Al Jarman Is a Qatari Graduate of Effusive in Reinforcing Its Commitment to MS in Global Affairs at New York University

Global Policy, January 2018

American policy dissonance on the 2017 Gulf Crisis

Mohammed al-Jarman

Abstract

Since the Suez crisis of 1956, the United States of America has been widely recognised as the dominant power in the Middle East. For sixty years, this domination has not only defined the regional balance of power, but it has also in some cases decisively shaped the internal politics of key regional states. Whilst contemporary U.S. influence (and interest) in the region appears to be in decline, no serious analyst can argue that the U.S. has lost the ability to shape key regional developments. In keeping with diplomatic norms, traditionally the U.S. has relied on its foreign policy establishment to formulate and implement its strategic policies in the region. The advent of Donald Trump and his peculiar brand of “arson” diplomacy threatens to undercut longstanding U.S. policy positions, notably the unwavering American commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the smaller Gulf States. Whilst the U.S. establishment appears to be sufficiently resilient to major policy disruptions, the danger is that even minimal disruption resulting from unofficial presidential diplomacy can potentially produce regional instability.

Policy recommendations • Small states such as Qatar should be prepared for a degree of U.S. policy upheaval in relation to the Gulf region during the Trump presidency. • Recognise that U.S. influence (and interest) in the Middle East is on the decline. In this context, Trump’s declared desire to disengage from burdensome U.S. commitments in the region is not necessarily an aberration, but merely a blunt and acerbic expression of deep-seated American desires. • The Gulf Cooperation Council states should act more independently of one another and diversify their arms supplies and alliances with a view to decreasing dependence on the U.S. in the long term. • Encourage greater international involvement in regional security. This involvement can encompass both large international bodies (such as the European Union) and individual powerful states with an actual or potential global reach, such as Russia and China. • Greater international involvement in regional security – in tandem with deeper indigenous security arrangements – can blunt the impact of future U.S. policy shifts or even a sudden loss of commitment.

Global Policy, January 2018

Background This article examines the prospect of U.S. policy dissonance in the Middle East in the The rise to power of Donald Trump has caused context of divergent attitudes and approaches surprise, anxiety and in some cases fear in between the president and the American geopolitical circles around the world. Trump’s foreign policy community. The foreign policy nationalist ideology has raised the prospect of community is understood to comprise the U.S. the re-emergence of US “isolationism”, state department, U.S. intelligence agencies marked by a gradual withdrawal of the U.S. (principally the Central Intelligence Agency or from its global commitments. CIA), and the Pentagon.

This anxiety has been most evident in Europe More specifically, the article examines the where Trump’s opposition to both the North apparent divide between Trump and the U.S. Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European establishment on the dispute between KSA Union has raised fears of both greater and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the vulnerability to external aggression one hand and Qatar on the other. This article (originating from Russia) and potential argues that Trump is unique amongst modern disintegration from within. U.S. presidents in so far as some of his attitude and positions are opposed by the With respect to the Middle East, Trump was critical of previous U.S. administrations on entire U.S. policy-making establishment. account of their instigation and perpetuation of Furthermore, this article argues that if left intractable and unwinnable wars, in particular unchecked this gap can undermine regional security and by extension inflict substantial the war in Iraq. In keeping with his nationalist damage on U.S. positions and interests in the ethos, and as part of his campaigning strategy, Trump promised a withdrawal from the U.S.’ Gulf. commitments in the Middle East.

Campaign rhetoric notwithstanding – and in a The Trump effect conflicting and confusing turn of events - hitherto Trump has not initiated a major U.S. Barely a year into his administration, Donald withdrawal from the region. In fact, he has Trump’s presidency is already proving to be escalated U.S. involvement in the proxy war in one of the most controversial in living memory. Syria ostensibly as part of a broader strategy On foreign policy, a striking feature of the to defeat the Islamic State (IS) group. Trump presidency has been a significant ratcheting up of tensions with two key U.S. However, Trump has produced an apparent adversaries, namely North Korea and Iran. shift in U.S. policy by aligning American positions in the Middle East closer to that of In regard to the latest Gulf crisis which erupted the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). For in early June, Trump was quick to take sides, example, Trump shares the Saudi hostility by praising Saudi-led efforts to isolate Qatar. towards Iran; in addition, he has sided with Trump’s position came on the heels of a Saudi Arabia over the latter’s political and speech he made in Riyadh barely two weeks economic blockade of Qatar. In addition, before the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, in which Trump is fully aligned with Saudi Arabia’s he not only praised Saudi counter-terror position on Egypt, specifically Saudi’s support efforts, but went further in validating broader for the Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al- Saudi regional policy, notably in respect to the Sisi. conflict in Yemen.

