------ 93 modernizing modernizing logistics not Logistics is perhaps the most complex complex most is perhaps the Logistics In addition to ensuring that modernized lo The success of logistics during the The success of military logistics breadth, depth, and complexity, it can be con and complexity, breadth, depth, past 16-plus years of overseas combat opera combat overseas of years 16-plus past intensity as other profession with the same sidered an assumed capability—something sidered an assumed capability—something ernized force. day’s military. Unfortunately, to those unfa to those Unfortunately, military. day’s to connected not is that function office” environment security national ever-changing gistics capabilities are appreciated as central capabilities are appreciated as central gistics gistics enterprise. This dangerous assumption gistics and interrelated capability provided by to by provided capability interrelated and and Russia, are debated. Failure to understand to understand and Russia, are debated. Failure advantage over major competitors like China China like competitors major advantage over terprise is rarely debated outside the logistics logistics terprise is rarely debated outside the tions is partly to blame for anyone’s assump tions is partly to blame for anyone’s in the success logistical continued that tion the implications of tially spells doom for the success of the mod- to regaining our military advantage, logistics that simply happens—or, worse yet, a “back worse yet, that simply happens—or, conversa the from logistics exclude to tends current and future tion regarding the nation’s the need to regain our military technological training, equipping, deploying, and employing and employing deploying, training, equipping, the force. therefore affects every aspect of organizing, of organizing, aspect every therefore affects is a given across the entirety of the military lo across the entirety is a given in a time of great technological change poten miliar with its intellectual and technological miliar with its intellectual and technological especially needs, more publicized warfighting fighting capability. warfighting needs. As a result, the logistics en a result, the logistics As needs. warfighting - - - - - is 1 3 The Joint Chiefs of The Joint The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military Heritage Foundation The 2 elaborates on this definition elaborates on this definition

Logistics until shortly before II, but the War until shortly before World he term “logistics” commonly used not was

This simple two-sentence statement ef statement two-sentence simple This The Merriam-Webster online dictionary dictionary online The Merriam-Webster —Major-General Clausewitz, Carl von between the economy of the Nation and the of the Nation and the the economy between been around since the earliest days of warfare. of warfare. days been around since the earliest fectively captures both the complexity and and complexity the both captures fectively far-reaching implications for the nation and implications for the nation and far-reaching far-reaching implications of military logistics. implications of military logistics. far-reaching facilities, and personnel.” and facilities, environment of the combat forces.” environment defines logistics as “the aspect of military sci as “the aspect of military defines logistics mainte ence dealing with the procurement, concept and understanding of logistics have have of logistics and understanding concept and quotes Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles’s Rear Admiral E. Eccles’s and quotes Henry ’s marching is simply that he should fight at the marching right place and the right time. the military element of national power and and the military element of national power the Nation and with the tactical concepts and the Nation and with the tactical concepts the true essence of military logistics. tactical operations of its combat forces. Ob tactical operations of its combat forces. objective of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and of his sleeping, eating, objective clothed, armed, and trained, the whole the trained, clothed, armed, and harmony, both with the economic system of of with the economic system both harmony, ic system of the nation, military logistics has has of the nation, military logistics ic system nance, and transportation of military materiel,nance, and transportation of military viously then, the logistics system must be in in be must system viously then, the logistics From the farthest tactical edge the farthest to the econom From 1959 statement that “Logistics is the bridge that “Logistics 1959 statement

In Clausewitz’s words, getting the force to the getting words, In Clausewitz’s Logistics: The Lifeblood of Military Power Military of Lifeblood The Logistics:

The end for which a soldier is recruited, T John E. Wissler, Lieutenant General, USMC (Ret.) Lieutenant John E. Wissler, “fight at the right place and the right time” right and the place right the at “fight capabilities must be considered in the ongoing ll Medical services including patient discussion of solutions to overcome the cur- movement, evacuation, and hospitaliza- rent readiness shortfalls of today’s military. tion for U.S. and partner personnel as Logistics is nearly absent from the recent tes- well as indigenous personnel affected timonies by military leaders, members of con- by operations; gress, and industry.4 While all of the testimo- nies highlight the need to modernize the U.S. ll Facilities and infrastructure acquisition, military in order to regain our technological construction, use, and disposition; advantage, few specifically highlight the need for modernized logistics capabilities. ll Provision of food, water, and operational Alan Estevez, former Principal Deputy hygiene and sanitation support; Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and a career Depart- ll Operational contract support including ment of Defense Senior Executive Service lo- contract management; gistics leader, recently stated, “Logistics isn’t 5 rocket science…it’s much harder!” Logistics ll Infrastructure assessment, repairs, is fundamental to the readiness of the entire and maintenance; Joint force—those at home, deployed in oper- ational settings, and permanently stationed ll Common-user logistics support to other abroad—given that it must operate around the U.S. government entities, intergovern- world and across every domain of activity in mental and nongovernmental organiza- spite of enemy efforts to frustrate its opera- tions, and other nations; tions. Consequently, it is far more complex than even the most sophisticated global busi- ll Establishing and sustaining large-scale ness enterprises. and enduring detention compounds;

