Originally composed for Spring 2019 Boston Baptist College History Seminar.

Boston Curmudgeon Coalition, 2019 – 1 –

The First Anglo-Burmese War was the longest, most devastating, and most disastrous war waged in the history of British India.1 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Civil Commissioner of Burma, observes that the war received little attention when it was fought. Instead, in the years leading up to the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852) “the leading Journals of the day reserve[d] a prominent place in their columns for intelligence from the banks of the Irrawaddy.”2 Despite this interest, the war has faded into relative obscurity over the last two centuries. The war itself was incredibly well documented from the British side: several British officers published narratives of the war, including J. J. Snodgrass, F. B. Doveton, Sir Henry Havelock, and Thomas Abercrombie Trant. Civil officers and ambassadors, like Thomas Campbell Robertson, , Sir Henry Yule, Sir Arthur P. Phayre, Michael Symes, and Hiram Cox also provide valuable insight into the war, its causes, and effects. Henry Gouger, a British merchant, provides a unique perspective in the account of his imprisonment in Ava during the war. Both Adoniram and Ann Judson, American Baptist missionaries to Burma, have useful perspectives of the war – due to both their disinterest in promoting either side and in their close connections with the Court of Ava – which coincided with Adoniram’s own imprisonment at Oung-pen-la.3 The Baptist Missionary Magazine frequently provides updates on the war because of their concern for the Baptist missionaries in Burma, namely the Judsons.4 A few British historians, namely G. E. Harvey and D. G. E. Hall have also taken interest in the conflict; Hall himself published a study in the historical relations between Europe and Burma. The war also inspired G. A. Henty’s novel On the Irrawaddy: A Story of the First Burmese War. Most of the concerning the war is found in epistolary, poetry, and plays; much of which remains untranslated from the original Burmese.5 The official Burmese account of the war, Chronicle of the Kings of Burma, is only partially translated into English. Thus, several histories and accounts of the war heavily rely on the Anglo-American accounts and interpretations. For instance, Courtney Anderson’s6 and Rosalie Hall Hunt’s7 biographies of both only consult Anglo- American sources concerning the war. Oddly enough, one American Baptist narrative – F. D. Phinney’s – was only published in Burmese. In the last fifty years, though, Burmese scholars such as Maung Htin Aung and Thant Myint-U have published histories of Burma using sources largely unavailable to the English-speaking world.

1 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 113. 2 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), v. 3 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 1: 356. 4 See The Baptist Missionary Magazine, Baptist General Convention (Boston: James Loring, and Lincoln & Eerdmans, 1817-1909, 89 vols.), 4: 456. (From here on, cited as BMM). 5 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 230. 6 Courtney Anderson, To the Golden Shore: The Life of Adoniram Judson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), 509. 7 Rosalie Hall Hunt, Bless God and Take Courage: The Judson History and Legacy (Valley Forge: Judson Press, 2005), 387. – 2 –

The First Anglo-Burmese War is important for two reasons: 1). it was the longest and most devastating war in the history of British India and 2). it marks the beginning of the British seizure of Burma.8 The two years the war waged on (1824-1826) were not due as much to the military genius of the Burmese as much as to the ineptitude of the Governor-General of India, Lord Amherst: a “man of mediocre abilities”9 and “a man of no imagination and very limited intelligence, faced by a situation which he frankly admitted was beyond his grasp.”10 Robertson also relays a story of the British officers arrogantly ignoring advice on Burma if it were not relayed to them by a friend or a fellow officer.11 Major J. J. Snodgrass also admits that the British had little accurate intelligence on Burma from the start: “Beyond the invisible line which circumscribed our position, all was mystery or vague conjecture.”12 This combined ineptitude, arrogance, and ignorance cost the British dearly: 15,000 men of the 40,000 sent to Burma died between 1824 and 1826 – only 3.5% of these losses actually occurred in battle. Nearly half of the British troops and Sepoys perished from disease, especially during Burma’s monsoon seasons. The officer corps – comprised exclusively of British natives – was hit the hardest: Over one-third of British officers were wiped out.13 The Indian Commissariat dragged its feat victualing the troops, wrongly believing that some of the natives would provide the invaders with materiel and food.14 The British muskets were also often rendered ineffective due to the Burmese rains.15 The British, though, still had superior materiel compared to the outdated arms of the Burmese.16 The land forces benefited being under the command of a hardened veteran of the Peninsular War, having served under the Duke of Wellington: General Sir Archibald Campbell.17

