Saddle Up... Tonight We Ride

Platoon Leading 101 is possibly one of the toughest of teaching leadership, but anyone who hopes to become courses our Army has to offer. I doubt few survive the a better or more effective leader must begin by examining course unscathed. Wrong turns, missed LDs, bright ideas his failures with a critical and objective eye, as Crandall gone awry, and other embarrassments mark the course (and certainly all leadership guides) advocate. for young platoon leaders as they master their craft. Re- Of course, there are a couple of prerequisites for this counted through the years, the stories take on epic pro- technique to succeed. It won’t work in a “zero-defect envi- portions. Recently, I bumped into a member of my first ronment” where a single mistake dooms or damages a platoon who recounted, in vivid detail, an unfortunate inci- career. You must also be willing to admit your mistake and dent that involved me slaving a tank (it’s amazing how take responsibility for it. Too often, instead of admitting an much voltage the human body can take). error, we seek to spin, rationalize, or explain it away. In this issue, Captain Douglas Crandall confesses the When confronted with the evidence of an adulterous affair sins he committed as a new platoon leader — they look and the prospect of divorce recently, an aging rock star familiar. Crandall’s apprehensions, concerns, and mis- shifted the blame to a disease he suffers from — he’s a takes are not new. Generations of platoon leaders have sex addict. “Mistakes were made.” “There was no control- made the same mistakes, wrestled the same demons, ling legal authority.” Does anyone accept blame or re- and asked themselves the same questions: “How do I sponsibility anymore? Admit the error, accept responsibil- prove myself to the platoon?” “How do I tell a platoon ity and learn from it — good advice for everyone. sergeant as old as my father what to do, especially when Sure, there are mistakes one should not recover from. he has been doing it for 16 years?” Good lieutenants an- And I am not advocating “a get out of jail free card” for swer the tough questions, prove themselves, and move young leaders; rather, that we keep in mind the process on to executive officer jobs or to the scout and support and transformation new platoon leaders go through and platoons. allocate the room to grow while providing the time and Crandall mentions FM 22-100, Leadership, in his article effort necessary to AAR them on their adventures. and adds that books on leadership and the vaunted FM In closing, I’d like to point out that several of the articles offered precious few “lessons upon which to draw,” for his in this issue highlight the importance of teamwork in purposes. It occurs to me that we are literally besieged mounted warfare. Inside the cover, you’ll find a piece on with the opportunities to learn leadership. We have FM the Falklands that demonstrates the importance of the 22-100, we have numerous periodicals which frequently combined arms team in that conflict; Major Kevin Marcus devote entire issues to the topic, we have writing contests, writes about AC/RC assignments and illustrates another awards, departments and faculty whose stated mission is key partnership; the development of the tank-infantry team the pedagogy of leadership, and there are hundreds of is detailed by Captain J.L. Mudd; and our brothers in the books written by experts, yet this young officer points out Engineer and Air Defense community weigh in with advice the most critical tool for him in learning to lead his platoon on how we can fight better as a combined arms team. was simply examining his failures and learning from his mistakes. Not to disparage those engaged in the science — D2

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI JOEL B. HUDSON General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army 9919301

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-99-5

Editor-in-Chief Features MAJ DAVE DAIGLE 7 Tips on Being a Platoon Leader by Captain Douglas B. Crandall Managing Editor 9 The 2nd Parachute Battalion’s War in the Falklands JON T. CLEMENS by Captain Daniel T. Head 13 AC/RC Assignments: One Officer’s Perspective by Major Kevin B. Marcus Commandant 15 Development of the American Tank-Infantry Team MG B. B. BELL During World War II in Africa and Europe by Captain J. L. Mudd 23 From Warrior to Logistician ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- by Captain John D. Fio Rito monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 26 Three Tanks Featured in Russian Arms Show Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. by Colonel James H. Nunn and Lieutenant Colonel John C. Paulson Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- 30 Engineer Basics, Some Rules to Improve Mobility and Countermobility MOR represents the professional opinions of by Captain Wayne Skill the authors and does not necessarily reflect 37 Employing the Bradley Stinger Platoon in Support of Task Force Operations the official Army or TRADOC position, nor by Captain Douglas J. Waddingham does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. 39 Using Flag Signals to Speed Combat Casualty Evacuation by Major Joseph M. Nolan Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored 41 The JRTC and Light/Heavy Integration: Defensive Operations cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion by First Sergeant Paul E. Thompson Jr. headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- 44 New Ideas for Armor Company Maintenance Plans quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar- by Captain Paul J. Taylor ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the 47 Fire Support: Killing System or Battlefield Shaper? United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, by Robert Doughty Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM 48 The First Lieutenants to Korea Program staff agencies with responsibility for armored, by Captain Ron MacKay direct fire, ground combat systems, organiza- 49 STRAC XXI — Budgeting the Bullets: The Master Gunners’ Concerns tions, and the training of personnel for such by Sergeant First Class David Cooley organizations may request two copies by sending a request to the editor-in-chief. 51 The Graphical Spot Report by Captain Brandon K. Herl Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor 53 A Technique to Get Organized and Manage Your Career Center has proponency. That proponency by Captain Christopher H. Engen includes: all armored, direct-fire ground com- 54 Tactical Vignette 99-4: “Trouble for the Redball Express – Rear Area Security” bat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively 55 Solution to Tactical Vignette 99-3: “Screen in a Snowstorm” in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted 58 Review of Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of the U.S. Armored Forces soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equip- by Gunnery Sergeant Leo J. Daugherty ment which armor and armored cavalry organ- Back T-80U Russian Main Battle Tank Poster izations use exclusively; training for all SC Cover Threat Branch, Directorate of Force Developments 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF- 19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and Departments leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to 2 Contacts 6 Driver’s Seat include Threat units at those levels. 3 Letters 60 Reviews 5 Commander’s Hatch Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. September-October 1999, Vol. CVIII, No. 5 USPS 467-970 Directory — Points of Contact

DSN – 464-XXXX Commercial – (502) 624-XXXX

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor-in-Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) MAJ Dave Daigle 2249 MG B. B. Bell 2121 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Jon T. Clemens 2249 BG R. Steven Whitcomb 7555 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Vivian Oertle 2610 COL Frank J. Gehrki III 1101 E-mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

Production Assistant Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Mary Hager 2610 CSM David L. Lady 4952 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

Staff Illustrator Directorate of Force Development (ATZK-FD) Mr. Jody Harmon 2610 COL Joe Hughes 5050 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK-TD) COL Matthew L. Smith 8247 U.S. Army Armor School E-Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) Director, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) COL Brett H. Weaver 4009 COL Richard P. Geier 1050 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) COL James H. Nunn 7955 CSM Carl E. Christian 7091 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW) NCO Academy (ATSB-NC) COL Richard T. Savage 7809 CSM Kevin P. Garvey 5150 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) Aubrey Henley 1272 COL Michael D. Jones 7848 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 (ATSB-BAZ) 1st Armor Training Brigade Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL William J. Blankmeyer 6843 COL D. Allen Youngman 1315 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

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2 ARMOR — September-October 1999

LETTERS

Let’s Not Give the OPFOR U.S. Army in its conduct of military operations. departure of those who readily see the hand- Too Much Credit, He Says But let’s not give them too much credit for writing on the wall, et al) — there is no hope. what appears to be tactical proficiency. Is this the real message, colonel? Dear Sir: The OPFOR operates with profligate fre- GEORGE G. EDDY quency on the only terrain on which they will COL, USA (Ret.) Oh, c’mon. We should all be as lucky as the ever operate. The rest of the Army is not so Austin, Texas OPFOR. The true source for the OPFOR’s lucky. Operational requirements and limited success in the battles fought at the NTC is budgets make the frequency of practicing found in the article, but it is glossed over in a combat missions problematic and the likeli- Bradley IFV/CFV Design barrage of accolades heaped on their training, hood of doing it over and over on the same Was Driven by the Soviet Challenge their TTPs, and their righteousness in main- terrain remote. The OPFOR’s mission is sim- taining focus. Nevertheless, it’s really simple: ple and resources are matched to it. Dear Sir: the battle they have to fight is easier; they have the opportunity to train on a narrow set Train a lot over the same terrain week after I am reaching the age at which histories are of missions frequently; and they know the week, focus on nothing else, remove logistics being written that cover events I lived through terrain. from the equation and negate the probability and, like some WWII vets I know, perhaps the of operating in assorted terrain under varied best policy is silence. Still, recent discussions Permanently task-organized? Of course they conditions and you’ll get pretty good at a sim- on the design of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle are. They only have one operational require- ple task. They train on a narrow set of tasks a in your fine journal demand some comment — ment — to be the OPFOR. No other require- lot and they know the terrain. No one else’s not to belabor the past but to allow the current ment is superimposed on them. They never mission statement is quite that simple. Nice generation of cavalrymen to understand fully get sent to fight forest fires or to support job if you can get it. our combat vehicle design decisions as they ROTC camps or to provide relief to victims of begin the process of designing the Army After hurricanes, riots, ethnic cleansing, floods, or, JAMES G. DIEHL Next class of vehicles. for that matter, to screen a corps front or flank COL, Armor in all kinds of terrain and conditions, ad infini- Via email As MAJ Winstead brilliantly pointed out in his tum. Nor are they sent off once every 18 May-June 1999 letter to ARMOR, the Bradley months or so to fight at a training area far from OPFOR Doesn’t Present Fighting Vehicle design was a compromise of their home station against the unit that lives A Realistic Comparison many doctrinal, technological, and economic there and trains there. No other mission re- issues. Although this will always be the case, quirements exist to preclude them from train- even for the richest nation on earth, and MG ing down to the individual certifiable level Dear Sir: Sheridan understands this better than most repeatedly on the only terrain where they will I found the May-June 1999 ARMOR to be a professionals, it is very important to under- ever perform a limited set of tasks. The rest of most interesting issue, especially the articles stand how and why these compromises were the Army is pretty busy with a hefty schedule on Grozny, Dr. John Daley’s piece on the made. MAJ Winstead’s conclusion that the of operational requirements. The OPFOR’s fighting in Spain, and Colonel Rosenberger’s BFV design and doctrinal employment are operational requirement is right outside the lengthy article on reaching full combat poten- inadequate for 21st century warfare is correct, back gate of their motor pool. in my opinion, but for very different reasons. tial in the 21st century. On the latter, I am Masters of command and control? The impressed at how extensive preparations are The first factor to understand is that the fight- BOSs being orchestrated present a different for the OPFOR at the NTC. It seems to go on ing vehicle concept is a Soviet idea reflecting and simpler challenge to the OPFOR than and on, and since OPFOR fights in the same Soviet doctrine. It is every bit as much an they do to their BLUEFOR counterparts. place (as near as I can tell), well, by golly, achievement as the T34 tank and the Kalash- Choosing engagement areas, defilade posi- they ought to be ready! Would a unit in com- nikov rifle — so much so that all major armies tions, obstacle locations, avenues of ap- bat in strange territory be able to go through copied the concept shortly after the BMP was proach, routes — whether they really do go this vast and repetitious routine? introduced. Imitation is the most sincere form through an abbreviated MDMP or not — have He notes that incoming units cannot match of flattery, particularly in the field of weapons got to be a little easier when operating some- design, where original thought is so scarce. where where every rock and depression has a OPFOR in training and preparation, and exe- cution, so it is not difficult to see why they lose Soviet doctrine since the spectacular WWII first name and every action has been walked victory that saved their country has been to over weeks or months or years in advance. most of the time. No doubt, even so, these incoming units learn a host of useful lessons concentrate forces at the critical point, con- Computerized artillery units that never get — but one must wonder how long these les- duct a mounted breakthrough under over- lost, never miss. Maneuvering in demi-tanks sons stick and are passed on. Unless I have whelming artillery attacks and drive for deep, with 2-man crews instead of 60-ton main bat- misunderstood Colonel Rosenberger’s pres- critical objectives. This very consistent doc- tle tanks. Chemical warfare? Ever seen an entation, it looks that these returning incoming trine has, until recently, driven their infantry, OPFOR soldier with his mask on in MOPP IV? units come to NTC with nearly a clean slate. If tank, and artillery design: large numbers of How about logistics? Big part of the battle for this is a valid conclusion, then our units never relatively simple weapons systems that sup- the BLUEFOR — just not an issue with the will be as ready as they should be. port this doctrine, i.e., large, relatively inaccu- OPFOR, where resupply, medevac, Class rate guns on small tanks; small infantry IV/VII/IX, battlefield repair, etc., is not a part of Throughout his article, he repeats that the squads that fight mounted during the break- the game. The battle is simply easier. rest of the Army cannot do what OPFOR through (hence Infantry Fighting Vehicle); and does, and this is quite chilling. And then, after massive artillery/rocket/missile formations. Train more frequently? How about doing a noting this circumstance, he admonishes us to The BFV, therefore, is a Soviet concept TF-sized maneuver exercise monthly? Fa- roll up our sleeves. And do what? With what? done in grand American style — bigger, bet- tigue with all that training? Not really. Mostly When? ter, and more expensive. When the BMP was company-sized exercises — day trips to the Are we as dead in the water as he claims? A being deployed, we were mired in a land war field — once a month at the battalion level. pessimist probably would conclude that as in Asia, more worried about bombers and Hot chow on the objective? Hot chow is in the long as present conditions continue to prevail jungle boots. When Abrams/DePuy/Starry and mess hall on main post when they return from the day’s battle. (administration hostility to the military, insuffi- some outstanding Chiefs of Staff put the Army cient funding and staffing, excessive deploy- back together, we threw large dollars at mod- The OPFOR is a great training aid that has ments, inadequate effective training, degraded ernization and came up with the Abrams tank, meant a great deal to the proficiency of the combat readiness, high turnover, increased Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and now the Cru- ARMOR — September-October 1999 3

sader artillery system (20 years later). The Some parts of the movie are unfortunately important when organizing for combat, but so Abrams is a world class tank, thanks to some laughably true, but the basic issues are so are mutual trust, understanding, and habitual very talented, disciplined designers at Chrys- distorted that the only casualty is my trust in relationships. We must find a means and ler Defense and TACOM, albeit with German the historical record according to Washington method of recognizing, and combining both, armament and British armor. The Bradley D.C. and Hollywood, Calif. and at the same time dispensing with branch suffered from uncertain U.S. infantry doctrine parochialism. in the post-Vietnam era which, in my opinion, Where do we go from here? The Future In- continues today and is the major obstacle to fantry Fighting Vehicle (FIFV) concept work (4) Never forget history: We must place re- the design of vehicles for AAN. The specific has begun and the Future Scout Vehicle is newed emphasis on the study of past con- Sheridan/Winstead points are: trying to be born as a joint U.S./U.K. demon- flicts. The statue in front of the National Ar- strator program. In the short run, relatively chives says it best. “What is past is prologue.” Battlefield taxi vs. fighting vehicle. The peaceful times and low RDTE budgets will The problems and challenges that today’s Bradley was designed as a fighting vehicle but probably mean that the 17 years it took to commander face have been solved by some- was immediately compromised by weight/size develop the Bradley will be exceeded. Design one before. The trick is finding and applying limitations and U.S. doctrine. U.S. infantry compromises will have to be made, of course, the solution. The thorough study of the history wanted to keep the large squads, did not but can be kept to a minimum if a forward- of our profession is an invaluable tool in this really want to fight mounted, and was smart looking, clear and consistent how-to-fight regard. Also, never overlook the history of our enough to know it didn’t have overmatching doctrine is developed for AAN and disciplined particular unit. It may seem trite, but colors, artillery support anyway, with WWII formations leadership rises to the occasion. guidons, patches and crests are combat mul- declining from fully one third of a division to tipliers that cost next to nothing. FRANK HARTLINE the paltry numbers of today. Firing ports were COL, Armor (Ret.) With the above rules in mind its “out on a discarded soon after fielding. Armor protection Tucson, Ariz. limb time.” My proposed mounted force struc- was state of the art, but completely inade- ture, to meet the challenges of the next cen- quate in the face of another Soviet invention, tury, is along the following lines; the Sagger anti-tank missile. Ft. Benning Future Mounted Forces, wisely accepted the better mobility and fire- And the Shape of a New Army (1) Change our army from one based upon power of the Bradley but avoided the fighting divisions to one based on brigades. Divisions vehicle doctrine whenever possible. MAJ are too cumbersome for the twenty-first cen- Winstead is correct that monthly NTC blood Dear Sir: tury fight. Remember how long it took us to baths demonstrate vividly the error of BFV I am a light infantryman by commission and get to the Gulf? Our potential enemies are not head-on engagements, and poor U.S. experience. Therefore, read what follows with stupid. They won’t give us six months next mechanized infantry doctrine continues to be Caveat Emptor in mind. My love affair with the time. Brigades are easier to station, train, masked by improper lessons from Desert mounted arm began at the age of 16 when I modernize, mobilize, and deploy, and when Storm. One hopes that perceptive infantry read my father’s dog-eared copy of JEB Stu- properly organized can pack nearly the punch leaders will make do until doctrine catches up art by John W. Thomason, a Marine — go of today’s “Army XXI” division. with the times. figure. Since that time, I have read, no de- (2) Design a mounted brigade that is self- Armament. The TOW AT missile launcher voured, every book and article on mounted sufficient all the time. It should contain “joint and two-man turret were major design com- combat I could get my hands on, including compatible” C4I, robust reconnaissance, fire promises, caused by lack of capability against every issue of ARMOR for the last 38 years. support (aviation, field and air defense artil- Soviet tank divisions in Europe at the time, My bookshelves and filing cabinets are full to lery), and a world-class logistics system, as and continue to cause doctrinal problems. overflowing. I am comfortable with the mindset well as the teeth arms. How can the vehicle be 2-3 kms in overwatch of Murat, Kellermann, and Stuart, as well as and still be accompanying the Abrams onto Antal, Benson, MacGregor, Rosenberger, and (3) The combined arms battalion’s organiza- the objective? Is the 25mm a precision or area Thompson. What follows then are the results tion is anybody’s guess. My particular favorite weapon? Suffice it to say that the BMP had a of the lessons gleaned from the great masters is the balanced approach of two mechanized direct fire cannon and missile launcher — ours as well as the modern practitioners. Based infantry companies and two tank companies, do, too. The advent of fire-and-forget AT mis- upon these lessons, I will further go way out with a headquarters containing engineer, siles, such as the U.S. Javelin, may cause on a limb, and propose a mounted force struc- signal, mortar, air defense, and reconnais- new thinking — soon, we hope — although ture for the twenty-first century. sance platoons. An organic service company the Marine AAAV and the U.S. Future Scout would contain all of the battalion’s service There are four rules for mounted combat, as support requirements. No “just in time” logis- Vehicle appear to have missed this leap- I see them: ahead opportunity. tics belonging to some other commander for (1) Never fight fair: Strength on strength this kid. I would want to control my own des- Mobility. The Bradley was a great improve- combat, when avoidable, is a waste of men tiny. The organization described would seem ment in battlefield mobility for its time, al- and equipment. Properly conceived maneu- to meet most of the presumed parameters of though it is, in my opinion, still its greatest ver, attacking C4I, fire support, and logistical METT-T. Will it meet them all? Of course not, limitation for future battlefields. The next infan- assets render the enemy’s maneuver assets but it will meet most of them. Cross-attach- try vehicle, and tank for that matter, needs to irrelevant. Tanks and IFVs that are out of gas ment between battalions will become the fly over obstacles and fight successfully on the and ammo are useless junk. exception, not the rule. There is just no such ground. Technology is not the limiting factor, thing as a perfect organization. only doctrine and proponent inertia. The Brad- (2) Always fight offensively (even while de- ley swimming issue, another BMP mirror- fending): Frederick the Great is said to have (4) To summarize, the brigade I envision image threat and infantry-cavalry compro- relieved any of his cavalry commanders who would have a headquarters battalion contain- mise, can be avoided by flight if some original waited to receive the enemy’s charge. The ing the brigade headquarters company, signal thinking is done. true potential of the mounted arm is in offen- company, MI company, attack/recon aviation sive combat. company, and ground recon troop. It would al- “The Pentagon Wars.” I should have been so contain three combined arms battalions, a upset by being portrayed as ineffective and (3) Organize and train the way you intend to field artillery battalion, and a support battalion unethical in the HBO movie, but have come to fight: Combined arms has evolved from the containing very robust medical, maintenance, realize that the few people who saw it believe army corps of Napoleon’s day to today’s bri- and supply and transportation companies. it to be comic satire of our bumbling defense gade. It’s time that it evolves even further to a establishment and are not concerned with the combined arms battalion that crosses tradi- Continued on Page 56 core issues involved. This is as it should be. tional branch lines. The factors of METT-T are 4 ARMOR — September-October 1999

COMMANDER'S HATCH

“On Point for the Nation . . .”

by Major General B. B. Bell, Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center

As I assume the duties as your 38th • Develop future mounted combat sys- to reinforce Class 40 bridges to pass our Chief of Armor, I cannot imagine a more tems to achieve substantially improved heavy armor. To become a more strategi- exciting challenge or greater privilege. strategic mobility and tactical agility, cally mobile and tactically agile force, we On the eve of the 21st century, our while maintaining overwhelming fire- will aggressively pursue scientific and mounted combat force is postured as the power and crew protection. technological breakthrough applications most lethal and relevant heavy force in • Train our soldiers, NCOs, and officers to the development of our future mounted the history of America’s Army. Our na- combat systems. tion, by destiny and design, has growing to serve and lead as decisive warriors, enlightened by the precepts of Force interests in an increasingly complex and XXI, yet grounded in the realities of Our Armor soldiers are the best in the interdependent world. At home and world — by far. They out-think, out- across the globe where our military forces the deployed Army on mission. smart, out-quick, out-react and can out- defend our national interests, our ar- • Seek, develop, capture, then rapidly fight any other fielded Armor force. They mor/mechanized team is respected and adapt, relevant breakthrough informa- are innovative, resourceful, courageous, admired by our friends, and feared by our tion technology to the Armored Force. compassionate, and vicious warriors. We potential enemies. The mounted force has will build on this base. We will train our become the centerpiece force of choice, In achieving these objectives, the Armor soldiers to further leverage information whether postured for intense combat on Center will review our mounted force technology to widen the overmatch they the Korean peninsula and the now enjoy. They will literally deserts of Southwest Asia or think, plan, and execute “out of demonstrating American deci- the box,” while staying inside our siveness, commitment, and will in Our Armored Force must get to the proven doctrine. They will be Bosnia and Kosovo. Our mounted predictably unpredictable and warriors are leading the charge in fight fast — before the enemy pre- they will thrive on uncertainty. pares the battlefield — and situation- executing the National Military We will enhance our commit- Strategy — they are literally on ally dominate. It must achieve rapid point for the nation. ment to instilling in our warriors and decisive mission resolution on the values and standards which The Chief of Staff of the Army our terms. are the foundation of our Army, has established the Army’s non- recognizing that our volunteer negotiable contract with the na- mounted troopers serve self- tion and the American people. We lessly, prepared to accept enor- are a warfighting Army — persuasive in METT-T. We will capitalize on our cur- mous hardship, deprivation and death to peace, invincible in war. My goal is to rent strengths and develop innovative defend the nation and the ideals on which provide the central leadership and vision approaches to overcome our weaknesses. it is built. We will pursue appropriate upgrades to to field an Armored Force that expands Today, the mounted combat force has its relevance and capabilities for the our M1 fleet as the dominant flagship of Army. Our Armored Force must get to our full-spectrum armored force. How- never been more important or central to ever, we cannot afford to overwhelm the Army’s ability to fight and win our the fight fast — before the enemy pre- nation’s wars, defend its interests and pares the battlefield — and situationally scarce strategic deployment resources dominate. It must achieve rapid and deci- with massive, unwieldy formations that preserve the peace. To cement and ex- our arrive late on the battlefield. We cannot pand our relevancy, we will commit our- sive mission resolution on terms. Our selves to ensuring that the mounted force objectives to achieve this goal are to: afford to leverage superb strategic de- ployment platforms such as the C-17, is formed, trained, and equipped as a • only to find our force tactically stacked decisive, lethal, rapidly deployable, and Structure current mounted forces to agile force for the next millennium. achieve marked enhancements to stra- up and vulnerable behind legions of un- tegic deployability. protected engineer formations struggling STRIKE FIRST!

ARMOR — September-October 1999 5

DRIVER'S SEAT

FORSCOM Plan to Allocate Ammo Draws Armor Center Alternative

by CSM David L. Lady, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

It is the rare tanker who believes that he vest ammunition savings from crew- would suffer if commanders were al- has enough ammunition for gunnery tables and shift this ammunition to collec- lowed too much latitude. This consensus training! The STRAC (Standards in tive-level training tables. This proposal was based on the current level of training Training Commission) allowance of 90 emphasizes using TADSS and allowing and qualification with their units. Also, main-gun rounds per tank per year was an the commander to determine the track the Armor Center was asked to better unpopular reduction which permitted the each crew takes through qualification. specify the gates and prerequisites for purchase of the Tank Weapons Gunnery This proposal utilizes the current 90- each track. Simulation System (TWGSS). As an round strategy for Armor. It was during the Gunnery Conference armor force, we have a long way to go in STRAC XXI for M1A1/A2 tank battal- that MSG Steven Delabar (Platoon Gun- order to reap the full benefit of TWGSS; we need enough spare systems/PLL on ions w/TWGSS would make no change to nery Doctrine Branch NCOIC, who co- current requirements for COFT/AGTS; it authored this article) presented an Armor hand to repair/replace bad components would require TCGST and a Dry/TADSS Center proposal for STRAC XXI. This “on the spot,” as well as a better NETT and sustainment training system. Initia- Tank Crew Proficiency Course prior to USAARMC model is based on the both Level I and II Gunnery. Live Fire FORSCOM approach and has two tracks: tives to improve TWGSS-user training Accuracy Screening Test (LFAST) and a live-fire track in which all crew-level have been proposed by the Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development Tank Table V would remain mandatory tables are fired with main gun ammuni- live fire tables. Following TTV, the tion and a track that combines TADSS (DTDD), but the fact remains that most commander would have the option of with live-fire to verify proficiency before tankers want more main gun ammunition; many commanders want the ammunition directing his crews into one of the three moving into collective-level gunnery. tracks. If the TC/gunner had qualified This model allows the harvesting of am- in order to better resource unit collective- live-fire TTVIII within the past 12 munition savings from crew-level tables training tank tables XI and XII, as well as an annual CALFEX. months, the crew could fire TTVI and and shifting these savings to collective- VII using TADSS (generally TWGSS) level training tables, while maintaining FORSCOM staff has been working on a and fire a “modified” TTVIII. If the crew proficiency and safety at crew-level gun- STRAC XXI proposal, in order to rec- met the standard for TTVIII-M, then they nery. FORSCOM’s third track would not ommend improvements to DA Pam 350- would be Qualified and would go on to be used in the “qualification” sense, but 38. This proposal was presented by the live-fire TTs XI and XII and/or CAL- could be used by commanders if the unit FORSCOM Master Gunner, MSG Ron- FEX. If the TC/gunner had not qualified was deployed to an area where there are nie Ward, at the CSM Update during the live-fire TTVIII in the past 12 months, no live-fire ranges or laser-engagement Armor Conference and, more recently, at then TTs VI, VII, and VIII would be live- areas to sustain some gunnery profi- the Gunnery Conference conducted at fire qualification tables. The third track, ciency. Fort Knox 22-24 Jun 99. For more on the involving total use of TADSS, would STRAC XXI proposal, see “Budgeting the only be used by experienced qualified Both tracks maintain COFT/AGTS re- Bullets,” pg. 49. — Ed. quirements, require hands-on TCGST, crews determined by the commander as and TCPC using TWGSS. Screening and not needing to live-fire prior to the ad- The strategy model represented a three- vanced tables. With the ammunition TTV would remain live fire in both track approach to training and qualifica- tracks. Following TTV, the commander tion: a live-fire track in which all crew- saved by using the combination or could direct the crews to one of two TADSS track for previously qualified level tables are fired with main-gun am- crews, commanders would have a “har- tracks, one of which would lead to quali- munition, a simulation track in which all fication and the other to “proficiency crew-level tables are fired using TADSS vest” for more robust TTs XI and XII and verification.” for a CALFEX. (Training Aids, Devices, Simulations and Simulators), and a track that combines At both presentations the consensus of both. The goal of this proposal is to har- attendees was that crew-level proficiency Continued on Page 14 6 ARMOR — September-October 1999

Tips on Being a Platoon Leader

A Refreshingly Honest Account of a Junior Leader’s Learning Curve

by Captain Douglas B. Crandall

Platoon leaders start from scratch. While rest; I was energetic and ready to get Find out quickly from your commander, we receive leadership training throughout started. Understanding the circumstances the first sergeant, or the command ser- the commissioning process, nothing can surrounding a unit that existed before me geant major what goes into proper coun- fully prepare us for our first day in (and will exist long after me) would have seling, and then do it. The likely result charge. We can study to master the tacti- put my own importance in context. will be a quality exchange of ideas be- cal and technical aspects of the job, but January 1996 - April 1996: Establish- tween you and your senior NCO. leadership experience only comes with ing standards within the platoon. November 1996: You will make criti- experience. The responsibilities of the Al- though it is important to build credibility cal mistakes; drive on. My best tank junior leader are numerous: develop sub- before making changes, some standards commander taught me the importance of ordinates, build the team, set the example, quickly recovering from failure. While make sound and timely decisions — to are simply non-negotiable. Even the most junior lieutenant understands the tenets of preparing for a mobile defense at JRTC, I name a few. Our lack of practice is no basic discipline. I observed but did not threw track. Instead of acting decisively, excuse. If we fail, soldiers die. correct simple deficiencies: leaders who commandeering another vehicle, and FM 22-100, Military Leadership, directs did not take the APFT with their soldiers, accomplishing the mission, I stayed with young officers to know their strengths a tank commander who regularly came my tank and reflected upon my misfor- and weaknesses and to practice honest late to formations, sub-standard uniforms tune and stupidity. After the battle was self assessment.1 Honest analysis of one’s and haircuts. Even though the platoon over — and we had lost — SGT Morn- own failures can be difficult. The failures appeared on a par with the company, I ingstar told me that I often took my mis- are many; the failures are inexcusable; still should have immediately corrected takes too hard. In this case, he said, I had the failures violate the confidence of our these problems. let the platoon down by not rebounding subordinates. As I look back, many of my and continuing with the mission. I needed Throughout AOBC, our instructors in- to quickly put it behind me and carry on. own mistakes embarrass me. Nonethe- undated us with the mantra: “Your pla- less, those mistakes provide valuable I will never forget that. insight. We must seek to improve upon toon sergeant will make you or break you.” It is definitely crucial to establish a December 1996: Never criticize the them to lead more effectively in the fu- strong relationship with your resident performance of your predecessor. Fol- ture. Lives depend upon it. expert. However, if you have high stan- lowing JRTC, the battalion commander The quandary for the new platoon leader dards coming in, do not lower them as chose me to take over the support pla- is the virtual absence of lessons upon you attempt to build that relationship. toon. Although I had heard it was a mis- which to draw. There are books on lead- erable job, the challenge of leading the Many new platoon leaders will not face platoon through an upcoming NTC rota- ership, and the Army publishes manuals the challenge of immediately instilling on the subject. However, few of those tion provided me with excitement. discipline; the noncommissioned officers Probably the biggest mistake I made sources describe the intimate details of will have things under control; but, if the failure — a crucial tool in learning how came upon my arrival to that platoon. NCOs do not, it is your responsibility to “Right off the bat,” I discussed my per- to lead. Therefore, I have recalled my enforce standards from the start. mistakes as a platoon leader to help those ception of the previous lieutenant with who will soon tread that ground. Al- January 1996 - December 1996: the platoon sergeant and some of the though the lessons are specific to my own Counseling is your duty from the first squad leaders. experiences, they should not be too dif- day you take control of your platoon. Since that time, I have learned that there ferent from what most platoon leaders Counsel your platoon sergeant on what are few blunders a new leader can make will encounter. you expect from him and ask him what which approach this one. Disparaging the January 1996: Taking over the pla- he expects of you. Learn from him as you previous leadership alienates those who toon conduct the counseling. If he is a quality respected their former boss. It is unpro- . Assuming leadership of 1st Pla- NCO, the counseling sessions will serve toon, Delta Company, 1-33 Armor was fessional at best, and springs from a lack the first major event of my Army career. as professional development for you. If of confidence in your own abilities. The he is not, you will have to develop him. constant need for comparison is a malady Five years of college and four months at The bottom line is that he works for you, the Officer Basic Course all pointed to that plagues or has plagued numerous this moment. The platoon, however, and you are responsible for rating his leaders — myself included. Rid yourself performance. You cannot properly do of any concern for who came before you could not have cared much less. While that without formal counseling. there is usually some anticipation with or who will come after you. Just do the regard to a new leader — especially at I did not counsel my first platoon ser- job. lower levels — it is pretty much business geant. The reason was simple: he was old As I soon found out, my predecessor as usual for the soldiers. Moreover, my enough to be my father. I felt inadequate. had performed admirably in an extremely platoon had just returned from the Na- What was I, as a new second lieutenant, difficult position. It is embarrassing to tional Training Center. The deployment going to tell him? This is a typical mis- think that I ever made the mistake of cri- took its toll, and the platoon was ready to take. Don’t make it. tiquing him. ARMOR — September-October 1999 7

DOONESBURY © 1991 G. B. Trudeau. Reprinted with permission of UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE. All rights reserved.