The Logistics Enterprise ll Planning, coordinating, and integrat- You will not find it difficult to prove that , ing host-nation support from over- campaigns, and even have been won or seas partners; lost primarily because of logistics. —General Dwight D. Eisenhower ll Disposal operations that deal with the removal and remediation of waste and Logistics touches every aspect of military unusable military property; strength and is the sum of the capabilities brought to bear by all of the U.S. military ser- ll In-transit visibility of sustainment and vices and those of a wide array of international asset visibility of all major military end partners.6 items; and The core functions within logistics are sup- ply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, ll Engineering support including horizon- health services, logistic services, engineering, tal and vertical construction of ports, and operational contract support (OCS).7 airfields, and other military support Logistics includes planning and executing infrastructure.8 the movement and support of forces as well as those aspects of military operations that Thus, military logistics’ defining attributes— deal with: agility, survivability, responsiveness, and effec- tiveness—are measured by the breadth and ll The acquisition, storage, distribution, use, depth of these core functions, which affect maintenance, and disposal of materiel; the military from force generation to training

94 2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength to the readiness of units stationed at home the globe creates a distribution pipeline that and abroad. moves critical sustainment from the factory Logistics is the oxygen that allows military to the tactical edge of U.S. military operations. muscle to function, grow, and strengthen. Just In coordination with USTRANSCOM’s dis- as DNA represents “the fundamental and dis- tribution functions, the actions of the Defense tinctive characteristics or qualities of someone Logistics Agency (DLA) as supplier for the mil- or something,”9 logistics planning and modern- itary are equally staggering in scope and scale. ization define the distinctive characteristics or During fiscal year (FY) 2017, DLA provided qualities of the military force and ultimately more than $35 billion in goods and services, provide the military commander the freedom coordinating the actions of 25,000 military, of action, endurance, and ability to extend op- civilian, and contract personnel who provid- erational reach that are necessary to achieve ed food, clothing, fuel, repair parts, and other success. Logistics is the foundation for the items across nine supply chains distributing success of military operations from entry-level approximately 5 million distinct consumable, training to the most complex operations across expendable, and reparable items. DLA’s activ- the spectrum of conflict. From providing the ity is spread across 48 U.S. states and in 28 dif- facilities that house the members of the force ferent countries.12 and the ranges where they , to sustaining These are far from “back office” functions the equipment operate and wear, to and are truly what sustain the force and sup- providing fuel and in operations port its warfighting readiness. The criticality and training, the interconnectedness of lo- of logistics is not a new phenomenon, howev- gistics inextricably links logistics to military er; logistics has a significantly more complex combat power. nature today because of its integration across  U.S. Transportation Command (US- air, land, sea, space, and the information and TRANSCOM) provides daily examples of cyber environments. what it takes to keep U.S. forces and their sustainment moving around the world. US- The Timelessness and Ever-Changing TRANSCOM conducts more than 1,900 air Nature of Logistics missions during an average week and has 25 Amateurs think about tactics, but ships underway and 10,000 ground shipments professionals think about logistics. operating in 75 percent of the world’s coun- —General Robert H. Barrow, USMC tries. It does this with a total wartime person- nel capability of 45,945 active-duty soldiers, Alexander the Great noted with dark hu- sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guards- mor the importance and complexity of logis- men; 73,058 Reserve and Guard personnel; and tics during his campaigns of nearly 19,104 DOD civilian personnel—numbers that 2,400 years ago: “My logisticians are a humor- do not include the significant contributions of less lot…they know if my campaign fails, they USTRANSCOM’s commercial partners or the are the first ones I will slay.”13 Alexander’s abil- contributions of foreign entities.10 ity to move a force from Greece to and Utilizing its people, trucks, trains, railcars, back, conquering adversaries in , Africa, aircraft, ships, information systems, and dis- the Middle East, and Central Asia and leaving tribution infrastructure, as well as commercial functioning outposts along the way, attests to partners’ 1,203 aircraft in the Civil Reserve his logistical prowess. Air Fleet (CRAF) and 379 vessels in the Vol- In the modern era, the appreciation of lo- untary Intermodal Agreement (VISA), gistics by Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander USTRANSCOM provides the U.S. military in Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief with highly responsive strategic mobility.11 Its of Naval Operations during World War II, is handoff to service logistics personnel around equally telling: “I don’t know what the hell this

