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Reconsidering the Military Axis of the Chinese Space Programme

E S P I 48 PERSPECTIVES

Reconsidering the Military Axis of the Chinese Space Programme

Alain De NEVE , Research Fellow at the Royal Higher Institute for Defence (RHID), Ph.D. Candidate at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL)

Many conjectures regarding the political and strategic objectives of the Chinese space programme emerged from the recent essays conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). According to some observers, these tend to suggest that the People’s Republic of (PRC) is not only making technological leaps forward, but is also clearly pursuing the development of the military axis of its space activities. Although legitimate concerns might result from the repeated ASAT tests and other demonstrations operated by the PLA, it should be reminded that the lack of information regarding Chinese imposes us to be very careful when evaluating the future of China in space. The aim of this issue of the ESPI Perspectives’ series is to offer a balanced analysis of the Chinese space programme by examining some governance and policy aspects related to the country’s space activities. Finally, it will scrutinise as far as possible the future of the Chinese space programme, in order to understand how China could challenge the established leading technological powers.

1. Introduction CSS-5 in NATO terminology) 1, against one of its derelict weather (FY-1C) orbiting in For several years now, China has been LEO at an altitude of 870km. The methods multiplying its achievements in the field of space adopted to carry out this test had raised some technologies. The repeated successes scored questions. Some wondered if several ASAT tests by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) covers against this same had been conducted a wide range of segments in this sector at a very short interval or if the target had been (launchers, Earth observation, communications, destroyed by only one missile firing. Likewise, satellite navigation etc). The country’s one of the attempts at explaining the destruction accomplishments not only focus on the process of this satellite suggested that the PLA civil/commercial market, in which China is fully had actually conditioned the target satellite by developing international co-operation. More equipping it before its launch with a charge recently significant progresses were also made meant to be detonated at the required moment, in the military field of the Chinese space with the aim of giving the destruction the programme. Many states have been expressing appearance of an ASAT test. However, it seems legitimate concerns about the real goals of the now established that the test has been in deed country’s space programme. The facts lying at conducted by a kinetic interception system (hit- the basis of such concerns are well known. But it to-kill). This latest point deserves some seems quite appropriate to go back over their attention, because it would imply that unlike chronology. appearances suggested, the test conducted by

the PLA fit more into an anti-missile scheme In October 2006 China used a high-powered than to solely space activities’ considerations. ground-based laser to temporarily blind an In response to this Chinese force demonstration, American satellite flying over its territory. One year later, in January 2007, the 1 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) successfully Most of the information about the technical conditions in launched an ASAT, based on the DF-21 which this ASAT test was conducted comes from open U.S. sources. Few details however leaked out about the exact intermediate-range (known as characteristics of the DF-21 missile, which has been most likely used for this test.

ESPI Perspectives No. 48, June 2011 1 Reconsidering the Military Axis of the Chinese Space Programme