8 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), v. 9 R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, Datta Kalikinkar, “Expansion of the British Dominion Beyond the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej, 1824-1856,” An Advanced History of India (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1963), 732. 10 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 119. 11 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 127. 12 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 16. 13 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 252; D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 119. 14 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 228; John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 17. 15 Ibid., 30. 16 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 213. 17 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 113. – 3 –

The war proved even more of a disaster for the Burmese. Burma had been an aggressively imperialistic nation up to the First Anglo-Burmese War. Snodgrass reports that Burma’s

wars have been for many years a series of conquests: every late attempt of the neighbouring nations to check their victorious career had failed, and the Burmese government, at the time of our landing in Rangoon, had subdued and incorporated into their overgrown empire all the petty states by which it was surrounded, and stood confessedly feared and respected even by the Chinese, as a powerful and warlike nation.18

But with the end of the war the Burmese, in the words of D. G. E. Hall, “had been shattered once and for all.”19 The entire nature of the Burmese nation changed after the war. Their bellicosity understandably shifted into timidity. Towards the end of his narrative, Snodgrass remarks that “the King of Ava… can have neither interest nor motive in troubling us again” – and truly he never would.20 After 1826, Burma no longer played the aggressor with Calcutta.21 No records indicate the precise number of Burmese casualties, but one may infer that they were high. Calculating Burmese casualties is even more difficult since the records concerning the size of Bandula’s army are in conflict. Htin Aung22 indicates that 30,000 marched on Rangoon while Hall23 and Majumdar24 both maintain that he had 60,000. Regardless, 4,000 British soldiers and Sepoys were able to repel Bandula’s forces in two weeks with the help of naval support. Myint- U observes that “nearly an entire generation” of Burmese men died during the entire conflict.25 If that were not enough, the proved an utter embarrassment to Burma. Calcutta received virtually all of the Burmese coastline after the war.26 The indemnity the British placed

18 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 21. 19 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 121. 20 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 297. 21 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 133. 22 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 213. 23 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 115. 24 R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, Datta Kalikinkar, “Expansion of the British Dominion Beyond the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej, 1824-1856,” An Advanced History of India (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1963), 731. 25 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 126. 26 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 314; R. C. Majumdar, H. C. – 4 – on Burma was crushing – it was a high amount even for a contemporaneous European country to pay.27 The ten million rupees the treaty required is roughly equivalent to two billion USD today.28 The eventual annexation of Burma in 1885 was made inevitable by the Treaty of Yandabo. Britain would have interests in Burma until 1947.29

While the British are solely to blame for the Second and Third Anglo-Burmese Wars, both belligerents share responsibility for the first war. Maung Htin Aung suggests that Britain was the only party interested in war – claiming that King and his court had no real intentions of fighting the British.30 Though this principle is true for the later wars, the same cannot be said for the First Anglo-Burmese War. Thant Myint-U more objectively observes that both Burma and the British East India Company were aggressively expansionist towards the beginning of the nineteenth century.31 “The expansion of Russia in Asia,” writes Majumdar, “and her various ambitious enterprises in the East, proved to be the dominating factor in the foreign policy of the East India Company in the post-Waterloo period.”32 The Company at this time, though, was not necessarily interested in directly annexing territory. Britain had been busy battling France and Napoleon around the world for three decades – forcing the Company to focus on maintaining the territory already under its control. Thus, Calcutta adopted a policy of converting states around the Indian subcontinent into British protectorates. Lord Amherst, seeing the mounting aggression from the Burmese and following this policy, began to make states threatened by Ava into protectorates.33 Hall explains, though, that after Napoleon’s defeat the “East India Company had its hands free in India. Bandula and Bagyidaw had chosen a singularly inappropriate moment at which to challenge it.”34 When disputes arose under King – Bagyidaw’s predecessor – Calcutta was willing to be conciliatory and relatively forgiving partly because they were too focused on keeping France out of India. Bagyidaw lacked the political acumen and foresight of his grandfather, leading him to succumb to ’s and Queen Nanmadaw Me Nu’s cries for war.35 Had Bagyidaw understood that Calcutta’s leniency was

