural disasters or suffering from grain shortages. He blamed grain merchants forcreating disorder in the marketplace49 and was more determined than ever to put the grain market under the control of the central government; he had in factwanted to do this since late 1951.so To ensure control over the grain market, the government had to control the procurement of the surplus grain, which the peasants had thus farbeen able to dispose of as they wished. Until 1953, the government had collected grain through two channels: taxes paid by peasants in the form of grain (gongliang) and the government's direct procurement of surplus grain fromthe market.51 To meet the needs of the on­ going Korean War and the drive forindustrialization, the government had re­ lied mainly upon collecting taxes paid in grain, in accordance with the party's decision of 1949. During the two years 1951 and 1952, forexample, 61 percent of the grain was collected through taxes paid in grain, and 39 percent was col­ lected through the government's direct procurement of surplus grain fromthe market.5 2 The grain market was still a relatively freemarket at the time. Aside frompaying relatively high taxes, peasants were able to sell their surplus grain according to their wishes in the marketplace; other participants in the market included state-owned entities, SM Cs, and private grain merchants. As of June 1953, the state and the SM Cs collected 69.9 percent of the grain, while private merchants purchased the remaining 30.1 percent.53 As discussed in chapter 2, the CCP had decided in 1949 to adopt an ag­ gressive policy of taxing the peasants in order to accumulate the capital nec­ essary to support the state-owned sector and rapid industrialization. In fall 1949, peasant families transferred about 20 percent of their grain production to the government as taxes paid in grain.54 A party directive in early 1950 es­ tablished the rules for collecting taxes from the peasants in the "newly liber­ ated areas."55 The directive called forthe central government to collect up to 17 percent of the overall production of a peasant family.The local government was then allowed to tax peasant families at a rate no higher than 15 percent of the family's totalproduction. 56 Collecting taxes paid in grain in the newly lib­ erated areas was not an easy task forthe party. In fall 1949, about three thou­ sand cadres were killed when they attempted to collect taxes paid in grain. 57 In 1952, the government's financial and economic organs instituted a con­ troversial new policy called "measure land area and determine production lev­ els" (chatian dingchan). Cadres were sent to the villages to remeasure the land owned by each familyto determine the amount of tax each familyshould pay Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Tra nsition 157 to the government. The new approach, intended to maximize the amount of grain the government could collect from each peasant family, represented a major change from the way the tax paid in grain had been calculated and col­ lected since land reform.58 The introduction of the new policy caused serious problems in the countryside, and in March 1953, Mao intervened to correct the situation.59 By 1953, the tax rate had dropped, and a peasant family, on av­ erage, paid about 15 percent of its harvest to the central government in the formof taxes paid in grain; the government considered this percentage a rea­ sonable rate of taxation. 60 In the early 1950s, Mao and the CCP Central Committee were regularly in­ formedof complaints about the tax burden imposed upon the peasants and about the abuse of power by local cadres, and these complaints were taken se­ riously. 61 To make sure he was receiving accurate information,Mao oftenre­ quested that reports candidly describing the conditions confrontingthe peas­ ants be sent to him.62 In general, Mao took seriously the peasants' complaints and was willing to reduce the tax burden on the poor and waive tax payments by those who either were situated in poor regions or were suffering fromnat­ ural disasters.63 He also issued instructions that the taxes for19 52 should not exceed the rate set by the Central Committee. 64 When Mao attacked Liang Shuming in September 1953, Mao was fullyaware of the problems that existed in the countryside. Mao disliked being told that the ((peasants were suffering hardship."65 He was probably especially annoyed to hear this criticism from his old friendLiang. Mao was aware of the serious consequences that were being produced by the heavy taxes the CCP was collecting fromthe peasants. When he learned in spring 1953 that about 10 percent of the peasants in Hubei were without food, he solicited ideas fromhis lieutenants on how to deal with the situation.66 He was also aware that the new policy of ((measure land area and determine pro­ duction levels" had resulted in an exceedingly high tax burden in several re­ gions. He therefore insistedthat the peasants should not be subjected to an ex­ cessive tax burden and that taxes should be reduced for those having real difficulties. He also recognized how important it was to either reduce or waive agricultural taxes on the 10 percent of peasants who did not have enough food to eat during the springtime.67 In April 1953, Mao issued instructions that the tax problem be resolved ((in a fundamental way during the time of grain collection in 1953" because he be­ lieved that the problem had become an ((extremely big one" and that ((it had been repeating itself year afteryear."68 To reduce the tax burden on millions of peasants, the CCP decided in May 1953 to shiftits long-term policy from one highly dependent on taxes toward one more dependent on procurement.69 Mao was determined to either reduce or waive grain taxes substantially forregions hit 158 Chapter 5 by natural disasters, such as southwestern China. The new policy would allow the peasants to receive some payments, but the prices the peasants would receive would be set by the government. The grain crisis in summer 1953, however, un­ dermined the CCP's efforts to improve conditions forthe peasants. Between early 1950 and summer 1953, Mao showed both flexibility and concern in his approach to grain procurement. In 1950, he questioned the wisdom of purchasing summer grain in areas where natural disasters had oc­ curred. 70 In addition, Mao expressed his disgust forlocal leaders who abused their power and forcedpeasants to sell more grain than they wanted to.71 Be­ forethe grain crisis in summer 1953, the CCP also tolerated private merchants and allowed them to make some money as long as the government could ob­ tain grain. 72

Looking for Solutions

As the grain shortage became more serious during late 1952 and the firsthalf of 1953, Mao asked the Finance and Economic Commission to come up with some solutions.73 By late summer 1953, various policy groups and committees at the ministerial level, aftermany discussions, offered eight competing pro­ posals. 74 One proposal called for "maintaining the status quo" (yuanfe ng budong) . A second advocated "forcing the peasants to sell their surplus grain to the government and rationing food in the cities and towns" (youzheng youpei). A third recommended food rationing in the cities without forcing the peasants to sell their surplus grain to the government (zhipei buzheng) . A fourth relied on forcing the peasants to sell surplus grain to the government without food rationing in the cities (zhizheng bupei). A fifth proposal sug­ gested keeping the current system and, in the event of serious grain shortages, forcing thepeasants in the major grain-producing regions to sell their surplus grain to the government (Zinke juejing, literal meaning: "not to dig a well until one is thirsty"). A sixth would force thepeasants to sell their surplus grain to the government according to an unspecifiedquota foreach village ( dongyuan rengou). When this practice was once used in the Northeast, local party cadres stopped demanding surplus grain only when the unannounced quota, which was never revealed ahead of time, was met. Bo Yibo described this policy as "exerting coercion without giving a [clear] order." A seventh proposal pro­ vided for the establishment of a contract between the government and the peasants, specifyingamou nts and prices (hetong yugou). The government had used this method in the Northeast and in northern China in 1949 and 1950 to purchase cotton, and it had also been utilized in 1951 to purchase a variety of products, including cotton, hemp, tobacco, sugarcane, and tea leaves in the re- Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 159 gions where they were grown. The government assigned such purchase con­ tracts to the peasants in the early spring of the year. The eighth proposal was to let each region find its own solutions rather than to have a unifiedplan.7 5 These eight proposals were screened by Chen Yun, the chairman of the Fi­ nancial and Economic Committee, but beforemaking a finaldec ision, he con­ sulted with other senior leaders.76 Offering such a wide range of proposals to the senior leaders reflected con­ siderable flexibility on the part of ministerial officialsin solving problems, and it indicated a readiness to findsolutions that caused the least suffering forthe peasants. Mao and other top leaders, on this occasion, were unwilling to show flexibility and were concerned with maintaining control. They must have been aware of Stalin's policy- announced in his famous"tribute" speech in 1928- that required the peasants to make contributions without remuneration to the industrialization effort in the form of compulsory deliveries to the govern­ ment, but there was no indication in 1953 that Mao was planning to go to the extremes that Stalin had gone to in this regard. Two major meetings were held in October 1953 to discuss the grain issue. On October 2, an enlarged Politburo meeting was held to discuss the matter.77 It was also decided to hold a "National Emergency Meeting on Grain," al­ though the public was not told about the urgent nature of the meeting. Re­ gional leaders were called to Beijing to participate in this second, larger meet­ ing, which began on October 10.78 Chen Yun played an important role in shaping the new procurement policy, giving speeches at both the enlarged Politburo meeting on October 2 and the Emergency Meeting on Grain on Oc­ tober 10, 1953.79 In his speech at the second meeting, Chen not only identified problems but also outlined solutions. He was adamant about maintaining the grain-allocation amounts at current levels in fourareas: the domestic market; the export market, with grain being sent mainly to the Soviet Union in ex­ change for machinery; allotments to military and administrative personnel; and the nation's grain reserves.80 Chen Yun ruled out the seven most moderate of the eight ministerial pro­ posals and selected the most oppressive one: forcingthe peasants to sell their surplus grain to the government and rationing food in the towns and cities (youzheng youpei). He argued that none of the other seven methods could solve the fundamentalproblem that was facing the nation, namely, that the demand forgrain exceeded the supply. The only way the government could stabilize the grain market and maintain order in the countryside, he argued, was to followhis chosen method.81 He additionally wanted to impose severe restrictions on the activities of private grain merchants. 82 Chen Yun was highly respected, and he was able to persuade other senior leaders who shared his fe ar of social unrest to support his approach. Zhou 160 Chapter 5

Enlai and Deng Xiaoping strongly supported Chen Yun's proposals, and Mao also endorsed them.83 Echoing Chen's points, Mao said that ((forcing thepeas­ ants to sell their surplus grain to the government, controlling the private grain merchants, and unifying the management of grain procurement [were] all necessary." Like Chen, Mao also said, ccwe should consider food rationing; I think it is also necessary."84 Mao, however, was quick to deny any similarity be­ tween China's policy of forcingthe peasants to sell their surplus grain to the government and the Soviet Union's oppressive surplus-procurement system used during the period of war communism under Lenin from 1917 to 1921.85 Although Chen Yun's proposed solutions won the support of the senior leaders, they received a cool reception from regional leaders who were more in touch with local conditions. Mao learned of this directly from Li Jingquan, the senior regional leader of southwestern China, who along with other re­ gional leaders was asked to come to Beijing to participate in the Emergency Meeting on Grain. The policy of forcing peasants to sell their surplus grain to the government had been practiced on a trial basis in Sichuan Province, and it was unpopular. Cadres in Li's region, at the county, district, and provincial levels, were resentfultoward the policy. 86 Negative reactions were not limited to southwestern China; they were expressed in various regions. Leaders in Hubei Province reported that local cadres, especially those with a rural back­ ground, were ((very concerned" about the possible ((negative impact" of the policy upon the peasants. 87 Li Jingquan told Mao that cc if the grain collection [policy] is not linked to the general line, there will be no way to get the whole party to agree to [the new procurement policy]." Li probably meant that the local cadres could be persuaded to accept the new procurement policy only if they were told that it was an essential part of the plan forbui lding socialism in China. It was a powerfulstatement fromsomeone of Li's stature. Mao took Li's advice and asked Deng Xiaoping to speak on his behalf at the Emergency Meeting on Grain, and Mao insisted that Deng link the two issues. 88 CCP propaganda in the followingmonths tied grain procurement and the general line together. On November 19, 1953, the Chinese government informed the nation that a new policy would soon go into effectcalled the ((planned procurement and planned marketing system" (jihua shougou jihua xiaoshou), a euphemism for the "forced sale of surplus grain to the government and foodrationing in the cities" (youzheng youpei). Mao, however, did exempt from this policy certain areas in Guangxi and Guangdong, where land reformhad been concluded but a stable social order had not yet been restored.89 Soon afterward,the policy was modified and given a new name, "unified procurement and unified dis­ tribution" ( tonggou tongxiao). Under the modified policy, the government specifiedwhich grains it would purchase fromthe peasants, the price it would Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 161 pay, and the amount of each type of grain to be purchased. 90 The government said the peasants would be freeto do as they wished with whatever grain was leftover afterthey had paid their taxes and had sold the specifiedamounts of surplus grain to the government. Food rationing did not become effective in towns and cities until 1955.91 Although it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the implementa­ tion of the ((unified procurement and unified distribution"poli cy, informa­ tion released in the 1980s shows that the party met serious resistance fromthe peasants, especially during the initial stage of implementation. The policy was not a success, and many peasants went hungry in spring 1955 because the gov­ ernment had taken too much away fromthem.9 2 This informationon peasant resistance requires a reevaluation of some earlier arguments that the policy of ((unifiedprocurement and unifieddistribution" was initially well received.93 In early October 1953, at the height of the search fora solution to the prob­ lem of grain collection, the CCP continued to maintain that there was a need to curb the ((rash advance" in organizing mutual-aid teams. The Central Com­ mittee directed local cadres not to organize any more LPCs, it made Deng Zihui's report available to local party committees, and it provided instructions on how to implement its recommendations. Those instructions indicate that even during the height of the grain crisis in fall 1953, a consensus was reached among the senior leaders on the need to consolidate the existing mutual-aid teams rather than to rush to organize more LPCs. The party directive offered the compelling observation that in China, ((At the present time the mutual-aid teams were not only well suited to meeting the needs of production but also compatible with the cultural level of the peasantry," and that, as a form ofor­ ganization, mutual-aid teams were still usefuland not ((outdated" as some had argued.94 This statement was a strong endorsement not only of the status quo but also of the policies that the party had adopted in spring 1953.

Mao Goes into Action

In mid-October 1953, immediately after the Emergency Meeting on Grain, Mao began to promote his own agenda fortransforming the countryside. He began to use the grain crisis to advance his cause in the countryside, to reshape the structure of land ownership, and to move the countryside quickly toward socialism. When he believed he saw a shortcut to socialism, he was ready to take it. In mid-October, Mao told Chen Boda and Liao Luyan, both of whom were deputy directors of the Rural Wo rk Department, to organize the Third Na­ tional Conference on Mutual-Aid Cooperatives. It was held between October 26 and November 5 of 1953. 162 Chapter 5

