The Spiritual Legacy of the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict

THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT

JOACHIM G. PERSOON*

INTRODUCTION

On the 10th of December 2004 a group of demonstrators gathered outside the Eritrean Embassy in the Hague carrying banners with slogans such as: ‘Freedom of Belief in Eritrea’, and presented a petition with three thousand signatures.1 The demonstration echoed the findings of the US State Depart- ment Annual Report on religious freedom around the world. The Report mentioned a deterioration of the situation in Eritrea and referred to cases of harassment, detention and torture of members of non-sanctioned religious groups.2 The event demonstrated the extent of the tensions generated by the religious policy of the Eritrean government, and the importance of the religious element in the legacy of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict. The phenomenon of multi-ethnic Eritrea that has broken away from multi- ethnic Ethiopia presents a theoretical challenge to current mainstream theo- ries of nation formation.3 Eritrea counts nine ethno-linguistic groups. Its first basis for nationhood is civic identity. ‘The war and the sharing of suffering in struggle have been the very cement of national unity through common

* Joachim G. Persoon PhD is an Affiliated Researcher of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. In November 2003 he defended a thesis entitled ‘Monks and Cadres in the Land of Prester John: A Multidisciplinary Study of Modern Ethiopian Monas- ticism and its Encounter with Communism’. While doing research for the thesis he visited Eritrea in January 1998, interviewed various people, including the first Patriarch (he was then Archbishop), and visited monasteries in the border area. This journey facilitated gathering material for this paper.

1 D. Gillissen, ‘Drieduizend handtekeningen voor de ambassade, Jubilee Campaign demon- streert tegen opsluiting van Christenen in Eritrea’, Nederlands Dagblad (11 December 2004), p. 2. 2 ‘US Condemns Eritrea over Religion’ Internet site BBC News Africa (23 December 2003) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3343635.stm 3 R. Bereketeab, Eritrea the Making of a Nation 1890-1991. Dissertation University of Uppsala (Uppsala, 1999; published 2000), p. 14. 292 JOACHIM G. PERSOON identity and aspiration.’4 Identity constitutes a cluster of properties, among which religion represents a transcendent element. When the imperative for wartime cooperation ceases to exist religious tensions are likely to rise. A recent conference on the horn of Africa in Paris5 stressed the significance of Ethiopia and Eritrea as key areas in a clash of civilisations. This article inves- tigates how the religious aspect of this clash is related to the Ethio-Eritrean struggle. The fall of the communist dictatorship in 1991, facilitating the achieve- ment of Eritrea’s independence in 1993, apparently heralded an African renais- sance. Yet within a few years a series of dramatic events brought the period of optimism to a close. On the 12th of May 1998, columns of the Eritrean army backed by tanks moved into Badme town and its environs. The border dispute became a ferocious war with much bloodshed6 and the displace- ment of tens of thousands of people. The fratricidal nature of the struggle between two related leaders and former comrades in arms during the fight against the communists shocked the world. The Ethio-Eritrean conflict is usually thought of in political or ethnic terms and rarely it is associated with religion. Both populations share the same major religious groups (even if in different proportions).7 The predominant ethos in both countries is pro- foundly religious. Even after 17 years of communist rule people’s sense of identity and many aspects of their everyday lives are determined by religion. Fur- thermore, religion constitutes one of the most important contexts of public association, and one of the areas that is least subject to government control. The present Ethiopian and Eritrean governments both began as allied regional liberation movements, sharing very similar ideological and political aspirations. Their religious policies reveal the extent to which they moved in different directions, resulting in widely varying developments within the religious sphere in each country. This raises questions as to how religion played

4 G. Kebreab, ‘When Refugees Come Home: The Relationship Between Stayees and Returnees in Post-Conflict Eritrea’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 20 ( 2002), 1, pp. 53-77, on p. 76. 5 Colloque Les nouvelles d’Addis / Les Verts Paris, Assemblée Nationale, Lundi 2 février 2004. 6 Estimates are that about 100,000 people died. 7 Religious statistics are controversial. Estimates for the percentage of Muslims in the Ethiopian population vary from 30 to over 50%; however, there is a general consensus that about 50% of the Eritrean population is Muslim. THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 293 a role in the situation leading up to independence, what influence it had on the freedom struggle, and subsequently what was the impact of the border war of 1998. Rather than seeking to document all details, I want to identify the major trends that have characterised spiritual life in the two countries. I do not engage in any kind of value judgement, but will make an attempt to reveal the motivations of the governments and the effects they had on the religious lives of their subjects.

ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOXY AND THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church became autocephalous by a gradual process. The number of Ethiopian bishops was steadily increased until finally an independent Holy Synod could be formed and a Patriarch could appointed in the middle of the 20th century. In 1951 Anba Basilius was consecrated Abuna of Ethiopia, and in 1959 he was enthroned as the first Patriarch Catholicus of the Ethiopian Church with the right to consecrate metropolitans and bishops. A real confrontation of religious and secular ideologies occurred after the revolution of 1974, and it initially looked as if organised religion was doomed. However, surprisingly Christian Churches and Islam were able to recreate themselves and displayed a remarkable resilience. Drastic measures such as the confiscation of land impoverished the Orthodox Church but paradoxically freed her of her unpopular feudal trappings, thus endearing her to the masses. Already at an early stage in the revolution different sources were reporting a great public interest in participation in organized religion. This phenomenon was strong enough to provoke specific counter measures: ‘Special treatment is proposed for the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois classes which have been thrown into a state of fright by the Ethiopian revolution and are flocking to the churches in great numbers. This revival is fast becoming ground for counter-revolution.’8 Atheistic propaganda provoked a religious revival initially more visible in the Orthodox sphere, later revealing itself as an underground movement in evangelical circles. Oriental Orthodoxy conceptualises itself as unchanging, but

8 D. Cross, ‘Ethiopian Attack on Evil of Religion’, The Times (London, 15 November 1994), p. 1. 294 JOACHIM G. PERSOON is going through a process of reinventing itself. In practice it accepted foreign innovations such as Sunday Schools (from Coptic Egypt) and parish councils introduced through WCC funded seminars and crucial for the church’s survival. Under communist rule Ethiopian Orthodoxy developed as a highly polarised form of religion displaying features characteristic of world- wide Orthodoxy, such as a certain degree of fundamentalism and religious nationalism. During the revolutionary project of ‘encaderment’ the Church constituted one of the few alternative spaces for meaningful interaction and individual and group empowerment. It became popular with large sections of the population, as shown by the massive participation in pilgrimage rites at shrines like Kulubi Gabriel. However, the stress on the links between religion and community identity caused tensions in ecumenical relations. There was a sense of canonical territory in which the ‘natural’ religion was orthodoxy, sometimes leading to violence between religious groups. The Ethiopian communist leadership recognised the religious element in the Eritrean conflict at an early stage. In the late eighties Colonel Mengistu, despite his earlier Leninist rhetoric, nominated his first minister of Religious Affairs. Soon after when he had agreed to divide Eritrea administratively into Muslim and Christian areas, he was not merely trying to buy time. ‘Although the measure was designed to divide and rule, in a sense it was an acknowledgement, albeit belated, of the significance of religion in the Eritrean conflict.’9

