Selections Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense 273598
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
'l'he Open Court Series of Classics of Science and 'Philosophy, .<J(q. 2 SELECTIONS FROM THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BY G. A. JOHNSTON, M.A. LECTURER IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERII;)ITV OF GLASGO* 273598 CHICAGO AND LONDON THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY 1915 Cq/,Yl"l:~ht1I1 Great Bruatn under the Act of 191 I CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION I THOMAS REID 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE- § 1. The Importance of the Subject, and the Means of Prosecuting RT 27 § 2. The Impediments to our Knowledge of the Mmd. 30 II. ANALYSIS OF A TYPICAL SENSATION- § I The Sensation considered abstractly 37 § 2. Sensation and Remembrance, Natural Pnn- ciples of Belief 39 § 3. Judgment and Belief in some Cases precede Simple Apprehension 43 § 4. Two Theories of the Nature of Belief Refuted 44 § 5. Apology for Metaphysical Absurditres-c-Sensa- non wrthout a Sentient, a Consequence of the Theory of Ideas . 48 § 6. The Conception and Belief of a Sentient Being or Mind 1S suggested by our Constrtution-s- The Notion of Relations not always got by companng the Related Ideas 56 § 7. There 1S a Quahty or Virtue in Bodies, which we call their Smell-How tills 1S connected in the Imagination WIth the Sensation . 60 V VI PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE PAGE § 8. That there IS a Prmciple In Human Nature, from which the Notion of tills, as well as all other Natural VIrtues or Causes, IS denved 63 ~9. Whether 10 Sensation the Mind 18 Active or Passrve ? 70 III. KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY- § I. Of Hardness 72 ~ 2 Of Natural Signs 74 § 3. Of Extension 80 § 4. Of the Visible Appearances of Objects . 84 § 5. Of Perception In General 89 § 6. Of the Process of Nature In Perception 98 Appendix: Of Cause and Power 100 IV. THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND- ~I. Pnnciples taken for Granted III § 2. Of Hypotheses and Analogy II7 § 3. Of Perception lI8 § 4. Of Sensation 122 § 5 Of Pnmary and Secondary Qualrtres 125 § 6. Of Conception . 128 S 7· Of Judgment 132 § 8 Of Common Sense 148 § 9. First Prmciples of Contingent Truths 152 § 10. First Prmciples of Necessary Truths 157 V. OF MORALS- § 1. Of Benevolent Affection 10 General 161 § 2. There are Rational Principles of Action in Man 165 § 3. Of Regard to Our Good on the Whole . 168 § 4. Of the Notion of Duty, Rectitude, Moral Obliga- tion 173 § 5. Observations concernmg Conscience 182 § 6. That Moral Approbation imphes a Real J udg- ment . 186 ADAM FERGUSON OF MAN'S PROGRESSIVE NATURE . 197 CONTENTS vii JAMES BEATTIE PAGE OF THE PERCEPTION OF TRUTH IN GENERAL 217 DUGALD STEWART I. OF THE OBJECT OF PHILOSOPHY, AND THE METHOD OF PROSECUTING PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRIES 229 II. OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS 233 III. OF THE POWER WHICH THE Mum HAS OVER THE TRAIN OF ITS THOUGHTS 236 IV. OF THE INFLUENCE OF ASSOCIATION ON OUR ACTIVE PRINCIPLES, AND ON OUR MORAL JUDGMENTS . 242 V. OF CERTAIN LAWS OF BELIEF, INSEPARABLY CONNECTED WITH THE EXERCISE OF CON- SCroUSNESS, MEMORY, PERCEPTION, AND REASONING 249 INDEX. 265 SELECTIONS FROM THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE INTRODUCTION THE Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense origin- ated as a protest against the philosophy of the greatest Scottish philosopher. Hume's sceptical conclusions did not excite as much opposition as might have been expected. But in Scotland especially there was a good deal of spoken criticism which was never written; and some who would have liked to denounce Hume's doctrines in print were restrained by the salutary reflection that if they were challenged to gIVe reasons for their criticism they would find it uncommonly difficult to do so. Hume's scepticism was disliked, but it was difficult to see how it could be adequately met. At this point Reid 1 stepped into the field. He I Thomas Reid was born in 1710 at Strachan in Kmcardmeshire, HIS father was mmister of the parish. At the age of twelve, Reid entered Marischal College, Aberdeen, but did not profit much by the teaching. After graduating in Arts, he studied Divmrty, and was hcensed to preach m 1731 In 1733 he was appointed Librarian of Marischal College, and In 1737 was presented by I 2 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE was the only man of his time who really understood the genesis of Hume's scepticism and succeeded in locating its sources. At first sight it would seem that this discovery required no peculiar perspicuity. It would seem that nobody could help seeing that Hume's sceptical