ARMOR, September-October 1999 Edition

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ARMOR, September-October 1999 Edition Saddle Up... Tonight We Ride Platoon Leading 101 is possibly one of the toughest of teaching leadership, but anyone who hopes to become courses our Army has to offer. I doubt few survive the a better or more effective leader must begin by examining course unscathed. Wrong turns, missed LDs, bright ideas his failures with a critical and objective eye, as Crandall gone awry, and other embarrassments mark the course (and certainly all leadership guides) advocate. for young platoon leaders as they master their craft. Re- Of course, there are a couple of prerequisites for this counted through the years, the stories take on epic pro- technique to succeed. It won’t work in a “zero-defect envi- portions. Recently, I bumped into a member of my first ronment” where a single mistake dooms or damages a platoon who recounted, in vivid detail, an unfortunate inci- career. You must also be willing to admit your mistake and dent that involved me slaving a tank (it’s amazing how take responsibility for it. Too often, instead of admitting an much voltage the human body can take). error, we seek to spin, rationalize, or explain it away. In this issue, Captain Douglas Crandall confesses the When confronted with the evidence of an adulterous affair sins he committed as a new platoon leader — they look and the prospect of divorce recently, an aging rock star familiar. Crandall’s apprehensions, concerns, and mis- shifted the blame to a disease he suffers from — he’s a takes are not new. Generations of platoon leaders have sex addict. “Mistakes were made.” “There was no control- made the same mistakes, wrestled the same demons, ling legal authority.” Does anyone accept blame or re- and asked themselves the same questions: “How do I sponsibility anymore? Admit the error, accept responsibil- prove myself to the platoon?” “How do I tell a platoon ity and learn from it — good advice for everyone. sergeant as old as my father what to do, especially when Sure, there are mistakes one should not recover from. he has been doing it for 16 years?” Good lieutenants an- And I am not advocating “a get out of jail free card” for swer the tough questions, prove themselves, and move young leaders; rather, that we keep in mind the process on to executive officer jobs or to the scout and support and transformation new platoon leaders go through and platoons. allocate the room to grow while providing the time and Crandall mentions FM 22-100, Leadership, in his article effort necessary to AAR them on their adventures. and adds that books on leadership and the vaunted FM In closing, I’d like to point out that several of the articles offered precious few “lessons upon which to draw,” for his in this issue highlight the importance of teamwork in purposes. It occurs to me that we are literally besieged mounted warfare. Inside the cover, you’ll find a piece on with the opportunities to learn leadership. We have FM the Falklands that demonstrates the importance of the 22-100, we have numerous periodicals which frequently combined arms team in that conflict; Major Kevin Marcus devote entire issues to the topic, we have writing contests, writes about AC/RC assignments and illustrates another awards, departments and faculty whose stated mission is key partnership; the development of the tank-infantry team the pedagogy of leadership, and there are hundreds of is detailed by Captain J.L. Mudd; and our brothers in the books written by experts, yet this young officer points out Engineer and Air Defense community weigh in with advice the most critical tool for him in learning to lead his platoon on how we can fight better as a combined arms team. was simply examining his failures and learning from his mistakes. Not to disparage those engaged in the science — D2 By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official: ERIC K. SHINSEKI JOEL B. HUDSON General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army 9919301 The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-99-5 Editor-in-Chief Features MAJ DAVE DAIGLE 7 Tips on Being a Platoon Leader by Captain Douglas B. Crandall Managing Editor 9 The 2nd Parachute Battalion’s War in the Falklands JON T. CLEMENS by Captain Daniel T. Head 13 AC/RC Assignments: One Officer’s Perspective by Major Kevin B. Marcus Commandant 15 Development of the American Tank-Infantry Team MG B. B. BELL During World War II in Africa and Europe by Captain J. L. Mudd 23 From Warrior to Logistician ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- by Captain John D. Fio Rito monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 26 Three Tanks Featured in Russian Arms Show Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. by Colonel James H. Nunn and Lieutenant Colonel John C. Paulson Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- 30 Engineer Basics, Some Rules to Improve Mobility and Countermobility MOR represents the professional opinions of by Captain Wayne Skill the authors and does not necessarily reflect 37 Employing the Bradley Stinger Platoon in Support of Task Force Operations the official Army or TRADOC position, nor by Captain Douglas J. Waddingham does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. 39 Using Flag Signals to Speed Combat Casualty Evacuation by Major Joseph M. Nolan Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored 41 The JRTC and Light/Heavy Integration: Defensive Operations cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion by First Sergeant Paul E. Thompson Jr. headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- 44 New Ideas for Armor Company Maintenance Plans quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar- by Captain Paul J. Taylor ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the 47 Fire Support: Killing System or Battlefield Shaper? United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, by Robert Doughty Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM 48 The First Lieutenants to Korea Program staff agencies with responsibility for armored, by Captain Ron MacKay direct fire, ground combat systems, organiza- 49 STRAC XXI — Budgeting the Bullets: The Master Gunners’ Concerns tions, and the training of personnel for such by Sergeant First Class David Cooley organizations may request two copies by sending a request to the editor-in-chief. 51 The Graphical Spot Report by Captain Brandon K. Herl Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor 53 A Technique to Get Organized and Manage Your Career Center has proponency. That proponency by Captain Christopher H. Engen includes: all armored, direct-fire ground com- 54 Tactical Vignette 99-4: “Trouble for the Redball Express – Rear Area Security” bat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively 55 Solution to Tactical Vignette 99-3: “Screen in a Snowstorm” in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted 58 Review of Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of the U.S. Armored Forces soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equip- by Gunnery Sergeant Leo J. Daugherty ment which armor and armored cavalry organ- Back T-80U Russian Main Battle Tank Poster izations use exclusively; training for all SC Cover Threat Branch, Directorate of Force Developments 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF- 19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and Departments leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to 2 Contacts 6 Driver’s Seat include Threat units at those levels. 3 Letters 60 Reviews 5 Commander’s Hatch Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. September-October 1999, Vol. CVIII, No. 5 USPS 467-970 Directory — Points of Contact DSN – 464-XXXX Commercial – (502) 624-XXXX ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center Editor-in-Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) MAJ Dave Daigle 2249 MG B. B. Bell 2121 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Jon T. Clemens 2249 BG R. Steven Whitcomb 7555 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Vivian Oertle 2610 COL Frank J. Gehrki III 1101 E-mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Production Assistant Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Mary Hager 2610 CSM David L. Lady 4952 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Staff Illustrator Directorate of Force Development (ATZK-FD) Mr. Jody Harmon 2610 COL Joe Hughes 5050 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK-TD) COL Matthew L. Smith 8247 U.S. Army Armor School E-Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) Director, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) COL Brett H. Weaver 4009 COL Richard P. Geier 1050 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) COL James H. Nunn 7955 CSM Carl E. Christian 7091 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW) NCO Academy (ATSB-NC) COL Richard T.
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