Global Policy, January 2018

By appearing to take credit for the diplomatic, Before addressing these central questions in political and economic blockade of Qatar, depth, it is important to set out the foundational Trump dissented from a long-established U.S. facts. Indeed, a comprehensive understanding tradition of neutrality and mediation in the of the pertinent issues require scrutiny of the event of disputes and conflict between U.S. deep background, notably the nature of the allies. Trump’s position was all the more American relationships with both Saudi Arabia striking in view of Qatar’s centrality to U.S. and Qatar. military and counter-terror posture in the region.

In the early days of the crisis there were fears The US-Saudi alliance that Trump’s personal diplomacy ran the risk What is the nature of the U.S. alliance with of seriously complicating the Gulf crisis on the Saudi Arabia? Exploring the nuances of this one hand and potentially rupturing alliance helps to shed some light on the longstanding U.S. ties to Qatar on the other. In complexity of the U.S. position on the Qatar- regard to the latter, the worst fears have not GCC crisis. This is all the more important in so yet been realised inasmuch as the crisis – and far as U.S.-Saudi relations have been Trump’s incendiary role in it – has not described by some analysts as showing adversely affected Qatar-U.S. defence ties. “strains” of late, largely owing to policy But the core of the crisis remains unresolved differences with the previous U.S. as the GCC core continues to embargo Qatar administration led by Barack Obama. with a view to fundamentally altering the From an American perspective, the U.S.- latter’s foreign policy. This effort is led by Saudi alliance has been framed as the Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which lynchpin of the U.S. position in the Gulf arena appear to be determined to keep up the and more broadly as an important pillar of U.S. pressure on Qatar, even at the risk of policy in the Middle East. From this vantage undermining KSA’s internal security. point, only the iron-clad alliance with Israel is In recent months Trump has moderated his more important to American strategic posture stance on the standoff, by default as opposed in the Middle East than the alliance with KSA. to by design, in so far as he is no longer talking The origin of the U.S.-Saudi alliance is infused or tweeting about it. Moderation by default with a heavy dose of mystique, as notwithstanding, in view of the unresolved demonstrated by historical accounts of an nature of the dispute, and taking into account alliance forged on the decks of USS Quincy the U.S. president’s volatility and cruising on Egypt’s Great Bitter Lake. From a unpredictability, the risk of future aggravation strategic point of view, the onset of the U.S.- cannot be ruled out. Saudi alliance was principally an expression of What is also unclear is to what extent the U.S. the decline of the United Kingdom as the great foreign policy establishment (i.e. State power in the Middle East, and conversely it Department, CIA and the Pentagon) can symbolised the rise of the United States as the continue to contain – indeed to correct – region’s pre-eminent power. Trump’s penchant for parallel diplomacy. As This alliance became all the more important the U.S commander in chief, in theory Trump following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which has the power to overrule the “expert” advice removed another U.S. ally (the Shah) from the of the diplomatic, intelligence and defence scene, only to see him replaced by an communities. ideological regime deeply opposed to U.S.