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 95 ‘logistics’ is that [General George C.] Marshall numbers of non-deployable personnel reduce is always talking about, but I want some of it.”14 the available strength of military units, and Similarly, in his timeless treatise on warfight- without the full complement of personnel, ing, Defeat into Victory, British Field Marshal teams cannot be trained effectively, whether Viscount Slim commented that building his they are ground units, ship’s crews, or aviation ’s logistical infrastructure and supply formations. Personnel readiness is also affect- reserves and maintaining his army’s health ed by other logistics-related issues such as the were two of the three “foundations of victory” lack of training throughput caused by insuffi- in his campaign in Burma and India. The third cient, inadequate, or nonfunctional training fa- foundation, the of his troops, was di- cilities or the disruption caused by manpower rectly affected by the first two.15 Slim’s ability transitions across the force that limit the avail- to innovate in planning, organizing, and sus- ability of ready personnel. taining his logistics enterprise was critical to Equipment readiness is another area of con- his logistics success. cern. Military units cannot perform their mis- These historically rooted truths of the sion without the equipment needed to do so. centrality of logistics to success in war are re- Availability and delivery of parts and spare com- flected in the 2018 National Defense ponents, maintenance capability and the capac- (NDS) in which Secretary of Defense James ity to surge increased maintenance volume on Mattis notes the criticality of logistical prepa- short notice, the ability to contract additional ration to the resilience and agility of U.S. forces support when necessary—all of these logistical in any setting. For the U.S. to be able to sus- elements are essential to military effectiveness. tain effective combat operations in the modern Within logistics, the supply function is era, it must “prioritize prepositioned forward critical to equipment readiness. Simply stat- stocks and munitions, strategic mobility assets, ed, supply readiness is the ability to have the partner and allied support, as well as non-com- right types and amount of equipment available mercially dependent distributed logistics and for a ground unit, a ship, or an aviation unit. maintenance to ensure logistics sustainment Perhaps not so obvious is the interconnected- while under persistent multi-domain attack.”16 ness of supply readiness to all other aspects of unit readiness. Without the right equipment, Demands of Today and Tomorrow units cannot train to the full complement of Logistics is critical not only to employing their mission sets. Lacking something as sim- the force, but also (and perhaps even more im- ple as power generation capability on a ship, on portantly) to building the everyday readiness the ground, or on an aircraft can prevent a unit of the force. At the tactical level, one need only from establishing the look at the various elements of readiness re- capabilities that are vital to modern warfight- porting reviewed by senior leaders to discern ing. As cyber and capabili- that the fundamentals of logistics directly af- ties are introduced to the forward edge of the fect the majority of elements that define read- , individual capabilities represent- iness across the services—personnel, equip- ed by on-hand quantities of various technolo- ment, and supply readiness—which in turn gies and trained personnel will truly define a directly affect the ability of the services to meet unit’s ability to execute the mission-essential the recurring needs of ongoing deployments tasks demanded in the complex warfighting and generate the forces needed for war. environment of a peer adversary. For example, Secretary of Defense Mat- Supply readiness has been the subject of tis’s recently announced intention to reduce various testimonies to Congress regarding the non-deployable personnel is one aspect of readiness of the force on land, in the air, or on force readiness that is affected by the health the sea. Shipyard capacities and the impact services component of logistics.17 Large of deferred maintenance due to shortages of