BETWEEN OPENNESS AND BELONGING

As long as the government continued the trajectory of central state formation, some compromise with the privileged status of the Orthodox Church was required. After 1991 the subversion of a centre-periphery model of state- hood in Ethiopia formed part of the upheavals associated with ‘globalisation’, challenging the special status of the Orthodox community and open- ing up the way for greatly increased foreign competition. Following the introduction of Federal administration Orthodox minorities in certain areas faced persecution and central areas of the Orthodox homeland became economic backwaters.

9 S. A. Hussien, ‘The Conflict in Eritrea Reconsidered’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 18, (1998) 1, pp. 159-167, on p. 165. THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 295

The new élan of the Protestant churches obliged the Orthodox to reorganise and become more competitive in the religious market place. Political alien- ation made the Church into a zealously guarded core symbol of identity. Renewed vitality was evident in widespread projects of church construction.10 A more inclusive way of conceptualising the church encouraged the growth of a multi-ethnic Orthodox identity evident at Orthodox festivals in which ethnic minorities played an important part. The visionary Abuna (Bishop) Gorgorios established a monastery at Zwey to prepare for missionary work in the South, a movement continued by recent developments at Mehur Yesus monastery. Modern Ethiopian Orthodoxy transformed itself from an appendage of the imperial state to a grassroots people’s movement, becoming attractive and influential by formulating an alternative discourse. A wide range of para- Church associations and informal gatherings developed a sense of personal commitment to the Orthodox faith. As in Eastern Europe, Orthodox identity coalesced in the confrontation with other religious groups that flourished due to contacts with international networks. The Orthodox Develop- ment Commission indicated Orthodox resolve to establish its own international network, while Orthodox Diaspora encouraged the flow of ideas and openness.

RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS IN THE MOVEMENT FOR ERITREA’S INDEPENDENCE

Ethiopia and Eritrea share the heritage of the ancient and cosmopolitan Aksumite Empire, whose bishops came from Coptic Egypt. However, Islam gradually dominated the Red Sea littoral, and the Christian empire eventu- ally became more inward-looking and retreated inland. This process culmi- nated in the 19th century, when repressive laws of the Ottoman rulers and the activities of Sufi fraternities such as Khatimiya Tarika consolidated Islam as the dominant religion of the coastal lowlands. Meanwhile at the end of the 19th century, the emperor Menelik II restored the fortunes of the Solomonic empire, which expanded to include Muslim areas. He defeated the Italians at the Battle of Adowa, but allowed them to retain Eritrea. The first

10 C. Marcus, ‘Imperial Nostalgia. Christian Restoration and Civic Decay in Gondar,’ in Remapping Ethiopia Socialism and After, eds. W. James, e.a. (Oxford - Addis Ababa - Athens, OH, 2002), pp. 239-257, on p. 244. 296 JOACHIM G. PERSOON stirrings of Eritrean nationalism are associated with foreign religious influences: ‘Beginning in the 1850s-1870s, the people of the Bogos, Mensa and the Catholics of the Akkele Guzai had progressively been seeking protection from European missionaries and diplomats, here Eritrea was, in fact conceived.’11 Already at the end of European rule there were signs of emergent Eritrean nationalism, resulting from the penetration of foreign capital. The 56 years of Italian rule effectively created Eritrea. However, the defeat of the Italians left a vacuum stimulating traditional religious and ethnic allegiances. From 1941 to 1952 Eritrea was governed by the British, and subsequently feder- ated with Ethiopia, only to be annexed in 1961. During the political squab- bles in the 1940s, Muslim Eritreans preferred Arabic, spoken by a negligible percentage of the population (0.5%), as their national language.12 Meanwhile, with the help of the Orthodox Church in Eritrea, religious and kinship ties became the rallying point for elements proposing union with the empire. The alliance of the Eritrean churches with the Ethiopian empire changed the balance in favour of the pro-union elements, using the pulpit to ‘convert’ people to support union with Ethiopia.13 By 1942 every village church had become a centre of Ethiopian nationalism. However, support for the unionist cause did not only come from the Orthodox: ‘the Unionist Party was imbued with religious values, its leaders were deeply religious people and came predominately from Catholic and evangelical backgrounds. Leaders of the Moslim religious and commercial community were also active members of the UP it was genuinely multi-religious’.14 Abune (bishop) Marcos, an Italian appointee of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, used ardent support for the unionist cause to get confirmation for his position, threatening seces- sionists with excommunication. Ethiopian sponsorship precipitated the resurgence of ethnic, religious and provincial cleavages that had been subordi- nated to the more universal anti-colonial and nationalist sentiments.

11 Bereketeab, Eritrea, p. 82. 12 A. Abbay, Identity Jilted or Re-Imagining Identity? The divergent paths of the Eritrean and Tigrayan Nationalist Struggles (Lawrenceville Asmara, 1998), p. 12. 13 R. Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence Domination Resistance Nationalism 1941- 1993 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 66. 14 T. Negash, Eritrea and Ethiopia, The Federal Experience, African Studies Political Science (Uppsala, 1997), p. 38. THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 297