Global Policy, January 2018

interests in the region. It became stronger still Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) necessarily during the Afghan “Jihad” of the 1980s, when constitute a radical departure from the norm. the U.S. and Saudi Arabia (in addition to Starting with Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Pakistan) worked closely together to continuing with Ronald Reagan, George W. undermine the Soviet intervention in Bush and now Donald Trump, U.S. presidents Afghanistan. A major unintended have gone out of their way to lavish praise on consequence of this cooperation was the Saudi leaders with a view to forging that all- formation of the Al-Qaeda network which has important personal bond with Saudi Kings and been at the forefront of attacking both U.S. and Crown Princes. Saudi interests for close to two decades. What makes Trump different to his Furthermore, the close bond between the two predecessors is his willingness to override the states has periodically proved inimical to U.S. establishment in order to promote a KSA’s internal unity, if not national security. specific policy or viewpoint. This is clear both This came into sharp relief during the Kuwait in his immediate knee-jerk reaction to the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 when KSA hosted large crisis, in addition to his deployment of his son- numbers of American (and British) troops as in-law Jared Kushner as a personal envoy to part of a military plan to oust occupying Iraqi Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, there are forces from Kuwait. The presence of American unconfirmed reports that Trump stands to troops on Saudi soil was sufficiently benefit personally from his close bond with controversial in conservative Islamic circles as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. to touch off the first wave of dissent in the Kingdom. Trump’s close bond with MBS notwithstanding, the key question at this The U.S.-Saudi alliance was strong enough to juncture is whether this unconventional U.S. survive the cataclysm of the September 11, administration can reverse the long-term trend 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, of deterioration in U.S.-Saudi ties. Some relatively unscathed. Whilst the passage of the analysts – particularly those biased toward the “Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act” supposedly superior judgement of the (JASTA) in September 2016 under the Obama “institutions” as opposed to the presidency – Administration, appeared to have the potential paint a picture of continual decline, even with to undermine U.S.-Saudi relations, hitherto the advent of the Trump presidency. this has not come to pass, not least because the White House can use its veto to blunt the Implicit in this argument is the belief that big legislation. geopolitical trends, and specific policy differences, continue to pull the U.S. and KSA However, it has come under greater pressure apart. Another key inference is that the U.S. in recent years, due to a number of geopolitical policy-making institutions – where real events, including the Anglo-American invasion “expertise” on the KSA and the region of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. reluctance to supposedly resides – no longer have a high decisively intervene in the Syrian conflict, and level of confidence as to the long-term last but not least the landmark nuclear accord durability of the Saudi regime. with Iran in July 2015.

The Trump Administration’s pivot toward Saudi Arabia is not so striking in view of the U.S. attitude towards Qatar decades-long U.S.-Saudi alliance. Nor does Qatar’s emergence in the 1990s as an Trump’s close bond with Saudi Crown Prince independent player in the Gulf arena has

Global Policy, January 2018

posed a number of challenges to U.S. or non-jihadist Islamists, even though in positions and policies in the area. Central to principle the CIA is opposed to conflating these challenges is Qatar’s geopolitical profile political Islamists with jihadists. as a “soft” power. Indeed, since the mid-1990s Qatar has built the foundations of its strategic There have been reports that a significant profile and geopolitical reach on a range of faction in the Trump Administration wants to cultural, educational and media enterprises. designate the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) a terrorist organisation and subject it to a raft of In the cultural and educational field, the “Qatar sanctions. This is yet another indication that Foundation”, which was founded in 1995, the Trump Administration is at odds with the symbolises Qatar’s commitment to U.S. intelligence community. If the MB is transforming into a regional, and in some declared a terrorist organisation, such cases global, pioneer in the fields of science, designation will bear negatively on U.S.-Qatar research and development, across multiple relations in so far as the latter hosts MB sectors. leaders.