Raychaudhuri, Datta Kalikinkar, “Expansion of the British Dominion Beyond the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej, 1824- 1856,” An Advanced History of India (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1963), 732; BMM, 6: 63. 27 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 214. 28 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 125; 126. 29 John W. Henderson, et al., Area Handbook for Burma (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1971), vii. 30 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 217. 31 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 109. 32 R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, Datta Kalikinkar, “Expansion of the British Dominion Beyond the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej, 1824-1856,” An Advanced History of India (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1963), 730. 33 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 112. 34 D. G. E. Hall, Burma. 3rd ed. (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1960), 102. 35 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 109; 118. – 5 – more in fear of France than it was of Burma he may have been less inclined to listen to the war party at Ava. Adoniram Judson articulates the war’s cause clearly:

I am of opinion that war was ultimately inevitable, but might, perhaps, have been delayed for a short time by the British government, yielding to all the demands of the Burmans, especially the restitution of the refugees. The next demand would have been for Chittagong and Dacca.36

Though both sides could delay the war, preventing the war entirely was no longer possible.

The British largely lay the blame on Burma, claiming that Burma had been intruding into British . During Lord Hasting’s governorship, Bodawpaya had demanded that Calcutta surrender Chittagong, Dacca, Murshidabad, and Cassimbazar as the Company was suppressing the Pindaris across India. Ava tenuously claimed its right to these lands pointing to the fact that they had once paid tribute to the medieval ruler of Arakan, whose domains were now part of the Burmese Empire. The demands arrived in Calcutta after the fighting stopped, and Lord Hastings tossed them aside, finding them so ridiculous that he believed they were a forgery.37 Some at Ava even claimed that Burma had a right to Bengal and Bandula treated it as part of Bagyidaw’s domain. The Burmese also seized an island belonging to the Company as well a “European pilot.”38 British intelligence revealed that Bandula in fact was making designs to invade British Bengal. Calcutta viewed these aggressions as acts of open war, prompting Amherst to declare war on Ava.39 Twenty years prior to the conflict, the British were on a relatively good standing with Ava. Bodawpaya had received Michael Symes, the British emissary, with grace and Symes’ own account of Burma underemphasized the difficulties of dealing with the Burmese.40 Symes’ successor, Captain Hiram Cox, changed Calcutta’s perspective on Burma, though. His poor disposition led the Company to look askance at the Burmese and both became increasingly distrustful of one another.41 Ava treated neither Cox nor his successor, Captain Canning, terribly well, leading the Company to cease sending envoys after 1811.42 Thus, when Burmese Buddhists

36 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 2: 429. 37 R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, Datta Kalikinkar, “Expansion of the British Dominion Beyond the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej, 1824-1856,” An Advanced History of India (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1963), 731. 38 John Clark Marshman, Memoirs of Major-General Sir Henry Havelock, K. C. B. (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1860), 16. 39 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 113. 40 Michael Symes, An Account of an Embassy to the , Sent by the Governor-General of India, in the Year 1795 (Online Burma/ Library, 1800, Online Burma/Myanmar Library, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs09/4.1Symes-red.pdf.), 207. 41 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 203. 42 R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, Datta Kalikinkar, “Expansion of the British Dominion Beyond the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej, 1824-1856,” An Advanced History of India (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1963), 730; D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 108. – 6 – crossed into India, the British suspected some sort of intrigue between Burma and a collection of disgruntled Indian princes.43 Htin Aung, though, argues that these expeditions were solely religious, observing that the East India Company was never able to produce any evidence for its claims.44 Regardless, Indian Brahmins still played an important role in instigating their Burmese co-religionists to war against the Company.45