As a side note, complimenting your pre- again. Rank has no privilege except that • Never criticize your predecessor of caring for young lives. • decessor can have a proportionally oppo- • Enforce standards from the start site effect. Subtle praise for the job he did July 1997: Act decisively when you Be with your soldiers and do not take will impress subordinates and indicate know you are right — no matter how special privileges that you are confident in your own abili- many subordinates or peers disagree. ties. I saw that quality in my battalion and I also learned three general lessons not Upon its return from NTC, the support directly associated with the personal dis- brigade commanders, and I have logged it platoon received a new platoon sergeant. appointment of my own mistakes. They as an example of great leadership. Because he seemed to possess a great provide similar value in my quest for deal of initiative, I allowed the new pla- effective leadership. January 1997 - May 1997: Hold your toon sergeant to make some ill-advised noncommissioned officers responsible changes. In particular, I acquiesced to the Basic discipline is the foundation of for the deficiencies of their subordi- any good unit. alteration of our manning roster. I have A quote from General nates. In many ways, I alienated my sup- regretted it ever since. The personnel George S. Patton, Jr., communicates the port platoon soldiers because I was too moves reversed a tremendous amount of importance of making discipline the pri- willing to correct them myself. In addi- progress that the platoon had made. ority in every endeavor: tion, this served to weaken the chain of “You cannot be disciplined in great command. Whenever possible, be tough I knew I was right; we did not need to things and undisciplined in small things. on your NCOs and make them enforce make any changes. But similar to mis- There is only one sort of discipline — the standards. The noncommissioned takes I made as a tank platoon leader, I perfect discipline. Discipline is based on officers (squad leaders, tank command- allowed secondary factors to trump my pride in the profession of arms, on me- ers) are accountable to you; the soldiers better judgment. When you know you are ticulous attention to details, and on mu- are, in turn, accountable to them. right, act decisively no matter who dis- agrees. You are the leader. tual respect and confidence. It can only be obtained when all officers are so im- June 1997: Be with your soldiers and July - August 1997: Never talk about bued with the sense of their lawful do not take special privileges. About how things have improved since you obligation to their men and to their half-way through our NTC rotation, SGT arrived. The support platoon’s new pla- country that they cannot tolerate negli- Kauahi, an outstanding squad leader, toon sergeant constantly talked about gence.” confronted me. The guys in the platoon how much things had improved since he Once you or your superiors set a stan- felt as if I was not spending enough time arrived — how things were now “shaping dard, “perfect discipline” mandates that with them. I had been sleeping near the up.” The rest of us thought we had done you enforce it. Failure to do so is a com- Field Trains Command Post (FTCP) with pretty well before he got there. His words mon flaw of junior officers and leads to the XO, CO, and 1SG, instead of with my proved especially embarrassing to the the mediocrity of platoons and compa- soldiers. Initially, I resented the criticism. former platoon sergeant — a young staff nies. One of my commanders taught me The commander had me doing a lot of sergeant who was still in the unit. an important lesson: every time you walk work in the FTCP, so I thought it made by a deficiency without correcting it, you sense to sleep there. I am sure I probably made the same lower the standard. mistake some time in my first few When I reflected upon SGT Kauahi’s months. It is a failure much like criticiz- Your soldiers will not always like you. comments, I realized that I had failed. My ing your predecessor. In effect, you are Prior to taking charge of a platoon, I NCO was right. I belonged with my sol- saying, “Hey! You guys are great now imagined that I would be able to enforce diers whenever possible: working beside that I am here.” Intentional or not, it standards while simultaneously com- them, communicating with them, and causes subordinates to resent your pres- manding the respect of all of my subordi- addressing their concerns. Taking care of ence. Remember to give credit and take nates. No fantasy ended more quickly; it soldiers is the best part of the job. Oppor- the blame. died for me when I read my name on the inside of a port-a-potty wall. tunities to isolate yourself and gain spe- I have listed the above leadership lapses cial privileges will arise often. Resist the You must prepare to do what is right temptation. in chronological order. All of them pro- vide perfect examples of pitfalls to avoid. despite your soldiers’ responses. A good I was back with the soldiers that night While I try to reflect on each of them, litmus test is to gauge the attitudes of and will never make the same mistake there are three that I vow never to forget: Continued on Page 12 8 ARMOR — September-October 1999

The 2nd Parachute Battalion’s War in the Falklands:

Light Armor Made the Difference in South Atlantic Deployment

by Captain Daniel T. Head

Since the end of the cold war, the try operations. Armored vehicles allow naval supremacy was established, so the United States government has increas- the light infantry commander to effec- brigade stopped at Ascension Island dur- ingly called upon the Army to respond to tively mass fires anywhere on the battle- ing the voyage to the South Atlantic, contingency situations throughout the field in order to achieve direct fire supe- while the British Navy established naval world. Generally, American policy mak- riority; this allows him to develop simple dominance in the area of operations. As- ers choose light infantry units as the con- plans, maintain freedom of maneuver, cension Island, about midway between tingency ground troops of choice because and retain the offensive throughout the the Falklands and England, was desig- they deploy rapidly and require a mini- battle. nated as the staging area. At Ascension, mal amount of logistical support. the British had a chance to conduct some Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands Unfortunately, light forces often arrive on 2 April 1982. The British government training, including gunnery for 3 and 4 Troop and landing techniques for 3 too light, and, despite over fifty years of immediately began assembling a joint Commando,3 and the task force had a combined arms doctrine, light infantry task force in order to conduct a show of forces are employed without enough sup- force in the South Atlantic and, if neces- chance to reorganize its jumbled supplies prior to combat following the chaos of port. They either cannot accomplish their sary, to recapture the islands. The 3rd rapid deployment.4 mission, or they can only accomplish it Commando Regiment of the Royal Ma- with the serious risk of heavy casualties. rines made up the bulk of the ground British Royal Marine infantry battalions Even against a relatively untrained force, forces initially deployed, but it had sev- and parachute battalions were organized light infantry forces need the direct fire eral attachments. Among other units at- support of armored forces as part of the tached, two parachute battalions (2 Para similarly. Each battalion consisted of three rifle companies of approximately combined arms team to effectively ac- and 3 Para) and two troops of light ar- 120 men each. Each rifle company con- complish their missions with minimal mored reconnaissance vehicles, 3 and 4 casualties. Troops of the Blues and Royals, de- tained three troops (the size of American platoons) and a headquarters section, and The Falkland Islands War of 1982 pro- ployed with 3 Commando to the Falk- each troop was further subdivided into lands. vides a perfect example of this. The ex- three sections (squads) and a headquar- periences of the 2nd Battalion, the Para- The British government felt that speed ters element. Additionally, each battalion chute Regiment (2 Para) in the Falklands was essential to the domestic political contained a support company and a head- prove, with a recent and relevant exam- success of the mission to recapture the quarters company. The infantry were ple, that rapid deployment infantry must islands, so the deployment quickly be- armed with 7.62 semi-automatic rifles have armor support in order to ensure came rapid deployment. Due to the speed (with no burst selection as on the success in combat operations with low of the deployment, space aboard British M16A2), and each section had one Gen- casualties. 2 Para’s experience is instruc- ships was critically tight and the terrain eral Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) and tive because the battalion fought in two and weather in the Falklands uncertain, 66mm Light Anti-Tank Weapons (LAW). battles during the war, Goose Green and so only limited logistical lift assets, Each troop also had a Carl Gustav Wireless Ridge. Goose Green was the mostly Volvo tracked vehicles designed (84mm) Medium Anti-Tank Weapon first major land battle of the war, and in for use in snow, deployed with 3 Com- (MAW). Each battalion support company it, 2 Para fought almost entirely with mando. 3 and 4 Troops’ squadron com- was equipped with a mortar troop with dismounted infantry. Wireless Ridge was mander was denied permission to deploy six 81mm mortars and an anti-tank troop the decisive point of the larger battle for with his units due to limited space avail- with 14 Milan anti-tank wire-guided mis- Port Stanley that ended the war, and dur- able, and so the reconnaissance troops siles. ing that fight, the battalion received sup- deployed under the command of a 24- port from a combined arms team includ- year-old lieutenant.1 The last of the Brit- The regiment was supported by its or- ing one troop of light armor, two Scorpi- ish forces deployed for war on 9 April ganic artillery battalion, 29 Commando ons and two Scimitars. The contrast be- 1982.2 3 Commando would operate with Regiment Royal Artillery, with three tween these battles highlights the impor- little helicopter support and under condi- 105mm gun batteries with six guns each.5 tance of combined arms warfare, particu- tions of air parity throughout the war. 2 and 3 Para also each had a Patrols larly the impact that direct fire support Fortunately for 3 Commando, the ground Company, C, in addition to their three from armored vehicles has on light infan- war in the Falklands could not start until line companies. Brigadier Julian Thomp- ARMOR — September-October 1999 9

Photo at left of a Chinook cargo helicopter hovering over two British armored vehicles gives some sense of the barren landscape, devoid of cover. Above, a lightweight Scimitar (only 8 tons) moves easily over the boggy terrain.

son commanded 3 Commando through- island chain, approximately 11 miles would use his C (Patrols) Company to out the Falkland Islands War. away. As with all military operations, conduct area reconnaissance up to his line 3 and 4 Troops are part of B Squadron, terrain was a major factor. First, the Falk- of departure. Then he would attack at land Islands in general can be considered night with two companies, A and B, Blues and Royals, one of the regiments an obstacle to movement because they abreast down the sides of the isthmus and that, together with the Life Guards, make up the British Household Cavalry. They are made up of rocky outcropping sur- infiltrate through Argentine positions to rounded by bog. There are virtually no Boca House, a major strongpoint adjacent were equipped to conduct armored re- improved roads on the islands, and to Darwin. There, D Company would connaissance with Scorpions and Scimi- wheeled vehicles could not hope to move pass forward to take this major strong- tars.6 A total of four Scorpions, four through the terrain when they were point while B Company would continue Scimitars, and one Samson light recov- loaded down with supplies. Thus, be- around to Goose Green Airfield in order ery vehicle deployed to the Falklands. The Scorpion light tank weighs eight cause the British did not have air superi- to complete the destruction of the Argen- ority and had few helicopters in general, tine outer ring of defenses and envelop tons, has very low ground pressure, and 2 Para had no choice but to attack from Goose Green. Once Goose Green was can traverse even very boggy, restrictive terrain. Additionally, the Scorpion has a their assembly area in the north along the encircled, the battalion would clear the obvious avenue of approach down the town in daylight to avoid civilian casual- crew of three, aluminum armor, a full isthmus to Darwin and Goose Green. The ties.11 NBC system, and a 76mm main gun with a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. The Argentines were dug in on the only de- fensible terrain nearby, and, at the time, The battle went basically according to main gun fires high-explosive squash- the British ground commanders believed plan until daylight. C Company moved head (HESH), high-explosive (HE), can- ister, smoke, and illumination rounds, and that their light armored vehicles could not out at 1800, and at 280235MAY82, A maneuver effectively through the boggy Company crossed the LD. B Company the turret has a second generation day and ground. Also, there was no real cover and began its attack approximately 45 min- night thermal sight. The Scimitar is very 12 similar, but has a Rarden 30-mm high- concealment available to the light infan- utes later. The two companies moved try that were to attack Goose Green be- up together and cleared or effectively velocity cannon which fires sabot, HE, cause the Falklands have no trees or other bypassed bunkers in the dark due to supe- and armor-piercing special effects (APSE) vegetation to hide attacking forces. Addi- rior training, night vision capability, and rounds.7 These vehicles proved to be tionally, the battalion could be supported naval gunfire support. The battle was perfect for the Falklands because they by only three 105mm artillery pieces that going well, but slowly, when the artillery could deploy rapidly (two can fit on a C- 130, but the Blues and Royals traveled by would be moved into position by helicop- began to run out of ammunition around ter, along with their ammunition. One dawn. When dawn began at 0530, the ship) and they were light enough to move frigate, the Arrow, would provide naval battalion had reached its secondary objec- on the islands and could be recovered easily… so easily that when one hit a gunfire support, but it could only fire tives and had taken few casualties. How- during hours of limited visibility due to ever, once daylight illuminated the bat- land mine during the final battle for Port the Argentine air threat. Since the infan- tlefield, the battle began to go against 2 Stanley, the vehicle was recovered by try would have to carry everything that Para. The relatively untrained Argentine Chinook helicopter.8 they took to battle, they could only take conscripts began to pour machine-gun By mid-May 1982, 3 Commando had two mortar tubes with ammunition.9 fire into the exposed British infantry. successfully landed on East Falkland, the Moreover, ammunition would be critical Since the British had bypassed several location of the islands’ principal town, throughout the battle due to the difficulty bunkers during their infiltration, they Port Stanley, while 2 Para waited in an of resupply. found themselves surrounded and in poor assembly area on Sussex Mountain. On terrain. The battalion bogged down 23 May, 2 Para received a warning order Nonetheless, the battalion moved out for around Darwin Hill and Boca House, and to conduct a battalion-sized raid on Ar- the attack on 27 May 82 with two days ammunition became a serious issue. The gentine positions at Darwin and Goose basic load of rations and ammunition.10 2 mortars ran out of ammunition shortly Green, two towns containing a set of Para’s commander, LTC H. Jones, had a after sunrise and the Arrow had to with- strongpoints that controlled the isthmus relatively simple plan that depended on draw to safety about two hours after sun- between East Falkland and the rest of the stealth to accomplish his mission. He rise. 2 Para’s attack was halted and in 10 ARMOR — September-October 1999

danger of failing. At around 0830, 2 ganic Milan and Machine Gun Troop. He the flanks or rear this time. Once Rough Para’s commander was killed as he led an would first seize Rough Diamond, a hill Diamond was seized, A and B Compa- assault on an Argentine machine gun nest mass northwest of the ridge itself, with D nies moved to attack Apple Pie. The di- in an attempt to get his battalion mov- Company supported by direct fire from 3 rect and indirect fire support quickly ing.13 However, about that time, A Com- Troop. Then A and B Companies would broke the defenders’ spirit, and 2 Para pany began to break through the defense attack on line to seize Apple Pie, a ridge watched as the Argentines fled down the by using LAWs against Argentine bun- adjacent to Wireless Ridge. Then D ridge to the dubious safety of Wireless kers. Additionally, LTC Jones had or- Company would move up to the western Ridge itself. While D Company moved to dered his Milan and Machine Gun Troop flank of the defensive line along Wireless its next start point west of the ridge, 3 to move to support B Company. By and envelop the Argentines, again sup- Troop and the Milan and Machine Gun massing their fires against Argentine ported by direct fire from 3 Troop and A Troops moved to Apple Pie. D Company strongpoints, B Company was finally and B Companies.17 Clearly, the battalion moved out and captured the first half of able to achieve direct fire superiority and had learned the value of both direct and Wireless fairly easily, but the Argentines break through the line at Boca House.14 Once Boca House was taken, the British had broken through the Argentine’s first line of resistance and victory became only a matter of time and determination.15 2 Para slowly encircled Goose Green, and, by sundown, they demanded and received the Argentine garrison’s surren- der. The poorly trained and led Argentine troops could not cope with the collapse of their initial line of resistance. 2 Para, a battalion of 450 men, captured 1200 pris- oners of war. 2 Para lost 17 men killed and 35 wounded and achieved a great victory, but overall the battalion was ba- sically lucky. The battle had gone very well in darkness, but once daylight hit, the Argentine conscripts were able to fix The four Scimitars deployed to the Falklands first stopped at Ascension Island, where their the entire battalion for several hours and training included gunnery in preparation for the invasion. Their 30mm Rarden cannons kill many of its key personnel. Clearly, a were later used to pick off Argentine bunkers. well-trained force would have been able to defeat and probably destroy the British indirect fire support in infantry opera- withdrew in an orderly fashion and parachute battalion attacking without 18 16 tions. The attack was to take place en- forced the company to fight from bunker support at Goose Green. tirely at night. to bunker. The attack might have stalled 2 Para learned a lot at Goose Green. By but for the highly accurate direct fire sup- the time the British forces marched across The preparatory bombardment of port from the Blues and Royals into the East Falkland to the climactic battle with Rough Diamond began at 132115JUN82, enemy’s bunkers. This enabled D Com- the Argentine garrison at Port Stanley, the and at 2145, D Company crossed its LD pany to assault and push the enemy out of Scimitars and Scorpions of the Blues and with 3 Troop and the battalion Machine his prepared positions and off of their 22 Royals had proved their mobility through Gun Troop in support. 3 Troop conducted strongest defensive position. At dawn, the boggy countryside of the Falklands. 2 reconnaissance by fire to locate and de- the Argentines mounted their only coun- Para was assigned to seize Wireless stroy Argentine bunkers. They called this terattack of the war, and D Company Ridge, the ridge overlooking Port Stanley technique “zapping.”19 “Zapping” in- quickly repulsed it with indirect fire from itself and the suspected location of an volved engaging Argentine bunkers with 3 Commando’s 105mm battalion. Shortly Argentine regimental command post. machine-gun fire in order to provoke a after dawn, 2 Para began preparing to Again, terrain was important. During this response. Once the Argentines returned continue its assault into Port Stanley, but battle, the Argentines were dug in along fire, usually with 7.62 machine guns, the peace intervened, so the battalion entered several pieces of key terrain. Two Argen- Scimitar crew would engage the machine the city unopposed. 3 Troop led the way tine companies occupied Wireless Ridge gun crew with 30mm cannon fire. This with infantry riding on their Scimitars itself while company strongpoints were technique proved highly effective, and by and Scorpions. sited on several nearby hill masses. All the time that D Company got up to their Clearly, today’s rapidly deployable Argentine positions were well dug in, initial objective, they found the entire position occupied by only a few Argen- forces can learn a lot from 2 Para’s ex- with overhead cover and ammunition perience in the Falklands. By examining cached in bunkers throughout their posi- tine dead; the Argentines forces had the war using the principles of war of tions. 2 Para’s new battalion commander, withdrawn.20 Additionally, the light ar- mor’s night sights enabled 2 Para’s mass, maneuver, the offensive, and sim- LTC D.R. Chaundler, had a simple com- plicity, one can readily explain the neces- bined arms plan. 2 Para would conduct an commander to get good intelligence on sity for armored forces in the light infan- enemy positions as his troops assaulted infantry assault supported by 3 Troop try fight. Light armored forces enable the their various objectives.21 2 Para was able from the Blues and Royals, both 2 and 3 rapid-deployment light infantry com- Para’s mortar platoons, two 105mm artil- to destroy all of the Argentine bunkers mander to easily mass overwhelming lery batteries, naval gunfire from the during their initial assaults, so no by- passed enemy would engage 2 Para from direct fires on any specific point or area HMS Ambuscade and the battalion’s or- target. This, in turn, allows the com- ARMOR — September-October 1999 11

Platoon Leader (Continued from Page 8)

your quality noncommissioned officers. If the good NCOs respect you and follow you willingly, then you are likely striking a proper balance. There will always be those who complain and despise you — your high standards will ensure as much. (It is important to note, however, that there is a difference between enforcing standards and abstractly wielding the power of authority. Even the best leaders have their detractors, but if no one can stand you, then you may be the problem.) The difference between great lieuten- ants and poor lieutenants is in the small things. Almost every tank platoon Paratroopers hitch a ride on a Scorpion over the barren Falklands terrain after the conclu- leader comes to the table with limited sion of hostilities. Rapidly deploying light armor made the difference in this unexpected experience. Simple things delineate be- conflict over a distant British South Atlantic colony long claimed by Argentina. tween those who succeed and those who fail: being on time to formations and mander to retain freedom of maneuver. 4Hastings and Jenkins, pp. 91-93. meetings, paying attention to detail, meet- Additionally, light armored forces can be 5Thompson, pp. 3-4. ing commanders’ deadlines, and follow- transported more easily than their heavy 6 ing established policies are good exam- Jones, p. 26. ples. It is impossible to cultivate an envi- counterparts, and so cause little loss in 7 operational or strategic mobility. Since Jones, pp. 26-27. ronment committed to basic discipline if the light infantry commander now has a 8Jones, p. 30. you fail to demonstrate discipline your- way to readily achieve direct fire superi- 9Hastings and Jenkins, pp. 235-238. self. ority, he has the ability to retain the of- 10Hastings and Jenkins, pp. 238. The single most important contributor to fensive, and this allows him to keep his 11Hastings and Jenkins, p. 240. your performance is your attitude. Sol- plan simple and flexible. MG Nick Vaux, 12 diers follow — and commanders desire then a battalion commander in 3 Com- Hastings and Jenkins, p. 241. 13Hastings and Jenkins, pp. 243-245. — platoon leaders with a positive out- mando, called the Falklands, “The last look. A combination of confidence, hu- place we expected to fight.”23 Clearly this 14Hastings and Jenkins, pp. 245-246 mility, enthusiasm, and hard work will statement can be applied to any number 15Hastings and Jenkins, pp. 247-248. capture the attention of your platoon and of potential battlefields for American 16Hastings and Jenkin, pp. 250-252. guarantee your success. A negative per- forces. However, despite all of the chal- 17 spective will destroy your unit. lenges, 2 Para fought well both at Goose Thompson, pp. 175-177. Green and at Wireless Ridge. The differ- 18Hastings and Jenkins, p. 304. If I succeeded in any form, it was be- ence came in the appreciation for the 19Jones, p. 30. cause of a positive attitude and a willing- combined arms fight that the battalion 20Thompson, p. 177. ness to learn from my mistakes. As I in- learned at Goose Green. MG Vaux said, 21 dicated, I often look back on my errors Jones, p. 30. with horror. However, the daunting re- “Once we cracked their defenses, they 22 collapsed quickly, as any ill-trained army Thompson, pp. 177-178. sponsibility of serving as a role model would. Their officers simply lost con- 23Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, “Reflections on demands that we acknowledge our faults trol.”24 Light armor enables the infantry the Falklands,” Marine Corps Gazette, January and seek self-improvement. Our soldiers commander to crack initial defenses 1989, p. 70. deserve nothing less. 24Trainor, p. 71. quickly with overwhelming fire and shock effect; infantry can then effectively Notes close with and destroy the enemy with minimum casualties, even in a rapid- CPT Dan Head graduated in 1995 1Department of the Army, Field Manual 22- deployment scenario. from the U.S. Military Academy with a 100, Military Leadership (Washington, D.C.: BS in European History. Following U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 4.

the Armor Officer Basic Course, he Notes was stationed with the 3d ID at Ft. CPT Douglas B. Crandall graduated Stewart, Ga., where he served as a from the U.S. Military Academy in 1Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle tank platoon leader, company XO, 1995. He served in 1-33 Armor at Ft. for the Falklands (New York: W.W. Norton and and brigade staff officer. He recently Lewis, Wash., as a tank platoon Company, 1983) pp. 91-93. leader, support platoon leader, tank 2 graduated from the Armor Captain’s Julian Thompson, No Picnic (Glasgow: Wil- company XO, and battalion adjutant. liam Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1985) p. 14. Career Course and Combined Arms 3 and Services Staff School and is Currently, he is completing Infantry LTC Andrew R. Jones, “British Armor in the 3 Falklands,” ARMOR, March-April 1983, pp. 26-27. headed to the 2d ID in Korea. Captains Career Course and CAS . 12 ARMOR — September-October 1999

“Away from the Flagpole,” There Are Rewards and Frustrations

AC/RC Assignments: One Officer’s Perspective by Major Kevin B. Marcus

For many soldiers, duty with the Re- during monthly “drill” periods, which myths regarding the Guard/Reserve just serve Components has become more than usually focus on individual/crew training. aren’t true. Far from being “weekend just an option. Congressional mandates Only 14 days are focused on collective warriors,” most are dedicated soldiers have made AC/RC assignment a fore- training at platoon/company or higher who are doing what they do because they gone conclusion for many officers and level. Time is the largest constraint in the honestly love it. Most want to succeed senior noncommissioned officers. This RC environment; there’s only so much and do the very best job they can. How- trend will likely continue in the future; as you can achieve in a weekend. Your suc- ever, just as in the Regular Army, there our reserve components play a larger role cess in large part depends on your ability are some who are in it only for the pay- in the Total Army, the active compo- to realize RC capabilities; you must un- check. We all must realize that standards nent’s personnel commitment to them derstand what they are really able to ac- of professionalism, conduct, and exper- will certainly remain significant. The complish in a time-constrained environ- tise must be total and apply to all compo- good news is that an AC/RC tour is a ment. nents of the Total Force. You, as the AC worthwhile experience for any active soldier, will be expected to embody those component soldier. This article will de- Next is the unique “dual nature” of the standards. Army National Guard. As most of us scribe the benefits and frustrations of an know, the Guard is under state control The RC gains from your assignment as AC/RC tour in an attempt to provide an overview for those soldiers pending as- when not activated. Their commander-in- well. Aside from the obvious benefits of chief is their governor. Although they your effort and experience, they’ll gain a signment to AC/RC duty. receive the lion’s share of their funding better understanding of the active com- Relatively little is known about an through federal budgeting; their day-to- ponent. Some ARNG/USAR soldiers AC/RC assignment. Branch representa- day activities are driven by state, not fed- have extremely limited exposure to active tives can usually tell you where you’ll be eral, chains of command. You must un- duty soldiers and lack an understanding working, and for which major command derstand their sense of “self”; the ARNG of the reality of the current AC operations (i.e., FORSCOM vs. TRADOC), but is justifiably proud of its dual mission. and personnel tempos. You’ll be able to little more. TOE battalion/brigade com- However, we all must realize that the AC provide a ready reference for them; as manders (who were captains in an era of soldier is assigned there to promote the well, you’ll be able to personify the “total few AC/RC assignments) usually have primacy of their federal, war-fighting army.” few insights into the duties and responsi- mission. Your AC/RC assignment will also pro- bilities of the job. While I am far from an Within both Guard and Reserve units, vide/enhance skills you’ll use throughout expert, my almost two years in an AC/RC assignment provided some insights. I there’s a curious division between “M your career. The first is the ability to be Day” or “traditional” soldiers and full- an effective trainer. Any AC/RC assign- should first mention that there are many time unit support personnel. “M Day” or ment will rely on you to either train RC different types of AC/RC assignments out there, in literally hundreds of loca- “traditional” soldiers are those who have units or their leadership. You’ll be ex- civilian jobs/careers and drill once a pected to be an expert in training man- tions. I’m assigned as a training/opera- month and two weeks a year, although agement and execution. You’ll be ex- tions officer in an ARNG TASS (Officer Candidate School) battalion. My specific many (especially those in leadership posi- pected to be the subject matter expert on tions) will put in more time. Full-time your specific area of expertise and be able job notwithstanding, many of my experi- unit support personnel are, as the title to apply this knowledge. This will entail ences are universal and are worthwhile to pass on. suggests, full-timers. They are a combi- some self-development time. You’ll have nation of Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) to dig into our doctrine in order to know Probably the single most important soldiers or federal (GS) technicians who and apply it. This expertise will directly benefit of an AC/RC tour is the exposure maintain membership in a Guard/Reserve affect your credibility. They’ll check up to the reserve component environment. unit. The majority of command positions on what you’ve told them. And if they As does any unit, both Guard and Re- are filled by “M Day” soldiers; while the find out you’re wrong, you’ll not be as serve units have their own languages, “full-timers” are the ones who oversee credible as you need to be. missions, and cultures. Learning to ap- the day-to-day activities of RC units. You preciate that provides the AC soldier with must always balance the day-to-day ne- As well, you’ll learn to be an effective staff officer. You’ll learn to analyze situa- valuable insights into an increasingly cessity of coordinating with the “full- tions, recognize issues, and form recom- important part of the Total Army. timers” with preserving and supporting the chain of command (largely “M Day” mended courses of action. You may be The first “unique” aspect you’ll learn to rated by an ARNG/USAR “M Day” offi- appreciate is the importance of time, and soldiers). cer or NCO; these soldiers have full-time how it constrains RC training and readi- You’ll also be disabused of many of jobs/careers and don’t have the time to ness. RC units train collectively 39 days a your preconceived notions regarding the digest a lot of material. They’ll rely on year. Of these 39 days, 24 days are spent RC. You’ll find that many of the popular you, and your judgment, for the basis of ARMOR — September-October 1999 13

their decisions. The ability to provide do everything in your power to coordi- what you want; sometimes you just have well reasoned, thoughtful staff recom- nate to the best of your ability. to salute and accomplish the mission. mendations will stand you in good stead Finally, you’ll see that the “Total Army” throughout your career. Finally, life “away from the flagpole” isn’t yet “total.” We’re making progress, has its own rewards and frustrations. Life Finally, you’ll learn how to coordinate. but we’ve got a long way to go. Your You’ll very quickly learn that, with few assignment is critical to making the the- without ready access to exchange/com- missary services, military medical care, exceptions, command (in ARNG units) ory reality. As the Army continues to lose and post support agencies can make life doesn’t extend across state boundaries. In resources and structure, there’s a fierce my specific situation, my ARNG battal- competition for remaining resources. interesting and challenge a family budget. ion commander is responsible for all Both active and reserve components are OCS training in a six-state school region. scrambling to “preserve” what they see as In conclusion, there’s much to be Yet he has command authority over only their traditional, appropriate missions. As learned from an AC/RC assignment. You’ll gain an understanding and appre- one company (the company in “his” state, well, neither active nor reserve compo- ciation for the RC training environment, Minnesota). Thus, you’ll have to coordi- nent seem to have a common understand- nate training/training support activities ing of what each component can, and while becoming a better trainer and staff officer. You will have some challenges to without the accompanying command and should, do. While this “friction” is declin- overcome; the Total Army isn’t “total” control resources. Principles of staff co- ing, it will never go away until we clearly ordination apply and are integral to your define expectations (standards), missions, yet. On the balance, however, assignment to any type of AC/RC assignment can success, both in an AC/RC assignment and roles. We must have a common set of enhance any soldier’s personal and pro- and in your future assignments. standards and understand what real, “no kidding” wartime missions will be as- fessional life. There will be times and situations when signed to RC units to drive training and you’ll be frustrated. Some you can ad- resourcing. We have to make the hard MAJ Kevin Marcus was commis- dress, others you cannot. The first is the calls on force structure. Those units with- sioned in 1986 as a Distinguished lack of command authority. While no out wartime missions should be dis- staff officer, in his own right, has any banded. We cannot let our pride in unit Military Graduate from Officer Candi- command authority, AC soldiers are used lineage and capabilities override a realis- date School. His Armor assignments to working for commanders who can tic understanding of training and resource include platoon leader/support pla- delegate the authority we need to do the constraints. toon leader with the 8th ID (Baum- job. In AC/ RC assignments, you may not holder) and tank company com- work for a boss who has that authority. We also have to understand that each mander with the 1st ID (Ft. Riley). For instance, in my situation, my boss has component must compromise to find an Other assignments include O/C on no command authority over five of “his” agreeable, effective “middle ground.” the Scorpion Team at the NTC and companies. You may be assigned to a The AC has to realize the complementary duty as a training and operations offi- training support unit and tasked to coor- and supplementary role of the RC and cer (AC/RC) in TRADOC’s Total dinate training events, but you may not think outside the box to make every train- have the authority to “make it happen.” ing program, unit organization, and piece Army School System. He is curren- The bottom line is that you may find of new equipment suitable for the RC as tely assigned as the Senior Staff Offi- yourself without the authority to match well as the 1st Cavalry Division. The RC cer-Operations for the Multi-National your responsibilities. You’ll just have to needs to realize that you don’t always get Force and Observers in the Sinai.

DRIVER’S SEAT, Continued from Page 6 In order to proceed along the verifica- A-6 (Defense) Engage multiple targets 12 months and, as a minimum, qualify 4 tion track, crews must meet the following with multiple weapon systems from a of 5 TTVII engagements live fire with 70 criteria: 1) Crews must be previous Q-1 defensive firing position. points on each engagement and total 350 on TTVIII within the last 12 months; 2) B-1 (Offense) Engage multiple targets points or more within the preceding six Crews must achieve RA Level 301 in the with multiple weapon systems from a months. To require any less of our crews COFT. Crews would then fire TTVI us- moving tank. will lead to unacceptable proficiency and ing TADSS and must qualify 4 of 5 TT safety risks as units enter collective-level VII tasks (Tasks A-2, A-5, A-6, B-1, and B-3 (Offense) Engage multiple targets training. Either of these tracks requires B-3) in live fire with 70 points on each with multiple weapon systems from a we noncommissioned officers to verify engagement and a score of 350 points moving tank. proficiency or qualify all crews in the overall. Meeting the TTVII(5) standard New TC/gunner combinations, and unit, and to confidently hand them off to would achieve proficiency verification, crews that did not qualify in the last gun- commanders for collective-level training. and the crew would continue into collec- nery cycle (Q-2) must fire TTVI, TTVII, This approach to STRAC XXI for Ar- tive-level training. The tasks selected for and TTVIII live fire to achieve the profi- mor and Cavalry will allow commanders TTVII(5) are listed below: ciency required before proceeding to to utilize more ammunition for collective- advanced tables. This comprises the level gunnery, and remain confident that A-2 (Offense) Engage multiple targets qualification track which leads to collec- NCO-led, crew-level gunnery training with multiple weapon systems from a tive-level training. will set their units up for success. Discus- moving tank. The Armor Center position is that all sions with FORSCOM continue, mean- A-5 (Defense) Engage multiple targets crews firing TTXII must be qualified on while… from a defensive firing position. gunnery Table VIII within the preceding “SERGEANT, TAKE THE LEAD” 14 ARMOR — September-October 1999

Art by Jody Harmon

Development of the American Tank-Infantry Team During World War II in Africa and Europe

by Captain J. L. Mudd

The American tank-infantry team was to destroy antitank weapons, bunkers, and tions, and its weight ranged from 33 to the key maneuver element that led to the unarmored or lightly-armored vehicles.5 almost 36 tons. Typically, the tank car- overwhelming number of tactical suc- When the United States Army entered ried a 75-mm gun, but many were later cesses enjoyed by the United States in the World War II, the two main tanks in its fitted with a 76-mm higher velocity can- Second World War.1 However, this win- arsenal were the M3 light tank and the non. It bristled with bow and coaxial .30- ning combination of men and machines M3 medium tank.6 The Light Tank, M3 caliber machine guns and a flexible tur- had developed throughout the course of Series weighed approximately 14-16 ret-mounted Browning .50 caliber ma- the war, and included a number of varia- tons, depending on the model, and was chine gun for antiaircraft use. Armor on tions based on the theater and areas armed with a 37-mm cannon and up to the turret front was 3.75 inches in effec- within each theater. Original develop- five .30-caliber machine guns. Its thickest tive thickness, while the hull front was ment came from training and lessons effective armor was 1.75 inches on the effectively up to four inches thick.10 learned in the decades between the two turret front and 3 inches on the hull front. Both medium tanks employed five-man world wars by infantry tank and cavalry However, most units armed with M3s crews. The tank commander’s job was to combat car units.2 When General Mar- replaced them with the M5 light tank select targets, defensive positions and shall was made Army Chief of Staff on 1 prior to combat overseas. The M5 was routes of advance, and supervise and lead September 1939 (the day of Germany’s very similar to the M3, but had some attack on Poland), he began a major reor- engine and other design improvements. the tank crew at all times. In the five-tank platoon, the platoon leader (usually a first ganization of the service in order to put it (Later models of the M3 incorporated or second lieutenant) and the platoon on a wartime footing more like that of its some of these improvements.)7 sergeant, a staff sergeant, each com- European counterparts.3 One of the The Army’s first wartime medium tank manded a tank. Sergeants commanded changes was the creation of the Armored was the M3 series, nicknamed variably the remaining three. The gunner, a corpo- Force, a combination of the armored ele- 8 ments of the infantry and cavalry “Lee” or “Grant” by the British. The ral or technician 5th grade, was to iden- Medium Tank, M3 mounted a 75-mm tify and engage targets with either the branches, as well as sufficiently mobile cannon in a starboard hull sponson, a 37- main gun or the coaxial machine gun. components of artillery, communications, mm gun in the turret, and three .30- The remaining three crewmen were jun- and other services.4 caliber machine guns — one each in the ior enlisted soldiers — technicians, pri- Tanks bow, coaxial in the turret and in the vates first class or “buck” privates. The commander’s cupola. Its heaviest effec- driver controlled the speed and direction Tank combat doctrine developed in the tive armor was 6.5 inches on the turret of the vehicle in accordance with the 1920s and ’30s called for two types of front and 4.3 inches on the front slope of commander’s orders. The assistant driver/ tanks: a light tank armed with machine the hull.9 During the fighting in North radio operator ensured that vehicular guns and a small-caliber cannon to en- Africa, the M3 began to be replaced by communications (both internal and exter- gage “soft” targets and a medium tank the Medium Tank, M4 — the Sherman. nal) were functional, and engaged targets with machine guns and a heavier cannon The M4 appeared in a number of varia- with the bow-mounted machine gun. The ARMOR — September-October 1999 15

loader was typically the most junior tank awesome firepower against almost fire tactics as used in the final phase of crewmember. His job was to load the any target. However, the tank was highly World War I,19 referred to as “fire and main gun during engagements and to vulnerable to both antitank guns and in- maneuver.”20 Two riflemen, often ac- assist the commander in looking for tar- fantry antitank teams, as well as antitank companied by the squad leader scouted gets when not in actual combat. Only mines and obstacles. Against these foes, ahead of the squad.21 When they encoun- four crewmen manned light tanks; the the tank had a partner in a man and his tered an enemy force, the leader called tank commander assumed the duties of rifle — the infantryman. for his four-man fire team (Baker) to 11 loader as well. All members partici- Infantry place suppressive BAR and rifle fire on pated in crew-level maintenance of their the enemy position. With the enemy tank, and usually assisted mechanics as- The American infantry squad in World pinned, the leader ordered his remaining signed to the company.12 War II consisted of 12 men armed mainly five-man maneuver and assault team Normally, all tankers underwent initial with M1 semiautomatic .30-caliber ri- (Able) into a position where they could fles.17 The linchpin of the squad was the assault by fire, then overrun the enemy. If training at Fort Knox, Kentucky’s Ar- Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), a light enemy fire was such that assaulting ri- mored Replacement Training Center automatic weapon with a cyclic rate of flemen were unable to maneuver, tank (ARTC).13 In theory, men inducted under fire of either 300-350 or 500-600 rounds support was necessary. Infantry units the Selective Service Act were to be per minute. The rifle squad of the ar- from squad to corps used a variation of trained in accordance with their civilian occupations, prior training, even hobbies, mored division’s armored infantry battal- this tactic under most circumstances in all ions was similar, but one squad member theaters of the war, typically sending whenever possible. Under this theory, if a was assigned as the M3 half-track per- specialized reconnaissance units to scout man were a professional wilderness guide, he went to the infantry; if a ham sonnel carrier driver who normally re- the front and flanks; providing supporting mained with the vehicle, and had no fires with artillery, machine-gun and anti- radio buff, to the Signal Corps; a heavy BAR.18 The mechanized rifle platoon was tank fires; and finally assaulting with equipment operator, to the engineers or the Armored Force. Although this conse- mounted on five M3 halftracks and infantry and tanks. boasted a vast array of weapons. There quently benefited some of the more tech- were three rifle squads, as in a dis- Another style of assault tactic developed nical services of the Army, the combat during the war — the marching fire of- mounted infantry platoon, but the ar- arms received mainly “any arm or ser- fensive.22 General Patton’s 3rd Army 14 mored infantry platoon leader also had a vice” inductees. Training was length- 60-mm mortar squad (an eight-man mor- used it to good advantage in northwestern ened from 12 to 13 weeks in 1941, and Europe, and though it was sometimes was later increased to 17. Conducted in tar crew) and a light machine gun squad effective in Italy, the terrain generally did (12 soldiers manning one .50-caliber two phases, the first was devoted to basic machine gun and two .30-caliber machine not favor it. The method placed tanks and soldier skills such as infantry drill, physi- halftracks at intervals within dense skir- cal fitness training, and small arms guns). The dismounted infantry company mish lines of dismounted infantry. The centralized these special squads in a sepa- marksmanship. The second phase intro- rate weapons platoon. There, the platoon entire line moved abreast, firing at possi- duced the trainees to tank skills: driving, ble strongpoints and other targets as they maintenance, tactical movement, and fielded a section of three 60-mm mortars advanced. Although it maximized mutual and a section of two .30-caliber machine gunnery. Much of this was conducted guns. Additionally, the mechanized com- support, it reduced shock effect and under “combat conditions,” including tended to increase casualties. Its use was flares, explosions, gunfire sound effects, pany had a platoon of towed 57-mm anti- often the result of a lack of mental flexi- tank guns, each operated by a ten-man and even a special aggressor unit dressed bility on the part of commanders.23 15 squad. as German soldiers. Upon completion Officers of training, the majority of new tankers Both mechanized and traditional infan- reported to the armored divisions or sepa- try battalions possessed three rifle com- The main roles of the Army officer in rate tank battalions. panies plus an additional complement of World War II were to plan operations and organic combat forces. The armored in- training, administer military justice under The combat elements of a tank battalion included the reconnaissance and assault fantry battalion had a reconnaissance the Articles of War, and lead soldiers in platoon of half-track mounted scouts, an combat. Officers held their commissions gun platoons of the headquarters com- assault gun platoon with three 75-mm not only in the Army, but also in one of pany, three companies of medium tanks self-propelled assault guns, a mortar pla- the several arms or services, called a and one of light tanks.16 Each tank com- toon with three 81-mm tubes, and a ma- “branch.” When the Armored Force was pany had three platoons of five tanks and chine gun platoon with four .30-caliber established, it was not created as a sepa- two tanks in the headquarters section. Additionally, a medium company boasted machine guns. The infantry battalion had rate branch, but was made up of person- a single antitank platoon of three 57-mm nel of all arms and services. Tank officers an assault gun — an M4 armed with a guns, and a heavy weapons company and crewmen typically came from the 105-mm howitzer as its main armament. Each medium company was assigned with a platoon of six 81-mm mortars and infantry or cavalry branches, but wore the a platoon of four .30-caliber machine Armored Force insignia: the profile of a five officers and 117 enlisted men; a light guns. World War I British Mark IV tank. company was somewhat smaller with only 92 enlisted personnel. The tank’s The age-old mission of infantry is to Tank and infantry officers came from advantage in close battle was its relative close with and destroy the enemy. The one of four commissioning sources: the imperviousness to small arms and indi- usual method employed by the American United States Military Academy at West rect fires. Its array of weapons gave the infantry squad was based on the covering Point, New York (USMA); the Reserve 16 ARMOR — September-October 1999

Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC); one of combat doctrine. Those veteran combat the officer candidate schools (OCS) run leaders selected by their commanders to by the Armor or Infantry Training Cen- become officers generally were young This photograph shows all of the ters; and for a deserving few, direct bat- noncommissioned officers who had men and machines that made up the tlefield commissions. USMA graduates proven their abilities under fire. They 66th Armored Regiment, part of the 2nd Armored Division, assembled were appointed Regular Army officers, received no additional training; their ex- on a hillside in Southern England and their pre-commissioning training perience was considered sufficient. about a month prior to entering the included instruction in all of the arms. Growing Pains war in Europe. Graduates of ROTC programs located at civilian universities trained in one of the The fighting elements of the Armored arms or services as cadets and were Force consisted originally of the 1st and commissioned into their respective 2nd Armored Divisions, which formed ington, from the summer of 1941 until branches.24 Until the mobilization of the I Armored Corps,29 and a number of spring 1942.33 The tankers took advan- 1940-42, the majority of these officers separate tank battalions. The divisions tage of all possible training time to im- did not enter active service, but were reflected the new “triangular” infantry prove their abilities to use their speed and placed in an inactive status in the Offi- division organization, with a brigade firepower in support of dismounted infan- cers’ Reserve Corps (ORC).25 The ORC comprised of two light tank regiments try. On two occasions in the immediate provided a trained pool for the great and a medium tank regiment. By March aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl number of officers needed when the of 1942, as the number of armored units Harbor, the tank-infantry teams reacted to Army expanded in the early 1940s. The grew, this was changed to two tank regi- alerts that brought them to the mouth of Armored Force School at Fort Knox, ments, each now with two medium and the Columbia River on the Washington Kentucky, and the Infantry School at Fort one light battalion, and an armored infan- coast, prepared to repel Japanese inva- Benning, Georgia, each established an try regiment — three infantry battalions sion. officer candidate school to train and equipped with halftracks.30 The assign- commission qualified enlisted soldiers ment of infantry to the armored division As part of Amphibious Corps Pacific and warrant officers.26 Candidates were eventually afforded commanders the op- Fleet, the soldiers of Fort Lewis were carefully screened and selected based portunity develop combined arms tactics expecting to be employed in the Pacific upon demonstrated performance and and train their soldiers to use and refine Theater. Company B of the 756th and the leadership aptitude. As combat losses them.31 15th Infantry moved to Monterey Bay to began to take their toll on the officer practice amphibious landings at Fort Ord, The separate tank battalions were to 34 corps, the practice of commissioning California. At this very early stage of combat-experienced sergeants with prov- keep an infantry flavor. Doctrine for these the war, the specialized equipment and “infantry tanks” specified a two-echelon en leadership talents was revived in the techniques that would later make am- attack.32 The lead echelon consisted of form of the battlefield commission.27 phibious tank assaults a realistic proposi- medium tanks and would destroy enemy tion were not yet available. The Navy’s For USMA and ROTC graduates, as antitank weapons. The second wave in- solution was to lower the new M3 light well as officers transferring into the Ar- cluded light tanks advancing with infan- tanks by crane from the ship’s deck into mored Force from other branches, the try to neutralize machine guns and targets violently bobbing landing craft several Armored Force School conducted an of opportunity. Infantry divisions and yards below. A number of tanks were lost orientation course to familiarize students separate tank battalions rarely enjoyed the this way before the naval crane operators with tank tactics, gunnery, maintenance, benefits of sufficient combined training became reasonably proficient. Armored Force organization, and to re- prior to actual combat. Habitual associa- fresh other military skills.28 The three- tions between tanks and infantry gener- The combined arms training undertaken month Infantry and Armored Force OCS ally did not develop until well into the by the 3rd Infantry Division and the courses taught candidates the skills war, but there are examples of early train- 756th Tank Battalion (L) reflected a ma- needed to be effective platoon leaders in ing relationships. One of these was the jor push by the Armored Force to in- their respective specialties, including partnership of the 3rd Infantry Division crease infantry-tank proficiency.35 In small-unit tactics, Army organization, with the 756th Tank Battalion (L) while early 1942, COL Edwin K. Wright, Ar- philosophy of leadership, and enemy they were stationed at Fort Lewis, Wash- mored Force Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 ARMOR — September-October 1999 17

(Operations and Training), began stress- enemy. Unfortunately, the manual alone had as an initial objective the seizure of ing the need for combined arms training, was insufficient. The commanding gen- French antiaircraft, coastal and field artil- emphasizing tank support of infantry eral of the 84th Infantry Division wrote: lery batteries located on the Cape north of divisions in the attack. Army Ground “We have worked constantly with armor, Fedala. COL William H. Wilbur, a senior Forces, the Armored Force’s higher head- and with no training in the U.S., it was liaison officer from MG George S. Patton quarters, “replied with a supplement to its hard to receive our training on the battle- Jr.’s headquarters, took control of 2nd initial training directive, stating that field. I cannot stress too much the abso- Platoon, Company A, 756th Tank Battal- ‘combined infantry division-tank unit lute necessity for combined tank-infantry ion (L), which was just coming off land- training will be emphasized,’ and that training even in replacement training ing craft. COL Wilbur sped through town problems for the maneuver period should centers. We have worked with the 2nd, to assist the regiment’s first battalion in include infantry-tank unit operations.”36 3rd, 5th, and 7th Armored Divisions. silencing the coast artillery battery, which However, this training often did not oc- They are all excellent units, but it is diffi- had been engaging landing craft enroute cur, or at least not to levels which made cult to teach infantry-tank tactics actually to the beach.41 After the tanks assumed an for real combined operations proficiency. on the battlefield. We now have our own assault position, Company A, 7th Infantry COL Wright, in analyzing reports from tank battalion, and I spend every avail- opened fire on the battery’s fire direction the North African battlefront in May able minute in training my infantry to center. The M5 tanks made an initial 1943, wrote the following:37 operate with tanks.”38 The tactics kept breach in the defensive wire, and infantry 42 In spite of constant attempts to provide evolving, however, and tankers and in- quickly seized the objective. infantry division-tank battalion coopera- fantrymen continued to send hard-fought lessons home from combat theaters Units not in contact in North Africa con- tive training in this country, practically 39 tinued to train while others eventually no success has been obtained. All infan- around the world. met the enemy in Tunisia. By the spring try division commanders, whether con- North Africa of 1943, Allied forces had made consid- tacted direct or through Army Ground erable progress in driving the Germans Forces, have indicated the desirability of The first major employment of tanks out of Africa. While the British 8th Army with infantry by the United States was on such training but fend it off on the excuse Operation under General Bernard Law Montgomery that “Time is not available,” “After we November 8, 1942 — the Torch pressed from the east, American, British complete our unit training,” “After we landings on the North African and Free French units advancing from the finish maneuvers,” etc. Army Ground coast. Amphibious assault technology Afrika Korps still required the use of LCMs (Landing west beat back the into a Forces has been of no assistance to us in tight perimeter on the Tunisian peninsula. forcing this training. Craft Mechanized) to transport heavy At the end of April, the American II vehicles from ship to shore. The LCM The results of this failure to provide co- was capable of carrying only one tank or Corps was attacking German defenses operative infantry-tank training is being 40 along an east-west row of hills near the large artillery piece at a time. Neverthe- town of Mateur. The main defenses were reflected in the combat zone. For exam- less, tanks made it ashore and were able ple, Lieutenant Colonel Lou Hammack’s to assist the infantrymen right from the atop Djebel Tahent, identified on U.S. very fine 751st Tank Battalion (M) was maps as Hill 609. Riflemen from the 34th outset of combat. During the initial as- Infantry Division had fought their way to practically wiped out because in four sault from the beaches, the tank’s speed successive attacks, the infantry refused to and armor were exploited to seize key the base of the hill, but by April 29, had follow him. Four times he took the objec- reached an impasse. Both sides had been mission objectives and destroy enemy exchanging mortar and artillery fire in- tive and each time had to pull back, try- positions. ing to pull the infantry forward, the Ger- cessantly and the infantry could advance mans in the meantime re-obtaining the One example comes from the 3rd Infan- no further. Company I of the 1st Armored position. try Division’s landing at the town of Division’s 1st Tank Regiment, another II Fedala, about ten miles northeast of Corps unit, was assigned to assist in Finally, by September 1943, Army Casablanca. The 7th Infantry Regiment breaking the stalemate. In the early morn- Ground Forces had published FM 17-36, Employment of Tanks With Infantry. The publication of this field manual allowed units still training in the United States to learn some of the lessons learned the hard way by forces already in contact with the

Troops and equipment disembark from one of the tiny LCMs used to land in Algeria, North Africa in 1942. Compare this quiet beach landing scene with the complexity of the later Normandy invasion. But at the time, this was the largest seaborne inva- sion in history. In photo at right, opposite page, troops are crammed in a landing craft. They wear American flag patches for identification, in the hope that Vichy French in Algeria would capitulate and not fire on Americans.

18 ARMOR — September-October 1999

ing of April 30, the tanks picked up the 1943, was to prove a long and bitter absence of dismounted support allowed infantry and proceeded up the hill, at struggle that would continue for most of the Germans to lay out antitank mines times literally pulling the riflemen along the next two years. Italy was not particu- quickly. One of these stopped a tank. The where the slope was too steep. The tanks larly suited to tank warfare, but the infan- remaining three began to move back destroyed a number of enemy positions, try went, and they needed tanks to see across the river, but the first got hung up and when antitank fire became too them through. One of the hardest-fought on the bridge and blocked passage of the deadly, the American infantry conducted engagements of the entire Italian cam- other two, one of which had been com- a bayonet charge against the gun crews, paign was the first phase of the Battle of mandeered by CPT Wilkie. As the crew allowing the tanks to continue. The abso- Cassino. Cassino was the anchor of the on the bridge dismounted and ran for lute summit of Hill 609 was inaccessible German “Gustav” defensive line to which friendly lines, the tank’s commander, LT to the tanks, but they supported the infan- they had steadily withdrawn by the end of Wayne Henry, was machine-gunned try with cannon and machine-gun fire November. Located near the western down. It was his first day in combat. The until the position was secure. The tank- coast of Italy, Monte Cassino overlooked crews of the remaining two tanks were infantry team repelled counterattacks the main highway to Rome. By the end of captured. both at 609 and at the neighboring Hill January 1944, when the Americans were The tanks managed a more successful 531. On May 2, the GIs saw heavy traffic ready to launch an attack against the town moving north. The Germans were leav- as a diversion to attract the German 10th crossing in the late afternoon of the 29th. 43 Again, the bulk of the infantry hesitated, ing. Army’s attention away from the immi- but the tank battalion commander, LTC nent amphibious invasion at nearby An- The North African Campaign of 1942- zio, the soldiers of the XIV Panzerkorps Harry W. Sweeting called for them to 43 demonstrates some of the earliest cross. A smaller, grass-covered hill nick- combat techniques of the tank-infantry had been digging in for two months. named “the Pimple” was an initial objec- team. There was yet no permanent affilia- On the night of January 20, two regi- tive for the 34th Division, which it seized tion of specific units with one another, so ments of the U.S. 36th Infantry Division soon after dark. The maneuver elements there was often no way to retain lessons conducted an opposed river crossing of of the division closed on the objective learned from one engagement to the next. the Rapido River just downstream from area and expanded up the hills over the The infantry typically fought without the where Cassino stood.45 The German de- next few days and into the village of aid of armored forces, and called on the fenders soon repulsed the Americans, so Cairo. The division next turned its atten- tanks to penetrate defenses or advance in the U.S. II Corps decided to try for an- tion south toward the town of Cassino the face of heavy small arms and artillery other foothold, this time with the 34th and the narrow path between the sheer fire. Tank units were used to break Infantry Division slightly upriver from rock face and the abrupt drop to the river through enemy formations, destroy tanks Cassino. The division began its attack on that led to it. On the morning of February and other pieces of equipment, and re- the 24th of January, but the Germans had 2nd, elements of the 133rd Infantry and duce hardened fortifications and wire demolished a small dam about two miles Company B of the 756th moved south to obstacles. However, the general lack of north of Cassino. North of town, the secure the road to Cassino. As the tank- prior training created some major defi- Rapido was fordable and normally only infantry team progressed, the file of tanks ciencies in effective prosecution of the about 50 feet wide; now, however, the poured armor piercing shells (high explo- campaign.44 dam’s destruction had allowed the river sive would have been too close to Italy to flood the east bank and the land had friendly riflemen) and machine-gun fire become a marsh hundreds of yards across onto any suspicious-looking points on the The push against the Germans in Italy, — impossible for tanks to negotiate. For hillside above. The infantrymen followed which had been launched by General more than two days, the riflemen of the through and captured about 150 prison- Mark Clark’s 5th Army in September of 34th tried to establish a bridgehead on the ers. west bank of the river. Opposing them The 34th Division never did secure Cas- were barbed wire entanglements, antiper- sonnel mines and a series of machine gun sino. At one point in the first week of February, the division held about four nests stretching from the water’s edge square blocks on the northern edge of nearly to the top of the towering hills. These were supported by hidden mortar town, but they were relieved soon there- after by the 4th Indian Division.47 The pits and artillery dug into the back side of experience of the 34th Infantry Division the mountain. and the attached 756th Tank Battalion is Finally, on the morning of the 27th, an example of some of the problems of- combat engineers had emplaced enough ten faced by units without a standing “corduroy road” to allow CPT Charles support relationship. The tankers were “Wilkie” Wilkenson’s Company B, unfamiliar with the strengths and weak- 756th Tank Battalion to cross at a small nesses of the particular infantry leaders bridge.46 However, it still was not suffi- and the infantry were not used to using cient. The battalion had transitioned from the tanks’ advantages in combat. This M5 light tanks to M4 mediums in De- unfamiliarity took time to overcome, and cember. All but four of the company’s 18 in war, wasted time can mean wasted tanks became stuck in the mud. Those lives. Eventually, the men of the 756th four crossed and tore through the enemy were reunited with their old friends from defenses near the shore. The infantry Fort Lewis and Morocco — the 3rd In- failed to cross with the tanks, and the fantry Division. The battalion remained ARMOR — September-October 1999 19

attached to the 3rd from August of 1944 antitank guns were suspected, the infantry use of medium tanks over light.50 The (Operation ANVIL) until the end of the infiltrated into the positions at night, then armored divisions developed two ways of war in Europe. MG O’Daniel writes, destroyed the gun positions at dawn. In employing the tank-infantry team.51 The “The extent to which the various expedi- breaching the Siegfried Line, the 745th’s use of the armored division reflected its ents adopted to increase mutual confi- tanks moved into the woods, where en- origins in cavalry tactics. The essence of dence succeeded was well exemplified by gagement ranges were much shorter. armor is speed, firepower and shock ef- a statement made by an officer of the 3rd There, often as close as fifty yards, the fect. The armored division was used to Infantry Division toward the close of the tanks opened concrete pillboxes with gain ground rapidly and to exploit pene- campaign. He was asked his opinion of armor-piercing rounds, then dispersed the trations of enemy defenses and attack his the relative merits of the various tank occupants with white phosphorus shells. rear or flank. battalions then doing duty in the Sixth This allowed the infantry and engineers The division consisted of five basic Corps, to which the division belonged. to destroy the remnants in detail with elements: command, reconnaissance, He listed a number of the battalions in the grenades and explosives. 52 order of his opinion of their efficiency. striking, support, and service. The chief In Aachen, small teams of two tanks and command structures of the armored divi- His questioner then remarked: an infantry platoon cleared blocks build- sion were its divisional headquarters and ‘Funny you didn’t include the 756th.’ ing by building. As the riflemen cleared, three subordinate “combat commands” the tanks provided security with longer — CC A, CC B and CC R(eserve).53 ‘Oh!’ He replied hastily. ‘That’s part of range fires. At intersections especially, These combat commands were in control the Division. They don’t come any better tanks fired at all four corners and down of one tank and one infantry battalion. than that.’ ”48 cross-streets to suppress possible ene- The division’s cavalry reconnaissance Northwest Europe mies. In turn, the dismounted soldiers squadron fielded four recon troops, an Another tank-infantry team that enjoyed protected their protectors with constant assault gun troop, and a light tank com- reconnaissance against antitank rocket pany. The squadron performed the recon- “permanent” attachment was the 745th (Panzerfaust) teams and antitank gun naissance function for the division, advis- Tank Battalion and the 1st Infantry Divi- positions. Additionally, four infantrymen ing the commander on terrain navigabil- sion.49 Attached in April 1944, the battal- were detailed to stay with the tank as last- ity, obstacles, and enemy presence. ion remained part of the division until the line defenders and runners. In small war’s end. However, until the Normandy The support echelon consisted of the invasion was completed, the companies towns, the tanks provided an initial attack division artillery’s three field artillery by fire, then accompanied the infantry in of the battalion had no support relation- clearing the town. In crossing rivers, the battalions, which provided indirect fire ship with any unit in the division, nor did support; the armored engineer battalion the tanks and infantry conduct serious tanks provided direct suppressive fires on conducted mobility (obstacle and mine the far side as the infantry made the initial training together. In France, a company crossing. When all was secure, engineers clearing), countermobility (obstacle build- of medium tanks was attached to each of ing and mine laying), and survivability the infantry regiments, and the regimental laid bridges for the tanks to cross. Al- (defensive earthworks) operations; and though tank fire was not too accurate in commanders attached a tank platoon to night attacks, their presence was a morale the signal company established the divi- each battalion. Save for certain missions, sion’s communications networks. The this arrangement remained unchanged. booster to American infantry and a psy- armored division trains formed the ser- chological weapon against the Germans. Within the infantry battalions, the tank In the defense, 1st Infantry Division units vice echelon. This included an armored platoon could be further attached to a rifle medical battalion, which provided ambu- company for a particular task. This per- sometimes used tanks as part of the main lance service and medical clearing facili- defense, at others they were kept back as manency fostered mutual respect and a mobile counterattack force. The experi- ties for the wounded; the maintenance trust in the other’s capabilities and made battalion gave repair support beyond the it easy for standing operating procedures ence of this tank-infantry team shows the abilities of the mechanics on the front benefit of a close, long-term support rela- (SOPs) to develop. tionship. Early in the hedgerow fighting, lines; and the division’s military police platoon provided security to the rear areas Upon landing on June 7, the tanks were the veterans of the “Big Red One” recog- occupied by the trains. able to help speed the infantry into the nized the value of what the tanks brought hedgerow country by protecting the divi- to the fight, and in the spirit of mutually Three tank battalions and three armored sion’s exposed flanks and being alert to beneficial cooperation, did what they infantry battalions comprised the striking the enemy armored threat. The advancing could to help the tankers. echelon. There were two possible ways to infantry, meanwhile, was available to create the armored division’s combined repel potential tank-hunting infantry The Tank-Infantry Team arms team under control of the combat teams and clear away antitank mines. In the Armored Division command.54 The first was to create “tank- Once in the hedgerow country, tanks heavy” and “infantry-heavy” teams by aided the highly vulnerable infantry by The Armored Force expanded from two attaching an infantry company to the tank spraying the next and flanking hedgerows to sixteen armored divisions during the battalion and a tank company to the in- with machine-gun fire and clearing en- course of American involvement in fantry battalion, respectively. This way, emy machine gun nests with white phos- World War II. As mentioned above, the each team had strengths suited for certain phorus rounds. Advancing infantry made organization of the division was materi- types of missions. Crossing rivers, clear- sure to shoot or take fleeing Germans ally altered several times. The overall ing woods, and seizing towns were prime prisoner. When attacking wood lines, trend of the modifications was to reduce examples of tasks assigned the “infantry- tanks placed machine gun fire into the the number of tanks, eliminate middle heavy” team. The “tank-heavy” team trees from 400-500 yards while the infan- levels of command, increase the amount would assume the lead mission if, for try advanced below the covering fire. If of infantry in the division, and favor the example, enemy tanks or other armored 20 ARMOR — September-October 1999

Infantry find cover behind an M4 Sherman as it brings fire on a German pillbox in Lammersdorf, Germany. They communicated with the tankers by hand signals, wire phone, infantry ra- dios, and sometimes by banging on the hull with their rifle butts.

could talk via radio to anyone on the ground. Several fixes were tried, and some units made them work, such as placing an additional infantry-compatible radio in the tank with the antenna through the hatch, or even through a bolt hole. An important means of communication vehicles were expected. Either way, the rail centers, bridges, sealing a pocket of was an external telephone handset team not in the principal role would re- resistance, etc. mounted in a steel box on the tank linked main in close support, prepared to react to The goal of the “Slugging Match” was with the tank crew’s intercom system — any change in the situation. to seize a series of dominant terrain fea- the interphone. This developed from a The second method of forging the ar- tures until the main objective was se- series of field expedient methods. At first, mored infantry-tank team was to meld the cured. Characterized by constant and the tank would trail a phone wire con- two battalions together fully, creating a heavy resistance, the armored team nected to a field telephone inside the sort of “super battalion.” The staffs of the counted its gains in thousands of yards tank. Accompanying infantry could con- two headquarters would combine to run per day. Here, the balanced or combined nect the end to another field telephone the combined arms battle. Each line com- team was used. The division assigned CC and talk to the crew. This was ineffective pany joined with its counterpart, giving A and CC B a series of objectives, which because the wire was constantly torn off tremendous fire- and manpower to the they then attacked in a leapfrogging se- the tank. company command team. This “dual quence; after one team secured its objec- Wire was an effective option if the tank captaincy” did not violate the principle of tive, it could support the other team in its was to remain in position for any consid- unity of command; rather, each com- advance with direct and indirect fires. erable length of time. In the defense, for mander assumed the lead on those mis- This left one whole team in reserve to example, field telephones could be in- sions in which his unit specialized. For reinforce one of the other teams as neces- stalled and quickly dismantled. However, example, if the mission was to destroy a sary or react to possible counterattack. in World War II, tanks were rarely used series of bunkers, the tank commander Again, the infantry and tanks worked as a defensive weapon. took charge and the infantryman assisted. nearly shoulder-to-track to seize their On the other hand, if the company was goal. The light tanks would normally Visual signals included standard hand ordered to secure a tree line, the infantry provide rear or flank security while the and arm signals, pyrotechnics (flares and commander planned and directed the medium tanks and riflemen conducted smoke) tracer ammunition, and lights. operation. the attack. Sound signals, such as tapping on the hull of a tank were also used. These signals MAJ Edward Bautz notes that the ar- Tank-Infantry Communications were, however, somewhat limited in their mored division conducts two types of A serious problem faced by the com- use and had to be supplemented by the offensive operations: the “Rat Race” and bined arms team at the tank company, external interphone or radio. the “Slugging Match.”55 The former is platoon, and individual tank levels was essentially an exploitation or pursuit, that of communication with the supported Finally, the use of messengers or com- characterized by rapid terrain gains of up mand liaison was a necessity. At the tank to a hundred miles a day against light to infantry. The soldiers in World War II developed a number of methods to com- platoon level and below, it was necessary moderate resistance. In this type of opera- municate, some of which were for the infantry commander and the sup- tion, the infantry would ride in their half- porting tank commander to make face-to- tracks or on the tanks, while the battal- impractical, while others were quite effi- cient.57 The six that were developed are: face contact from time to time. Typically, ions’ “specialty platoons” and light tanks radio, external tank interphone, wire, at the tank company and above, a repre- secure an exposed flank or provide a sentative from the tank unit remained more robust reconnaissance force. Proper visual signals, sound signals, and mes- senger or liaison. with or near the supported commander’s spacing and placement of elements headquarters. within the moving force was critical in During the war, the radio sets used by ensuring the ability to “crash through the infantry platoon (SCR-536) and by Summary moderate resistance, to remove obstacles, the tank platoon (SCR-508, SCR-528, or to provide a base of fire for other ele- AN/VRC-3) weren’t compatible. Al- The World War II American tank- ments deeper in the column to maneu- though the tank platoon leader could talk infantry team was the product of numer- ver.”56 Typical objectives were essen- to the infantry company commander’s ous factors, foremost among which were tially strategic — key terrain, road and SCR-300 via his AN/VRC-3, no one else the men who fought the tanks and the ARMOR — September-October 1999 21

“By the late summer of 1944, as the Allies began the final long drive to Berlin, the tank-infantry team had come together and were finding ways to use their respective talents to the utmost.”

men who carried the rifles. These men Star, Purple Heart, Presidential Unit Citation and 43Zumbro, pp. 110-113. The account comes were willing to come together as a team, French Croix de Guerre. from a CPT Gwinn, the tank company com- 13 mander. frankly recognize each other’s strengths Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, and weaknesses, and use the best of what Study #27: The Armored Force Command and 44O’Daniel, p. 42. See also Historical Section, they had to drive the enemy from the Center (Headquarters, AGF: 1946) pp. 71-83. AGF, p. 54. 14 field of battle. For their commanders, this Lee Kennett, G.I. — The American Soldier in 45Fred Majdalany, The Battle of Cassino (River- coming together was a sort of laboratory World War II, 2nd ed. (University of Oklahoma side Press, Cambridge, Mass.: 1957) pp. 67-76. experiment, with sometimes frustrating, Press, Norman, Okla.: 1997) pp. 37-38. 46Roger Fazendin, ed., The 756th Tank Battal- even disastrous results. In North Africa, 15 Historical Section, AGF, pp. 76-78. ion in the Battle of Cassino (Stories Unlimited, the United States Army began to realize 16 that without closer cooperation between Armored Div Org Charts, pp. 15-16 (T/O 17- Carefree, Ariz.: 1991) pp. 43-48. Majdalany 27 & 17-17). describes this action, but indicates that infantry tanks and infantry, the war could be lost. crossed with the tanks and were able to consoli- 17 U.S. Army Handbook 1939- In Italy, the desire to build a team was George Forty, date a bridgehead, but Dave Redle in Fazendin’s 1945, there, but it often took some painful ex- 2nd ed. (Sutton Publishing Ltd., Glouster- book specifies that no infantry followed. shire, UK: 1995) p. 74. periences to make it work. By the late 47 18 Majdalany, p. 99. summer of 1944, as the Allies began the Armored Div Org Charts, pp. 19-20 (T/O 7-26 final long drive to Berlin, the tank- & 7-27). 48O’Daniel, p. 44. 19 infantry team had come together and Forty, p. 174. 49MAJ. William R. Campbell, “Tanks With In- were finding ways to use their respective 20Redle interview. fantry,” The Armored Cavalry Journal, v. LVI talents to the utmost. #5, September-October 1947, p. 49-51. 21FM 21-100, Soldier’s Handbook (War De- partment Basic Field Manual: July 23, 1941) p. 50Forty, p.78. Notes 181. 51MAJ Edward Bautz, “The Tank-Infantry 22 Forty, p. 175. Team in an Armored Division,” The Cavalry 1 23 Journal, v. LV #3, May-June 1946, p. 21. CPT James J. Butler, “Individual Tank-Infantry LTC William D. Duncan, “Tanks With the Communications,” The Armored Cavalry Jour- Infantry Division” Military Review, v. XXIX #3 52The Officer’s Guide, p. 38. nal, v. LVI #4, July-August 1947, p. 43. p. 49. 53The 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions did not 2 24 Geoffrey Perret, There’s a War to Be Won The Officer’s Guide, 9th ed. (Military Service adopt this new organization in September 1943, (Ballantine Books, New York: 1991) p. 40. Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa.: 1942) p. 107. but retained the previous structure of one regi- 3Ibid., p. 26. 25CPT Addison F. McGhee, Jr., He’s in the Ar- ment each of tanks and armored infantry. 4 mored Force Now (Robert M. McBride & Co., 54 Ibid., p. 41. Bautz, p. 21. New York: 1942) p. 226. 5David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy 55Ibid., p. 22. 26The Officer’s Guide, pp. 78-79. Bombers: The United States Army and the Devel- 56 27 Ibid. opment of Armor and Aviation Doctrines and Redle interview. Technologies, 1917 to 1945 57 , Duke University 28McGhee, pp. 234-235. CPT James J. Butler, “Individual Tank- Ph.D. Dissertation, 1990 (UMI Dissertation Ser- Infantry Communications,” The Armored Cav- 29 vices, Ann Arbor, Mich.: 1993) p. 365. Edwin P. Hoyt, The GI’s War (Da Capo Press, alry Journal, v. LVI #4, July-August 1947 p. 43- 6 New York: 1988) p. 10. 45. Charles M. Baily, Faint Praise: American 30 Tanks and Tank Destroyers During World War II Forty, pp. 71-76. (Archon Books, Hamden, Conn.: 1983) p. 5. 31MG John W. O’Daniel, “The American Infan- 7Ian V. Hogg, ed., The American Arsenal try-Armor Team” The Cavalry Journal, v. LV #3, (Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, Pa.: 1996) pp. May-June 1946, p. 42. Captain J. L. Mudd is a 1990 13-17 . 32Johnson, p. 365. ROTC graduate of the College of 8 William and Mary. He served in the Baily, p. 148. 33Redle interview. 9 Regular Army for four years as a Hogg, p. 23. 34Ibid. 10 platoon leader in the 82d Airborne Ibid., p. 29. 35Historical Section, AGF, Study #27: p. 52-54. Division and in the XVIII Airborne 11 Armored Division Organizational Charts, T/O 36Ibid., p. 52. Corps G-3, operations staff. Addi- 17, 15 September 1943 (Reprint, Armor School 37 tionally, he spent two years as a Library, Ft. Knox, Ky.: 1985) p. 15 (T/O 17-27) Ibid., p. 54. & 16 (T/O 17-17). 38Ibid., p. 69. platoon leader in the Kentucky 39 ARNG and served in the 100th Divi- 12Interview with David W. Redle, 5-6 March Ibid., p. 59. 1999 at his home in Akron, Ohio. Captain Redle 40Donald D. Taggart, ed., History of the Third sion (IT) in a number of staff as- was commissioned in 1941 ROTC from Creigh- Infantry Division in World War II (Washington signments. An Armor officer, he is ton University, Omaha, Nebraska. He served as a D.C., 1947) pp. 13-14. currently a Tactical PSYOP De- tank platoon leader, company executive officer 41Ibid., p. 18; see also Ralph Zumbro, Tank Aces tachment Commander in the 10th and company commander in Co. B, 756th Tank — Stories of America’s Combat Tankers (New PSYOP Battalion in St. Louis and is Battalion. He served in North Africa, Italy, York, 1997) pp. 106-107. Southern France, and Central and Southern Ger- a graduate student at Southern Illi- 42 many. His awards include the Silver Star, Bronze Taggart, p. 18. nois University in Edwardsville. 22 ARMOR — September-October 1999

From Warrior to Logistician

Learning to Run the Support Platoon, The Biggest in the Armor Battalion by Captain John D. Fio Rito