THE INTIMACY OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

In 1958 the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELF) was established by five young Moslem Eritrean exiles in Port Sudan. The heavy-handed dismantling of Eritrean institutions by Ethiopian rulers created a ‘pan-Eritrean national sentiment’. The first shots were fired in 1961. The ELF exacerbated endemic ethno-religious frictions by capitalising on Moslem fears of federation. From 1961 to its demise in 1981 the ELF fought on two fronts: against the Ethiopi- ans and against internal challengers. The ascendancy of Muslim militants in the ELF and discrimination against Christians led to a crisis in the organi- zation which led to the establishment of the EPLF, the Eritrean People’s Lib- eration Front, in 1969-1970. The most important support for the Eritreans came from Arab countries, alarmed at Ethiopia’s recognition of the state of Israel which was perceived as a Jewish-Christian alliance in the Red Sea against panarabism. ‘The Arab world viewed the Eritrean independence movement as an inseparable part of the struggle of Arab people for their inalienable rights of self-determination.’15 The EPLF’s desire to minimalise inter-religious tension caused them to contest this: ‘the fiction of Arab support constituted a crucial foreign policy objective of the Ethiopian regimes.’16 Meanwhile Asrate Kassa, the Gov- ernor General of Eritrea, established a new anti-guerilla division, Comman- dos 101, recruited primarily from Christian villages and trained by Israeli military advisers. Consequently there was discrimination against Christian ELF recruits, highlighting traditional animosities, and hastening the fragmentation of Eritrean nationalism. The ELF’s structures reproduced local Islamic inter-clan power struggles, while the EPLF advocated multi-culturalism. The two groups fought a bru- tal civil war largely for political reasons, sometimes expressed in religious terms. In 1981 the ELF was defeated, and the EPLF came to dominate. The EPLF’s hallmark became the submission of all other identities and interests to the primacy and service of nationalism. It was said that the EPLF engaged

15 S. A. Hussien, ‘The Conflict in Eritrea Reconsidered’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 18, (1988), 1, pp. 159-167, on pp. 162 and 165. 16 A. Hagos, ‘Arabism: Ethiopia’s Wartime Bogeyman in Eritre’a, Eritrean Studies Review, 1, (1996), 1, pp. 119-142, on p. 137. 298 JOACHIM G. PERSOON in building a synthetic nationalism that homogenized differences between Eritreans to produce a unified nation-state.17 Only with the emergence of a strong EPLF cooperating with the Tigrean Peo- ple’s Liberation Front (from the Northermost province of present Ethiopia) could the Derg be toppled and independence achieved. The traditional affin- ity between Tigrinya-speaking Orthodox highlanders in Eritrea and Tigre thus contributed to the resolution of the conflict. During the last phase of the Eritrean conflict, highland Christian elements prevailed and now dis- proportionately dominate state power in independent Eritrea. ‘This situation casts a doubt as to whether the independence of Eritrea will bring to an end to the problem without addressing the root causes because of which the struggle was launched by Muslim dissidents.’18

TOWARDS AN INDEPENDENT ERITREAN CHURCH

In contrast to Ethiopia, autocephaly in Eritrea was a sudden event, involving the intervention of the Coptic Patriarch Shenouda III. Five new Orthodox bishops for Eritrea were ordained in Cairo in 1994. Subsequent consultation with the Eritrean Orthodox Church resulted in more consecrations. In August 2003 the WCC accepted an application for membership fom the Eritrean Ortho- dox Tewahedo Church. In view of the way the Orthodox Church in Eritrea had been co-opted by the imperial regime, it is understandable that the Eritrean Church felt obliged to dissociate itself from Ethiopia and become a patriotic national church. In February 1994 an agreement was signed in Addis Abeba that reaffirmed the autocephalous status of both the Ethiopian and the Eritrean church, and that recognised the primacy of honour of the Coptic Church among the Orthodox Churches in Africa. Provision was made for a very close cooperation between the two churches, including regular bilateral consultations, mutual representation in ecumenical forums and the mention of both patriarchs in liturgical celebrations.19

17 T. Redeker Hepner, ‘Religion, Nationalism, and Transnational Civil Society in the Eritrean Diaspora’, Global Studies in Culture and Power, 10, (2003), pp. 269-293, on p. 273. 18 Hussien, ‘The Conflict in Eritrea Reconsidered’, p. 165. 19 ‘Pope Shenouda Ordains First Eritrean Patriarch’, The Glastonbury Bulletin – The Jour- nal of the British Orthodox Church within the Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexan- dria, 98 (London, July 1998), pp. 197-207. THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 299

There are 1,200,000 registered Orthodox members (other estimates speak of 1,700,000 on a total population of about 3.9 million, with 4% non-religious). This comprises most inhabitants of the central highlands (except for Catholics and Protestants). There are 1,350 churches, 15,000 members of the clergy, 5,666 parish councils, 220 organized Sunday schools, and 22 monasteries. At present there are no talks of cooperation with the Ethiopian Ortho- dox Church due to political and historical tensions.20 Official documentation implies that there is a smooth transition to ecclesiastical independence, but in reality level things looked rather different. Initial reactions in Ethiopia upon hearing of the Coptic intervention were extremely negative and caused a rupture in Ethiopian Orthodox - Coptic relations. There were also com- plaints about a lack of consultation of the Eritrean Church concerning the Coptic choice of the first bishops consecrated for Eritrea. ‘Relations between the Coptic and Ethiopian Churches have been strained since 1994… Dur- ing the recent General assembly of the World Council of Churches in Harare, meetings between the two churches delegations produced hopeful signs that the problems between the two churches soon mighty be healed.’21 In April 1998 Abune Philippos, Bishop of Asmara and former Abbot of Debre Bizen, was ordained Patriarch in Cairo. When I met him in January 1998 he spoke with warmth of his Ethiopian former colleagues, but insisted that there should be no Ethiopian intervention in Eritrean affairs. A proto- col approved by the Holy Synods of the Coptic and Eritrean Orthodox Churches in 1999 re-affirmed the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Eritrea,22 although in foreign branches there is some confusion about the use of epiphets such as Coptic or Tewahedo (united-nature). Abune Philippos died at the age of 101 in September 2002. He was succeeded by the 76 year old Abune Yakob, who died after only two years in office. His successor Abune Antonios was consecrated on Sunday April 25, 2004. The Orthodox Church is still in many ways the official Eritrean national church, and shows less interests in international contacts than other denominations. Yet there is a certain tension between religion and nationalist politics. ‘Since politics is

20 R. Voigt, ‘Die Erythräisch-Orthodoxe Kirche’, Oriens Christianus, 83 (1999), pp. 185- 192, on p. 190. 21 ‘Hope For Improved Relations Between Coptic and Ethiopian Churches’, Glastonbury Bul- letin, 100 (London, June 1999), pp. 71-72. 22 ‘The Orthodox Church in Eritrea’, ibid., p. 58. 300 JOACHIM G. PERSOON everywhere, many people especially in Eritrea, think nationalism can be like a god, with a small “g”’.23

THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE RECENT FRONTIER CONFLICT ON THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN ETHIOPIA