The Burmese believed that the British were the sole aggressors. When Bagyidaw succeeded to the throne in 1819, a British dignitary produced a map of the Bay of Bengal for the new king. Bagyidaw, irritated by the map, commented: “You have assigned the English too much territory.”46 Decades earlier, Bodawpaya had conquered the state of Arakan, between Bengal and Burma, in order to keep the French and English out of Burma, but this very conquest embittered the Arakanese towards the king, leading to their failed rising against him in 1794.47 Arakanese rebels fleeing Bodawpaya naturally found safe haven across the Rakhine Mountains in British Bengal.48 Many of the fifty thousand refugees were held in custody by the Company, but they refused to surrender them to Ava.49 Lord Wellesley, Governor-General of India, offered no support for Chin Byan (the rebel and self-proclaimed king of Arakan), but he did try to contain him in Bengal – further enraging the Court of Ava.50 When the Burmese followed these insurrectionists into Bengal, they claimed an international “right of hot pursuit.” Such a claim is understandable along the Burmo-Bengalese border of the early nineteenth century: the Rakhine Mountains made drawing a definitive border incredibly difficult.51 Neither the East India Company nor the Court of Ava really knew where Burma ended and Bengal began. Calcutta would refuse to acknowledge this ambiguity once the Burmese captured the British post of Tek Naaf.52 Captain Canning even suggested that Calcutta should seize Arakan as early as 1812.53 Ann Judson relates that many in the Burmese court were suspicious of all Europeans, believing them to be spies in pay of the East India Company.54 When they discovered that Captain Laird, Henry Gouger, and Rogers had seen Bengal papers revealing the British designs to seize

43 Ibid., 109. 44 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 201. 45 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 2: 428. 46 Ibid., 2: 429. 47 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 195. 48 Ibid., 201. 49 D. G. E. Hall, Burma. 3rd ed. (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1960), 98; Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 2: 428. 50 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 206. 51 Ibid., 201. 52 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 112. 53 Ibid., 108. 54 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 1: 337. – 7 –

Rangoon, the Burmese began to imprison all Europeans;55 including Americans, Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks, and Armenians.56

The war proved devastating for both belligerents, but this destruction was not a result of Burmese military prowess. In fact, the Burmese armies were so thoroughly crushed by the British that they considered the English “invincible” and spread tales of their supposed invincibility in battle for years afterwards.57 Instead, according to Hall, the First Anglo-Burmese War proved to be “the worst-managed war in British military history.”58 The Company’s military abounded with capable officers and superior arms, but they wildly misallocated their resources. Robertson admits in his account that had the Burmese marched on the British forces at Arakan during the rainy season of Burma they could have crushed the occupying force there.59 Even Sir Archibald Campbell was nearly seized by the Burmese while marching through the jungles.60 The first blunder of the entire war was right at the start. The war began just before the monsoon season in Burma,61 which typically begins around May and ends in October.62 The D- Day was in fact suggested by Captain Canning who did not believe that the rains would hinder the British advance. The plan for the campaign was that the British would land in Rangoon, capture it, and then advance up the Irrawaddy towards Ava while conducting minor offensives in other quarters.63 When the British arrived in Rangoon, almost all of the thirty thousand citizens had already evacuated the city.64 Campbell remarks on his entering Rangoon that, “I do not think one hundred men were found in the town on our taking possession of it.”65 Hall observes, though, that since Campbell captured Rangoon so quickly, his best course of action would have been to march straight up the Irrawaddy to Ava and force Bagyidaw to surrender. The British, though, were under the false impression that Bagyidaw would surrender when he lost Rangoon, so they decided to occupy the city instead.66 The Court of Ava did not view the British expeditionary force as an existential threat; instead, Bagyidaw considered the entire siege as