On two occasions, once in mid-October and again in early November, Mao told Chen Boda, Liao Luyan, and senior leaders of the Rural Wo rk Depart­ ment what should be done in the countryside.95 It is believed that Mao's con­ versations with the leaders of the department on these two occasions had a huge impact on later agricultural policies. In December 1953, Mao's ideas were at the core of a new party resolution on collectivization and were in­ cluded in the propaganda outline, referred to above. These new ideas departed considerably from those contained in the resolution on agricultural coopera­ tives of February 1953 and in the CCP's policy as late as early October 1953, when the party was engaged in a campaign to curb the ((rash advance" in or­ ganizing cooperatives in the countryside. In his discussions with senior cadres, Mao emphasized the need to change land ownership in rural China. Mao stressed that the problem most urgently in need of resolution in rural China was the individual ownership of land, be­ cause ((it was in complete conflict with the demand for a large supply of food."96 Implied in his comments was the view that small-scale farming in China was inefficient, that it prevented the use of tractors for mechanized agricultural production, and that it was therefore incapable of producing the large quantity of grain needed by the nation. His statement echoed Stalin's views of the late 1920s, as recorded in the Short Course.97 Mao's arguments in October and November 1953, however, contradicted his earlier position of February 1953, when he maintained that China could organize more ad­ vanced cooperatives without mechanization. In any case, he was convinced in fall 1953 that collectivization would yield many practical benefits,such as pre­ venting poor peasants from selling and leasing land, increasing production, and assisting poor familieswho were short on either foodor manpower.98 Mao, as always, looked to socialism, as presented in Stalin's writings, as his beacon. He continued to attack the idea of "guaranteed private ownership," as he had in summer and fall 1953. This time, he called the idea a bourgeois con­ cept and a "small kindness." He repeatedly told the cadres in the countryside that they must "practice socialism."99 His emphasis echoed Stalin's view­ stated in "On Several Questions Concerning Land Policies," published in 1929-that the only way fora small-scale, scattered agricultural economy to develop was to followa collectivist road, not a capitalist road. Mao also ex­ pressed his unhappiness at the efforts made in spring 1953 to rein in the "rash advance"; he believed that in some instances those efforts had gone too far and were unnecessary.100 In fall 1953, Mao was impatient with a step-by-step approach to collec­ tivization and was looking fora shortcut. He identified two ways to achieve collectivization, one indirect and the other direct. The indirect way was to fol­ low the path from mutual-aid teams, based on private land ownership and Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Tra nsition 163 mutual aid in labor, to agricultural production cooperatives, or LPCs, based on private land ownership and communal production and distribution. The direct way was to organize agricultural production cooperatives without going through the stage of mutual-aid teams. Mao saw nothing wrong with trying the direct way. 101 He advocated the establishment of LPCs, a more ad­ vanced formof cooperative than the existing mutual-aid teams, in the newly liberated areas. He not only ignored the Central Committee's recommenda­ tion to stop creating LPCs in areas that had been liberated forthe longest time, but in facthe also ordered the number of LPCs to be doubled or tripled. This time he really meant business, and he told the leading cadres that "it should be made clear that at the beginning of next year there will be a meeting to see how much progress has been made on collectivization."102 Mao's commitment to collectivization in the countryside was driven in part by his long-held belief in the benefitsof such a system and in part by his con­ viction that it offered the solutionto such practical problems as the grain cri­ sis. There were, however, other forcesat work. First, his strong views on agri­ cultural collectivization may have been influenced by the decision of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on September 7, 1953, to ap­ prove Khrushchev's report on the measures to improve Soviet agriculture. In approving the report, the CPSU recognized both the positive and negative fea­ tures of collectivization, but there was no indication in the report that the CPSU was about to abandon the system. Instead, the CPSU had decided to im­ prove the system of collectivization by expanding the party's role in agricul­ ture. 103 Ten days after the report was approved in Moscow, Mao decided to publish Khrushchev's report in China, and it appeared in Renmin ribao on Sep­ tember 17, 1953. He must have been encouraged by the CPSU's decision to maintain the collective system that Stalin had set up some twenty years earlier. Second, Mao was encouraged by the apparent success of the Soviet Union in dealing with its grain problems through collectivization. In October 1952, during the Nineteenth Party Congress, Malenkov reported that the Soviet Union had solved its grain problems through collectivization. His remarks re­ ceived long applause from the audience. Mao must have heard the story of Malenkov's speech fromLiu Shaoqi, who was in Moscow at the time, and been impressed by the Soviet "success story," forwhen the grain crisis was discussed during the Politburo meeting in October 1953, Mao used Malenkov's story to "encourage" the members of the Politburo. 104 In 1991, however, Bo revealed that Mao realized in 1956 that Malenkov had probably overstated the achieve­ ments of collectivization in his speech in October 1952.105 There was another important factor at work: Stalin was no longer around to look over Mao's shoulder and tell him not to collectivize too quickly, as he had cautioned Liu Shaoqi in the fall of 1952. 164 Chapter 5

The general line of December 1953, as expressed in the propaganda outline, no longer emphasized mutual-aid teams; the focus hadshifted to promoting the organization of LPCs. The party's target was forthe nation to organize 800,000 LPCs by 1957.106 The ideas expressed in December departed substan­ tially from the policies contained in the directive of October 4, 1953, which had emphasized mutual-aid teams, as discussed earlier.107 Land ownership was the decisive factor that distinguished the different types of cooperatives, from temporary mutual-aid teams, through permanent mutual-aid teams, to LPCs and advanced cooperatives. In mutual-aid teams, both temporary and permanent ones, peasants continued to own the land. In LPCs, peasants still owned their land, but they were forcedto pool their land forpr oduction. LPCs were cooperatively managed, and a considerable amount of property was owned communally. The advanced cooperatives were the highest formof co­ operative, and they were organized on the basis of cooperative land owner­ ship. 1os The earliest discussion of the different types of cooperatives appeared in a study conducted by the Agricultural Administration Department of the Min­ istry of Agriculture in 1951. In the study, the firstthree types of cooperatives mentioned above-temporary mutual-aid teams, permanent mutual-aid teams, and LPCs--were identified.At that time, LPCs were considered to be the most advanced type of cooperative because they incorporated some so­ cialist concepts in their operation. Members of these cooperatives pooled their land and combined their labor forproduc tion. The LPCs were praised as an effectiveway to utilize labor and land.109 In September 1951, when Mao asked that a draftresolution on organizing mutual-aid teams in the countryside be put together, the three types mentioned above were included.110 In 1953, the fourth type, advanced cooperatives, was added. Even though the general line definedcollectivization as including three dif­ fe rent kinds of cooperatives--agricultural producers' cooperatives, SM Cs, and agricultural credit cooperatives 111-the general line departed significantlyon this point from the CCP's position of 1949, as well as from Mao's own posi­ tion of 1952. The new program gave priority to producers' cooperatives rather than SM Cs. It additionally sought eventually to eliminate private land owner­ ship, which was supposed to be protected according to the party's 1949 policy. In advancing his agenda, Mao was also departing fromthe plan he had pre­ sented in September 1952, which called forcollectivization only upon com­ pletion of the First Five-Year Plan (FFYP), when the ratio between state­ owned and privately owned industry was expected to reach 9 to 1, 112 a precondition that he believed had to be met before collectivization could begin. He, however, did adhere to an idea contained in the Short Course: to begin collectivization afterthe economic recovery period. Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 165

In late 1953, Mao was able, as he often had in the past, to abandon a policy that had previously been supported by a majority of the members of the Cen­ tral Committee, himself included. In doing so, he brought China's economic program, as expressed in the general line, closer to the one described in the Short Course. In December 1953, he also succeeded in bringing the policy dis­ putes over collectivization to an end, at least temporarily, by pushing through his agenda. Differing views continued to exist, but they were not expressed. When the resolution on agricultural collectivization was completed in De­ cember 1953, it did not mention the differing views of Mao and Liu Shaoqi on collectivization or include any reference to Mao's criticism of Liu.113 Policy disputes of a similar kind resurfaced in 1955 when Deng Zihui strongly chal­ lenged the wisdom of Mao's imposing collectives of the most advanced type, higher-level cooperatives (HLCs), in the countryside.

Mao's Justification forthe General Line

The need to justifythe general line was obvious to Mao. The ideas and pro­ grams contained in the general line departed dramatically from the ones the party had adopted in the late 1940s under the banner of New Democracy. Mao was forcedto explain the change to the party's confused rankand file and to other social groups, including capitalists, merchants, shop owners, ped­ dlers, artisans, and peasants, whose lives were going to be profoundlyaff ected by the new policies. In October 1953, a little over a month afterMao announced to the nation his general line forsocialist transition, he started to receive reports of con­ fused localofficials, resentful capitalists, and other negative reactions to the new policy. The reports caught his attention, and he responded quickly, issu­ ing directives on how to deal with the negative reactions. The discussions of the general line forsocialist transition by local cadres in October 1953 made it clear to Mao that many local cadres were confused about the new policy. This confusionwas highlighted in a report the South-Central Bureau submit­ ted to the Central Committee, noting the «muddled thinking" of some local cadres in Hubei. 114 Since 1949, local cadres had been led to believe that the country was in the stage of New Democracy and that this stage would continue forat least ten to fifteenyears before the transition to socialism would begin. When presented with Mao's general line, they had difficultyunderstanding how to fitit in with everything they had been told previously. Many raised important and honest questions. They wondered whether the New Democratic revolution had come to an end, and if so, what was the nature of the revolution that was replacing 166 Chapter 5 it. These questions reveal that the local cadres were simply not prepared for the new policy. The situation in China in 1953 paralleled what had happened in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s. Cadres in the Soviet Union were taught the virtues of Lenin's gradualist approach to a socialist transition under the New Economic Policy (NEP) and were not ready when Stalin told them to abandon the Leninist approach and instead embrace Stalin's ideas of rapid in­ dustrialization and collectivization. The South-Central Bureau's report noted, however, that cadres in Hubei fi­ nally came to understand that "China was in fact in a period of transition fromNew Democracy to socialism, and the basic task was not to maintain and develop the existing five economies, but instead to transformthem into a sin­ gle economy, i.e., a socialist economy." Not coincidentally, the reported change in the thinking of these cadres corresponded almost exactly to the change fromwhat the party line had been until summer 1953 to what it had become under the general line in October 1953. Mao must have been alarmed at the questions being raised by the local cadres. He responded with a Central Com­ mittee directive entitled "Combat the capitalist thinking expressed within the party."11s A report from Tianjin showed that reactions from the industrialists and capitalists were, not surprisingly, the most negative, because they realized they were going to be the biggest losers. Although they did not publicly oppose the new policy, the capitalists were unhappy and expressed their dislike forstate capitalism. They also asked why the party had not talked about the general line in 1949, the implication being that if the government had announced the general line in 1949, they would have leftthe country at that time. By 1953, it was too late forthem to do anything. As one report stated, "they had no alter­ natives."116 Mao was even more alarmed about the report on the Tianjin cap­ italists than he had been about the report on the cadres. He quickly forwarded the report to party committees at the central governmental, ministerial, cen­ tral bureau, subbureau, provincial, and municipal levels and asked leaders to monitor the activities of the capitalists and at the same time to educate them.117 In 1953, Mao exerted great effortsto justifyand establish the legitimacy of the new policy program contained in the general line. 118 Mao's stance com­ bined elements of self-confidence and defensiveness and revealed an extreme sensitivity to questions raised about whether the general line adhered to or­ thodox Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism. In the December 1953 propaganda outline, referred to previously, Mao gave fourreaso ns to justifythe general line. First, he asserted that the issues associ­ ated with the new policy "had already been fundamentally resolved in 1949 ." Second, he explained that the party had decided to embark on a Stalinist so- Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 167

cialist road in 1953 because the conditions fordoing so had been established. Third, to justifythe main thrust of the policy-the elimination of all nonso­ cialist economic elements in both the rural and urban economies--he rede­ fined New Democracy to mean the transition period that paralleled the so­ cialist revolution that began in 1949. Fourth, he quoted extensively from the writings of both Lenin and Stalin to lend legitimacy to his new policies, quot­ ing also fromhis own writings and those of Marx.

Issues Already Resolved in 1949 In response to the confusionand simmering resentment created by the new policy, Mao made a statement justifyingthe general line:

Many of the policies embodied in the general line had already been put forward and settled in a fundamental way in the decisions made during the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee meeting [in 1949].1 19

At the same time, he noted that

some comrades didn't want to work in accordance with these decisions; they pre­ ferred to look forother ways to deal with certain issues that were contrary to the principles of the Second Plenum. 120

Mao wanted to make the case that the general line merely formalized deci­ sions that had been made in 1949. Statements to this effecthad been made be­ fore. On August 11, 1953, Zhou Enlai made a similar statement in his con­ cluding remarks to about one hundred national leaders attending the National Conference on Financial and Economic Wo rk. In 1958, during the Chengdu Conference, Mao reiterated his view that all the core issues concern­ ing China's road to socialism had been resolved in 1949 during the meeting of the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, but he admitted for the first time that "it was an issue of tactics not to talk about them [pub­ "121 licly] . Mao selected fourpolicy areas that had been discussed in the party resolu­ tion of 1949 to make his point. First, he emphasized the importance the party resolution had given to the state-owned economy; though small in scale, it must be given priority during both the economic recovery and the construc­ tion periods. Second, he pointed out that the party resolution called for re­ strictions on the capitalist economy, especially in the areas of pricing and labor conditions and in the scope of the business activities of capitalists. The resolution also provided for measures that would ensure that the capitalists paid their fairshare of taxes. Third, the party resolution identifiedthe path to 168 Chapter 5 be followedto collectivize agriculture, reorganize the handicraftindustry into cooperatives, and organize other types of cooperatives such as SMCs and credit cooperatives. Fourth, the party resolution identified the type of class struggle that exists in a New Democratic society, a struggle between the party, which seeks to restrict the capitalists, and the capitalists, who try to resist the restrictions being imposed by the party. 122 Mao selected only the fourpolicy areas in the 1949 resolution that he felt could be used to justify the general line; he intentionally avoided the policy areas that were more moderate in nature. For example, the 1949 party resolu­ tion stated that the capitalist economy should be utilized effectively and should not be controlled too tightly. 123 It furtherdeclared that the usefulseg­ ments of the capitalist economy would exist fora considerable time to come. It was obvious in 1953 that Mao was eager to create an economy in which ownership was in the hands of the state and the collectives; he therefore re­ fe rred only to those parts of the 1949 party resolution that supported the gen­ eral line.

The Necessary Conditions Established Mao tried to justifythe general line by arguing that the conditions were ripe forthe transition to socialism in 1953. This view echoed similar statements in the Short Course evaluating conditions in the Soviet Union in 1924, when Stalin made the dramatic shift from Lenin's NEP to a policy focused on elim­ inating the capitalist economy. Mao cited a wide range of conditions to make his point. He noted that economic recovery had been completed and that po­ litical power had been consolidated. He added that socialist economic ele­ ments had not only advanced in the overall economy, but they had also be­ come dominant. It was thereforetime, he asserted, to move to the next stage: planned economic construction and the systematic transformation of nonso­ cialist economic elements. 124 Among all these conditions, Mao regarded the growing dominance of the state-owned economy as the most important indicator that it was time to eliminate the capitalist economy. 125 In 1953, he believed that the state-owned economy could be defined asbeing dominant when it accounted for67.3 per­ cent of all industrial output. 126 According to Stalin, between 1924 and 1925, the last two years of the Soviet Union's five-year economic recovery period (1921-1925), 81 percent of all industrial output came from the state-owned sector; the rest, 19 percent, was produced by the private sector. 127 Apparently Mao felt that in China, 67.3 percent of all industrial output being produced by state-owned factorieswas good enough forhim to be able to definethe state­ owned economy as being dominant. Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 169

Mao's Redefinition of New Democracy in 1953 In December 1953, Mao redefined New Democracy and "made a funda­ mental change" in specifyingits duration. 128 He decided in 1953 that the New Democratic revolution, the first stage of the Chinese Revolution, had already been concluded in 1949 and that China had thereafter entered the second stage of the Chinese Revolution (i.e., the socialist revolution).129 Mao's redef­ inition of New Democracy at this time must be seen as part of his effortto jus­ tify hisnew policies. He definedthe tasks forthe second stage of the Chinese Revolution beginning in 1949 as "the establishment of a socialist society and the complete elimination of capitalism in the cities and the countryside."130 To declare retroactively that the New Democratic revolution had ended in 1949 enabled Mao to fitthe post-1949 Chinese reality into the post-1917 Soviet sit­ uation; he could thereby justifyhis taking a path and implementing policies similar to those described in the Short Course. By redefining when the New Democratic revolution ended and the social­ ist revolution began, Mao was able to eliminate the ten-to-fifteen-yeartransi­ tional period, scheduled to begin in 1949, that the party had designated as New Democracy. To deal with the resulting gap, Mao simply declared that the New Democratic revolution had ended in 1949 and that the time fromthe end of New Democracy in 1949 to the achievement of socialism would be defined as the period of transition to socialism.131 He redefined this transition as "a period of changing the existing capitalist economy and small-commodity economy to a socialist economy; and it is also a period of enlarging the exist­ ing socialist economy, and"-the only new fe ature-"making the socialist economy the sole basis of our economy."132 Mao's redefinition of New De­ mocracy was confusing,to say the least, and it leaves the impression that Mao stretched the meaning and foreshortened thetime span of New Democracy to unacceptable extremes in order to achieve and justify his own political and economic objectives.