At 0233 hours, your radio comes to life your alley. You don’t have to thank me; The platoon has almost 100 soldiers as some XO pleads for three quarts of the look on your face is thanks enough!” moving in about that many directions, Turboshaft. It seems that one of his tanks With that, the CSM left the room and so and meeting it for the first time borders cannot LD at 0600 without it. As you drift began what would be one of the most on terrifying. Fortunately for me, it was in and out of consciousness, wondering if difficult and rewarding experiences of my almost 60 days before I met my platoon you’re dreaming, the thought of fumbling career. For a young 2LT who has been in its entirety. Of course, I’m being around in the dark for a few cans of oil, led to believe that the warriors ride off somewhat facetious, but with everything not to mention the 20 km trip up to his into the sunset with the princess and the the support platoon does, I couldn’t cor- assembly area, almost convinces you to REMFs clean up after the horses, this rectly identify members of my platoon roll over and pretend you didn’t hear it. was a traumatic event. The removal from two out of three times in a line-up. To What do you do? Your job, of course. You my tank platoon after only 10 months and mitigate this “knowledge deficiency,” roll out of your sleeping bag into the the thrusting into this unknown entity of first acquaint yourself with your platoon front seat of your HMMWV, go find the support is equivalent to an infant being on paper. Read the MTOE, look at the oil, and start your trip. You are the sup- yanked from the womb. Hell, no, I didn’t current organization of equipment and port platoon leader. personnel to see if it differs. Look at the The support platoon is, arguably, the current personnel strength and OR rate and look at names and bumper numbers most complex and important platoon in “In my ignorance and to have a general idea of who is a the Armor battalion. With 40-plus vehi- cles, and more than twice that in person- inexperience, I thought “cargo,” who is a “fueler,” who is a cook, food, fuel, and ammo and what bumper numbers belong to each nel, it has the mission of providing all the type of their trucks. Do all this before you food, fuel, ammunition, and medium ‘just showed up,’ like transportation to a 600-man armor battal- sit down with your platoon sergeant for manna from heaven de- the first time. This will show you are ion, a prodigious task to say the least. posited from on high interested in your new job, that you’re a With all that said, I know of no doctrine, competent officer, and that you’re on top besides the MTP and a few short para- when I needed it.” of things right from the start. graphs in FM 71-2, and FM 71-123, that All units “test” their new leaders, but gives the support platoon leader any idea want to go, and I made it clear to every support platoon soldiers are a different how to lead his platoon or, at the very deaf ear I could find. In the end, however, least, how it’s supposed to function or breed from 19Ks, and you need to show my new call sign was Support 1 and my your strengths and abilities right from the operate. It seems that, while the scouts battle chariot reduced to an M998 cargo start. Also, all the things your PSG tells have SPLC, and the mortars have IMLC, HMMWV. the support platoon leader has only OJT. you during your first meeting will make a I share this with you because most sup- lot more sense if you’ve done your The purpose of this article is to share port platoon leader “elects” have the homework. The first impression you give some of my experiences as support pla- same reaction. The world of logistics is will be how the entire platoon views you toon leader of an armor battalion. It is not only an enigma to be feared, but for a by the end of the day. based on 15 months experience, includ- bold, audacious lieutenant of armor, it’s a After meeting your platoon sergeant and ing deployments to Kuwait and the Joint position to be scorned. In my ignorance getting an overview, go meet and be Readiness Training Center (JRTC). I will and inexperience, I thought food, fuel, address the shock of going from warrior briefed by your section sergeants. Again, and ammo “just showed up,” like manna do your homework before you get there to logistician, taking command of your from heaven deposited from on high — bumper numbers, OR of his trucks new platoon, working for your boss (or when I needed it. As a tank platoon rather bosses), and good attributes to pos- and equipment, names of soldiers, and leader, I definitely could not even begin any major problems they may have that sess as the support platoon leader. I will to tell anyone what the support platoon you as the platoon leader should know use examples, both good and bad, of leader did or what made up his platoon. what happened to me. about. I also suggest having each section The world, however, is a lot larger and sergeant walk you through a PMCS of his “Congratulations, lieutenant, you’re the more complex than my limited percep- equipment. This will give you an idea of new support platoon leader! I know you tion, and I was about to be introduced to a the pride he has in his fleet, his profi- wanted the scouts, but I convinced the world of responsibility I had not known ciency, and his ability to teach a new commander that support was right up existed. soldier about the section’s equipment. It’s ARMOR — September-October 1999 23

good for you because you need to know rectly. Finding out the day you’re going lieutenant and it is here that the problem the capabilities and limitations of your to the field that the battalion is zero bal- may arise. Although it is not unprece- equipment. When I took over, I couldn’t ance on fuel or critical package products dented for a lieutenant to rate a lieutenant, even spell HEMTT (heavy expanded is the wrong time to realize he may not be it is frowned upon. Therefore, in the mobility tactical truck) let alone know doing his job correctly. above scenario, the HHC commander what to check on this vehicle that was so Now, tour the dining facility and see will rate you. This in itself is not bad, the different from a tank. HHC commander is a huge help with the what your food service section does. FSB as the primary liaison between it and Following your section sergeants, meet Shortly after I took over the platoon, all your ammo NCO. Nothing will ruin your the food service sections were consoli- the battalion. It’s when the lines between boss and rater become blurred that the day quicker than losing accountability of dated into a brigade section. Even though delicate synergy between planner, execu- CL V, or having the battalion’s ammo they still fell under me for vehicle main- account frozen because of delinquent tenance, accountability, and administra- tor, and liaison breaks down and prob- lems may arise. I’m not speaking of ca- documents. A good ammo NCO won’t tive actions, their day-to-day operations reerism and saying that some may only let either happen to you (it’s your signa- were controlled by the brigade DFAC ture on the 581s). Sit down with him and NCOIC. do what their rater says so they get a good “grade.” However, even if we don’t want have him brief you on his entire operation Before I move on to the next group of to admit it, there is the underlying — from the time the S3 forecasts ammo until the last residue is turned in. Beware people, I want to reiterate the importance thought of pleasing our rater and also the of knowing what everyone in the platoon supposition of the rater that he must de- of things that seem “shady” to you. It’s is supposed to do and know yourself how velop you. This is all personality depend- nice when your ammo NCO can produce CL V on request; however, if he does this to do it and how long it takes. This will ent; in some cases, this is never a problem obviously take some time and effort, but and in some cases it is. by getting it out of his garage at home, it will benefit you in the long run if you you may have something to worry about. Additionally, be aware that in the field, are well versed in everything your sol- with the scouts and mortars working for Your ammo NCO should have a good diers do. It can’t hurt to know how to relationship with the S3 shop, specifically submit an ammunition request, forecast the battalion commander, the medics with the companies or in the MAS/FAS, and the master gunner, and be present when fuel, or lube a HEMTT. the mechanics also with the companies or ammunition is the topic of conversation. It’s not uncommon for a great plan pro- Next go meet everyone that supports with the BMO, there is no one left in the you at the forward support battalion BSA except you and your platoon. There- duced in the S3 shop to go amiss for lack (FSB). Believe it or not, or like it or not, fore, you may receive a lot of attention. of input from the guy who actually has his hands on the rounds. I suggest you the world of logistics, at least in my ex- This is not necessarily bad but, although perience, is a lot of “back scratching.” your soldiers live in the BSA and are at visit the division ammunition office/offi- Whereas one of the permutations of the the HHC 1SG’s disposal for guard and cer (DAO) and see their operation first- hand. Also go to the ammunition supply golden rule is that “those who have the details, your primary duty is to run LOG- gold make the rule,” here “those who PAC and execute the S4’s plan. Finally, I point (ASP) and the ammunition holding have the supplies can make things easy or need to mention the S3. He has the oak area (AHA) to view their operation. One way to do this is to go on an ammo pick- hard.” This sounds pessimistic, I know, leaf cluster trump card, and when it but what is going to streamline things comes to procuring CL V for the training up to get a feel for the time involved in when you’re in a crunch is how good he has planned, you will definitely work the procedure. It’s very easy to sit in your office and wonder why it’s taking so long your working relationship is with those for him. As far as people in your food who support you. What’s going to make a chain, there you have it — at least three to draw ammunition if you’ve never done clerk in the CL III yard go that extra people (not including the battalion com- it. This will keep you from promising ammo and not being able to deliver. The “mile” at 1630 on Friday is not your bar, mander) that at any one time will offer but your attitude. It’s a lot harder to deny input. I can’t really offer a solution here more you know about the mechanics of someone something when you’ve met as it is a matter of the group dynamics of the operation, the more informed deci- sions you can make. them and have a good impression. In that your unit. In some cases it’s a juggling vein, the world of the FSB is a world unto act, and in some cases it’s not. I thought it itself (imagine your platoon times 10) and might help to offer this as insight. Your POL NCO is responsible for stocking and operating the Class III pack- its soldiers a slightly different breed. Sol- In May of 1996, Team D from 3-8 Cav diers no better or worse than your own, age shed and bulk Class III. This includes but still different. Your ability to modify deployed to JRTC in support of the 2nd ordering, issuing, and securing package Bde, 25th ID. The team was composed of products; and the request (forecast) and your leadership style to the situation will 10 M1A2 tanks, six M2A2 BFVs, a pla- be a great asset. pick-up of the Class III bulk. He ensures toon of mechanized engineers, and the the fuel HEMTTs are all topped off and You probably have not gotten this far company headquarters vehicles. In sup- sufficient package products are on hand. without meeting your “boss,” but this port of the team, I deployed as the CSS He tracks consumption and loss; requests area can be somewhat sticky and so it LNO. My package consisted of four fuel and submits the monthly reports for your deserves some mention. Your boss is the HEMTTs, four cargo HEMTTs, one 25- approval prior to them going to the battal- S4. He is the logistical planner and you ton low-boy, a maintenance support team ion XO/CDR. Like you did with the are the executor, and, in a utopian world, (MST) from the FSB with six vehicles, ammo NCO, you should have him brief it would end there and everything would my HMMWV, and a total of 30 soldiers. you on his operation from start to finish. be great. However, it is my experience Similar to our mission at Ft. Hood, our It’s very easy to fear the unknown and that there is a shortage of captains to fill mission at JRTC was to provide the team shy away from his operation, but you positions such as the S4 and so the job with food, fuel, ammunition, and trans- should know the POL NCO’s job well falls to a first lieutenant. You are proba- portation. Unlike Ft. Hood, I was the only enough to ensure it is being done cor- bly a first lieutenant or a senior second officer from HHC deploying, and in addi- 24 ARMOR — September-October 1999

tion to my regular mission, I was respon- one tank probably has the firepower of an over six hours, unlike the two-hour win- sible for performing the duties of S1, S4, entire light battalion. Of course, he didn’t dow allotted by SOP. My mistake was BMO, and HHC commander for the like the firepower comparison, but he did that I was only worried about a threat heavy team. Additionally, I was the only understand my point and my part was on while we were traveling between the “heavy” guy in the BSA and soon real- the next helicopter. Had I voiced my con- BSA and the kabals. Once we arrived at ized that the light infantry didn’t have the cerns earlier, instead of thinking “some- the logistics release point (LRP), I felt we assets or any idea how to support us. one” was taking care of it, I could have were out of danger. However, we were Without replaying the entire month-long put a tank back into the battle earlier. actually more at risk while we waited for rotation, I’ll address the lessons learned: This entire episode was an illustration of the 1SGs to return their LOGPACs be- poor integration and communication. cause we were a sitting target. We would First, set yourself up for success. I mis- sit at the LRP, in the middle of the desert, takenly brought the two squads I thought Finally, force protection is of the utmost would benefit the most from a training importance, especially for CSS assets. literally for hours, waiting for one truck to return. It took me about a week of this center. I quickly realized that bringing the Logistics are the soft under-belly of any nightly ritual to realize my mistake. Very weakest squads in my platoon to JRTC to operation. Tankers think of fighting in the train them was not a great idea. Although deserts of the Middle East, not in the for- simply, I instituted an early return and a late return. Those trucks returning in the they did learn a lot, a better idea would ests of Louisiana. Subsequently, the CSS allotted time went back immediately with have been to bring well-trained squads soldiers in an armor battalion have the with members of the weak squads as same notion of the enemy. They are used my platoon sergeant. Any company who couldn’t make the window would deliver augmentees. I found myself continually to being at least 15 km behind the FLOT their LOGPAC to me at the CTCP kabal, pulled away from my duties to deal with and relatively safe, hardly ever seeing the problems that never should have hap- enemy. Therefore, they are more lax in and, once I got them all back, we would depart for the BSA. It was not an option pened. Also, I didn’t bring my platoon security and lacking in basic soldier skills for the 1SGs to bring their LOGPAC sergeant or a section sergeant. I thought such as building a fighting position, react- that since 80 percent of the platoon was ing to contact, and dismounted patrolling. back to the BSA because it was a 100 km round trip and, on the return trip, they still at home station, they should remain These are things we never practiced be- would be traveling alone. behind. I soon recognized that mistake as cause we never needed to, but which well. resulted in many “casualties” during the My second learning point was to keep rotation. The perception of wide open strict accountability of our ammunition. Second, delegate your authority. I tried spaces and seeing the enemy at 4,000 This sounds pretty obvious, but it wasn’t to do everything myself. I didn’t feel meters is quickly shattered when a six- until the third week “in-country” that I comfortable delegating anything because man squad destroys an entire LOGPAC realized, that although we had the correct I had never worked in the BSA in my and the tanks can’t get into the fight be- quantity of each type of ammunition, we current capacity, acting as the S1, S4, cause they’re out of fuel. The OPFOR also had some incorrect lot numbers. This BMO, and HHC commander, in addition quickly realized they never had to engage turned into a nightmare that lasted several to my usual duties. I also didn’t have faith the heavy team, all they had to do was to weeks. On the first day in country, each in anyone else doing it correctly. I guess destroy the LOGPACs. We learned the support platoon will draw the battalion’s this is a very arrogant and inexperienced hard way that we needed to get back to unit basic load (UBL) from the ammuni- way to think (although I think most peo- basic soldiering skills and fieldcraft. tion transfer point (ATP). The ATP is ple do it), but I learned my lesson. Very nothing more than a spot in the desert Those are some lessons learned from quickly I was overwhelmed by the sheer JRTC that can be applied to many situa- with stacks and stacks of ammunition as number of tasks I had to accomplish. far as you can see. It’s almost a free-for- Toward the end of the time in the “box,” I tions. It was the most difficult operation I all in the sense that you show up with had done until that time and remains one began to delegate duties down to my of the best learning experiences I’ve had. your trucks, the DAO hands you a stack NCOs and some of my soldiers. This not of 581s, and you go to the designated pile only took a huge burden off me, but the It was an eye-opening experience for a and start uploading. The problem was cocky young lieutenant and soon I would soldiers enjoyed the increased responsi- get the chance to put those lessons to use that three support platoons, including bility. mine, hit the ATP at the same time and on another deployment. started to upload. Third, become fully integrated into the unit you are working with. Know what On September 19, 1996, the 1st Cavalry Things were hectic to say the least. It Division alerted 3-8 Cav for a possible you can do for them and what they can deployment to Kuwait on a show of force was dark, and on the first day in country, do for you. The “light” guys were very it still looked like the Iraqis were going to eager to be of any assistance, but knew mission. Five days later, we were in Doha cross the border. Once we had our am- drawing our equipment in a sand storm. nothing about supporting a heavy team Once again, I’ll spare you all the gory munition, I signed the 581s and we were and I knew nothing about being light. To off. It wasn’t until we issued the ammuni- illustrate this, let me indulge in a war details and concentrate on the lessons tion that we realized our mistake. In the learned. story. I had a tank forward module wait- end, we had to upload several trucks with ing on the D-rear airstrip for two days. Force protection was again paramount. the mismatched ammo and drive to every When I finally asked when it was going We faced a very real threat in Kuwait kabal in the brigade. Much to the surprise to be lifted to the BSA, the SPO told me even after we realized the Iraqis weren’t of every other support platoon leader, I he had limited air assets and that my CL coming south. Every day we were briefed showed them that we all had mismatched IX was not an urgent priority. I explained on the terrorist threat level. We carried ammunition. It was no small task, but I to him that for a light infantryman CL IX live ammunition in our weapons, and we probably is not a priority, but for a tanker practiced ambush reaction drills. But I did it means that I’ve had a vehicle out of the make a few mistakes. LOGPAC turn- Continued on Page 38 fight for two days, not to mention that around in the first two weeks took well ARMOR — September-October 1999 25

Photos by LTC John Paulson Three Tanks Featured In Russian Arms Show by Colonel James H. Nunn and Lieutenant Colonel John C. Paulson

In early June, Russia held its third Inter- tronic self-defense suite and the Arena Above, a T-90 races through a mobility national Exhibition of Military Land active protection system. demonstration at the Russian arms Equipment, Armament, and Conversion Key systems displayed by Russia at the show at the Omsk proving ground. Products at Omsk, Siberia, more com- exposition included: the T-80U improved monly called the Omsk Arms Show. tank, T-90 tank, Black Eagle tank, BTR checks. The tank did not appear to have a Military representatives from around the 90 wheeled armored personnel carrier, world attended, including the Project digital data bus system. The Shtora, and the tracked BMP-3 APC. They also Arena, or Drozd system warnings are Manager and TRADOC System Manager showed a recovery vehicle based on the - Abrams as part of the U.S. team. integrated into the computer’s digital T-80 chassis and a mine clearing engi- displays. We attended for two reasons, both to neer vehicle. The gunner has a thermal sight, and know the enemy — since many potential T-90 enemies are likely to be using Russian both the TC and gunner have small video weapon systems — and to know the com- The T-90 tank is manufactured at the screens that display what the gunner is petition, since both the U.S. and Russia tank plant in Nizhniy-Tagil, southeast of viewing through his thermal sight. The make foreign military sales in order to Moscow. The T-90 is based on the T-72 Russians advertised that foreign custom- lower their own unit costs and so enable tank, but the fire control system is similar ers can also choose to add a foreign-made them to afford the quantity and quality of to the basic T-80. The gunner has a ther- thermal sight to the tank, as the Ukraine tanks they want and need. Russia’s need mal sight and laser rangefinder. Like the has done with its T-84, which demon- to export has improved Western knowl- T-80, the tank has a hunter-killer system strated the incorporation of the French edge of Russian systems. for the tank commander, but the TC’s SAGEM second-generation FLIR. sight at this time is daylight and IR only. Russia recently closed one of its three The T80UM1 has the 2A46M-4 main There is no independent thermal sight for gun, but now there is a muzzle reference tank plants, leaving two, at Nizhniy Tagil, the commander. The tank comes with the where the T90 is built, and at Omsk, the sensor (MRS) on the end of the gun tube. Shtora active protective system as stan- The Russians advertise a 20 percent in- T80 factory. Cost is the key factor in dard equipment, with the Drozd or Arena Russian export success: both T80 and crease in fire effectiveness over the system optional. 2A46M-1 main gun in the standard T- T90 enjoy a significant cost advantage The primary differences between the T- over the M1A2, LeClerc, or Leopard 2. 80U. The tank is capable of firing 80U and T-90, according to the Russians, APFSDS, HEAT, HE-Frag main gun In years past, buyers were concerned with is that the T-90 has a diesel engine, a the survivability of Russian tanks after rounds, and 9M119/9M119M anti-tank different suspension system, and the abil- laser-guided missiles. seeing the poor performance of the T72 ity to start the engine electronically or in Desert Storm, but the passage of time through an air power system. The latter The T80U brochure states that the “RE- has eased these concerns. system improves reliability in cold FLEKS” laser-guided missile system is weather or when battery power is low. intended to engage land and low-altitude Moreover, Russia has made improve- aerial targets at a range of 100-5000M. ments in the lethality and survivability of T-80UM1 (Improved) During the firepower demonstration, both their tanks, which improves export pros- The T-80UM1, made at the Omsk plant, the T-80U and T-90 shot missiles at a pects. Russian tank design remains strong includes several improvements over the range of approximately 4K, and all in areas of armor, firepower, and mobil- last few years. The T80U on display at rounds were dead-center target hits. The ity, and they are also making great im- Omsk had digital computers for the TC tank carries a basic load of 45 rounds, provements in survivability with intro- and gunner. It also had a built-in test sys- with 28 in the autoloader carousel and 17 duction of systems like the Shtora elec- tem and self-tests for various fire control stored in the hull. 26 ARMOR — September-October 1999

The T80UM1 has an air conditioning The tank has “dazzle paint” over most The Black Eagle’s blocky turret resem- system, a fire-suppression system and of its surface. This paint is an electro- bles recent Western designs. The chas- NBC protection. magnetic wave deforming/absorbing coat- sis of this Black Eagle was longer, with ing used to prevent radar detection. An- seven road wheels on each side, com- Russia also offers the Shtora electro- other improvement is that the driver’s pared to the tank identified as the Black optical countermeasures system, which Eagle in a 1997 exhibition. covers a 360-degree arc, and is capable of steering laterals have been replaced with a steering wheel. detecting laser emissions and launching aerosol grenades to screen the tank. The According to a brochure, the tank’s im- brochures claim Shtora triples the tank’s proved GTD 1250G HP multi-fuel gas- Black Eagle protection. turbine engine has a hydraulic volume The Black Eagle tank is also made at tuning mechanism that produces a 29 Omsk. It was demonstrated during the The more complex Arena-E defensive percent increase in average speed on countermeasures system is an active pro- last five minutes of the live fire mobility tection system against rocket grenades winding routes. Fuel consumption has demonstration. The Black Eagle repre- been trimmed 9 percent over the standard sents a major change in Russian tank and ATGMs. A radar mounted on top of GTD 1250 turbine. The tank is listed at the turret scans 360 degrees. It is linked design. It has a Western tank-style turret to a series of grenade launchers mounted 46 tons. With a 27.2 horsepower-to-ton with a bustle rack, which appears to be ratio, the T-80U has a higher power to designed to hold main gun rounds. It is on a ring along the frontal 110 degree arc weight ratio of any modern main battle of the turret. Incoming missiles moving at the first Russian tank with a bustle, which 70 to 700 meters per second are detected tank in the world. It was dubbed the “fly- gives them the capability to make lethal- ing tank” at the show. at 50M. The automatic system reaction ity improvements in ammo and increase time is .07 seconds. Once a ground- or Other features on the tank include a crew space. The Black Eagle has a tur- air-launched missile is detected, the small turbine 18kW GTA-18 auxiliary bine engine. Some changes seem to have Arena system launches a grenade in that power unit. This under-armor APU can been made to the hull. When first seen in sector at approximately a 70 degree an- operate all the tank’s systems when the 1997, the Black Eagle had six road gle. The grenade then shoots down at the main engine is switched off. The engine wheels and appeared to be built on a T- incoming missile to destroy or deflect it has an automatic air cleaning system, and 80U hull, but in this showing, the hull before it hits the tank. The Russians claim there is a one-point refueling location for appeared longer and had seven road Arena doubles the protection of the tank, the fuel tanks. Maximum range for the wheels. During the mobility demonstra- and that the combined protection level of tank is listed at 440 km with external fuel tion, the tank appeared to have an excel- a tank with Shtora and Arena increases tanks and 335 km without them. Maxi- lent power-to-weight ratio and suspen- five-fold. The Arena system is available mum speed is listed as 70 kph highway sion system similar to the T80U. The gun for the T80 tanks, T-72C, and BMP-3. and 40-45 kph cross-country. stabilization system also appeared to be very good. In the exhibition hall, the Russians dis- played a model of the Black Eagle which appeared to be an exact replica of the mobility demo vehicle, although the top of the tank’s turret was covered by a camouflage screen during the demo. A display board indicated it had a three-man crew, autoloader, a weight of 48 tons and a 1,500-hp turbine engine. Exhibitors stated that the current gun tube was the 2A46M-4, 125mm, but that it could be fitted with a 140mm cannon. Not much else is known about the Black Eagle. The

The BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle goes through its paces on the mobility course. This vehicle can be ordered with the Russians’ Arena active pro- tection system, which detects incom- ing rocket-propelled grenades and AT missiles and shoots them down or deflects them before they hit.

ARMOR — September-October 1999 27

T-80, left, and T-90 on static display, painted with an electromagnetic wave deforming/absorbing coating to prevent radar detection.

The view from the top of the turret of a T-90 is impressive for the sheer number of hatches, boxes and accessories that clutter the turret roof, much of it re- lated to the tank’s self-protection sys- tem.

At right, a Russian show card outlining the features of the Black Eagle, al- though the vehicle on display had an- other road wheel station. At right be- low, a T-80 is hooked up for retrieval.

key question is not whether the Russians HHC, 2-32 AR; commander of CSC riety of Armor assignments with 2- can design a new tank, but if economic and A Co, 197th Infantry Brigade; 64th Armor in Schweinfurt, Germany; realities will permit them to bring this Separate Troop Commander, 15th 2-10 Cav, 194th Armored Bde, Ft. tank into production. Cavalry; TRADOC DCST operations Knox, Ky.; as the S3 and XO of 3-8 The Omsk military show was a world- and plans training officer; brigade S3, CAV, and G3, Force Modernization, class exhibition. The Russians were ex- 5ID; and brigade S3 and XO, 2AD; 1st Cavalry Division, Ft. Hood, Texas. cellent hosts and were very open about battalion commander of 3-8 Cavalry, He has also served in several acqui- the improvements to their equipment. 1CD; deputy chief of staff, 1CD; and sition assignments, first as M1A2 The show was well organized and dis- political-military affairs planner (J5) at Test Officer for PM Abrams, APG, played a broad range of the country’s EUCOM. Currently, he is the TRA- Md.; Training Division Chief, TRA- military and civilian industrial capability. DOC System Manager (TSM) for the DOC Program Integration Office - Abrams tank system, at Ft. Knox, Ky. Army Battle Command System COL Jim Nunn is a 1976 ROTC (TPIO-ABCS), Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.; graduate of the University of Florida LTC John C. Paulson was commis- and currently as Assistant Project where he received his Armor com- sioned as a 2LT of Armor from the Manager (Tank Fielding and Foreign mission. He served as a tank platoon U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Military Sales), Abrams Tank System, leader, battalion S3 and S4 with N.Y. in 1981. He has served in a va- Warren, Mich.

28 ARMOR — September-October 1999

ARENA Active Loading DV-EBS Satellite Navigation System Defense System Mechanism Module Wind Sensor Digital Data Secure NSTV-12.7 Remotely-Controlled Transmission Equipment AA Machine Gun Mount Gunners Hatch GTD-1250G Engine with Hydraulic Volume AINET Automatic Fuse Setting System Gear of Turn Mechanism Gunner’s Thermal Imaging Sight Blow-Off Panels over of Russian/Foreign Origin Loading Mechanism

KAKTUS Explosive Reactive Armor Air Conditioner

Advanced Electro-Optical Countermeasures System 2A46M-4 Main Gun Commander’s Hatch

Welded Turret

Commander’s Thermal Imaging Sight

Turret Roof Explosive Reactive Armor

TUMAN Rapid-Action Fire-Fighting System

Anti-Fragmentation Screens Anti-Radar Coating KAKTUS-Type ERA Side Panels Made of Kevlar-Type Tissue

ARMOR — September-October 1999 29

ENGINEER BASICS

Some Rules to Improve Mobility and Countermobility

by Captain Wayne Skill

The following compilation of lessons erally do not define where smoke needs learned and observations from the Na- to go and what it must accomplish. Or- tional Training Center, the CMTC, and ders also fail to define what, or how even Bosnia is intended for all of us in- much, the support force needs to kill on a volved in the combined arms fight. Al- particular enemy battle position in order though it is about mobility, countermobil- to successfully suppress. ity, and survivability, this article is not • Preparation. just for engineers. If you’ve ever watched Units usually always conduct some form of rehearsal, but not your combat power dwindle away at the full mounted rehearsals that include use breach site, or had your battle position overrun by the OPFOR, this article may of mine plows. As a result, units lose an opportunity to synchronize actions at the be for you. Few of these techniques are breach site. original on my part, but rather are a col- lection of methods successfully executed • Execution. When units do have a on the ground. good plan in place, we often see them fail to maintain tactical patience when setting Mobility the conditions to breach, and then, once they commit, they do not execute quickly Mobility means maintaining freedom of and violently. maneuver and making sure we can get the force from one place to another on the Here are some tips and lessons learned: battlefield. At the task force level, what TerrabaseII. we’re really concerned with is finding a If your unit doesn’t have it, get it. It’s free from the Engineer Cen- way around or through obstacles. Breach- ter, or you can download it off the Web. ing is about as difficult an operation as we can execute at the task force level. At Teach your TOC NCOs how to use the program and build your products for you. movement of the support force, you may the NTC, we see most units struggle with It’s easy to learn and pays huge dividends not have a support force left to suppress breaching operations, particularly during the bad guys by the time you commit force-on-force battles. Problems gener- as a tool to help you analyze the terrain, build the situational template, pick reduction assets. Consider infiltration of ally fall into four areas: OP/RETRANS locations, or locate possi- FISTs/ COLTs with scouts in order to get • Plan. Units fail to account for the five ble support by fire or battle positions. accurate indirect fires prior to the arrival breaching tenets, including the breach Terrabase allows you to quickly under- of the support force. fundamentals, during both course-of- stand how intervisibility lines will affect More smoke. action development and wargaming. Of the fight. The breach force needs smoke pots or smoke platoon support in the breach tenets, intelligence (OBSTIN- CFZ. TEL) and synchronization prove to be the Activate a radar zone over both order to execute the breach fundamentals, the proposed breach site, and the assault suppress, obscure, secure, reduce (SOSR), biggest problem areas. Engineers are not position where you plan to conduct final getting involved in the R&S planning locally at the breach site. Remember to process and are not coordinating to make MICLIC preparation. This helps reduce include smoke grenade launchers, and the operational risk of excessive losses at onboard smoke capabilities. sure PIR and resultant NAIs develop the the breach site due to OPFOR artillery. information to get us to the objective. Lots of Smoke. You can never have too Finally, we often see the staff fail to ef- ADA. Coverage is a must over the much, even if it causes some confusion fectively wargame the plan, including breach site, particularly once the breach for friendly forces. Take advantage of our enemy reactions and realistic estimates of lanes are passing combat power forward, optics. The technology works in our fa- combat power losses at the breach site. and over the assault position where we vor. prepare the MICLICs. • Order. Orders tend to lack definition Mortars are not enough. It takes more of the specific sub-unit tasks required to Smoke. Use obscuration, not just to ob- smoke rounds than you can carry to get set the conditions to breach, or fail to scure breach site but also to screen the effective obscuration for a mechanized define what “good” looks like in terms of movement of the support force into posi- breach. Use additional methods if FA the breach fundamentals. The orders gen- tion. Without smoke to cover the move- smoke is not available. Think about using 30 ARMOR — September-October 1999

your mortars to suppress, while artillery such as smoke, to successfully breach. sault force. A lack of control measures fires your smoke. You also have to define the criteria for will result in killing your own. It’s hap- Reverse Breach Planning. Analyze transition to a deliberate breach and plan pened. Consider a release line on the far for that scenario as well. Determine ex- side of the obstacle. The assault force backwards from “actions on the objec- actly what criteria will trigger transition remains in a weapons hold status until tive” (in this case the breach lanes, in- cluding assault breach lanes) to derive to a task force deliberate breach, and in- clear of this control measure. This pre- clude it in the OPORD. Too often, plan- vents fratricide of the breach force occu- breach force (and engineer) task organi- ning at the task force level ceases when pying support by fire positions securing zation. Analyze what it will take to open each lane, down to the individual vehicle we identify a task force in-stride breach the exit to the breach lanes, or the engi- as our course of action. neer vehicles marking and proofing the and squad. Everybody is not entitled to a lanes. Carefully plan the control measures fair share of engineer or other reduction Redundancy. If you think one MICLIC assets. Put them where they have to be in is enough to clear one lane, it means you and plan to lift or shift fires as the breach force moves forward to reduce a lane. order to accomplish the mission. Use the need two. Use the same rationale for each Synchronize through mounted rehearsals. same methodology to determine the individual vehicle, squad, and task in the composition of support and assault reduction element (engineers, plows, and Have a Plan. Even in a movement to forces. Each of these represents a com- rollers) of the breach force. Include a contact mission, you need a plan to bined arms team. redundant means of proofing each lane. This must be done in conjunction with transition to a task force deliberate Have a Plan. Saying we’re going to breach. You also have to have a plan at conduct a TF in-stride breach, handing the reverse breach planning process. Plan task force level for how you will execute to lose half the reduction assets you the designated company/team some engi- commit to the breach. Use this factor in a task force in-stride breach. An in-stride neers, and pushing the planning responsi- breach at task force level is not just that bility down to company/team level is not your wargame process. designated company/team’s problem, and adequate. That maneuver company still Direct fire planning. Fire control your job is not done just because you’ve requires assistance from the TF to set measures are a must at the breach site, allocated them some engineer support. A conditions, and it will need other assets, particularly for trailing units and the as- task force in-stride breach is a deliberate ARMOR — September-October 1999 31

breach for the breaching maneuver com- pany team. That maneuver company commander must have at his disposal all the tools to set the conditions to breach. That means he’s got to have some addi- tional help from the task force, to include smoke for obscuration, priority of fires for suppression, plows, dismounts for security, a plan to gather OBSTINTEL, and enough reduction assets to provide redundancy. Breach fundamentals (SOSR). What does “good” look like? Define your crite- ria in the OPORD for commitment of reduction assets. Define who suppresses, from where, against what enemy forma- tion, and how many enemy combat sys- Mine rollers are the best method to find the edge of a minefield and the best way to proof a tems you need to kill on that position in breach lane, according to the author. order to set the conditions to breach. Use the same type of language to describe what the security element of your breach you can afford to go to two-way traffic to for using battlefield shapers. Consider the force is supposed to accomplish. Define allow for casualty evacuation, etc. flanks, or defeat of the OPFOR’s com- bined arms reserve (CAR). the basics and mechanics of your obscu- MICLIC Reloads. Plan for it. You may ration plan. Define who calls for the need those systems again in order to get OBSTINTEL. We often identify this as smoke, who controls it, where it needs to through the assault breach. Also a tool for a PIR, but fail to adequately address it in be, and what effect it needs to have. De- trench clearing if you are in a bind. the R&S plan. The task force engineer fine all of this in terms of task and pur- MICLIC Trailers must be a player in both the development pose in the sub-unit instructions of para- . Even if you plan to of the situational template and the R&S graph three of the OPORD. put your MICLICS on an AVLM, bring the trailers as least as far forward as the plan. The engineer must work with the S2 Rehearsals. Conduct a mounted re- to template the enemy’s use of battlefield assault position. The M-60 and M-48 shapers, including FASCAM, and then hearsal at TF level. A mounted rehearsal chassis are not the dependable platforms is your most effective method to syn- they once were. You need lift to do a help prepare a plan to confirm or deny the chronize actions at the breach site. Your template. The collection effort should reload, so you can also have a trans-load also include locating where the combat first attempt will prove why you need to plan as well, just by taking the trailers do this. Plan time for multiple iterations. forward behind one of your other vehi- systems that cover the OPFOR obstacles If you are passing another unit through will fight. This will help you effectively cles. You can always drop the trailers in position your support force. your breach lanes, they need to be there, the assault position before you move too. forward to breach. Covert Breaching. This can be a low Marking. Set up your lane marking sys- MICLIC Maintenance. This is critical. cost, high payoff operation. A covert tem at the task force “rock drill” site. breach may allow you to get at least some Next to the M-105 trailer, it’s probably of your lanes in using a minimum of That way everybody knows what it looks the most neglected piece of equipment in like. In addition, show how you plan to your motor pool. Train the operators, and combat power, allowing you to preserve mark obstacle bypasses, and enemy use TM the rest for actions on the objective. You the . have to go after OBSINTEL anyway if FASCAM. If possible, do this in terrain Mine Plows that is similar to the terrain where you . Tank crews must practice you hope to successfully negotiate the plan to breach. The NTC OPFOR does actual plowing with the MCB on a regu- OPFOR’s prepared defense. With a little this for every attack. lar basis. They need to be as proficient extra planning and coordination, you can with engaging the plow as they are at move straight through to the objective Traffic Control. You have to have a boresighting. They need to do it every using a defile drill. In order to make this method to control forward and rearward day during a rotation, and get familiar work, your covert breachers must learn movement through the breach site. Re- with what types of soil allows them to use how to find the enemy overwatching the hearse it as well. This brings up the issue the plow. site and kill them with indirect fire. of who controls the breach site. Our doc- Mine Rollers trine does a good job of outlining this for . Use them. They are the More on OBSINTEL. best method to find the edge of a mine- Getting your river-crossing operations, but FM 90-13-1 engineers to the point on the ground doesn’t really address it. It’s best to have field and the best way to proof a breach where they can give you good OBSIN- one person controlling passage and fires lane. If you are worried about the plows slowing your movement, consider hook- TEL, in one piece, may be your biggest in the immediate vicinity of the breach challenge. In order to really get you the site. It may be the breach force com- ing your plows up in the assault position information that you need, including mander, or it might be the S3. Regardless, at the same time engineers prep their MICLICS. mine type, obstacle composition, and you need to develop a method, publish it depth, they need to get right up on the in your SOP, and practice it. At some Situational Obstacles. Have a plan, obstacle. Finding a safe route to that point point, you also need to consider when during attacks or movements to contact poses the biggest risk. Consider using 32 ARMOR — September-October 1999

The ACEs (Armored Combat Earthmovers) have to be used selectively because they were not designed to be bulldozers, and can be damaged when used on rocky ground.

task force scouts to pull your engineer reconnaissance into zone on routes they have already proofed. In essence, the scouts hand over the obstacle to the engi- neers, and continue to concentrate either on deeper NAI, or on finding the OP- FOR’s over-watching forces lack adequate organic MEDEVAC as- OPORD. Publish the time-line in the Assault Breach. You may need to con- sets, so having one of those task force order. Put responsibilities and times in the duct final assault breaches in order to get assets in position is important. “Sub-unit Instructions” portion of the onto the objective, once you’ve breached Survivability order so that maneuver company com- his tactical obstacles. If your template manders understand that the times in- says he will use protective obstacles, then At the task force level, this translates to volved are directed by the task force you need a collection plan to confirm or fighting positions. The trend at the NTC commander. If the information is buried deny this point, and a plan to get through is wasted blade hours due to a lack of in the engineer annex, no one will read it. the obstacles if they’re there. planning at the task force level, lack of preparedness to put blades to work at the Dig Smart. No forward slope positions. Engineer Reconnaissance and OB- company team level, and a failure to ana- They take much more time to dig and STINTEL. Reconnaissance is a sapper lyze terrain at all levels. leave the tank or IFV with no good way squad mission. All the tools for conduct- to reposition or withdraw. Take advan- ing reconnaissance exist within an engi- ACEs Aren’t Dozers. They were never designed to be, and they can’t dig in all tage of the terrain. If the ground offers neer platoon, including a HMMWV. Sap- you an opportunity for reverse slope, use pers need to train on a regular basis with the places dozers can. Train your opera- it. Think about reverse slope positions the task force scout platoon and be famil- tors to recognize where they can and can’t dig. If possible, use Terrabase or that look like a fan with the wide end iar with their TTPs and SOPs. Do not toward the enemy. That gives the combat overlook the value or opportunity of con- other tools to produce “no dig” overlays vehicle the opportunity to execute a berm ducting covert breaching operations. before an operation. At the NTC, high ground is still high because it’s rock, and drill so he pops up in a different position each time that he engages. More on OBSTINTEL. Look before hasn’t eroded. Plan to dig smart. Rocky you breach. Make sure someone actually soil will bend an ACE every time. puts eyes on the obstacle, and determines ACE/Dozer Chains. Chains can be a both depth and composition. You might Priorities and Time. Set priorities, big aid to your equipment operators. The find that the obstacle you are stacked up make a time-line, and enforce it. The task chain has a weight on the end that is and dying behind is not a real obstacle to force commander must set his priority by marked with the correct depth for M1, tracked vehicles after all. The OPFOR battle position and by combat system. and M2 fighting positions. That saves will put in berms instead of tank ditches Make it the gaining company/team’s time on the battle position, instead of if they are running low on time. Tanks responsibility to escort the blades to the constantly moving vehicles in and out of and Bradleys can usually get over these next battle position. holes to proof for depth. You should only without difficulty, but because no one goes to get a good look, we stack up be- hind the phony obstacle and take casual- ties trying to set the conditions to breach. The same goes for wire obstacles. The OP- FOR will put wire with no minefield be- hind it, to make their obstacle system appear more formidable. From a distance, the BLUEFOR assumes that there’s mine- field behind it. Wire by itself does not stop tracked vehicles (unless it’s 11 rows deep). The bottom line is you have to look. MEDEVAC. Think about FAS or MAS support in the vicinity of the breach site. Even if everything goes well, this is where you stand to take the most casual- ties within the task force. Engineer units

Before tank fighting positions are dug, crewmen need to sight in their positions by lying flat at the same level as the gun tube.

