Al Jarman Is a Qatari Graduate of Effusive in Reinforcing Its Commitment to MS in Global Affairs at New York University

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Al Jarman Is a Qatari Graduate of Effusive in Reinforcing Its Commitment to MS in Global Affairs at New York University Global Policy, January 2018 American policy dissonance on the 2017 Gulf Crisis Mohammed al-Jarman Abstract Since the Suez crisis of 1956, the United States of America has been widely recognised as the dominant power in the Middle East. For sixty years, this domination has not only defined the regional balance of power, but it has also in some cases decisively shaped the internal politics of key regional states. Whilst contemporary U.S. influence (and interest) in the region appears to be in decline, no serious analyst can argue that the U.S. has lost the ability to shape key regional developments. In keeping with diplomatic norms, traditionally the U.S. has relied on its foreign policy establishment to formulate and implement its strategic policies in the region. The advent of Donald Trump and his peculiar brand of “arson” diplomacy threatens to undercut longstanding U.S. policy positions, notably the unwavering American commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the smaller Gulf States. Whilst the U.S. establishment appears to be sufficiently resilient to major policy disruptions, the danger is that even minimal disruption resulting from unofficial presidential diplomacy can potentially produce regional instability. Policy recommendations • Small states such as Qatar should be prepared for a degree of U.S. policy upheaval in relation to the Gulf region during the Trump presidency. • Recognise that U.S. influence (and interest) in the Middle East is on the decline. In this context, Trump’s declared desire to disengage from burdensome U.S. commitments in the region is not necessarily an aberration, but merely a blunt and acerbic expression of deep-seated American desires. • The Gulf Cooperation Council states should act more independently of one another and diversify their arms supplies and alliances with a view to decreasing dependence on the U.S. in the long term. • Encourage greater international involvement in regional security. This involvement can encompass both large international bodies (such as the European Union) and individual powerful states with an actual or potential global reach, such as Russia and China. • Greater international involvement in regional security – in tandem with deeper indigenous security arrangements – can blunt the impact of future U.S. policy shifts or even a sudden loss of commitment. Global Policy, January 2018 Background This article examines the prospect of U.S. policy dissonance in the Middle East in the The rise to power of Donald Trump has caused context of divergent attitudes and approaches surprise, anxiety and in some cases fear in between the president and the American geopolitical circles around the world. Trump’s foreign policy community. The foreign policy nationalist ideology has raised the prospect of community is understood to comprise the U.S. the re-emergence of US “isolationism”, state department, U.S. intelligence agencies marked by a gradual withdrawal of the U.S. (principally the Central Intelligence Agency or from its global commitments. CIA), and the Pentagon. This anxiety has been most evident in Europe More specifically, the article examines the where Trump’s opposition to both the North apparent divide between Trump and the U.S. Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European establishment on the dispute between KSA Union has raised fears of both greater and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the vulnerability to external aggression one hand and Qatar on the other. This article (originating from Russia) and potential argues that Trump is unique amongst modern disintegration from within. U.S. presidents in so far as some of his attitude and positions are opposed by the With respect to the Middle East, Trump was critical of previous U.S. administrations on entire U.S. policy-making establishment. account of their instigation and perpetuation of Furthermore, this article argues that if left intractable and unwinnable wars, in particular unchecked this gap can undermine regional security and by extension inflict substantial the war in Iraq. In keeping with his nationalist damage on U.S. positions and interests in the ethos, and as part of his campaigning strategy, Trump promised a withdrawal from the U.S.’ Gulf. commitments in the Middle East. Campaign rhetoric notwithstanding – and in a The Trump effect conflicting and confusing turn of events - hitherto Trump has not initiated a major U.S. Barely a year into his administration, Donald withdrawal from the region. In fact, he has Trump’s presidency is already proving to be escalated U.S. involvement in the proxy war in one of the most controversial in living memory. Syria ostensibly as part of a broader strategy On foreign policy, a striking feature of the to defeat the Islamic State (IS) group. Trump presidency has been a significant ratcheting up of tensions with two key U.S. However, Trump has produced an apparent adversaries, namely North Korea and Iran. shift in U.S. policy by aligning American positions in the Middle East closer to that of In regard to the latest Gulf crisis which erupted the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). For in early June, Trump was quick to take sides, example, Trump shares the Saudi hostility by praising Saudi-led efforts to isolate Qatar. towards Iran; in addition, he has sided with Trump’s position came on the heels of a Saudi Arabia over the latter’s political and speech he made in Riyadh barely two weeks economic blockade of Qatar. In addition, before the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, in which Trump is fully aligned with Saudi Arabia’s he not only praised Saudi counter-terror position on Egypt, specifically Saudi’s support efforts, but went further in validating broader for the Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al- Saudi regional policy, notably in respect to the Sisi. conflict in Yemen. 11 Global Policy, January 2018 By appearing to take credit for the diplomatic, Before addressing these central questions in political and economic blockade of Qatar, depth, it is important to set out the foundational Trump dissented from a long-established U.S. facts. Indeed, a comprehensive understanding tradition of neutrality and mediation in the of the pertinent issues require scrutiny of the event of disputes and conflict between U.S. deep background, notably the nature of the allies. Trump’s position was all the more American relationships with both Saudi Arabia striking in view of Qatar’s centrality to U.S. and Qatar. military and counter-terror posture in the region. In the early days of the crisis there were fears The US-Saudi alliance that Trump’s personal diplomacy ran the risk What is the nature of the U.S. alliance with of seriously complicating the Gulf crisis on the Saudi Arabia? Exploring the nuances of this one hand and potentially rupturing alliance helps to shed some light on the longstanding U.S. ties to Qatar on the other. In complexity of the U.S. position on the Qatar- regard to the latter, the worst fears have not GCC crisis. This is all the more important in so yet been realised inasmuch as the crisis – and far as U.S.-Saudi relations have been Trump’s incendiary role in it – has not described by some analysts as showing adversely affected Qatar-U.S. defence ties. “strains” of late, largely owing to policy But the core of the crisis remains unresolved differences with the previous U.S. as the GCC core continues to embargo Qatar administration led by Barack Obama. with a view to fundamentally altering the From an American perspective, the U.S.- latter’s foreign policy. This effort is led by Saudi alliance has been framed as the Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which lynchpin of the U.S. position in the Gulf arena appear to be determined to keep up the and more broadly as an important pillar of U.S. pressure on Qatar, even at the risk of policy in the Middle East. From this vantage undermining KSA’s internal security. point, only the iron-clad alliance with Israel is In recent months Trump has moderated his more important to American strategic posture stance on the standoff, by default as opposed in the Middle East than the alliance with KSA. to by design, in so far as he is no longer talking The origin of the U.S.-Saudi alliance is infused or tweeting about it. Moderation by default with a heavy dose of mystique, as notwithstanding, in view of the unresolved demonstrated by historical accounts of an nature of the dispute, and taking into account alliance forged on the decks of USS Quincy the U.S. president’s volatility and cruising on Egypt’s Great Bitter Lake. From a unpredictability, the risk of future aggravation strategic point of view, the onset of the U.S.- cannot be ruled out. Saudi alliance was principally an expression of What is also unclear is to what extent the U.S. the decline of the United Kingdom as the great foreign policy establishment (i.e. State power in the Middle East, and conversely it Department, CIA and the Pentagon) can symbolised the rise of the United States as the continue to contain – indeed to correct – region’s pre-eminent power. Trump’s penchant for parallel diplomacy. As This alliance became all the more important the U.S commander in chief, in theory Trump following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which has the power to overrule the “expert” advice removed another U.S. ally (the Shah) from the of the diplomatic, intelligence and defence scene, only to see him replaced by an communities. ideological regime deeply opposed to U.S. 12 Global Policy, January 2018 interests in the region. It became stronger still Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) necessarily during the Afghan “Jihad” of the 1980s, when constitute a radical departure from the norm.
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