As an immediate result of the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998 many churches and religious institutions in the zone of combat were destroyed and a great deal of the population was displaced.24 Since Ethiopia is much bigger, the reper- cussions of the war were less serious than in Eritrea. The war re-established an awareness of the importance of a sense of national identity linked with religious affiliation. After a period of internal disunity, his support of the war efforts enabled the Ethiopian Patriarch, Abune Paulos, to reassert control over the church and to weaken the opposing factions. In 2000 the Norwegian national Church invited the religious leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea to a meeting of reconciliation in Oslo. It was one of six peace meetings held in Europe, the United States and Kenya before the religious leaders visited each other’s capital. The visits of the Ethiopian religious leaders to Eritrea and of the Eritrean religious leaders to Ethiopia were instru- mental in restoring cordial relations after the bitterness of the war with all its bloodshed. Abune Paulos described it as ‘a healing of wounds,’ and the Eritrean Grand Mufti Sheikh Alamin Usman Alamin as part of ‘a holy mission’ and ‘a historic day’. The encounters were particularly significant because there are no other contacts between the two countries. The border conflict resulted in an expulsion of Eritreans from Ethiopia (allegedly for supporting the enemy) and of (a smaller number) of Ethiopi- ans from Eritrea. In 1998 over a million people lived in tents, with their religious leaders but without any provisions to practice their faith. Certain minority churches were hit most strongly. Many Catholics in Ethiopia were Eritreans. The sudden exodus of a large number of them was keenly felt. An ethnic group known as the Irob (who speak Saho) and living along the Ethio- Eritrean border have traditionally been receptive to Catholic missions and inhabit an area that is completely impoverished through drought and crop failure. In the wake of the war up to 90% of the population was in need of

23 Redeker Hepner, ‘Religion, Nationalism, and Transnational Civil Society’, p. 283. 24 In the eparchy (diocese) of Adigrat in Tigray alone, 300,000 people were displaced. THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 301 food aid. There are many Catholic institutions in the border area, and the local Catholic Bishop at Adigrat lobbied for the inclusion of Catholic parishes in the Ethiopian section in the run up to a final negotiated resolution.25 The Ethiopian side26 made accusations (denied by the Eritreans) that advanc- ing Eritrean troops targeted churches. Certain churches and religious institutions were destroyed in the fighting in places such as the important border town of Zalambassa.27 Several of these are now being reconstructed. How- ever, the nearby ancient Orthodox monastery of Ham Libanos survived unscathed. Catholic clergy and nuns were arrested by Eritrean forces in Alitiena, marched across the border and subsequently imprisoned in Eritrea. A few priests are listed among the Ethiopian civilians still missing after the war.28

THE LONG TERM INFLUENCE OF THE BORDER WAR ON THE SPIRITUAL SITUATION IN ERITREA

In Eritrea leading members of certain church communities were drafted into the army which had a direct influence on church life, especially because many of them did not return. In addition the political tensions had a strong impact on the situation of the Church in general. Since mid-2001 Eritrea experienced its worst internal unrest in half a century. The gains achieved since independence were virtually demolished by the border war of 1998-2000. The war provoked an uprise of nationalism and debates on the regime itself. Provocative letters were addressed to the president and the nation was abuzz with the winds of change. The regime reacted ruthlessly and abruptly: students were sent to workcamps, the independent press was shut down and the unions were suppressed. Eleven members of the government “disappeared” and a couple of others slipped into exile. ‘The Catholic bishops were

25 Open Letter of Abune Tesfaselassie Medhin to Kofi Anan and others, dated 10 August 2003. 26 Eyewitnesses reported that the Eritreans tried to bombard Debre Damo. An Orthodox Church was said to have been bombed by Eritreans coming from Zalambassa, and the church of Feia Keshi was destroyed. 27 Zalambessa was systematically bulldozed, the Catholic Church lost eight of its institutions. 28 Among those missing are Keshi Adduma Medhin, Keshi Girmay Fitiwi Tesfu, Keshi Hadgu Gebray (from a list by Fr. Hagos Woldu of the Catholic Secretariat). 302 JOACHIM G. PERSOON reprimanded for their critiques and the Church’s press, the oldest in Ethiopia was closed.’29 The government became increasingly intolerant, reacting against Eritrean soldiers who had converted to evangelical Christianity by listening to radio pro- grammes during the war. They were subjected to extreme punishment, including incarceration in metal containers (which were very hot during the day and cold at night) which apparently resulted in some deaths. This can only be under- stood against the abckground of the doctrine of ‘self-mobilisation’, a corner- stone of Eritrean nationalism.30 Anything that threatens to undermine this ‘self- mobilisation’ can be seen as treason. Eritrean officials explained that soldiers were not imprisoned because they possessed Bibles, but because they had allowed themselves to be indoctrinated. Drastic measures were required to preserve the integrity of the armed forces.31 Similar measures prevented “foreign” religious influence from penetrating in other sectors of the society. The heightened tensions, even in the Diaspora communities in The Netherlands, obviously made Eritrean and Ethiopian Orthodox faithful less willing to pray together.

THE IMPACT OF EVANGELICAL AND PENTECOSTAL CHURCHES IN FEDERAL ETHIOPIA AND INDEPENDENT ERITREA

The Charismatic movement that is active in most Protestant churches since the 1960s has promoted an experiential rather than fundamentalist religious mode suited to the African context. Persecuted under communist rule, Pen- tecostals and evangelicals went underground and flourished after the fall of the communist regime. The Pentecostal movement spread its message on the wings of more secular sectors of the globalisation process, as Catholic and traditional Protestant missions had accompanied colonial expansion. It was ‘characterised by the paradox of flow and closure projecting a vision of “moder- nity”, which emphasised the “Spirit” in a way evoking the evanescent, ambiguous nature of globalisation’.32 Pentecostalism grew due to the crisis in the