55 Ibid., 1: 338. 56 Edward Judson, The Life of Adoniram Judson (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1883), 580. 57 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 2: 433; 435. 58 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 113. 59 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 121. 60 Ibid., 200. 61 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 113. 62 John W. Henderson, et al., Area Handbook for Burma (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1971), vii. 63 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 114. 64 BMM, 5: 26. 65 Ibid., 5: 24. 66 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 114. – 8 – mere marauding.67 This sentiment explains why Bagyidaw did not immediately call Bandula – “the only one of the Burmese chiefs who ever gave any proofs of possessing talent, or military spirit” – to stop the British advance in May 1824.68 Instead, he would remain in Arakan, where he defeated the British at Ramu.69 Nevertheless, Campbell’s decision to remain in Rangoon trapped the entire expeditionary force in the city until the end of the monsoon season. The rains were perhaps Burma’s greatest weapon. The expeditionary force was rendered immobile during the monsoon season. The rains proved incredibly deadly for the British forces, bringing on various illnesses that ravaged their troops.70 Daily, the British held funerals for those who perished from disease during the rainy season.71 During the occupation of Rangoon, the British infirmed had to be sent to Mergui and Tavoy on the Tenasserim coast until they restored to health.72 Robertson also notes that every British surgeon was responsible for four hundred sick soldiers during the monsoon season.73 As bad as the rains were, the season immediately following the monsoons proved even deadlier.74 Both Snodgrass75 and Doveton76 mention that the rains could even render the British muskets useless. Even though the whole Bay of Bengal is plagued by monsoons, Snodgrass observes that the heaviest rainfall is in Burma.77 Even when the British were able to occupy the whole of Arakan, they had to retreat simply because the rain left them vulnerable.78 Almost every other account of the war – or even Burma in general – mentions the deadliness of the rains.79

67 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 2: 425. 68 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 12. 69 G. E. Harvey, History of Burma: From the Earliest Times to 10 March 1824, The Beginning of the English Conquest (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1925), 341. 70 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 117. 71 Ibid., 119. 72 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 79. 73 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 122. 74 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 90. 75 Ibid., 30. 76 F. B. Doveton, Reminiscences of the Burmese War, In 1824-5-6 (London: Allen and Co., 1852), 120. 77 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 19. 78 Ibid., 24. 79 See Thomas Abercrombie Trant, Two Years in Ava: From May 1824, to May 1826 (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 43; Henry Gouger, Personal Narrative of Two Year’s Imprisonment in Burmah. (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1860), 83; Hiram Cox, Journal of a Residence in the Burmhan Empire and More Particulary at the Court of Amarapoorah (London: John Warren, 1821), 129; Sir Arthur P. Phayre, History of Burma: Including Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim, and Arakan, From the Earliest Time to the End of the – 9 –

The Burmese, though, were unaffected by the monsoons. Snodgrass applauds Bandula for marching two hundred miles – from Arakan to Rangoon, over the towering Rakhine Mountains – during the rainy season.80 The Burmese were well adapted to the rains – even their houses were built to accommodate the seasonal deluges: the floors are raised some feet above the ground, which could contribute much to their dryness, healthiness, and comfort, were not the space beneath almost invariably the receptacle for dirt and stagnant water, from which, during the heat of the day, pestilential vapours constantly ascend, to the annoyance of every one except a Burmhan.81 The Irrawaddy was the main avenue for travelling north and south in Burma, but boats were particularly useful during the monsoon season. Without boats, it was impossible to travel any considerable distance during the diluvial rains.82 Interestingly, the Judsons make little mention of the rain, though they acknowledge the problems it presents.83 While Adoniram appears impervious to its effects, Ann Judson does perish right at the end of the monsoon season, which Snodgrass claims is the deadliest time of the year.84 The British also lacked the proper intelligence for such an invasion. Few besides the Judsons, a handful of missionaries, and Gouger were fluent in both Burmese and English, complicating communications with the locals.85 Robertson explains this difficulty during negotiations: The language also presented another difficulty, for although an elementary treatise on the Burmese grammar was soon afterwards published by Mr. Hough, a missionary, yet at the commencement of our operations nothing of the kind was