Mao's Orthodoxy In justifyingthe general line, Mao relied on a large number of direct quo­ tations: eleven from Lenin, nine from Stalin, one from the Short Course, and six fromhis own writings. Mao mostly quoted fromLenin's writings on the NEP and state capitalism and fromStalin's writings and speeches on industri­ alization and collectivization. One Chinese scholar has observed that it was unprecedented in the early 1950s to have such a large number of direct quo­ tations fromthe writings of Lenin and Stalin appear in a party document. 133 It is highly likely that Mao included so many authoritative quotations in this 170 Chapter 5

document as part of a larger ambition to position himself as an important leader within the Communist world. In pursuit of this objective, he was using the opportunity affordedby his publication of the general line in 1953 to show the Soviet Union that he and the CCP were the equals of the CPSU in apply­ ing orthodox theory to national conditions. It was not just a symbolic gesture on Mao's part; he was also being shrewd in his timing and in his assessment of international conditions. Stalin's death in 1953 created a vacuum of politi­ cal leadership and ideological authority within the Communist world, and Mao wanted to establish himself as the new leader of the world Communist movement. From about that time, Mao began to position himself as not only the leader of the Communist world but also as an authority on orthodox Marxist theory.

Stalin's General Line of 1929 and Mao's General Line of 1953

In 1929, Stalin put forwardhis general line and established a new policy plat­ form aimedat accelerating the nation's industrialization through the transfer of resources fromthe countryside to industry. Collectivization was, in Stalin's mind, the key to success in transferring these resources. Senior Soviet leaders who had been schooled in Lenin's ideas about cooperative socialism and who were still influential, by contrast, believed that the Soviet Union was not in a position to embark upon such a path in the late 1920s. In spite of opposition, Stalin maneuvered, manipulated, and got his way by crushing his main oppo­ nent, Bukharin.134 Stalin's general line differed sharply fromLenin's gradual­ ist approach to the transition to socialism; it did not, however, depart fromthe goal of building a socialist society in the Soviet Union. Mao's general line of 1953 similarly presented a new policy platform to guide the socialist transformation in China so that a Stalinist economic sys­ tem could be built. As with Stalin's general line of 1929 in regard to Lenin's NEP, Mao's general line of 1953 differed from the gradualist policies that the CCP had adopted in 1949, but it did not depart from the general goal that the CCP had established of building socialism in China. Mao formulatedthe gen­ eral line during a time of complex international and domestic conditions. Fol­ lowing Stalin's death, Mao was beginning to assert his authority in the selec­ tion and interpretation of Lenin's and Stalin's theoretical works. It was in this context that Mao formulatedthe general line on the basis of the Short Course and other works of Lenin and Stalin. In the Soviet Union and China, the general line was imposed by Stalin and Mao, respectively, to eliminate the backward economic conditions in their countries in a speedy fashion. In 1928, Stalin exaggerated the dangers of war Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 171 to promote his agenda, 135 and in 1953, Mao sometimes used emotion to per­ suade others. In mid-February 1953, during an inspection tour in the Wuhan region, Mao told local officials,((I do not love a poor China, but I love a pro­ gressive China."136 Stalin, in addition to wanting to build socialism, believed that the Soviet Union must become modern and strong to survive in a hostile world. 137 Mao, in addition to sharing with Stalin the desire to build socialism as quickly as possible, was also motivated by his competitive zeal to outdo Stalin and the Soviet Union; Mao consistently upheld the view that China could build socialism better and fasterthan the Soviet Union had. In 1928 and 1929, Stalin manipulated other leaders to get his way. He first made an alliance with the "right" to defeat the ((left," and he then eliminated the ((right." Stalin's political victory in 1929 led to a bloody purge of his for­ mer political ally, Bukharin, and set the stage forthe ((great purge" in the mid­ l 930s. In 1953, Mao firstmade friendswith the ((left," Gao Gang and his fol­ lowers, to attack the "right," Liu and his faction;Mao then dumped the "left" and persisted in attacking ((rightist mistakes." Mao was particularly harsh on one ''rightist," Bo Yibo, whose role in revising China's tax system Mao severely condemned. There was one area where Mao differed significantlyfrom Stalin in the for­ mulation of a general line. Between 1927 and 1928, high-level debates took place in the Soviet Union over what to do next with regard to the nation's economy. 138 The situation was very different in China. There was no open de­ bate or real discussion about the new policy platform forChina. Policy deci­ sions were arrived at through informal discussions, behind a veil of great se­ crecy, between Mao and a few senior leaders, presumably Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. It was Mao who decided when leaders of a given social group would be informed of a policy decision before it was announced to the gen­ eral public. Mao may have been skillfulat playing court politics to stir up elite conflicts, but he was not in a position to purge top leaders as Stalin had been in 1929. Mao had to deal with his frustrations for thirteen years, until 1966, when he used the Cultural Revolution to purge Liu Shaoqi and other top lead­ ers. From the very beginning of the process, Mao was the dominant force. He determined the agenda and set the tone for internal discussions, he made the final decisions, and if necessary he gave the justification forthem. Like em­ perors who founded dynasties in Chinese history, Mao was self-confident, hardworking, dictatorial, and very involved with the details of power, policy, and administration. Mao's dominance in policy processes was enhanced by the passivity of other senior leaders. Bo Yibo, for instance, admitted in his 1991 book that he did not raise any questions or objections when Mao an­ nounced the dramatic departure from theparty's officialpol icy in September 172 Chapter 5

1952.139 One Chinese scholar, who has written widely about the early 1950s, describes how things were done in China at the time:

When Mao was introducing his new ideas about domestic contradictions and the general line, the other party leaders were not sure how to deal with these is­ sues, but they nevertheless made an effortto followMao. 140

The passivity displayed by senior leaders at that time might help to account forthe facadeof party unity in the early 1950s.

Mao's Three-Front Propaganda War

From early November through December 1953, Mao waged a propaganda war on the three issues that were important to his policy: grain procurement, the collectivization drive, and the general line forsocialist transition. In doing so, he hoped to divert attention from the problems with the new policy and sup­ press opposition to it. First, on the issue of grain procurement, in the face of a grain crisis, party propaganda praised the great number of individual peasants as well as mu­ tual-aid teams and agricultural production cooperatives in all parts of the country that had sold surplus grain to the government. Reports were also published showing the efforts being made in many regions to educate peas­ ants to sell more grain. 141 Second, with regard to collectivization, reports appeared telling of how peasants, realizing the superiority of mutual-aid teams and production coop­ eratives over privately owned farms,were eager to join cooperatives. At the same time, the party described training classes that were organized to teach mutual-aid team leaders about socialism.142 In addition, fe ature stories were published that portrayed local party secretaries leading efforts to organize mutual-aid teams and production cooperatives.143 Peasants such as Li Shunda and Han En were introduced to a mass audience as model peasants who had learned fromSoviet farmersand were followingthe socialist road. 144 Finally, concerning the general line, CCP propaganda showed that it was being studied by a wide range of social groups, including labor unions at all levels; 145 teachers, students, and staffof institutions of higher education; 146 re­ gional bureau party committees at all levels; cadres at the district, township, and village levels; cadres of many regions;147 regional leading organs;148 and the youth league. 149 All regional party leaders led the propaganda effort in support of the general line.150 Propaganda also described the positive effect the general line was having on the behavior of people who were studying it, Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 173 including glowing accounts of how the level of consciousness of peasants had been raised concerning mutual-aid teams and the need to increase produc­ tion.151 According to the reports, the general line had made more peasants want to sell surplus grain to the government and to work harder to increase production. In addition, many of them decided to organize agricultural pro­ duction cooperatives on their own. 152 Despite the glowing reports issued by the CCP through its propaganda ma­ chinery, many problems remained. First, the government continued to have difficultieswith grain procurement. Many peasants refused to sell their grain to government representatives. Among peasants who did sell their grain to the government, some suffered severe grain shortages. Peasant resistance was ag­ gravated by the high-handed manner in which they were treated by local offi­ cials. 153 Second, the status enjoyed by Li Shunda as a model peasant was tainted by the factthat he achieved it at least in part by overstating the size of the grain harvest of his cooperative.154

The Reevaluation of the General Line during the Reform Era

Despite the CCP's effort, beginning in the late 1970s, to reform the system that was created in the mid- l 950s in implementing the general line, the party still de­ fe nds the decision that produced this system. The party resolution of 1981 stands by the general line, maintains "it was absolutely correct to put forwardthe gen­ eral line:'155 and, forthe firsttime in an official document, acknowledges Mao's close association with the general line, noting that he put forward the idea, for­ mulated the basic concepts, and oversaw the creation of the finalresolution. 156 The party resolution of 1981, however, identifies some mistakes the party had made during the implementation of the general line, especially during the "high tide" of 1955 and 1956: "Collectivization and the transformation of the handicraft industry and individual commerce were carried out too quickly and in too rough a fashion,the change was too fast, the formula wastoo sim­ ple, and chronic problems were created as a result."157 It is significantthat the three areas where the party, according to the 1981 resolution, made its worst mistakes-collectivization, handicraft industry, and individual commerce­ were the same three areas about which the Chinese leaders, in the early and mid-1 950s, differed the most and had the greatest reservations. It is not sur­ prising that these were also the areas that the party, in the late 1970s, first moved to reform. The CCP's 1981 resolution defending the basic correctness of the general line has had the effect of limiting academic discussion in China of this ex­ tremely important subject. Such unspoken limitations continue to this day. 174 Chapter 5

There was one period, between 1988 and the early 1990s, when the general line was discussed extensively by academics and party researchers. These dis­ cussions were stimulated by Zhao Ziyang's reinterpretation of the current stage of Chinese socialism in 1987. The relatively freeenvironment at the time made it possible formany people to speak candidly and even criticize Mao for his decision in 1953 to adopt the general line, which produced such dire con­ sequences forChina. In 1987, Zhao Ziyang, then the party secretary, redefinedthe country>s cur­ rent revolutionary stage by declaring that China was still in the initial stage of socialism. 158 He did so in the context of making an ideological justificationfor the CCP's reform policies. Since thesepolicies permitted the revival of private ownership and economic inequality, they created a climate that encouraged academics and party researchers to reevaluate and repudiate Mao's policies, especially the general line. 159 The sentiment shared by many was that if China had not adopted the general line in 1953 and had instead allowed New De­ mocracy to last longer, as the CCP had promised in 1949, China would have had a much better economic outcome. There is also a consensus among Chinese scholars and party researchers that in 1953 Mao departed drastically from the CCP's original plan, but they differ in their views as to what caused Mao to change course. According to one view, Mao made his decision based on a flawed understanding of Lenin's the­ ory of the ((transition from capitalism to socialism." Another view attributes his decision to a misjudgment of China's domestic contradictions, and still another view explains his decision by emphasizing the limited options avail­ able to him at the time. 160 Scholars and party researchers have also taken dif­ fe rent positions in judging the general line. 161 Their judgments fall into four categories. In the first,Mao is criticized foradopting the general line because in doing so he abandoned ideas that the CCP had set for the country in 1949. 162 In the second, it is argued that the general line was established too early and that the results would have been much better if it had been adopted later. 163 In the third, the general line is blamed formaking a mess of socialism (ba shehui zhuyi gao zaole).164 In the fourth and most charitable category of evaluations of the general line, which echoes the position expressed in the CCP's 1981 resolution, no criticism is made of the general line itself; instead, any problems associated with the general line are described as being primarily the result of poor implementation.165 Scholarly discussions of the general line lost their vigor beginning in the early 1990s, perhaps affected by the heightened political control imposed in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident of June 4, 1989. In the 1990s and early 2000s, scholars and party researchers have continued to write about the general line, but only a small number of published materials has dealt with the Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 175 topic, and most of these avoid critical comments, being either objective166 or positive in tone.167 One comprehensive study of the policy-formulation process leading to the general line, written by a leading officialscholar, Pang Xianzhi, and a younger scholar, Li Jie, was published in 2001. Like other writ­ ers on the topic during this period, they emphasize the factsand refrain from making judgments on the correctness or incorrectness of the general line.168 Departing from the scholarly trend of the 1990s and early 2000s was Hu Sheng, a member of the party's old guard. In 1998, he wrote an article in which he criticized Mao, arguing that after 1949, Mao had failedto honor his pre-1949 commitments and had become a "populist"-a term associated with the Russian "populists;' early revolutionaries who wanted to develop the Russian economy by skipping the capitalist stage169-whose fe ar of any capitalist development in post-1949 China had created terrible consequences for the country. Hu's criti­ cism of Mao was unprecedented, for it challenged the CCP's official party line. Hu's criticism also stirred up a brief yet heated debate between those who sup­ ported his position and those who opposed it. Hu's chief opponent in the debate · was Sha Jiansun, a conservative party scholar who not only challenged Hu in per­ son at a conference in Changsha on December 26, 1998, but also wrote a re­ sponse to Hu's article.170 Hu's chief defender was Qiu Lu, who sharply criticized Sha.171 Shortly thereafter, a number of articles, milder in tone than Qiu's article, appeared in support of Hu's position.172 Sha also had his allies who voiced their strong support for his views. 173 Although the debate was brief, its intensity re­ flects the continued sensitivity and divisiveness of this subject even today.

Conclusion

The grain crisis in summer 1953 was a turning point in the history of post- 1949 China, for it provided Mao with the opportunity to accelerate collec­ tivization, eliminate the private economy, and reshape the country's economic structure. In the process, he sought to balance his political and ideological goals with the realities he encountered in China at that time. Mao could be flexible and concerned about the heavy tax burden placed on the peasants and ready to help those peasants affected by natural disasters, but he would never compromise his ultimate goal of building socialism in China as quickly as possible. To understand Mao and his actions, it is necessary to come to terms with his belief system and commitment to Stalinism. As shown throughout this chapter, Mao intervened at every opportunity to promote radical posi­ tions during disputes and was ready to adopt policy options that were in tune with Stalinist ideas as presented in the Short Course. Mao's commitment to achieving socialism in a Stalinist mold was deeply rooted and unyielding. 176 Chapter 5

Notes

1. We nxian xuanbian 4, 713-18, 721-29. 2. Oral source, September 22, 2004. 3. Pang Xianzhi and Jin Chongji, eds., Mao Zedong zhuan: 1949-1976 (shang) [Bi­ ography of Mao Zedong: 1949-1976, vol. 1] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2003), 265. 4. Zhonggong 20, 147. 5. Cheng Zihua, "Zhongguo gongxiao hezuo shiye de dianjizhe-Liu Shaoqi" [Liu Shaoqi-the founder of China's supply and marketing cooperatives] (hereinafter as "Gongxiao hezuo"), ZDY, no. 5 (1988): 4. For a more detailed discussion of this sub­ ject, see Cheng Zihua Huiyilu [Memoirs of Cheng Zihua] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chuban­ she, 1987), 337-402. 6. Ai Di, "Woguo gongxiao hezuoshe qingkuang jianjie" [Brief introduction to the conditions of supply and marketing cooperatives in China] (hereinafter as "Woguo gongxiao"), XX, no. 4 (1954): 22-23. 7. Ai Di, "Woguo gongxiao," 23. 8. Ai Di, "Woguo gongxiao," 22. 9. Cheng Zihua, "Gongxiao hezuo;' 6. 10. Cheng Zihua, "Gongziao hezuo," 4. 11. Li Rui, Mao zaonian, 220. 12. For a recent study on this topic, see Luo Pinghan, "1950 nian guanyu dongbei funong wenti de zhenglun" [Debates in 1950 concerning rich peasants in the North­ east], DYZ, no. 1 (2004): 72-81. 13. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 196. 14. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 197. 15. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 198. 16. An oral source, September 30, 1991. 17. Zhonggong 19, 515. 18. Zhonggong 20, 13-14. 19. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 185. For a more detailed account, see Tao Lujia, Yige shengwei shuji huiyi Mao zhuxi [A provincial secretary's recollections of Chairman Mao] (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1993), 9-28. For a more recent study on this sub­ ject, see Zeng Kang and Zhou Zhiqiang, "Jianguo chuqi zhonggong dangnei guanyu nongye fazhan daolu de zhenglun" [Debates within the CCP during the early period after the establishment of the PRC concerning the road to agricultural development], DW, no. 1 (2003): 74-79. 20. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 185. 21. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 185. 22. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 186. 23. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 187-91. On May 7, 1951, Liu criticized "utopian socialism" in a speech; on July 3, he continued his criticism in comments he wrote in response to a report from Shanxi province; on July 5, he made furthercriticisms in a lecture he de­ livered to students at the Institute of Marxism and Leninism; and on July 25, he incor­ porated his criticisms into revisions he made of a report fromthe North China Bureau. Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Tra nsition 177

24. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 188. 25. An oral source, September 30, 1991. 26. Zhang We ntian xuanji, 412. 27. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 191. 28. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 191. 29. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 191. 30. See, forexample, Frederick C. Te iwes, "Mao Texts and the Mao of the 1950s," AJCA, no. 33 (January 1995): 137. 31. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 192. 32. Jiang Huaxuan, Zhang We iping, and Xiao Sheng, eds., Zhongguo gongchandang huiyi gaiyao [General summary of the meetings of the CCP] (hereinafter as Huiyi gaiyao) (Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1991), 297-98. 33. Gong Yuzhi, Zai lishi zhuanzhezhong [At a historical turning point] (hereinafter as Zhuanzhezhong) (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1988), 369. 34. Gong Yuzhi, Zhuanzhezhong, 369. 35. Gong Yuzhi, Zhuanzhezhong, 370. 36. Gong Yuzhi, Zhuanzhezhong, 370. 37. For Mao's instructions, see Mao wengao 2, 578-79; Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 193-94. 38. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 193. For Mao's written comments, see Mao wengao 2, 476-77. For a brief description of Gao Gang's report, see Mao wengao 2, 478(5). 39. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 193. For Mao's written comments, see Mao wengao 2, 517. For a brief description of the Hebei report, see Mao wengao 2, 517(1 ). 40. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 194. 41. Jiang Boying, Deng Zihui zhuan [Biography of Deng Zihui] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1986), 296-99. For more information on Deng Zihui's role, see Gao Huamin, Nongye hezuohua yundong shimo [The whole story of the agricultural collectivization movement] (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1999), 83-91; Deng Zihui zhuan bianxiezu [Deng Zihui biography editorial group], Deng Zihui zhuan, 454-64. For a general discussion of the effort to correct the "rash advance," see Gao Huamin, "Jiuzheng;' DY, no. 3 (1981): 18-24. 42. Zhonggong 20, 51-54, 60-6 1, 61-65, 176-80. 43. We nxian xuangbian 4, 89-95. See also "The key point on leading the agricultural production;' a Renmin ribao editorial, March 26, 1953. The editorial is also included in We nxian xuangbian 4, 109-15. 44. Mao's comments are included in Mao wenji 6, 275; Mao wengao 4, 152. 45. See articles appearing in Renmin ribao on April 5 and 20, 1953, and on June 4, 1953. 46. Zhonggong 20, 170. 47. Chen Yu n wenxuan 1949-1956 [Selected works of Chen Yu, 1949-1956) (hereinafteras Chen Yu n wenxuan 1949-1956) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 203. 48. Chen Yu n wenxuan 1949-1956, 207. 49. Chen Yu n wenxuan 1949-1956, 203. 50. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 259. For details, see Chen Yu n wenxuan 1949-1956, 159-60. 51. Zhonggong 20, 171. 52. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 258. 178 Chapter 5

53. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 257. 54. Zhonggong 19, 151. 55. Zhonggo ng 19, 105-7. 56. Zhonggong 19, 106. 57. Zhonggong 19, 151. 58. Zhonggo ng 20, 137; Bo Yibo, "Guanyu 1953 nian guojia yusuan de baogao" [Report on the national budget of 1953], XX, no. 3 (1953): 13. 59. For Mao's comments on the problems created by the new measures, see Mao wengao 4, 198. 60. Zhonggong 20, 137. 61. For details, see Mao wengao 1, 338, 360, 376, 502; Mao wengao 3, 587; Mao wen­ gao 4, 197, 214; Mao wenji 6, 57-58; Liu wengao 1, 316-17( 1), 356-57, 363, 363-64(1). 62. See Mao wengao 3, 587; Mao wenji 6, 241-42. 63. Mao wengao 3, 587; Mao wengao 4, 214. For Liu's instructions, see Liu wengao 1, 356-57, 476. 64. For details, see Mao wengao 3, 588(5). 65. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 373. 66. Mao wengao 4, 197. 67. Mao wengao 4, 198. 68. Mao wengao 4, 197. 69. Zhonggong 20, 170. 70. Mao wengao 1, 316. 71. Mao wengao 1, 502. 72. Mao wengao 4, 221. 73. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 259. 74. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 259-6 1. 75. Chen Yu n wenxuan 1949-1956, 207-9; Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 260-6 1. 76. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 261. 77. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 261-64. 78. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 264-65. 79. Chen Yu n nianpu (zhongjuan) [A chronicle of Chen Yun, vol. 2] (hereinafteras Chen Yu n nianpu 2) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 178-80; forhis report delivered on October 10, 1953, see Chen Yu n wenxuan 1949-1956, 202-16. It is also included in We nxian xuanbian 4, 446-6 1. 80. Chen Yu n wenxuan 1949-1956, 204-5. 81. Chen Yu n wenxuan 1949-1956, 207-10. 82. Chen Yu n wenxuan 1949-1956, 214-15. 83. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 261. For Mao's report on October 2, 1953, see Mao wenji 6, 295-97. 84. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 264. 85. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 264; Mao wengao 4, 382. 86. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 266. 87. Zhonggong 20, 194. 88. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 266. 89. Mao wengao 4, 363, 363-64( 1). Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Transition 179

90. Zhonggong 20, 196-97; Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 268. 91. Gongheguo 1949-1952, 325. 92. For a report written in early February 1955 by a group of twelve cadres, in­ cluding Zhao Ziyang, who were sent to ten key counties in Guangdong to investigate rural conditions, see Zhonggong 20, 493-96. For a scholarly treatment of the subject, see Thomas P. Bernstein, "Cadre and Peasant Behavior under Conditions of Insecurity and Deprivation: The Grain Supply Crisis of the Spring of 1955," in Chinese Commu­ nist Politics in Action, ed. A. Doak Barnett (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 365-99. 93. Vivienne Shue, Peasant China in Tra nsition: The Dynamics of Development to­ ward Socialism, 1949-1956 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 214-45. 94. Zhonggong 20, 177. 95. For records of Mao's talks, see Mao wengao 4, 356-60; Mao wenji 6, 298-307; We nxian xuanbian 4, 467-76. 96. Mao wengao 4, 359. 97. Liangong dangshi, 447. 98. Mao wengao 4, 357. 99. Mao wenji 6, 302. 100. Mao wenji 6, 301-2. 101. Mao wenji 6, 299; an oral source, September 30, 1991. 102. Mao wenji 6, 298. 103. For Khrushchev's report, see Renmin ribao, September 17, 1953; also see Of­ fice ofIntelligence Research, "Soviet Party's Role Expanded in Agricultural Affairs;' In­ telligence Report, no. 6444 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, October 12, 1953), 1-4. 104. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 363. 105. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 365. 106. Zhonggong 20, 234; We nxian xuanbian 4, 718. 107. Zhonggong 20, 177. 108. We nxian xuanbian 4, 715-16; Zhonggong 20, 228. 109. Zhonggong 19, 395-96. 110. Zhonggong 19, 390-91. 111. Zhonggong 20, 233-34. 112. An unpublished paper of an oral source, 15. 113. An oral source, September 30, 1991. 114. Zhonggong 20, 195-96. For more internal reports on "muddled thinking;' see NC, no. 266 (November 13, 1953): 183-86; no. 281 (December l, 1953): 4-5; no. 292 (December 14, 1953): 240-43. 115. Zhonggong 20, 194; Mao wengao 4, 386. 116. Zhonggong 20, 198-99. For more internal reports on capitalists' reactions to the general line, see NC, no. 277 (November 26, 1953): 377; no. 290 (December 11, 1953): 198-99; no. 295 (December 17, 1953): 307-9. 117. Zhonggong 20, 198; Mao wengao 4, 396. 118. For Mao's revisions of the propaganda outline of December 1953, see Mao wengao 4, 403-7. 180 Chapter 5

119. Mao wengao 4, 301. 120. Mao wengao 4, 301-2. 121. Shi Zhongquan, Kaituo, 178. 122. We nxian xuanbian 4, 699-700. For a similar statement made by Zhou Enlai on August 11, 1953, see Zhonggo ng 20, 133-34. 123. Zhonggong 19, 3. 124. We nxian xuanbian 4, 700. 125. Li Rui, Mao zaonian, 223. 126. See, for example, Liu's statement in his letter to Stalin in October 1952, "Guanyu zenyang cong xianzai zhubu guodudao shehuizhuyi qu de wenti" [How to achieve a gradual transition to socialism beginning now], DW, no. 5 (1988): 53. 127. Liangong dangshi, 446. 128. Li Rui, Mao zaonian, 223. 129. We nxian xuanbian 4, 693. 130. We nxian xuanbian 4, 695. 131. We nxian xuanbian 4, 695. 132. We nxian xuanbian 4, 695. 133. Liu Zongrao, "Sulian gongchan guoji yu zhongguo guodu shiqi zongluxian" [The Soviet Union, the Comintern, and China's general line forthe transition period] (hereinafteras "Sulian"), Sichuan jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao [Journal of the Te achers' Col­ lege of Sichuan], no. 4 (1990): 7. 134. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power, 69-70. For a detailed account of the fall of Bukharin, see Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Bi­ ography, 1888-1938 (New Yo rk: OxfordUniversity Press, 1980), 270-336. 135. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power, 76. 136. Guo Simin, ed., Wo yanzhong, 44. 137. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power, 70. 138. For a full treatment of the subject, see Alexander Erlich, The Soviet Industrial- ization Debate (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960). 139. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 214. 140. Lin Yunhui et al., Ka ige, 325. 141. Renmin ribao, December 2, 3, 6, 9, 22, and 30, 1953. 142. Renmin ribao, December 2, 17, 20, and 22, 1953. 143. Renmin ribao, December 2 and 10, 1953. 144. Renmin ribao, December 7, 1953. 145. Renmin ribao, November 26, 1953. 146. Renmin ribao, November 29, 1953. 147. Renmin ribao, December 2, 1953. 148. Renmin ribao, December 4 and 12, 1953. 149. Renmin ribao, December 16, 1953. 150. Renmin ribao, November 17, 1953. 151. Renmin ribao, December 17, 1953. 152. Renmin ribao, December 22, 1953. 153. NC, no. 285 (December 5, 1953): 92-93; NC, no. 297 (December 19, 1953): 348, 349, 353; NC, no. 298 (December 21, 1953): 366, 367-68. Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Tra nsition 181

154. NC, no. 170 (July 23, 1953): 334-35. 155. Guanyu jianguo yilai dangde ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi zhuyiben (xiuding) [Revised notes on the resolution of certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the PRC] (hereinafter as Jueyi) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 17. 156. ]ueyi, 16, 226-27. 157. Jueyi, 18. 158. For a roundtable discussion of this topic by Soviet scholars, see "The Initial Stage of Socialism in China: Theory and Practice;' PEA, no. 2 (1989), 18-52. 159. An oral source, August 10, 1999. 160. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 215-17; Hu Qiaomu, "Zhongguo zai wushi niandai zenyang xuanze le shehui-zhuyi" [How China chose socialism in the 1950s], Renmin ribao, Oc­ tober 5, 1989; Lu Shuiming, "Ping guodu shiqi zongluxiang" [Commentary on the general line forthe socialist transition], Mao Zedong sixiang yanjiu [Research on Mao Zedong thought], no. 2 (1989): 110-1 1; Hu Sheng, ed., Zhongguo gongchandang de qishinian [Seventy years of the CCP] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1991), 298-301; Yan Ling, "Cong shinminzhuzhuyi dao shehuizhuyi de zhuanbian" [The transition from NewDemocracy to socialism], Zhongguo shehui kexue [Chinese social sciences], no. 2 (1990): 13; Li Rui, Mao zaonian, 223; Shi Zhongquan, Kaituo, 177-82; Liu Zongrao, "Sulian," Sichuan jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao [Journal of the Teachers' Col­ lege of Sichuan], no. 4 (1990): 5; Hu Zhenghao, "Lengzhan shidai de zhongguo gongyehua daolu xuanze" [China's choosing its road to industrialization during the cold war era], Huadong shifa n daxue xuebao [Journal of the Huadong Normal School], no. 4 (1989): 48; Liu Ji, Zhang Yun, and Zhu Jinyuan, eds., Zhongguo gongchandang qishinian (1921-1991) [Seventy years of the CCP, 192 1-1991] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1991), 490-92; Pang Song and Wang Dong, Huagui yu shanbian: xinminzhuzhuyi shehuijieduan beiwanglu [Offthe track and evolution: Memorandum for the New Democratic social stage] (Henan renminchubanshe, 1990), 90-107; Lin Yunhui et al., Kaige, 301-18. 161. This information is based on a conversation on September 8, 1999, with a well-informed party official who wants to remain anonymous. For a general discus­ sion of differentviews expressed by scholars in the late 1980s, see Shi Zhaoyu, "Guodu shiqi zongluxian yanjiu zhuangkuang gaishu" [General commentary on research con­ cerning the general line forthe transition period], DW, no. 6 (1990): 63-67. For a brief discussion of a symposium held at the Central Committee Document Research Office on July 18, 1990, concerning the general line, see Geng Sufen, "Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi juxing guanyu guodu shiqi zongluxian wenti xueshu taolunhui" [The Cen­ tral Document Research Office's symposium on questions concerning the general line forsocialist transition], DW, no. 6 (1990): 67-68. 162. See Lin Yunhui et al., Kaige, 289. 163. See, for example, Xue Muqiao's influential argument in "Cong shinminzhu zhuyi dao shehui zhuyi chujijieduan" [From New Democracy to the initial stages of socialism], Qiushi [Search forthe truth], no. 1 (1989): 21-27. 164. This view must have been expressed internally. I have not come across any writings that state such a view. 182 Chapter 5