In the media sector, the emergence of the These challenges notwithstanding, the state-funded Al-Jazeera broadcaster in late pertinent fact remains that the United States 1996, constituted a breakthrough moment in continues to maintain strong bonds with Qatar. the region’s bland and highly controlled news Since establishing formal high-level diplomatic and analysis landscape. Through relatively relations with Qatar in 1974 (marked by the independent reporting, and by presenting a arrival of the first U.S. ambassador), the U.S. broad range of views and analysis, Al-Jazeera has continually upgraded relations with the created a regional, and indeed in some cases Emirate. Formal defence ties commenced in (as for instance on its coverage of terrorism) a June 1992, as symbolised by the signing of a global, media revolution whose repercussions Defence Cooperation Agreement. This are still unfolding. agreement has allowed the U.S. to build its largest regional air force base on Qatari soil. Qatar’s pioneering of high quality and relatively independent journalism would Furthermore, Qatar is host to the forward inevitably produce political consequences, headquarters of the U.S. Central Command, one of which has been the apparent inability of with U.S. troops stationed at the Al Udeid the United States to fully come to terms with it. military base, located just outside Doha. The Indeed, the U.S. government found Al- centrality of this base – and the wider Jazeera’s coverage of the “War on Terror” American military presence in Qatar – to U.S. objectionable ostensibly on the grounds that military operations across the region was the Qatari broadcaster – or at least sections of underscored by the Pentagon’s immediate it - was too close to the al-Qaeda network. reaction to Trump’s anti-Qatar position. The Critics quipped that the real reason was U.S. Defence Secretary James Mattis met his because the U.S. government was less than Qatari counterpart in Washington D.C. only pleased with Al-Jazeera’s objective coverage days after Trump’s description of Qatar as of the issue. “funder of terrorism”, to finalise an arms deal to the tune of $12 billion centred on the Another bone of contention has centred on purchase of F-15 fighter jets. Qatar’s sponsorship of political Islam as embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and its Although this deal was part of a broader arms myriad offshoots. The U.S. intelligence purchase (reportedly worth $21 billion) initially community is instinctively wary of democratic agreed at the end of Barack Obama’s term in

Global Policy, January 2018

November 2016, nevertheless it can be “interfered” with the elections, by contrast argued that by highlighting a key component Trump and his team attribute this intelligence of it immediately on the heels of Trump’s anti- assessment to “fake” news. Qatar remarks, the Pentagon leadership was attempting to assert the true U.S. policy on This has created an unprecedented situation Qatar. where a serving administration has openly identified the intelligence “bureaucracy” as an The Pentagon’s immediate corrective reaction adversary. Needless to say, the intelligence to Trump’ ill-considered attack on Qatar bureaucracy is central to American foreign coincided with apparent disquiet inside the policy formulation and implementation. It is the State Department over Trump’s dissension intelligence community which supplies the raw from established U.S. positions. This was data, trenchant assessment and expert dramatically underscored by the decision of analysis which inform policy-making. the U.S. ambassador to Qatar, veteran diplomat Dana Shell Smith, to step down in the On the Gulf crisis, the key question is to what midst of the regional crisis. Although the State extent (if any) is the Trump Administration at Department maintained that her departure odds with the intelligence community? was part of a “normal rotation” for career Needless to say, on account of the nature of diplomats, Smith had tweeted critical their work, intelligence services do not commentary on the Trump administration habitually state their position on key policy before stepping down. issues. Absence of unequivocal statements notwithstanding, it is clear that tacit support The confusion sparked by contradictory from the intelligence community in part statements and positions on Qatar – which explains the Pentagon’s forthright praise of clearly set Trump apart from the establishment Qatar’s “enduring commitment to regional – led to growing calls in the American think security” in the wake of Trump’s anti-Qatari tank community for the U.S. government to tweets. Put simply, we can make a strong clarify its policy on Qatar. This confusion – and conjectural case that absent backing from the the resulting clamour for clarity – can be intelligence community the Pentagon would be considered as the immediate or short-term more circumspect in adopting an oppositional consequence of Trump’s dissension from stance vis-à-vis a serving president. established positions. That is not to say the U.S. intelligence community does not harbour any concerns in relation to Qatar. As stated earlier, the U.S. Trump Vs. U.S. Intelligence intelligence community, and specifically the Beyond the Pentagon and the State CIA, is opposed to the Trump Administration’s Department, there are strong indications that plans to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation. However, there are the U.S. intelligence community is opposed to indications that U.S. intelligence is concerned some of Trump’s basic foreign policy instincts. about Qatari attitudes to extremist groups in The strongest indication to date that the Trump the region, and specifically to the al-Qaeda Administration is at odds with the U.S. affiliate in Syria. intelligence community revolves around the unfolding drama on alleged Russian However, these concerns do not appear to be interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential serious enough to force the U.S. intelligence community to dissent from the military elections. Whilst the U.S. intelligence establishment’s clear-cut and supportive community has determined that the Russians