96 2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength parts in the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps ll Unlike commercial firms that can prepare have been highlighted as factors in the need for by the calendar, the military must operate improved force readiness.18 without knowing when the date of each The impact of logistics beyond readiness event occurs and still have the ability to grows exponentially when taken in the context respond to a sudden change in the “latest of the larger complexities of strategic logistics hot item” within hours, if not minutes. capabilities such as national and international highway, rail, port, and sealift capacities. Re- ll Military forces must receive such support ductions in the size and capability of the indus- regardless of how limited or intermittent trial base, limitations on our national sealift ca- their access to the Internet may be, and pacity, and aging of the infrastructure needed supporting logistics forces must meet the to move personnel, systems, ammu- demand while an enemy is trying to kill nition, and fuel all directly challenge the ability the customers, both at home and in the of the United States to project military power. parking lot, and is destroying the delivery Port facilities capable of handling critical fleet at every opportunity. munitions movements are critical to force de- ployment and sustainment. The U.S. has only To say the least, the challenges of military 23 designated Strategic Seaports—17 commer- logistics are unique. Although many of indus- cially operated and six under military control— try’s best practices and technologies are rel- that make it possible to sustain overseas forces evant and even vital to the modernization of daily and keep them sustained during wartime. military logistics, the agility, survivability, re- , composed of the Civil Reserve air and sponsiveness, and effectiveness of military lo- cargo fleets19 and thus a critical capability gistics require another level of integrated inno-  .that directly affects our ability to move large vation in technology and operational concepts portions of our force and their associated sus- tainment to points of crisis around the globe, The Challenge is similarly limited. To appreciate the challenge confronting At first glance, the challenges of military lo- America’s logistical capabilities, imagine having gistics may appear to be the same as, or at least to execute a future operation similar in scale to very similar to, those experienced by FEDEX, the major deployment of U.S. combat power to Walmart, Amazon, DHL, or any other major Kuwait in preparation for Operation Iraqi Free- supply chain operation supporting vast num- dom (OIF) in March 2003. Now imagine doing bers of customers both internationally and this in an environment devoid of modern in- across the United States. On deeper inspection, frastructure in a manner that defeats an adver- however, the differences are profound. sary’s desire to prevent our use of air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace to project military power, ll Military logistics involves the interaction all in consonance within the complex interrela- of military and government entities with tionships and intricacies that support current private, commercial, foreign, and multina- collective defense arrangements. Imagine fur- tional organizations worldwide. ther that this must be accomplished against a force that has near-parity with our technologi- ll Unlike commercial companies with global cal capabilities and the ability to engage us from distribution operations, the military faces fixed, friendly facilities with engagement timed conflicts that usually erupt with very little on their terms. warning and immediately create enor- While significant force-protection require- mous demands for support akin to the ments affected the deployment of military ca- Christmas rush, the Black Friday crush, pability to Kuwait for combat operations in and Cyber Monday rolled into one. Iraq, the U.S. and partner-nation forces did not

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 97 have to “fight their way to the fight” in Kuwait. Mission ships were directly supporting Additionally, U.S. and partner-nation forces combatants with telemetric, hydro- had significant time to deploy military capa- graphic and acoustic data…. bility, ultimately using a single point of entry with mature facilities and infrastructure and During the height of Operation Iraqi Free- Internet access. dom, MSC had 167 of its 214 active ships In preparation for combat operations in directly supporting the war. Of these Iraq, logisticians had six months to deploy ships, 26 were operated by federally the force and its associated sustainment. U.S. employed mariners and 141, or 84 per- forces initiated the deployment with Military cent, were crewed by merchant mariners Sealift Command (MSC), a USTRANSCOM employed by commercial companies subordinate command, prepositioning assets under contract with MSC. Of the 141 ships, moving to Kuwait beginning in October 2002, 127 ships were carrying combat equip- with the off-load of increased military capabil- ment and cargo from the U.S. or Europe ity beginning in earnest in January 2003 and into the theater of operations or were en wrapping up in April 2003, completing the six- route to load cargo for the operation.20 month force buildup. Six months may seem a long time, but the The same account further reflects that from volume of activity was immense. According to January 2003 through the end of April 2003, one account: MSC delivered more than 21 million square feet of warfighting equipment and supplies, In January 2003, MSC began the build-up 260 million gallons of fuel, and 95,000 tons of for what would become Operation Iraqi ammunition to the Persian Gulf area for the Freedom. In January 2003 momentum Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy war- was really gaining and APS-3 down- fighters involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom. loaded several ships of equipment into More than 90 percent of the military cargo theater. In late March 2003 MSC reached to support OIF was delivered by MSC ships. a peak of 167 ships in the “Steel Bridge of While 10 percent of the cargo was delivered by Democracy”, carrying “the torch of free- other means, primarily aircraft, understanding dom to the Iraqi people” in the words of the magnitude and significance of sea-based Rear Admiral D. L. Brewer III, Commander, sustainment is critical to understanding what Military Sealift Command. it takes to deploy and employ the U.S. military. At the same time, Naval Fleet Auxiliary The span of that bridge was literally a Force oilers pumped more than 117 million ship every 72 miles from the US to Kuwait. gallons of fuel to Navy combat ships for bun- That was more than 78 percent of the to- kering and aircraft fuel. Of the 42 ships in the tal MSC active fleet of 214 ships that day— Prepositioning Program, 33 were underway ships dedicated to supporting the US or had already off-loaded gear for warfighting forces…. The mix of ships encompassed forces in the Persian Gulf area. all four of MSC’s programs, and included In the MSC Sealift Program, 106 of 115 the U.S. Maritime Administration’s Ready ships, including government-owned surge Reserve Force, and more than four times sealift ships, Maritime Administration Ready the normal daily number of commercial Reserve Fleet ships, and chartered commercial ships. Twenty-five of 33 Naval Fleet Aux- ships, were carrying equipment and supplies iliary Force ships were providing combat for the Army’s 3rd and 4th Divisions, logistics for the carrier strike groups and 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, and V amphibious strike groups involved in Op- Corps and the Marine Corps’ I and II Marine eration Iraqi Freedom. Three of 25 Special Expeditionary Forces. Additionally, two of