ARMOR — September-October 1999 33

have to proof the hole once. In a different bottom line is that the engineer platoons order so that maneuver company com- color, you can also mark the width re- are going to need help in the form of manders understand the times involved quired for each type of position on the manpower, particularly in the erection of are directed by the task force commander. chain, and stake it out beforehand. minefield marking. A 20- to 30-man de- Define which company/team has respon- tail from the task force nearly doubles the sibility for each obstacle group and when Proofing/Sighting Positions. The tank crew must sight the position before the manpower available within an engineer company/team commanders must be company to construct obstacles. If the ready to site the individual obstacles with blades start to work. Sounds basic, but it detail is building the fences, engineers which engineer platoon leader. Avoid doesn’t always happen. Sighting needs to be done from the height of the gun tube can concentrate on getting the mines on burying the information in the engineer the ground, and getting them armed. annex. when it fires. That means the crewmen need to get down on their bellies to sight Seven Steps of the Defense. These are Situational Obstacle Planning. Situ- in the position. It does no good to stand the steps to building a defense that the ational obstacles must have a target, a on the battle position and say, “I can Cobra Team coaches during the NTC trigger, and a desired obstacle effect. By shoot from here.” I’ve seen tanks have to Leadership Training Program (LTP) and definition, situational obstacles have a fight above ground, 10 meters in front of during rotations. Build your defense from trigger that allows execution to be with- their perfect hole, because the crew failed inside the engagement area (EA) out. held until specific criteria are met. You to do this. Finally, before the blades • only execute if the specific event you leave, proof the position with the actual Know the enemy and visualize how identified during the planning process he will fight vehicle that’s going to fight from that occurs. The criteria, or trigger, should be hole. • Select where, and determine how, to based on enemy or friendly actions, not kill the enemy time. Timing, between defined events, General Support Assets. Have a way to track the progress of GS engineer as- • Position obstacle groups to support however, is critical if you’re going to direct fires successfully get the obstacle on the sets working in your sector. If you’re the ground in the right place at the right time task force engineer, it’s your responsibil- • Plan indirect fires to support direct ity to keep the task force commander to achieve the desired effect on the en- fires emy. informed on the progress of all engineer work done in your sector, regardless of • Position forces to kill him with di- • Define your trigger (event-based). If it who is doing the work. This goes for rect fires is an enemy action, then it defines a spe- obstacle work as well. GS engineers • cific place on the ground, and is therefore Complete the plan: Site and execute don’t report to you, and extracting infor- an NAI. mation out of a higher headquarters may obstacles, and prepare positions • • Assign someone to observe the NAI in present a problem. Establish direct com- Rehearse the R&S during the window of time you munications with the unit if possible, and Note: Steps in bold can be simultaneous, use an LNO to monitor their progress and expect the trigger event to occur. and should be repetitive coordinate with your task force on the • The obstacle location also defines a ground. To get started, you have to be Cover the obstacles by fire specific place on the ground, and is there- able to put a timeline and plan in the GS . Every- fore a TAI. Someone must have the re- body’s heard this before, but few units engineers’ hands when they arrive. actually do it. That means sighting in the sponsibility of observing the TAI as well. Countermobility individual obstacle with the unit it sup- • Choose your delivery system. ports prior to beginning work. One well- • Countermobility equals effective obsta- sighted obstacle is worth 10 that nobody Do the time-distance analysis between cles integrated with fires. The trend at the the NAI and TAI. How long does it take NTC is that units are not executing obsta- can cover by fire. the bad guy to get from your trigger point cle groups with sufficient minefield den- OPORD. Publish the time-line in the to the obstacle site. Does this give you sity to achieve the desired obstacle effects order. Put responsibilities and times in the enough time to execute the obstacle, or sufficiently integrating obstacles with “Sub-unit Instructions” portion of the given location of your delivery system both direct and indirect fires. Class IV/V. Coordination, ordering, movement, and distribution of mines and wire for the defense are a maneuver S4 responsibility. It is not an engineer task. The engineer company must have a tech- nical representative at the CL IV/V point, but responsibility for its operation rests with the S4. This includes a work detail to unload and uncrate mines. It takes a company day to uncrate 3,600 mines. If sappers are doing this, who is going to “It takes a company day to put in the minefields? uncrate 3,600 mines. If sappers are doing this, who is going to It Doesn’t Take Engineers to Build a put in the minefields?” Fence. In order to get effective obstacle groups in place to support a task force defense in 36-48 hours, it’s going to take more than just an engineer company. The 34 ARMOR — September-October 1999

and how long it takes to execute the force has refined the exact location and to get on the ground based on time and minefield? arrayed forces to integrate the obstacle assets. • Integrate fires with the obstacle. If with fires. Otherwise, you encourage Lanes. You have to plan for lanes, and engineer anarchy, resulting in ineffective nothing is shooting at the enemy when he obstacles that really are a waste of work put them on the graphics. A very com- encounters the obstacle, then you’ve just mon question to task force engineer is, wasted your time and assets. hours. “All right engineer, where are all of the The issue that is often lost on the task • Position your delivery system so it can obstacles?” The real question asked is, force is that they have an implied task to “Where can I drive my tanks?” The execute the obstacle. Sounds simple, but integrate the brigade directed obstacle graphics already have the obstacle control this requires planning, and additional with fires. In essence, the brigade com- time-distance analysis. For ground sys- measures on them, but that doesn’t give mander is providing guidance in how the exact locations. The exact location of tems, consider a series of positioning task force will array forces and fires when minefields is unknown until each one is areas along a route. Each positioning area he issues graphics with brigade-directed is tied to one or more situational obsta- sighted in and executed. What the ma- obstacles or obstacle groups. The task neuver commander really needs to know cles. Have a criteria that triggers move- force staff must recognize this fact during is where can he plan to be able to move ment of the ground system from one mission analysis, and then start the re- positioning area to the next. The trigger without blowing a hole in the bottom of finement during COA development and his vehicle. Develop lanes. Publish them. for movement should be event-based and actual on-the-ground reconnaissance. Enforce their use by all equipment mov- linked to the DST in the same way as obstacle execution triggers. If the obstacle is deep, then the only ob- ing around the battlefield. stacle effect you can achieve is to disrupt. Because it’s a FASCAM doesn’t Think about fencing obstacle groups Without direct fires, it is impossible to instead of individual minefields mean it’s a situational obstacle . This . FAS- turn, fix, or especially block. In order to can save you time and resources. It takes CAM, particularly ground Volcano, pro- make deep obstacles work, you’ve got to vides us with a great tool to get a high less time to put in one fence around the have an observer plan, and indirect fires. outside of where you plan to put the ob- density of minefield frontage down in a Think about using in conjunction with stacles than doing individual fences one hurry in the defense. Think about using CAS or attack aviation. 48-hour duration Volcano minefields in at a time as you go along. It also takes Volcano Consolidation. Avoid con- less CL IV. Fencing the group can also order to get the requisite density of mine- confuse the enemy as to the exact loca- fields in to achieve the desired obstacle solidation of Volcano assets into a single effect. Because the minefield goes in platoon controlled at brigade level. tion and orientation of your obstacles, Ground Volcano assets are a task force causing him to expend more of his breach quickly, you can take more time up front assets than necessary. If you fence the to make sure it’s sighted properly and commander’s tool to shape the battlefield. integrated with sufficient fires. As the Brigade-controlled ground Volcano ob- group, and don’t get all the mines on the stacles are rarely coordinated with task ground, the bad guys might not realize it, number of sappers coming out of the and go somewhere else. back of tracks dwindles, we’ve got to rely force maneuver, and are not refined at on this system to achieve what we used to task force level. As a result, task forces Integration of Fires. It isn’t enough to plan on conventional mines to do. generally do not know when or where be satisfied with merely covering an ob- they go in and do not cover the obstacles Minefield Marking stacle by fire. In order to achieve your . Do it, all four with fires. The end result is usually fratri- desired obstacle effect, both direct and sides, period. There is a saying at the cide and restricted maneuver for task NTC, “ If you want to find your 1SG, indirect fires need to attack the enemy in force logistics assets. a particular way for each type of obstacle CSM, or chaplain, look in the nearest group. minefield first.” If the bad guys see the Obstacle Group Design. Read FM 90- minefield, and avoid it, you’ve effectively 7. Plan your obstacle groups with suffi- Obstacle Siting. This is where the rub- FM 90-7 shaped the battlefield. The purpose of the cient minefield density IAW to ber meets the road in terms of getting minefield is to shape the battlefield so achieve the desired obstacle effect. In effective obstacles on the ground. In or- that we can kill him with fires where we addition, integrate obstacles with suffi- der for an obstacle group to be effective, want to. A minefield by itself is not a cient direct and indirect fires, as outlined it takes effort on the part of the engineer killing system except to civilians and in FM 90-7, to achieve the obstacle ef- platoon leader, the maneuver company friendly forces. fect. Insufficient obstacle density and commander, and his FIST. The following integration of fires is a recurring trend at represents “a way” to make this happen. Brigade Directed Obstacles. Brigade- the NTC. Engineer company XOs gener- • directed obstacles represent a double- ally understand the calculation to deter- The maneuver company commander mine how many minefields an obstacle and engineer platoon leader position edged sword, and are often misunder- on the BP. stood or misinterpreted. Brigade com- group requires to achieve a specific ef- manders use these obstacles to shape the fect, but often don’t apply the full width • The engineer platoon and other vehi- brigade fight, particularly the deep battle. of the avenue of approach to the calcula- cles attack as if they were the enemy. tion. The result is too little obstacle in too What they should not be used for is a tool • to “get engineer effort going early so we big an area to have the desired effect on Plan where to mass fires. don’t lose work hours while the task OPFOR maneuver. • Put fire control measures on the forces develop their plan.” If brigade- Engineers need to be able to rapidly do ground. directed obstacles fall within the task the math, on the ground with the task • Locate key weapons on the BP (at force battle space, they require bottom-up force commander, in order to tell him least one per platoon). refinement like any other obstacle group. how much is needed in terms of mine- That means that the engineers can’t start field effort to achieve a specific effect, • Site the obstacle group (all obstacles) to work on these obstacles until the task and how much he can realistically expect with flags. ARMOR — September-October 1999 35

General NCOs Pass Information. The engineer ble to the M/CM/S BOS. They are based company XO cannot afford to spend his on common sense and get validated every Here are some additional points that time during the fight glued to the radio rotation. don’t fit into any one category. These all mike. If he’s doing that, he’s in the reac- • relate to trends at the NTC. If you’re able tion mode. He’s the only person in the Time spent on RECON is never wasted. to fix these areas, you will do well in the engineer company who is in position to rest. be able to analyze information, perform • Conduct a rehearsal. predictive analysis, and think clearly Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) • Don’t drive toward blinking lights or /Estimate Process. Overall, this is proba- without the distraction of bouncing across yellow smoke. the ground in the cupola, trying to control bly the biggest demonstrated weakness formations, and react to threats. The en- • Resource your most dangerous COA. among engineer company XOs during NTC rotations. Without a solid estimate gineer XO needs to think, predict, and • Hope is not a method (nor a battle- make recommendations. This goes for process, you handicap your ability to engineer battalion XOs as well. We’ve field operating system). effectively plan because you lack a firm • grasp on the issues. The EBA need not be got good, experienced NCOs. Use them. Wire is not an obstacle to mounted movement. a formal product, but it should be a for- Reporting. Do it. The reports you send mal process that results in an understand- are your input to decisions made by your • Don’t put obstacles where you want ing of the terrain, how the enemy will boss that impact your unit in the immedi- them to come. fight using the terrain, and our own capa- ate future. So, if you’re told to do some- • An obstacle not covered by fire is not bilities. A number of units have good thing that doesn’t make sense, check the checklists in their SOPs, but fail to follow reports you have been sending higher. an obstacle. the process, use tools such as Terrabase, Garbage sent up the chain may mean • Any action not rehearsed will fail. or coordinate with the rest of the staff to something unpleasant coming back your • derive the information in a timely man- way. A technique to use is to push infor- Kill sacks are called kill sacks for a reason. ner. During the mission analysis brief, it’s mation before someone asks for it. That not enough to merely be able to rattle off way, you are sending it on your terms, • Put smoke on, or behind your enemy, enemy engineer capabilities. The engi- not when you are in the middle of some not on yourself. neer has got to work with the S2 to show other stress-producing event. You cannot • To waste engineer blade time is the the “so what” of enemy engineer actions afford to make the boss ask you for a on the situational template and then wear location or a status. It’s too late by then, same as wasting lives. the red hat during the wargaming process. because that means he doesn’t have a • If the enemy’s range is greater than Use a Decision Support Template clear picture, and if he doesn’t have a yours, execute a reverse slope de- clear picture, chances are the bad guy’s fense. (DSM/DST). It’s the only way you can track all the actions and reactions that you are going to have a good day at your ex- • DSTs work. pense. have planned or should have planned for • Terrain is neutral. The advantage is a battle. It’s the best way to keep your MEDEVAC. Get the TF to commit to situational obstacle plan on track. Like helping or providing coverage for the gained in how it’s used. the shoe company says, “Just Do It.” engineers. We don’t have the assets, they • A berm is not always an obstacle. do. Seeing Ourselves. Have a good system • At stand-to, check your obstacles. in place to track the status of equipment, Use the Task Force Commander to • preparation tasks, and defensive prepara- get what you need in order to support his Just because you build an EA, doesn’t mean they will come. tions. Words are OK, but pictures are task force. Make him your advocate to better, especially for tracking the current higher headquarters when it comes to • The time to cease defensive prepara- status of defensive preparations. Think getting the resources you need to make tion is when you see the dust cloud about using a Commander’s Card, which him successful. His voice carries more on the horizon. is nothing more than a cartoon showing weight with the staff at the next level. each BP, the number of holes planned, Risk Assessment. Everybody talks CPT Wayne Skill is currently the the number complete, the obstacles about it, and for the most part everybody planned, and the number complete. Use Engineer Trainer on the Armored this to keep the commander updated so understands the Force XXI model. How- ever, unit emphasis is usually on accident Task Force/Cavalry Squadron Train- he can adjust priorities if you are ahead or prevention at the expense of taking a hard ing Team (Cobras) at the National behind schedule. look at tactical risks. As engineers, we Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. He Engineer PSG. Use him. He is the most need to pay particular attention to how commanded Company A, 40th Engi- experienced NCO in the platoon, and we and where we execute FASCAM mine- neer Battalion in direct support of 1/4 can’t afford to have him out of the fight. fields and the risks they represent to the Cav during Operation Joint Endeavor Get him out of the HMMWV and for- force. Lane planning and dissemination in Bosnia. Previously, he served in a ward into a track. It doesn’t take an SFC of graphics help. variety of staff position in both Europe to handle CASEVAC for a platoon; Other Notes of Wisdom and CONUS, including deployments you’ve got the 1SG to handle that. Use him to control the tracks if the PL is on I found the following notes on a sheet of to both Honduras and Macedonia. He the ground. Use the wingman concept paper taped to a desk in the Cobra trailer is a graduate of the Engineer Officers like the tankers do. In the defense, it’s at the NTC, titled “102 National Training Advanced Course and holds a critical to get him on the ground pushing Center Rules to Live By.” I didn’t reprint Bachelors of Architectural Design the troops who are building obstacles. all 102, but picked out the ones applica- from the University of Oregon. 36 ARMOR — September-October 1999

New Weapon System Calls for New Techniques Employing the Bradley Stinger Platoon In Support of Task Force Operations

by Captain Douglas J. Waddingham

How should a Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) platoon fight when placed in direct support of task force/ squadron operations? Few commanders understand the new benefits and tactics BSFV platoons bring to support TF operations. For many years, task forces and squadrons fought with self-propelled or towed Vulcans. Because of logistical challenges, these systems were split into sections and at- tached to individual CO/TMs. To the detriment of proper air defense employ- ment, this simplified the Vulcan section’s scheme of maneuver, allowing it to sim- ply integrate into the CO/TMs orders process, rehearsals, casevac plan, etc. of fires. To provide this type of protec- The Bradley Stinger platoon leader can’t While this plan briefed very well, it pre- tion, the platoon leader must have the effectively command from a distant TOC. sented two major problems. First, both flexibility to maneuver all of his fire He needs to be forward on the battlefield towed and self-propelled Vulcans failed units. The old habits and SOPs of the to best influence the fight, author argues. to keep up with the faster Bradleys and Vulcan days set the precedent for S3s and All photos by Greg Stewart tanks. Second, the platoon leader lost his commanders to task-organize the Vulcan ability to maneuver and emplace his sections with CO/TMs. This method of teams at critical points on the battlefield. task organization is outdated and must be being ‘attached’ to a CO/TM. The BSFV The combination of these two factors revised for the BSFV. The platoon leader platoon sergeant supports his platoon in meant that air defense weapon systems must retain command and control. He the same manner a first sergeant supports were unable to mass combat power at cannot effectively command and control his unit. He must attend all CSS rehears- critical times and defeat the enemy air from the inside of a TF TOC. He is is- als. His resupply truck must be integrated threat. Now, with the advent of the sued his own M2A2 to place himself into the trains, and during a battle, the BSFV, TFs can overcome these limita- forward on the battlefield, where he can platoon sergeant retains control of his tions. best influence the fight. resupply truck to expedite resupply. He The BSFV is a fully functional IFV with He must be integrated into every step of coordinates Class III and casevac support the addition of a two-man Stinger crew. the decision-making process in order to during the CSS rehearsal. The platoon The platoon is also equipped with an provide the appropriate type employment also utilizes the task force UMCP. M977 for missile/ammunition resupply as the battlefield framework changes and Under this new configuration, the pla- and an M113 for casevac and logistical develops. He is a key player and must toon has the flexibility to mass at critical missions. The BSFV platoon enables air brief his air defense design to the CO/TM points on the battlefield. Fire units no defense to share the same speed and commanders and task force commander. longer follow an assigned CO/TM flexibility as its combined arms brethren. In each phase, everyone must understand through the battlefield. This does not The challenge is educating both com- the air order of battle and how air defense negate the ability of the commander to manders and BSFV platoon leaders on coverage must maneuver, adjust, and place a section with a CO/TM (if METT- the BSFV’s capabilities and tactics in weight coverage to defeat the current T driven), but this is the exception, not order to preclude commanders from em- threat. He briefs this AD design at the the rule. The air order of battle and hos- ploying their BSFVs using the outdated task force rehearsal. The platoon leader tile air threat changes throughout the employment tactics of yesterday’s Vul- must conduct extensive platoon-level squadron’s battle space, requiring the cans. operations orders and rehearsals, to in- platoon leader to constantly maneuver clude mounted rehearsals. The platoon and readjust his coverage. The platoon A BSFV platoon is designed to provide must understand the task force scheme of AD for the entire task force, not just one leader is focused on denying the most maneuver, air defense design, and com- likely hostile air avenues of approach or two CO/TMs. The platoon leader must mander’s intent. take the commander’s air defense priori- (AAA). This is where he will earn his ties and build an air defense design that With respect to logistical self- money, because with only four firing includes early engagement, weighted sufficiency, the platoon’s MTOE is units available, he is forced to “vote” coverage, defense in depth, and balance equipped to support the platoon without where to emplace his assets. ARMOR — September-October 1999 37

The bottom line is that the platoon is now focused on shutting down the air avenues of approach threatening the task force, not AAAs threatening an assigned CO/TM. In order for the platoon leader to ma- neuver his BSFV platoon, specific and rehearsed movement criteria are estab- lished in order to maximize AD coverage and eliminate fratricide. It is essential that every member of the platoon understands the commander’s intent and air order of battle to guarantee fluid execution in the absence of orders and/or the loss of communication. A well rehearsed chain of command is essential. These tactics have proven themselves lethal at National Training Center Rota- mand net down to individual teams. Front CPT Douglas J. Waddingham, tions 98-01 and 99-01 and Joint Readi- line traces, chemical strikes, FASCAMs, outgoing commander of ADA Bat- ness Training Center Rotations 98-09 and enemy TRPs, enemy situation, etc., were tery, 1/3 ACR, earned a BA in Edu- 99-02. At the NTC, BSFV sections trav- annotated on squad and team graphics, cation from Slippery Rock Univer- eling 500-1000 meters behind and to the painting a detailed picture of the battle- sity. His military education includes flanks of a CO/TM targeted by air were field. Teams cross-leveled information ADA Basic Course, Basic Airborne not only successful in defeating the air via the platoon net and the platoon leader threat, they were credited with destroying passed critical information back up to the Course, Air and Ground Operations numerous opposition forces targeting the TF. Course, and the ADA Advanced TF flanks. Course. Previous assignments in- In summary, a BSFV platoon is a battle- cludes Stinger platoon leader, Not tying the BSFV sections to the field operating system that must have the Avenger platoon leader, Bradley CO/TMs allowed the BSFVs to become freedom to be employed throughout the extremely survivable. Individual teams entire battlefield framework. This re- Stinger Fighting Vehicle platoon were not targeted by the OPFOR’s quires intense synchronization with the leader, executive officer, and bri- chemical strikes, FASCAM minefields, other operating systems, which cannot gade liaison officer, Ft. Stewart, Ga.; etc. Situational awareness was achieved occur if the BSFV platoon is at- Officer Basic Course Mentor, Ft. with a non-stop flow of information tached/OPCON to a CO/TM maneuver Bliss, Texas. monitored and passed from the TF com- element. From Warrior to Logistician, continued from Page 25 learned the important lesson of tracking and correct LOGSTAT found themselves food, fuel, and ammunition that allows everything not only by quantity, but lot wanting for essential items. It was no the battalion to function. Everyone is number as well. longer possible for me to just turn around different and obviously what worked for and go back to the field trains. me may not work for you. However, this The distances traveled during LOGPAC made it critical that the LOGSTATs from This aspect of the rotation taught me, piece should offer the novice support platoon leader the opportunity to learn the companies were correct and the pack- and a few others I believe, how important from some of my experiences (and mis- ages built at the BSA contained every- a well-thought out logistical plan is. Lo- thing listed on them. In the field at home gistics is based on anticipation and plan- takes). Good luck! station, the BSA or field trains were ning. Reacting to events as they arise will never very far from the assembly areas. If not only put undue stress on yourself and a LOGPAC was missing something, I your soldiers, but it will also have a disas- CPT John D. Fio Rito is a 1994 could always go back and get it. It is sad trous effect on the morale and welfare of graduate of the United States Mili- to say, but in my experience (prior to the soldiers you are supporting. tary Academy. He has served as Kuwait) there was never any real empha- an M1A1 and an M1A2 tank pla- These are a few of the lessons learned sis put on logistics. When we went to the from my experience as a support platoon toon leader, support platoon field at home station, the focus rested leader, tank company executive solely on maneuver; we never trained our leader. I’ve omitted some and covered others in a perfunctory manner, but it officer and S3 Air, all in 3-8 Cav at logistic tail. In Kuwait, however, it was runs the gamut from wide-eyed ignorance Ft. Hood. He is currently assigned apparent that the logistic tail had the very to ODCSOPS, 7th Army, USAR- real probability of “wagging the dog.” to a successful overseas deployment. Our logistic plan was based on reaction Being the support platoon leader is a EUR. CPT Fio Rito is a graduate instead of anticipation and it was not go- fantastic job because you do your job of the Armor Officer Basic Course ing to work in our current AO. 1SGs who every day. Whether in garrison or in the and the Engineer Officer Ad- were not used to submitting a complete field, every day you are supplying the vanced Course. 38 ARMOR — September-October 1999

Using Flag Signals to Speed Combat Casualty Evacuation

Marking Technique Tried at the NTC Shows Who Needs Help First

by Major Joseph M. Nolan

There is an alarming trend at the NTC and throughout the Army, the lack of adequate force protection considerations in all operations. This trend is emerging at every CTC and is addressed by numer- ous tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Army Safety Center and the Center for Army Lessons Learned regularly pub- lish articles about force protection; how- ever, none of these articles discusses a proposed solution to a major cause of “KIAs” at the NTC, which is “soldiers dying of their wounds.” The purpose of this article is to propose an interim solu- tion to this problem and to encourage further discussion that might result in development of a permanent solution. Maintaining task force strength is a dif- ficult task at best during a rotation to the NTC. Normally, we lock in personnel in key positions, assign augmentees for the rotation, and try to send a 100% manned task force. In spite of careful planning, factors like illnesses, emergency leaves, and real world injuries drain away soldier strength before units “enter the box.” The result is that most units enter “combat” at approximately 95% strength. Shortly after the first battle, they will have about from the battlefield.” Clearly, task force This Armored Medical Treatment Vehicle 60 casualties, and about 48% of these are commanders cannot afford this level of (AMTV), a variation on the MLRS chassis, lost because they died of wounds loss in soldiers’ lives and still sustain is seen as a possible replacement for the (DOW). sufficient combat power. M577A2 battalion aid station. This proto- type at the NTC participated in one of the In the July-August 1998 issue of AR- Units must have and display a recogni- Advanced Warfighting Experiments. MOR, CPT King discusses medic alloca- tion signal for casualty triage before help The AMTV, like the prototype C2V vehicle tion for better casualty evacuation, better ever arrives at the flashing combat vehi- that it resembles, shares many common planning, and aggressive use of doctrine cle kill indicator (CVKI). Without such a parts with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle to reduce DOW casualties. While CPT signal, first sergeants and medics spend and the Multiple Launch Rocket System King’s suggestions will certainly reduce valuable time going to vehicles that may carrier. these casualties, I believe there is a more or may not have casualties requiring their basic problem. Units do not have recogni- attention. As a result, soldiers who need tion signals for casualty triage that can be immediate attention are not receiving seen from a distance. The largest causes timely care or are “dying” without ever of DOW are “time” and “never evacuated being evacuated from the battlefield. By ARMOR — September-October 1999 39

Casualty evacuation times to include NBC are:

BAS to FSB Combat Medical PRECEDENCE Buddy Aid Lifesaver Medic (91B) Company

Urgent 1 hour 1.5 hours 2 hours 2 hours Priority 2 hours 3 hours 4 hours 4 hours Routine 6 hours 8 hours 12 hours 12 hours the end of a rotation, most units have casualties. To illustrate this point, con- develops a standard marking system, here improved their average DOW rate to sider this vignette. is a proposal. It is cost-effective, visually 35%, an improvement from 48%. But, “Stetson Six, this is Blue One. I am ob- recognizable from a distance, and works losing 18 soldiers after every battle serving artillery at NK142356, time 1800, day or night. It is the standard flag set quickly drains away combat power. Even continuing mission, over.” “Stetson Six, (NSN 8345-00-357-0223) recommended the most lethal, technologically superior this is Green One, Runner 1, 3 BMPs and for daylight operations, with a minor vehicle is useless without a crew. 1 T80 vicinity NK177300, over.” “Green modification. Take a caliber .50 link and place it on the antenna. Insert a flag for The high rate of DOWs is not a medical One, this is Stetson Six, engage the T80 and if possible fix the BMPs, break, the highest level casualty on board — red problem but a leader problem. In today’s for urgent, yellow for priority, and green Army, force protection is of paramount White One action left. Out.” “Stetson Five contact Seven and get some help to for routine. At night, the same caliber .50 importance. There needs to be a solution link will hold a chem-light, using the to the DOW problem. Though there is Green.” “This is Seven, monitored and am moving to Green’s location, Out.” same colors. (This will work provided the extensive analysis from the Center for chem-lights are not already used as a Army Lessons Learned and numerous You are Stetson Seven (1SG). Which of marking system.) With these visual sig- CTC publications address force protec- Green’s tanks do you go to first? Moving nals, the 1SG and the medics will know, tion, no standard system has been pro- in desert formation, there is 250 meters as they approach, which vehicles contain posed to identify, treat, and evacuate between each vehicle in the platoon. urgent, priority, and routine casualties. wounded soldiers from the battlefield in a Three vehicle CVKI lights are flashing Clearly, not every vehicle will contain timely, efficient, or effective manner. and more are likely to be flashing before urgent casualties. These signals will you arrive. You need to know where the greatly reduce the “time” medics spend urgent, priority, and routine casualties going vehicle to vehicle. are, and the clock is running according to the ROE. All you have to guide you to Commanders, from the Joint Task Force “The vehicle command- (JTF) to the troop/company/battery, are the vehicles with wounded soldiers is the entrusted with their most valuable re- ers do not have a method standard bumper number marking system in 2-inch block letters. On top of all that, source — soldiers. Losing soldiers by to visually tell the first failing to adequately plan and rehearse sergeant or medics who it will be dark in 30 minutes. casualty evacuation is unforgivable. A needs attention first. Unfortunately, medics going to the mural in Skidgel Hall states, “Let no While some units have wrong vehicles, or getting to casualties man’s soul cry out, had I been better after the “clock” has expired, is what trained!” Soldiers must be trained to sur- developed recognition happens during many fights at the NTC. vive on today and tomorrow’s battlefield signals, most units do not This will probably happen to our soldiers and Army systems must work to ensure have a system to priori- in combat because leaders failed to pro- their survival. Let us push for a system vide a standard marking and identifica- that will save more soldiers from those tize which vehicle needs tion system for casualty triage. Subordi- three dreaded words, DIED OF medical evacuation...” nate leaders have no technical means to WOUNDS, and keep our task force visually tell combat service support per- strength at the highest possible level. sonnel where they are most critically needed on the battlefield. The vehicle Casualty evacuation times at the Na- commanders do not have a method to MAJ Joseph Nolan is the squadron tional Training Center are listed in the visually tell the first sergeant or medics XO of 2nd Squadron, 4th Cavalry table above. “Died of Wounds” occurs who needs attention first. While some Brigade. He has served as an Assis- when one of four things takes place: im- units have developed recognition signals, tant Professor of Military Science at proper medical treatment, improper trans- most units do not have a system to priori- portation methods are used, evacuation tize which vehicle needs medical evacua- Johns Hopkins University; troop times are not met, or the casualty arrives tion, during day or night operations. commander, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment; S1 for 5th Squadron, 9th at the treatment facility without a MILES Today the Army relies on more and casualty card or DD Form 1380. As dis- Cavalry; and troop XO for HHC, 25th more technology to detect the enemy, ID (L). He is a graduate of the Armor cussed earlier, the major reason for mass direct and indirect fires, maintain DOWs is not meeting the casualty situational awareness, and deliver sup- Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, evacuation time. plies. Yet with all the investments in and the Battalion Adjutant Course. One clear reason time standards are not technology, we have not developed an He earned his masters at Johns met is because leaders fail to establish a accurate, Army-wide system to triage Hopkins University and his bachelors system to properly identify and treat casualties at a distance. Until the Army at the University of Kentucky. 40 ARMOR — September-October 1999

The Joint Readiness Training Center And Light/Heavy Integration: Defensive Operations

by First Sergeant Paul E. Thompson Jr.

