The Military Units' Logistic Support Principles

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Military Units' Logistic Support Principles Land Forces Academy Review Vol. XXIV, No 1(93), 2019 THE MILITARY UNITS’ LOGISTIC SUPPORT PRINCIPLES Sorin PÎNZARIU “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, Romania [email protected] Costel-Dorel MÎNEA Ministry of National Defense, Bucharest, Romania [email protected] ABSTRACT The fundamental objective of the military units’ logistic system during peacetime is ensuring necessary logistic support for the military personnel to properly carry out the training and instruction activities in order to fulfill the missions assigned to the military units at every hierachical level. Concurrently, the logistic system of the military units during peacetime tracks the supply of material assets for emergency situations, crisis, mobilization and war. Achieving logistic support for military units during peacetime depends on a number of principles that underpin the provision of high-quality logistic support necessary for the fulfillment of the basic mission and the fundamental objectives of each military structure. KEYWORDS: logistics, logistic sistem, logistic support, principles 1. Introduction adapt to the states, situations and processes The permanent transformation of the that take place during military action. national defense system at the same time Military actions, and especially war, generated the modernization of the military are the confrontation between opposing and logistics system, perceived not only as a hostile forces, where moral factors such as central point of the future of military fear, courage, will, spirit of sacrifice are actions, but also as a point of support for often more important than physical and the struggling forces effort to train and mental factors. Logistics and logistic prepare in time peace with the same logistic support during military action and support and under the same conditions especially at war play an important role in generated by the battlefield. the cohesiveness of the fighting forces, but The Romanian Army’s fighting the same importance and influence also forces, irrespective of the hierarchical level have on the training and training of troops of the military unit, are constantly evolving in peacetime. We believe that by providing due to the changes imposed by the modern, the necessary for living and struggling, multi-national military actions. For this logistics and logistic support make it reason, the logistic systems that follow and possible to provide personal needs, support these forces must evolve in a allowing the military to concentrate their similar way, is quickly and efficiently. efforts on fulfilling the mission. A flexible An optimal logistics system will always be logistics system led by logisticsists who a stable structure with components easy to possess economical knowledges, meaning DOI: 10.2478/raft-2019-0002 © 2017. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. 20 they are correct and have an innovative spirit, the main purpose of their use is to plan and can give commanders and commandments execute the training and training of the fighting from all echelons the moral authority over forces. At the same time, the basic principles those who lead them in action and who thus of logistic support “can be supplemented with feel they are useful. other principles specific to functional logistics In other words, an optimal and efficient logistical support of the military areas” (NATO, 2014, p. 1-5). units to peace, based on clear and coherent In the light of the above, we believe principles, strengthens the moral authority that the principles of logistical support to of the commanders, but also has a profound peace must be considered in the light of two effect on the morale of the combat forces important objectives of the “Principal being trained for military action. Action Plan” of each military unit, namely: That is why the principles of logistic training and training of combat forces; the support are very important in delivering creation of peacetime supplies and war quality logistic support to each military supplies. Based on these considerations, we unit, regardless of the scale they are in. appreciate that the logistical support of Their importance also results from the fact peacetime military units is carried out and that the logistic support in time, comes operates on the basis of principles, which from the use of the logistics principles by are not specified, defined, explained in any all the logistic structures involved in the regulation national, and therefore we military activity or action. These properly propose to adapt those specific to military applied principles underpin the implementation actions as follows: of effective logistical support and, when 2.1. Efficiency can be a basic strictly adhered to, increase the chances of principle of logistical support in peacetime successfully completing the planned military as it implies the rational use of material activities and actions. assets at its disposal through careful planning and careful planning of the tasks 2. General Principles of Logistical set out in the “Plan of Main Activities” and Support of Peacetime “List with the essential requirements” for The principles of logistical support of the fulfillment of the basic mission for each peacetime military units are based on the military unit, regardless of the hierarchical principles of logistical support for military level in which they are located. action or war and are applicable to activities Material resources of good quality planned through the “Plan of Main needed to prepare and train peacekeeping Activities” of each military unit. Analyzing forces are usually difficult to obtain due to the principles of peacetime logistics support limited funds allocated through the revenue and NATO logistics documents, we have and expenditure budget. In this case, the use noticed that the principles of logistical of stocks and stocks of material goods is support are the same and apply to both used, but filling them up is a problem military activities during peace time and caused by the insufficiency of funds from military actions during a war, such as: the approved budget and complicated authority, coordination, efficiency, procurement procedures. accountability, flexibility, visibility, In this respect, the