165. An oral source, September 8, 1999. 166. See, for example, Sun Yo ukui and Wang Yugui, "Yetan dang zai guodu shiqi zongluxian" [We also discuss the party's general line forthe transition period], ZDY, no. 2 (1994): 80-84; Dai Guangqian, "Shixi guodu shiqi zongluxian" [An attempt at analyzing the general line forthe transition period], DZY, no. 2 (1998): 9-19. 167. For a rare positive evaluation of the general line, see Jiang Zhonghui, "Dang zai guodu shiqi zongluxian tichu de biranxing" [The inevitability of the party's put­ ting forwardthe general line for thetransition period], Dangshi wenhui [Party history documents], no. 8 (1996): 3-6. 168. Pang Xianzhi and Li Jie, "Mao Zedong yu guodu shiqi zongluxian" [Mao Ze­ dong and the general line forthe transition period], DW, no. 4 (2001): 46-57. 169. Hu Sheng firstexpressed his views at a conference on December 26, 1998, and they were later published in an article entitled, "Mao Zedong de xinminzhu zhuyilun zai pingjia" [Reevaluating Mao Zedong's theory of New Democracy], ZDZ, no. 3 (1999): 3-15. For his overall arguments, see pages 3-5, 10-15. 170. For Sha's two articles, see "Yige zhiguan zhongyao de quanjuxing wenti-dui kexue pingjia Mao Zedong sixiang de zhongyao yiyi de zairenshi" [An important over­ all empirical issue: Reconsidering the scientific evaluation of the important meaning of Mao Zedong thought], Zhongliu [Midstream], no. 4 (1999): 2-6; and "Makesi zhuyi haishi yongsu shengchanli lun?-Ping Hu Sheng jiaoshou dui Mao zhuxi de pipan" [Is it Marxism or a vulgar theory of productivity? Evaluating Professor Hu Sheng's criti­ cism of Chairman Mao], Zhongliu [Midstream], no. 12 (1999): 2-9. 171. For Qiu's defense of Hu, see Qiu Lu, "Qing fangxianide gunzi-zhiyi Sha Jian­ sun jiaoshou dui Hu Sheng xiansheng de pipan" [Please put down your stick: Ques­ tioning Professor Sha Jiansun's criticism of Mr. Hu Sheng], BNC, no. 1 (2000): 23-27. 172. See Hu Ya n, "Mincuizhuyi he shehuizhuyi" [Populism and socialism], Dang­ dai shijie shehuizhuyi wen ti [Problems in contemporary world socialism], no. 2 ( 1999): 2-20. For another article written by Hu Ya n, see "Dui dangqian mincui zhuyi taolun­ zhong jige wenti de kanfa" [My views on several questions in the ongoing discussions concerning populism], ZDY, no. 2 (2000): 79-83. For other articles agreeing with Hu Sheng, see Lin Yunhui, "Lun zhongguo guoqing yu Makesizhuyi zhongguohua-jian­ ping 'yiqiong erbai' haohua zuixin zuimei de huatu" [Discussing conditions in China and the sinificationof Marxism: A brief comment on 'poverty and blankness' makes it easy to draw the newest and most beautiful picture], ZDY, no. 1 (2000): 89-95; Lin Tingfang,"Yingdang zhunzhong Hu Sheng jiaoshou de yuanyi" [We should respect Professor Hu Sheng's original intention], ZDY, no. 1 (2000): 106-10. For a general dis­ cussion of the study of populism in China, see Liu zhiguang et al., "Zhongguo shehui zhuyi fazhan yu mincui zhuyi zongshu" [A comprehensive summary of the develop­ ment of socialism in China and populism], ZDY, no. 2 (2000): 84-89. 173. For other strong opposing views, see Huang Rutong, "Shehuizhuyi geming de chengjiu qirong fouding" [How can we permit the success of the socialist revolutions to be denied?],Zhongliu [Midstream], no. 4 (1999): 17-19; Fan Xiu "Nenggou zheyang lunzheng ma?" [Is it possible to argue in this way?] Zhongliu [Midstream], no. 4 (1999): 20-2 1. For a somewhat milder opposing view, see Wang Yeyang, "Yeping Mao Mao's General Line fo r Socialist Tra nsition 183

Zedong de 'yizhang baizhi' shuo" [My evaluation of Mao Zedong's "blank sheet of paper" doctrine], ZDY, no. 6 (1999): 81-84. For another article by Huang Rutong op­ posing Hu Sheng, somewhat milder than his earlier article, see Huang Rutong's slightly modified argument: "Guanyu 'Mao Zedong de xinminzhu zhuyi lun zai pingjia' ruogang wenti de taolun" [A discussion of several questions concerning Mao Zedong's theory of New Democracy], ZDY, no. 6 (1999): 85-87.

Conclusion: Mao, Stalin, and China's Road to Socialism

HE POLICY SHIFT OF 1953 EMBODIED in the ((general line forsocialist transi­ Ttion" represented a dramatic turning point in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and continues to exert a profound impact on China's economic development to this day. Though often misunderstood, the policy shift involved the abandonment by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of the official policy it had established in 1949. The 1949 policy had been rolled out under the banner of New Democracy and had emphasized a long-term commitment to a mixed economy. The CCP had indicated that building socialism was a task for the distant future and would occur only when conditions were ready. There had been no clear consensus, however, among the top leaders about what exactly would constitute the proper condi­ tions forbuilding socialism. The CCP's official 1949 policy had resembled Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) by emphasizing a gradualist transition to socialism rather than a drastic change of the old economic structure. The new policy program of 1953, by contrast, introduced under the ban­ ner of the «general line forsocialist transition," was inspired by Stalin's gen­ eral line of 1929 and was a Stalinist program to the core. It emphasized the importance of establishing a new economic order based solely on state own­ ership, and the building of this new economy would begin immediately, rather than some ten to fifteen years after 1949. Although gradualism was promised, Mao had no intention of honoring that promise. The general line appeared to be a sudden policy shift,but it in facthad its roots in a decision Mao had made in 1950 and carried out with great cunning and secrecy during the next three years. With the completion of the policy

-185 - 186 Conclusion shift in 1953, Mao had set the country on a Stalinist road to socialism. Be­ tween 1950 and 1953, Mao consciously and deliberately sought to repeat Stalin's actions between 1921 and 1925 as described in the Short Course. Mao almost literally relied upon this work as a do-it-yourself handbook for build­ ing socialism. Mao's general line, which summarized Stalin's basic ideas on how to build socialism, became a mini handbook for building socialism in China in the 1950s. Mao did not use violence to change the basic economic structure in China, which was predominantly private in the early 1950s, but his implementation of the general line, beginning in 19 54, and the ((high tide" of socialist trans­ formation, between 1955 and 1956, profoundlychanged China's political and economic landscape. The disastrous consequences of Mao's ((high tide" en­ couraged other leaders afterthe mid-l 950s to become more assertive in pol­ icy deliberations and to insist on the inclusion of private ownership and mar­ ket forces, even if on a limited scale, alongside state ownership and control. During the Cultural Revolution, in his quest fora pure socialist society, Mao eliminated market forces and material incentives and offered in their place ideological and spiritual incentives. Probably the most significant long-term consequence of Mao's general line and its implementation was the postpone­ ment of China's economic development fora quarter of a century. Beginning in the mid-1950s, Mao's domination of the policy process gave way to sharper divisions between Mao and more moderate leaders. The re­ sulting pendulum swings of power and policy agendas within the leadership set the stage forlater events, up to and including the economic reforms that began in the late 1970s. From 1956 to 1976, there continued to be a struggle within the leadership to finda proper balance between the state-owned econ­ omy and market forces-a balance that was ideologically acceptable to Mao, on the one hand, and to other, more moderate leaders, on the other hand. Some important findingsemerge from this study concerning Mao's role in domestic policy making, his belief system, and his relationship with Stalin.

Mao's Dominant Role in the Policy Process

Mao played a dominant role in formulating the general line. He took the ini­ tiative in starting the process and in shaping the policy outcome. In 1952, he arbitrarily determined that the necessary conditions already existed forChina to begin building socialism. He later also definedthe time needed to achieve socialism and the means to be utilized to change the old economic structure. His dominance depended on his ability to conceal his real intentions, not only Conclusion 187

fromthe public, but also fromother senior leaders. He was skillful at using se­ crecy and at controlling the flowof informationto protect his own policy ini­ tiatives frombeing challenged by various social groups. His dominance can also be traced to his ability to intimidate and neutralize real and potential op­ ponents-whether party leaders like Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Bo Yibo, and Deng Zihui, or nonparty notables like Liang Shuming-through harsh criti­ cism and ruthless attacks. Other leaders became increasingly passive, with the conspicuous exceptions of Deng Zihui, who dared to challenge Mao in 1955, and Peng Dehuai, who was bold enough to criticize him in 1959. Mao's already dominant position within the CCP after 1945 was furtheren­ hanced in the early 1950s when, with Stalin,s help, a revised, officialversion of Mao's selected works was published in both the Soviet Union and China. Al­ though Stalin rejected the validity of "Mao Zedong thought,, and persistently suppressed Mao's attempts to use the term in the Chinese press, Mao gained enormous prestige within the CCP from the publication of his works. It was, after all,Stalin, the leader of the Communist world, who had decided to publish Mao's writings in the Russian language, giving international legitimacy to his works and introducing them to the Communist world. A more self-confident Mao skillfully exploitedhis new prestige and asserted his authority, especially in selecting and interpreting Lenin,s and Stalin's writings and using them to guide China's socialist construction.

Mao's Devotion to Stalinism

Mao was paradoxically both a disciple and a rival of Stalin. Far from being a reluctant Stalinist, he was in fact a committed one. The best evidence for his commitment to Stalinism was his devotion to the core economic doctrines expressed in the Short Course, which included a dedication to state ownership and control and a disdain forpri vate ownership and market forces.It is clear that Mao had the highest regard forthe Short Course. His intimate association with this book, however, did not begin in the early 1950s; it began in Yan' an in the late 1930s, as discussed in chapter 3. This deep commitment goes a long way toward accounting forhis belief system, including not only his Stalinist orientation toward socialism but also his concepts of the two-line struggle and class struggle. He was more radical than most other Chinese leaders in pursu­ ing a Stalinist vision of China, and more so than the conventional wisdom would have us believe. From Mao's perspective, all capitalist elements had to be crushed. There was no place in Mao's vision of a socialist economy formar­ ket forcesor a private economy. 188 Conclusion

Mao, a Junior Partner to Stalin

Though Mao was dominant domestically, he was dependent on Stalin not only forec onomic and military aid, but also forpolic y guidance, ideological legitimacy, and prestige. In spite of this reality, Mao succeeded in projecting an image of himself as original and independent. Mao had ambivalent fe el­ ings toward Stalin. He respected Stalin forhis accomplishments in the Soviet Union and his leadership of world Communism, and he had a deep affinity with Stalin's radical approach of the 1920s and 1930s toward economic de­ velopment. At the same time, Mao felt resentment toward Stalin fornot pro­ viding more support forthe Chinese Revolution. In addition, Mao was frus­ trated and angered at the constraints imposed by Stalin; his dependency on Stalin put him in no position to reject these constraints openly. Mao was also competitive toward Stalin; he believed fromthe late 1940s that he could build socialism in China faster than Stalin had in the Soviet Union. As long as Stalin was alive, however, Mao worked as his junior partner. Mao did not nec­ essarily enjoy this role and was always looking forways to assert his inde­ pendence, especially with regard to economic matters. He had learned, how­ ever, from his long interactions with Stalin, the Comintern, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), when to pay lip service to Stalin, when to make compromises, and when to be assertive about his own interests and those of the CCP. Despite all his problems with Stalin, Mao did not attempt to break away from him. It was only afterStalin's death that Mao fe lt he had a free hand and could finally ignore Stalin's cautionary advice about taking a gradualist approach in building socialism in China. As Mao completed his transformation of China's economy in 1955 and 1956, he felt he could finally claim that he had outdone Stalin. He also moved to position himself as the leader of the Communist world and as an authority on Marx­ ist theory. Mao did not openly express his bitter fe elings about Stalin until 1956, three years after Stalin's death and a few months after Khrushchev's de-Staliniza­ tion speech. In April 1956, Mao presented a de-Stalinization speech at an en­ ,, larged Politburo meeting, at which the "Ten Great Relations were also dis­ cussed. His remarks provide an insight into his deeply rooted resentment, frustration, and anger toward Stalin: "Whenever we speak of Stalin, we are absolutely exasperated, and triple that."1 For a long time, Mao did not allow this speech to be made public forfe ar that it might cause harm to the inter­ national Communist movement. To the end, Mao was a good Communist, even showing concern that something he said might cause damage to world Communism.2 Conclusion 189

Further Research

My study of the policy shiftin the early 1950s is an attempt to understand one of the murkiest periods in China's post-1949 history. Given the importance of the early 1950s in shaping the nation's later political and economic develop­ ment, further studiesof this period are needed. One particular area that needs study is the Soviet role in shaping Chinese domestic politics. Our under­ standing of the role played by Stalin in Chinese policy making and of Mao's manipulation of the Soviet connection to advance his domestic-policy agenda is still limited. Mao had, after all,since the early 1940s, monopolized China's communications, firstwith the Comintern, and later with Stalin. Further re­ search is also needed on the role of the Soviet connection in leadership strug­ gles in China: how exactly did Mao play the Stalin card when it was to his ad­ vantage to do so? Lastly, furtherinvestigation into Mao's personal relationship with Khrushchev might offer a new perspective on the possible causes of the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s.

Mao and His Legacy

We can now see that Mao was a more serious believer in Stalinist teachings than the conventional wisdom has suggested. Mao shared with Stalin a pro­ founddisdain forthe private economy and market forces.Mao's devotion to this component of Stalinism and his passion to surpass Stalin and the Soviet Union drove him to establish a Stalinist system in China at a rapid pace. It is safe to say that he not only shared Stalin's dogmatic views on how to build so­ cialism froman early time, but he also persisted in holding to them. This new understanding goes a long way toward explaining why he did not attempt to alter the basic Stalinist economic structure. Economic reformscame to China only afterMao's death, and they were initiated by many of the same people who, in the early 1950s, were actively involved in creating a Stalinist economic system, although most of them at the time were less radical than Mao. China is now in the midst of a long-term transition. While it is one of the most dynamic and fastest-growing economies in the world, China still pos­ sesses a «one-party" political system. In economic terms, the Stalinist legacy is still evident. China still has five-year plans. Key economic sectors such as finance, transportation, energy, utilities, and all major industries are still owned and controlled by the state. In addition, China has not yet resolved the issue of land ownership in the countryside. Reformsin the state-owned sectors in the last decade have encountered enormous problems. Though 190 Conclusion practical considerations, such as unemployment, have hindered reforms, ideological barriers also still persist. Although the CCP continues to insist on one-party rule, as China develops a more market-oriented economy, we can expect to see the further decline of Stalinism and the gradual emergence of a more pluralistic economic and political order.

Notes

1. Bo Yibo, Huigu l, 490. 2. Bo Yibo, Huigu 1, 490. Appendix 1

Ta ble of Contents of Lenin and Stalin on Economic Construction, Vo lumes 5 and 6

N THE SPRING OF 1949, the party leadership of the CCP compiled a twelve­ Ivolume collection called Ganbu bidu [Required Readings for Cadres]. Two volumes of the collection, entitled Liening Sidalin lun shehuizhuyi jingji jian­ she (shangxiace) [Required readings for cadres: Lenin and Stalin on socialist economic construction], are devoted to Lenin's and Stalin's works on building socialism and were influential in shaping the thinking of the Chinese leader­ ship. Chapter headings in both volumes are identical to those used in the Short Course. Listed below are the tables of contents forvolumes 5 and 6 based on the English translation published in the Soviet Union.

