The New Market Campaign, May, 1864

THE iiiii EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER GIFT OF THE NEW MARKET CAMPAIGN MAY, 1864 BY EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER PROFESSOR OF EUROPEAN HISTORY UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN WHITTET & SHEPPERSON 1912 COPYRI GHT IQI2 BY EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER TO MY AUNT Curner A WOMAN OF THE OLD SOUTH 244014 PREFACE writing of this volume was made possible by the THEpreliminary researches of Captain Henry A. Wise, Colonel George H. Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel George M. Edgar, and Mr. Benjamin A. Colonna. The battle of New Market, though one of the smaller en gagements of the Civil War, possessed certain striking features which made it such an attractive subject, that it had been described by numerous writers. Moreover the part taken by the Cadets was so brilliant and unique that tales of their ex ploits, from the very day of the battle, were given wide circu lation. To those in a position to know, however, it was evi dent that no satisfactory account had been written; for not withstanding that General Sigel, General Imboden, and others had given versions, their work was obviously semi-popular and incomplete; while everything relating to the Cadets was more or less a matter of rumor and controversy, exaggerated asser tions being made by their partisans, and sweeping denials by those who opposed them. The desirability of writing an authoritative account had occurred to a number of those who took part in the battle, but to no one more than Captain Wise, who led the much debated charge of the Cadets, and who ardently wished that the part taken by his comrades should be perpetuated and placed in the proper light. With this purpose in view he began a study of the subject, which was continued for twenty years, and which resulted in the collection of much of the material used as a basis for this study. He began by bringing together every- (v) VI PREFACE thing that had hitherto been written about the battle. He then tried to get possession of such source materials as existed out side of the War Department. Finally he endeavored to have every surviving officer and Cadet write all that he knew about the Valley campaign and all that he could learn from others. For years Captain Wise carried on a voluminous correspond ence, asking and answering questions, and continually seeking for new information. In all of this he was eminently suc cessful, for men on both sides told him all that they knew, while a number of small collections were given to him by those who had previously begun them. The result was an extraor dinary mass of material, of uneven value, it is true, but pro portionately speaking, as voluminous and minute, perhaps, as similar material relating to any battle of the Civil War. The entire accumulation was delivered to me to be used in the com position of this book. Meanwhile, Colonel George H. Smith, who commanded the 62d Virginia Regiment at New Market, undertook to write an account of the battle. He was the first who tried to do this in a scientific way. A legal training and a judicial temperament caused him to weigh and compare evidence in a manner not theretofore characteristic of the study of this incident. He was one of the first, moreover, to visit the battlefield, and endeavor to determine accurately the positions of the troops. The result of his investigations was a series of papers dealing with the New Market campaign. When my own work was begun, the first draft, filled as it was with inaccuracies, was sent to him for criticism. I shall never forget the moderation with which this older student took issue with me, the courtesy with which my attention was called to mistakes, and the sug gestive and constructive advice which was given to me. Since PREFACE vii then this advice has always been at my service, and I have con stantly profited by it. The opponents of Colonel Smith have reproached him with making mistakes, which he had afterward to acknowledge; but I know of almost no one else who has done pioneer work in this field, who has been able progres sively to abandon errors, errors unavoidable because of the chaos of obscurity in which the subject was enveloped, for closer approximations to the truth, which he was himself helping to establish. It is one of the most pleasant tasks in writing this book to pay a tribute to this Southern gentleman. Lieutenant-Colonel George M. Edgar, who commanded the 26th Virginia Battalion at New Market, and who directed one of the decisive movements in the battle, had begun to write a history also. The men of the 26th Battalion had been hardly dealt with. At a critical moment in the fight they had charged desperately upon the enemy and broken his line, doing much to enable their comrades to the battle for a time win ; yet long it was asserted that they had remained in the rear as a reserve. Colonel Edgar desired to undo this injustice. He began to collect material and study the sources, and would undoubtedly have composed one of the ablest and most accurate histories of the battle yet written, when the present undertaking was brought to his attention. Then not only did he give the author the benefit of his knowledge and experience, but with rare generosity turned over the entire collection of materials which had been amassed by him, desiring only that justice be done to all. Another task remained, which was undertaken by the one most fitted to do it. There was no accurate survey, and no adequate topographical map of the battlefield. In 1911 this was executed by Mr. Benjamin A. Colonna, a New Market Vlll PREFACE Cadet, whose training in the government service made him eminently qualified. When the map was completed, copies were sent to most of the commanders who had taken part in the battle, with the request that they mark the several positions of their commands, and the lines along which they had moved, and answer a series of carefully prepared questions. The in valuable data thus obtained was likewise delivered to me. My own task has been the using of all this material, a task characterized by such difficulty as I fear will be appreciated only by those who have tried to make military history minute and detailed. The very mass of the evidence was bewildering, while a part of it was contradictory, owing to the fact that in to matters 1 indeed who regard some eye-witnesses , men par ticipated in the same movement, had given diametrically oppo site accounts; a difficulty not lessened by the fact that as a rule numbers of writers had hastened to substantiate the rival narratives. Accordingly while this volume is intended to be approximately a final statement, I put forward the solution of some of the problems with considerable diffidence, though I fear some of them are destined not to be solved in a manner satisfactory to all authorities. I have constantly been re proached for not doing justice, and reproved for not making account different but I for the of these critics my ; hope lenity in asking them to consider that from nearly every one of the commands I have statements to show that when a retreat was made, that command retreated last or did not retreat at all that a ; when charge was made, that command charged first, and first broke the enemy s line; and that when cannon were taken, that command captured them. I have been conscious of no prejudice myself, and I have desired earnestly and tried arduously to tell the truth. I have good reason to believe that PREFACE ix the conclusions presented are correct, but if they are mistaken, I hope that the mass of evidence submitted will assist my critics in correcting them. The bibliography and the discus sion of the sources there contained will show the character of the materials used and the methods employed in using them. I may say that the earlier drafts of this work were for more than two years subjected to the scrutiny of those best qualified to criticise them. Some of the more important results of this study may be summed up as follows : There was no such disparity of numbers in the opposing forces as has often been stated : Sigel had about 6,000 men in the battle; Breckinridge about 4,500. The Federal army was defeated because of the slow, falter ing, and clumsy strategy of its commander, and through a lack of hearty co-operation on the part of the different commands. The Confederate triumph was owing to superb and brilliant movements of Imboden and Breckinridge, who showed them selves no unworthy successors of Stonewall Jackson, and to the resolute bravery of the veteran Confederate troops. The decisive factors on May 15 were the storming of the Federal position on the right, the excellent handling of the Confederate artillery, the defeat of the Federal cavalry, and the desperate charges made by the Confederate center. As regards the Cadets it may be said : Any assertion that the Cadets won the battle of New Market, or stemmed a Confederate rout, are popular exag gerations which have tended to discredit what they actually did. There is no doubt that they held the gap in the Confed erate line, fought wondrously well, and by their example stim ulated the adjoining regiments to make the decisive charge. x PREFACE It remains only to make my grateful acknowledgments to all who assisted me either by contribution, criticism, or sug gestion.

Load more