First War with British India (London: Trübner & Co., Ludgate Hill, 1883), 68; Sir Henry Yule, A Narrative of the Mission Sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855, With Notices of the Country, Government, and People (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1858), 119; G. E. Harvey, History of Burma: From the Earliest Times to 10 March 1824, The Beginning of the English Conquest (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1925), 92; Michael Symes, An Account of an Embassy to the Kingdom of Ava, Sent by the Governor-General of India, in the Year 1795 (Online Burma/Myanmar Library, 1800, Online Burma/Myanmar Library, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs09/4.1Symes-red.pdf.), 71; BMM, 6: 62. Cf. John Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Chochin China; Exhibiting a View of the Actual State of Those Kingdoms. 2nd ed. (Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1830), 420. 80 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 75. 81 Ibid., 13. 82 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 121. 83 See Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 1: 405; Edward Judson, The Life of Adoniram Judson (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1883), 395; 513. 84 Ibid., 565. 85 Ibid., 89; Henry Gouger, Personal Narrative of Two Year’s Imprisonment in Burmah. (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1860), 21. – 10 –

known to exist. A letter to the Burmese chiefs had to pass through the following process: – It was first written in Persian, and then explained in Bengalee to a Mug Moonshee, who rendered it into Burmese.86 Improper modes of communication led to the erroneous rumor that Bagyidaw and his wife were both beheaded in November 1824.87 With such poor avenues of communication, it is no wonder that the Company conducted the war with such ignorance. They wrongly believed that the disgruntled Arakanese would willingly join the British against the Court of Ava. Though they were able to raise a small Arakanese levy, they did not prove particularly useful to the British campaign.88 The Company foolishly depended on the Arakanese and disillusioned Burmese to supply the British with cattle, boats, cattle drivers, and boatmen.89 The expeditionary force was able to secure some boatmen, but, as Robertson laments, they demanded “very high wages.”90 Bagyidaw cleverly secured the majority of the Burmese boatmen as servants of the Crown, knowing that the British would need these boats to advance past Rangoon.91 All men in Burma were “by profession” soldiers, “liable at all times to be called upon for military service at the pleasure of the sovereign.”92 The British were not entirely baseless to believe that the common people of Burma would join them: Ann Judson in fact records that during the war, “the common people were speaking low of a rebellion, in case more troops should be levied. For as yet common people had borne the weight of the war; not a tical had been taken from the royal treasury.”93 Despite the possibility, this popular rebellion hardly appears to have materialized: Only Jonathan Wade ever reports of a “civil war” among the Burmese people.94 Likewise, the British had hoped that the Kingdom of Siam would march on Ava,95 but Siam did nothing but abstain.96 The British also underestimated the Burmese resilience, incorrectly believing that

86 Ibid., 15. 87 BMM, 5: 180. 88 J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (New York: New York University Press, 1956), 24. 89 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 5. 90 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 150. 91 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 115; John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 19. 92 Ibid, 18. 93 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 1: 351. Emphasis original. 94 BMM, 5: 279. 95 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 156. 96 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 81. – 11 –

Bagyidaw would surrender once Rangoon fell.97 Thus, the British were prepared for a war that would last months – not years. The British intelligence also led to another of their greatest blunders: the undersupply of the expeditionary force. The Commissariat depended on the natives happily surrendering their victuals to the invading troops, thus refusing to send more supplies to Burma than they felt necessary. Despite the advanced strategies of the British military, the Commissariat adopted the logistical philosophy of the seventeenth century: plunder and pillage. The Commissariat seems to have forgotten that such strategy famously proved the undoing of both Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus during the Thirty Years War.98 It is perhaps most surprising that Campbell – who had himself served in the Iberian campaigns – allowed the Company to forget that Wellington’s brilliance lay in straining Napoleon’s supplies on the peninsula.99 Indeed, the Burmese scorched- earth strategy – leaving little for the British to use – is more reminiscent of Prince Rostopchin’s boldness before Kutuzov’s victory over Napoleon at Borodino.100 Snodgrass even suggests that the Burmese strategy was even more intense than the Russians’ campaign during 1812: leaving entire towns destroyed in their wake.101 The British also made the same mistake as Napoleon by not bringing a large enough medical corps.102 Had they brought a larger medical corps; the casualties of the monsoon season would have been greatly mitigated. Despite Calcutta’s incompetence, the Burmese were no match for the British invaders. Bandula proved the only worthy adversary – Burma’s only victories were at Ramu and in the Arakan region under his command. His army was not sufficiently armed to face the British, though. Bandula’s musketeers were equipped with outdated supplies; especially in comparison to Britain’s modern arms.103 Even worse, musketeers compromised roughly half of his army. He had to supplement his army with spearmen and swordsmen.104 Many of the Burmese did not view this disparity in arms as a problem, claiming that the British “have never yet fought with so strong and brave a people as the Burmans, skilled in the use of sword and spear.”105 No matter the Burmese prowess in battle, these antiquated arms proved useless in the face of the advanced materiel supplied by the Company. The expeditionary force was equipped with Congreve