Volume 5

1. The Period of Preparation and Realization of the October Socialist Revolution Lenin The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It (September 10-14, 1917) DraftRegulations on Wo rkers' Control (November 8-13, 1917) DraftDecree on the Nationalization of the Banks and on Measures of Its Implementation (December 1917) DraftDecree on the Consumers' Communes (January 7-10, 1918) How to Organize a Competition (January 7-10, 1918) Declaration of Rights of the Wo rking and Exploited People (January 17, 1918)

-191 - 192 Appendix 1

The Current Task of Soviet Power (April 28, 1918) Report to the All-Russia Congress of Representatives of Financial De­ partments of Soviets (May 18, 1918) Letter Addressed to the Conference of Representatives of Enterprises to Be Nationalized (May 18, 1918) 2. The Period of Foreign Military Intervention and Civil War Lenin On the Famine. A Letter to the Wo rkers of Petrograd (May 1918) Speech Closing the Debate on the Party Programme. Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (RCP) (March 19, 1919) Report on Wo rk in the Countryside. The Eighth Congress of the RCP (March 23, 1919) Great Action (June 28, 1919) Economy and Politics in the Era of Proletarian Dictatorship (October 30, 1919) The Fight to Overcome the Fuel Crisis, Circular Letter to Party Orga­ nizations (November 13, 1919) Speech Delivered at the First Congress of Agricultural Communes and Agricultural Artels (December 4, 1919) Report on Subbotnicks Delivered to a Moscow City Conference of the RCP (December 20, 1919) Remarks on and Addenda to Drafts for"R ules forthe Wo rkers' and Peasants' Inspection" (Early 1920) From the Destruction of the Old Social System to the Creation of the New (April 8, 1920) The Land Question, A DraftOutline forthe Second Congress of the Communist International (July 20, 1920) 3. The Period of Transition to the PeacefulWo rk of Economic Recovery Lenin Summing-Up Speech on the Tax in Kind at the Te nth Congress of the RCP (March 15, 1921) The Importance of Gold Now and Afterthe Complete Victory of So­ cialism (November 5, 1921) The Role and Functions of the Trade Unions under the New Eco­ nomic Policy: Decision of the Central Committee (CC) of the RCP (January 12, 1922) Political Report to the CC of the RCP at the Eleventh Congress of the RCP (March 27, 1922) Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the Wo rld Revolution. Report to the Fourth Congress of the Communist In­ ternational (January 13, 1922) Appendix 1 193

On the Cooperative System (January 4-6, 1923) Less but Better (March 2, 1923) Stalin Questions Concerning Peasants, Chapter 5 of"On the Basis of Lenin­ ism" (April 1924) The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the RCP: Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Activists of the Moscow Or­ ganization of the RCP (May 9, 1925) The Internal Situation in the Soviet Union: Excerpts fromThe Politi­ cal Report of the Central Committee, the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU (December 18, 1925) Stalin on the NEP and State Capitalism: Excerpts fromthe Summary Report of the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU, the Central Com­ mittee's Political Work (December 23, 1925)

Vo lume 6

4. Struggle forthe Socialist Industrialization Stalin Excerpts from"On Several Questions of Leninism" (January 25, 1926) The Soviet Union's Economic Situation and the Party's Policies (April 13, 1926) The Question of the Soviet Wo rking Class and Peasantry: Excerpts from"T he Opposition Bloc in the CPSU" (October 26-November 3, 1926) Reply to the Discussion on the Report on "The Social-Democratic Deviation" (November 1-3, 1926) Excerpts from the Interview with the First American Labor Delega­ tion (September 8, 1927) Excerpts from the Interview with Foreign Workers' Delegations (No­ vember 5, 1927) The Success of Socialist Construction and the Internal Situation in the U.S.S.R.: Excerpts from the Fifteenth Party Congress of the CPSU (December 3-7, 1927) The Grain Front: Excerpts from a Talk to Students of the Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy and the Sverdlov Univer­ sity (May 28, 1928) Lenin and the Question of the Alliance with the Middle Peasant. Reply to Comrade S. (June 12, 1928) 194 Appendix 1

Question Concerning Socialist Construction in the Soviet Union: Ex­ cerpts from"R eport to a Meeting of the Activists of the Leningrad Organization forthe CPSU," Results of the July Plenum of the Cen­ tral Committee of the CPSU (July 13, 1928) [N.B., the phrase "Question Concerning Socialist Construction in the Soviet Union" does not appear in the English translation published in the Soviet Union, though it does appear in the Chinese edition. I have trans­ lated the phrase from the Chinese and have included it here.] The Right Danger in the CPSU. Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the CPSU (October 19, 1928) National Industrialization and the Right Tendency of the CPSU (No­ vember 19, 1928) The Right Deviation in the CPSU. Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (April 1929) A Year of Great Change (January 7, 1929) 5. Struggle forAgricultural Collectivization Stalin Several Problems of Soviet Land Policies (December 27, 1929) Concerning the Policy of Eliminating the Kulaks as a Class (January 21, 1930) Dizzy with Success: Concerning Questions of the Collective-Farm Movement (March 2, 1930) Reply to Collective-Farm Comrades (April 3, 1930) The Increasing Advance of Socialist Construction and the Internal Situation in the U.S.S.R. (June 21, 1930) The Tasks of Economic Personnel (Speech on February 4, 1931) The Tasks of the New Situation and the New Economic Order (Speech on June 23, 1931) The Results of the First Five-Year Plan. Report Delivered on January 7, 1933, to the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and CC of the CPSU On the Wo rk of the Rural Areas (January 11, 1933) Speech at the First National Congress of Collective Farm Shock Wo rk­ ers (February 19, 1933) The Continuing Progress of National Economy and the Internal Situ­ ation in the U.S.S.R. Excerpts from the Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress of the Wo rk of the Central Committee of the CPSU (January 26, 1934) Excerpts from the Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress of the Wo rk of the Central Committee of the CPSU (January 26, 1934) Appendix 1 195

6. Struggle to Complete Socialist Construction Stalin Speech to Graduating Class of Red Army Academy (May 4, 1935) Speech to the First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites (Novem­ ber 17, 1935) The Internal Situation in the U.S.S.R.: Excerpts from the Summary Report of the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU, on the Central Committee's Political Wo rk (March 10, 1939) Speech to Conference of the Foremost Combine Operators (Decem­ ber 1, 1935) Speech to Wo rkers of the Higher Schools (May 17, 1938)

Appendix 2

The Soviet Experience in Building Socialism: Selected Articles from Xuexi and New China

EGINNING IN MID- 1953, as Mao was completing the general frameworkfor Bhis general line, a series of articles concerning the Soviet Union's experi­ ence in building socialism appeared in a party publication called Xuexi (here­ inafteras XX) and in New China (hereinafter as XY). These articles were in­ tended to educate the rank and file so thatthey could keep up with the party's new initiatives. These articles are extremely valuable forthe purpose of this study because they show what Mao and the CCP considered to be important at the time they were formulatingthe general line for socialist transition. Se­ lected articles appearing in XX and XY relevant to this study are organized here by topic; the titles are arranged in chronological order by date of publi­ cation.

Conditions in the Soviet Union: 1921-1925

Chen Hanbo. "Cong zhanshi gongchanzhuyi zhengce guodu dao xinjingji zhengce" [The transition from"war communism" to NEP]. XX 5 (1953): 18-21. Zhang Xianchou. "Xinjingji zhengce de shizhi" [The essence ofthe NEP]. XX 5 (1953): 22-28. Zou Shumin. "Sulian 1921 nian dao 1925 nian de gongye zhuangkuang" [Industrial conditions in the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1925]. XX 5 (1953): 29-31. Ding Yu. "Sulian 1921 nian dao 1925 nian de nongye zhuangkuang" [Agricultural con­ ditions in the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1925]. XX 5 (1953): 31-34. Deng Quan. "Sulian 1921 nian dao 1925 nian de shangye zhuangkuan" [Commercial conditions in the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1925]. XX 5 (1953): 34-36.

-197 - 198 Appendix 2

Chen Dao. "Huifugu omin jingji shiqi de shangye wenti" [Questions concerning com­ merce during the period of national economic recovery]. XX 6 (1953): 17-23. Dong Sen. "Sulian 1921 nian dao 1925 nian de jinrong zhuangkuang" [Monetary con­ ditions in the Soviet Union between 1 921 and 1925]. XX6(1 953): 28-30. Wen Zixu. "Sulian 1921 nian dao 1925 nian de caizheng zhuangkuang" [Financial con­ ditions in the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1925] . XX 6 (1953): 30-32. Gao Zhengsheng. "Sulian 1921 nian dao 1925 nian de hezuoshe zhuangkuang" [Con­ ditions in Soviet cooperatives between 1921 and 1925]. XX 8 (1953): 31-33. Luo Jinglan. "Sulian huifu guomin jingji shiqizhong wuzhong jingji chengfen de xi­ aozhang zhuangkuang" [The growth and decline of the fivetypes of economic ele­ ments during the period of the Soviet national economic recovery] . XX 9 (1953): 31-32. Chen Maoyi. "Guodu shiqi ruhe duidai zibenzhuyi qiye" [How to deal with capitalist enterprises during the transition period]. XX 12 (1954): 12-15.

Conditions in the Soviet Union: 1926-1929

Hua Guangwu and Chen Ta o. "1926 nian dao 1929 nian Sulian de guoji guonei zhuangkuang" [International and domestic conditions in the Soviet Union between 1926 and 1929]. XX9(1 954): 18-20. Zou Shumin. "1926 nian dao 1929 nian Sulian de gongye zhuangkuang" [Industrial conditions in the Soviet Union between 1926 and 1929]. XX9(1 954): 20-2 1. Gao Song. "1926 nian dao 1929 nian Sulian de yunshuye zhuangkuang" [Conditions in the transport industry in the Soviet Union between 1926 and 1929]. XX9(19 54): 22-23. Hu Qilin. "1926 nian dao 1929 nian Sulian de nongye zhuangkuang" [Agricultural conditions in the Soviet Union between 1926 and 1929]. XX9(19 54): 23-25. Deng Quan. "1926 nian dao 1929 nian Sulian de shangye zhuangkuang" [Commercial conditions in the Soviet Union between 1926 and 1929]. XX 10 (1954): 36-37. He Zhuo. "1926 nian dao 1929 nian Sulian de caizheng jinrong zhuangkuang" [Fi­ nancial and monetary conditions in the Soviet Union between 1926 and 1929]. XX 10 (1954): 38-40. Luo Jinglan. "1926 nian dao 1929 nian Sulian wuzhong jingji de xiaozhang zhuangkuang" [The growth and decline of the fivetypes of economic elements in the Soviet Union between 1926 and 1929]. XX 10 (1954): 40-42.

Conditions in the Soviet Union: 1930-1934

Hu Qilin. "1930 nian dao 1934 nian Sulian de nongye zhuangkuang" [Agricultural conditions in the Soviet Union between 1930 and 1934]. XX 11 (1954): 14-16. Zheng Rong. "1930 nian dao 1934 nian Sulian de gongye zhuangkuang" [Industrial conditions in the Soviet Union between 1930 and 1934]. XX 11 (1954): 17-18. Appendix 2 199

Wang Yibin and Yu Weicong. "1930 nian dao 1934 nian Sulian de guoji guonei zhuangkuang" [International and domestic conditions in the Soviet Union between 1930 and 1934]. XX 11 (1954): 19-20. Deng Quan. "1930 nian dao 1934 nian Sulian de shangye zhuangkuang" [Commercial conditions in the Soviet Union between 1930 and 1934]. XX 2 (1955): 34-35. Liu Song. "1930 nian dao 1934 nian Sulian de jieji biandong zhuangkuang" [The change in class conditions in the Soviet Union between 1930 and 1934]. XX 2 (1955): 35-36.

The Short Course

Bianjibu [Editorial department]. "Sulian huifu guomin jingji shiqi de jingji jianshe wenti-gong zhongjizu xuexi liangong (bu) dangshi, dijiuzhang tigang yong" [Questions concerning economic construction during the period of the Soviet na­ tional economic recovery-providing middle-level cadres with a study outline of chapter 9 of History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course] . XX9(19 53): 17-23.

-- . "Sulian wei shixian guojia de shehuizhuyi gongyehua er douzhengshi de jingji jianshe wenti-gong zhongjizu xuexi liangong (bu) dangshi, dishizhang tigang yong" [Questions concerning economic construction at the time of the Soviet struggle to achieve national socialist industrialization-providing middle-level cadres with a study outline of chapter 10 of History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course] . XX 5 (1954): 5-16.

--. "Sulian wei shixian nongye jitihua er douzhengshi de jingji jianshe wenti­ gong zhongjizu xuexi liangong (bu) dangshi dishiyizhang tigang yong" [Questions concerning economic construction at the time of the Soviet struggle to achieve agri­ cultural collectivization-providing middle-level cadres with a study outline of chapter 11 of History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course] , XX 11 (1954): 3-1 1.

Industrialization

Fang Yuan. "Shehuizhuyi guojia gongyepin de jiage zhengce" [The pricing policy of in­ dustrial products in socialist countries]. XX 7 (1953): 3-1 1. Chen Hanbo. "Shehuizhuyi guojia gongyehua de fangzhen" [The guiding principles of industrialization in socialist countries]. XX 10 (1953): 15-20. Wang Fu. "Sulian shehuizhuyi gongyehua de zijin wenti" [Questions concerning fund­ ing forsocialist industrialization in the Soviet Union]. XX 10 (1953): 20-24. Li Qun. "Sulian gongyehua chuqi de liangshi wenti" [Grain problems during the ini­ tial stages of Soviet industrialization]. XX 11 (1953): 4-12. Chen Yuxiang. "Sulian shehuizhuyi gongyehua de sudu" [The pace of socialist indus­ trialization in the Soviet Union], XX 12 (1953): 19-25. 200 Appendix 2

Fang Yuan. "Sulian renmin zai gongyehua chuqi zenyang wei jilei zijin er lishing jieyue" [How the Soviet people practiced strict economy in order to accumulate capital during the initial stages of industrialization]. XX 12 (1953): 25-31.

Collectivization

Li He. "Sulian nongye de shehuizhuyi gaizao de daolu" [The road to socialist transfor­ mation of agriculture in the Soviet Union]. Xinhua yuebao [New China Monthly] (hereinafteras XY) 3 (1954): 162-65. Wei Wei. "Sulian nongye jitihua de jiben fangzhen" [The basic guiding principles for collectivization in the Soviet Union]. XX 3 (1954): 33-36. "Liangong (bu) zhongyang 1930 nian yiyue wuri'guanyu jitihua de sudu he guojia bangzhu jiti nongzhuang jianshe de banfa' de jueyi" [Decisions on the pace of col­ lectivization and methods of state assistance in the construction of collective farms by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (Bolshevik) on January 5th, 1930). xx 11 (1954): 11-12. "Liangong (bu) zhongyang 1930 nian sanyue shisiri 'guanyu fandui waiqu dangde jiti nongzhuang yundong luxian' de jueyi" [Decisions made by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (Bolshevik) on March 14, 1930, on how to combat misrepresentations of the party line guiding the collective farm campaign]. XX 11 (1954): 13-14. Li Fu. "Sulian gongchandang zenyang lingdao shixian nongye quanpan jitihua de douzheng" [How the Soviet Communist Party led the struggle to achieve compre­ hensive collectivization]. XX 12 (1954): 22-25.

Soviet First Five-Year Plan

Chen Chi. "Sulian diyige wunian jihua de jiben renwu" [The basic tasks of the Soviet Union's First Five-Year Plan]. XX 1 (1954): 34-36.

Soviet Party Congresses

Chen Chi. "Jieshao 'Eguo gongchandang (bu) shiyici daibiao dahuishang zhongyang weiyuanhui de zhengzhi baogao"' [Introducing "The Political Report of the Central Committee delivered to the Eleventh Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)"]. XX 3 (1953): 32, 40-43. Hu Qilin. "Sulian gongchandang dishisici daibiao dahui de qingkuang" [The Four­ teenth Party Congress of the CPSU]. XX 12 (1953): 32-33. Chen Tao. "Sulian gongchandang dishiwuci daibiao dahui de qingkuang" [The Fif­ teenth Party Congress of the CPSU]. XX 12 (1953): 34-36. Appendix 2 201

Pan Peixin. "Sulian gongchandang dishiliuci daibiao huiyi de qingkuang" [The Six­ teenth Party Conference of the CPSU]. XX 12 (1953): 36. Chen Wenzhuang and Yang De. "Sulian gongchangdang dishiliuci daibiao dahui de qingkuang" [The Sixteenth Party Congress of the CPSU]. XX 3 (1955): 36-37. Wu Jianfei and Hu Ping. "Sulian gongchandang dishiqici huiyi de qingkuang" [The Seventeenth Party Conference of the CPSU]. XX 3 (1955): 37-38. Ding Yu and Liu Jingmei. "Sulian gongchandang dishiqici daibiao dahui de qingkuang" [The Seventeenth Party Congress of the CPSU]. XX 3 19( 55): 38-40. Yi Wen. "Sulian gongchandang dishibaci daibiao huiyi deqingkuang" [The Eighteenth Party Conference of the CPSU]. XX 3 (1955): 40.