logistic cooperation, sufficiency, transparency and microstructures of the military units draw simplicity. These principles are found in the up and submit annually requests for Romanian legal framework and can be completing the reserves and stocks, as well applied by the commanders of the logistic as requests for endowment/endowment with support and peacetime structures, noting that material goods used in the training and training of peacekeeping forces. In their 21 turn, the superior echelons have, through the 2.2. Visibility is an important specifications they send to the military units principle used in the process of developing for the “Plan with the main activities”, that the “Main Activities Plans” of peacetime the endowment of the fighting forces and the military units, as this principle must lead to filling of the reserves and the stock of the achievement of sufficient, efficient materials are made on the basis of the logistic support, taking into account all “Essential Requirements List”, the one that changes in the activities underlying the the basic mission received. training and training of combat forces. We believe that this principle is Regardless of the nature of the fundamental important because the material resources are objectives and the basic mission of each exhaustible and the economy is permanently military unit, visibility and transparency of represented by the reality of the purchase of resources are essential for the smooth cheap materials. Heads of logistics structures running of the tasks outlined in the “Main in military units must identify from time to Activities Plan”. Visibility involves the time the real needs of the fighters being trained provision of accurate and timely exchange to optimize the use of material assets available of information between peacekeeping at a certain stage of military action. Material militaries in order to prioritize resources planning should take into account supply/replenishment activities at the same the saving and optimization of the use of time as fulfilling the core mission and core logistical support to ensure the fulfillment of objectives set out in the “Main Activities the basic mission of the military unit in Plan” of each military unit. peacetime, regardless of its hierarchical level. We appreciate that the application of By doing so in parallel with multinational this principle is based on the military operations, we note that this principle implementation of an integrated logistics requires a broader approach in the sense that program that allows for the permanent logistical capabilities and resources are used in exchange of data in order to prepare order of priority, with minimal consumption, in situations with the necessary material goods order to optimize the existing logistic support, to meet the real needs of the fighting forces to eliminate the doubling of the quantities of but to ensure the availability of the material material goods in the area of the joint goods at any time and in time, regardless of operations. This optics is supported by the the mission entrusted in peacetime. techniques and methods used in the 2.3. Sufficiency highlights the ability multinational logistic support, which can to provide essential,
Recommended publications
  • THE LOGISTICS of the FIRST CRUSADE 1095-1099 a Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Wester
    FEEDING VICTORY: THE LOGISTICS OF THE FIRST CRUSADE 1095-1099 A Thesis presented to the faculty of the Graduate School of Western Carolina University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History By William Donald O’Dell, Jr. Director: Dr. Vicki Szabo Associate Professor of Ancient and Medieval History History Department Committee Members: Dr. David Dorondo, History Dr. Robert Ferguson, History October, 2020 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my committee members and director for their assistance and encouragements. In particular, Dr. Vicki Szabo, without whose guidance and feedback this thesis would not exist, Dr. David Dorondo, whose guidance on the roles of logistics in cavalry warfare have helped shaped this thesis’ handling of such considerations and Dr. Robert Ferguson whose advice and recommendations for environmental historiography helped shaped my understanding on how such considerations influence every aspect of history, especially military logistics. I also offer my warmest regards and thanks to my parents, brothers, and extended family for their continued support. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ iv Abstract ............................................................................................................................................v Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
    [Show full text]
  • The Quandary of Allied Logistics from D-Day to the Rhine
    THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE By Parker Andrew Roberson November, 2018 Director: Dr. Wade G. Dudley Program in American History, Department of History This thesis analyzes the Allied campaign in Europe from the D-Day landings to the crossing of the Rhine to argue that, had American and British forces given the port of Antwerp priority over Operation Market Garden, the war may have ended sooner. This study analyzes the logistical system and the strategic decisions of the Allied forces in order to explore the possibility of a shortened European campaign. Three overall ideas are covered: logistics and the broad-front strategy, the importance of ports to military campaigns, and the consequences of the decisions of the Allied commanders at Antwerp. The analysis of these points will enforce the theory that, had Antwerp been given priority, the war in Europe may have ended sooner. THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History East Carolina University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in History By Parker Andrew Roberson November, 2018 © Parker Roberson, 2018 THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE By Parker Andrew Roberson APPROVED BY: DIRECTOR OF THESIS: Dr. Wade G. Dudley, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER: Dr. Gerald J. Prokopowicz, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER: Dr. Michael T. Bennett, Ph.D. CHAIR OF THE DEP ARTMENT OF HISTORY: Dr. Christopher Oakley, Ph.D. DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL: Dr. Paul J.