conclusions were based on Locke's premises, and that Hume could never be success- fully opposed by any critic who accepted Locke's assumptions. But this is precisely one of those obvious things that is noticed by nobody. And in fact Reid was the first man to see it clearly. It thus became his duty to question the assumptions on which all his own early thought had been based. The result of this reflection was the conclusion that, since the "ideal theory" of Locke and King's College to the Irving of New Machar, near Aberdeen. At first his parishioners were very hostile, tradrtion saymg that his uncle had to guard the pulpit stairs with a drawn sword. But their prejudices were gradually overcome by Reid's practical benevolence, though to the end they were dissatisfied WIth ills sermons, which they regarded as not sufficiently ongmal In 1751 Reid was appointed a regent at King's College, and became .. Professor of Philosophy," his lectures including mathematics and phYSICS He was one of the founders of the Aberdeen Philosophical SOCIety (" The WISe Club "). which included among Its members Beattie and Campbell. It was m this SOCIety that Reid developed his plulosophy. HIS point of view was made known to the club m several papers, which were systematised in the Lnqusry mto the Human Mvnd on the Principles of Common Sense. This was published in 1764, the year m wluch Reid succeeded Adam Smrth as Professor of Moral Plulosophy m the Unrversity of Glasgow. The next sixteen years were fully occupied with the duties of his chair and University business. In 1780 he retired from his active Unrversity work, m order to complete his philosophical system In 1785 appeared the Essays on the Intellectual Powers oj Man, and three years later the Essays on the Actwe Powers oj Man. The last years of ills hfe were devoted to mathematics and gardening. and III 1796 he died. INTRODUCTION 3 Berkeley logically led to Hume's scepticism, and since scepticism was intolerable, that theory would have to be amended, or, if necessary, abandoned. Reid himself gives an admirable account of the way in which he was roused from his dogmatic slumbers. "I acknowledge," he says in the Dedication of the Inquiry, "that I never thought of calling in question the principles commonly received with regard to the human understanding, until the Treatise of Human Nature was published in the year 1739. The ingenious author of that treatise upon the principles of Locke-who was no sceptic-hath built a system of scepticism, which leaves no ground to believe anyone thing rather than its contrary. His reasoning appeared to me to be just; there was therefore a necessity to call in question the principles upon which it was founded, or to admit the conclusion." 1 Reid was deter- mined not to acquiesce in the sceptical conclusion. And that for three reasons. Scepticism, he says, is trebly destructive. It destroys the science of a philosopher, it undermines the faith of a Christian, and it renders nugatory the prudence of a man of common understanding. Thus he was forced to undertake a criticism of the assumptions on which that sceptical conclusion was based. "For my own satisfaction, I entered into a serious examina- tion of the principles upon which this sceptical 1 WOt'ks, vol. 1. p. 95. 4 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE system is built; and was not a little surprised to find that it leans with its whole weight upon a hypothesis which is ancient indeed, and hath been very generally received by philosophers, but of which I could find no solid proof." 1 This hypo- thesis is to be found in Locke and Descartes, and consists in the postulation of a world of ideas inter- mediate between the knower and the object known. It is from this hypothesis, says Reid, that Hume's scepticism directly results. Reid therefore really criticises Hume via Locke. He takes up the position that if Locke's assumption be proved untenable, Hume's conclusion will fall to the ground. Thus, while it is true that it was Hume who elicited Reid's philosophy, that philosophy is not so much a direct " answer to Hume " as an answer to Locke. Now, Locke's doctrine admitted of two, and only two, answers. One of these was given by Berkeley, and led to the scepticism of Hume. The other was given by Reid. For Locke perception involves three elements: the percipient, the idea perceived, and the thing; and it is assumed that the idea is somehow a copy of the external reality. Both Berkeley and Reid saw clearly the difficulties of the doctrine of Representative Perception. If the mind is confined to its own ideas and is cut off from immediate knowledge of the real world, how is it to know if its ideas do or do not agree with things -r 1 Works. vol. 1. p. 96. INTRODUCTION 5 In order to compare two thmgs, it is necessary to know both.