The Writings of Lenin and Stalin

Sun Dingguo. "Sidalin tongzhi duiyuji anshe gongchanzhuyi de lilun de weida gong­ xian" [Comrade Stalin's great theoretical contribution to the construction of com­ munism]. XX 4 (1953): 24-27. Fang Yuan. "Liening de tongyi jingji jihua-jieshao Su E dianqihua jihua" [Lenin's uni­ fiedeconomic planning: Introduction to Soviet Russia's Electrification Planning] . XX 5 (1953): 9-17. He Jun. "Jieshao Liening de Lun hezuozhi" [Introducing Lenin's On Cooperatives] . XX 5 (1953): 37-40. Zhang Xianchou. "Liening de hezuohua jihua" [Lenin's plan for cooperativization]. xx6 (1953): 23-28. Chen Manyuan. "Xuexi Sulian shehuizhuyi jingji wenti jiajin women de jingji jianshe gongzuo" [Studying The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR and intensify­ ing our economic construction work]. XX?(1 953): 27-31. Zhang Xianchou. "Yiguo jiancheng shehuizhuyi shehui de Wenti" [Questions con­ cerning the building of socialism in one country]. XX 8 (1953): 15-19. Ma Jibin. "Liening Sidalin lun Sulian huifuguomin jingji shiqi de guojia zibenzhuyi" [Lenin and Stalin on state capitalism during the period of the Soviet national eco­ nomic recovery] . XX 8 (1953): 28-30. Chen Chi. "Xuexi Sidalin tongzhi zhu Lun Sulian jingji zhuangkuang he dangde zhengce" [Study comrade Stalin's Soviet Economic Conditions and Party Policies]. XX 10 (1953): 32-35. Wu Jiang. "Liening Sidalin lun lianhe zhongnong wenti" [Lenin and Stalin on the question of uniting middle peasants]. XX 11 (1953): 16-21. Fan Ruoyu. "Xuexi Liening guanyu guodu shiqi de lilun wei shixian woguo zai guodu shiqi de zongluxian er fendou"[S tudy Lenin's theories concerning the transition pe­ riod in order to achieve the goals of the general line for the transition period in China]. XX2(19 54): 3-5. Yang Feng. "Liening guanyu cong zichanjieji minzhu geming zhuanbian wei she­ huizhuyi de lilun" [Lenin's theories concerning the change frombourgeois demo­ cratic revolution to socialist revolution]. XY 4 (1955): 39-43.

References in English

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Index

Agriculture, Ministry of: Agricultural capitalists, 16, 79, 90-9 ln28; Administration Department, 164 confiscation of bureaucratic capital, An Ziwen, 152 65, 67, 90-9ln28 Angang, 40 Anshan,32. See also Anshan steel plant CCP. See Chinese Communist Party Anshan steel plant, 31. See also Anshan Central Party School, 33, 99 Changchun Railroad, 29, 30 Beijing, 16, 78, 139, 160 Chen Boda, 37, 38, 55n1 54, 76, 154, 161, Beijing Institute for Marxism and 162 Leninism, 33, 153, l 76n23 Chen Duxiu: and Comintern, 20 Beria, Laverenti, 41, 43, 57nl91 Chen Yi, 85 Bo Gu, 97 Chen Yo uwei, 123 Bo Yibo, 5, 18, 111, 113, 114, 124, 126, Chen Yun, 9n16, 18, 21, 23, 131; and 142, 163, 171, 187; and agricultural grain crisis in summer 1953, 156; policy debate, 153; demotion and grain procurement policy, 159 (see later reinstatement of, 139; new tax also grain procurement policy); and law, 138-39; new tax law, and Mao's Stalin's advice on the national harsh criticism of, 139 bourgeoisie in March 1949, 63 Bolshevik (Soviet party magazine), 37 Cheng, Zihua, 151 Braun, Otto, 21 Chiang Kai-shek, 19, 24, 31 Broz, Josip. See Tito, Marshall China. See People's Republic ofChina Bukharin, Nikolay, 97, 106, 119n55, 136, (PRC) 171 China, socialist transformationof, 115; bureaucratic capitalism, 126; "high tide" of, 75, 173, 186 bureaucratic capital, 79; bureaucratic China, Soviet sources of ideas for, 95

- 24 1 - 242 Index

Chinese civil war, 28, 47 Chinese Red Army, 20, 21 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 1, 4, collectivization in China, 73, 109, 13, 17-18, 28-29, 48, 76, 83, 85-88, 149-50, 172, 173; agricultural credit 89, 91n31, 130, 137, 138, 170, 190; cooperatives, 164, 168; and curbing party directives of, 42, 81, 90-9 1n28, the "rash advance," 155, 161, 162; 132, 155, 156; party resolutions of, higher production cooperatives 39, 139, 173, 174; Politburo meetings (HPCs), 165; lower production of, 37, 68, 77, 110, 132, 133, 135, 138, cooperatives (LPCs), 152, 161, 163, 159, 163, 188; propaganda of, 155, 164; and Mao, 115, 121, 124, 128, 160; Stalin, written reports to, 4 134, 162-63, 164-65, 175; mutual-aid Chinese Communist Party (CCP), production teams, 73, 87, 124, 125, meetings and conferences of: 127, 136, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 161, Chengdu Conference of 1958, 167; 163, 164, 172-73; "rash advance" Jin-Sui Conference of 1948, 153; (maojin), 155; supply and marketing Lushan Conference of 1959, 104; cooperatives (SMCs), 69, 73-74, 75, Second Plenum of the Seventh 86, 150-5 1, 152, 156, 164, 168 (see Central Committee meeting in also Zhang We ntian) March 1949, 36, 68, 78, 79, 167; collectivization in Soviet Union, 107, Secretariat meeting of September 24, 108, 163, 170 1952, 114, 115; September Cominform, 29, 35 Conference of 1948, 26, 46, 67, 68; Comintern: CCP, relationship with, 22 Seventh Party Congress of April (see also Chinese Communist Party); 1945, 108; Third Plenum of the and Chen Duxiu, 20; and Mao, Seventh Central Committee meeting 20-2 1, 188, 189; Mao, condemnation of June 1950, 110; Ya ngjiagou, of, 23; and Sixth Party Congress of December 1947 meeting in, 25 CPSU in 1928, 20 (see also Chinese Communist Party (CCP), work Communist Party of the Soviet conferences of: "August Report" of Union); strategy of early 1940s, 23 1952, 18; Conference on Mutual-Aid Commerce, Ministry of, 137 Teams in September 1951 (see Common Program (temporary Conference on Mutual-Aid Te ams in constitution of 1949), 138 September 1951); First National Communist Party of the Soviet Union Conference on Organizational Work (CPSU), 19, 41, 46, 97, 106, 109, 163, of March 1951, 127; First National 170, 188; Department of Conference on Rural Wo rk of April International Information (OMI), 23; 1953, 127; National Conference on FifteenthParty Congress of 1927, Financial and Economic Work in 106; Nineteenth Party Congress in summer 1953, 111, 132, 138, 139, October 1952, 39, 42, 85, 87, 163; 145n62, 167; Third National Politburo meeting on July 27, 1949, Conference on Mutual-Aid 28; propaganda resolution of Cooperatives, October 26-November November 14, 1938, 97 5, 1953, 161 Conference on Mutual-Aid Te ams in Chinese People's Political Consultative September 1951: draftresolution Conference (CPPCC), 112, 140, 141; from, 154; Mao's role in, 154; three Forty-Ninth Standing Committee of, "rightist expressions," Mao's criticism 131, 140 of, 135-36 Index 243 constitution, 35, 85 Ganbu bidu, 99 CPPCC. See Chinese People's Political Gao Gang, 31, 136, 139, 145n62, 152; Consultative Conference Mao Zedor:ig,relationship with, 40, CPSU. See Communist Party of the 48, 122, 132, 138 Soviet Union general line. See general line forsocialist Cultural Revolution, 5, 12n25, 100, 129, transition of 1953 171, 186 general line forsocialist transition of 1953, 1, 13, 103, 111, 128, 129, 132, daixiao ("sell on commission"), 138 136, 140, 160, 164, 165, 172, 18lnl61; Dalian, 29, 30 CCP's official position in 1981, Deng Xiaoping, 65, 127, 160; speech by, 173-74 (see also Chinese Communist 160 Party); comparison with Stalin's Deng Zihui, 155, 161, 165, 187; "four general line, 7, 150, 170-72; freedoms," Mao's criticism of, 126, implementation "now," 86, 122; 127; "preserving rich peasant implementation of, 186; industrialists economy," policy of, 82-84 and capitalists, reactions of, 166; local "protecting private property;' Mao's officials,reactions of, 165; and Mao, 6, criticism of, 136 7, 122, 133, 170; Mao, announcement de-Stalinization of 1956, 8, 101 by, 1; Mao, formulationby, 13, 14, 40, Dimitrov, Georgi, 4; Mao Zedong, cable 121-22, 142, 170, 186; Mao as a of December 22, 1944, to, 23, 24, 104; "populist," debate concerning, 175; Mao Zedong, cable responses from, Mao's justificationfor, 15 0, 166-70; 23-24 Short Course, Mao's reliance on in formulation of, 115 (see also History East Lake, Wuhan, 129 of the All-Russian Communist Party economic euphoria in China in 1952, [Bolshevik] : Short Course); as policy 18-19 shift, 1-3, 185, 189; and "propaganda Engels, Friedrich, 36 outline:' 149, 162, 164, 166; Ewert, Arthur, 20 reappraisal of, 150, 173-75; Stalin, consultation with, 84-87; Stalin's Fedorenko, Nikolai, 30, 39, 40, 56nl74 response to, 87-88; statements about, FFYP. See First Five-Year Plan in China; 113-14; as surprise to country, 2 First Five-Year Plan in Soviet grain crisis of summer 1953, 6-7, 13, Union 122, 155-56, 158, 161, 163, 172, 175; Financial and Economic Commission, Emergency Meeting on Grain, 138, 158 159, 160, 161; eight solutions First Five-Year Plan (FFYP) in China, 19, proposed, 158-59 32, 48, 54-55nl35, 64, 88, 109, 110, grain procurement policy, 159; regional 111, 114, 115, 164 leaders, concerns of, 160; support First Five-Year Plan (FFYP) in Soviet received from Mao and top leaders, Union, 106-7, 108, 123 159-60 Five-Antis, 14, 15, 16-18, 87, 112, 125, grain taxation system, 156; chatian 130 dingchan ("measure land area and Ford Model T A3-5 l automobile, 33 determine production levels"), "fourfreedoms": Mao's criticism of, 126. 156-57; gongliang (taxes paid by See also Deng Zihui peasants in form of grain), 156 244 Index

Great Leap Forward of 1958-1960, 8 jihua shougou jihua xiaoshou ("planned Great Wa ll region, 22 procurement and planned marketing "guaranteed private ownership": Mao's system"), 160 attack on, 162. See also Deng Zihui Jilin hydroelectric power station, 32 joint public-private ownership (gongsi Hainan rubber plantation, 30 heying), 125; and joint public-private handicraft industry, transformation of, enterprises, 128, 139; and Li We ihan, 130, 150 131; and Mao, 125, 128, 135, 139; and He Changgong, 32 Zhou Enlai, 131 higher production cooperatives (HPCs), 165 Kang Sheng, 23 History of the All-Russian Communist Kardelj, Edvard, 35 Party (Bolshevik): Short Course, 67, KGB, 41 70-72, 96-97, 120n94, 145n60; Khrushchev, Nikita, 30, 35; de­ application by Mao in China, 97-101; Stalinization of 1956 by, 30, 35, 97; Chinese translation, 97-98; and Soviet agriculture, report on means communist world, 97; and Liu to improve, 163 Shaoqi, 98 (see also Liu Shaoqi); and KMT. See Kuomintang Mao, 3, 6-7, 95-96, 97, 98-99, 101-2, Kolakowski, Leszek, 72 114-16, 133, 134, 149, 162, 164, 168, Korean War, 13, 32, 34, 47, 48, 84, 110, 169, 170, 175, 187; Marxism and 111; armistice at end of, 1; China, Leninism, as encyclopedia of, 97, 102; impact on, 15; and Mao, 14, 41, 43 and Ren Bishi, 97 (see also Ren Bishi); Kovalev, Ivan, 24-25, 33, 63 socialism, as roadmap forMao's kulaks, 106, 107 building, 46, 95, 104-9, 116; and Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party), Stalin, 96; study campaign for, 132; 19, 20, 24-25, 31,44, 66, 77, 79 summary of chapters 9-12 of, 104-8; use during the Rectification Lai Ruoyu, 153 Campaign, 103-4; what Mao learned land law of 1947, 82 from, 108-9; and Zhang Wentian, 99 Land Reform,15 -16, 18, 110; Mao's (see also Zhang We ntian) reporting in person to Stalin in 1950 Hong Kong, 49nl, 63 about, 80; in newly liberated areas, HPCs. See higher production 15, 65-67, 79, 80; in old liberated cooperatives areas, 66; rich peasants, effects on, 65; Hu Qiaomu, 37, 149 Stalin's policy recommendations for, Hu Sheng, 175, 182n169, 182nnl 71-72, 81; Stalin's "two-stage" land reform 182-83n 173; and Mao as a "populist," policy, Mao's agreement with, 82; 175 Stalin's "two-stage" land reform Huadong, 58n 198; Huadong Bureau, 82 policy, Mao's later disassociation Huang Kecheng, 78-79, 92n78, 114 from, 84; two-stage land reform policy, 66, 80, 82 Japanese Communist Party (JCP), 85 Lenin, 36, 45, 46, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 101, JCP. See Japanese Communist Party 105, 160; China, view on, 19; on Jiamusi (city), 99 "cooperative socialism:' 70, 71-72, Index 245