the destroyed one of their own spy satellites, USA-193, in February 2008. It was In order to assess the influence of the Chinese intercepted by an SM-3 missile, fired from the space programme on the international security, Aegis -class cruiser USS Lake Erie . This we should go back over several basic facts. operation, which was officially conducted under First, let’s think about the place held since 1949 the pretext that the faulty satellite could cause by the space domain in the building-up of the hydrazine (or beryllium) pollution if its debris Chinese communist system. Let’s also highlight were to cross the atmosphere, was in fact the main approach adopted for its development intended as a display of power aimed at China. and based on the creation of a “useful space”. An analysis of the main Chinese achievements In January 2010, China confirmed to some in the field of space activities seems to confirm extent the “anti-missile” purpose of its tests by that the country is first and foremost considering openly carrying out, under this “cover”, a new this technological sector as a vector of the multi- ASAT test against one of its satellites. Yet sectorial development for the entire country.3 contradictory information spread about the results of this interception attempt. Several events in the 1980s prompted China to free itself from foreign support Regarding the January 2007 test, it had aroused for the development of its national space great public indignation among the international programme. community both with regard to the danger of a revival of a space arms race and with respect to the risks that this test could entail for the safety The space conquest goes back to the very roots of space platforms. Experts assess that this of the regime. It is indeed in the late 1950s that Chinese ASAT test would have generated on its the PRC launched a major missile research own a total of more than 2 million programme for which Moscow accepted to share fragments of various sizes.2 its technologies for a while. What followed is indicative of the determination with which China In addition to these tests, China is also entered this domain. In 1970 China became the conducting space experiments, admittedly of a world’s fifth country to lift a satellite into . In more dual nature, but all the same raising the 1984, PRC reached a significant technological question of the country’s ambitions. As such, it milestone when it successfully placed its first seems that last August China succeeded in geosynchronous satellite in orbit (so meeting the performing a rendezvous manoeuvre of two goal set in 1975 in the framework of that year’s experimental satellites, with the particularity that Five Year Plan). Several events in the 1980s it was fully automated. If this operation were to prompted China to free itself from any foreign be definitively confirmed, it would make China support regarding the development of its the member of the very restricted club of national space programme. The American space countries to have the capacities to achieve such shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986 forced the a technological breakthrough. However, some United States to redefine their national observers keenly reminded that, while a possible programme and to limit co-operation activities. sign of China’s wish to start building its own The collapse of the some years , such a manoeuvre could also be later temporarily dashed China’s hopes of considered as the testing of a killer satellite. acquiring the Soviet expertise in this sector. In the field of launch systems, the development of This being said, should the Chinese space the Long March family, entirely based on programme still be feared? Chinese technologies, clearly illustrates this orientation. Let’s notice that the Long March 2. The Chinese Space Programme’s Origins series is nowadays particularly active, with no and Facts less than 16 successful launches over 2010 and a score of launches planned for 2011. As many would agree, such a question requires a careful answer. Not only do we have to take The same determination is also seen is the field into account the facts, but we also have to be of manned . In the 1970s, Project 714 aware of the ensemble of the structural factors marked the beginning of the first tests in this guiding the development of the Chinese space field. Despite the temporary suspension of the component, and of our own Western perceptions programme in the 1980s and failed co-operation of its achieved progress. attempts with the United States, China managed

2 3 Wright, David. “Orbital Debris from the Chinese ASAT Test”. Panthamakkada Acuthan, Jayan. “Le programme spatial Security for A New Century Briefing. U.S. Senate, chinois : compétition ou coopération ?”. Perspectives Washington D.C. 9 Feb. 2007. Chinoises 92 (2005) : 4.

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to send its first “taikonaut” into space on 15 absorb and develop new technologies. Until October 2003. This achievement confirmed the recently, China had to buy from foreign countries success of Project 921, which had been technologies that it wasn’t able to develop on its undertaken by the PRC at the turn of the 1980s. own. In the framework of the partnerships that On 27 September 2008, in the framework of the China developed with emerging markets (such Shenzhou 7 mission, the first spacewalk of a as Latin America and Africa), some of the Chinese seemed to be met with systems provided by the country revealed success and opened up the way for the project manufacturing defects that pose questions about of developing a Chinese space station. the degree to which it masters the sector’s technologies. As far as budget is concerned, it should be emphasised that the increase in the Chinese 3. Co-operation and Conquest of Markets space budget is directly proportional to the The Chinese space policy attaches great country’s economic growth.4 According to open importance to the development of co-operation sources, this budget would amount to €2 billion on an international level. Co-operation enables a year. Several observers believe that this China to conquer emerging markets. This amount could be three times as high, if a more strategy is one of the methods adopted in the realistic assessment was required. However, we asymmetric competition China has embarked are not witnessing a significant increase in upon in the space sector with the historic space China’s space spending. In order to assess the powers. For instance, China is co-operating with Chinese investment in this field, it is important to Nigeria, in exchange for access to the country’s point out that, while U.S. per capita spending in fossil fuel resources, in the development and this field 2009 amounted to $155 (against $ 43.5 exploitation of the for the French), the Chinese allotted “only” $ 1.7 series NigComSat . The aim of Nigeria is to during the same period.5 provide, with China’s help, a whole range of