29 Redeker Hepner, ‘Religion, Nationalism, and Transnational Civil Society’, p. 284. 30 Cf. ‘Popular Mobilization in the Eritrean National Liberation Struggle’, Eritrean Stud- ies Review, 2 (1997), 1, pp. iii-viii. 31 From an interview with a senior member of the Eritrean Catholic Secretariat who preferred to remain anonymous. 32 A. Corten and R. Marshall-Fratani, Between Babel and Pentecost Transnational Pente- costalism in Africa and Latin America (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2001), p. 5. THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 303 old mechanisms of identification. It proved to be flexible, yet it was also able to offer a stable collection of formulae and organised structures, enabling Africans to opt into the global order. Pentecostalism appeared as an alternative imagined community, growing in the face of ethno-regional tensions and political crisis, facilitating social ascent in the cities, and modifying the rural areas. Evangelical groups in Ethiopia are going through a period of rapid growth. The Mekane Yesus Churches (Ethiopian Lutherans; 2 million members) are now divided along ethnic lines, one section having links with the Oromo33 ethnic liberation movement. The Kale Heywot [Word of Life] Church has more members but a less prominent national profile due to its former foreign leadership [Sudan Interior Mission]. Mulu Wangel [Full Gospel], the biggest and oldest Pentecostal Church in Ethiopia, is independent but has international contacts. Charismatic Meserete Christos [Based on Christ] Church, originally a Mennonite mission, is the fastest growing church. Most other Evangelical or Pentecostal churches operate in cities or in one particu- lar region, thus avoiding ethnic tensions. The Evangelical Churches use a large percentage of their budget for missionary work and evangelism. In 1960 there were fewer than 200,000 Evangelicals, less than 1% of the population. By 1984 they numbered 7 %, and 11% in 1994; by 1997 there were 8 million Evangelical Christians in Ethiopia. Togther they represent 14% of the population. Federal Ethiopia constitutes a fertile terrain for evangelical expansion The Eritrean government appears to be doing its best to prevent a similar phenomenon in their country. The first to experience repression were Jeho- vah’s Witnesses, who refused to participate in the 1993 independence refer- endum and to serve in the army. After the war of liberation was over, people expected to enjoy religious freedom. However, only Orthodox, Muslims, Catholics, and Lutherans were officially recognised by the government. In 1995 a new law ordered all religious groups to re-register. The Kale Heywot Church which had been founded back in 1953 and had been recognised by the British, the Imperial and the communist government suddenly was declared illegal. In 2002 this and other churches were first told to halt worship services and then apply for registration. When this was not granted,

33 The Oromo, formerly known as the Galla tribes, who speak languages related to Somali, are now the largest ethnic group. 304 JOACHIM G. PERSOON they were closed. Since then clandestine services have been arranged which have resulted in arrests and disappearances. Eritrean political leaders warned church leaders not to oppose these measures and accused them of being supported by Western governments. The major Evangelical groups are almost equal in size: the Kale Heywot and Mulu Wangel both have approximately 20,000 members. Lutherans account for a further 10 to15,000, and there are said to be at least 10,000 Evangeli- cal Orthodox. In the 1980s there were only a few hundred Evangelicals. Var- ious explanations are offered for the anti-Evangelical policy: It would result from the desire not to disturb the delicate religious balance in the country, or to placate the Orthodox Church. It is ironic that the Evangelicals, who were more supportive of independence than the Orthodox, are now being considered as unpatriotic.34 There is a well known case of two pastors from the Mulu Wangel Church, Dr. Gebremeskel and Naizgi, whose brothers fought side by side with the current president of Eritrea, Isaias Aferwerki. As someone noted, ‘The dead would turn over in their graves if they knew that their fight for freedom resulted in a regime which imprisoned their brothers.’35 The Eritrean Constitution guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and belief,36 but this is confined to state endorsed religious beliefs and expressions. The President declared that independent Churches must be stopped because they are destroying the unity of the Eritrean people and are distorting the true meaning of religion.’Unjustified fragmentation has its costs. It represents a caricature and abuse of democracy. It is also a diversion of badly needed national resources that should be channelled into more constructive enter- prises.’37 Recent reports indicate a deterioration of the situation. Since March of this year raids on house meetings have intensified and between 6 and 9 September about 700 members of Christian churches were arrested. The former ambassador of France to Eritrea expressed great concern about the situation: ‘That which strikes me especially is the dignity and discretion of the Eritreans, who are probably linked with their past and culture, but

34 Information supplied by an Eritrean Evangelical pastor who now lives in England and prefers to remain anonymous. 35 H. Yohannes, ‘Vervolging, Verloren oorlog tegen God en zijn schepselen’, Jubilee Cam- paign in actie voor godsdienstvrijheid en kinderrechten, 8 (October 5, 2004), pp. 2-3. 36 Eritrean Constitution, Chapter 3, Article 9. 37 President I. Aferwerki, ‘Democracey in Africa: an African View’, Eritrean Studies Review, 2 (1998), 2, pp. 133-141, on p. 141. THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 305 above all with the dolorous (painful) present.’38 He described in detail the circumstances which gave rise to this attitude towards religion: ‘It is undeniable that the situation concerning human rights and public liberties is far from satisfactory. The country has regressed from 2001, … the question is to know if this regression is justified and how it can be explained. The war (of liberation) facilitated constituting a state, which has qualities, which are very real and rare in Africa (the absence of corruption, efficient organisation and con- secration to the service of the public good) and above all the creation of a national unity in a country of extreme diversity. As a young country, in com- paratively rapid social and political transition … Eritrea still finds herself in an unstable situation.’39

DIFFERENT ACCENTS IN THE ORTHODOX TRADITION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA

The Orthodox Church in Ethiopia and Eritrea basically follows the same rites, although there are some differences in practice due to varying political and social circumstances. Unlike in Ethiopia, in Eritrea monks rarely live in the cities. Begging for alms near churches is officially forbidden in Eritrea, while this is common in Ethiopia. Preaching hermits, who are such a characteristic (and uncontrollable) part of the Ethiopian church scene, are scarcely present in Eritrea. The Eritrean Orthodox Church gives the impression of being more efficiently organised than the Ethiopian in certain respects, but seemed to have less support among the younger gen- erations in the cities. In the important Eritrean monastery of Debre Bizen I was told that many of the students in the traditional education system were from Tigrey (the Northermost province of Ethiopia) and not from Eritrea. A striking example of the difference in atmosphere between the two countries is the celebration of the festival of Epiphany or Timkat.40 In Asmara in 1998, only a small percentage of the population participated in the celebration. In Addis Ababa the whole city appeared to be involved in the processions