98 2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength the three Maritime Prepositioning squadrons or chartered for the command’s support supporting the U.S. Marine Corps were un- of U.S. forces in OIF.23 loaded at the Ash Shuayba Port in Kuwait. By late April 2003, more than 150 MSC ships had While the immensity of this undertaking is off-loaded in Kuwaiti ports.21 staggering, it pales in comparison to the require- It should be noted, however, that in the ment laid out for the future military force in the years since these tremendous accomplish- National Defense Strategy (NDS). The future ments, the size of the force available to execute fight will require significantly greater respon- these missions has shrunk considerably. siveness and diversity in the face of a greater Admiral Brewer put these accomplishments threat. The NDS requires a military that will “be into context: “The amount of cargo we deliv- able to strike diverse targets inside adversary air ered could fill all 119 1-A college foot- and missile defense networks to destroy mobile ball fields three times over.”22 Specifically: power-projection platforms. This will include capabilities to enhance close combat lethality in From November 2002 to May 2003, near- complex terrain.”24 With regard to mobility and ly 85,000 pieces of cargo and 4,000 con- resilience, our military will be required to field tainers of ammunition, requiring 16 million “ground, air, sea, and space forces that can deploy, square feet of cargo space, were loaded survive, operate, maneuver, and regenerate in all aboard MSC ships under MSC Atlantic’s domains while under attack. Transitioning from operational control. This was enough large, centralized, unhardened infrastructure military cargo to fill the deck space of 58 to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing Nimitz class aircraft carriers. that includes active and passive defenses will also be prioritized.”25  These figures comprised equipment load- These challenges become infinitely harder ed in Texas, Georgia and Florida for the when considering the vastness of the Pacific U.S. Army’s 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions or the intricacies of meeting challenges across and 101st Airborne Division, which in- the depth and breadth of Europe. The force of cluded thousands of Abrams main tomorrow must be ready to defeat a peer com- , Bradley fighting vehicles, humvees petitor in a broad battlespace that requires se- and helicopters…. curity for each logistics movement, the ability to off-load across various widely distributed In February, MSC Pacific provided direct locations, with minimal infrastructure, and in support in the activation of 10 MSC cargo a communications-degraded environment. ships at various West Coast ports. They The ability to meet the NDS requirements also coordinated the loading of anoth- requires a significantly more agile force. It er 10 MSC ships at Tacoma, Wash., and must be able to dictate the time and tempo of San Diego, Calif., which resulted in the its buildup and control the massive capabilities movement of over 1 million square feet of the U.S. military. It must coordinate with al- of military equipment for the U.S. Marine lies and partners to place combined force ca- Corps 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and pabilities against the adversary’s weakness and the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division…. develop and sustain a broad array of overseas advanced bases that will change frequently and MSC normally operates 120 civil- provide the responsiveness and effectiveness ian-crewed, non-combatant ships for a needed to prevail despite enemy efforts to pre- variety of missions around the world. The vent U.S. forces from getting to or operating number of ships expanded to about 214 within the theater of combat. The U.S. military in mid-March as additional ships were has not had to “fight its way to the fight” since activated from reduced operating status World War II. Equally absent since that time