services to the West African market. Yet some According to open sources, the C hinese technical setbacks led to the definitive loss of space budget would amount to €2 billion a the NigComSat -1 satellite. The China Great Wall year. Several observers reckon that this Industry Corporation (CGWIC) pledged to amount could reasonably be tripled if a replace the faulty platform. As for Latin America, more realistic assessment was required. China also co-operated with Venezuela on the development of the Venesat -1 communications Of course, the significance of these amounts satellite, also known as “Simon Bolivar”. Bolivia can be put into perspective in the light of the decided to follow this example, by signing a difference in wage levels between the Western scientific and technological co-operation space powers and China. Moreover, China’s agreement with Beijing in the framework of the demographics unquestionably account for the Tupac Katari communications satellite project. small amount that each Chinese citizen allocates to the space domain. Consequently, if As for the co-operation process into which China we consider that investments in the space sector entered for a while when it joined the satellite are largely supported by the population, this is navigation and positioning programme Galileo , also due to the limited sum that each citizen has some observations should also be made. The to allot to this policy. Any request to increase the reason why China chose already in 2003 to financial strain by inhabitant in the space area become one of the main partners of the would inevitably lead to a change in the Chinese European programme, at the time jointly citizens’ interpretation of this sector’s benefits. managed by the European Commission and the (ESA), was its Let us also point out that, as far as quality is aspiration to acquire GNSS technology know- concerned, China was until quite recently in a how. At that time, Beijing had agreed to invest catch-up phase with the other “historic” space €200 million in the project. Yet the Chinese faring powers: the United States, Europe and participation in the Galileo programme raised . This being said, this catch-up process considerable reservations regarding security and did not apply evenly to all segments of space a possible technology transfer. Several factors activities. As a matter of fact, the PRC was faced prompted China to reconsider its participation in with considerable difficulties in its effort to the programme. Among these were of course the delays in the programme’s implementation, 4 but also the European Commission and ESA’s Rathgeber, Wolfgang. China’s Posture in Space: Implications for Europe. ESPI Report 3. June 2007: 33. decision to refuse to China access to the 5 Pagkratis, Spyros. Space Policies, Issues and Trends in technologies of the public regulated service. Due 2009/2010. ESPI Report 23. June 2010: 20.

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to the setbacks China had suffered, it decided to the fact that the ASAT test did not breach any reinvest in its own GNSS project named international convention. Beidou/Compass, which chiefly focuses on military applications, with civil and commercial The ASAT test of January 2007 was applications being only secondary. While everything but the military expression of a Galileo ’s progresses are worryingly stalling for “visceral” reaction to the American NSP. various reasons, China is making headway in its own programme and expects it to be operational on a regional scale by 2013. The same explaining arguments also contradict the second hypothesis, according to which the central government was not aware of the project 4. What Future for the Chinese Space 6 Programme? of testing an anti-satellite weapon. This attempt to interpret suggests that military officials would How does China perceive the future of its space have achieved a certain level of autonomy from capacities? The lack of direct information from the government authorities, or even that there Chinese open sources quite obviously restricts would be no coherent space policy. At the very our ability to analyse the country’s space policy least, we could suggest that the exact timing of and forces us to be cautious. the test had not been communicated beforehand to government authorities, or that the Chinese In international forums, Beijing would regularly military advisers provided only partial information advocate the internationalisation of about the operation’s strategic consequences. and the implementation of equal rights to freely explore and exploit it. In Beijing’s view, space Nevertheless, it seems quite unlikely that the activities launched by various countries must January 2007 ASAT test announces China’s serve the economic and social development and wish to undertake the “weaponisation” of space safety of all. Yet, in the eyes of many observers on its own, for a number of reasons. First of all, China has quite clearly shown its wish to break responsibility for such a development would not with those principles by conducting an anti- be the result of a single actor’s attitude, but satellite weapon test. As a matter of fact, several rather of the balance of power between several attempts to explain this test were proposed, protagonists. Second, such a project would which may shed light to China’s future ambitions require substantial financial investments that are in space. hardly sustainable on the long term. The social demands that China’s economic growth will According to a first hypothesis, China would generate would prove hardly compatible with the have intended to react sharply to the release of expenditure linked to a risky weaponisation the US National Space Policy (NSP), re-edited in programme, both in budget and strategic terms. October 2006, of which the Space Control concept would have upset the authorities in China does not wish that its space technologies Beijing. However, such a hypothesis does not become the Achilles’ heel of its defence system. stand up to analysis. Indeed, testing an anti- Earth are first and foremost a crowded satellite weapon cannot be improvised. area and collision risks are particularly high, as it Realising a complex programme like this was shown by the accidental collision of an presupposes the mobilisation of China’s best American and Russian satellites in Feb. 2009. In scientists on the long term (CASC [China general, Beijing has no intention to mould its Aerospace Science and Technology space strategy into a Western, (in fact mainly Corporation] employs no less than 250,000 American) geostrategic logic. The PRC probably people). Besides, it implies the use of seeks to impose its own dialectics on the considerable financial, human and institutional American representations of its power. The new resources. In other words, the ASAT test of orientation given to the American space policy, January 2007 was everything but the military following President Obama’s decision, has expression of a “visceral” reaction to the illustrated the need for the United States to American NSP. Some Chinese leaders seem in reconsider its project agenda in the face of the fact quite determined to pour a substantial part crisis. The Chinese manoeuvres were probably of the country’s space investments into the intended to prompt the United States to development of an ASAT programme. Beijing negotiate a break in the competition between the sees no incoherence between this approach and two countries. It would then be conceivable that the posture it assumes in favour of disarmament the deadlock in the PAROS (Prevention of an in space. It feels that it has the right to pursue its 6 R&D strategy as long as no treaty on this issue Sanger, David E. and Kahn, Joseph. “U.S. Tries to Interpret is formally signed. Moreover, Beijing stressed China’s Silence Over Test”. 21 Jan. 2007.