38 A. Leterrier, ‘Eritrée. Un pays qui reste digne en toutes circonstances. Entretien avec Gérard Sambrana, ambassadeur de France en Eritrée’, Les Nouvelles d’Addis, 39 (Janvier- Mars 2004), p. 6. 39 Ibid., p. 5. 40 I.e., the Baptism, traditionally celebrated in an exuberant way. 306 JOACHIM G. PERSOON carrying the tabots.41 I was later told that in Eritrea the festival had become less popular because it was associated with the imperial rule. In Eritrea (as under the former Ethiopian communist regime) there is a very powerful Ministry of Religious Affairs. The influence of this body is apparent from an incident that involved Mr. Takle Mariam Merkehazian, the 62 years old editor-in-chief of two church publications, Fnote Berhan and Bserate Gezan. Formerly residing in Germany, he returned to Eritrea to participate in the reconstruction of the Orthodox Church. Since 1994 he has written several challenging articles to defend the autonomy of the Church. Last April he was summoned for questioning by security agents. His family and friends are still unaware of his whereabouts. His wife gave up hope after looking for her husband in every police station in Asmara.42 In both Ethiopia and Eritrea there has been a controversy on some renewal movements within the Orthodox Church that seem to be influenced by Evan- gelical ideas (in Ethiopia called ‘tehadeso’). There have been reported some cases of violence in Ethiopia, but nothing comparable to what happened in Eritrea where such groups are systematically eliminated. In 2001 young people were beaten up in Asmara and religious literature, including bibles, were burned. Such groups are claimed to originate from Ethiopia and to be associated with people known as amichey (those who speak imperfect Tigrenya), and thus perceived as foreign to the local church.43 These actions caused certain groups to abandon the Orthodox Church and seek support from Protes- tant groups. The use of certain symbols indicates a difference in attitude and means of identification. Thus the camel has become a national symbol in Eritrea despite its associations with Arabic and Islamic tradition because of the services it pro- vided during the revolution. In Eritrea church buildings have disappeared from tourist posters, while they remain much in evidence in Ethiopia. I was told by officials of the Ministry of Tourism that they rather regarded the natural beauty of the coast as the major tourist attraction. In some places the Eritrean Orthodox Church abroad calls itself the ‘Eritrean Coptic Orthodox

41 The tabot is the representation of the Arc of the Covenant ( holiest object in the Church), which is carried to the water during the celebration. 42 ‘Official of Eritrean Orthodox Tewahedo Church in Jail’, see http://www.sudantri- bune.com/article.php3?id_article=5896 (December 15, 2004). 43 According to a member of the Eritrean Catholic secretariat. THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 307

Church’ and in some others the ‘Eritrean Tewahedo Orthodox Church’,44 indicating the ambiguous relationship with Ethiopia and Egypt.

FROM COLONIAL TO INDIGENOUS CATHOLICISM AND THE IMPACT OF NGOS

Catholicism in Ethiopia and Eritrea is mainly associated with certain ethnic groups as a result of the imperial policy to encourage the establishment of missions in peripheral areas. In the north of Ethiopia it is anchored within the historic context of the wider Semito-Ethiopian tradition; in the South- ern tribal region it has adopted a more locally orientated strategy linked to Western paradigms of development. Catholics in Eritrea follow the Ge’ez rite. The Catholic Eastern Rite Church of Ethiopia formally exists since 1939 and has at least 700,000 members. Catholics often belong to minority groups such as the Bilen and the Kunama. They are said to represent 3.4 to 5% of the country’s 3.5 million inhabitants. In Ethiopia the Catholic Church is characterised by a dynamic for modernization that is inspired by the Second Vatican Council. Through education and health care the Church often provides indispensable services, much to the concern of the Orthodox Church.45 Increasing use of Orthodox traditions by the Catholics, including the Ge’ez rite, has raised suspicions. A project of joint Catholic/Orthodox evangelism in Goma Gofa (by the Fathers of the Holy Spirit) proved to be controversial. The impact of the Catholic Church as a catalyst for development exceeds its numerical strength. Originally an essentially foreign institution, the Church is currently administered by local leaders using a modern discourse to explore and develop indigenous traditions. The present generation of young clergy actively seeks to respond to the challenges of a civil society. The potential for ecumenical cooperation, however, has been somewhat frustrated by inherent suspicions and the emergence of ‘tribal mentalities’. On a visit to Rome, the Ethiopian Prime-Minister Meles Zenawi asked the pope to establish a Catholic university in Addis Ababa, which is a sign of the Church’s vitality and a promise for its future.

44 Tewahedo means ‘united nature’ or ‘mia-physite’, and is associated with the Ethiopian tradition. 45 T. Tamrat, ‘Evangelizing the Evangelized: The Root Problem between Missions and the Ethiopia Orthodox Church’, in The Missionary Factor in Ethiopia, eds. G. Haile, A. Lande, and S. Rubenson (Frankfurt, 1998), pp. 17-30. 308 JOACHIM G. PERSOON

The relationship between church and state is quite different in the two countries. Since the Portuguese in the 16th century tried to bring the Ethiopian Orthodox Church under the control of Rome, the Catholic Church has often been seen as potentially subversive and unpatriotic. But it is also true that ‘Etritrea gewann seine Identität auch dank seiner katholischen Mission und dank der Errichtung eines katholischen Bischofswesen.’46 There were rumours that Catholic priests had assisted the freedom fighters. The link with the Ital- ian colonial government gave the Catholic Church certain privileges: ‘Als die Italienische Regierung die Prachtstrasse Asmaras anlegte und die Eingebore- nen von dort an den Stadtrand verwies, sicherte sie auch der katholischen Kirche die städtebaulich beherrschende Mitte.’47 Consequently the Catholic Church in Eritrea has a high public profile and is well endowed materially: it runs orphanages, clinics, and schools, as well as the University of Asmara.48 It is not unusual to hear that the present government is very much pro- Orthodox and only tolerates the Catholics as some sort of remnant of the colonial past. The Eritrean Catholic Church is unique in maintaining a link with its Ethiopian neighbour. The two are members of the same Bishops’ Conference. However, the nunciature is now linked with that of Sudan. The Catholics are better prepared to act independently, although Catholic institutions are not exempt from political pressures, as was demonstrated again when its press was closed. Ecumenical relations in Ethiopia are limited to a few organisations, such as the International Bible Society and the All Africa Council of Churches. In Eritrea they are virtually nonexistent, although the clergy of different churches knows and respects each other. Eritrean Catholics resisted government pressure to support the closing of Evangelical Churches emphasising instead the human rights and freedom of conscience.49 NGOs have increasingly come to dominate the interaction between international Christendom and Ethiopia. They justify the presence of Church personnel and even actively contribute to the expansion of Catholicism.