    [Show full text]
  • The Nature of Logistics
    Chapter 1 The Nature of Logistics “Throughout the struggle, it was in his logistic inability to maintain his armies in the field that the enemy’s fatal weak- ness lay. Courage his forces had in full measure, but courage was not enough. Reinforcements failed to arrive, weapons, ammunition and food alike ran short, and the dearth of fuel caused their powers of tactical mobility to dwindle to the van- ishing point. In the last stages of the campaign they could do little more than wait for the Allied advance to sweep over them.”1 —Dwight Eisenhower “As we select our forces and plan our operations, . [w]e must understand how logistics can impact on our concepts of operation. Commanders must base all their concepts of operations on what they know they can do logistically.”2 —A. M. Gray, Jr. MCDP 4 The Nature of Logistics o conduct logistics effectively, we must first under-stand T its fundamental nature—its purpose and its characteris- tics—as well as its relationship to the conduct of military op- erations. This understanding will become the basis for developing a theory of logistics and a practical guide to its application. WHAT IS LOGISTICS? Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the move- ment and maintenance of forces.3 Logistics provides the re- sources of combat power, positions those resources on the battlefield, and sustains them throughout the execution of op- erations. Logistics encompasses a wide range of actions and the relationships among those actions, as well as the resources that make those actions possible.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations
    China’s Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations The modular transfer system between a Type 054A frigate and a COSCO container ship during China’s first military-civil UNREP. Source: “重大突破!民船为海军水面舰艇实施干货补给 [Breakthrough! Civil Ships Implement Dry Cargo Supply for Naval Surface Ships],” Guancha, November 15, 2019 Primary author: Chad Peltier Supporting analysts: Tate Nurkin and Sean O’Connor Disclaimer: This research report was prepared at the request of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, it does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission or any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed in this commissioned research report. 1 Contents Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 4 Methodology, Scope, and Study Limitations ........................................................................................................ 6 1. China’s Expeditionary Operations
    [Show full text]
  • The Lifeblood of Military Power Military of Lifeblood the Logistics
    Logistics: The Lifeblood of Military Power John E. Wissler, Lieutenant General, USMC (Ret.) The end for which a soldier is recruited, therefore affects every aspect of organizing, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole training, equipping, deploying, and employing objective of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and the force. marching is simply that he should fight at the Logistics is perhaps the most complex right place and the right time. and interrelated capability provided by to- —Major-General Carl von Clausewitz, On War day’s military. Unfortunately, to those unfa- miliar with its intellectual and technological he term “logistics” was not commonly used breadth, depth, and complexity, it can be con- Tuntil shortly before World War II, but the sidered an assumed capability—something concept and understanding of logistics have that simply happens—or, worse yet, a “back been around since the earliest days of warfare. office” function that is not connected to war- In Clausewitz’s words, getting the force to the fighting capability. “fight at the right place and the right time”1 is The success of military logistics during the the true essence of military logistics. past 16-plus years of overseas combat opera- The Merriam-Webster online dictionary tions is partly to blame for anyone’s assump- defines logistics as “the aspect of military sci- tion that continued logistical success in the ence dealing with the procurement, mainte- ever-changing national security environment nance, and transportation of military materiel, is a given across the entirety of the military lo- facilities, and personnel.”2 The Joint Chiefs of gistics enterprise.