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 99 has been the need to apply combat power to While procurement is not exclusively a func- preserve logistics capabilities. tion of logistics, the country’s industrial capac- Given the evolution of competitors’ abilities ity affects the availability of spare parts, the to threaten the logistical underpinnings of U.S. availability of technical support for contract combat power, force logistics planning now re- maintenance, and the ability to replace war- quires innovation in both technology and oper- fighting platforms that are well beyond their ational concepts. In a time of constrained fiscal service life, be they ships, aircraft, or major resources, this means doing differently with land-component systems (tanks, , re- less. There is no option to fail, and there is no connaissance vehicles, personnel carriers, ra- hope of unlimited resources. The combination dars, ground vehicles, etc.). of innovation and new technology is therefore When the instability of funding that results critical to maintaining the competitive logis- from continuing resolutions and an inability tical advantage that U.S. forces have enjoyed to pass budgets on time is added to these chal- since World War II. lenges, one can see that the problems con- The NDS focuses on investments needed to fronting the industrial base are magnified at improve the ability of forces deployed abroad a time when they most need to be reduced so to maneuver against an enemy and ensure that our ability to supply the force is respon- that the posture of those forces (how they are sive and resilient. Perhaps counterintuitively, arrayed in theater) has resilience (the ability a constrained ability to build “new iron” (ships, to sustain losses and remain effective). Not aircraft, and major ground weapons systems) explicitly addressed in the NDS but funda- actually increases the logistical burden and mentally implied is the equally daunting chal- budget because the cost of maintaining older lenge of winning the “home games” by having systems necessarily increases. the critical military–industry partnerships The problem is made worse by the com- and dedicated infrastructure that serve as the plexity of dealing with both old and new tech- preparation and launching pads for our forces. nologies in a single logistics enterprise. Add The shrinking military–industrial base to these challenges the reduction of skilled that provides the wherewithal of national manpower in the active and reserve forces, the power faces significant challenges because increased difficulty of retaining seasoned mil- of unpredictable budgets and inconsistent itary personnel, and a decreasing number of program funding. During World War II, from civilian and contractor artisans in the logistics 1939 to 1945, the United States delivered 1,089 workforce, and the need for modernizing the warfighting ships to the fleet that today would logistics force, from training to developing new be classified as battle force ships. These 1,089 concepts, becomes even more obvious. ships included 32 carriers, 10 battleships, 62 Modernizing “home game” infrastructure cruisers, 442 destroyers, and 563 frigates and must also include improved, state-of-the-art destroyer escorts.26 Compare this to the Navy’s ranges and maintenance facilities, which are Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range critical to supporting the readiness of new Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal platforms that are being acquired in every ser- Year 2019, which proposes the construction of vice. Such facilities must also be made resilient 54 battle force ships during the five years from in the face of cyber challenges, now a common 2019 to 2024.27 feature of modern conflict. Integrating simula- It should be noted that the current ship- tors and virtual reality capabilities into range building plan projects 11 more battle force design will also help to reduce the logistical ships than were projected in the 2017 plan. impact of home-station training and generate This trend is very similar across the industrial much-needed efficiencies in major range train- capacity capabilities that produce aircraft and ing opportunities while also improving overall major land-component warfighting systems. warfighting readiness.

100 2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength Success Now and in the Future certainly affects the latter. Effectiveness is -ul New principles must be embraced to achieve timately what matters at the tactical edge. Ef- the requirements for successful logistics capa- ficiencies should be pursued to free resources bilities in support of operational commanders for use elsewhere, but those efficiencies must and the National Defense Strategy. Many have never be taken at the expense of the soldiers, written on the challenges of logistics in the 21st sailors, airmen, or Marines who have been century, but Lieutenant General Michael Dana, committed to battle. Many logistical challeng- Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Instal- es will remain unchanged in the near future be- lations and Logistics, has captured the require- cause of the sheer physics of distributing am- ment succinctly in his term “hybrid logistics,” munition and bulk liquids and the requirement which he defines as the era “where ‘old’ meets to move major ground warfighting equipment ‘new.’”28 This is a period in logistics operations in and personnel. Nevertheless, changes that which the combination of old and new technolo- positively influence the agility, survivability, gy and innovative concepts will provide precise responsiveness, and effectiveness of logistics logistics support to a widely distributed force systems can and must be made. instead of a large logistics footprint that delivers Change must be made that ensures logistics through a central hub. agility by designing procedures and acquiring The hybrid logistics attributes that Dana systems that adjust to changing requirements describes are a mixture of legacy and evolving across a widely distributed force constantly technologies. They are delivered from the sea and with domain-wide visibility, highlighting by means of modern connectors, platforms, the needs, resources, and capabilities of the processes, and concepts with the flexibility to force. An understanding of the changing re- enable multi-domain fires and maneuver. They quirements must be achieved in the absence  are innovative in thought and practice, with a of direct input from the supported force command and control architecture that is im- through predictive capabilities that are en- munized against cyber and electronic warfare abled through improved artificial intelligence threats, and data-driven through predictive and machine learning capabilities. analytics. They also are applicable across the Future logistics command and control sys- entire U.S. military from the strategic level to tems can ensure agility by operating despite the tactical level. Ultimately, the effectiveness an enemy’s efforts to disrupt communications of any logistics capability is determined at the through cyber and electronic warfare. This can tactical level, but sustained success at the tac- be done by developing the means to transfer tical level requires effectiveness further up- logistics data systems seamlessly from digi- stream at the operational and strategic levels. tal-based processes to analog-based processes Success at the operational level requires the and back. This requires both technological and integration of logistics capabilities contribut- training/conceptual change across the force, ed by all entities involved in military affairs, to not exclusively in the logistics enterprise. include service, coalition-partner, interagen- The use of unmanned platforms will be crit- cy, governmental, private/commercial, and ical to the future of agile logistics. Unmanned host-nation capabilities. The operational in- platforms that support ground distribution will tegration of these various capabilities provides complement unmanned aerial platforms that the linkage between the tactical and strategic deliver vital sustainment to widely distributed levels: a means to leverage the “Arsenal of De- forces. In addition, unmanned platforms that mocracy”29 in the hands of the men and women can evacuate the injured from the point of injury who serve in harm’s way around the globe. without sacrificing high-cost combat platforms In assessing the true value of logistics, how- and additional combat capability will be critical ever, one needs to distinguish between efficien- in the dispersed battlefield. Every facet of military cy and effectiveness, even though the former logistics must embrace unmanned platforms, from