46 K. Zelleke and F. Heyer, Das Orthodoxe Äthiopien und Eritrea in jüngste Geschichte (Aachen - Heidelberg, 2001), p. 156. 47 Ibid., p. 160. 48 Tekeste Negash, The Catholic Mission and the Catholic Community in Eritrea, 1894- 1950’, in The Missionary Factor in Ethiopia, pp. 121-134. 49 From a conversation with a Eritrean Catholic Bishop in November 2004. THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 309

Government control of the NGOs weakened as a result of the famine of the mid 1980s, which revealed the failure of the regime’s top-down model of development. Cooperation with NGOs turned out to be vital, and hence anti-religious propaganda was reduced. World Vision, one of the few NGOs that explicitly promotes conversion, used 20% of its budget for evangelical purposes in the region of Wollaita, the Omo Valley, Kamabata and Hadiya (Timabro area) and on the Shoa/Jimma border. Meles Zenawi criticised the foreign NGOs for their limited foresight and accountability,50 and began encouraging the growth of national and regional NGOs as local partners. Local religiously inspired NGOs demonstrate the ability of the local churches to take control of the situation. In Eritrea the government is very critical of NGOs and prefers to mobilise its own citizens for development projects. However, the crisis caused by the war resulted in a more flexible attitude towards the NGOs. 51

CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF LOCAL ISLAM AND AFRICAN TRADITIONAL RELI- GIONS

A tradition of mutual tolerance and respect induced Muslims tacitly to accept the centre/ periphery paradigm of Imperial Ethiopia. The gradual and peace- ful penetration of Islam along trade routes was occasionally interrupted by the violent rhetorics of warlike Somali and Sudanese tribes.52 In recent years Islam in Ethiopia is rapidly losing its tribal, nomadic and decentralized elements to become a strong political philosophy that looks towards the Horn of Africa and the Muslim Middle East.53 Its recognition by the Communist regime as an indigenous religion equal to others dramatically altered its profile

50 He echoed the theme of G. Hancock’s Lords of Poverty (London, 1989). 51 Due to the crisis following Ethiopia’s invasion the number of foreign aid organisations that are active in the country rose considerably. In November 2000, there were 34 international and 13 national NGOs. See N. Hirt, Eritrea zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Die Entwicklungen seit der Unabhängigkeit, Institut Für Afrika-Kunde im Verband Deutsches Übersee-Institut, 62 (Hamburg, 2001), p. 113. 52 See H. Ehrlich, ‘The Saudis and Ethiopia – Which Islam?’; paper read at the XVth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (Hamburg, 21-25 July, 2003). 53 H. Erlich, ‘The Horn of Africa and the Middle East: Politicization of Islam in the Horn and Depoliticization of Ethiopian Christianity’, ed. J. Tubiana, Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies. (Nice – Rotterdam, 1980), pp. 403-410, on p. 405. 310 JOACHIM G. PERSOON and initiated a huge programme of mosque building. The growing importance of the peripheries after 1991 further underlined the demographic strength of Islam and its spiritual and commercial links with the adjacent Ara- bian heartland.54 In contrast, in Eritrea rigid control has forced local Islamic leaders to relinquish their political ambitions. The introduction of a Federal system activated the political strength of the peripheries. This also affected the status of traditional tribal religions, providing political incentives to revive them. Tribal religions that had been relegated to the shadowy sphere of folk religion, the occult and the esoteric, such as Amhara and Oromo Zarr cults,55 were suddenly taken more seriously again in Ethiopia. An interest in oral literature with its religious undertones encouraged the politicisation of the indigenous spiritual heritage. In Eritrea there is a small community of Kunamas (Gash-Setit) who practice their own traditional religion, centred around the worship of Anna, the Creator, and the veneration of ancestral heroes.

THE ETHIOPIAN AND ERITREAN DIASPORA AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE INTERNAL RELIGIOUS SITUATION

Until 1991 Ethiopians and Eritreans constituted the largest African refugee population in the United States. While the diaspora communities in North America and Europe remain predominantly Christian, those in the Middle East and Northern Africa are largely Muslim. Despite the differences in political identities and occasional tensions between Muslims and Christians, the most sustainable institutions to emerge in the diaspora communities have been religious ones. In the West religious identity and gatherings lessened the impact of political identities that often threaten to weak associations of a secular nature. Practicing identity through religion challenges the power of the State to exercise control over diaspora communities and to dictate national identity. New spaces for political action have been created. The relative autonomy of the churches and their international contacts have allowed them to use religion in constituting a civil society.56

54 A. al-Hashimi, The Oppressed Muslims in Ethiopia (Washington, 1987), pp. 49 and 56. 55 See H. Aspen, Amhara Traditions of Knowledge. Spirit Mediums and Their Clients (Wies- baden, 2001). 56 A good example is the way Evangelical Eritrean Churches abroad have lobbied for religious and other freedom rights in Eritrea, provoking criticism of the present regime. THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 311

The Eritrean government tries to prevent political intervention by the diaspora and to maintain control over secular associations. Incipient trans-nationalism, supported both by American traditions and newer patterns of a global and de-territorialized religion, enable the diaspora to redefine nationalism, with important political implications. In Ethiopia international lobby groups have an easier access to the country. Oromo organisations connected with the Mekane Yesus Church have benefited from their contacts with German Luther- ans to exercise political leverage. Ethnic cleavages within the Ethiopian diaspora have expressed opposition to the Patriarch, who is associated with the present Tigrean government. An alternative ‘Holy Synod’ has been established by canonically consecrated bishops in the United States, many of whom are associated with the former imperial capital of Gondar. They have engaged in some political-religious agitation, especially through publications in the free press. The Eritrean Orthodox Church, like the Eritrean government, attempts to keep control on the diaspora communities in order to suppress the internal reformist movement adopting charismatic or ‘foreign’ elements. To stop the proliferation of such reformist congregations in the diaspora the Church is strengthening its trans-national structure. Not considered as a threat in Ethiopia, influences of globalising tendencies are vigorously opposed in a centrally organised state as Eritrea, so as to avoid challenges to nationalism and state power. As one author puts it, ‘What will happen when the by- products of globalisation meet again in Eritrean (and Ethiopian) territory, both enabled and circumscribed by trans-nationalism? Serious conflicts could arise between local and diaspora agendas and more importantly between Muslims and Christians.’57 The determination of the Eritrean government to steer its own course and to consolidate the hegemony of state power without regard for foreign opin- ion was once again illustrated by recent events. A congress of the Eritrean Holy Synod (6-7 August 2005) decided that the acting Patriarch Abune Antonios should be ‘frozen’. This euphemism, commonly used in Eritrean government circles, indicates that someone has fallen out of favour and been forced to leave his position. The reason was that the Patriarch had dared to challenge government interference in the administration of the Patriarchate and had