97 Ibid., 92; 5. 98 See Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 8. 99 See Michael Howard, War in European History: Updated Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 85. 100 See William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914 (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 191. 101 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 191. 102 See Alan Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: HarperCollins, Inc., 1997), 61. 103 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 213. 104 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 95. 105 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 2: 426. – 12 – rockets: explosive warheads that could level Burmese fortifications in a single barrage.106 Bandula himself, taking shelter in his stockade at Danubyu, was killed by one of these rockets.107 Even after the British captured Prome, they were outnumbered 10:1.108 The presence of the HMS Diana, though, proved a decisive factor. The Diana had struck considerable fear in the Burmese: She was able to destroy large portions of Bagyidaw’s teak navy while sustaining little-to-no damage herself.109 Upon seeing the steam boat as the British were marching from Prome to Moulmein, the Burmese boats willingly escorted the British to their destination.110 The Burmese army was not only ill-equipped for such a war, they also lacked the national identity that often proves useful in times of war. The British were coming off victories over the French, whose army was highly professionalized, well-staffed, and possessed high nationalistic zeal.111 The Wars of the Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars were formed around and solidified the identity of various nation-states across Europe.112 Wars in Europe were increasingly understood as existential threats for nation-states. The Burmese dynast-state, though, did not view the war as such a threat until the British were within sixty miles of Ava.113 As Adoniram Judson explains, the Burmese people “know nothing of war, but by the levy of troops and contributions.”114 Though Bandula is now viewed as a patriotic idol today by many in the Burmese armed forces, there is no evidence to suggest that the Burmese in 1824 were quite so patriotic or nationally self-aware.115 It appears that this patriotism was more focused among the nobility of the time and largely absent among the populace. Indeed, the Burmese had an “overgrown opinion of their own prowess and military genius – fostered by frequent victories over all their neighbours, and numerous unchecked conquests during half a century.”116 This opinion, though, is hardly the same as the nationalistic zeal that the British were used to

106 BMM, 6: 243; Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 118. 107 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 173. 108 Ibid., 256. 109 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 124. 110 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 260. 111 William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution. 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 198. 112 Ibid., 416. 113 R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, Datta Kalikinkar, “Expansion of the British Dominion Beyond the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej, 1824-1856,” An Advanced History of India (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1963), 732. 114 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 2: 430. 115 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 112. 116 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 18. – 13 – combatting. The Burmese may have stood a chance had they sensed that the British posed a threat to the very existence of their nation. Burmese strategy also had severe problems. The scorched-earth campaign and allowing the rains to reduce the British forces is perhaps the strongest aspect of their strategy. Had the Burmese played more to their guerilla superiority, they may have inflicted considerably more damage on the invaders.117 Though the Burmese exhibited great skill in constructing stockades, these defenses could hardly withstand British arms and artillery.118 The Burmese also missed their opportunity to destroy the British forces in Arakan. They had been greatly reduced by monsoons; had the Burmese attacked, they would have likely defeated the British.119 The levy system – although effective at raising sizable armies – proved no match against the professional Anglo-Sepoy army. Though some of the Sepoys were mutinous and a few did smuggle British arms to the Burmese,120 many still fought valiantly alongside the British.121 Even captured Sepoys remained loyal to Britain – leading the Court of Ava to throw its hands up in confusion, incapable of understanding precisely what a Sepoy was.122 The Burmese also had depleted the royal treasury123 and bankrupted the people in levying troops.124 The Court of Ava only began to tap into its personal coffers in a last-ditch effort to stop Campbell from marching upon Ava.125 The war was an utter disaster and embarrassment for Burma. The official court account of the war, seeking to restore some prestige Burma, completely rewrites the entire narrative of the war: In the years 1186 and 1187 [1824 and 1825] white strangers from the west fastened a quarrel upon the Lord of the Golden Palace. They landed at Rangoon, took that place at Prome, and were permitted to advance as far as Yandabo: for