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 101 unmanned sea-based ship-to-shore connectors efficient performance is critical. This focus on to platforms for the refueling of ships to the use effectiveness will prioritize the force’s critical of unmanned platforms for . logistics needs by evaluating all requirements Logistics survivability upgrades can achieve against mission success and differentiating the reduced targetability of the logistics force critical requirements from the multitude of in- through development of manageable electron- puts: in essence, providing the nail at the right ic signatures, a reduced logistics footprint, and time and place that prevents having to build a improved distribution with reduced static in- complete inventory of shoes, horses, and riders ventory. Static inventory is distribution mov- in order to win the battle.30 ing at zero miles per hour, and anything that is static on the modern battlefield has little Conclusion chance of remaining survivable. Logistics is critical to success on the battle- The ability to make the force more sur- field. To remain a vital contributor to military vivable requires both technological improve- success, logistics must adapt continuously so ments that reduce the need for large footprints that it bridges old systems and capabilities in bulk liquids and ammunition and refocused while embracing new technologies and con- training and logistics concepts. Technologies cepts. In addition, the success of every new such as additive manufacturing, improved system and concept, every new technology man–machine interfaces, and advanced ro- and , must be evaluated botics will contribute significantly to improved against the commensurate evolution and rev- survivability. Ultimately, change must ensure olution in logistics sustainability. both speed and reliability of logistics systems While not a new consideration in design- that build trust from the tactical level to the ing a force for tomorrow that remains rele- strategic level. Improvements in munitions vant today, the development of integrated, and energy systems will directly improve the agile, technologically advanced, and effective speed and reliability of the force and, thus, its logistics systems that drive efficiencies into logistical survivability and effectiveness. every corner of the military is increasingly Responsiveness can be improved by lever- essential in today’s dynamic, fast-paced, and aging industrial-base support from the point ever-changing national security environment. of manufacture to the tactical edge forces. Im- The shift in our military focus to competing in proved responsiveness through domain-wide an era of great-power competition demands visibility and predictive logistics capabilities an even greater understanding of logistics and driven by improved artificial intelligence ca- highlights the breadth of the requirement to pabilities will provide sustainment based on support the entirety of the force in innovative finely tuned metrics that eliminate the need to ways, from training in the United States to de- request support. In short, we need to have the ploying far from home. ability to autonomously anticipate the needs Whether the unit engaging the enemy is in of the commander, not simply respond faster the air, on land, at sea, or in space or cyberspace, to bottom-up needs identification. it must embrace innovation in logistics that not Improvements in logistics effectiveness only integrates new technology, but also inno- require improved integrated capabilities and vates in the “hybrid” environment of old and authorities that allow logistics challenges to be new in order to retain our military’s true advan- resolved at the lowest levels, leveraging shared tage as the world’s only force that can “prevail in awareness, and focused on effectiveness. conflict and preserve peace through strength,”31 The ability to measure effectiveness against both today and well into the future.