The first article in this series appeared the preparation phase as the company able enemy formations/support-by-fire as the cover story in the July-August, commander gains more information. positions enables the commander to best 1998 issue of ARMOR (“Light/Heavy position the company’s platoons. This Integration at the JRTC”). The series was It is critical that the infantry company commander identifies where he wants to will include analysis of available fields of written to help armor platoon leaders or fire and observation. Platoon leaders can platoon sergeants facing light/heavy kill the enemy. The commander must then determine positions (to include indi- situations, either at the Joint Readiness make sure all the platoon leaders are clear in this regard. At JRTC, there is little vidual tank positions in the tank platoon) Training Center (JRTC) or in an actual which best allow their platoon to mass deployment. open ground, aside from the drop zones. fire into the company engagement area. OPFOR armor will avoid open areas at The first article gave an overview of the all costs. JRTC is close, wooded terrain Subordinate platoons should complete JRTC battlefield and “experience,” that is broken up by dense underbrush in reconnaissance by conducting initial co- along with some tips to make training wet, low-lying areas. This terrain pro- ordination between adjacent platoons. successful. Future articles will cover vides perfect avenues of approach for The establishment of mutual support is offensive operations, planning considera- enemy dismounts. The streams that are vital. Mutual support allows the coverage tions, and the capabilities and limitations characteristic of Fort Polk (and other less of dead space. It also promotes infantry’s of light infantry and armor. –Ed. than ideal examples of “tank country” in understanding of the positioning of the the world) also have stream crossings for tank platoon in addition to subsequent various types of vehicular movement. At movement plans during the operation. times, the place where the infantry com- Planning Phase An additional consideration is the need mander wants to kill the enemy will only to analyze terrain to best utilize the capa- Tank platoons participate in the com- have a kill zone extending out to 100 or pany defense by performing one or more 200 meters. Planning for employment of bilities of the infantry and tanks in the defense. of the following operations: the tank platoon should include potential • displacement routes, additional positions, Participating in the counterreconnais- and counterattack contingencies. C2 sance/security zone effort During the commander’s reconnais- • Defending a BP The primary concern in selecting fight- sance, the tank platoon leader must iden- ing positions for the tank platoon is the • Displacing tify, record, and mark the tentative TRPs, decision points, fighting positions, and platoon’s ability to concentrate and mass • Counterattacking lethal fires into its engagement area(s). routes he thinks the platoon will use in The tank is the commander’s fastest tacti- • Acting as a reserve executing the defense. It is important that the platoon leader bring sufficient day cal asset and the best killer of enemy When defending a battle position, the armor. platoon may be asked to destroy, block, and night marking materials (i.e., engi- neer stakes, tape, chem lights, or thermal or canalize enemy forces. They may be paper). The tank platoon leader should Dispersing positions laterally and in asked to retain terrain, or displace to oc- depth helps protect the company from cupy subsequent battle positions. In the record exact eight-digit coordinates of enemy observation and fires. Establish each position in the platoon. This will counterattack or reserve mission, the tank allow him to relay this information to the company and platoon positions in depth platoon conducts tactical movement to and provide sufficient maneuver space in occupy BPs or attack-by-fire positions. commander. The tank platoon leader the tank platoons’ positions to establish should also know the location of all the The platoon also executes hasty attacks, other units in the company. This will aid in-depth placement of tanks. Tanks will be placed 150-200 meters apart based on assaults, or other actions based on the him if he gets called to help one of these METT-T. Dispersal of tank positions commander’s intent. Tank platoons other units, will reduce the chances of should be retained under the tank platoon fratricide, and will allow him to plan and reduces the tanks’ vulnerability to enemy fires; however, it also increases the de- leader’s control and made an integral part rehearse routes to and from those posi- mands for local security in the area be- of the company’s defense. tions. tween the tanks. The commander should Reconnaissance and efficient time man- Intelligence consider co-locating infantry with armor agement during the planning phase are to assist in providing local security if he keys to a successful, coordinated com- Identification of mounted and dis- plans to have such wide dispersion in pany defense. Planning will continue into mounted avenues of approach and prob- restrictive terrain. ARMOR — September-October 1999 41

Whenever possible, primary and alter- The commander must prioritize the sur- and the armor platoon leader should issue nate fighting positions should allow en- vivability effort. his in accordance with the commander’s gagement of the enemy in the flank and In countermobility operations, the wishes. Remember, there’s a better than from two directions. This provides the average chance that this commander has defender with a larger and more vulner- commander’s intent should guide the never worked with a heavy team and the emplacement of obstacles based on the able target and, at the same time, con- following: armor platoon leader must be ready to fuses the enemy as to the actual location offer suggestions as the resident “subject of the defense. • Reinforcement of the scheme of ma- matter expert.” neuver and direct fire plan. The commander should plan disen- Intelligence gagement criteria and develop a resulting • Integration with existing obstacles. disengagement plan. The plan should • OPSEC is critical during defensive op- identify a break point and provide over- Employment in depth and positioning erations. Effective OPSEC procedures where they will surprise enemy watch between platoons. The tank pla- forces. will limit enemy reconnaissance efforts. toon must prepare to provide internal Consider recommending to the com- overmatch if it is not provided by another • Coverage by direct and indirect fires mander the establishment of a screen platoon. The plan should designate dis- at all times. forward to deny the enemy information engagement criteria; routes to alternate, through aggressive counterreconnais- supplementary, and subsequent fighting If the commander does not specify in- sance. The counterrecon force must have tent for obstacles, the armor platoon positions and BPs; direct fire suppres- leader should plan hasty or deliberately disengagement criteria, routes back out of sion; cover, concealment, and rehearsals; the security zone, and a coordination indirect fire and smoke; and obstacle employed obstacles to meet these pur- made as to who will close the gap left for poses: integration. the counterrecon force to get back into • Block the final assault of an enemy friendly lines, along with recognition Fire Support force in front of the platoon. signals. The armor team, with remote Platoon leaders can provide the FIST • Block the seams between tanks. sensors and the integration of infantry on dismounted avenues of approach, can with nominations for additional targets in • Disrupt enemy forces that are assault- give the task force a decided advantage. the battalion fire support plan. Platoon ing on the flanks of the platoon. leaders should plan or request artillery C2 targets on/at potential avenues of ap- • Shape the engagement area by forcing proach, choke points along the avenues of the enemy elements to turn, slow The tank platoon can occupy BPs by approach, possible enemy support-by-fire down, stop, or flank themselves at hasty or deliberate occupation. Hasty positions, obstacles, and dead space known ranges in the engagement occupation can occur during counterat- within the platoon battle space. When area. tack missions, after disengagement and approved, each and every target will be movement to subsequent or supplemen- When supervising the digging effort, dig registered with the firing data recorded in down, not up. Berms attract attention. tary BPs, or in response to FRAGOs re- the firing element’s FDC according to the flecting a change of mission. Deliberate availability of ammunition to ensure ac- Reduce spoil so that it blends into exist- occupation can occur when the enemy is ing terrain. Tie down all antennas and curate and timely fires. Each target in the cover all reflective surfaces. Make sure not expected or has not been located armor platoon’s area should have a deci- within direct fire range or a friendly ele- sion point overwatched by at least a tank each firing position has a covered and ment is forward of the BP with the mis- concealed route to the next firing posi- crew or section. The decision point trig- tion. sion of providing security for the occupy- gers the call for fire on a target to ensure ing platoons. Begin from the enemy’s the impact of rounds coincides with the Combat Service Support perspective in the engagement area, with enemy’s arrival at the area targeted. The the reconnaissance party looking toward tank platoon’s laser rangefinders or target The platoon sergeant should ensure that the BP. Driving the engagement area designation capabilities (on the M1A2) basic loads are fully restocked. Consider from the enemy point of view is very enhance its effectiveness in triggering pre-stocking and pre-positioning ammu- useful in confirming that the selected artillery fires using decision points. Con- nition on the battlefield. The vehicles of positions are tactically advantageous. sider the use of DPICM or FASCAM in the heavy team are the only ones that the Driving the engagement area also allows an area where an enemy armor advance is tank platoon will be able to rely on for the killers in the BP to identify where and expected. movement of this Class V should the when the enemy will be engaged and need arise. Know locations of the forward destroyed in the engagement area. Mobility and Survivability and main aid stations. Plan and rehearse Reconnaissance of the engagement area the CASEVAC plan. The combat capa- The company’s survivability effort is in bility of the tank platoon is directly re- is complete when all leaders are certain as the BPs or strongpoints to protect vehi- to where the commander wants to kill the cles, weapons systems, and dismounted lated to logistics. Plan for tank recovery enemy. The platoon leaders should then and maintenance. elements. The defensive effectiveness back brief the commander on the follow- and survivability of tanks is greatly im- Preparation Phase ing issues: trigger lines, engagement cri- proved by the preparation of hull or turret teria, fire patterns, disengagement criteria defilade firing positions. Two-tier fight- Preparation of the defense begins after and plan, routes to supplementary or sub- ing positions are the best. The company the company commander has issued his sequent BPs, marking of primary and may consider using engineer assets to dig order and ends at the “defend not later alternate fighting positions, individual in ammunition prestocks at platoon BPs than” time specified in his OPORD. The tank positions, platoon sector or engage- or in individual tank fighting positions. infantry will put out a priority of work ment areas, TRPs, OPs (if used), obsta- 42 ARMOR — September-October 1999

cles (if used), indirect fire targets includ- one of the platoon’s vehicles. A logical are based on a specific type and number ing FPFs (if allocated), and dead space. choice to carry out this task is the senior of enemy vehicles reaching a specified The commander must focus special at- tank commander because the PLD and location (sometimes called the break PSG will be occupied handling other point) to trigger displacement. The pla- tention on the addition of tanks to his task aspects of the defensive preparations. An toon may have to cover its own dis- organization. The tank platoon leader coordinates with adjacent platoons and escort should always remain with the placement in bounds to subsequent posi- engineer assets during their time with the tions. other company elements and ensures company. Inform the commander of their sectors of fire overlap and that his CS and The tank platoon is capable of conduct- CSS requirements are fulfilled. progress and coordinate for movement ing limited counterattacks. It can com- between platoons. Your unit then escorts Rehearsals are critical to ensure every the engineer elements over to another plete the destruction of the enemy forces in the company’s assigned area, regain soldier understands the plan. Specific company when all of your work is com- key terrain, relieve pressure on an en- areas include: passage of the counterre- pleted. The key factor is that the engi- connaissance force or other security neers must never be by themselves. The gaged rifle platoon, or initiate offensive operations. force, closure of the lane, movement engineers are far too valuable and vulner- from hide positions to the BP, use of fire able an asset and every bit of their time Some counterattack considerations fol- commands, triggers to initiate fires, must be monitored and productive. low: preparation and transmission of critical Make sure firing positions are in the best • Counterattack by fire: Maximize reports using FM and digital systems, execution of the fire support plan, as- place to maximize stand-off distance weapon standoff and/or cover. and/or the platoon’s ability to mass fires • sessment of the effects of enemy weapon from survivable positions. Make sure that Counterattack by fire and movement: systems, displacement to alternate, sup- Close with and destroy the enemy. plementary, or successive battle posi- firing positions are complementary, tak- ing advantage of knowing the exact loca- Some of the preceding information is tions, and the evacuation of casualties. tion of the start point, end point, and turns covered in the draft copy of “Tactics, Rehearsals begin as soon as the company issues its warning order. The company of any obstacles, and locating pre-plotted Techniques, and Procedures for Light artillery targets on the enemy side of ob- Infantry Company Employment of Tank XO can move a series of vehicles through stacles to ensure accurate calls for fire. Platoons in Restrictive Terrain.” It may or the engagement area to depict an enemy force while the commander and platoon This will help the platoon increase the may not be the actual beginning of doc- number of kills it achieves in the defense. trine for Light/Heavy Integration in the leaders rehearse the battle from the com- Delay of the enemy will also allow other U.S. Army. This information and the pany/platoon BPs. You can never do too much coordination and rehearsal. assets of the brigade to be brought to bear additional remarks are to give Armor on them, such as TACAIR or attack heli- leaders a starting point for reference. It is Operations in restrictive terrain offer copters. the Joint Readiness Training Center’s special challenges in the defense. A thor- hope that the information contained in ough reconnaissance is required to iden- Execution Phase this series of articles will be a real help to tify all mounted and dismounted avenues Armor leaders in the immediate future. The tank platoon will be located in good of approach. Special care is required to hide positions behind its primary battle Finally, there are again undoubtedly coordinate with adjacent units to ensure plenty of old tankers and cavalrymen out the maximum coverage of all approaches. and/or fighting positions. While in the there that could teach us more. If you hide position, the platoon should employ all applicable OPSEC measures to limit have any comments please forward them Fire Support to: aerial, thermal, electronic, and visual All platoon leaders should confirm loca- detection. It should deploy OPs to pro- Operations Group-Bde C2 tions of artillery and mortar targets, adjust vide surveillance of its sectors of fire and Attn: Armor/Mech Team them if necessary, and mark them for early warning. It should be at the RED- 7154 Alabama Ave. daylight and limited visibility recogni- CON status prescribed in the OPORD. Fort Polk, LA 71459-5313 tion. Decision points that will be used to The hide position will not be located on Or contact us e-mail harzbepd@polk- request artillery on moving targets must or near obvious artillery targets. emh2.army.mil be marked. Decision points are identified based on the enemy’s doctrinal rate of During the defense, all leaders in the re- porting process must avoid sending re- movement, the terrain, the time of flight dundant or inflated descriptions of the First Sergeant Paul E. Thompson Jr. of artillery or mortar rounds, and the pri- enlisted in the Army in 1976 as an ority of the target. situation. Report what you see. Do not analyze over the air. Leave that to the Indirect Fire Infantryman. His as- Mobility and Survivability commanders and the intelligence types. signments include 2-325 AIR and 1- In a direct firefight with enemy armor, a 320 FA in the 82nd Airborne Division; Engineer assets are key during defensive 4-333 FA, 428th FA Brigade; 2-64 preparations and will be working except tank platoon can expend main gun am- munition quickly. Planning and care must Armor, 3rd Infantry Division; Cincin- for maintenance checks and services. A be taken to transfer ammunition and re- nati Recruiting Battalion, Recruiting member of the tank platoon leadership Command; 4-67 Armor, 1st Armored must physically link up with the engi- trieve pre-stocks while continuing to keep fire on the enemy. neers at the time directed in the company Division; and Operations Group, Joint OPORD. They should physically escort Displacement criteria are established in Readiness Training Center. He is them to each firing position, provide local the OPORD. Time permitting, pre-stocks currently assigned as a first sergeant security on site, supervise the digging of will be retrieved or destroyed to prevent in E Co., 1-81 Armor at Fort Knox, the position, and proof the position using use by the enemy. Displacement criteria Ky. ARMOR — September-October 1999 43

New Ideas for Armor Company Maintenance Plans by Captain Paul J. Taylor

In today’s Army, maintenance has be- How can a company commander man- A good company maintenance plan come even more vital in sustaining readi- age the competing demands of budget, consists of two things: accomplishment ness than ever before. Advancing tech- time, and personnel, yet still run an effec- of scheduled maintenance checks and nology such as the M1A2 increases our tive maintenance program? services, and soldier training on mainte- lethality on the battlefield but at the same nance-related tasks. The first element time makes our equipment more suscep- The answer is to not bite off more than ensures that all equipment, including tible to maintenance problems. But just at each company can chew, so to speak. stand-alone equipment such as radios and the time when maintenance is becoming And although this may seem obvious to weapons, receive the Preventive Mainte- more critical, many units are struggling many of you, there are many units out in nance Checks and Services (PMCS) re- with issues such as shrinking budgets and the force attempting to do too much with quired by the -10/-20 manuals. These understrength maintenance platoons that too little (people, money, time). They include crew-level inspections, periodic make a maintenance program even more ultimately pay the price when it is time to services, and oil analysis (AOAP) sam- difficult. roll out the gate. pling. The second element ensures that all 44 ARMOR — September-October 1999

Table 1 - Sample Maintenance Training Schedule

Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Week 1 1st Plt- M/A COMPANY 2nd Plt- W A.M. - SGT’s BN Training TRAINING Time Holiday P.M. - Family Time Week 2 1st Plt- AUX HQ Plt - M/A COMPANY 2nd Plt- AUX 3rd Plt - M/A TRAINING the maintenance platoon (BMO) and the Week 3 COMPANY 2nd Plt - M/A 3rd Plt – W 3rd Plt- AUX company to ensure that the battalion’s TRAINING HQ Plt – W HQ Plt- AUX assets adequately support the company 1st Plt - S maintenance team and that the battalion Week 4RED CYCLEcommander’s maintenance priorities are TASKINGS met. 1st Plt - S The bottom line is that maintenance M - Monthly PMCS W - Weekly PMCS A - AOAP sample AUX - Weapons, NVGs S - Services training, just like other training, should be planned and resourced at least six weeks in advance. We do this for other training soldiers are knowledgeable enough on set of 5988-Es in a timely manner. Of events and should give maintenance the associated equipment to perform course, this system is harder for the com- training equal priority. Also, by decen- quality maintenance checks. pany commander and XO to control, but tralizing maintenance into smaller ele- platoon leaders and platoon sergeants are ments, such as platoons, the company Planning is critical to any maintenance more than capable of executing this level program. Field training is conducted ac- commander makes scheduling easier and cording to the standards of 25-101, Battle of training. If they are not, then it is an lightens the work load of his maintenance Focused Training excellent training tool for the company team and ULLS/PLL clerk. ; there is no reason why commander to teach accountability and maintenance does not deserve the same attention. The commander must consider maintenance concepts to his platoon Actually finding the time to conduct leadership. several factors when planning mainte- maintenance training is only half the bat- nance periods. First, the old motor stables Second, the company commander must tle of effective maintenance. The other concept, where the entire company ensure that the maintenance platoon can portion is training subordinates to main- marches to the motor pool weekly and support his plan. While the cavalry troop tain properly. Focused maintenance train- performs maintenance, is an impossibility is a wonderful thing, because the com- ing is vital to sustaining the force. A for many units today. Let’s face it: in mander actually owns his mechanics, the company will not conduct quality main- today’s world of red cycle taskings, train- regular armor community does not have tenance periods if its soldiers are not pro- ing holidays, Sergeant’s Time, Family this luxury. The maintenance team is ficient at performing PMCS, diagnostic Time, and training dictated by higher (to often torn between supporting its as- checks, and other maintenance-related name only a few), it may seem hard to signed company and BMO/HHC com- procedures. All soldiers should receive find time to breathe, let alone perform mitments. The only way to defeat this basic PMCS and administrative skills quality maintenance. However, just be- problem is to plan maintenance training from the unit’s driver training program. cause the entire company cannot come to with the maintenance team chief so that But special emphasis is required to teach the motor pool at one time does not mean he can deconflict it with his maintenance soldiers the specifics of technical areas that a company cannot have an effective platoon training schedule. The mainte- such as air induction, mine plows, or the maintenance program. Table 1 outlines a nance team chief is an integral player and fire control system, that the -10 manual sample monthly maintenance training should be a regular attendee at company may not cover in sufficient detail. A ma- schedule that works around training, duty training meetings. The executive officer trix like Table 2 can help commanders cycle, and services. should provide that critical link between structure maintenance training. Training You will notice in Table 1 that instead of finding one set day for company “command maintenance,” the com- mander plans platoon maintenance peri- ods. This has several advantages. First, the company and platoons still have time to execute other training during the week. It also lightens the work load of the main- tenance team, which more than likely is understrength due to critical 63/45-series MOS shortages. Last, it more evenly distributes the work load of the ULLS/PLL clerk, who normally finds it impossible to update an entire company

A good company maintenance plan en- sures that quality maintenance continues when units go to the field. In the photo at right, an M1A2 crew cleans their air filters during an NTC Rotation. Photo: Greg Stewart

ARMOR — September-October 1999 45

should be executed at platoon level by motor pool for an entire day to check Fort Riley in 1997. The author is indebted knowledgeable NCOs, unless time does MlAl air induction systems, but does not to LTC Rick Jung, CW2 (Ret.) Roger not permit or there is no one qualified to accurately define the standards for check- Behrens, and MSG Steve Murphy for teach the subject. The XO can coordinate ing them, he has only wasted his most their assistance in developing this pro- for the maintenance team chief or other precious resource — time. A mainte- gram. specialized personnel, such as the battal- nance skill training plan like Table 2 can ion maintenance technician, to teach spe- address any weaknesses in the company, cific subjects if there is no one qualified allowing them to make effective use of CPT Paul Taylor was commissioned in the company. Each class should be what little maintenance time can be in Armor in 1993 from the U.S. Mili- immediately followed by hands-on appli- “carved” out of an already hectic sched- tary Academy. He served as a tank cation supervised by the platoon leader- ule. Hopefully, by integrating concepts platoon leader, company XO, and ship. Platoons can be left to schedule similar to those discussed above, com- battalion maintenance officer for 3-37 these classes independently, ensuring that pany commanders can conduct good, Armor (later 1-13 Armor) at Ft. Riley, they meet the suspense listed, and com- quality maintenance and not pause at the pletion can be tracked by the XO (or re- LD, waiting for a tank repair. Kansas. He later commanded E/1-81 ported during company training meet- Armor and HHC/1-81 Armor at Ft. ings). Monthly intervals are listed here, Author’s Note: This article is actually an Knox, Ky. He is currently assigned but depending on the company training adaptation of the battalion maintenance as the S-3 for 3rd Army (ARCENT) schedule and level of maintenance profi- plan planned and executed by 1-13 AR at forward headquarters in Doha, Qatar. ciency, the interval could change accordingly. The matrix can be easily focused to support other Jan Feb Mar Apr May training events as well. For in- stance, using Table 2 as an exam- TANKS AACs Brake system Suspension Air induction NBC system Fire control Steering Walk track system Mineplow ple, the AACs, fire control system system checks, and prep-to-fire checks Prep-to-fire might be part of preparation for checks gunnery in February. Companies can very easily execute these LIGHT Heaters Brake system Suspension Air intake Check fuel lines classes in a field environment as TRACKS Cooling Steering Walk track system well, instead of falling into the all system system Drive lines, prop too common trap of performing shafts, U-joints quality maintenance only in garri- HEAVY Heaters Brake system Suspension Air intake Check seat belts son. WHEELS Cooling Steering Tires system Check lights system system Drive lines, prop horn In conclusion, it may seem that shafts, U-joints the result of today’s increased OPTEMPO, decreased resources, LIGHT Heaters Brake system Suspension Air intake Check seat belts WHEELS Cooling Steering Tires system Check lights and many competing demands system system Drive lines, prop horn for an armor company’s time is shafts, U-joints that maintenance suffers. This article discusses several ideas that SUSPENSE COB 13 Jan COB 28 Feb COB 28 Mar COB 18 Apr COB 30 May differ from the traditionally ac- cepted methods of company Jun Jul Aug Sep command maintenance but have proven successful in maintaining TANKS Radios and Batteries C/S gun tube Walk track equipment and increasing readi- mounts Charging C/S breech Suspension ness rates. The success of plans Intercom System like Table 1 depend on the com- LIGHT Radios and Batteries Check Walk track mander establishing maintenance TRACKS mounts Charging weapon Suspension as a priority in his company and Intercom system mounts scheduling the time for subordi- HEAVY Fuel/Water Batteries Hose reels Crane nates to conduct effective main- WHEELS separator Charging Static reels mechanisms tenance. The ability of subordi- Drive belts system nates to operate somewhat inde- pendently is also a crucial factor. LIGHT Radios and Batteries Check ring Gen/Starter Lastly, the success of any main- WHEELS mounts Charging mounts brackets tenance plan depends on the level Drive belts system Check troop Winches of proficiency of every soldier in seats performing Preventive Checks SUSPENSE COB 27 Jun COB 20 Jul COB 29 Aug COB 24 Sep and Services. If a company com- mander sends his soldiers to the Table 2 - Sample Maintenance Focused Training Matrix

46 ARMOR — September-October 1999

Fire Support: Killing System or Battlefield Shaper?

by Robert Doughty

If artillery is given credit for a large ing, lean over and give his FSO a pat on having little or no effect on OPFOR artil- amount of battle damage, but doesn’t set the back merely based on the battle dam- lery. the conditions for successful maneuver, age assessment (BDA). was this fire support successful? If the CFZ had been made small enough When I was going through advanced to cover just the breach site, just those Often, as I’ve watched a maneuver af- individual training (AIT) back in April incoming artillery missions that affect ter-action review or fire support AAR, 1976, I was told that the best anti-tank that very critical event in the battle will the Fire Support Officer (FSO) was cred- weapon was another tank. I know there be answered. This would have freed up ited with a “job well done” if the artillery are other systems that will also do well assets that would have better been used to killed many enemy combat systems, and against armor. The point was that artillery shoot smoke and suppression missions. criticism if it didn’t. There didn’t seem to may destroy some combat vehicles but its This type of scenario may not destroy a be much consideration given to whether primary mission was to assist in the bat- MRP but it will get enough combat the fire supporter met the commander’s tle, not win it. power on the objective so that the ma- intent or supported the commander’s neuver force can take it down. If the fire scheme of maneuver. As long as there are The task force commander does have a support element (FSE) had planned nu- tool for giving the FSO better guidance, many enemy vehicles destroyed, fire sup- called Essential Fire Support Tasks merous radar zones, they may destroy the port did well, according to this judgment. RAG, but at what cost? If, after destroy- (EFSTs), but if not used correctly, they ing the RAG, they concentrate on the But in reality, even if the indirect fires still will not make for a successful mis- did not cause a large amount of battle sion. In most EFSTs, I see the same objective, they may even destroy a MRP or more, but did the maneuver com- damage, but set the conditions for ma- statements, depending on the type of bat- mander lose too much combat power neuver to be successful, then the fire sup- tle being fought. “Destroy the Regimental port was used correctly and should be Artillery Group (RAG),” or “Destroy one going through the breach because we focused on the enemy artillery, whether remembered in the back-slapping that MRB or motorized rifle platoon (MRP),” or not it was firing on our forces at the follows a successful mission. or “Fire artillery FASCAM (family of scatterable mines) to separate the For- breach site? The EFSTs might have been Even “success” can be a murky concept: met; we may have checked the block and If the commander wanted his fire support ward Detachment and the Main Body,” credited artillery in the BDA for that or “At 0600, Fire SOSR.” (FS) to destroy a motorized rifle battalion night’s AAR, but did we shape the battle- (MRB), and the indirect does indeed ac- field for the maneuver element’s success? complish this task, but with the majority These EFSTs will not assist the maneu- ver commander in attaining success Another problem concerns the firing of of kills coming from the third MRB when unless they are linked with what the ma- the artillery-delivered family of scatter- the battle is all but over, did the fire sup- port do its job? My contention is that if neuver forces or the engineers are doing able mines (FASCAM). As Col. Ander- at the time. Firing counter-fire while the son noted in his September 1998 Field the OPFOR was able to get through a maneuver forces or engineers are doing a Artillery Journal article, units at Combat maneuver commander’s defenses and decimate his unit with his first echelon breach, or when the enemy has moved up Training Centers (CTCs) rely heavily on to breach our obstacles, may not be in the FASCAM, but these minefields are sel- because the artillery was not focused at best interest of success. I’m not saying to dom adequately covered with direct or the right place at the right time, then re- gardless if the number of enemy vehicles ignore the counter-fire fight at this time, indirect fire systems. He further states but if the maneuver commander has told that, “Commanders and FSOs tend not to killed, we do not have success. the FSO he wants a critical friendly zone understand the tradeoffs they incur firing If the maneuver commander is unable to (CFZ) over the point of penetration, that this resource-intensive munition.” get enough combat power on the objec- does not mean a CFZ that is 1 kilometer tive to finish his mission because the ar- by 1 kilometer. The artillery can quickly An EFST that has the artillery firing a tillery is counter-firing, rather than sup- become so overwhelmed with Priority FASCAM to separate the FD (forward pressing and obscuring the objective, the One acquisitions that they cannot effec- detachment) and MB (main body) is an fire support did not do its job. I have of- tively engage any. Or they try to engage example of that. Artillery-delivered FAS- ten seen TF commanders, even after los- all acquisitions with a lower volley count, CAM is not a blocking obstacle or a turn- ARMOR — September-October 1999 47

ing obstacle by itself. If we fire the FAS- Just because brigade or division has successful in their battle, then the fire CAM too deep to be covered by direct given the brigade or task force com- support was used correctly and should be fire systems, or there are no eyes on it mander release to use FASCAM doesn’t remembered in the back-slapping that that can call indirect fires, then the best it mean that it has to be used. There may be follows a successful mission. can do is delay. An enemy with a good a few vehicles destroyed in the FASCAM There will be those fire supporters who breach drill will be through it in 10 min- and maybe even one or two vehicles will complain that because CTCs cannot utes. If the maneuver commander had killed going in or coming out of the mine- wanted to destroy the FD with direct fire field, but this is another case where the replicate the terror and proper suppressive effects that indirect fires cause, they are systems and only needed an extra 10 fire supporter could accomplish an EFST hampered in shaping the battlefield; how- minutes to do it, perhaps FASCAM and not shape the battlefield or set condi- would be useful, but in most cases, this tions for success. ever, if we can learn to do the job with the tools we have, we will be even more would not be true. The maneuver com- effective when fighting a real enemy mander might not have realized how long When the maneuver commander is sit- it takes to emplace the FASCAM, during ting in an AAR discovering how well he shooting real bullets. which he will not be able to mass indirect did, before offering his congratulations or fires. If the artillery-delivered FASCAM criticism to his FSO, he should look at Robert Doughty is currently a Fire had been used to reseed an obstacle that the whole battle. Just because the artillery Support Maneuver Analyst at CMTC, was already being overwatched and cov- is given credit for a large amount of Hohenfels, Germany. Previously, he ered by direct fire, it may be more useful, BDA, and if it didn’t set the conditions was a Brigade Maneuver Analyst and but if the maneuver commander is not for a maneuver success, then his fire sup- willing to give up his ability to mass indi- port was not successful. On the flip side, NCOIC, Fire Support TAF at the rect fires, then perhaps it shouldn’t be even if the indirect fire is not credited CMTC, Hohenfels. Additionally, he fired at all. with a large amount of BDA, but the has served as Battalion Fire Direction conditions were set for maneuver to be Chief, 2/78 FA, Bamberg.

The First Lieutenants to Korea Program by Captain Ron MacKay, Adjutant, 1st “Iron” Brigade, 2d Infantry Division

The purpose of this article is to draw atten- down on orders for Korea, and PCSs from his kilometers away. No manifests, no flights. The tion to the First Lieutenants to Korea Program, current duty assignment. Upon completion of horn goes off, you get on your tank, and you which offers lieutenants an excellent opportu- his one-year tour, he again PCSs to the Ca- drive to your BP! How easy is that? This cer- nity to expand their experience prior to as- reer Course. tainty and defined mission provides a bit more stability than found in some of the stateside signment to the Career Course. We currently There are several advantages to volunteer- units. It also really puts the mission, sense of are looking to fill between six and eight junior ing to come to Korea as a lieutenant. First of urgency, and readiness requirement into per- officer positions, such as tank company ex- all, Korea provides unique terrain and mission spective for both the leaders and the soldiers. ecutive officer, headquarters company execu- challenges. Fighting in Korea is very different tive officer, mortar platoon leader, scout pla- than anywhere else in the world. While in Fourth, many here will tell you that you will toon leader, and support platoon leader. Korea, you will enjoy a high OPTEMPO train- find the units in Korea are tighter and more Some of these jobs are currently filled with ing environment without a lot of the stateside cohesive than stateside units. Soldiers here second lieutenants, but the majority are cur- distracters. Units usually shoot at least three enjoy a better quality of life than they did four rently filled with capable NCOs. gunnery densities a year. Additionally, they or five years ago. Many of the camps, specifi- You may be asking yourself as you read this, conduct extensive maneuver training, and are cally Camp Casey, are enjoying a large influx “Why are there no first lieutenants in Korea?” working more with light-heavy integration. of money for area and facility improvement. Not true, we have some, but need MORE! Korea is truly a combined arms fight. There Several barracks are under renovation, and Korea is typically a one-year tour. So once a are few places where you will experience many more are being built, in addition to new second lieutenant makes first lieutenant, he is combined arms like you will in Korea. gyms, theaters, and other soldier amenities. close to the end of his tour, and he leaves us Second, those that volunteer will avoid Ko- The fifth, and probably most interesting, is for a CONUS assignment. We get first lieu- rea as a tour after the Advance Course. For Korea is a country filled with friendly people tenants two ways. The first way is we grow some, this is a significant reason. But since and an ancient history. It enjoys a growing our own, by retaining a certain number of Korea is considered a hardship (unaccompa- economy with much to see and do. If you like officers. Armor Branch allows us to do this by nied) tour, Armor Branch takes that into con- to travel, Korea is a good base to start from. granting Foreign Service Tour Extensions to sideration, and volunteers will get one of their The USO and other travel agencies offer trips lieutenants who want to stay in Korea. Occa- top three assignment choices after the Career to China, Australia, Thailand and other excit- sionally, these are turned down because that Course, as opposed to someone who did not ing places in the Far East at very good prices, lieutenant is already scheduled to fill a slot volunteer to come to Korea as a lieutenant. A if Korea doesn’t offer what you want. somewhere else in the Army. growing number of Armor officers are being selected to serve as TDA commanders, and So if you are looking for something new, or The second (usually lesser known) method for an Armor officer who really wants the ex- you want an opportunity to travel, you defi- we get first lieutenants is the First Lieutenants perience of an MTOE command, the First nitely need to look into volunteering for the to Korea Program. You may have heard about Lieutenant to Korea Program is a good way to First Lieutenant to Korea Program. If you are it, or seen it at the bottom of the PERSCOM assure you of a command in an MTOE unit. interested, please contact CPT Tom Cipolla at Armor home page. The prime candidate is an DSN: 221-5533, or email him at: Armor lieutenant with a minimum of two years Third, the joy of no movement books! You on station and at least one year left as a 1LT. are already here! Korea is the forward edge of [email protected] He volunteers, contacts Armor Branch, comes freedom, with a real world enemy about 20 48 ARMOR — September-October 1999

STRAC XXI Budgeting the Bullets: The Master Gunners’ Concerns by Sergeant First Class David Cooley

A master gunners conference was held tasks by allocating more ammunition to The first wide dissemination of STRAC at Fort Knox, Ky., 22 through 24 June training events such as Table XII and XXI to the Armor enlisted community 1999, with master gunners from across CALFEX. The current STRAC allocates was at the Sergeants Major conference at FORSCOM, USAREUR, 8th Army, and 12 rounds (per platoon), less than re- the 1999 Armor Conference. Shortly the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as Crew/ quired by FM 17-12 to conduct Table thereafter, Crew/Gunnery Doctrine and Gunnery Doctrine and Master Gunner XII, and there are no rounds allocated for Master Gunner Branch got their first de- Branch. Discussions covered the FM 17- CALFEX. tailed look. The heart of the concept can 12 rewrite, TWGSS training, ammunition be seen in Figure 1. allocations, and numerous other subjects, A FORSCOM working group has been addressing these issues, and the results of A crew’s track through gunnery would with perhaps the most contentious issue their labors have come to be known as depend on the previous qualification of being STRAC XXI. This article will try to explain the reasons behind changing STRAC XXI. Bear in mind that, as we the gunner and TC. If a TC or gunner did DA PAM 350-38, discuss tank-specific aspects of STRAC not qualify the previous Table VIII, live- known as “STRAC,” XXI, changes will affect the training pro- fire, the crew would take the bottom track the issues involved (from the master gun- ner’s point of view), and the consensus of grams for every weapon system in the and fire Tables VI through VIII full up, Army. STRAC XXI is on the FOR- main gun. If the TC and gunner both fired the conference members. SCOM web site, and interested readers the last Table VIII live, but not together, First, it is important to understand — are encouraged to take a look at the entire their crew would take the middle track and accept — that Army doctrine as it package. and fire TWGSS through VII and live- applies to gunnery training is going to change. Assumptions that used to hold true, such as every crew firing a full Table Table 2-29 (Future?) TRC A VIII at least twice a year, are M1A1/A2 Tank Battalion w/TWGSS Unit Combined no longer valid. Modifications Collective Arms to that strategy, whether “le- Crew Qualification Training Training Training gal” or not, have become a fact of life. “Validation,” in its Decision Point (PGT/CCTT) many forms, is the most famil- V VI VIII iar example. Validation has, in Q Qualification VII fact, become unofficial doc- PQ