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Arms Race in Outer Space) negotiations that rationality of the steps taken in this view can be have been stalling since 1993 may be broken. challenged. China’s denial of access strategy should nevertheless trigger a prompt reaction of The goal of China consists in curbing as established space powers, including Europeans. much as possible the American armed Indeed, while our projects are about to forces’ ability to deploy on a distant experience a slowdown as a result of the crisis, theatre in the framework of a “denied the dynamics of the Chinese development are confrontation” strategy. bound to have consequences on the redefinition of the world’s technological innovation zones.

While cautious not to follow the Western In that context, Europe should adopt a careful strategic logic, China is nevertheless resolved to position regarding Chinese space activities. In a pursue a “denial of access” strategy, of which recent address, the EU Commission announced the space area is only of the levers. All the that it would like to improve cooperation with manoeuvres conducted by the PRC seem to China in technologies. confirm this ambition. And it so happens that the Perhaps the announcement is intended to renew 998 state security project, also called links between both actors after the mixed results “Assassin’s Mace”, rests on the development of of the attempted cooperation in Galileo. While means able to weaken a technologically more international cooperation is necessary for advanced and dependant opponent by targeting, Europe to secure the future of its activities in among other things, information infrastructures space, it should be reminded that under a on which its defence technology superiority is realistic policy approach any step towards new based. In this perspective, it is obvious that the fields of collaboration has to be evaluated goal pursued by China is not to be able to stand regarding its security implications. Perhaps the up to a long-lasting conflict with the United best way for Europe to engage in a positive States. It rather consists in curbing as much as relation with China would be to invest in a more possible the American armed forces’ ability to active diplomatic effort to re-launch the PAROS deploy on a distant theatre in the framework of a negotiations. “denied confrontation” strategy. Europe has also to wait for unambiguous signs 5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations from the PRC regarding the orientation of the While we have to admit that the various tests nation’s space activities. Given recent essays and other manoeuvres conducted by China and demonstrations, China appears at best as display some blatant diplomatic “blunders”, it an unpredictable partner. In the same time, it would be a mistake to reduce the Chinese space should be reminded that numerous examples of programme to its feats, to which the media industrial collaboration between Europe and sometimes devote excessive attention; all the China exist, and in most cases proved to be more when they don’t take into account the fruitful. However, given the new challenges that specificity of the context and of the development lay ahead of forthcoming space activities for factors linked to the space domain in China. each of the contemporary space faring powers, Space weaponisation is most likely unavoidable. qualitative new approaches must be adopted in It will doubtlessly prove a major trend of future order to guarantee the future of space activities. developments in the space sector, even if the

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Short title: ESPI Perspectives 48 Published in June 2011

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