102 2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength Endnotes 1. , On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 95. 2. “Logistics,” Merriam-Webster.com, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/logistics (accessed May 29, 2018). 3. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,Logistics , Joint Publication 4-0, October 16, 2013, p. I-1, http://www.jcs.mil/ Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp4_0.pdf (accessed May 29, 2018). 4. See, for example, The Honorable Mark T. Esper, Secretary of the Army, and General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, statement “On the Posture of the ” before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 115th Cong., 2nd Sess., April 12, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Esper-Milley_04-12-18.pdf (accessed May 30, 2018); The Honorable Richard V. Spencer, Secretary of the Navy, statement on “Fiscal Year 2019 Department of the Navy Budget” before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 19, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ Spencer_04-19-18.pdf (accessed May 30, 2018); Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations, statement on “Fiscal Year 2019 Navy Budget” before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 19, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate. gov/imo/media/doc/Richardson_04-19-18.pdf (accessed May 30, 2018); General Robert B. Neller, Commandant of the Marine Corps, statement on “The Posture of the United States Marine Corps” before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 19, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Neller_04-19-18.pdf (accessed May 30, 2018); and The Honorable Dr. Heather Wilson, Secretary of the Air Force, and General David L. Goldfein, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, “USAF Posture Statement: Fiscal Year 2019,” Department of the Air Force presentation to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 115th Cong., 2nd Sess., April 24, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wilson-Goldfein_04-24-18.pdf (accessed May 30, 2018). 5. The Honorable Alan Estevez, remarks at Marine Corps Association and Foundation 14th Annual Ground Logistics Awards Dinner, Arlington, Virginia, March 22, 2018. 6. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Logistics, pp. I-5–I-6. 7. Ibid., p. I-2. 8. Ibid.

 .(DNA,” Oxford Living Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/dna (accessed May 29, 2018“ .9 10. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Transportation Command, “About USTRANSCOM,” https://www.ustranscom.mil/cmd/aboutustc. cfm (accessed May 29, 2018). 11. General Darren W. McDew, U.S. Air Force, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, statement “On the State of the Command” before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 10, 2018, pp. 10–21, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/ media/doc/McDew_04-10-18.pdf (accessed May 29, 2018). 12. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Logistics Agency, “DLA at a Glance, http://www.dla.mil/AtaGlance.aspx (accessed May 29, 2018). 13. Naval Supply Systems Command, “Logistics Quotations,” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/log_quotes_navsup.pdf (accessed May 30, 2018). 14. Ibid. 15. Field Marshal Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945 (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), pp. 169–180. 16. James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, p. 7, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed May 29, 2018). 17. Robert L. Wilke, Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, memorandum, “DOD Retention Policy for Non- Deployable Service Members,” February 14, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/02/16/new-pentagon-separation-policy-non- deployable-service-members (accessed May 29, 2018). 18. See Esper and Milley, statement “On the Posture of the United States Army,” April 12, 2018; Spencer, statement on “Fiscal Year 2019 Department of the Navy Budget,” April 19, 2018; Richardson, statement on “Fiscal Year 2019 Navy Budget,” April 19, 2018; Neller, statement on “The Posture of the United States Marine Corps,” April 19, 2018; and Wilson and Goldfein, “USAF Posture Statement: Fiscal Year 2019,” April 24, 2018. 19. Fact Sheet, “Civil Reserve Air Fleet,” U.S. Air Force, July 28, 2014, http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/ Article/104583/civil-reserve-air-fleet/ (accessed May 29, 2018). 20. Global Security.org, “Sealift in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” last modified July 7, 2011, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ systems/ship/sealift-oif.htm (accessed May 30, 2018).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 103 21. Ibid. 22. Press release, “MSC Area Commands Provide a World of Service to Military Forces in Middle East,” U.S. Navy, Military Sealift Command, July 23, 2003, http://www.msc.navy.mil/publications/pressrel/press03/press34.htm (accessed May 29, 2018). 23. Ibid. 24. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, p. 6. 25. Ibid. Emphasis added. 26. Shipbuilding History, “Large Naval Ships and Submarines,” http://www.shipbuildinghistory.com/navalships.htm (accessed July 27, 2018). 27. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Warfare Systems) (N9), Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2019, February 2018, p. 3, https://news.usni.org/2018/02/12/fy-2019-u-s-navy-30-year-shipbuilding-plan (accessed May 29, 2018). 28. Lieutenant General Michael G. Dana, USMC, “21st Century Logistics: Designing and Developing Capabilities,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 101, Issue 10 (October 2017), https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2017/10/21st-century-logistics (accessed May 29, 2018). 29. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “The Great Arsenal of Democracy,” address delivered December 29, 1940, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrarsenalofdemocracy.html, (accessed May 29, 2018). 30. “For the want of a nail the shoe was lost, / For the want of a shoe the horse was lost, / For the want of a horse the rider was lost, / For the want of a rider the battle was lost, / For the want of a battle the kingdom was lost, / And all for the want of a horseshoe-nail.” Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richards Almanack, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/poor-richard-s-almanac (accessed May 30, 2018). 31. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, p. 1. 

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