XII trine across the Armor Force, Validation (TWGSS) XI and it is too late to shove that V V particular genie back in the

bottle. One problem with vali- Q FCX V VI VII

dation is that, as it is not de- TCPC COFT TCGST VIII-M rived from any published LFAST Army doctrine, each MACOM ** ** (TWGSS) ** Q (Live/CCTT) has implemented it differently, XII and standardization has been NQ XI lost. Once doctrine is updated, Qual w/12 months VI * **

PQ VII we can ensure that everyone is VIII CMTT X/X on the same sheet of music Not Qual w/12 months * * ** and that a common standard is NQ achieved. * Live Fire Tasks 2x 2x 2x Another force driving the ** Mandatory Live Fire Crews must live-fire qualify at least every 12 months changes now underway is the Figure 1 desire to better train collective ARMOR — September-October 1999 49

Big Bullets... Big Money. Each practice sabot round (M865) costs the taxpayers $490. Practice HEAT rounds (M831A1) cost $520 each. Each crew is allocated 64 sabot and 26 HEAT practice rounds per year, so the ammo cost of a single crew’s gunnery allocation is $44,880. A battalion of 44 tanks runs up an ammo bill of $1,974,720 per year.

fire a modified Table VIII. If both TC itself on Table XII with a loader or In summary, collective live fire training and gunner both live-fired Table VIII driver that has no live fire experience at is important, but it will only be as good as together during the last gunnery, the crew all. This leads to safety concerns when a the individual and crew training that it is would fire through VIII using TWGSS, loader has to perform actions, such as based on. We should not be in a position then move into collective training. Re- clearing an aft cap jam, which he has where we have to choose one or the member, the goal is to save rounds for not faced before, while his TC is dis- other, but when forced to choose, most Table XII and CALFEX. Rounds for tracted by what’s happening to the rest participants agreed that the crew level collective live fire have to come from of the platoon and not what is happen- training should get priority for resources. existing allocations, without increasing ing inside his own tank. The vast majority of participants at this the current authorization of 90 rounds per • conference favored the Armor Center tank, per year. Currently, the only place that com- manders and master gunners can assess approach, as outlined in the “Driver’s proficiency on individual and crew Seat” on page 6, over the FORSCOM The sergeants major, master gunner in- concept, for the reasons listed above. As structors, and Crew/Gunnery Doctrine gunnery tasks is during the intermediate personnel have many concerns with this tables, VI through VIII. Once the crew noncommissioned officers, our focus is moves into platoon level exercises, the training individuals and crews for com- approach. They include, but are not lim- bat. To do so, we require resources that ited to, the following: jump radios and TCEs are no longer • there to capture data on crew perform- are expensive and that can never be com- Table VIII, as a qualification table, ance. pletely replaced by simulators or training should never be modified or fired dry. devices. Our final consensus was that the • • A crew should never arrive at Table There was nearly unanimous agreement FORSCOM concept was too much, too at this conference, and it was brought up fast. Before going to a virtual Table VIII VIII without having fired any main gun by a few participants at the Armor Con- of any kind, we had better take “baby rounds since last gunnery. ference, that one of the root causes of steps” and see how it affects readiness. • A crew should never move into collec- our current retention woes is that tank- tive training without having fired main ers don’t get to do enough of what gun rounds (the screening test does not keeps tankers in the Army — tanking. SFC David Cooley is currently as- count as main gun training). The major This strategy would only make the signed as a gunnery instructor at the concern here is that a crew could find problem worse. Master Gunner Course. 50 ARMOR — September-October 1999

The Graphical Spot Report

A multi-echelon technique to quickly track and record battlefield information

by Captain Brandon K. Herl

Battle tracking is a fundamental skill Graphical Spot Reports — separate overlay placed on top of the every combat arms leader must have, The Overall Concept operational graphics (preferably in a fine- from tank commander through brigade tip, red pen). In the upper right corner of All the graphical spot report does is pro- commander, but it is one of the most dif- vide an alternative method to track a bat- the cross hairs, he gives a shorthand de- ficult skills to learn. Once upon a time, a scription of the size and equipment seen. combat leader had the luxury of having tle on a map. It is not intended to replace Two tanks would become “2T;” three the information flow pattern or SOPs. every piece of information critical for his Graphical spot reports are designed to BMPs with four dismounts would be “3P, unit’s survival within eyeball range or 4PAX.” earshot. Only high-level commanders help the leader and battle staff speed up the process of tracking current informa- The upper left corner will have the time received reports “transmitted” by mes- tion, reconciling and analyzing enemy the report was rendered. The lower left senger or other signals. But in modern warfare, the first-line leader is forced to movements, and “painting” a more com- corner gives an indication of the unit’s plete tactical picture. activities. If the unit is moving, an arrow gather a large portion of his combat intel- is drawn indicating its direction. For ex- ligence from radio transmissions rather The basic information in a good spot than first-hand observation. With the report is in SALUTE or SALT format. ample, if a report had the unit moving north, the arrow would be drawn pointing increase in battlefield complexity, the The graphical spot report is no different. north. If the unit is stationary, a dot (or an radio has become an additional sensory Figure 1 shows what a single graphical system that supplements the sights and spot report looks like. Notice that all the “X”) would replace the arrow. sounds of battle. The leader must absorb information basics are depicted. The bottom right hand corner is not used both the multiple inputs he sees, hears, smells, as well as the constantly blaring Upon hearing a spot report on a radio and left for remarks. A battalion S2 could net, the leader quickly finds and draws annotate “CRP” if he believed the report radio traffic. cross hairs on the reported location on a was an attacking combat reconnaissance Battle Tracking and Spot Reports One of the hardest parts of battle track- ing is managing “spot” reports, the heart and soul of battlefield information. This The Graphical Spot Report information generates intelligence on enemy movements, strengths, disposi- Vehicle Shorthand Key: tions, and probable courses of action. The GENERIC CONCEPT information from one vehicle com- T = Tank P = BMP mander’s spot report can make the differ- M = BRDM ence in a brigade commander’s decision H = Helicopter to launch an assault or counterattack. NUMBER & TYPE REPORT A = Fixed-Wing Aircraft Great leaps in battlefield technology still OF VEHICLES PAX = Troops TIME have not and will not replace this aspect OR PERSONEL ------of combat. (see key) W = Wire Obstacle N = Mines/Minefield From the grimy, grease pencil smudges on a new platoon leader’s map case to MOVEMENT any echelon’s tactical operational center, SPECIAL DIRECTION REMARK soldiers must track engagements and Example: ARROW or DOT (if desired) battles. At platoon level, battle tracking is (if stationary) 2 P “…I have 2 BMPs and usually something learned through trial 0610 and error. At the battalion and higher 1 T 1 Tank moving northeast at grid AB123456 at time level, intricate battle tracking and spot CROSS HAIRS SHOW GRID 0610…” report SOPs have evolved. Either way, LOCATION OF REPORT the need for quick documentation, dis- semination, and analysis of battlefield information exists. The graphical spot Figure 1 report is one way to help. ARMOR — September-October 1999 51

patrol. Likewise, a “PLT BP” could be By “connecting the dots” of similar spot niques, and procedures. No good intelli- used if a unit came in contact with three reports, other information is gained. En- gence can come of looking at a bunch of stationary, dug-in BMPs. Another possi- emy concentrations, main efforts, front- cross hairs if you do not understand their ble use for this corner is to quickly track line traces, march rates, and axes of ad- significance or patterns. battlefield damage assessment (BDA). vance/battle positions become instantly Another caution is to be careful how Once the battle is finished, label the readable. Likewise, blank spots on the much information is recorded. Too much overlay show a distinct absence of enemy overlay with the usual marginal data and activity — a result of either no enemy information can negate its usefulness. the date-time groups the overlay spans. This method is very useful for tracking This overlay can now be used as a record presence or enemy activity that is unseen friendly reports, such as the locations of (see Figure 2). of contact for later reference. While not minefields or booby traps, downed air- always helpful at company level or be- Drawbacks and Limitations crews, fuel convoys, or LZ/PZ opera- low, a staff may find this documentation tions. Unskilled or unguided personnel useful in analyzing past enemy trends and While this method is easy to learn and will be tempted to put everything on the predicting his next course of action. implement, it does have some drawbacks. overlay, cluttering it beyond recognition. The first is at the headquarters level. A Advantages TOC crew that is new at using this sys- Conclusion tem will be tempted to quit “wasting” Graphical spot reports are designed to effort writing down reports and recording Graphical spot reports are designed to be posted directly to a map overlay once the report is received over the radio. This them in their logs. Graphical reports are supplement and enhance existing unit not designed to replace this system; they SOPs. This system gives leaders at all overlay becomes a hard-copy, graphic are designed to complement it. The hard- levels a simple method for acquiring (or record of unit contacts. The benefit is that a commander (or his staff) can glance at copy reports are still needed later to re- refining) the necessary military skill of construct the battle and more accurately battle tracking. Additionally, it reinforces the map and quickly reconcile redundant determine battle damage assessment. leaders to use and teach proper spot re- spot reports and enemy movements with- out sorting through hastily scribbled, map Map skills and familiarity are para- port submission techniques. margin notes or heaping mounds of spot mount when using this system. A leader The graphical spot report battle tracking reports. This saves a lot of time and ef- who fumbles around with locating grid technique documents and follows the fort, especially in the middle of an action. coordinates on a map will not be able to modern battlefield’s swift information As more reports trickle in, a better pic- keep pace with the incoming information flow. It also quickly generates combat- flow. Likewise, unfamiliarity with the critical intelligence on the enemy’s ma- ture of the enemy is painted. Over time, shorthand can also lead to confusion neuver scheme, a crucial element when this overlay will illustrate certain enemy trends that some tracking systems tend to when repeating or disseminating a report. considering preplanned countermoves. While the technique does have some ma- miss. Instead of giving an instantaneous A third drawback with this system is jor drawbacks, properly trained leaders or enemy picture “snapshot,” the leader now that analysis depends upon the user’s has a “moving picture” of the enemy. familiarity with enemy tactics, tech- units can reap numerous advantages when fully employing this system.

Battle-Tracking Example Captain Brandon K. Herl is a 1990 Battle-Tracking Example graduate of the U.S. Military Acad- emy. He has served as a tank pla- SPOT REPORTS River toon leader, asst. squadron S1, 1 M 5 PAX 0432 0523 000101NOV98 1 H troop XO, and asst. regimental S1 0502 to 0700NOV98 in 3d ACR, Ft. Bliss, Texas; squad- ron S1, asst. squadron S3, and

1 M HHT commander, 3-17 Cav, Ft. 0448 Locate or anticipate: Drum, N.Y.; and Support Group J1, U.S. Support Group-Haiti, Port-au- Ford - Regimental Recon Prince, Haiti. His military schooling 2 M 2 P 0358 0618 1 T - Possible OPs includes Airborne School, Air As- 2 P 0620 1 T - CRP Route(s) sault School, AOB, SPLC, JOMC, 2 P 1 P - Air Insertions 0615 1 T 0451 IOAC, CLC, CAS3, and the U.S. - FSE Objective Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare Town - Information Gaps School. Upon completion of his MS

2 P degree in forest science from Colo- 0610 1 T rado State University, he will be-

7 P come an instructor in the Geogra- 1 P 0658 4 T 0420 phy and Environmental Engineering Figure 2 Department at the U.S. Military Academy.

52 ARMOR — September-October 1999

A Technique to Get Organized and Manage Your Career

by Captain Christopher H. Engen

You have most likely heard or been ad- all of your important documents and or- ies of past OER support forms with the vised that you are your best career man- ganize them. corresponding OER. These come in ager. Yet, how many times have you Place your ORB in the front of your handy when queried about past accom- found yourself shuffling through papers plishments, or when your replacement looking for that award which did not get binder. You will use this document the asks for a copy of your job description. most and be required to update it annu- added to your Officer Record Brief ally. In addition to posting the current After organizing your evaluation re- (ORB), or perhaps your last Officer Evaluation Report (OER), or maybe even copy, consider saving the past two copies ports, gather your past awards or special so that you have a history of what items skill qualification certificates. These are a copy of your Permanent Change of were posted or what changes were made. the most common items omitted from Station (PCS) orders? If you have never found yourself in such a predicament, In the next section, post copies of all of your ORB or fiche, so keeping copies your permanent orders, organizing them proves important. Although the award then you must be well organized, but in chronological order. Ensure you in- certificate itself serves as proof of an some of us can relate to this situation. The simple technique which follows will clude copies of any amendments. You award, keep the DA Form 638 if you now have the documents that outline your have it. Likewise, hang on to both your help you manage the paperwork, which assignment history. certificate or any authorization orders often proves critical to the management of your career. The next, and one of the most important generated from a special skill school such as airborne or air assault. sections, of the binder includes your past A three-ring binder with document pro- evaluation reports. Hopefully you have Once you have organized the documents tectors is a simple, inexpensive way to retained copies of both academic evalua- discussed above, you may wish to add easily manage your important career tion reports as well as officer evaluation some additional sections to your career documents. While other techniques, such reports. Ensure that you have official book. Records pertaining to civilian as file folders, will certainly do, a binder copies with all signatures and PSB blocks schooling, such as undergraduate tran- comes in handy when you need to just complete. Incomplete copies will not be scripts or GRE results, will prove useful grab your files and go, such as when you accepted when attempting to add them to if you plan to apply for advanced civilian must visit your servicing Personnel Ser- your fiche. If you did not receive an offi- schooling. Once you have chosen and vice Battalion (PSB) to update your cial copy of a recent report, request a been designated within a functional ORB. Once you have your binder, collect copy through your S1 or PSB. Place cop- area/career field, you may wish to create a section to organize those important documents. Finally, you may want to retain copies of military correspondence Permanent Orders to include letters of recommendation. Officer Record Brief (ORB) These will become important when ap- plying for advanced schooling or seeking a special assignment. ORB OERs with support forms OFFICER EV ALUATION REPORTSU P PO R T FO RM After you have built your career book, For us e of thisfor m, see AR 623 - 10 5; the proponent ag ency isODC SPER OF FICER EVALUATION REPORT SEE PRIVAC YACT STATEMENT Fo usr e fo thisfor m, se e AR6 23-10 5; the prop on ent agen cy si O DCSP ER ON D A FORM67-9- 1 Read Privacy ActSt atemnt e onRe v e rsebef ore Completing hist form PAR TI - AD MINISTRATVE I DATA PART I -RATEDOFFI CERIDENTI FI CATI ON b. SSN c.RAN K d. DATE OF ANKR e. BRNCH A f.DESIGNATED PMOS W0)( a. NAME (Last, First, iddM le niI tial) SPECIALTIES NAME OF RATEDOFF I CER Last( ,Fir st , MI) RANK O RGANI ZATION Year MonthDay

g. UNI, T ORG ., STATON, I ZIP CODE OR APO, MAJOR COMMAND h. REA SON FOR SUB MISSON I PA RTII -RA TING C HAI N- YO UR RATING CHAIN FORTH E EV AL UATION PERO I DIS:

NAME RAN K PO SITION m.RA TED FFIO CERCOPY (Ch ek c one and date) RATER i. PERIOD COVERED j.RAT ED k. NONRATED l.NO. OF n. PSB o. CMD ODEC p. PSB MONTHS CODES ENCL Date INITIAL CODE FROM THRU 1. Give n to Office r INT ER MEDATE I NAME RAN K PO SITION Year Mo nh t Day Y ear Mo n th Day 2. Forwarde dot Officer keep it in a safe place. As you progress RATER

NAME RAN K PO SITION SENIORRATER PART I - AUTHENTICAT I O N (Rated ofic f er'ssi gnature ver ifies officer has see n compl etedOE R Pa r ts -VII Iandthe ad mindat a is corect) r a. NAMEOF RATER La(st Fi, rst, MI ) SSN RANK PO SITION SIGNA TURE DATE PAR TII I -VE RI FICAT I ON OF F ACE- TO- F AC E DISCUSSION

MAN DAT ORYRATER /RATED OFFICER NII TIAL F ACE- TO- F ACE CO U NS EL I NG ON DUTI ES, RESPONSIBI LITIESAND PE R FORM A NCE OBJECTVES I FOR T HE RANK PO SITION SIGNA TURE DATE CURRENTRATI NG PERO I D TOO K PLA CEON ( Dat e) Rat e dO fficer nitialsI Rat e r nitI ials Se nio r Ra t er I n it ia ls b. NA ME OF INT ERMEDI ATE RATER (Last, First, MI ) SSN (Review) PERO I DI C RAT ER / RA TE DO FFCE I R FOLL OW - UP F AC E- TO- F AC E COUN S ELNG I S : c.NAM EOF SE NIOR RAT ER (Last Fi, rst, MI ) SSN RANK PO SITION SIGNA TURE DATE

Da tes Rat e dO fficer nitialsI Rat e r nitI ials Se nio r Ra t er I n it ia ls (Review) SE NIORRAT ER 'SORGAN IZATION BRANC H SENI OR RATER TELEPHONENUM BER E-MAIL ADDRESS though your career, you will find it more

d. This is a referred report, do youwish toma k e comments? PART VI - RA TE D OFFICER ( Complet ea, b, a nd cbe low for thisrating per io d ) e.SI GN AT URE OF RATEDOFF ICER DATE

PR I N CIPAL DU TY TITLE POSIION T AO C / BR Ye s,co mmnt e s areat tachedNo

a. STA TE YOURSI GNI F IC ANT DU TIESAN D RESPONSIBILITIES PARTII I - DU TY D ESC RIPTION

a. PRINCIPALDU TY TITLE b. POSI TION AOC/BR c. SI GNIICA F NTDU TIES ANDRE SPNSI O BIIT LIES.REFE R TO PARTIV a, DAFORM 67-9-1 and more useful as you update your ORB,

b. INDICAT E YOURMA J O RPE RFORM AN CEOBJ ECTIVES

PART IV - PE RF ORM AN CEEV ALUA TION - PROFESSIONAL I SM (Rater ) prepare for selection boards, and manage CH ARACTER Di spo sition of the leder a :combination of values, attrib u t es,and ski llsaff ecting lead er actions

a. ARM Y VALUES (Commentsmand at oryfor all "NO" en t ries. Us e PARTVb. ) Yes No Yes No 1. HO NOR:Adhe renc etothe Army ' s pub l ic ly declared code fova lues 5. R ESP E CT: Promotes digni ty, consideration,fairn ess, & EO 2. INTEGRITY: Possesses high pe rsonl a morl a st an dards; h onestin wo r d an d deed 6. SELF LE SS- SE RVI CE : Places Armypriorit iesbef ore self 3. COURAGE: Ma n if ets s physicaland moralbra very 7. DUTY: Fulf i lls rofp es siona l, legal, and moral blo igatio n s 4. LOYA L TY: Be ars tr ue fait h andallegianc etothe U.S. Co nstut it ion ,the Army ,the unit, andthe soldier

b. LEA DER A TTRI BU T ES / SK ILL S/ ACTIO NS: Firt, s mark "YES " or "NO "for eachblock .Se c ond, chos o e a totalof six hatt be st esd cribe het rated officer .Se lec t one from ATTRIB UT ES, two from SKILLS Compet( ence), and hrt ee fromACT I ONS (LEADERSHI P). Plac ean X"" in het approp ria t e number ed bo xwith optionalc ommentsin PA RTVb. Comm ents ar e mandator y in Par t Vb foral l "No" ent res. i your career. Do not procrastinate getting b.1. ATT RB I UT ES Se( lect 1) 1. MENTAL YES NO 2. PHYS ICAL YES NO 3. EMOTIONAL YES NO F und amentalqua lities and Po s se ssesdesire ,wi ll, in i tia tive,and d is c ip lie n Ma inains t ap propriate le v e lof physical Displys a self -control; cal mund er pr essure character istics fit n essand mi litry a bearing b. 2 SKILLS (Com pe t en ce) 1. CONCEPTUAL YES NO 2. INTERPERSONAL YES NO 3. TEC HNICAL YES NO (Sel ect )2 De mo n stratessound judgment, critical/creative Sh ows sk i ll with pe ople: oac ching, teaching, Po sse sses theneces sary xpere tise to thinking, moal r rea soning co un seling, motivatin g and empowering ac compl ish a ll ast ks and functions Ski ll dvelopment e ispar t of self- dev elopment; prere quisit e toac tion 4. TACTI CA L Demonstrates proficiencyin re quired professiona l kn owledge, judgment ,and wa rfighting YES NO b.3. ACTI ONS (LEADERSHIP) (Select 3) Major activities leaders perform: in fluencing, oper a ting, and im p roving IN FL U EN CI NG 1. COMMUNICATING YES NO 2. DECISI ONMA - KING YES NO 3. MOTI VATI NG YES NO organized, for those who do often find Me tod h of reachinggoa ls w h ile Displaysgo od oral wr, itten,an d lite s ni ngsk i lls orf Employsso undjudg ment, logi cal rea son ing Inspires, motivates, and uig desot hers toward operat ing / imp rving o i ndividuals/ groups a nd usesres ourceswi sely mi sio s n accm o plishment OPERATING 4. PL A NNING YES NO 5. EXE CUTING YES NO 6. ASS ESS I NG YES NO Sh ort-termmi sio s n De velops de tail ed, execu tab le plns a thatar e Shows tacticalpr oficiency, mets e mision s Uses after-action and evaluatio n tools to a ccom plishment feasible, ac ceptabl e, an d suitab le stnd a ards, and takesca e r ofpeo pl e/res our ces fa c ilat it e consisten timprovement IMPR OVING 7. DEVELOPI NG YES NO 8. BULD I NG I YES NO 9. LEA RNING YES NO L ong -ter m improv ementin the Army Invest sade qu ate timeand ef for tto develop Spends imt e nda resou r cesim proving teams, Se eks self-improv ementan d organizatio n a l it s people andorga ni zations indii v dualsub ordinates salea ders group sand units; osfterset hica l climate gr owt h ;e n v is io n in g ,ada ptin g and leading change c. AP FT : DA TE : HE IGHT : WEIGHT : d.JU NIORO FFICE R DEV ELO P MENT - MAN DATO RY YESOR NO ENT R YFO R RATERS OFL Ts ANDW O1s. YES NO NA themselves spending more time searching WERE DEVELOP M ENTA L TASK S RE CO RDE D ON D A FORM 67-9-1aAN DQUARTERLY FOLO L W-UP COUNSELING S CO N DU C TE D? DA FORM 67-9, OCT 97 RE PL ACESDA FOR M 67-8, 1SEP 79,WHI CH IS OBSOLET E, 1 OCT 97 U SAP A V2 .00 Personal DA FORM 67-9-1,OC T 97 RE PL ACES DAFOR M67-8 -1, FEB 85,WHI CH IS OBSOLET E, 1 OCT 97 U SAP A V1 .00 for lost documents or requesting copies. Award Certificate with DA Form 638

RE COMMENDATION FORAWAR D Foru se of thi s form, s ee AR60 0-8-22; the pro pon en t agency is OD CSP ER

For valor/heroism/wartimea nd al l aw ar ds hi gher t han MS M, refer ot sp e ci a l i n st r uc t io ns in C hap t er3, AR 600 - 8- 22. Records 1. TO 2. FROM 3. DATE

PART I -SO LDI ER DA TA 4. NAM E 5. RAN K 6. SS N

7. OR GAN IZA TION 8. PREVO I U S AW ARD S

9. BR ANC H OF S ER VICE 10. RECOMM END ED AWAR D 11. PERIODOF AWAR D a. FROM b. TO CPT Christopher Engen was com-

12. RE ASONFO R AW AR D 13. POSTHUMOUS Notebook 1 2a. NDI ICATE ACH, SVC , PCS , ET S,OR RET 1 2b. NTERIMI AW AR D YES NO IFYES, STA TEAWARD G IVEN YES NO

PART I- RECOMMENDERDATA 14 . NA M E 15. AD DRE SS 16. TITLE/PO SI TION 17. RA NK missioned in Armor from the U.S. 18. RELATIONSHIPTO AWARDEE 19. SI GNATURE

PART III - JU STIFI CA TIONA ND CI TAT I ONDA T A (Use pecs ificbu l letex am ples of meritorious actsor service) 20. ACHIEVEMEN TS A CHIEVE MEN T#1 Military Academy in 1991. He served A CHIEVE MEN T#2 A CHIEVE MEN T#3 as a tank platoon leader and battalion A CHIEVE MEN T#4 21. PROPOSE DCI TA TION adjutant for 2-37 Armor, in Vilseck,

DA FORM 638, NOV94 R EP LAC ES DA FOR M 638-1. USAPPCV6. 00 PREVIOU S EDI TION S OF DA FOR M 638AR E OB SO L E T E. Germany; BMO in 3d Bde, 1st AD, at Civil Schooling Documents Special Skill Certificates and orders Ft. Riley; and Commander, C Co., 2- 70 Armor, then HHC, 2-70 Armor. Undergraduate Transcripts Following graduate school, his next assignment will be as a company tactical officer at the U.S. Military GRE Results Academy. He has completed AOB, Scout Commander Certification Course, and AOAC. ARMOR — September-October 1999 53

TACTICAL VIGNETTE 99-4 WHAT’S

YOUR Trouble for the Redball Express - NEXT Rear Area Security MOVE??

Situation: 100643AUG99 Friendly Situation: PL RED TF 1-23 Logpac PL BLUE 2 BDE FLOT attacked by X mines and You are “Rubicon 6,” the brigade com- s 3 BDE N sniper mander of 3 Bde, 4th AD. Your brigade LRP 26 is preparing a defense in sector. A 1 mechanized infantry division is expected 110217AUG99 2 MI-24s to attack NLT 110530AUG99. TF 1-23 and 6 MI-8 conduct 24 MP and TF 1-78 are defending forward in possible air insertion X sector while TF 2-78 is the brigade re- serve. C/1-23(-) is attached to 1-1 FA 22 protecting an MLRS platoon and Q37 TF 1-23 radar located in the brigade sector. The BSA II TF 1-78 20 brigade is currently at 90% strength. 1-1FA Your task organization is in Figure 1 and TF 2-78 the current graphics are in Figure 2. 18 Enemy Situation: 102032 BSA attacked by small arms, MG, and The brigade cavalry troop has had spo- mortar fires 17 radic contact with enemy reconnaissance elements for the last 12 hours. The for- ward task forces have reported no contact 3 BDE 15 X in the main battle area. The division S2’s 98 00 02 04 06 08 101 BDE 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 FLOT assessment indicates that the enemy 66th PL RED PL BLUE MID will LD its main body early in the Figure 2: Operational Graphics morning on 11AUG99. Based on experi- ence over the last few weeks, division believes that the enemy will increase its SOF, and air-inserted forces. These at- security forces are continuing to man activity in our rear area using partisans, tacks will likely target logistics, com- their perimeter. Most logistics functions mand and control, and artillery are on hold. assets to desynchronize our op- Event #3: At 110217AUG99, 2 MI-24s X erations while the enemy divi- (HIND-D) and 5 MI-8s (HIPs) penetrate 3 4AD TF 1-23 3/4AD sion attacks into the main battle area. the brigade’s air space and land vicinity grid 070225. Each Hip has the potential to Event #1: At 100643AUG99, carry 28 troops. Reports indicate that 1 TF 1-23 reports that its LOG- MI-24 and 1 MI-8 were destroyed by PAC, en route to LRP1, ran into ADA fires, but the rest of the element TF 1-78 3/4AD a point minefield roadblock successfully exited the brigade sector. over-watched by a sniper. The convoy reacted to the ambush, Requirements: forcing the sniper to withdraw. Assess the situation presented by each The LOGPAC lost of one event and formulate a course of action. 2-78AR(-) 3/4AD HEMTT fueler and three soldiers were wounded. The convoy is Issue instructions to your staff or a BDE RES FRAGO to your commanders to deal continuing to the LRP1. with the threats to your rear area. Issue Event #2: At 102032AUG99, your FRAGO as if talking on the radio to 1-1FA 4AD the FSB commander reports that your commanders. Submit your solu- the BSA is under attack by a tions to the BN/BDE Branch by email at: squad-size element equipped [email protected], Q37 with small arms, machine guns, or mail your solution to ARMOR, and mortars. The enemy position ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY BDE is vicinity grid 047193. The FSB 40121-5210. Control security forces have prevented MP 8 HMMWV .50/MK19 any penetration of the BSA pe- Solutions to this vignette will appear Figure 1: Task Organization rimeter, but are unable to destroy the enemy position. The FSB in the January-February 2000 issue.

54 ARMOR — September-October 1999

Solution — Tactical Vignette 99-3

“Screen in a Snowstorm,” from the May-June 1999 issue of ARMOR

Author’s Solution Guidons, this is WOLFPACK 6. FRAGO follows, acknowledge over. SITUATION: There are three T-34s moving south vicinity NAI 3. WHITE has eyes on but will lose them quickly. Bulldog reports one T-55 moving east, last seen grid 1.5 kilometers NNW of NAI 16. BULLDOG has one downed aircraft at GV299123, currently being observed by five apparently unarmed personnel 500 meters to their north. Additionally, S2 reports that weather conditions are worsening, and the snowstorm moving in will probably last for two days. The air troops are currently grounded and are likely to remain that way for at least 48 hours. MISSION: A Troop, 1-201 CAV screens along PL SILVER from PL GOLD to PL LEAD and along PL GOLD between PL BRONZE and PL SILVER NLT 051030JUN1999 to iden- tify and track insurgents entering PRU. WOLFPACK 7 move to the squadron to track them with their displaced section. EXECUTION. TOC to advise SABER 6 of our situation. I decided to send WOLFPACK 7 to ap- Ensure the squadron TOC notifies F prove my plan because I did not want to Tasks to Subordinate Units: Troop to launch the Downed Aircraft be out of contact with my platoon leaders RED: Move two vehicles from OP 1a to Rescue Team (DART) and informs 1st should problems arise during this reposi- establish OP b1a VIC GV299123, to BDE they have three T-34s moving to tion, with tank moving in sector. If them. I will remain at my current position GREEN can avoid bumping into the T- provide security for the downed aircraft and crew. Be prepared to accept a three- and continue to try and raise SABER 34s and the SCO approves of my plan, vehicle section from GREEN VIC TOC. we are in business until the storm sub- sides. GV352104. Move one HMMWV from What are your questions? GREEN to reinforce 1a, and the other Reader’s Solution two to establish b2a VIC GV 305102 RATIONALE oriented on NAIs 12-13. (Submitted by 1LT Nathan A. Cox, The squadron commander has ordered ACCC 99-03, Section 1B, Ft. Knox, Ky.) WHITE: Continue to track the three T- me to screen along PL SILVER from PL 34s moving in your sector. Reposition a PLATINUM to PL LEAD. The situation “White 1, this is 6. Roger. Continue to two-vehicle section within your sector to has changed, however, with the weather- monitor until you lose visual. NAI 3 is pass the tanks off to 1st BDE south of PL ing in of the two flight troops on my still in your sector. Attempt to move to a BRONZE. flank. Also, two contacts force me to position that better suits visual on the T- BLUE: Continue mission. make one quick move with RED, to se- 34s. Break. Red 1, this is 6. White 1 re- cure the downed aviators, and one more ports seeing three T-34s vic NAI 3. He GREEN: Collapse OP 4a and move a deliberate move with GREEN, to estab- may lose visual. I need you to see if you three-vehicle section into first platoon’s lish a new OP in B/C sector. The shifting can get a visual on NAI 3, just in case sector VIC GV352104. This section is of force gives the number of OPs I want White loses contact. Red 1, also be pre- attached to RED upon link-up. in sector with enough soldiers at those pared to send a section with MK-19 and Coordinating Instructions: OPs to establish them for long duration .50 cal. vic GV305120. Bulldog has a operations. The decision to shut down OP bird down with engine trouble. Leave Report when moving and set. 4a is based on the belief that GREEN can your AT assets to monitor enemy tanks. RED report when you have secured the cover both NAIs 7 and 8 from OP 4b. I I’m going to call Bulldog 6 and let him downed aviators. Your sector now ex- am not overly concerned with the T-55 know I’ve got contact with his guy, then moving around in EUS, with the estab- I’ll let you know. Break. Guidons, this is tends east to and along PL GOLD. lishment of the two new OPs in the old 6. S2 reports a big snowstorm coming. GREEN move to WHITE’s FREQ B/C sector, he should be identified if he It’s supposed to last for two days. Con- while moving through their sector. Avoid crosses into PRU. Having contact with tinue to monitor your NAIs, and let me contact with the T-34s. Move to RED’s the three T-34s center sector only adds to know when you lose visual contact. Red FREQ at the link up point. the problem, but WHITE should be able 1, stand by. Over.”

