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Reconsidering the Military Axis of the Chinese Space Programme Reconsidering the Military Axis of the Chinese Space Programme E S P I 48 PERSPECTIVES Reconsidering the Military Axis of the Chinese Space Programme Alain De NEVE , Research Fellow at the Royal Higher Institute for Defence (RHID), Ph.D. Candidate at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) Many conjectures regarding the political and strategic objectives of the Chinese space programme emerged from the recent essays conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). According to some observers, these tend to suggest that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is not only making technological leaps forward, but is also clearly pursuing the development of the military axis of its space activities. Although legitimate concerns might result from the repeated ASAT tests and other demonstrations operated by the PLA, it should be reminded that the lack of information regarding Chinese space policy imposes us to be very careful when evaluating the future of China in space. The aim of this issue of the ESPI Perspectives’ series is to offer a balanced analysis of the Chinese space programme by examining some governance and policy aspects related to the country’s space activities. Finally, it will scrutinise as far as possible the future of the Chinese space programme, in order to understand how China could challenge the established leading technological powers. 1. Introduction CSS-5 in NATO terminology) 1, against one of its derelict weather satellites (FY-1C) orbiting in For several years now, China has been LEO at an altitude of 870km. The methods multiplying its achievements in the field of space adopted to carry out this test had raised some technologies. The repeated successes scored questions. Some wondered if several ASAT tests by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) covers against this same satellite had been conducted a wide range of segments in this sector at a very short interval or if the target had been (launchers, Earth observation, communications, destroyed by only one missile firing. Likewise, satellite radio navigation etc). The country’s one of the attempts at explaining the destruction accomplishments not only focus on the process of this satellite suggested that the PLA civil/commercial market, in which China is fully had actually conditioned the target satellite by developing international co-operation. More equipping it before its launch with a charge recently significant progresses were also made meant to be detonated at the required moment, in the military field of the Chinese space with the aim of giving the destruction the programme. Many states have been expressing appearance of an ASAT test. However, it seems legitimate concerns about the real goals of the now established that the test has been in deed country’s space programme. The facts lying at conducted by a kinetic interception system (hit- the basis of such concerns are well known. But it to-kill). This latest point deserves some seems quite appropriate to go back over their attention, because it would imply that unlike chronology. appearances suggested, the test conducted by the PLA fit more into an anti-missile scheme In October 2006 China used a high-powered than to solely space activities’ considerations. ground-based laser to temporarily blind an In response to this Chinese force demonstration, American reconnaissance satellite flying over its territory. One year later, in January 2007, the 1 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) successfully Most of the information about the technical conditions in launched an ASAT, based on the DF-21 which this ASAT test was conducted comes from open U.S. sources. Few details however leaked out about the exact intermediate-range ballistic missile (known as characteristics of the DF-21 missile, which has been most likely used for this test. ESPI Perspectives No. 48, June 2011 1 Reconsidering the Military Axis of the Chinese Space Programme the United States destroyed one of their own spy satellites, USA-193, in February 2008. It was In order to assess the influence of the Chinese intercepted by an SM-3 missile, fired from the space programme on the international security, Aegis -class cruiser USS Lake Erie . This we should go back over several basic facts. operation, which was officially conducted under First, let’s think about the place held since 1949 the pretext that the faulty satellite could cause by the space domain in the building-up of the hydrazine (or beryllium) pollution if its debris Chinese communist system. Let’s also highlight were to cross the atmosphere, was in fact the main approach adopted for its development intended as a display of power aimed at China. and based on the creation of a “useful space”. An analysis of the main Chinese achievements In January 2010, China confirmed to some in the field of space activities seems to confirm extent the “anti-missile” purpose of its tests by that the country is first and foremost considering openly carrying out, under this “cover”, a new this technological sector as a vector of the multi- ASAT test against one of its satellites. Yet sectorial development for the entire country.3 contradictory information spread about the results of this interception attempt. Several events in the 1980s prompted China to free itself from foreign support Regarding the January 2007 test, it had aroused for the development of its national space great public indignation among the international programme. community both with regard to the danger of a revival of a space arms race and with respect to the risks that this test could entail for the safety The space conquest goes back to the very roots of space platforms. Experts assess that this of the regime. It is indeed in the late 1950s that Chinese ASAT test would have generated on its the PRC launched a major missile research own a total of more than 2 million space debris programme for which Moscow accepted to share fragments of various sizes.2 its technologies for a while. What followed is indicative of the determination with which China In addition to these tests, China is also entered this domain. In 1970 China became the conducting space experiments, admittedly of a world’s fifth country to lift a satellite into orbit. In more dual nature, but all the same raising the 1984, PRC reached a significant technological question of the country’s ambitions. As such, it milestone when it successfully placed its first seems that last August China succeeded in geosynchronous satellite in orbit (so meeting the performing a rendezvous manoeuvre of two goal set in 1975 in the framework of that year’s experimental satellites, with the particularity that Five Year Plan). Several events in the 1980s it was fully automated. If this operation were to prompted China to free itself from any foreign be definitively confirmed, it would make China support regarding the development of its the member of the very restricted club of national space programme. The American space countries to have the capacities to achieve such shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986 forced the a technological breakthrough. However, some United States to redefine their national observers keenly reminded that, while a possible programme and to limit co-operation activities. sign of China’s wish to start building its own The collapse of the Soviet Union some years space station, such a manoeuvre could also be later temporarily dashed China’s hopes of considered as the testing of a killer satellite. acquiring the Soviet expertise in this sector. In the field of launch systems, the development of This being said, should the Chinese space the Long March rocket family, entirely based on programme still be feared? Chinese technologies, clearly illustrates this orientation. Let’s notice that the Long March 2. The Chinese Space Programme’s Origins series is nowadays particularly active, with no and Facts less than 16 successful launches over 2010 and a score of launches planned for 2011. As many would agree, such a question requires a careful answer. Not only do we have to take The same determination is also seen is the field into account the facts, but we also have to be of manned flights. In the 1970s, Project 714 aware of the ensemble of the structural factors marked the beginning of the first tests in this guiding the development of the Chinese space field. Despite the temporary suspension of the component, and of our own Western perceptions programme in the 1980s and failed co-operation of its achieved progress. attempts with the United States, China managed 2 3 Wright, David. “Orbital Debris from the Chinese ASAT Test”. Panthamakkada Acuthan, Jayan. “Le programme spatial Security for A New Century Briefing. U.S. Senate, chinois : compétition ou coopération ?”. Perspectives Washington D.C. 9 Feb. 2007. Chinoises 92 (2005) : 4. ESPI Perspectives No. 48, June 2011 2 Reconsidering the Military Axis of the Chinese Space Programme to send its first “taikonaut” into space on 15 absorb and develop new technologies. Until October 2003. This achievement confirmed the recently, China had to buy from foreign countries success of Project 921, which had been technologies that it wasn’t able to develop on its undertaken by the PRC at the turn of the 1980s. own. In the framework of the partnerships that On 27 September 2008, in the framework of the China developed with emerging markets (such Shenzhou 7 mission, the first spacewalk of a as Latin America and Africa), some of the Chinese astronaut seemed to be met with systems provided by the country revealed success and opened up the way for the project manufacturing defects that pose questions about of developing a Chinese space station. the degree to which it masters the sector’s technologies.
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