Global Policy, January 2018

position on Qatar. Another way of framing the Implications of policy dissonance argument is that continuity of defence ties (and the strategic and security benefits which The U.S. presidential system allows for an accrue from these ties) supersede ideological foreign policy, and one that intelligence-related concerns and political partially dissents from the consensus and disagreements. advice of the American policy-making community. The best recent example is the Furthermore, the Trump Administration U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March-April 2003, appears to be at logger heads with the broader which was essentially driven by an ideological American policy establishment with respect to quest to remove Saddam Hussein with a view Saudi Arabia. There are growing reports of to “democratising” the region. Trump’s inner circle, led by his son-in-law Jared Kushner, effectively circumventing U.S. Moreover, the then U.S. administration of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson by talking George W. Bush ignored the assessment of directly to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin the U.S. intelligence community, which Salman. pointed to a lack of a credible Iraqi nuclear weapons programme. In fact, the Bush This unofficial diplomacy has centred on the administration applied pressure on the most sensitive regional topics and has been intelligence community to produce “evidence” reportedly successful to the point of creating supportive of the administration’s policy. the necessary conditions for America’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. An important balancing point to consider is Kushner made an unannounced trip to Riyadh that the U.S. institutions – and the intelligence in October 2017 – his third within a year – just community in particular – often commit before the declaration of intention to move the mistakes of commission and omission. U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, as well as before Indeed, American intelligence has consistently MBS’s crackdown on “corruption”. Therefore, failed to predict the biggest geopolitical by directly influencing the new Saudi events, including the Iranian revolution, the strongman, Mohammad bin Salman, via Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Kushner, Trump has effectively bypassed collapse of the Soviet Union. official U.S. diplomacy. The fallibility of the intelligence community Trump’s personalised contacts with the new notwithstanding, it is clear that in the absence Saudi leadership has led him to praise their of viable alternatives, the centrality of effort at ostensibly “combatting” corruption, intelligence-led assessment to foreign policy which has taken the form of unofficially cannot be eroded without incurring significant detaining senior members of the Saudi royal costs. Herein lies the danger of Trump’s family and leading businessmen at the Ritz- personalised approach to diplomacy. Carlton Hotel in Riyadh. More broadly, the nuances of the American By contrast, the U.S. State Department has presidential system notwithstanding, it is a urged Saudi authorities to stick to the rule of mistake to compare Trump to Bush junior, or law and to prosecute alleged corrupt officials indeed to any modern American president. and businessmen in a “fair and transparent” George W. Bush was not at odds with the manner. In this instance, the tone and entire U.S. establishment to the extent that approach of the State Department could not Trump appears to be. In fact, Bush enjoyed the be more different from that of the U.S. support of both the Pentagon and the State president. Department in his quest to topple Saddam

Global Policy, January 2018

Hussein. It was only the U.S. intelligence secures a second term in office and continues community which was not entirely convinced to pursue parallel diplomacy. of the case for invasion. In the final analysis, it is important to consider the U.S. election cycle and the fact that the ideological and policy excesses of one Conclusion president are usually corrected by his successor. This cycle was evident in the In view of Trump’s estrangement from the transition from Bush Junior to Obama, and in establishment, the key question revolves around the potential impact of this rift on U.S. turn from Obama to Trump. Through the policy towards the Gulf crisis and wider electoral cycle – and the attendant rotation of elites – the U.S. system guarantees a degree regional issues. The answer lies in part on the of policy moderation consistent with the extent of the push-back by the policy-making establishment, especially if key institutions institutional interests of the American (notably the Pentagon) feel that excessive establishment. U.S. alignment with Saudi Arabia threatens Qatar’s national security.

There is already evidence of push-back as the U.S. establishment has been unusually Mohammed Al Jarman is a Qatari graduate of effusive in reinforcing its commitment to MS in Global Affairs at New York University. Qatar’s defence and security. Institutional He is a specialist in political and economic resistance is likely to escalate if Donald Trump affairs of the Arabian Gulf. Email [email protected]