ARMOR — September-October 1999 55

LETTERS (Continued from Page 4)

(5) Remember that history stuff I mentioned peril and hardship and worthy of respect. nology has become a hobby shop for users above? Well here is where those patches, Having been a light fighter too, I have an ap- and developers over the past 20+ years. crests, and colors come in. Any reorganization preciation for what it’s like living in the mud. such as that outlined above will make most of As such, the humor in your joke is lost on me. I would caution the Armor development us trip on our old school tie. It does not have That infantry trooper could very well protect community that cased telescoped falls into the to be that way. We must keep a link with our you from the RPGs you fear so much... then category of “promising but not realistic” for a historical past. Redesignate divisions as bri- again, given the lack of respect you showed mature weapon system. It is much like the gades (1st Armored Division becomes 1st him, maybe not. Try clearing a defile, a wood- liquid propellant fiasco advocated by the same Armored Brigade). There would be no change line, or a city block without us. lab for our artillery comrades on Crusader. in history, patch, insignia, etc. It just becomes CT, then and now, is not ready for putting onto a smaller unit designed with today’s and to- And I close with a quote...Omaha Beach, 6 any platform, and especially the scout vehicle, June 1944. within the foreseeable program schedule. morrow’s requirements in mind. All it takes is a one-line entry in the lineage and honors “It was not a miracle. It was Infantry. The ROBERT F. GAUDET certificate. Regiments have been the historical plan had called for the air and naval bom- Armor, USA, Ret. backbone of the army, ever since there has bardments, followed by tanks and dozers, to Via email been an army. Under this proposal, I would blast a path through the exits so that the infan- redesignate battalions as regiments. Thus the try could march up the draws and engage the *Cased telescoped ammunition is an ex- 1st Battalion, 32d Armor, becomes the 32d enemy, but the plan had failed, utterly and perimental system that shortens the length of Armored Regiment. Brigades would be as- completely failed. As is almost always the a cannon round by carrying the projectile within the propellant case. — Ed. signed regiments associated with the former case in war, it was up to the infantry. It be- divisions. Therefore, the 1st Infantry Brigade came the infantry’s job to open the exits so would have as its assigned combined arms that the vehicles could drive up the draws and regiments the 16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry; engage the enemy.” - Stephen E. Ambrose, Military, Civilians Supported 4th Armored Brigade would have as its com- D-Day Both Sides of Maneuver Question bined arms regiments the 35th, and 37th Ar- mor and the 51st Infantry. There would be KARL E. SLAUGHENHAUPT Dear Sir: enough to go around to fit in all those LTC MAJ, Infantry Via email Responding to CPT Coglianese’s Nov-Dec requirements that the branches guard so ’98 letter, “More on Maneuver Warfare: Can jealously. Lets face it, we are not British; we We Change a Culture?,” I must disagree with fought a war about that, you will remember. I’d hoped the vignette would illustrate how much of the content of his letter’s second Then why should we blindly adopt a regimen- far we have come and, in a self-effacing way. paragraph. He claims that the concept of tal system based upon the British model, My goal was to point out the necessity of a maneuver warfare “still carries a tremendous which has failed miserably to preserve our combined arms team and I thought this would amount of emotional baggage” from the unit’s history since it was first placed into ef- be apparent as the column fleshed itself out mid-1980s debates “where a dedicated cadre fect in 1957? and by the other pieces in the issue. My of civilian defense intellectuals sought to re- apologies if it appeared otherwise to you, as I want to close by thanking all those associ- form our armed forces from the outside and I'm sure some of my infantry friends will testify ated with ARMOR Magazine, and the Armor change our way of thinking about warfare,” that I have always held them and their craft in Association, for 38 years of pleasure and and the Army “naturally resisted these up- highest regard. – Ed. professional stimulation. As I write my check starts, especially their nerve at telling us how today to renew my membership, I hope you to do our business...” He laments, “much of will continue to stimulate what’s left of the the debate took on the form of personal at- brain of this broken-down old infantryman. Writer Recalls Army Lab Problems tacks...” CHARLES W. TREESE Developing Novel Ammo Solution As someone who was aware of the maneu- LTC, USAR (Ret.) ver warfare controversy and who participated Colorado Springs, Colo. Dear Sir: in it with many published letters to the editors of several publications, I must in fairness to I noticed another article from Don Loughlin historical truth point out that many military Be Kind to the Infantry: on cased telescoped* ammunition and how it personnel became interested in and sup- Pick Up the Phone may adversely impact the Scout/Tracer pro- ported maneuver warfare as an alternative to gram. I have regarded his previous articles in the “win-by-attrition-through-firepower” ap- ARMOR magazine as factual, very candid, proach to fighting they had experienced in Dear Sir: and quite informative on matters pertaining to Vietnam, and which they, uniformed members Armor. I read your editor’s note in the May-June 99 of the Army, found reflected in the 1976 edi- issue of ARMOR and must chastise you! I I would like to add my support to Loughlin’s tion of FM-100-5 Operations, the Army’s doc- found myself bristling when I read how you hypothesis on cased telescoped ammo. In the trinal statement, which called for pulling back and your loader went out of your way to make late 1970s, while assigned to the small caliber and wearing down the enemy, “attritting” him a young foot soldier’s life more difficult, forcing lab at Picatinny, I had a chance to observe up through firepower, and counterattacking and him to slog through the mud to use a broken close the many attempts to make this tech- otherwise taking the initiative only after the phone, and gloating about it. I suppose dis- nology work, all to no avail. The Army Chief of enemy had been attritted through firepower. mounting never occurred to you. (Just how Staff and Marines were also enthralled/in- While some civilians did become involved in long was that phone inoperable, anyway?) volved with the failed super 75mm (cased the debate for maneuver warfare, some civil- telescoped) Mobile Protected Gun System As a Bradley company commander in 1st ians entered the debate against maneuver (MPGS) — a precursor to the AGS. In short, Cav, I had the pleasure of working with many warfare. And many in the military argued for the Army labs have tinkered with cased tele- fine armor officers, from platoon to brigade maneuver warfare. These active duty soldiers scoped in several calibers and numerous level, all of whom had a tremendous apprecia- were supported in their advocacy by some permutations of designs without success. tion for dismounted infantry. Likewise, we civilians and opposed by other civilians. Both insolvable cost and technical problems grunts have great respect for the capabilities CPT Coglianese’s picture of maneuver war- our armored brethren bring to the battlefield. kept this novel ammo packaging solution from becoming more than a pipe dream. Institu- fare as an entirely or at least essentially civil- I would think you might show a little more tional memory being what it is — very short ian-generated concept, which civilians tried to respect for infantrymen. It’s a life fraught with nowadays — it seems cased telescoped tech- ram down the throats of an unwilling Army 56 ARMOR — September-October 1999

whose members opposed it and resisted it Candil’s article (“Soviet Armor in Spain: Aid days, a whole division left the lines to seek because it came from outside, is inaccurate Mission to Republicans Tested Doctrine and shelter, so exposing to encirclement the best and misleading. Equipment,” March-April 1999 ARMOR). unit of the corps, the Littorio Division, which was compelled to retreat in its turn. From what I could see, most of the sparks I am afraid the author has not read some of flew because the opponents of maneuver the essays about the Spanish Civil War, es- The responsibility fell mainly on the generals. warfare, both uniformed and civilian, continu- pecially the most recent ones from the Italian (I found an anonymous letter to the Duce ally and stubbornly saw only the word maneu- Army Historical Branch (Rovighi-Stefani, La claiming a treason hypothesis.) The officers ver in “maneuver warfare” and believed that parteciazione Italiana alla Guerra Civile Spag- lacked practice and the services appeared maneuver warfare, was supposed to be nola), four thick volumes, the last of which badly organized. Only the Littorio looked like a merely about just moving around, and mistak- was published in 1994, and my modest Mo- proper infantry division, with the others being enly believed that maneuver warfare’s opposi- tori!!!, Le Truppe Corazzate Italiane 1919/1994 improvised....Moreover, the enemy air force tion to winning by firepower-induced attrition (Start Engines!!! Italian Armor 1919-1994)... was stronger and closer to their lines, while was an opposition to firepower in general, our air groups were too far from the battlefield. when in fact maneuver warfare, properly un- ...(At) Seseña, on 29 October 1936, some derstood, involves using firepower. German Pz 1 and Italian CV 35s met a num- A last question: If the Italian contribution was ber of Russian gun tanks T-26B. That is re- so poor after Guadalajara (finally conquered I dispute strongly Coglianese’s claim that corded as the first tank engagement in Spain by the Italian tanks on 28 March 1939), why “much of the debate took on the form of per- and its outcome is still controversial. Colonel did General Franco order that, at the victory sonal attacks.” I concede that personal attacks Candil seems to trust in the anti-Italian parade in Madrid (March 1939), the CTV had do creep into heatedly discussed issues, but it sources only. But we must remember that to be the first to march past him, with its 70 is certainly untrue to say that “much” of the others (General Emilio Faldella and the Italian surviving tankettes? maneuver warfare debate “took on the form of War Department of the period) give an almost personal attacks.” DR. NICOLA PIGNATO opposite version of the episode. Only one CV Italy 35 was destroyed and another damaged; But I agree that, as Coglianese claims, the debate “left the heart of the issues essentially three Russian tanks destroyed by our 65/17 anti-tank team and another disabled. Emilio Seeking U.S. Contacts unexamined,” as regards, as I’ve stated above, the aspects of maneuver warfare be- Faldella, in his Venti mesi di guerra in Spagna ing more than just moving around and of op- (Twenty months of war in Spain), Le Monnier, Dear Sir: position to winning by firepower-attrition, not Florence 1939, at page 129, reports that Bar- being opposition to firepower per se. resi’s flamethrower tank succeeded in stop- One of the members of the Finnish Armour ping a Russian tank but the latter’s gunner hit Guild, Dr. Stig Nyström, is a retired professor JOSEPH FORBES the Nationalist tank, killing the crew. (Accord- of neurologic surgery at the University of Oulu Pittsburgh, Pa. ing to the citation)... I translate literally: in northern Finland. He has served in the Armoured Division under Gen. Lagus in our Careless of the danger to which he was ex- last wars and has, upon his retirement, started Advantage of Sling Loads posing himself, he attacked, with his flame- Is Their Quick Insertion a research on injuries in tanks. He is looking thrower tank, an adversary gun armed tank. In for literature from the USA and/or a medical this unequal struggle, his vehicle being hit by collegial contact. Dear Sir: the enemy gun, he heroically lost his life, to- The address of Professor Nyström is: In “The Case for an Airmobile, Amphibious gether with his driver, still staring, even after Scout Vehicle,” Mr. Crist states that “the his death, at the enemy tank stopped at five Prof. S. Nyström HMMWV is a little too wide to fit into a CH-47.” meters distance. Bulevardi 34 A a 8 As a CH-47D aviator, I can say without doubt Guadalajara, I would say, was not a real de- FIN-00120 HELSINKI that this is not the case. The HMMWV fits feat for the Italians. They did not withdraw on FINLAND quite nicely inside the CH-47D. their original lines of departure. On the con- RURIK WAHLSTEIN As to his contention that carrying vehicles as trary, they stopped the Red attack 20 km Chairman sling loads “exposes the personnel, rotorcraft ahead of those lines, according to a Commu- Finnish Armour Guild/Helsinki Div. nist account in a book based on the docu- and vehicle to a number of hazards,” well, this ments of the Corpo Truppe Volontarie... In my is arguable. Sling loading allows an aircrew to Photo Search Seeks insert the vehicle, land, and offload passen- opinion, several of our tanks were hit but were recoverable (at least nine), while the “Republi- U.S. Vehicles in U.N. Service gers very quickly, limiting exposure time for the aircrew in the LZ. Internally loading the cans,” it is certain, lost twenty T-26Bs, some vehicle is time consuming, as is offloading it, of them captured... It was not a complete Red LTC Paul Malmassari, French Army, is as- exposes the crew to extended ground time in victory because they were so worn down that sembling a photo book documenting peace- the LZ, and often results in airframe damage they could not exploit their success. In addi- keeping operations and is seeking photos of when drivers are in a hurry to exfil. What in- tion, a lot of factors contributed to the Italian U.S. armored vehicles deploying during U.N. ternal loading does provide is a higher degree retreat: bad weather, which meant no air sup- operations, such as Haiti, Somalia, etc. Ex- of stealth during ingress/egress. port, and difficult terrain; a low training level of amples might include U.S. M113A3s in ser- most units; and that their motor vehicles were vice with UNPREDEP in Macedonia. Also THOMAS CARLSON tied to roads.... sought are photos of U.S. vehicles in foreign CPT, AV I found in our State Archive one roll on the service peacekeeping roles; e.g., a Pakistani ACCC 99-4 M88 in Yugoslavia, a Ghanean M578 in Spanish War and, in particular, about Guada- lajara, with some notes from witnesses and a Rwanda, etc. History Slighted Italian Role still unpublished secret report. Here it is, to The author is a French Army tanker. All pho- In Spanish Civil War make a long story short: tos will be returned.

On 10 March, our advance stopped at Tri- Dear Sir: LTC PAUL MALMASSARI jueque, but the Italian divisions had to retreat Commandant en second le 501/503rd RCC As a recognized historian of Italian armor a little because some units were left behind. Quartier Selestraint and an ARMOR subscriber, I would like to There they remained in the mud, under rain 51401 Mourmelon-Le-Grand point out some inaccuracies I found in COL and snow, with few dry provisions. After five France ARMOR — September-October 1999 57

Book Feature New Book Offers Definitive History of U.S. Armor

Review by Gunnery Sergeant Leo J. Daugherty, USMCR

Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The was conservative to the point of being team during World War II had been in- History of U.S. Armored Forces, reactionary. Many saw the tank as noth- culcated into Marine doctrine during the edited by George F. Hofmann and ing more than a passing fancy; for these interwar period in lessons drawn from the Donn A. Starry, Lexington, University leaders, the horse remained paramount in battlefields of France. The Marines’ in- Press of Kentucky, September 1999, battle. But others saw the tank as an ex- terest in the tank began almost as the war 610 pages, $35. cellent adjunct to infantry, and later as an itself ended. In fact, during the occupa- offensive weapon in and of itself. They tion of Germany by the Marines, the lec- General George S. Patton, Jr. wrote in a included Brigadier General Samuel D. tures and classes Leatherneck officers February 1928 paper, while serving at the Rockenbach, who was the American attended at Army-sponsored schools, and Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii Expeditionary Forces’ (AEF) first com- recorded dutifully in reports and student in 1925, that “The tank, in reality, is a manding general of the infant Tank papers during the period (1918-20), illus- modern version of heavy cavalry, as that Corps, Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Elt- trate the strength of this influence inside arm was understood by the first Napo- inge, and Captain (later Lieutenant Colo- the Marine Corps. This theme was con- leon. When satisfactory machines are nel) George S. Patton, Jr. Patton’s de- stantly reinforced in the interwar period available, they should be formed into a tailed report, submitted to General John J. at the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, separate corps and used, when terrain Pershing’s headquarters, remained the Va. permits, for the delivery of the final cornerstone of U.S. armor doctrine up Colonel Alexander’s essay is focused on shock in some great battle, when so used until its revision in the 1980s. the period after 1943, and is superbly they must be employed ruthlessly and in masses.” Captain Patton outlined the mission and written, but it fails to discuss the interwar tactics of this new Tank Corps, envision- period, the most critical period in Marine George F. Hofmann’s and Donn A. ing the tank as being the perfect infantry Corps thinking on armor and its associa- Starry’s Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The support weapon: Tanks could clear wire tion with combined arms warfare. This History of U.S. Armored Forces is by far obstacles, suppress enemy crew-served remains a glaring omission in light of an the single best compendium yet pub- weapons and prevent the enemy from otherwise good essay on tank and ar- lished on the history of the development manning the parapets or trenches after a mored fighting vehicle development in of armor and armored fighting vehicles in preparatory artillery barrage, help the the Marines. the United States, from World War I to infantry mop up the objective, guard In contrast, historian George Hofmann, the present. Beginning with the organiza- against counterattack by patrolling ahead one of the editors of this book, covers the tion of the U.S. Army’s Tank Corps at of the most advanced infantry positions, Camp Colt, Gettysburg, Pa., through De- and exploit the attack supported by re- developments of inventor Walter J. Christie’s revolutionary tank designs in sert Shield/Desert Storm, the book pro- serve infantry, seeking ‘every opportunity that era, which included an early experi- vides an in-depth examination of the role to become pursuit cavalry.’ armor has played in the development of mental amphibious tank. Alexander’s What is important here are two themes failure to discuss the Corps’ interest in the combined arms team in both the U.S. of Patton’s report that remained constant tank warfare as it applied to combined Army and Marine Corps. throughout the integration of armor into arms warfare is a significant shortcoming This collection of essays, written by the Army’s combined arms team. The since the Corps leaders during the inter- military historians, analysts, and techni- first theme is the constant referral back to war period, including Major General cians, examines the role armor has played cavalry and the use of tanks, like cavalry, John A. Lejeune, the commandant of the in forging U.S. Army and Marine Corps as a “shock” weapon. The Tank Corps corps (1920-29), saw combined arms doctrine, as well as its important function leadership during WWI were cavalrymen warfare as critical to the Corps’ survival. in the amphibious assault. What is even and saw the tank and motorized vehicles Historian Timothy K. Nenninger, an ex- more important about this book is the fact as an arm of the cavalry. This theme that it provides coverage of the lesser- would dominate Army thinking up to the pert on the history of the pre-World War II Army, provides a thought-provoking known controversies that plagued the advent of the helicopter, which in time and comprehensive essay on the devel- acceptance of armor in both services, and supplanted the tank as a cavalry weapon. how this oftentimes served to hinder its opment of both the tank and its missions The second theme describes how Army and roles in an Army still dominated by effective employment during World War and Marine leadership viewed the tank by infantrymen and cavalrymen. The domi- II, Korea, and Vietnam. and large as an infantry support weapon. nant theme in this chapter is the resis- The book begins with Dale Wilson’s In fact, Joseph Alexander’s essay on Ma- tance generated by opponents of an inde- essay on the birth of American armor rine Corps use of the tank as an infantry pendent armored corps against those who during World War I and the organization support weapon in the Pacific during had kept abreast of both British and Ger- of the 1st Tank Battalion during that con- WWII illustrates how the lessons of man experiments with armor during the flict under the command of a cavalry WWI confirmed in many of the Corps’ 1920s and 1930s. At this point, the edi- officer named George S. Patton. What senior leaders that the tank was merely a tors might have better served readers by makes this particular essay important is moving pillbox. Marine Corps armored inserting an essay on foreign develop- the story Wilson tells about the battles of development was influenced by its ex- ments, with special emphasis on the Brit- acceptance that armor proponents had to perience in World War I, and much of ish mechanization experiments. They wage inside an Army bureaucracy that what was practiced as a combined arms codified the first field regulations and set 58 ARMOR — September-October 1999

up the first totally mechanized formations tion of their tank battalions (both active the Bradley Fighting Vehicle system and in the mid- to late 1920s. Another foreign and reserve), as well as the adoption of the “king of the killing zone,” the M1 area to be explored is the German and the M48 Patton tank as the Army transi- Abrams tank. Both are extremely well Russian collaboration during the 1920s, tioned to the M60 series. written and heavy with technical details, which have been discovered to be far and both essays demonstrate how these In seeking to counter the Soviet Union’s more comprehensive since the opening of newly-developed line of tanks, beginning two weapons complemented AirLand the Soviet archives. There were also Battle. Despite bureaucratic roadblocks German experiments with mechanized with the T-54 up through the T-62 series and branch infighting, as well as budget in the mid-1960s, both the Army and the formations, beginning even before the Marine Corps sought a tank that could cut after budget cut, both the MICV and Nazi Party assumed power and tore up XM1 tank emerged as the two dominant the Versailles Treaty, in 1935, which qualitatively counter the Soviet Army’s weapon systems to enter the Army since quantitative advantage in armor. The prohibited Germany from having tanks. M60 Patton series proved a stopgap the organization of the Tank Corps at Camp Colt. Christopher R. Gabel’s essay on U.S. measure during the 1960s and early armored operations in Europe during 1970s, but the advent of the Soviet T-72 As the Yom Kippur War of 1973 dem- World War II is thorough and and T-64 tanks moved the Army toward onstrated, the ability to protect infantry thought-provoking, covering how the the eventual development of the M1 and move them into battle, as well as Army recovered from its first poor show- Abrams, as well as the NA4701 Mecha- development of a tank that could domi- ing at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia up nized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV), nate the battlefield, became the most im- through the Third Army’s relief of Bas- the forerunner of the Bradley. Thus began portant technological and doctrinal prob- togne and push into Germany. Despite a period of tank development that few lems during the 1970s and 1980s. The the fact that the Americans went to war historians have yet covered, the role of United States and NATO faced a with inferior tanks, compared to those of armor during the Vietnam War and the tank-heavy Soviet Army across the inter- both the Germans and Russians, the necessity of developing a vehicle capable German border. As both Urbina and Su- trusty old Sherman with its 76mm gun of effective fire support that could also nell’s essays illustrate, the Army planners proved sufficient to provide armored carry infantry into battle and protect sol- at TRADOC eventually resolved these support to the real victors of the ground diers from enemy fire and mines. While complicated issues and introduced into war in Europe and in the Pacific: the the Vietnam War has been touted as a the Army one of the best armored warfare combined arms team of infantry, combat helicopter war, tanks and armored vehi- fighting doctrines ever conceived. support, artillery, armor, and air. In fact, cles like the M113 and Marine LVTH-5 Gabel’s essay clearly illustrated the ne- series of armored personnel carriers often Stephen Bourque’s essay on Desert Storm is a sobering analysis of the effects cessity of combined arms warfare and the carried the day, providing soldiers and of this new doctrine and technology and importance of a team effort in overcom- Marines effective fire support despite the ing superior equipment and doctrine, and design and material construction flaws of how they aided General H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s “end run,” decimating the it was here that the U.S. Army triumphed both vehicles. Iraqi Republican Guard with General during World War II. It wasn’t the effi- cacy of armor or air; it was the combined The book’s chapter on the development Fred Franks’ VII Corps slamming into of AirLand Battle doctrine and the impact the flanks of the once-vaunted Iraqi ar- arms team that brought victory in this and of Generals Creighton Abrams and Wil- mored formations in a four-day ground subsequent wars. liam DuPuy are excellent. With the les- war. The performance of the U.S. Army’s Philip Bolté’s essay covers armored sons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kip- Bradleys and the Marines’ use of Light doctrine and the use of tanks during the pur War still fresh, the after-action dis- Armored Vehicles (LAVs) vindicated the Korean War. His underlying theme is the cussions pointed to the Army’s need to pioneers of the Army’s infant Tank Corps Army’s unpreparedness in the field of reshape its thinking on armored warfare in 1917. The same spirit of those who led anti-armor doctrine, due mainly to the and the use of combined arms. With the America’s first tanks into battle was also fact that it lacked an adequate anti-tank advent of man-portable anti-tank weap- present in late February 1991 as U.S. weapon to deal with North Korea’s Rus- ons, such as the Soviet AT-4 “Sagger” armored forces won perhaps their greatest sian-supplied T-34 tanks. Kenneth W. and the TOW missile system, as well as victory. It was armor that led the way. Estes’ essay on Marine armor during this the proliferation of rocket-propelled gre- Supplemented by excellent photographs same period picks up on Bolté’s theme nades (RPGs), commanders could no that, despite the lack of an adequate tank longer think just in terms of tanks, infan- and maps, as well as a full bibliography and a post-analytical reflection by Gen- to deal with the T-34, it was the counter- try, or artillery, but had to plan in terms of eral Donn A. Starry, Camp Colt to Desert measures that turned the tide in the U.S. combined arms. The lessons of the 1973 Storm: The History of U.S. Armored favor at the Pusan Perimeter and later at War pointed toward the need of an effec- Forces is a book that will remain as the Inchon. While the Korean countryside tive mechanized doctrine. General DePuy most important single volume on ar- was less than ideal for tank warfare, ar- answered with his revision of FM 100-5, mor nonetheless proved to be indispensa- Operations, the Army’s standard war- mored warfare in the U.S. armed forces for some time to come. Despite the lack ble in supporting the infantry and in stop- fighting battle plan. This field manual of a chapter on foreign developments ping the North Koreans and Chinese became the blueprint for what later Communists. Not only did armor provide emerged as AirLand Battle, a doctrine (most importantly, on Soviet armored developments), this is a book that will effective close-in fire support, it also pro- that challenged what had become an find its way into the curriculum at Army vided excellent mobile artillery against overwhelming Soviet/Warsaw Pact ad- the mass attacks by the Chinese Commu- vantage in tanks and AFVs in the 1970s and Marine Corps schools and is highly recommended as a book that will be un- nist forces in the perimeter fighting that and 1980s. rivaled for some time to come. took place from 1951 through the armi- stice in 1953. Estes’ essay covers primar- Diane L. Urbina’s and Robert J. Su- Gunnery Sergeant Leo Daugherty is a ily the Marines’ post-Korean reorganiza- nell’s essays cover the development of graduate student at Ohio State University. ARMOR — September-October 1999 59

Fighting for the Future: Will America cast, but it is decidedly in the far future. This is clearly evil and the nation banded together in Triumph? by Ralph Peters, Stackpole Peters’ weakest chapter because it deals with response. Rather than being a unified and Books, Mechanicsburg, Pa., 1999, 224 non-issues of an impossibly distant future. consensual military, political, and popular pages, $19.95. (Impossibly distant, that is, given our current effort, Dr. Pearlman reveals just how difficult it and forecasted budgets.) In just about every was to implement a coherent strategy since To many readers of ARMOR, retired Army other chapter, Peters is both entertaining and inherent domestic divisions remained through- Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters is probably informative. His personal theories of interna- out the duration of the war. Because Nazi best known for his periodic “Back Talk” col- tional relations and military conflict are appro- Germany and Imperial Japan posed such a umns in Army Times, or as the author of any priate for a professional of any pay grade. I dangerous threat, they had to be soundly and of seven military fiction novels he published in strongly recommend this book. permanently defeated, and thus required a the past ten years. In either format, Peters has concerted struggle and inspired military lead- never been known to shy away from a contro- ROBERT L. BATEMAN ership. On the other hand, domestic opinion versial topic or to abandon an intellectual CPT, Infantry demanded that military reversals be avoided position just because it wasn’t politically cor- West Point, N.Y. and casualties be minimized, which in turn rect. This book is a collection of essays, pre- discouraged risky military options. One of the viously published and expanded upon in con- Warmaking and American Democracy: more surprising revelations from the chapter is cept if not verbatim, in professional journals the astonishing “lack of wartime fervor, even such as Parameters. It is a book professionals The Struggle over Military Strategy, during wartime” that affected mobilization, will want to read. 1700 to the Present by Michael D. strategy, and operations. Pearlman{PRIVATE }, University of Kan- In Fighting for the Future, Peters is, by his sas Press, Lawrence, Kansas, 1999, 442 It is hard to find fault with this book. A wel- own admission, waging a war of attrition upon pages, 11 maps, $45, hardcover. come addition would have been an analysis of the Army establishment and bureaucracy. the American involvement in the Balkans This collection deals in issues of political af- The issue of how a democracy conducts war beyond a few thoughtful lines in the final chap- fairs, international relations, U.S. military force is complex and as relevant today as it has ter. It is in this part of the world that many of structure and the nature of the Army’s rela- ever been. Since the founding of our country, the points raised by Warmaking and American tionship to technology, among other things. the political system of the United States has Democracy are most starkly demonstrated. As More often than not, it reads like a “how-to” profoundly affected the manner in which the a whole, however, Dr. Pearlman has made an manual for the U.S. in the 21st century. Peters United States has waged its wars — it is a story important contribution to our understanding of is willing to take on just about any sacred cow, literally as old as the republic itself. Somewhat the intersection of politics and strategy. As the and he does so here with a decidedly irrever- surprisingly, however, as central as the topic line between war and peace seemingly be- ent wit. Warning: If you are a rabid nationalist, is to American military and political history, it comes more confused with each passing a tribal warrior, or a screaming fundamentalist, has rarely been addressed effectively in re- year, recognizing how domestic factors shape this book may offend you. Since many of the cent scholarship. Dr. Michael D. Pearlman, an strategy has never been more important. chapters apparently originated in Parameters, associate professor of history at the United The excellent sources and extensive notes they are fairly short and therefore easy to States Army Command and General Staff make this a work of scholarship of the first digest in a single sitting. The origin and focus College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has order, while the simple and informative maps of the essays might put some readers off at written a broad ranging and insightful account are an added bonus. Warmaking and Ameri- first glance. This should not be the case. of how American military strategy has devel- can Democracy is essential reading for the oped due to domestic considerations. Expan- Parameters is the journal of the U.S. Army military professional and anyone interested in sive in scope, yet concise in its prose, Dr. War College. It deals with issues at the strate- Pearlman’s book is an absolute delight to read. how America goes to war. Dr. Pearlman has gic, not tactical, level. The authors are almost aptly proved his point that “Constructing mili- exclusively lieutenant colonels, colonels, and What is most striking about Warmaking and tary policy in a pluralistic society has never Defense Department civilians, and generals American Democracy is its very premise: been a bed of roses.” Although the notion is writing for each other. Because of this focus, it although war is most effectively waged as a simple to understand, explaining the difficul- would be easy to assume that Peters’ topics united effort of political, military, and popular ties involved with formulating American mili- and style would be well above the heads of will, the American experience has been quite tary strategy so clearly is indeed a remarkable the average ARMOR reader, this reviewer different. Dr. Pearlman argues that the achievement. included. Happily, this is not the case. Peters method by which wars have been waged MAJOR KEVIN W. FARRELL writes in an easy, almost conversational style throughout the history of the United States Fort Leavenworth, Kan. that would alienate neither the majority of has had less to do with overall grand strategy civilians nor the average soldier. In short, he and more to do with a continuous struggle Seven Roads To Hell: A Screaming writes about global issues in a manner that between competing governmental and military Eagle at Bastogne by Donald R. Burgett, would be equally appropriate in PM Monthly. factions. In the beginning of the work, the Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 1999, 225 Reducing complex topics to their basics, even author makes it clear that the book is not pages, $24.95. issues of international affairs make sense about political, diplomatic, or military history when explained and dissected by the author’s but instead the area where these fields over- It is always professionally rewarding to read acid wit. lap. The topic is a challenging one and a good memoir written by a soldier who has Pearlman’s unique approach is up to the task. served in combat. Donald R. Burgett’s ac- If there is a chink in Peters’ armor, it is in the count of his experiences as a private in the chapter when he deals specifically with the Structured around the major military conflicts 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne, Seven future of armor. Peters’ contention — that of American history, each of the nine chapters Roads to Hell: A Screaming Eagle at Bas- much of future combat will be dominated by of Warmaking and American Democracy is togne, is no exception. But it is his depiction of the urban terrain of expanding cities — is one superbly written. The chapter devoted to the the more mundane and ordinary events of a that has been repeated over and over in the Second World War is arguably the strongest soldier’s life, not the story of battle, which past two decades, but we have yet, for some of the book because it starkly reveals the makes this book important and worthwhile. reason, seen this as a reality. It is beyond this degree to which our national strategy against reviewer to postulate why that is so, merely to the Axis powers was the consequence of As far as personal accounts of combat go, observe that this has been the case in very competing and often contradictory interests. Burgett’s is average in terms of scope and few instances. Peters may be wrong in this. Dr. Pearlman dispels many misconceptions emotional influence. His accounts of the bat- Yet he takes this as the starting point for his about how the United States fought the Sec- tles around Bastogne, fought by various ele- foray into what can only be described as sci- ond World War, often remembered as the ments of the 101st, are compelling to be sure, ence fiction. Peters sets no dates on his fore- “last good war” in which the enemy was but there is nothing that sets them apart from 60 ARMOR — September-October 1999

other personal narratives in either intensity or fare and environments, instead he falls too your local library, read it once, and save your poignancy. There are, however, two aspects often into service parochialism, indeterminate money for a more balanced view of modern of Burgett’s work that distinguish it. First, he statistics, and vague language. warfare. does an exceptional job of relaying to the CPT SCOTT MAXWELL reader the daily trials and travails of the aver- Storm Over Iraq begins with four chapters Fort Polk, La. dedicated to an overview of air power since its age GI, ranging from the simplistic implica- tions of a lost entrenching tool to instructions inception in World War I to the eve of battle in August, 1990. While Hallion provides a worthy Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red on keeping a foxhole dry. The author’s por- Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation trayal of the long periods of relative inactivity compact survey of the origins and develop- and anxiety between brief minutes of furious ment of modern air power and its weaponry, Mars, 1942 by David M. Glantz, Univer- combat bring home to the reader the life of the he uses 120 pages — half of his text — to do sity Press of Kansas, 1999, 421 pages, average GI in a way that complements the so. This leaves the author with very few pages $39.95, hardcover. writings of Stephen Ambrose. to review the Gulf War. His haste to do so becomes evident as the reader toughs While the long-term consequences of the fall Second, the reader can actually see and feel through much techno-speak and little sub- of the Soviet Union remain open to debate, this young soldier mature as the battle pro- stance. Virtually none of his figures are refer- one of the most positive short-term effects has gresses. Although this is a very recent publi- enced in the text and many of his facts and been an ever-increasing insight into Soviet cation, Burgett wrote the original manuscript tables seem superfluous to his arguments. military history. As more and more previously shortly after the events occurred. A veteran of unavailable primary sources have been at- Hallion closes with a sparse chapter of the European Theater since Normandy, Bur- tained by military historians, our view of Soviet analysis derived from the Gulf War. In it, he gett had seen plenty of combat by December military history has been steadily corrected as attempts to validate his concept that precision of 1944, yet his words and actions relay some historians compensate for our earlier reliance air power has risen to become the primary, of the jocularity and cockiness found in many on sources outside the Soviet military. The dominant form of war. While it is difficult to elite units before the German counteroffen- result has been a much more balanced history contend with the idea that air power is indeed sive. When his platoon first hears about the in the books published since the fall of the decisive and necessary for successful cam- impending operation, he remarks casually Soviet Union. paigns, Hallion’s blatant parochialism (even that, “We were gonna stack bodies. Germans, against the Navy) is often too strong to garner David Glantz takes advantage of many pre- give your souls to God, ‘cause your asses are agreement with his “determinant of victory” viously unavailable unit histories, personal ours.”(28) This cavalier attitude fades as the and “primary instrument” arguments. memoirs, and other primary sources to bring campaign progresses. It is replaced by reflec- to us the little known story of a major Soviet tion on combat and by realistic appraisals of Hallion also fails to acknowledge how exter- offensive in 1942 that failed miserably and the fighting and the author’s relation to it. nal factors affect the logic of his argument in a was subsequently ignored by official Soviet While the initial arrogance never completely non-ideal environment. Iraq was an open history. The sister offensive to the famous disappears, it is tempered by the trials of Bas- desert with a cooperative enemy and relatively encirclement of German forces in Stalingrad, togne. The process is both interesting and decent weather. How about the effects of Operation Mars, was at least as broad in pur- thought-provoking. terrain, weather, finite ordnance resources, pose and resources, but until now was almost Thumbs up to Burgett. He does an admira- political limitations, enemy tenacity, and the completely forgotten to history. Glantz brings ble job relating an original account of a proud increasing media impact of even small num- the story to life in vivid detail, and offers the moment in American military history. bers of collateral casualties, on the effective- student of military history not only an interest- ness of air power relative to land power? Hal- ing story of war on the Eastern Front, but con- MICHAEL A. BODEN lion dismisses the need for decisive ground siderable insight into the difficulties and perils MAJ, Armor forces at all when he states that air power of warfare at the operational level. He devotes Department of History “can hold territory by denying an enemy the almost 100 pages to notes and extracts to U.S. Military Academy ability to seize it…and can seize territory by support his reasoned and articulate view of controlling access to [it] and movement across the campaign. it.” I find this hard to believe! Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the The military reader is likely to find fault with Gulf War by Richard P. Hallion, Smith- The paperback edition of this book includes Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat on only two issues. sonian Institution Press, Washington, a new preface that mentions the Bosnian air First, the maps, although well-drawn and 1997, 352 pages (paperback), $17.95. campaign, but offers no modifications to the plentiful, do not use standard NATO conven- original text. However, the course of events in tions for unit symbols, and it takes some time I received this 1997 paperback reprint of Dr. Serbia and Kosovo are, by themselves, chal- to become comfortable with the way units are Richard Hallion’s analysis of the Gulf War air lenging Dr. Hallion’s theories. As Slobodan represented (the size of the type corresponds campaign during the second week of the Milosevic holds out and the talk of ground to the echelon of the unit). Second, Glantz NATO air campaign against Serbia. I thought troops in Kosovo grows, the balance of air to attempts to infer the inner thoughts of several that his work might provide me with a keen ground power is proving to be more tenuous key Russian and German commanders, but insight on the conduct of a decisive air on- than the author would have us believe. In a this is purely speculation and adds little to the slaught. However, much as the air war over theoretical world, maybe Hallion’s theories worth of the book. The value of this work is in Serbia has so far been a disappointment, so would hold up, but our world will never be this the detailed record of Soviet operations and too is Dr. Hallion’s book. (This review was way. Just as Douihet and Tedder failed to the underlying decisions that drove them. received before the Serbs agreed to withdraw deliver on the promise of the singular deci- from Kosovo. – Ed.) siveness of strategic air bombardment, so too Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat is well written and does Richard Hallion. extremely well researched. Military profes- Hallion puts forth the premise that the advent sionals need this work, and others like it, to of precision air-delivered weapons has al- Storm Over Iraq does provide a good survey balance our former reliance on German lowed nations the ability to strategically target of the development of American air and mis- sources as the basis for our view of warfare things instead of people. As a result, he be- sile power since the First World War. The 44 on the Eastern Front during World War II. lieves, air power has turned the tide of deci- pages of appendices outlining the develop- Glantz has written a history that offers fresh sive battle in favor of air forces; that navies ment of numerous high-technology systems insight while managing to be enjoyable read- and armies (to include their air power, to a are a useful reference. This book is worth ing at the same time. great extent) are obsolete in the context of reading to better understand how our Air modern war. While Hallion could have argued Force thinks and operates in the stealth era of CPT JOSEPH MCLAMB his point by examining the effects of precision air warfare. However, I do not recommend Fort Knox, Ky. air power across the broad spectrum of war- keeping it on your bookshelf. Borrow it from ARMOR — September-October 1999 61

A color version of this poster appears on the Threat Branch website at: knox-www.army.mil/center/threat/intel.htm.

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