    [Show full text]
  • Case-Study-Phillip-Murgatroyd-39.Pdf
    Medieval Warfare on the Grid Challenges Phil Murgatroyd This project uses agent-based modelling in a distributed environment to help The VISTA Centre understand how medieval states moved and fed armies. Institute of Archaeology and Antiquity University of Birmingham Background Edgbaston, Birmingham The movement of large numbers of people across a pre-industrial landscape B15 2TT UK presents a series of significant logistical challenges. When logistical systems broke down, armies failed and states sometimes collapsed. Given its impor- Contact Details tance to the state and its inhabitants, medieval military logistics has been slow [email protected] to utilise computer modelling techniques in order to understand the complex Product Used processes involved. This project takes as a case study the march of the Byz- Java antine army to the battle of Manzikert in AD1071 and models the army on a Blender 1:1 basis, tracing the movement and status of each individual. The Byzantine C++ army probably numbered over 40,000 and travelled more than 700 miles from PDES-MAS Constantinople to Manzikert through the Mediterranean summer. By model- ling different scenarios regarding the size and composition of the army, the Funding different possible routes and differing levels of food availability the project JISC-EPSRC-AHRC eScience Project seeks to generate a set of plausible parameters within which the fragmentary historical record can be placed. These results can then be rendered in both Contributors 2d and 3d images or animations, enabling them to be more easily understood Prof. Vince Gaffney Dr. John Haldon by people unused to traditional agent-based modelling outputs.
    [Show full text]
  • Contemporary Challenges in Military Logistics Support
    CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN MILITARY LOGISTICS SUPPORT MSc Marta PAWELCZYK Management and Command Faculty War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland Abstract Nowadays, the most important factors that cause global market activity and have a big infl uence on logistics processes are: globalisation and rapid development of new technologies. In that environment, military logistics are operating incessantly alongside the supply of goods in times of war, peace and crisis. Th ese logistics are focused on fi nding solutions for being more eff ective and economically profi table. Because of this, logisticians try to reduce costs and supply good faster, as well as trying to provide the right quality and service.. Th e current challenges in military logistics support have changed. Th e biggest challenge for all logistics processes is to provide services according to the 7R formula (right time, right product, right quantity, right condition, right place, right customer, and right price). A logistics leader is important for every operational mission. Th anks to the leader making quick and smart decisions, successful termination of a mission is possible. Th e article is based on the example of logistics support for the Polish contingent in Kosovo. In the light of the above, the aim of the article is to identify and estimate the situation of military logistics. Th e research problem is as follow: What are the biggest determinants of logistics processes in military area? Key words: logistics, military logistics, challenges, supply chains, national contingent. © 2018 Marta Pawelczyk, published by War Studies University, Poland This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
    [Show full text]
  • Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as CHILD POLICY a public service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION Jump down to document ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT 6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research NATIONAL SECURITY organization providing objective analysis and POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY effective solutions that address the challenges facing SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY the public and private sectors around the world. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND Support RAND INFRASTRUCTURE Purchase this document WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Arroyo Center View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom Battlefield Logistics and Effects on Operations Eric Peltz, John M. Halliday, Marc L. Robbins, Kenneth J. Girardini Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No.
    [Show full text]
  • Thinking Effects Mann, Endersby, & Searle Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations - Cut Along Dotted Line
    - After you have read the research report, please give us your frank opinion on the con- tents. All comments––large or small, compli- mentary or caustic––will be appreciated. Mail them to CADRE/AR, Building 1400, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112- 6428. Thinking Effects Mann, Endersby, & Searle Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations - Cut along dotted line Thank you for your assistance. - COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, RESEARCH AND EDUCATION AIR UNIVERSITY Thinking Effects Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations EDWARD C. MANN III Colonel, USAF, Retired GARY ENDERSBY Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired THOMAS R. SEARLE Research Fellow CADRE Paper No. 15 Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615 http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil October 2002 Air University Library Cataloging Data Mann, Edward C., 1947- Thinking effects : effects-based methodology for joint operations / Edward C. Mann III, Gary Endersby, Thomas R. Searle. p. cm. – (CADRE paper ; 15). Includes bibliographical references. Contents: Time for a new paradigm? – Historical background on effects – Conceptual basis for effects – A general theory of joint effects-based operations – An idealized joint EBO process – What are the major challenges in implementing the EBO methodology? ISBN 1-58566-112-0 ISSN 1537-3371 1. Operational art (Military science). 2. Unified operations (Military science) – Planning. 3. Military doctrine – United States. I. Endersby, Gary. II. Searle, Thomas R., 1960- III. Title. IV. Series. 355.4––dc21 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.