57 Redeker Hepner, ‘Religion, Nationalism, and Transnational Civil Society’, p. 288. 312 JOACHIM G. PERSOON opposed the government representative, Mr. Yeftehe Dimetros. Abune Anto- nios had been consacrated by Pope Shenoda and the Eritrean Holy Synod accompanied by a Coptic delegation in 2004. His resignation caused a break with the Coptic Orthodox Church. Some reports indicate that the Patriarch has already been replaced by Abune Dioskoros, and there are conflicting ver- sions of his present fate, including claims that he has been imprisoned. The most robust opposition to these developments came from the Council of Priests and Administrative Board of the Eritrean Orthodox Church of the Diocese of North America. In a special meeting in Atlanta it issued a number of resolutions (September 17, 2005). Abune Antonios was recognized as the legitimate Patriarch, and the Eritrean Synod’s trumped up accusations against him were denounced. The summary expulsion of the sole Anglican priest in Asmara, Rev. N. Fernandez, on the 29th October, which caused great concern in various countries, is a further indication of the government’s uncompromising policy.58

CONCLUSION

‘The Eritrean conflict (1961-1991) was initiated by a group of Muslims to counter the anticipated predominance and pressure from Christians.’59 Over the years its features may have changed, yet religion continued to play an important role. The complexity of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict cannot be characterised by a simple division between religious groups. Religion interacts with other factors, such as political ideology and geopolitics. A comparison between Ethiopia and Eritrea demonstrates that religious policy is linked with wider issues, such as attitudes to state formation. With the transition from a centralised model (as followed by the Imperial and Com- munist governments) to a federal system, the Ethiopian government adopted

58 References: Asmarino Independent news: http://news9.asmarino.com/content/view/ 506/86/ (November 2, 2005); Yahoo Groups: Arbible Messages: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/arbible/message/23974 (October 30, 2005); http://tewahedo.com/newsEven_DioceseResolutions-917-05.htm (October 30, 2005); Resolutions of the Diocese of North America of the Eritrean Ortho- dox Church (September 17, 2005); http//www.roarate.com/rorate/scripts/nws-art. php?id=20595 RKnieuws.net (November 2, 2005). 59 Hussien ‘’The Conflict in Eritrea Reconsidered’, p. 166. THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 313 a “laissez-faire” attitude to religion. The last vestiges of the ancient alliance between the Orthodox Church and the state were destroyed. (Militant) Islam and the Protestant and Catholic missionary churches gained political significance. In contrast, in Eritrea a one-party state model has consolidated itself, which does everything in its means to preserve the ethos of a liberation movement with its emphasis on idealism and sacrifice for the public good. ‘As a unity forged in war and sacrifice, it has its strong side. But it is a unity in the context of a highly traditional society, (with) parochial and sectarian attitudes. Until economic resurgence … creates new social bases and national rela- tionships, the likelihood that multiparty politics would divide the country into regional and religious factions is a real possibility and danger.’60 The president of Eritrea repeatedly has indicated that Western criteria or timetables for democracy are not relevant: ‘In my view democracy is not only culture-and- time dependent, but the dynamic process of its evolution requires much effort and a prolonged period. Our perspectives on generalizable models and unrealistic time-frames must therefore be adjusted accordingly.’61 The imperative to preserve national unity in Eritrea has resulted in a model that goes in the opposite direction from that in Ethiopia. The Ministry of Religious Affairs rigidly supervises the activities of all religious groups. The Orthodox Church has gained an increased status and official recognition, as evidenced by the construction of its new headquarters in Asmara and the presence of government officials at important ceremonies. But any sign of resistance and social reconstruction in traditional organized religion (Ortho- doxy or Islam) is immediately curtailed and severely restricted. The government is doing its utmost to avoid the influence of international movements. In the aftermath of the disastrous border war criticism of the government was considered a danger for the national unity. It resulted in severe restrictions on civil society (much of which is associated with religion) and repression of ‘foreign’ religious groups felt to undermine the national integrity. Yet it seems likely that even in Eritrea religion will continue to play a crucial role in society. Religious values are not transformed as easily as are the political ideologies or philosophies employed by the ruling elite. ‘The international

60 M. Doornbos and A. Tsegai, Postconflict Eritrea: Prospects for Reconstruction and Devel- opment, (Laurenceville – Asmara, 1999), p. 323. 61 Pres. I. Aferwerki, ‘Democracy in Africa: an African View’, p. 138. 314 JOACHIM G. PERSOON as well as regional climate finds in religion a force for forging alliances with regional powers as well as mustering domestic support. Subsequently further polarisation of religious groups in Eritrea and lack of interest to rectify past mistakes will provide additional impetus to an already tense situation.’62 As in other former communist countries, ethnicity is reaffirming itself. The Orthodox Church, overwhelmed by the financial advantages of their foreign competitors, has reacted aggressively. However, one also notes posi- tive signs of cooperation in the struggle against Aids and of the joint initia- tives for peace and reconciliation after the Ethio-Eritrean border war. The Orthodox Patriarchs of Eritrea and Ethiopia, Catholic bishops, imams, and Protestant ministers convened in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Sweden, and Nor- way to address the consequences of the war. The bitter legacy of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict is very apparent in the tensions that are presently visible in Eritrea. But religion has traditionally been a means to mobilise the population to express solidarity and to work together for the common good. The churches and monasteries have been the centres of assistance and comfort for the poor and distressed. They have also been sources of useful cultural knowledge concerning such things as herbal med- icine and ecologically responsible agriculture. Religious organisations have a unique opportunity to mobilise local communities to improve themselves by developing techniques in harmony with local traditions and customs. They are indispensable for the development of civil society, conceived of as the space between the state and the community or family, which is essential for cultivating a genuine democracy.63

SUMMARY

The Ethio-Eritrean conflict is normally not associated with religion, yet religion played an important role from the beginning. It was not a conflict between religious groups, but religious elements were part of a wider constellation of factors that interacted. Political events also had a direct impact on internal policies

62 Hussien, ‘The Conflict in Eritrea Reconsidered’, p. 166. 63 See the importance of tradition and the concept of survival in M. Kebede, Survival and Modernization. Ethiopia’s Enigmatic Present. A Philosophical Discourse (Lauwrenceville – Asmara, 1999). THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT 315

towards religion, especially in Eritrea after the latest border conflict. This contributed to the creation of the present crisis, especially with regard to the Evan- gelical-Pentecostal churches. In addition, the religious element is very influential in the diaspora. The present governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea share a common origin as resistance movements. Originally they had the same or a similar ideology, but they developed in very different directions after the independence of Eritrea. This article seeks to elucidate how religious factors play an important role at all levels of the public life.