The Scottish Enlightenment and the Problem of Individualism in Commercial Society
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Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2012 The Road to Virtue and the Road to Fortune: The Scottish Enlightenment and the Problem of Individualism in Commercial Society Sarah Ramirez Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Ramirez, Sarah, "The Road to Virtue and the Road to Fortune: The Scottish Enlightenment and the Problem of Individualism in Commercial Society" (2012). Dissertations. 382. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/382 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 2012 Sarah Ramirez LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO THE ROAD TO VIRTUE AND THE ROAD TO FORTUNE: THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALISM IN COMMERCIAL SOCIETY A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE BY SARAH RAMIREZ CHICAGO, IL AUGUST 2012 Copyright by Sarah Ramirez, 2012 All rights reserved. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would never have completed this dissertation “without the assistance and cooperation of many thousands,” as Adam Smith might say. Dr. John Danford, my committee chair, helped me to formulate the topic in the first place while I took his excellent course on the Scottish Enlightenment, and his continued guidance has been invaluable. Dr. Peter Berkowitz, an external member, graciously agreed to be on my committee and provided very helpful contributions. Dr. Claudio Katz went beyond the call of duty in writing detailed comments that pushed me to clarify my arguments. Dr. Thomas Engeman gave his input at the proposal stage, but retired before I could defend the dissertation itself. Dr. Raymond Tatalovich guided me through many a fellowship application, and rejoiced upon my success. Dr. Peter Schraeder, the graduate program director, has been my tireless advocate in navigating the various requirements and deadlines of the Graduate School and in securing two important university-wide fellowships, the Advanced Doctoral Fellowship and the Arthur J. Schmitt Fellowship. Besides these individuals, I have also had too many wonderful professors and mentors over the years to name them all. I would like to thank Loyola University Chicago, the Arthur J. Schmitt Foundation, the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, and the Institute for Humane Studies for their generous support. Most of all, I would like to thank my husband, because I could not have persevered without his moral and emotional guidance. iii In the middling and inferior stations of life, the road to virtue and that to fortune, to such fortune, at least, as men in such stations can reasonably expect to acquire, are, happily in most cases, very nearly the same. –Adam Smith The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding . He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. –Adam Smith TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER ONE: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY: FRANCIS HUTCHESON AND THE MORAL SENSE OF COMMERCIAL SOCIETY 32 CHAPTER TWO: INDUSTRY, KNOWLEDGE, HUMANITY: DAVID HUME AND THE VIRTUOUS CIRCLE OF COMMERCIAL SOCIETY 91 CHAPTER THREE: THE ROAD TO VIRTUE AND THE ROAD TO FORTUNE: ADAM SMITH AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF COMMERCIAL SOCIETY 152 CHAPTER FOUR: THE ADAM FERGUSON PROBLEM: THE TENSIONS IN FERGUSON’S SOCIAL THOUGHT 210 CHAPTER FIVE: PETTY TRAFFIC OR INTIMATE COMMUNICATION? JOHN MILLAR AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF COMMERCIAL SOCIETY 248 CONCLUSION 289 BIBLIOGRAPHY 330 VITA 343 v INTRODUCTION Do liberal commercial societies—that is, those based on the principle of self- governance in both the economic and political spheres—inevitably capitulate to the problem of excessive individualism? 1 Individual rights must be accompanied by duties—but, since commercial republics cannot compel such duties, they risk the problem of individualism, the possibility that their citizens will become engrossed with their own pleasures or interests at the expense of duty to others. Joseph Cropsey defines the problem as follows: liberal government needs “a feasible and satisfactory substitute for strong authority, which is yet compatible with good order and good living in society. Whether, and wherein, such a substitute exists, is the lasting problem of freedom” (1957, xii). Doubts over whether liberalism provides such a substitute have continued to flourish, even in the face of declarations that it constitutes the inevitable “end of history.” Alasdair MacIntyre complains that “contemporary debates within modern political 1 There is by no means a consensus on whether liberal democratic capitalism fosters individualism. John Stuart Mill (1974) worried about an apparently opposite tendency, that towards mindless conformism. Frankfurt School thinkers such as Erich Fromm (1941) and Herbert Marcuse (1991) analyzed the role of the mass media and consumerism in manufacturing conformism, while Michel Foucault argued that institutions such as education function as “disciplines” that socialize individuals into “docility-utility” (1995, 137). Interestingly, however, some observers have connected the two phenomena of individualism and conformism. Cyrus Patell argues that capitalist culture adopts an “ideology of individuality” that “enforces conformity at the very moment that it extols individuality” (2001, xii). Mark Kingwell has similarly identified “a peculiar tension that is lodged at the heart of the modern liberal project,” that of “individualist conformity” (2009, 12). 1 2 systems are almost exclusively between conservative liberals, liberal liberals, and radical liberals. There is little place in such political systems for the criticism of the system itself, that is, for putting liberalism in question” (1988, 392). Yet he overlooks many sites of vigorous debate about liberalism—including the streets, as Students for a Democratic Society and now Occupy Wall Street take up demands for “participatory democracy.” Society and now Occupy Wall Street take up demands for “participatory democracy.” Some take liberalism to task for failing to endow citizens with public spirit. Hannah Arendt, for instance, laments that liberal concern with mere bodily necessity, in the form of the right to life and of economic prosperity, brings “housekeeping activities to the public realm” (1998, 45). Hence, instead of providing a space for public virtue, “state and government gives place here to pure administration—a state of affairs which Marx rightly predicted as the ‘withering away of the state,’ though he was wrong in assuming that only a revolution could bring it about” (1998, 45). Others point to the impact of unrestrained autonomy on family and social life. Bruce Frohnen argues that selfish hedonism is so debasing that it merits community concern, even if it results in no tangible harm to others: “unrestrained exercise of the human will, even if limited by contract, degrades the soul as it warps the mind . by sanctifying the pursuit of a life of sensual pleasures” (1993, 5). Still others argue that liberalism leaves social or economic exploitation largely untouched. Catherine MacKinnon argues that the liberal notion of privacy functions as protection for male brutality, for “practices through which women are violated, abused, exploited, and patronized by men socially” (1987, 765). These criticisms issue from different points on the political spectrum and may harbor 3 incompatible assumptions, but they can be broadly subsumed under one main objection: liberal institutions predicated on individual rights are insufficient for perpetuating virtue. The critics may conceptualize virtue as public spirit, as prudence, as consideration for the disadvantaged, or as some other concept entirely—but, while the proper definition of virtue is certainly no trivial matter, it is significant that even such vastly divergent definitions seem to implicate liberalism. Many of these critics remain liberals in spite of their reservations, but others think this problem demands that we consider political alternatives. The anti-liberals have a point: finding solutions compatible with liberalism is an inherently difficult business. According to Peter Berkowitz, “the structure of liberal thought itself guarantees that virtue will be an enduring problem for liberalism, a problem that can neither be resolved by theory nor fixed once and for all by institutional design” (1999, xii). Since liberalism is based on the notion of free choice and individual rights, “every attempt to deny or resolve the problem of virtue within liberalism suppresses an important dimension of the liberal spirit” (1999, xii). It is difficult for a liberal state