    [Show full text]
  • Vauban!S Siege Legacy In
    VAUBAN’S SIEGE LEGACY IN THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1702-1712 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jamel M. Ostwald, M.A. The Ohio State University 2002 Approved by Dissertation Committee: Professor John Rule, Co-Adviser Co-Adviser Professor John Guilmartin, Jr., Co-Adviser Department of History Professor Geoffrey Parker Professor John Lynn Co-Adviser Department of History UMI Number: 3081952 ________________________________________________________ UMI Microform 3081952 Copyright 2003 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ____________________________________________________________ ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road PO Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 ABSTRACT Over the course of Louis XIV’s fifty-four year reign (1661-1715), Western Europe witnessed thirty-six years of conflict. Siege warfare figures significantly in this accounting, for extended sieges quickly consumed short campaign seasons and prevented decisive victory. The resulting prolongation of wars and the cost of besieging dozens of fortresses with tens of thousands of men forced “fiscal- military” states to continue to elevate short-term financial considerations above long-term political reforms; Louis’s wars consumed 75% or more of the annual royal budget. Historians of 17th century Europe credit one French engineer – Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban – with significantly reducing these costs by toppling the impregnability of 16th century artillery fortresses. Vauban perfected and promoted an efficient siege, a “scientific” method of capturing towns that minimized a besieger’s casualties, delays and expenses, while also sparing the town’s civilian populace.
    [Show full text]
  • Patton and Logistics of the Third Army
    Document created: 20 March 03 Logistics and Patton’s Third Army Lessons for Today’s Logisticians Maj Jeffrey W. Decker Preface When conducting serious study of any operational campaign during World War II, the military student quickly realizes the central role logistics played in the overall war effort. Studying the operations of General George S. Patton and his Third United States Army during 1944-45 provides all members of the profession of arms—especially the joint logistician—valuable lessons in the art and science of logistics during hostilities. Future conflicts will not provide a two or three year "trial and error" logistics learning curve; rather, the existing sustainment infrastructure and its accompanying logisticians are what America’s armed forces will depend on when the fighting begins. My sincere thanks to Dr. Richard R. Muller for his guiding assistance completing this project. I also want to thank the United States Army Center of Military History for providing copies of the United States Army in World War II official histories and Lt Col (S) Clete Knaub for his editing advice and counsel. Finally, thanks go to my wife Misty for her support writing this paper; her grandfather, Mark Novick for his wisdom and guidance during the preparation of this project; and to his brother David, a veteran of the Third United States Army. I dedicate this project to him. Abstract George S. Patton and his Third Army waged a significant combined arms campaign on the Western Front during 1944-45. Both his military leadership and logistics acumen proved decisive against enemy forces from North Africa to the Rhine River.
    [Show full text]
  • A Technique for Determining Viable Military Logistics Support Alternatives
    A TECHNIQUE FOR DETERMINING VIABLE MILITARY LOGISTICS SUPPORT ALTERNATIVES A Thesis Presented to The Academic Faculty by Jesse Stuart Hester In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy School of Aerospace Engineering Georgia Institute of Technology May 2009 Copyright © Jesse Stuart Hester 2009 A TECHNIQUE FOR DETERMINING VIABLE MILITARY LOGISTICS SUPPORT ALTERNATIVES Approved by: Prof. Dimitri Mavris, Adviser Prof. George Vachtsevanos School of Aerospace Engineering School of Electrical and Computer Engineering Georgia Institute of Technology Georgia Institute of Technology Prof. Daniel Schrage Dr. Janel Nixon School of Aerospace Engineering School of Aerospace Engineering Georgia Institute of Technology Georgia Institute of Technology Dr. Danielle Soban Mr. Philip Fahringer School of Aerospace Engineering Center for Innovation, Suffolk, Virginia Georgia Institute of Technology Lockheed Martin Corporation Date Approved:__4 March 2009 __ In Memory of My Mother, Victoria & My Father, Tom ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I first would like to thank my entire thesis committee individually. To Prof. Dimitri Mavris, for the opportunities not only given to me here at ASDL, but also his flexibility in allowing me to pursue another degree outside of Aerospace. Nowhere else would I have likely been afforded such an opportunity to personally and professionally develop. To Prof. Daniel Schrage, for lending an ear and making time during his busy schedule to listen to my ideas and progress reports. To Prof. George Vachtsevanos, for his guidance and direction in areas foreign to me and insistence that I bound the problem to a manageable realm. To Dr. Danielle Soban for her advice and input through out the doctoral process.
    [Show full text]