117 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 114. 118 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 21; Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 221. 119 Ibid., 121. 120 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 2: 432. 121 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), 105; John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, 1st Baronet's Army, From its landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo in February 1826, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1827), 109. 122 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 2: 431. 123 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 123. 124 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 1: 351. 125 Ibid., 1: 369. – 14 –

the King, from motives of piety and regard for life, made no preparations whatever to oppose them. The strangers had spent vast sums of money in their enterprise, so that by the time they reached Yandabo their resources were exhausted, and they were in great distress. They then petitioned the King, who in his clemency and generosity sent them large sums of money to pay their expenses back, and ordered them out of the country.126 In reality, the British had threatened the nation’s very existence. A Burmese general towards the end of the war had convinced Bagyidaw that he could repel the British. The king consented to his plan even though he had already begun communicating terms with Campbell. When the British inevitably repulsed this final effort, Bagyidaw “caused it to be reported that this general was executed in consequence of disobeying his commands ‘not to fight the English.’”127 For centuries, Burma and Arakan were considered one of the most formidable military powers in the Bay of Bengal.128 In 1824, the Court of Ava still was regarded as a formidable foe. By 1826, though, the Burmese Empire lay shattered. The East India Company refrained from annexing the entire country, but it did denude her of coastal possessions. Arakan, which the Burmese regarded with such great strategic importance, had not only proved trivial during the war, was ignominiously ceded to Calcutta in the Treaty of Yandabo.129 Burma completely lost her ability to interfere in international politics despite her retention of national sovereignty in Burma Proper. It comes as little surprise that mental illness would incapacitate Bagyidaw in the years following the war:130 He watched as his fearsome empire was handily toppled by a severely-outnumbered expeditionary force he had only years prior regarded as weak.131 1824 is the beginning of the end of Burmese independence. Though the Burmese kings still held court, their country had been severely handicapped by the war. Britain not only robbed her coastline, but also her status as a Westphalian state: Calcutta and London unofficially began to treat Burma Proper as a British subject. When Burmese dignitaries arrived in London to appear in Victoria’s court, they were introduced by the secretary of state of India – as if Burma were already a territory of British India.132 Neither London nor Calcutta appeared to be particularly interested in conquering Burma in the years leading up to 1824. Campbell’s hopes that Bagyidaw would surrender with the fall of Rangoon evidences that the East India Company only wanted to punish Ava, not annex Burma. Unfortunately, as the Baptist missionary George

126 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 119. 127 Francis Wayland, A Memoir of the Life and Labors Rev. Adoniram Judson, D.D., 2 vols. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1853), 1: 368. Emphasis original. 128 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 195. 129 R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, Datta Kalikinkar, “Expansion of the British Dominion Beyond the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej, 1824-1856,” An Advanced History of India (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1963), 732; D. G. E. Hall, Burma. 3rd ed. (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1960), 102. 130 Ibid., 107. 131 D. G. E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations with Burma to the Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom, 1886 (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 113. 132 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 249. – 15 –

H. Hough reports, “the Burmans appear resolved to defend themselves to the last.”133 Their resilience made it necessary for the British to continue marching towards Ava, crushing Bagyidaw’s armies along the way. Many newspapers suspected that nothing would cease the fighting except a complete conquest of Burma134 – as several British officers and officials advocated.135 It would take another two wars and nearly sixty years of tensions for Britain to finally add all of Burma to its territory; Burmese literature after the war shifted focus from Burmese prowess instead to court dramas, often dark and gloomy.136 Burma had been reduced back to isolation and obscurity, living under colonial hegemons to some extent for over a century.

133 BMM, 5: 279. 134 Ibid., 5: 249. 135 Thomas Campbell Robertson, Political Incidents of the First Burmese War (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1853), vi. 136 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 231. – 16 –

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