170; death of, 72; and NEP, 2, 45, 46, directives and instructions of, 4, 69, 70, 99, 105, 133, 166, 168, 169, 70, 55nl 36; "rich peasant" party 185; on "state capitalism," 70-7 1, 169; members, debate on, 152; Roshchin, theories of, 68; on "transitional Nikolai, conversations with, 16, 18, economy;' 69; on transition to 49nl2, 81; and SMCs, 154 (see also socialism, 45, 68, 166, 170, 174; works collectivization in China: supply and of, 70, 133, 169, 187 marketing cooperatives); Soviet Leninism, 103, 166 succession struggle, hearing Stalin's Lewin, Moshe, 70 comments about, 41; Stalin, Joseph, Li Fuchun, 113 last meeting with, 64; Stalin, Joseph, Li Jingquan, 160 letter on Mao's behalf to, 85-87, Li Lisan, 21, 139; and Comintern, 20; 180nl 26; Stalin, Joseph, October Comintern's "rich peasant" policies, 1952 meeting with, 85, 87; Stalin's deviation from,20; on state response to, letter on Mao's behalf, capitalism, 131, 133; Wuhan, research 87; Tianjin and the Northeast, trip in 1953 to, 130; Li Rui, 104 speeches in, 63; and "transition from Li Shunda, 172, 173 New Democracy to socialism," 45-46; Li Weihan, 136; state capitalism, Zhang We ntian's economic proposal, investigation of, 130; state capitalism, revision of, 69 report on the practice of, 130-3 1, Liu Xiao, 25 144n48 Long March, 21 Liang Shuming, 141, 157, 187; CCP, lower production cooperatives (LPCs). criticism of, 140 (see also Chinese See under collectivization in China Communist Party); Mao, as target of LPCs. See collectivization in China: attacks by, 141; Mao, responses to lower production cooperatives attacks by, 141; Mao's counterattacks Lu Zuofu (founder of Minsheng on, 140-4 1 Shipping Company), 128 Liao Luyan, 113, 161-62 Luo Ruiqing, 113 Lin Biao, 31 Lin Boqu, 136 Malenkov, Georgy, 112, 163; "New Liu Huinong, 125, 128 Course" of, 43 Liu Lantao, 153 Manchuria, 20, 21, 22, 24 Liu Shaoqi, 31, 40, 5ln65, 62, 63-64, 65, Mao Zedong, 8, 9nll, 18, 20, 5ln50, 74, 76, 88, 90nl2, 9ln31, 113, 121, 52n85, 52-53n92, 88, 92n78, 93n98, 126, 130, 134, 155, 163, 171, 176n23, 112, 118n29, 120n94, 122-23, 130, 187; and agrarian policy debate and 160; belief system of, 7, 80; and Bo "utopian socialism:' 153, l 76n23; and Yibo, 138-39, 142; and Comintern, consolidation of New Democratic 20-2 1; economic policy orientation order, 127; Mao, cables to, 94nl21; of, 77-79, 154; and Gao Gang, 154, Mao's new policies, explanation of, 171 (see also Gao Gang); ideological 110-11; Mikoyan, Anastas, orientation of, 62; inspection trip to discussions with, 79 (see also south, 122, 124-29; and Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Anastas); Moscow, summer Nikita, 189; leadership style, and 1949 visit to, 27-28, 33; policy secrecy, 122, 171, 18 7; leadership style 246 Index

ot 6, 7, 82-84, 122, 138-39, 154, Stalin, 30; Moscow, attempts at visits 171-72; legacy in China, 189-90; and to, 26, 52n71; Moscow, visit to, Liang Shuming, 140-42; and Liu 29-30; need to improve relationship Shaoqi, 46, 110-1 1, 139, 153-54, 165; with Stalin, 25-26; patterns of "On the Practice;' 28, 37; paichu communications, 40; personality cult policy toward private retailing of Mao and Stalin, 44; pledge of industries, 137-38; and peasant­ deference and subordination to based revolution, 20; policy directives Stalin, 26-27; on political matters of, 4; policy reversals, and receptivity to Stalin, 35; relationship, bureaucratic capitalists, 67; and works on, 30; relationship in early propaganda, 122, 123-24, 172-73; 1940s, 22-24; rivalry with Stalin, 3, and role in domestic economic policy 188, 189; seeking help from Stalin, (see Mao Zedong, and role in 25; Stalin's economic advice, domestic economic policy); role in responses to, 64, 65; Stalin's help with political campaigns, 16, 49n4, 49nl l; party reorganization, seeking, 112; Selected Wo rks of Mao Zedong, 37, 39, Stalin's intervention in civil war, 56nl 74, 145n60; and SM Cs, 74 (see resentment about, 28; Stalin's also collectivization in China: supply requests, responses to, 22; Stalin's and marketing cooperatives); and "two-step" approach to building Soviet post-Stalin collective cooperatives, acceptance of, 7 4; leadership, 6, 13, 19, 39, 41-44, 48 strategies in dealing with Stalin, 27, (see also Soviet collective leadership); 62, 89; tribute to and later thoughts and Soviet Union (see Mao Zedong, on Stalin, 40, 101; yielding to and Soviet Union); speech at pressure from Stalin, 24 Politburo meeting on June 15, 1953, Mao Zedong, and role in domestic 145n68; speech at Ya n'an in May economic policy, 14, 69, 186-87; and 1941, 103; Stalin, cables to, 57nl 76, agrarian policy debate, 153; joint 112; Stalin, relationship with (see public-private ventures, 124-25, 128; Mao Zedong, and relationship with land ownership, concerning change Stalin); and Tito, Marshall, 35; and in, 162; new tax law, 138-39 transition to socialism, 18, 111, 113, Mao Zedong, and Soviet Union, 19-35; 114, 121, 122, 125, 126, 134, 169; and Anastas Mikoyan, Mao's discussions "two-frontwar" strategy, 20; and with, 79 (see also Mikoyan, Anastas); "two-line struggles," 139, 142, 187; "high tide of learning from theSoviet and Wang Ming, 38, 102; and Zhang Union;' Mao's call for a, 48; "lean-on­ We ntian, 102; and Zhou Enlai, 124 one-side," Mao's policy of, 35; Lenin Mao Zedong, and relationship with and Stalin's ideals and writings, Mao's Stalin, 3, 13, 53nl06, 154, 163, 187, reliance on, 132-33, 167, 169 188; assertion of independence from Mao Zedong thought, 35-36, 38-39, Stalin, 49, 68, 188; dependency on 56n163, 187 Stalin, 6, 19, 27, 31-35, 48, 188; "de­ Maoism, 36 Stalinization" speech by Mao, 188; Maring, 20 frequentco mmunications in the late Marx, Karl, 36, 133, 167; theories of, 68, 1940s, 26; Mao as junior partner, 7, 103, 188 19, 48, 188; Mao's 1958 view of Marxism, 103, 166 Index 247

Mikoyan, Anastas, 25, 36, 47; Xibaipo, October Revolution, 99 visit in early 1949 to, 26-27, 31, 67, old liberated areas, 151 68, 79-80 (see also Xibaipo) Minsheng Shipping Company, 128-29; paichu (squeeze out) policy forcapitalist as model forjo int public-private commerce, 129, 134, 137, 138 companies, 129 Peng Dehuai, 119n47, 187 Molotov, V. M., 4, 41 People's Daily. See Renmin ribao Mongolia, Outer, 22 People's Democracies, 1, 25, 29, 39, 61, 63, 123; Czechoslovakia, 1953 Nanjing, 124, 125, 128 uprising in, 42; East Germany, 1953 national bourgeoisie, 16, 17, 61, 113, uprising in, 42; and land reform, 126, 130; Anastas Mikoyan's policy 15-16 suggestions in early 1949 regarding, People's Liberation Army (PLA), 48 79 (see also Mikoyan, Anastas); CCP's People's Republic of China (PRC), 1, 13, two-pronged policy concerning, 62, 14, 18, 25, 30, 31, 32, 35, 50n21,64, 63 (see also Chinese Communist 80, 85, 109, 113, 114, 134, 185 Party); Mao's views of, 16, 112 People's University, 33, 254nl53 Nationalist Party. See Kuomintang petit bourgeoisie, 16 National People's Congress (NPC), 35, plague of Asian locusts, 34 84-85, 88 plague of Zhangjiakou, 33-34 Neutrality Act, 22 Port Arthur, 27, 29-30 New Democracy, 1, 2, 44-46, 77, 111, Pravda, 37, 56nl 74, 72; editorial of July 114, 12� 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 165, 13, 1953, 42 174, 185; criticism by Mao of production cooperatives in Soviet "consolidation of New Democratic Union, 72, 73 order," 126, 135 (see also Liu Shaoqi); criticism by Mao of "walking toward Rao Shushi, 85; "preserving rich peasant socialism from New Democracy;' 135 economy," policy of, 83 (see also Zhou Enlai); definitionby Rectification Campaign (1941-1944), Mao in 1947, 44; New Democratic 23, 24, 28, 68, 95-96, 119n48 economy, 45, 75, 77, 132, 138; New Ren Bishi, 23, 31, 34, 5ln50, 65, 73, Democratic revolution, 165, 169; New 92n57; and Short Course, 97 (see also Democratic stage, 77, 153; redefinition History of the All-Russian Communist by Mao in 1948, 44-46; redefinition Party [Bolshevik] : Short Course) by Mao in 1953, 167, 169; transitional Renmin Daxue. See People's University economy, 69, 114; "transition from Renmin ribao, 37, 39, 41, 42, 56nl 74, New Democracy to socialism," 68, 77, 57nl91, 57-58nl96, 58nl 98, 123, 134, 166 (see also Liu Shaoqi) 129, 132, 143nnll-13, 145n60, 155, North China Bureau, 153, 176n23; 163, 180nl41; editorial of January 29, report of, 153 1953, 143n10; editorial of March 26, Northeast, the, 33, 44, 48, 63, 65, 67, 68, 1953, l 77n43; editorial of November 69, 74, 75, 76, 77, 110, 123, 143nll, 26, 1953, 42 150, 151, 154, 155 rich peasants, 61, 62, 69; Mao's Northeast model, 81; implementation consultation in 1950 with regional of, 150-5 1. See also Zhang We ntian leaders concerning, 82-84; "new rich 248 Index

peasants;' 151; policy debate in 1950 recommendations to); and Chinese concerning, 151-52; "rich peasant" Communist Party (CCP), policies, preservation of, 84; Stalin's relationship with (see Stalin, Joseph, policy recommendations on, 81, 82, 88 and Chinese Communist Party Rosh chin, Nikolai, 4, 9n 16, 16, 17, 40, [ CCP], relationship with; Chinese 49nl2, 52-53n92, 8 1 , 93n88 Communist Party); Complete Wo rks rural consumers' cooperatives in Soviet of Stalin, 37; death of, 1, 1 ln21, 13, Union, 72, 7 4 39, 40-44, 57-58n196, 58n1 98, 159, 170; Economic Problems of Socialism Safranko, Emanuel, 17, SOn 17, 54n 134 in the U.S.S.R., 39, 42, 57-58nl 96, Saich, Tony, 95, 102 100; on "Flax Centre," 73; Schwartz, Benjamin I., 3, 95 Foundations of Leninism, 72, 153; Second United Front, 20 general line of 1929 of, 1, 170-7 1, Shaan-Gan-Ning border region, 74 185; leadership style of, 170, 171; Shanghai, 32, 55n136 Lenin's "cooperative socialism," Shen Zhihua, Russian archive collection reinterpretation of, 72-73; Lenin's of, 9n12 "two-step approach" and, 72, 7 4; Mao Shi Zhe, 5, 23, 2� 30 Zedong, relationship with (see Stalin, Short Course. See History of the All­ Joseph, and Mao Zedong, Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik): relationship with); personality cult Short Course of, 43; Selected Wo rks of Stalin, 37-38; shumai (redemption), 126 works of, 169, 187 Sino-Soviet split of 1960, 36, 189 Stalin, Joseph, and China: aid to, 19, Sneevliet, Hendricus. See Maring 24-25; diplomatic recognition, socialism, Stalinist road to, 1, 2, 103, agreement in summer 1949 to 116, 134 support, 27; dual approach in late South-Central Bureau, 125, 145n60, 165 1940s toward, 24; economic euphoria Soviet advisors and experts, 31, 40 in 1952 of, 18-19; Manchuria, Soviet-Chinese joint-stock companies, assistance in, 19-20 (see also 30, 53n101 Manchuria); policy priorities for, 85; Soviet collective leadership, 42 trade with We st of, 15; views on, 19, 21 Soviet Foreign Language Publishing Stalin, Joseph, and China, policy Bureau, 98 recommendations to: on Soviet political economy textbooks, 100 collectivization, 166, 170; national Soviet Red Army, 27, 47, 48 bourgeoisie, advice on, 88 (see also Soviet Union, civil war in, 99 Chen Yun); on NPC and constitution, Soviet Union, socialist transformation 88 (see also constitution; National of, 106 People's Congress); policy Stalin, Joseph, 36-37, 54n 134, 76, 90nl3, recommendations, 3-4; on transition 101, 105, 122, 134, 135, 136, 143nl3, to socialism, 85; two-stage land-reform 153, 155, 168, 169, 211, 212; on policy proposal, 80-81 Bulgarian kulaks, 81; and China (see Stalin, Joseph, and Chinese Communist Stalin, Joseph, and China); and Party (CCP), relationship with: China, policy recommendations to apology to, 28; Cominform,rejection (see Stalin, Joseph, and China, policy of request to join, 29 (see also Index 249

Cominform); FFYP, support for, 34, two-line struggle, 6, 100; intraparty 114; on need to improve relations politics, as basis for interpreting, 102; with, 24; "new assignment" for, 28; Maoist discourse on party history, as praise of, 28 basis for, 104; between socialist and Stalin, Joseph, and Mao Zedong, capitalist roads, 142; Soviet party relationship with: advice to, 45, history, as basis forunderstanding, 101 61-62; constraints on, 35-40, 188; economic advice to, 62-64, 88-89; United Front of 1924-1927, 20 Mao Zedong's works, support for U.S. Department of State, 49nl; publication in Russia of, 36; Mao declassifiedintelligence reports of, 5 Zedong thought, refusal to recognize, 35-36; Rectification Campaign, Wang Jiaxiang, 52-53n92, 85 displeasure with, 103-4 Wang Ming, 23 Stalinism, 166, 190; Mao's devotion to, Wang Renzhong, 129 175, 187, 189 Wang Shoudao, 82 state capitalism in China, 73, 130-3 1; war communism, 45, 105, 160 capitalists' dislike for, 166; Mao's Wu Xiuquan, 34 typology of, 139. See also Li Weihan Wuhan, 124-129, 171 state-owned economy, 75, 167, 186; CCP, priority given by, 69, 73 (see Xi'an Incident of 1936, 20 also Chinese Communist Party); Xiaogang district, 126 Mao's emphasis on importance of, Xibaipo, 26, 31,67, 68, 79 77; Mao, as most important Xie Juezai, 113 indicator for, 168; and state-owned Xie Weizen, 97 sector, 76, 114, 123, 156, 189. See also Xingtai prefecture, 125, 127 Zhang Wentian Xinjiang, 31 Su Shaozhi, 8-9n7 Xue Muqiao, 113, 18lnl63 Sun Yat-sun, 19 Xuexi [Study] , 132 Suppression-of-Counter- Revolutionaries, 14, 15, 16, 125 Yan'an, 12n25, 56nl63, 98, 150, 152 Suzhou region, 34 Ya ng Shangkun, 139 Ya ngtze River, 128, 129 Ta ss, 41, 42, 57nl91 Yao Yilin, 113 "Ten Great Relations;' 188 Yellow River basin: Mao's working Three-Antis, 14, 15, 16-18, 87, 125 vacation during fall 1952 in, 125 Tian Jiaying, 37, 55nl54 Yudin, Pavel, 24, 30, 37, 251nl 10 Tianjin, 16, 78, 166 Tito, Marshall, 29, 35 Zhang Wentian, 21, 71, 76, 78, 80, 130, tongguo tongxiao ("unifiedprocurement 150-5 1, 153; CCP leader, replacement and unified distribution"), 160-6 1 by Mao in 1938 as, 21 (see also transition to socialism in China, 44, 111, Chinese Communist Party); and 127, 165; by peaceful means, 86; top Mao's instructions to learn about leaders, and agreements and Soviet party organization, 112; and disagreements among, 136 Northeast model, 69, 73-75, 76; and Trotsky, Leon, 97 Short Course, 99 (see also History of 250 Index

the All-Russian Communist Party 126, 128, 130, 135, 138, 140, 159-60, [Bolshevik] : Short Course); state 167, 171, 187; Bo Yibo, and attack capitalism, typology of, 75, 131; on, 138; and joint public-private three-pronged approach of, 69, 76 ventures, 124; Mao Zedong, Zhang Yumei, 125 February 15, 1952, letter to, 18; Zhao Ziyang, 174, 179n92; and China's Roshchin, Nikolai, response to "initial stage of socialism," 174 queries of, 16, 18; Stalin, Joseph, Zhongnan Bureau, 82 summer 1952 report to, 18; and state Zhou Enlai, 4, 20, 23, 25, 27, 28, 31, 40, capitalism, 131; and "walk toward 52-53n92, 62, 88, 113, 114, 121, 124, socialism:' 135 About the Author

Hua-yu Li grew up in Beijing and attended Sophia University in Tokyo, Japan. She received a master's degree in regional studies-East Asia from Harvard University and a Ph.D. in comparative politics from Columbia University. Li is currently associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Ore­ gon State University. Her new book project focuseson the impact of Stalinism on China's political and ideological transformation under Mao, and on the continued influence of Stalinism in China today.

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